Speech by Foreign Minister Tuomioja at the memorial ceremony for Minister Max Jakobson

Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Erkki Tuomioja at the memorial ceremony for Minister Max Jakobson
at the House of the Estates, Helsinki on 15 March 2013

Welcome to this memorial ceremony of Minister Max Jakobson. The influence of Max Jakobson’s life’s work is widespread not only in the Finnish society but also beyond its borders, and therefore this memorial ceremony could have been organised by many actors, for example by a society committed to the promotion of historical research and understanding of the past.

I want to mention this because my first personal contact with Max Jakobson dates back to 1955 and the publication of his Diplomaattien talvisota (The Diplomacy of the Winter War, Harvard University Press 1961). Much earlier than I chose historical research as my own field of interest, I had read the book and become enchanted by it in a way that served as an inspiration—and certainly has inspired many others—to explore history and acquire an analytical awareness and comprehension of past events.

Even though dozens of books based on an increasing amount of source material on the Winter War have been published after that, Max Jakobson’s book has in an amazing way maintained an unparalleled position as a portrayal of the diplomatic background of the Winter War and the course of events. Jakobson’s extensive later works have only strengthened his position as a top analyst of history and international politics.

Max Jakobson would have become Finland’s Walter Lippman, the journalist, who did not serve a day as a public official but whose texts and books played an immeasurable influence on the foreign policy of his country. However, Jakobson did not settle for that but also rose to Finland’s Henry Kissinger, contributing to the position where Finland now is in the world through a number of key positions in the Finnish diplomatic service.

It is most natural that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs hosts this ceremony, even though Jakobson’s career in the service of the Ministry was no longer than 21 years. His later influence in Finland’s foreign policy as productive writer has been as profound as while he served as a diplomat.

In the past few days, the media has covered Jakobson’s life’s work so thoroughly that there is no need to repeat the details. It is possible to approach its significance to Finland extensively from the perspective of the person and to speak highly of him, but we want to respect Max’s own wishes and will not concentrate too long on his person. Max wanted that we would speak about Finland, Finnish history, and its successes and future.

Max Jakobson’s life coincided with the most essential narrative of Finland’s recent past; Finland was a war-beaten nation which recovered from its many difficulties and, in fact, can be said to have been a winner.

Many of you are familiar with President Paasikivi’s famous words when he said that nations’ ways may go through the bottom of the valley, sometimes falling into canyons, but there is always a path upward. The way up is difficult, and demands a firm hold; each step takes nearer to the goal of freedom. We can trust that a new spring will dawn to our dear Finland after a foggy autumn.

President Kekkonen said on 6 December 1958, that we should bear in mind one of the guiding principles of E.G.Palmen, the historian, according to which a small nation cannot boast about a non possum opinion but in order to save its position, has to avert dangers before they grow too big by taking shrewd initiatives.

It is hard to find another person, whose role as a diplomat would resemble the above more than Max Jakobson’s life did. In Jakobson Kekkonen found his equal when it comes to intelligence. Their mutual friendship remained strong despite occasional open conflicts of opinion.

One of Jakobson’s biggest merits was his exceptional talent for understanding the larger historical picture and context of events, and his extraordinary ability to address the audiences from a historical perspective.

There are plenty of questions. What is the small Finland in the north? Why did it not face the same fate as so many other European countries did? How should its politics be assessed? Is Finland a part of the problem or a part of the solution? Is it a dangerous example or a genuine sui generis?

In the preface to the Diplomaattien talvisota Max referred to the Winter War as a part of the world history and described the bloody conflicts in the periphery of the imperium. The book covers several episodes from the big drama of the war and describes the extensive consequences of the Second World War to international politics, such as the expulsion of the Soviet Union from the League of Nations, which pulled itself together for a while before its demise; Sweden’s nearly unbearable test of its policy of neutrality; and a breach in the friendship between Hitler and Mussolini. The Winter War almost derailed the power blocs of the Second World War.

As we know, even Germany could misinterpret the situation having followed the Soviets’ poor success in Finland.

Finland may thus have played the role of a minor vignette in the big drama—however not at all without significance.

In many occasions over the years, Jakobson had to clarify Finland’s success story, which appeared peculiar in the eyes of foreign observers, including President John F. Kennedy, who had wondered how a country as small as Finland could maintain its independence next to the totalitarian Soviet Union against all assumed conformity with the law.

Telling the truth was not always simple in Finland either. In a talk show on the Finnish television in 1979, Jakobson was asked if he could mention any persons who could have been said to have been guilty of the eruption of the war. He said: ’How about Stalin’? The interviewer immediately corrected: ’I meant on Finland’s side.’

A competent diplomat is capable of forming a clear picture of his country’s own interests and also able to assimilate the other party’s intentions and conception of the reality, even if he would not share the ideas. Zero-sum games are very rare in diplomacy. It is essential to find common ground even if it required painful compromises.

Compromises are necessary, but they require careful reasoning and judgment.

Jakobson’s writings reflect his concerns at times when the values that Finland and the Finns held were tested. They must not turn into a grey area of compromise. A nation must always maintain a high morale; it is essential to be able to carry even the heaviest burden or trial.

During Jakobson’s diplomatic career in the 1960s and 1970s, it was natural that his activities focused on the navigation of Finland through the stormy weather of the Cold War, gradually building up Finland’s credibility and earning different parties’ confidence. Credibility had to be strengthened every day.

It was necessary for Finland to develop amicable relations with the Soviet Union in order to be able to integrate into the commercial and economic cooperation structures with the West that were natural for us. The goal was – in the metaphors of the time – to make Finland’s policy of neutrality a positive and permanent element of European security.

In fact, Finland can be said to have succeeded well in this. Finnish policy did not rate high in beauty contests nor did it suit to serve as a textbook example. The same had been expressed by Paasikivi, who had said that Finland’s neutrality did not fit well in the established framework.

But Jakobson like many of his contemporaries understood that the model was the best possible for Finland in the circumstances. It is difficult to believe that for example the USA would without question have been ready to invest more and more in northern Europe, where tensions were growing: had Finland chosen a different course of action, problems might undoubtedly have emerged in the neighbourhood.

This did not always feel pleasant but it was the reality that the Finns could cope with. Many Finns have heard American politicians or high officials, well versed in European history, say that during the Cold War period “you got it perfect”.

Finland managed its difficult situation admirably, without causing problems but holding on to its independence, national interests and Western value base.

The Finns also certainly remember the words of the first President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, when he said that in the relations between Finland and the Soviet Union, there is much pretence and outright hypocrisy.

One of the lessons that Max Jakobson has taught us concerns a healthy self-esteem which also requires humility and a sense of proportion. From a historical perspective, Finland has experienced a very rapid transfer from an agrarian society to an industrial society and further to a service society and finally an information society.

We can naturally be duly proud of this development, but there is a risk of speed blindness. A healthy self-esteem is important, but it is worth bearing in mind the centuries of European history and the richness of different nations’ contacts with each other, from which also Finland’s existence derives its building blocks—we are a part of a greater European entity.

After his diplomatic career, Max Jakobson continued in important positions in the business life. The word “consensus” is inextricably linked with him. As a person in positions of responsibility in society he also became a target of criticism, but he was not afraid of it. Jakobson was always willing to engage in a friendly exchange of opinion, relying on the power of arguments and facts, but also leaving room for different views.

Max Jakobson’s legacy will continue to live in the form of his abundant and unparalleled literary works. Its span that describes the change and development of Finland’s position ends with Kohtalonvuodet, a book published in 2008, subtitled ”Finland rose, yielded and survived”.

We want to express our heartfelt gratitude for the unique life’s work that Max Jakobson, as a diplomat, an important person in society and an author, has given to Finland.

  • The Diplomacy of the Winter War, Harvard University Press 1961
     


 

Speeches held by Ministers and the top leadership of the Ministry.