Jaakko Blomberg, Under-Secretary of State: Security in the Baltic Sea region

Spring Meeting of the Atlantic Council of Finland Helsinki 15 May 2001

During the Cold War, two factors influenced the security situation in Northern Europe: the Soviet Union with its strategically important north-western areas, and Norway, Denmark and Iceland as members of NATO. In the military sense, non-aligned Finland and Sweden were in the middle, between East and West. The focal point was in the north, at the point where the Soviet Union and NATO met. The Baltic Sea played a part in the Cold War confrontation but, on the other hand, northern Europe became increasingly stable thanks to the secure democratic systems maintained in all of the Nordic countries, their mutual cooperation, and their adaptable foreign and security policies which kept the Baltic detached from the focal points of political tension.

The end of the Cold War changed the constellation. The restoration of independence in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania transferred attention to the Baltic Sea.

NATO and the new Russia still meet in the north, where the borders of Norway and Russia converge, and in the Arctic Ocean. This involves issues related to the mutual nuclear policy of the USA and Russia, the future of which is hard to predict. The pending negotiations on missile defence will deal with themes that are important for the stability of the northern regions. The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons raises questions.

An essential aspect is that, unlike during the Cold War, today the Baltic Sea is a unifying factor. The Baltic Sea region is in a dynamic phase of development. Even though there is still friction between Russia and the three Baltic States, the region is becoming increasingly unified, on the basis of democracy and other common values, and former fault lines are being crossed and eliminated. All states in the region can influence development and each of them is, in one way or another, playing a part in that development.

The development of the Baltic Sea region comprises a number of aspects, such as social and economic cooperation within the region, European and other security cooperation, and the enlargement of the European Union and NATO.

I would like to go on to discuss these factors in more detail, focusing on the past decade, and assessing future prospects.

***

When the Cold War ended around 1990, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, which proclaimed a unified and free Europe, encouraged the states of the Baltic Sea region to engage in intensive cooperation. This had already begun prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union and the restoration of independence in the Baltic States. A number of special meetings at ministerial level were held, in which ministers from the Soviet Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania took part alongside the Soviet delegation, at times overcoming its resistance and gaining international attention.

The idea of a council of the Baltic Sea states was born in the autumn of 1991 after the Baltic States had been declared independent again. The idea emerged in various quarters, independently of each other. The Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs had prepared a memorandum on the issue in the early autumn of the year, but for various reasons, mainly the pressure of other business, no action had been taken. The Council was then established in early 1992 on the initiative of Denmark and Germany. Since then, the Nordic countries have exercised healthy and constructive competition. The Barents Euro-Arctic Council was established on the initiative of Norway, and Finland advocated the inclusion of the Northern Dimension in the policies of the European Union.

The underlying idea behind the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) was multifaceted but clear. As the oppressive grip of the Soviet Union had disappeared, Moscow too was willing to engage in cooperation based on equality. There was a desire to give the Baltic States a forum. It was hoped that united Germany would invest heavily in the development of the region. There was an urgent need for cooperation. The goal was regional unity, which would raise the Iron Curtain and, with the help of the West, lead the countries crippled by the socialist planned economy to a more prosperous future. The fundamental assumption was that cultural, social and economic cooperation, and eventual integration, would break the shackles of confrontation and render political conflicts impossible.

In the Baltic sphere the challenge of suggested extensive security has been taken seriously. Examples of it include the fight against international crime and drug trafficking and prevention of the spread of contagious diseases.

The CBSS has worked effectively and it is to be thanked for much of the development that has taken place.

***

Even if Russia had helped Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to break loose from the Soviet Union as early as August 1991, months before its break-up, it became soon apparent that there were deep problems between Russia and the Baltic States. Rebuilding the societies and their economies was demanding enough on its own, but on top of that the Soviet heritage proved to be a heavy burden. The new Russia found it difficult to adjust to the fact that the Baltic States had become independent. Disbanding Russian armed forces in these countries and arranging transit through Kaliningrad proved slow and laborious. In Estonia and Latvia in particular, a legacy of the Soviet period were significant Russian or Russian-speaking minorities, which included many groups who had implemented Moscow’s policy of oppression. Moscow considered it had the right to watch over and protect these minorities. Agreement over common borders, in accordance with normal international law, proved difficult because Moscow had changed its borders with Estonia and Latvia at the time when they were annexed by the Soviet Union. Apart from technical reasons, political factors were also involved.

In addition to the emerging opportunities, cooperation within the Baltic Sea region was faced with a host of complicated political problems.

***

Various quarters in the Nordic countries, Germany, Great Britain and the USA tried to find ways to influence the course of events. Security policy was ruled outside the sphere of the CBSS, even though the foreign ministers touched on the issue in their discussions. Neighbouring area cooperation and integration materialized slowly.

In the years of transition of the early 1990s, the OSCE was a central forum of international cooperation. For the countries that had broken free of the Soviet Union, it provided a channel through which they could make themselves heard when the ideals and values of the CSCE Paris meeting were being put into practice. This was of great importance to the Baltic States.

In the autumn of 1991, NATO set up the North-Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which was later changed into the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP). Its purpose was to develop military cooperation and, later, specifically to improve international military crisis management. All Baltic Sea states joined the Council at various times. This new kind of European military cooperation was seen as influencing the situation in the Baltic region via the PfP and the EAPC.

Around the middle of the 1990s, broadly-based cooperation was launched to develop the defence forces and defence policies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, to which the Nordic countries, Germany, Great Britain, the USA and some other western countries made a special contribution. Finland, the other Nordic countries and certain other countries had started to help the Baltic States build up their defences at an early stage. From the point of view of the Nordic countries and NATO, the Baltics’ national defence capabilities were considered to be an essential part of building up the statehood and national identity of those countries. Multilateral cooperation goes under the name of BALTSEA and aims to coordinate assistance from various sources. It has provided a framework for significant joint military structures and institutions in the Baltic States, such as a common air surveillance network, a military academy, a naval unit, and a training system for peace-keeping forces. From the point of view of the Baltic States, this cooperation is now a parallel track alongside the NATO Partnership for Peace and the MAP cooperation, the latter important in preparing for NATO membership, .

Last summer, Sweden and Germany launched an initiative for the arrangement of an unofficial meeting later this year of the defence ministers of the countries of the Baltic Sea region and other countries which contribute to its security (the USA, Great Britain and France) in order to discuss, in particular, the development of cooperation among naval forces. In this context, the principle which governed military cooperation in the Baltic Sea region throughout the 1990s came to the fore again. The principle emphasizes the fact that the region is part of a larger security policy entity within the framework of the principle of common norms and freedom of choice of the OSCE. One of the intentions of the Soviet Union was to exclude the Baltic Sea from the transatlantic link. This was not accepted by others then nor should it be accepted in the new situation.

The Nordic countries launched impressive political cooperation with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, encompassing active practical collaboration in various fields of interest at both bilateral and multilateral levels. The foreign and defence ministers of the Nordic (5) and the Baltic (3) countries started to convene annually, and last year these meetings began to be called meetings of eight countries. Civil servants and experts from the countries concerned cooperate in preparing the meetings.

As an offshoot of this cooperation, important outside partners began to be invited to the meetings, including US and Russian ministers. The reasoning was clear: it was hoped that contacts and cooperation would alleviate or prevent disagreements.

The Nordic countries’ fundamental idea was, and is, twofold: first, to strengthen the Baltic States’ identity and sovereignty as members of the democratic western community and to prevent further widening of the fault line between these countries and Russia.

***

When Finland and Sweden joined the European Union in 1995, the development of the Baltic Sea region entered a new phase. In qualitative terms it did not differ from the arrangement in which the CBSS was created, but the Union’s significance in the development of the region grew considerably. From the outset, Germany and Denmark had brought the Union’s perspective to the Council and the European Commission had participated in its work. In the latter half of the 1990s, the Union’s assistance and support programmes started to govern the thinking on development in the region.

Two processes have dictated the main course of cooperation in the Baltic Sea region since then. They are Poland’s, Lithuania’s, Latvia’s and Estonia’s EU membership negotiations and the Union’s active Russia policy.

It was as if the wishes of the breakthrough years of the early 1990s had come true. The Union committed itself to becoming the locomotive of development in the region. The start of membership talks with the Baltic States strengthened their international position. Russia began to show interest t in the Union and the partnership and related support programmes that it offered. The thought of interdependence gave a stimulus to policy planning. It gained impetus when the whole Union, with its resources, became involved. This was, without doubt, reflected in Russia’s attitude. On Finland’s initiative, the Northern Dimension for the policies of the Union was established, crystallising the new situation. Ensuring the commitment of the entire Union was as important as directing cooperation in the area, mainly on the Union’s terms.

It was increasingly firmly believed that the political problems between the Baltic States and Russia would take their proper dimensions thanks to this trend of development. Integration would take precedence. Russia would accept the idea that the Union’s enlargement is in its interests, also in the Baltic Sea region. When the Baltic States become members of the Union, the advantages Russia gains from its cooperation with the EU will outstrip its reservations towards them.

At about the same time, the USA started to vigorously activate its North European policy in various practical areas, in addition to the BALTSEA cooperation. The USA concluded a charter with the Baltic States, which provides a framework for political and practical support. The USA has made initiatives on cooperation under its new North European policy that are in line with the activities of the Barents Council and the CBSS and thus support them - not least in the field of nuclear safety.

***

The often expressed perception of the European Union as a peace project seems to function in the transition areas of central Europe, as it was meant to. One could believe the same will happen in the Baltic region, where the three Baltic States have quickly reached the front rank of applicants and Russia has started to recognize the value of partnership with the EU.

But the issue can be looked at from another angle. Integration certainly functions, but slowly. It offers cooperation and stability but no certainty that international relations will remain peaceful and that everyone will refrain from the use or threat of force. In the Union, the Member States commit themselves to joint responsibility but there is no obligation to take collective defensive action against the use of force.

When NATO, after the end of the Cold War and much hesitation, opened its doors to new members, a new phase began also in the development of the Baltic Sea region. Of the states in the region, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland applied for membership.

NATO’s enlargement policy meant recognition of the candidate countries’ needs as much as it meant any strengthening of the USA’s position in the development of Europe. Based on this viewpoint, European stability and security cannot be ensured without the determined involvement of the USA. At the same time, NATO’s role is underlined as an instrument of US security policy influence.

Despite the fact that Russia has cooperated with NATO since the 1990s and that specific organs were set up for this cooperation towards the end of the decade, Russia is relating to NATO enlargement with reservations, to say the least. It opposed the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary and partly suspended cooperation with the alliance for a time. The Kosovo crisis added to the friction.

In the present situation, Russia has targeted its policy explicitly towards opposing and slowing down the Baltic States’ accession to NATO.

In the joint declaration issued by the Russian and Lithuanian Presidents after their recent meeting, they confirm that every country has the right to choose its own security arrangements, noting, however, that this must not take place at the expense of other countries’ security. The statement, which is based on the security policy principles of the OSCE, neatly expresses the essence of the problem.

Supporters of the Baltic States’ NATO membership consider that membership would stabilize their position by eliminating the possibility that Russia might threaten or, - unhindered by others - occupy them as the Soviet Union did at the beginning of the Second World War; or it might exert politico-military pressure on them. The precondition for stability and security in the region is the elimination of this uncertainty. Leaving the Baltic States outside the alliance would maintain and even aggravate their unstable situation.

Russia, for its part, considers that NATO’s access to borders close to its heartland would be a strategic threat to its security. Like NATO in its joint declarations, many member countries have underlined the implications of enlargement for the entire European security situation. This can be taken as meaning that Russia’s views have been taken into account together with other factors.

This conflict of opinions will affect policy-making in the Baltic Sea region and, more widely, Euro-Atlantic relations in the near future. The decision on NATO’s next enlargement is scheduled to take place at the Prague summit in November 2002. The USA plays a decisive role. As long as it has not determined its position, the outcome remains unclear.

It has been estimated that NATO’s decision would be politically easier if the Baltic states were already members of the EU. There is reason to believe that the NATO countries try to take into account the impacts of the enlargement on not only the unity and effectiveness of the alliance but also on its relations with Russia. However, nobody wants the Cold War to return to the Baltic Sea region. It has been further estimated that, in the course of time, Russia would adjust to NATO’s decision, and cooperation between the two could continue. In conjunction with the previous enlargement round, NATO adopted certain restrictions to be applied in the new member countries during peace time.
***

The fact that Finland and Sweden remain outside the alliance is an important factor in the present security constellation of the Baltic Sea region. In Sweden, the definition of non-alliance is subject to discussion, but the content of the military policy of non-alliance is not expected to change. From Finland’s point of view, there are no visible factors that would require any change in present strategy.

The Baltic States’ NATO membership, to be decided in the near future, affects the security of Finland’s neighbouring area and, therefore, very closely Finland’s own interests as well. Finland has consolidated its position as an interlocutor with the United States and NATO on security matters in the region. As before, it is important to Finland that NATO’s doors remain open and that the alliance makes decisions that promote the security and stability of the whole of Europe, including northern Europe.

It is certain that even though Finland and Sweden play no part in NATO’s decisions, their attitudes to enlargement will be followed both by supporters and opponents of the Baltic States’ NATO membership. Both countries have emphasized that the principle of each country’s right to choose its own security arrangements applies to all, including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The Swedish Government has expressed its general support for the security policy aspirations of the Baltic States. Finland’s political leadership has stated that the Baltic States’ NATO membership is not in conflict with Finland’s interests. Both Finland’s and Sweden’s attitudes are undoubtedly influenced by an interest in the stability of the Baltic Sea region and especially in the consolidation of the position of the Baltic States.

***

To sum up, it could be said that developmental efforts in the Baltic Sea region follow two different tracks. On one of them work is being done on behalf of regional cooperation and integration, on the assumption that it produces stability and security. Results do emerge but ironclad ones are hard to achieve. On the other track, security guarantees are sought that would rapidly create certainty that the unhappy experiences of the past will not recur and would provide a political and psychological basis for political and economic development.

NATO’s enlargement issue should be viewed as a part of wider regional security and stability, a part of the construction of a Europe that is, in the words of the Paris Charter, “whole and free”. Russia must not be, and cannot be, excluded from this entity, and Russia has the same obligation as others to honour jointly accepted principles. Dividing lines do not belong in the Baltic Sea or anywhere else. EU enlargement and cooperation between the EU and Russia are deeply influential forces in the consolidation of democracy and change in Europe and in the traversal of former borderlines.