Speech by Mr. Erkki Tuomioja, Foreign Minister of Finland: "The Baltic Sea - a region of prosperity and stability", 121st Bergedorf Round Table in Helsinki, 9th June 2001

Venue: 121st Bergedorf Round Table, Helsinki 9.6.2001

Mr. Erkki Tuomioja,
Foreign Minister,
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
of Finland


Ladies and Gentlemen,

What potential does the Baltic region have to offer? I will try to answer this question from the point of view of political rather than economic affairs, concentrating on three closely interconnected aspects of the ongoing deep transformation process in the region; namely the Northern Dimension of the EU, the enlargement of the EU and the integration of Russia into pan-European co-operation.

The Northern Dimension has become an established concept in the Union and among its partner countries. It has also become an integral part of the external policies of the Union. This originally Finnish initiative from 1997 has focused the minds of numerous Northern players. It has given an impetus to new strategic thinking not only among governments but also at regional and sub-national level, within non-governmental organisations, private business and last but not least, networks like this, here, today.

The Northern Dimension is a partner-oriented EU policy. The key political objective is to engage Russia in European integration through closer cooperation with the European Union. The only way of doing this is to counteract tendencies towards any new dividing lines along the border between the expanding European Union and the Russian Federation. Russia has to be convinced that the Union will remain its main partner in the future. The acceding countries in the region, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, and the EEA countries Iceland and Norway, as well as Russia, can, in the ND context, make their voices heard and through dialogue influence the Northern Dimension agenda in close cooperation with the Commission.

Possibly some of you are not entirely familiar with the ND concept, so I would like to mention the key sectors in the Action Plan for 2000-2003. They are: energy, transport, the information society, the environment and natural resources, nuclear safety, public health, trade and business cooperation as well as investment promotion, human resources development and research, justice and home affairs, regional and cross-border cooperation and Kaliningrad.

The Action Plan is not a list of priority projects but a the basis for the implementation of the Northern Dimension. It is a political recommendation and a reference document to be taken into account in preparing projects and activities funded by the EU, the member states and other players. Joint financing by Community programmes, international financing institutions, national programmes and the private sector is essential.

Without considerable funding from national resources and from the IFIs, implementation of the Action Plan will be very difficult. National resources here means also the partner countries and funding from the private sector. Those partners who contribute most to projects will also gain the most.

The need for joint action between such programmes as Tacis, Phare and Interreg is widely recognized. Now, we expect the interface between Phare and Tacis to be examined with a view to enhancing cross-border cooperation between the future EU and Russia.

In the case of the International Financing Institutions, it goes without saying that they follow their own rules and policies when making decisions. Political recommendations, like the Northern Dimension Action Plan, cannot play a decisive role in their actions. The EBRD recently presented an initiative on a “Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership”. Moreover, the new possibilities for the EIB to take part in some environmental projects in Russia must be seen as a promising opening for its future involvement in the ND region.

As for Northern Dimension financing, one could in fact say that there is no lack of resources as such. But there is a lack of bankable projects and a lack of commitment from the recipients, including Russia. Improvement of the investment climate, including real action against corruption, is indispensable in paving the way for implementation of Northern Dimension policies.

The Swedish EU presidency has adopted an active role in developing the Northern Dimension and has concentrated especially on four priority areas: the environment, nuclear safety, the fight against organized crime as well as Kaliningrad. For the Göteborg (Gothenburg) European Council on 15-16 June, Sweden will prepare, together with the Commission, a full report on implementation.

In January this year, the Commission presented its Communication on the Kaliningrad region. This is the basis for discussion of possible steps to further promote cooperation between Russia and the enlarging EU. Kaliningrad as a "pilot region" in relations between the EU and Russia has created great interest among several players.

Discussions continue in the PCA working groups. Practical solutions must be found on how to deal with the "enclave Kaliningrad" after the next enlargement. The future EU member states should have an oppportunity to give their views in the process of finding workable solutions to sometimes difficult questions, for example, those concerning visas and transit traffic.


Ladies and Gentlemen,

During the past decade the Baltic Region showed an enormous potential for co-operation and also an amazing ability to actualise this potential into well functioning structures, such as the Helsinki Commission, the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the Baltic Sea Sub-regional Co-operation and the Baltic 21 Programme.

All of the foregoing, and a large number of other regional organizations, have expressed their interest in contributing to the Northern Dimension and thus enhance coordination and synergy of co-operation in the region.

The ND, with its partner-oriented 15+7 format, supports the candidate countries in the accession process and gives Russia a fair opportunity for mutually profitable co-operation with the enlarging EU.

The EU enlargement process launched in Luxembourg in December 1997 is proceeding at a steady pace towards the accession of new members. We have a good chance to keep to the objectives and timetables agreed in the Helsinki and Nice Summits. The European Council's decisions in December 2000 in Nice gave a strong impetus to the enlargement process. We now have a clear direction to follow. There is a clear strategy, a road map and an indicative timetable for the negotiations. Hence, the EU will be ready to accept new members as early as 2003, depending on the preparedness of the candidate countries. Finland fully supports the Swedish Presidency and the incoming Presidencies in their endeavours to promptly bring the negotiations to a successful end.

It is evident that enlargement will fundamentally change the Union as a whole, but it is not a simple task to give any exact estimate of what will be the consequences for existing EU policies in specific sectors such as the CAP, Schengen and the CFSP. The guiding principle from the union side is that the acquis should be fully implemented before accession and possible transitional periods should be limited in scope and length. At the same time, it is obvious that to some extent union policies will have to adapt to the new situation. The same applies to the EU budget. It goes without saying that the enlargement should be carried out in a politically and economically sustainable way. But both the present and new member states have a lot to gain. Therefore we should not only look at the budget figures.

The enlargement will add a new dimension also to the Common Foreign and Security policy. The CFSP was created to promote common European values and international peace and security through coordinated intergovernmental policy- and decision-making. Through enlargement, the geographical area of the shared values, plus peace and stability, will grow notably, and bring in new political and security aspects. This development will increase the global weight and visibility of the EU, but it will also make coordination and decision-making in this rather sensitive field more complicated than earlier. Therefore, as in many other policy areas, in the CFSP, too, institutional reforms will be necessary in order to keep it functional and effective.

The identifiable common European values (democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms) are widely shared by the applicant countries, and they have been eager to participate in those forms of CFSP cooperation that are already open to them. They have also showed considerable interest in the development of a common European security and defence policy.

All applicant countries of the Baltic Rim have progressed well in their negotiations with the EU. Estonia and Poland started the negotiations in March 1998 – Latvia and Lithuania in February 2000. The latter pair have managed to catch up with the countries that started talks before them. This really is an excellent achievement. It shows that the principle of proceeding on the basis of merit works in practice, followed by catch-up and differentiation. These principles will continue to apply in the further negotiations.

Using the so-called road map designed by the European Commission in autumn 2000, the accession talks have entered a new decisive phase; we are now dealing with difficult and complex issues in the talks, such as the environment and the free movement of persons. Finland is convinced that a flexible and fair solution can be found on the free movement of labour. Finland hopes that a European Union common position can be agreed during the Swedish Presidency.

Finally, I would like to emphasize the importance of support from public opinion, both within the present member states and in the applicant countries. Public awareness of the enlargement process needs to be heightened. This is vital if there is not to be a sudden backlash in public opinion in the final stages leading to enlargement.


Ladies and Gentlemen,

As a result of the forthcoming enlargement of the European Union the Baltic Sea will in practice become an inland sea of the Union, and Baltic Sea regional co-operation will be a natural part of union activities. From the point of view of external relations, this co-operation will essentially be co-operation between the EU and Russia on the basis of the PCA and Common Strategy, with the aim, as I have already emphasized, of involving Russia in all European co-operation.

Russia’s President summarizes his credo by saying: “Russia has to be a strong state or it will cease to exist.” As seen from the Kremlin, this means that the country is weak and disintegrating if it cannot be run the way Russia has always been run - on a short leash.

President Putin has created seven super regions headed by governors-general. They are directly subordinate to the president. There are also 89 subjects and their governors with certain rights and obligations as well as resources. It is not yet clear how these structures will coordinate their actions.

The reform agenda in Russia is broad. The juridical reform and the rule of law are of central importance. The Duma will receive the first draft laws before the summer. These changes, if passed, will imply that in the future it is the court, not the prosecutor, who decides about imprisonment. Juries will also be introduced to Russian courts of law.

President Putin has stated that the intention to integrate with Europe will be one of the main aims of Russia’s foreign policy. This is based on a realistic assessment as, at present, the EU accounts for some 35% of Russia’s foreign trade. After the enlargement, this figure will rise to 50%.

In the EU-Russia summit some weeks ago both sides reaffirmed their intention to strengthen long-term strategic partnership based on the principles of democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law and market economics. If we base our relations on common values we can best foster economic growth and prosperity, social development, a clean environment and strengthened security and stability in Europe.

Russia’s effort in the field of market reforms should open major new opportunities. Russia wants to integrate into the world economies and gain membership in the WTO. The application of international norms and disciplines, and full implementation of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement, are key elements in bringing the EU's and Russia’s economies closer together.

As I mentioned, the EU enlargement will lead to an increase in economic activity between the EU and Russia. Russia does not oppose the enlargement of the EU, but it is naturally concerned about what effects it will have on Russia as a whole. The EU will continue to inform Russia of the enlargement process. The Union is also willing to discuss the issues that the EU enlargement will raise.

The Kaliningrad region was already touched upon in the context of the ND. From the EU’s point of view Kaliningrad is a test case of Russia’s ability to find solutions to a wide range of practical problems.

For Russia, Kaliningrad is a case in point for federal reform, which has been one of President Putin's most important undertakings in asserting his power. Should a province or a region be allowed to enjoy preferential rights, for example in the form of a special economic zone, and thus perhaps develop faster and in a different way from the rest of the country? Or should the country be a single legal space in every respect? These are fundamental questions put to the test in Kaliningrad – with wide implications for the whole of Russia.

The Baltic States - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - want to integrate with Europe by joining the EU and NATO as soon as possible. Russia concedes that it is within the sovereignty of the Baltic States to decide upon their own security arrangements but at the same time indicates that if the Baltic States join NATO that would have a negative impact on its relations with them.

Russia has just – on the 7th of June - taken over the chair of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) after the German Presidency. The economy, energy and information technology are the priority issues for the Russians. Russia would also like to confirm the formal status of the CBSS. Finland is concerned about this process which, it feels, might lead to a situation where the CBSS would take up matters which are meant to be taken up in a different forum.

The success of the Euro-Russian partnership – in and around the Baltic Sea region – directly increases stability in Europe. Therefore, Russia must be effectively engaged in the European processes, and we do our share in this co-operation.


Ladies and Gentlemen,

In conclusion, I would like to say that the potential that the Baltic Region offers is the real possibility to build, on a regional level, a network of co-operative interdependence and functioning collaborative structures through which Russia,, too, would be able to find its natural place in Europe.