Under-Secretary of State Laajava: Iraq, the European Union and transatlantic relations


Harvard Club
Budapest, Hungary
October 13, 2003



Thank you for inviting me to speak at the Harvard Club of Budapest. This is a very prestigious forum and I am delighted to have this opportunity to explain here some Finnish views on the important topic of transatlantic relations.

The legacy of the war in Iraq

I think it is not exaggerated to say that the disagreement between a number of European powers and the United States over the Iraq war has indeed been dramatic. First, it is evident that these differences continue. As we know from the past couple of weeks, it has been very difficult to agree on a new UN Security Council Resolution concerning Iraq despite the fact that all seem to agree on the need now to address the future of the Iraqi people, not to remain paralysed by our past disagreements.

But secondly, the differences regarding Iraq have also resulted in a widespread belief that there is a fundamental rift in transatlantic relations. A rift that perhaps can not be repaired.

By way of an illustration, let me just quote from a column a few weeks ago by Thomas Friedman (NYT Sept. 18, 2003: "Our War With France"), one of the leading journalists of today, a very moderate and widely respected professional:

"It's time we Americans came to terms with something: France is not just our annoying ally. It is not just our jealous rival. France is becoming our enemy". Friedman cites as examples how France behaved - in his view - in the run-up to the war, during the war and especially after the war, and came to the conclusion that "France wants America to fail in Iraq, paving the way for France to assume its 'rightful' place as America's equal, if not superior, in shaping world affairs".

Very strong language indeed, and I could in fact just as well quote many similar statements on this side of the Atlantic, not only from France but from a variety of other places. There is certainly no lack of criticism on both sides.

A seasoned analyst of transatlantic relations would immediately point to the fact that there have been many such rifts before in these relations and that somehow, the two sides have always found their way back to normalcy.

But this time we live in a new reality, a post-Cold War reality where the nature of the Soviet threat no longer glues us together.

The rift must be taken seriously. Let us therefore look at it in a more analytical way. Is there something fundamentally wrong?

Public perceptions

The first thing is to try to understand where the general sentiment is going. Let's see how the public perceptions on both sides of the Atlantic have evolved.

A recent study conducted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia de San Paolo shows clearly that the split caused by Iraq in transatlantic relations has undermined America's standing with Europeans and increased American criticism with regard to policies of, in particular, France and Germany. Also other opinion polls tell about unfavourable public perceptions of America in Europe and of at least some European countries in the U.S.

The so-called Thermometer Readings used by pollsters – i.e. the warmth of various nations' feelings towards the United States and the European Union - show that of all Europeans, only Great Britain, Italy and Poland regard America as their close friend. On a scale of 0 to 100, with 100 meaning very warm, 50 neutral and 0 very cold, each of these three nations recorded 61 degrees while the largest drop in warmth was among French respondents, from 60 degrees in 2002 to 50 degrees one year later. The corresponding drop in American feelings toward France was from 55 degrees in 2002 to 45 degrees in 2003.

But these studies also tell about something else. In spite of the deep differences across the Atlantic over Iraq, Americans and Europeans have surprisingly similar assessments of the international threats they face. When asked about such threats both Americans and Europeans identified the top five as the threat of international terrorism, North Korean and Iranian weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Islamic fundamentalism and Arab-Israeli conflict. The Europeans and Americans also held a fairly similar view as to how important these threats were but had very different impulses on how to respond.

In any case, the results of the polls do indicate that Europeans and Americans consider their mutual cooperation very important. At the same time, both Americans and Europeans see U.S. unilateralism as a problem. Both view the United Nations favorably and want to strengthen it, but Americans are willing to bypass the U.N. if required by national interest.

All polls equally show that Europeans want to see the European Union become a much more powerful entity in order for the EU to be able to complete better the efforts by the United States, rather than compete with it. However, Europeans resist increased military spending.

A key message for the decision-makers seems to be that Europeans and Americans can simultaneously feel estranged and share foreign policy interests that lead them to work together. In Europe, there is a willingness, particularly in Germany, to support a stronger European Union and less willingness to rely on U.S. global leadership. Of all their international relationships Americans clearly favor a good partnership with Europe.

So, on the level of public perceptions, there seems to be a foundation and room for a healthier transatlantic relationship.

But does this relationship really matter? In order to understand the meaning of transatlantic ties today, let us look at the past achievements.

Transatlantic ties - past and present

It is first of all a historical fact that Europe and the United States have to a very large extent jointly created, right after the Second World War, the entire international cooperation system of nations and helped to establish its institutions as well as to develop its norms and rules. The international system supported by the West has always been based on core values such as democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law as well as market economy. Many mistakes have no doubt been made in the implementation of these Western ideals. Certainly not everything can be called a success and some things clearly went wrong. Nevertheless, if you think of it, significant progress has actually been made in a number of important areas. Democracy and human rights have generally been strengthened. The world is much safer than it used to be several decades ago. And this is a result, to a considerable degree, of joint endeavours by Europe and America.

And last but certainly not least, cooperation between Western Europe and the United States was absolutely vital in bringing about the end of the Cold War and securing a relatively smooth transition of Europe.

Europeans and Americans have also provided important content and resources for the international institutions, beginning with the United Nations. Without their combined effort and initiative, much of the multilateral cooperation, so vital for solving international problems of various kinds, could not succeed.

Therefore, if indeed the Europeans and Americans would stop working together the world would probably become a much more fragile and insecure place. If the transatlantic rift would take these two continents to turn into outright rivals and perhaps even mutual enemies, the very foundations of the international order as we know it might be at risk.

Hence, when talking now about efforts needed to bridge the present gap between Europe and America quite much is indeed at stake.

But bridging the gap is not going to be easy. There is still as much talk of punishment and proving the other side wrong as there is of magnanimity and reconciliation. The temptation to Schadenfreude seems strong.

Obviously, the rift is not only about Iraq. Let us look at the deeper origins of it, i.e. the differing world views of Europe and America.

Origins of the rift

Today, the sad state of transatlantic relations is on everyone’s lips. Already at the end of the Cold War, there were several analysts who predicted that the removal of the Soviet threat will result in a sudden demise of NATO. Demographic changes in Europe and America were seen as equally detrimental to Atlantic unity. The dwindling European immigration into the U.S. with the corresponding increase of new immigrants from Asia and Latin America was seen as the main trend in America while in Western Europe the most significant new feature was the immigration from Moslem states, particularly from the Mediterranean basin. Both these demographic trends were seen as important factors producing changes within the foreign policy priorities in both America and Europe.

Recently the discussion of the transatlantic rift emphasizes other factors. As Robert Kagan put it in his famous article last year, "Americans are from Mars, Europeans are from Venus". This meant, in Mr. Kagan's view, that Americans are fearless doers and decision-makers, Europeans wavering illusionists who just dream about things and avoid action.

Another recent theory explains the difference between Europe and America through the diverging views regarding the use of force. Due to a number of historical factors, Europeans are seen to totally dismiss the use of force as an option in politics, except in extraordinary circumstances. Americans, in contrast, are thought to see the possibility to resort to the threat or use of force as something which is de facto present in virtually all disputes among nations, albeit of course as a last resort.

The latter theory is further boosted by the huge difference in European and American military spending and capabilities.

As far as the differences in general orientation are concerned, during the Cold War the Europeans concentrated on their own survival in the divided continent. And later on, Europeans have focused on the internal development of the European Union, both on the deepening of the integration as well as the enlargement of the EU. Thus, Europe has perhaps been somewhat inward-looking and not so much interested in the rest of the world.

The United States, in contrast, has traditionally assumed a much more assertive role in the world. As the main opponent of the old Soviet Union the United States pursued for many years the strategy of containment. Military power became a very natural part of America's capability to influence - and at times, coerce - other actors.

In their self-portrait, Americans see themselves as a benevolent superpower, a nice hegemon serving the best of mankind. In the American view, this benevolent power must never be constrained by outside actors, including by intrusive and inefficient international organisations, as they see it. An idea that America would be tied like Gulliver terrifies them.

In terms of political attention, Americans seem to focus much less on Europe than they used to some years ago, emphasizing the many challenges posed by events and situations in Asia and other regions. Europe, plagued by sluggish economic growth looks to them somewhat uninspiring.

Europeans, in turn, focus on Europe. They see the process toward European integration as a major peace project aimed at securing stability and prosperity for them and their neighbors. The European way to solve problems though negotiation and compromise would, in the European opinion, provide a good example for other regions as well. And the Europeans always prefer to use carrots rather than sticks.

From these divergent points of departure it becomes quite clear that, although Europeans and Americans share the same basic values, they have a fairly different world outlook and pursue a different methodology.

The future

This state of affairs has given rise to a number of serious studies and efforts to develop new approaches.

Karl W. Deutsch described already in 1957 the European-American cooperation as a "pluralistic security community", emphasizing the importance of the shared identity, a stable and interdependent interaction between the two parties as well as the strong institutionalization of transatlantic relations, particularly in the field of security. In Deutsch's view both sides were genuinely interested in the well-being of each other.

That was in the 1950s.

A recent report by Charles Grant discusses a number of recommendations to both sides in order to bring the two sides together again now.

Dr. Grant, a British former journalist and now director of the Centre for European Reform, begins his conclusions with five recommendations for the Americans. These are the following:

1. Be aware that unilateral actions carry costs
2. Remember that the style of your diplomacy affects outcomes
3. Use the reconstruction of Iraq as an opportunity to revive transatlantic co-operation
4. Be even-handed in the Middle East, and
5. Don't jiggle the knife in the wound between "New" and "Old" Europe.

For the Europeans, Dr. Grant's advice is the following:

1. Adopt new economic policies, to encourage higher growth
2. Enhance your military capabilities
3. Overhaul the institutions of your foreign policy
4. Stabilize the "arc of instablity" that runs around your eastern and southern flanks, and
5. Work hard to overcome the division between "New " and "Old" Europe.

The author finalizes his view with the following four points for both Europeans and Americans:

1. Insulate the management of the global economy from arguments on security issues
2. Work out a common approach to Iran
3. Reach an understanding on weapons of mass destruction
4. Discuss the principles of intervention.

Obviously, Dr. Grant's vision is but one of many. Yet, I think that his points actually address in an interesting way some of the fundamental ills in the transatlantic relationship. And creative thinking and new ideas are indeed now called for, whether from governments or from outside.

In fact, the tragic events of September 11, 2001, brought home the fact that there is a fundamental new vulnerability as regards our societies.

The 9/11 made clear to us all that while globalization has produced much good, lowering various barriers to human contacts, trade and the flow of capital and ideas, promising new opportunities for all, and while the information revolution has made the latest knowledge available virtually everywhere, the process of globalization also has a darker side. First, not everyone is yet able to reap the benefits deriving from globalization. But at the same time, problems in one corner of the globe easily lead to problems everywhere. International terrorism and crime, drugs and communicable diseases as well as the spread of sensitive military technologies have become commonplace, creating a common risk and threat to us all. And there is really no way to close the gates.

As the new security environment gradually takes shape, we need a solid international dialogue on the real issues at hand. In Europe, the draft security strategy paper, proposed by Mr. Javier Solana, the EU's High Representative, is a good beginning. It addresses the security challenges faced by Europeans in the coming years and highlights the fact that they are quite similar to those faced by Americans, namely the threat of catastrophic terrorism and the spread of biological, chemical, radiological and nuclear weapons to irresponsible governments or even to non-state actors. Failed or failing states pose the same risk for both Europeans and Americans. And a common challenge for us both is the new vulnerability of our societies, increasingly based on electronic communications and networks of all kinds.

Thus, the threat posed by Soviet expansionism during the Cold War is in fact now replaced by the risk of increased vulnerability of our open and complex societies. The calls by Osama Bin Laden and other extremists for a total destruction of the West have added to this new sense of vulnerability and the new search for security.

Substance - i. e. what we do - is of course the most important factor but we also have to look at the methodology. We need improvements in the ways Europe and America work together. In this, we have a number of possibilities and avenues to consider.

The first thing is the overall imperative of working together, not acting alone. The only sensible way to deal with these new threats remains through international cooperation and through various methods, not only military but increasingly civilian: through economic, political and judicial cooperation, intelligence sharing and so on.

Common interests

Are there shared interests between Europe and America?

We certainly have different priorities. But they should not overshadow what remains the core objective of both Europe and America: to contribute to the creation of a more democratic and secure, stable and prosperous world with improved human rights, freedoms and equality for all.

The West must again become the "force for good". This means that we must be prepared to do more and be more innovative not only among ourselves but also in order to improve the relationship between the North and the South as well as generally promote peace and development globally. We must, in a certain way, "re-invent the West".

What about our shared sense of security?

I already mentioned the new unifying factor which is the common vulnerability of our societies. We must join forces to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. We cannot accept the prospect of the actual use of these weapons with catastrophic consequences. We may have to deal with a situation where these weapons are in the hands of non-state actors or irresponsible states. We must have the means to solve this dilemma, starting with diplomatic efforts to develop common legal norms to follow in such extreme circumstances.

And we must secure the maximum legitimacy of our endeavours through working consistently, as our first priority, within the United Nations.

Structures and methods

At the same time we must ensure that the transatlantic community works better.

We already have a number of arrangements in place between the EU and the U.S. to ensure cooperation in all central dimensions of our activities, in the economic area, in the political area as well as in the field of security.

But I would like suggest that the time has come to have a critical review of our methodology, to see whether arrangements that we have at present indeed meet with today's needs.

In the economic area, the practical work at the governmental level is carried out directly by the EU Trade Commissioner, Mr. Pascal Lamy and the U.S. Trade Representative, Mr. Robert Zoellick. They are close colleagues and work together in an excellent way. The practical management of the EU-U.S. trade is thus in good hands.

But we should ask ourselves whether this is enough. The reality of transatlantic economy is much more than just trade. Is our cooperation as we understand it today capable of coping with the future challenges of rapidly evolving technological change and the fact that European and American economies are integrating through a process of mergers and acquisitions and growing investments in both directions? Is it time to consider more ambitious economic arrangements between the EU and the U.S.?

Equally, in the political domain, we can ask ourselves whether our present working methods are sufficient to enable us really to cooperate. We do talk constantly between Europeans and Americans but do we really work together? Do we arrive swiftly at common policies if we would like to? Do we have the methods to formulate our joint responses to world events if we decide that such responses are called for? In other words, should our present voluntary consultation mechanisms be developed into something more ambitious than just a simple exchange of information? And should we involve other actors than just governments in this cooperation? I am thinking particularly about the role of the parliaments.

Furthermore, we should get the security dimension right. Of course, much of the security policy dialogue takes place within the Atlantic Aliance. But increasingly, it is also on the agenda of the EU and the U.S. The development of the European security and defense policy is a necessary and important process, leading, it is to be hoped, to a more united European Union, a union more capable of shouldering its wider responsibilities for stability and security in Europe and beyond. There are still many things to be resolved before we achieve this goal but the direction of our efforts is certainly correct.

But at the same time we should not unnecessarily duplicate military assets and organisations nor waste our scarce resources. The so-called Berlin + arrangement between the EU and NATO was originally designed to establish a good cooperation between the two institutions, respecting their independence but securing the maximum cooperation and a rational use of resources as needed. The same attitude of working together wherever possible should prevail now when both institutions go through a process of development and transformation. The transatlantic security link must not be jeopardized.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is both through substance and style that we can make progress in this important area. When Europe takes more responsibility it also has more to claim when it comes to the leadership of the transatlantic bargain. I would like to see a more balanced situation, a co-leadership of the transatlantic relationship by Europe and the U.S. But it does not come about without a long-term, determined effort on both sides. And there are certain codes of conduct. While a critical analysis of policies and actions of the other party is always healthy, empty criticism without workable alternative ideas does not cost much but easily undermines all efforts. We have plenty of experience of this, all sorts of recriminations, unilateral actions and mutual lack of understanding lately. And the results are less than perfect, to say the least.

These are very complicated and difficult issues and I have no illusions about my country's - or about any one country's - ability alone to contribute much to the debate. Yet, smaller partners often have a bigger stake than more powerful ones at a well-functioning cooperation between major actors of peace and prosperity in the world. So, while the challenges seem formidable there is no point in inaction but, on the contrary, all reason to roll up our sleeves and get on with our work.



































































































































































EU