Foreign Minister Stubb outlined challenges of a turning point in world politics
Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Stubb
Annual Meeting of Heads of Missions, Helsinki
25 August 2008
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The first post-080808 diagnose
Dear Colleagues and Friends,
The weeks after 8 August have passed in trying to find a solution to the crisis in Georgia. As the holder of the OSCE Chairmanship, Finland has tried to do its best; first to bring about a ceasefire in cooperation with the EU Presidency France, then to launch an OSCE military monitoring mission to support the ceasefire. The third phase - the establishment of a wider international presence and efforts to reach a solution - is now ahead. I want to underline that the crisis is not over. Its outcome and political aftershocks will be seen later.
What is certain is that, in its harsh language, the crisis in Georgia gives us three lessons with far-reaching repercussions, which will be my three theses today: 1) 080808 is a turning point in international politics; 2) 080808 poses a new challenge to the international system; 3) 080808 impacts Finland's foreign policy agenda.
Firstly, I will discuss the turning point in international relations. When the Cold War ended, people thought that history was over. The decades of confrontation was expected to be followed by a period of serenity, supported by the nearly omni-present Western democracy and market economy. The crises and civil wars of the 1990s appeared nothing else but the death throes of the old system, which in time would be over. However, the tectonic plates of international politics have moved again - but to a different direction. 080808 will be the bleak anniversary of new world politics.
To date, no one has managed to coin a name for the new era. Anyway, it is characterised by changes in both the structure and principles of action of the international system.
In this period of zeros-and-eights, the only superpower of the world, the United States of America, is getting a number of challengers on its coattails. China, Russia and also India are hungry for the post-American world, which involves several heavyweight fighters. The highly esteemed Editor of Newsweek International, Fareed Zakaria, calls this "the rise of the others". The US and Europe will have less weight. The way in which this happens will play a crucial role in determining the future of international politics. One of the divides on the horizon is the US presidential election. After the election, we shall see whether Washington's response is adjustment or resistance.
Our time is an era of overlapping systems, where the nation-state and power politics are about to make a comeback. They will take the place left vacant after the retreat of multilateral cooperation and international organisations. Realism will reach the same level with institutionalism. In negotiations, instead of pressing the button on the microphone, the trigger will be pulled. This is what took place in Georgia.
However, the logic of the economy is still going through the phase of globalisation and breaking of barriers. One of the big questions of our time is whether the policy which is heading back to nationalism and history will suck in also the economy. The first signs of this development are visible in such contexts as the WTO negotiations or, within the EU, in the increase of protectionism. The current reality of overlapping systems will not necessarily survive. This is the last moment that the distress rocket of liberalism should be fired. I believe that an open economy, liberalism, internationalism and strong international institutions will be the best guarantees of nations' success and peace.
The changes in structure and ways of action also show in the revival of the value struggle. If not by any other event before, the elections in Russia finally meant a splash of cold water on the face of Francis Fukuyama, who has predicted the universal hegemony of Western values. Neither the Western concept of human rights nor its model of democracy will be accepted without reservations by the new superpowers. On the contrary, they are about to raise authoritarianism by the side of democracy as a fully honourable "other road", which is also backed by economic credibility. The effects of oligarchy naturally span also international relations. For an autocrat, a nation-state and nationalistic armour are indispensable.
My second thesis is that the international governance system is challenged. It appears clear that the international community and international organisations have not managed to bring history to an end. There is rather a danger that they will be trampled by it.
The interim report of the crisis in Georgia is descriptive. The case of Georgia may become another example of how poorly the UN Security Council functions. The OSCE has been praised for rapid action and success in its actions has re-invigorated its relevance as a regional organisation. However, even the OSCE did not manage to prevent the war from erupting and, on the other hand, is incapable of building sustainable peace on its own. Both the UN and the OSCE are vulnerable; one member state can arrest their operation. At its worst, the confrontation between Russia and the West will exacerbate further, obstructing the operation of these organisations.
The war in Georgia can have only one positive impact. It should serve as a foreign political alarm clock, which awakens us to consider the future of the entire international system. This has to take place now, before power politics and protectionism manage to gain too much strength and to erode international structures of cooperation to nil.
The choice is depressingly clear: either we manage to revive the position of the international governance system or it collapses. In the early 20th century, when the system ran into crisis, major wars followed. If inward-looking political and economic procedures gain ground, dark clouds would soon start to build up over our safe heaven. It is easy to find cause for fight.
The layout of international institutions has to be spread out again on the designer's desk, if there is desire to revive the multilateral cooperation system and to commit the emerging actors in its service. We have to be able to make a direct question: Is the present UN relevant? How could its operational capability be raised to a credible standard? Is the norm base of the international community sustainable? And what would be the alternative - "democracies' concert" or something else? If we do not look for solutions and alternatives, we are doomed to head for the same route as Titanic.
Thirdly, I argue that our foreign and security policy agenda will be partly reorganised.
Discussion about the impacts of the war in Georgia has started to go strong also in Finland. We need open and realistic deliberation. We can no more tiptoe into silence or withdraw behind liturgy. Neither should be burrow deeper into the NATO trenches.
The issue of Georgia raises three critical questions. What is actually our national assessment of Russia? What should we expect from the EU? And finally - there is the question about our possible membership of NATO.
Victorious war strengthened Russia's position as a superpower. Nationalistic and protectionist superpower thinking has characterised its external relations even before this. But its superiority is not based on size and energy solely any more. Today, Russia has both the will and capacity to deploy its armed forces as a foreign policy instrument. Another significant change is the doctrine of protection of expatriate Russians, developed to justify the conduct of aggressive policy. It is impossible to think that these factors would not be taken fully into attention in Finland.
I do not consider that Russia would pose a military threat to Finland. Nevertheless, it is true that Russia has taken steps that are not favourable or acceptable from our point of view. If continued, the crisis in Georgia will deeply undermine the foundations of the cooperation between the EU and Russia.
Paradoxically, political alienation between Russia and the EU is coupled with strengthening economic integration. In the vanguard of the EU Member States, Finland is establishing economic links with Russia. Our investments in Russia have doubled during the first half of this year. And the big question in relation to Russia is whether political logic will rush into the economic playground more vigorously than earlier? Hopefully not, because the problems related to the wood tariffs would then turn out to have been only a soft prelude.
In the new situation, the European Union appears to be even more important to us than earlier. That is, a Union which is strong and capable of action. Finland can exert influence on the development of the international system and restrain the nationalist and nation-state -oriented trend only by being active in the EU. The EU either builds its global role or remains a regional actor.
The EU is - for a reason - gaining renewed security political clout. Even though the Union is not a military alliance like NATO is, Finland must not underestimate the added value that the EU brings to security. As a non-NATO country, Finland cannot afford doing that. Finland must actively promote the strengthening of the EU's security and defence policy. The Union does not compete with NATO neither does it weaken the Alliance; vice versa. The old chant can be forgotten.
The third question is the EU's enlargement. It proved to be the right policy even more clearly than earlier, and the same applies to NATO's enlargement. Where would we now be if, for example, the Baltic States had remained outside the integration process? The Union's next major challenge is to develop such a credible policy on the East that offers a solid compass point to the countries of Eastern Europe, without forgetting the option of enlargement. The crisis in Georgia painfully proves that the Union lacked a comprehensive hold of the situation in Southern Caucasus.
What about NATO membership? My own position is probably common knowledge. However, I am by no means proposing any move in a rush even though there are strong arguments in favour of considering our NATO membership.
The present policy line is valid for the present, as far as we remember to keep our eyes open and focused on the future. It is impossible to consider opening our eyes only once in four years' time. After 080808, producing a Government Report to Parliament on Finnish Security and Defence Policy every four years equals to blindness.
It is likely and understandable that NATO's collective defence and Article 5 will undergo some degree of renaissance. In any case, NATO knows its responsibility. The military alliance, which increasingly resembles a political organisation, has stabilised its members' position and security policy. This would have been the case also in Georgia. I got rid of my NATO phobia when I attended the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Foreign Ministers in Brussels last week. Compared with debate at the same level in the EU, the difference was minimal; and even the participants were nearly the same.
We have to bear in mind that in addition to the EU's defence dimension and discussion about NATO, the Nordic countries are also engaged in defence policy cooperation. Only a fraction of the security political potential is in use. Opportunities of widening and deepening the cooperation in the areas of regional and maritime surveillance, crisis management and defence acquisitions must be examined with an open mind. Even more far-reaching discussion must not be avoided.
Finally, I will conclude by outlining three foreign and security political considerations:
Firstly, we have to continue the pursuit of a foreign politically stronger EU despite all setbacks. The focus has to be placed on the EU's global role, the development of defence and a well-functioning policy to the East. The goal of the EU-Russia relations should be promotion of mutual integration. However, succeeding in this will essentially depend on Russia's action. Just now I assume that the relations are cooling down.
My second consideration is related to NATO. There is reason for closer cooperation with the alliance, for example, in the context of the NRF. Membership should be considered. However, the time is not ripe for making a decision. Assessment of security political issues should be more flexible and evaluations should be made at more frequent intervals. Such work cannot resemble slow-motion black-and-white films.
Thirdly, our foreign policy must be taken onto an entirely new level of intensified activity. We have to abandon such habits as withdrawing into a shell and delivery of automatic, empty statements. Instead of being an observer, we must take action. It is important to establish as close relations with all superpowers and international organisations as possible. Foreign policy is based on our values but its conduct is pragmatic.
Our foreign political thinking should finally be freed from phobias, handicapped attitudes and illusions. A fresh example of the last one is the notion of non-alignment. Finland's position outside the military alliances was not of any help in the mediation task in the crisis in Georgia. Our position was based on Finland's Chairmanship of the OSCE. In the work itself, strong batteries of the mobile were of the greatest assistance.
I have now presented my first post-080808 diagnose of the world today. And I will conclude by giving an assignment to all Heads of Finnish diplomatic missions abroad. I ask each of you to submit your own analysis of the current situation in international politics in a couple of weeks' time. The style if free, the length of the presentation may not exceed two pages. Enjoy your assignment!