


EVALUATION

META-ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY PROGRAMMES 2021–2024



Ministry for Foreign
Affairs of Finland

Volume I – Synthesis report



Evaluation on Finland's Development Policy and Cooperation

2024: 2



© Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2024

This report can be downloaded through the home page of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
<https://um.fi/development-cooperation-evaluation-reports-comprehensive-evaluations>

Contact: EVA-11@gov.fi

ISBN 978-952-281-828-7 (PDF)
ISSN 2342-8341

Layout: Grano Oy



META-ANALYSIS OF COUNTRY PROGRAMMES 2021–2024

Markus Palenberg (Team Leader)
Ann Bartholomew (Deputy Team Leader)
Merja Mäkelä
Sonja Huhta



Lead Company



2024: 2

This evaluation was commissioned by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland to the consortium Particip-Niras. This report is the product of the authors, and responsibility for the accuracy of the data included in this report rests with the authors. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions presented in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland.



Contents

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS	VI
YHTEENVETO	IX
SAMMANFATTNING	XIV
TABLE OF KEY FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	XXIV
1. Introduction	1
1.1 Motivation and purpose	1
1.2 Meta-analysis questions	1
1.3 Scope of the meta-analysis	2
1.4 Approach and methodology	3
1.5 This report	4
2. Overview of Finland's Country Programmes	5
3. Findings	8
1.1 Key developments affecting the Country Programmes	8
3.2 Adaptive management of Country Programmes	11
3.3 Results	18
3.4 Sustainability of results	29
3.5 Added value of the programmatic approach	31
3.5.1 General findings	31
3.5.2 Specific findings on CP planning and reporting in 2021-24	34
4. Experiences made with the meta-analysis approach	39
5. Conclusions	40
6 Recommendations	43
ANNEX 1: REFERENCES	48
ANNEX 2: THE META-ANALYSIS TEAM	56
ANNEX 3: TERMS OF REFERENCE	57
ANNEX 4: META-ANALYSIS APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY	67
ANNEX 5: LIST OF ORGANISATIONS CONSULTED	70



LIST OF BOXES

Box 1	Traffic light assessment of results in CP results reports	18
Box 2	Example for a modality-related lesson learned from Tanzania	23

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1	Principal meta-analysis activities and end products	3
Figure 2	Key indicators in the 10 partner countries	6
Figure 3	CP disbursements 2016-22	7
Figure 4	Overview of key events with relevance for the CPs in the 10 countries	9
Figure 5	CP documents and temporary policies 2021-24	13
Figure 6	Evolution of impact areas in the Ethiopia CP since 2013	14
Figure 7	Evolution of impact areas in the Myanmar CP since 2016	15
Figure 8	Aggregated SWOT analysis	16
Figure 9	CP outputs (immediate results) reported 2016-22 in the 10 countries	19
Figure 10	CP outcomes (long-term results) reported 2016-22 in the 10 countries	19
Figure 11	Percentages of unsatisfactory immediate results (outputs) by country (Ukraine excluded)	20
Figure 12	Percentages of unsatisfactory long-term results (outcomes) by country (Ukraine excluded)	20
Figure 13	Reported factors limiting or supporting the achievement of results	22
Figure 14	CP budget disbursement rates 2016-22	24
Figure 15	CP Results frameworks outcome and output objectives, and indicators, 2022 ...	36
Figure 16	CP Indicators (output and outcome) with targets in 2022	37

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1	Meta-Analysis Questions	2
Table 2	Dates and locations of the meta-analysis self-assessment workshops	68



Acronyms and Abbreviations

ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
BRAVE	Building Resilience and Addressing Violence from Early Years through Adolescence
CCGD	Collaborative Centre for Gender and Development
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi political party
CDM	Civil Disobedience Movement
CEHUR	Civic Engagement and Human Rights Project
CMI	Crisis Management Initiative
CP	Country Programme
CS	Country Strategy
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CT	Country Team
CWA	Consolidated WASH Account
CTA	Chief Technical Advisor
DFA	De-Facto Authorities
EBO	Euro-Burma Office
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECW	Education Cannot Wait Fund
EU	European Union
EU	European Union
EUR	Euro
EVA-11	Development Evaluation Unit
FCA	Finn Church Aid
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FIIA	Finnish Institute for International Affairs
FLC	Fund for Local Cooperation
FMS	Federal Member State
FORVAC	Forestry and Value Chains Development Project
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEQIP	General Education Quality Improvement Program for Equity Project
GESI	Gender, Equality and Social Inclusion
GOK	Government of Kenya
GRAPE	Green Resilient Agricultural Productive Ecosystems Project
GTK	Geological Survey of Finland
HEI-ICI	Higher Education Institutions Institutional Cooperation Instrument
HRBA	Human Rights-Based Approach
HSHC	Help Self Help Center
ICHR	Independent Commission for Human Rights
ICI	Institutional Cooperation Instrument
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IESE	Institute of Economic and Social Studies
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IGM	Inclusive Growth in Mozambique Project
ILO	International Labour Organization
IM	Inter-Mediate
IMD	Institute for Multiparty Democracy
IOM	International Organisation for Migration



JDP	Joint Devolution Programme
JFA	Joint Financing Arrangement
JPF	Joint Peace Fund
JRF	Joint Response Framework
KDHS	Kenya Demographic and Health Survey
KEO	Department for Development Policy
KNAP	Kenya National Action Plan
KRCS	Kenya Red Cross Society
KSH	Kenyan Shilling
LACC	Local Adaptation to Climate Change Project
LDC	Least Developed Country
LMIC	Lower Middle-Income Country
LNG	Liquified Natural Gas
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MEC	Myanmar Education Consortium
MEF	Ministry of Economy and Finance
MEL	Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning
MEUR	Million Euro
MFA	Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
MIC	Middle-Income Country
MINEDH	Ministry of Education and Human Development
MPDSR	Maternal and Perinatal Death Surveillance
MPF	Multi-Partner Fund
MPI	Multi-Poverty Index
MSI	Marie Stopes International
NASA	National Assessment of Students Achievement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEFCO	Nordic Environment Finance Corporation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OH	Outcome Harvesting
OWNP	One WaSH National Programme
PA	Palestinian Authority
PEACE	Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance Trust Fund
PEGASE	Palestino - Européen de Gestion et d'Aide Socio-Economique
PFM	Public Financial Management
PFP	Participatory Plantation Forestry Programme
PFRU	Partnership Fund for a Resilient Ukraine
PLG	Provincial and Local Government
PREFER	Public Revenue, Expenditure, and Fiscal Decentralization Enhancement and Reform programme
PWD	People with Disabilities
RBM	Results-Based Management
RCRF	Recurrent Cost and Reform Financing
REILA	Responsible and Innovative Land Administration Project
RVWRMP	Rural Village Water Resources Management Project
RWPL	Rural Women Peace Link



SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SRHR	Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights
SSDP	School Sector Development Programme
STFA	Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan
SUSWA	Sustainable WASH for All Project
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
TA	Technical Assistance
TAXTAN	Tax Sector Support to Tanzania Programme
TMP	Tax Modernization Programme
TOC	Theory of Change
TOSP	Tree Outgrowers' Support Programme
TRA	Tanzania Revenue Authority
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UI	Uongozi Institute
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council resolution
UNU-WIDER	United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
VAWG	Violence Against Women and Girls
VET	Vocational and Educational Training
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WB	World Bank
WBPC	West Bank Protection Consortium
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization
WPS	Women, Peace and Security
WSTF	Water Sector Trust Fund



Yhteenvedo

Johdanto. Tämä raportti tiivistää tulokset meta-analyysistä, joka arvioi Suomen kymmentä maaohjelmaa vuosina 2021–2024. Tarkastelun kohteena oli maaohjelmat Afganistanissa, Etiopiassa, Keniassa, Mosambikissa, Myanmarissa, Nepalissa, Palestiinassa, Somaliassa, Tansaniassa ja Ukrainassa. Meta-analyysin tavoitteena oli tuottaa tietoa kehitysyhteistyön suunnittelun perustaksi nykyisen ohjelmasyklin päättyessä ja arvioida, kuinka tuloksellisia maaohjelmat ovat olleet. Analyysi ei keskittynyt yksittäisiin hankkeisiin tai toimiin, vaan ohjelmien kokonaistuloksiin. Perinteiseen arviointiin verrattuna meta-analyysi perustui enemmän maatiimien näkemyksiin ja kokemuksiin. Tiedon jakamisen lisäksi maatiimit osallistuivat aktiivisesti aineiston tulkintaan ja arviointiin.

Löydökset. Meta-analyysi tuotti 29 erillistä synteesisihavaintoa 10 maaohjelmasta. Havainnot koskivat kontekstia, jossa maaohjelmia toteutettiin, maaohjelmien mukautuvaa ohjausta, miten ja mitä tuloksia ne tuottivat, kuinka kestäviä tulokset olivat sekä sitä, mikä lisäarvo maaohjelmilla oli verrattuna yksittäin suunniteltuihin ja toteutettuihin hankkeisiin vailla ohjelmallista lähestymistapaa. Lisäksi 10 eri maaohjelman yksityiskohtaisemmat, maakohtaiset havainnot on esitetty tämän raportin toisessa osassa.

Konteksti: Analyysijakson aikana konteksti muuttui kaikissa maissa ja joissakin maissa vaikutukset maaohjelmaan olivat odottamattomia ja dramaattisia. Tästä syystä jotkut maaohjelmadokumentit ja tuloskehikot eivät olleet enää ajan tasalla ja useilla maatiimeillä oli haasteita aiemmin suunniteltujen toimintojen toteuttamisessa ja seurannassa. Dramaattisimpia esimerkkejä muutoksien osalta olivat Afganistan, Myanmar, Palestiina ja Ukraina. Afganistanissa tapahtui Talibanin valtaannousu, Myanmarissa sotilasvallankaappaus, Gazassa puhkesi sota ja Ukraina joutui Venäjän laittoman hyökkäyssodan kohteeksi. Muutokset vaikuttivat yhteistyöhön, sillä osassa maita menetettiin valtiollinen vastinkumppani ja osassa tarpeet muuttuivat merkittävästi konfliktin vuoksi. Jotkin maaohjelmakontekstit pysyvät epävakaina tai epävarmoina myös seuraavan ohjelmakauden aikana, mikä vaikuttaa ohjelmasuunnitteluun.

Myös Suomessa tapahtui muutoksia, kun hallituksen uudet painopisteet ja säästötoimenpiteet vaikuttivat kahdenvälisen kehitysyhteistyön suunnitteluun. Neljässä maassa – Afganistanissa, Keniassa, Mosambikissa ja Myanmarissa – ei tule olemaan maaohjelmaa nykyisten maaohjelmien päättyessä, ja näillä maatiimeillä on jatkossa hyvin rajalliset resurssit kahdenväliseen kehitysyhteistyöhön. Ukrainaa lukuun ottamatta maaohjelmat Etiopiassa, Nepalissa, Somaliassa ja Tansaniassa sekä ohjelma Palestiinassa toimeenpannaan huomattavasti pienemmillä budjeteilla. Joissakin maaohjelmissa muutokset Suomessa aiheuttivat epäsuhtaa ohjelman tavoitteen ja henkilöstöresurssien välillä jo kuluvalle ohjelmakaudella, mikä johti henkilöstön ylikuormitukseen. Ukrainan ohjelmalla oli rajalliset henkilöstöresurssit ohjelmakauden alussa, ja budjetin merkittävästi kasvaessa henkilöstöresurssit eivät ole vastaavasti lisääntyneet.

Mukautuva ohjaus: Maaohjelmia onnistuttiin ohjaamaan aktiivisesti, niin että ne pysyivät tarkoituksenmukaisina maakontekstin muuttuessa. Useissa tapauksissa (Myanmar, Afganistan, Mosambik ja Tansania) muuttuvat maakontekstit huomioitiin hyvin väliaikaisissa linjauksissa ja päivitettyissä ohjelmadokumenteissa. Ohjelmadokumenttien täydellinen päivittäminen vaati kuitenkin paljon aikaa, vaivaa ja tulosohjauksen asiantuntemusta, mikä oli haastavaa henkilöstökapasiteetin ollessa rajallinen. Ukrainan maaohjelmaa ei päivitetty, joten se vanhentui. Samalla uusia toimia lisättiin



ja alkuperäistä ohjelmointia muutettiin vastaamaan konfliktin myötä nousseisiin uusiin tarpeisiin. Kuitenkin kaikkien maaohjelmien osalta oli jatkuvuutta tulosalueiden suhteen, kontekstien muuttuessa jopa dramaattistenkin.

Kohdennetuilla vaikuttamistoimilla oli keskeinen rooli maaohjelmien mukautuvassa ohjauksessa. Maatiimien mukaan toinen mukautumista tukenut tekijä oli henkilöstön vahva osaaminen ja tehokas tiimityöskentely. Tulevaisuudessa tosin kehitysyhteistyön määrärahojen leikkausten aiheuttama henkilöstön väheneminen voi vaikuttaa tähän.

Tulokset: Vuonna 2022 kaikista maaohjelmien tavoittelemista lyhyen aikavälin tuloksista (outputs) 82 % ilmoitettiin ”tydyttäväksi” tai ”hyviksi”, kun taas pitkän aikavälin tulosten (outcomes) kohdalla luku oli 85 %. Tämä toteutui kahden vaikean vuoden jälkeen, jolloin koronapandemia, konfliktit ja vallanvaihdokset vaikuttivat merkittävästi tuloksiin erityisesti hauraimmissa maissa, joita Suomi on pyrkinyt erityisesti tukemaan. Kohdennetuilla vaikuttamistoimilla Suomi pystyi edistämään tulosten saavuttamista enemmän kuin Suomen rahoitusosuus olisi mahdollistanut, erityisesti vaikuttamalla muihin kehityskumppaneihin ja monenkeskisten hankkeiden suunnitteluun. Vaikuttamistoimia ja -tuloksia ei kuitenkaan seurattu tai raportoitu järjestelmällisesti.

Keskimääräinen maaohjelmabudjetin maksatusaste oli korkea, 86 % vuonna 2021 ja 84 % vuonna 2022, mutta tämä ei anna täyttä kuvaa siitä, millaisia haasteita paikallisesti kohdattiin. Kaikki maaohjelmat edistivät Suomen läpileikkaavia tavoitteita koskien ihmisoikeusperustaista lähestymistapaa, sukupuolten tasa-arvoa ja syrjimättömyyttä. Sen sijaan maaohjelmat edistivät heikommin ilmastokestävyyttä ja vähäpäästöistä kehitystä. Jatkossa maaohjelmien odotetaan edelleen saavan aikaiseksi tuloksia, vaikkakin pidemmän aikavälin tulosten saavuttaminen riippuu suuressa määrin suotuisista olosuhteista erityisesti haurassa konteksteissa.

Kestävyys: Tulosten kestävyys riippuu useimmissa ohjelmamaissa erittäin paljon niiden kehitysskenaarioista. Myönteinen löydös oli, että useimmissa maissa tulosten odotetaan kestävän muutaman vuoden tai pidemmänkin ajan, jos kehitysolosuhteet muuttuvat suotuisammiksi tai eivät ainakaan heikkene entisestään. Odotettujen pidemmän aikavälin tulosten kestävyys riippuu vahvasti siitä, kuinka suotuisat olosuhteet ovat tavoitelluille muutoksille. Tämä voi vaihdella merkittävästi maaohjelman eri vaikutusalueiden välillä jopa samassa maassa. Myös maan vakaus ja kehityskonteksti sekä Suomen säästötoimet ovat vaikuttavat ratkaisevasti. Joissakin maissa, kuten Afganistanissa, Etiopiassa, Myanmarissa ja Palestiinassa, aiemmin saavutetut tulokset on osittain menetetty vallanvaihdoksen ja konfliktin myötä tai ne voidaan menettää tulevaisuudessa, esimerkiksi Palestiinassa ja Ukrainassa.

Yleisesti ottaen tulosten kestävyys edellyttää toimivia järjestelmiä, käytettävissä olevan kapasiteetin säilymistä sekä hallituksen tai sidosryhmien vahvaa omistajuutta. Konteksteissa, joissa ei ole valtiollista kumppania, yksilö- ja yhteisötason tulokset voivat olla kestävämpiä kuin instituutiotason tulokset. Mutta tällöin saattaa kuitenkin puuttua suotuisat olosuhteet, jotka mahdollistaisivat pidemmän aikavälin ja korkeamman tason tulosten saavuttamisen.

Maaohjelmien lisäarvo: Maaohjelmat ovat olleet tärkeitä ulkoministeriön tulohajauksen ja tulosperustaisen toimintatavan kehittämiseksi. Ohjelmaperustainen lähestymistapa mahdollistaa laajempien ohjelmien suunnittelun ja seurannan yksittäisten hankkeiden sijaan sekä keskittymisen tulosten eikä niinkään toimenpiteiden suunnitteluun ja raportointiin. Maaohjelma auttaa välittämään sisäisille ja ulkoisille sidosryhmille yhtenäisen vision Suomen kehitysyhteistyön tavoitteista ja mekanismeista niiden saavuttamiseksi, lisäten Suomen näkyvyyttä. Tämän avulla on myös saatu hankittua myös lisärahoitusta hankkeisiin kuten esimerkiksi Nepalissa Suomelle delegoitu EU-rahoitus.



Joskin maaohjelman lisäarvoa rajoittaa niiden keskittyminen kahdenväliseen kehitysyhteistyöhön, ne ovat vahvistaneet Suomen maaosaamista ja kontakteja sekä vahvistaneet pohjaa suhteiden luomiselle. Tämä voi auttaa myös Suomen muiden politiikkatavoitteiden edistämässä, erityisesti liittyen poliittisiin, kaupallisiin ja liiketoiminnallisiin tavoitteisiin. Tämä on tärkeä voimavara paitsi Suomen tulevalle kehitysyhteistyölle kussakin maassa. Suomen maine ja maaohjelmat tarjoavat perustan ja mahdollisuuksia muille Suomen politiikan painopisteille ja rahoitusmuodoille.

Vaikka maatiimit pitävätkin maaohjelmiin liittyviä prosesseja yleisesti hyödyllisinä, ne koetaan myös aikaa vieviksi ja joustamattomiksi. Maaohjelmien tuloskehikot ovat kehittyneet monimutkaisiksi, liian korkeatasoisiksi ja liian riippuvaisiksi määrällisistä tulosmittareista (indikaattoreita), joiden osalta ei ole aina dataa saatavilla. Ne eivät kata kaikkia saavutettuja tuloksia esimerkiksi Suomen vaikuttamistoimien osalta tai osallistumisesta hankkeiden johtokuntiin ja työryhmiin. Joskus indikaattoreita koskevan tiedon puuttuminen ja maatiimien tuloskehikoissa asettamien tavoitteiden puuttuminen voi vaikeuttaa seurantaa. Maatiimit hyödyntävät ohjelmiin liittyvää maksatustietojen seurantaa, mutta eivät niinkään maaohjelmien riskienhallinnan sekä seuranta-, arviointi- ja oppimissuunnitelmien (MEL) liitteitä. Ohjelmataason seurannan sijaan enemmän huomiota kiinnitetään hanketaso seurantaan. Johdonvastine nähdään erittäin hyödyllisenä menettelynä, sillä se tarjoaa maatiimeille mahdollisuuden palautteen saamiseen ja keskusteluun alueosaston johdon kanssa.

Johtopäätökset. Yllä olevien löydösten perusteella tehtiin kuusi yleistä johtopäätöstä:

1. **Maaohjelmat ovat tuottaneet tuloksia:** nykyisen ohjelmakauden kahden ensimmäisen vuoden aikana kaikki 10 maaohjelmaa saavuttivat suurimman osan tavoitelluista tuloksista painopistealueilla. Tämä onnistui huolimatta merkittävästä haasteista, jotka liittyvät meneillään olleeseen koronapandemiaan sekä joissain maissa konflikteihin ja vallanvaihdoksiin.
2. **Maaohjelmat ovat vahvistaneet Suomen kahdenvälisen kehitysyhteistyön jatkuvuutta ja tulosohjausta:** ohjelmallinen toimintatapa mahdollisti Suomen kahdenvälisen kehitysyhteistyön maakohtaisten, korkeamman tason tulosten suunnittelun, toimeenpanon ja raportoinnin sekä tulosperustaisen kulttuurin edistämisen ulkoministeriössä. Se korosti tulosohjausta ja vastuullisuutta, eikä vain yksittäisten suunniteltujen toimintojen toteuttamista.
3. **Jotta maaohjelmat toisivat lisäarvoa, niiden tulisi heijastella todellisia olosuhteita. Kumppanimaissa tapahtuneiden dramaattisten muutosten jälkeen maaohjelmadokumenttien ja tuloskehikoiden päivittäminen vaati kuitenkin epärealistisen määrän työtä huomioiden nykyisten prosessien vaativuuden ja henkilöstöresurssit:** Afganistanin ja Myanmarin vallanvaihdosten jälkeen vain Myanmarin maaohjelma päivitettiin lopulta täysin. Venäjän hyökkäyssota Ukrainaa vastaan ei vielä näkynyt maaohjelmadokumentissa, eikä Gazan sota ole näkynyt päivitetystä maaohjelman tuloskehikossa. Tällaiset perustavanlaatuiset päivitykset vaativat aikaa, vaivaa ja tulosohjauksen asiantuntemusta, eikä niiden tekeminen ole välttämättä mahdollista huomioiden maatiimien rajallisen henkilöstöresurssit ja muut kilpailevat prioriteetit.



4. **Maaohjelmoinnissa ennakoiva suunnittelu on yhä tärkeämpää tulosten kestävyuden ja resilienssin vahvistamiseksi tulevien tuntemattomien, mutta todennäköisten shokkien vuoksi:** koska tulevaisuuden kehityskulut ovat yhä epävarmempia useimmissa tämän meta-analyysin 10 maassa, tapahtumiin reagoiminen jälkikäteen ei enää riitä. Parempi vaihtoehto on lisätä joustavuutta ennakoimalla ja etukäteen suunnittelemalla lähestymistapoja ja tuloksia, joiden saavuttaminen on mahdollista erilaisissa tulevilla skenaarioissa.
5. **Hallituksen uudet painopisteet ja säästötoimenpiteet heikentävät kehitysvaikutuksia ja vaikuttamismahdollisuuksia kumppanimaissa:** Maaohjelmien lisäarvo on ollut kehitysyhteistyön tuloksia laajempaa. Suomelle on ollut merkittävää hyötyä asiantuntijuudesta, kontakteista ja pääsystä prosesseihin, jotka tukevat muidenkin Suomen politiikka-alojen tavoitteita painopisteitä kuin vain kehitysyhteistyötä. Riskinä on, että maaohjelmabudjettien ja henkilöstön vähentämisen sekä pitkäaikaisten kumppanimaiden määrän vähentämisen myötä Suomi menettää nämä edut, joita voitaisiin hyödyntää ulko- ja kauppapoliittisten tavoitteiden edistämiseksi.
6. **Kahdenvälisen kehitysyhteistyön ja Suomen muiden tavoitteiden integroimisen edistäminen kumppanimaiden osalta on mahdollista ja voi hyödyttää muita Suomen politiikkatavoitteita kahdenvälisen kehitysyhteistyön lisäksi:** Alueosastot eivät ole vastuussa vain kehitysyhteistyöstä tiettyjen maiden kanssa, vaan myös poliittisesta, taloudellisesta ja kaupallisesta yhteistyöstä. Ei ole syytä, miksi alueosastoilla ei voisi olla integroitua suunnitelmia, jotka toisivat synergioita eri politiikka-alojen välille. Myös yhteinen raportointi olisi mahdollista. Tämä mahdollistaisi maaohjelmiin liittyvien resurssien tehokkaamman käytön edistämään Suomen muita politiikkatavoitteita.

Suosituksat. Näiden päätelmien sekä synteesi- ja maakohtaisten havaintojen perusteella meta-analyysiryhmä antoi kuusi kattavaa suositusta:

1. **Ulkoministeriön tulisi jatkaa ohjelmiin ja tulosohejaukseen perustuvaa lähestymistapaa kahdenvälisessä kehitysyhteistyössä:** Maaohjelmat ovat kontribuoineet tulosten saavuttamiseen, vahvistaneet Suomen kehitysyhteistyön näkyvyyttä ja jatkuvuutta sekä vahvistaneet Suomen mainetta ja läsnäoloa useimmissa kumppanimaissa. Ne ovat mahdollistaneet raportoinnin ja tilivelvollisuuden tuloksista ja ne voivat myötävaikuttaa kokonaisvaltaisempaan lähestymistapaan Suomen ulko- ja kauppapoliittisten prioriteettien edistämiseksi kumppanimaissa.
2. **Maaohjelmien toimintatapoja tulee yksinkertaistaa ja muuttaa joustavammiksi:** Seuraavan sukupolven maaohjelmadokumenteissa ja tulosraporteissa perusrakenne ja sisältö tulisi säilyttää. Lisäksi niissä tulisi olla lyhyt osio vaikuttamisesta ja vaikuttamistuloksista. Tuloskehikkoa olisi yksinkertaistettava höllentämällä (mutta ei luopumalla) tulosmittareita ja tavoitteita koskevia vaatimuksia erityisesti haurassa toimintaympäristöissä. Meta-analyysitiimi suosittelee jatkamaan ”liikennevalojen” käyttöä tehokkuuden luokittelussa, mutta perustamaan ne ensisijaisesti itsearviointiin edistymisestä kohti tavoiteltuja tuloksia.



3. **Tulevan maaohjelmoinnin tulisi hyödyntää skenaarioanalyysiä ja järjestelmällisemmin huomioida kyky sopeutua mahdollisiin sokkeihin.** Hyödyllisiä ajankohtia skenaarioanalyysille ovat ohjelmointisyklin valmistelua edeltävä kausi (kuten tässä meta-analyysissä) tai äkillisten muutosten jälkeen, kuten Afganistanin ja Myanmarin tapauksessa vuonna 2021. Ulkoministeriön tulisi myös hyödyntää ennakoivasti oivalluksia, jotka on saatu analysoimalla mahdollisten tulevien skenaarioiden vaikutukset Suomen kahdenväliseen kehitysyhteistyöhön ja muihin toiminta-alueisiin.
4. **Toteuttaessaan hallituksen prioriteetteja ja säästötoimenpiteitä, mukaan lukien joidenkin maaohjelmien asteittainen lopettaminen, ulkoministeriön tulisi keskittyä tulosten kestävyyteen ja mahdollisuuksien mukaan säilyttää olemassa olevat yhteistyösuhteet ja vaikutuskanavat kumppanimaissa.** Maatiimejä tulisi rohkaista jatkamaan vaikuttamista sekä keskittymistä kumppanuuksien ylläpitämiseen ja rakentamiseen hallituksen ja ulkoisten kumppaneiden kanssa. Nämä toimet olisi asetettava etusijalle sen sijaan, että suunniteltaisiin uusia toimia, koska maatiimien resurssit ovat rajalliset.
5. **Ulkoministeriön tulisi yhä enemmän integroida kahdenvälisen kehitysyhteistyön maatason suunnittelua ja raportointia ulko- ja kauppapoliittisten tavoitteiden kanssa säilyttäen maaohjelmissa luodut hyvät tulohajauskäytännöt.** Tämä voitaisiin tehdä jatkamalla kahdenvälistä kehitysyhteistyötä koskevaa vakiintunutta tulosperustaista suunnittelua, seurantaa ja raportointia, ja hyödyntämällä näitä suunnitelmia ja raportteja eri politiikanalojen integroituun suunnitteluun ja raportointiin.
6. **Ulkoministeriön tulisi hyödyntää tulosperustaisesta kahdenvälisestä ohjelmoinnista saatuja kokemuksia tukemaan ulko- ja kauppapolitiikan prioriteettien tulohajusta.** Viimeisten kahden vuosikymmenen aikana on kertynyt merkittävää kokemusta tulohajauksen soveltamisesta kahdenväliseen kehitysyhteistyöhön. Näiden saavutusten säilyttämisen lisäksi ulkoministeriön tulisi harkita, kuinka joitakin näistä prosesseista ja mekanismeista voitaisiin käyttää maakohtaisten tulosten suunnittelussa ja raportoinnissa muilla politiikka-aloilla.



Sammanfattning

Inledning. Denna rapport sammanfattar resultaten av en metaanalys av Finlands 10 landprogram för programcykeln 2021–2024, i Afghanistan, Etiopien, Kenya, Moçambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Palestina, Somalia, Tanzania och Ukraina. Syftet med metaanalysen var att bidra till planeringen av utvecklingssamarbetet bortom den nuvarande programcykeln i de 10 länderna, och att bedöma hur landprogrammen bidragit till de resultat som har uppnåtts. Analysen hade inte sitt fokus på enskilda insatser, utan på sammanställda och konsoliderade resultat inom bredare resultatområden. Till skillnad från en konventionell utvärdering förlitade sig metaanalysen mer på landteamens egna åsikter och erfarenheter och involverade dem även i att tolka och bedöma utvärderingens resultat.

Resultat. Metaanalysen resulterade i 29 enskilda, överordnade resultat från de 10 landprogrammen, beträffande *kontexten* i vilka de genomfördes, till vilken mån programmen *anpassats* till kontexten (*adaptivt arbetssätt*), vilka *resultat* de gav upphov till och hur, hur *bärkraftiga* dessa resultat var och vilket *mervärde* landprogrammen hade, jämfört med planeringen och genomförandet av projekt utan ett programbaserat tillvägagångssätt. I rapportens andra volym sammanfattas mer detaljerade, landspecifika resultat från de 10 landprogrammen.

Kontext: Förändringar i kontexten ägde rum i samtliga länder, i vissa fall med dramatiska och oväntade effekter på landprogrammet. I vissa fall innebar förändringarna att programdokument och resultatramverk blev inaktuella, och flera landsteam upplevde svårigheter i att genomföra och följa upp planerade aktiviteter. De tydligaste exemplen var Afghanistan, Myanmar, Palestina och Ukraina, med talibanernas maktövertagande i Afghanistan, militärkuppen i Myanmar, kriget i Gaza och Rysslands illegala anfallskrig i Ukraina. Detta påverkade Finlands prioriteringar, då man inte längre kunde samarbeta med vissa regeringar eller då behoven i mottagarländer förändrades på grund av konflikter. Vissa landkontexter kommer att förbli volatila eller osäkra under nästa programcykel, med relaterade konsekvenser för framtida programutveckling.

Även den finländska kontexten förändrades, till följd av den nya regeringens prioriteringar och åtstramningsåtgärder som inverkade på planeringen av det framtida bilaterala utvecklingssamarbetet. Fyra länder – Afghanistan, Kenya, Moçambique och Myanmar – kommer inte vara föremål för landprogrammering under nästa programcykel, och kommer att ha mycket begränsade resurser för bilateralt utvecklingssamarbete. Med undantag för Ukraina kommer de återstående landprogrammen i Etiopien, Nepal, Somalia och Tanzania och programmet i Palestina att genomföras med avsevärt reducerade budgeter. Förändringar i den finska kontexten orsakade också en obalans mellan vissa programs målsättningar och personalresurser, vilket resulterade i en ansträngd personalsituation. Ukrainaprogrammet hade begränsade personalresurser i början av landprogramperioden. Budgeten för Ukraina har sedan dess utökats avsevärt, medan personalresurserna inte ökat i samma omfattning.

Adaptivt (anpassningsbart) arbetssätt: Landprogrammen förvaltades aktivt och framgångsrikt för att tillförsäkra att det förblev relevanta då landkontexten förändrades. I flera fall (Myanmar, Afghanistan, Moçambique och Tanzania) gav förändringar i kontexten upphov till tillfälliga riktlinjer och uppdaterade programdokument. En mer omfattande revidering av programdokument tog mycket tid och ansträngningar i anspråk samt krävde kompetens i resultatstyrning, vilket på grund av de begränsade personalresurserna visade sig vara en utmaning. I Ukraina blev landprogrammet



inaktuellt eftersom det inte uppdaterades trots att ytterligare insatser lades till och programmet inriktades mot de nya behov som uppstod till följd av konflikten. Trots det fanns det i samtliga landprogram en kontinuitet från en programcykel till följande i fråga om resultatområden, även i de land där kontexten förändrades dramatiskt. Riktade påverkansaktiviteter spelade en central roll för den adaptiva förvaltningen av landprogrammen. En annan faktor som underlättade anpassningen var, enligt landsteamerna, den höga personalkompetensen och det effektiva samarbetet inom teamerna. Detta kan dock påverkas i framtiden ifall den finska regeringens åtstramningsåtgärder för med sig ytterligare personalnedskärningar.

Resultat: År 2022 rapporterades 82% av alla planerade kortsiktiga resultat (och 85% av de långsiktiga resultaten) inom landprogrammen som "tillfredsställande" eller "bra". Under 2020 och 2021, det sista året under den föregående programcykeln och det första under den nuvarande, var situationen en annan, då pandemin, konflikter och regimförändringar hade en stor inverkan på resultaten, särskilt i de mer instabila länder som prioriterats av Finland. Finlands riktade påverkansaktiviteter bidrog till betydande resultat utöver det ekonomiska stödet, särskilt i samband med programpartners och multilaterala insatser. Påverkansaktiviteter och -resultat uppföljdes och rapporterades dock inte systematiskt.

Det genomsnittliga budgetutnyttjandet för landprogrammen var högt (86% år 2021, och 84% år 2022), men procentsatsen återspeglar inte de praktiska utmaningarna i länderna. Samtliga landprogram bidrog till förverkligandet av mänskliga rättigheter (HRBA) och UM:s tvärgående mål för jämställdhet och icke-diskriminering, men i mindre omfattning till klimatresiliens och utsläppsmål. Framöver förväntas landprogrammen fortsatt att generera kortsiktiga resultat, medan mer långsiktiga resultat beror på förutsättningarna i varje enskilt land, särskilt i instabila kontexter.

Bärkraft: Resultatens bärkraft är extremt beroende av utvecklingsscenarioer i de flesta partnerländerna. Om kontexten blir mer gynnsam eller åtminstone inte försämras ytterligare, så förväntas resultaten att fortsatt finnas kvar i några år eller mer i de flesta länderna. Förväntade resultat på längre sikt beror starkt på hur gynnsam kontexten är för de förändringar som behövs. Detta kan skilja sig avsevärt mellan landprogrammets resultatområden även inom samma land, och beror på hur oberäknelig och föränderlig landkontexten är, samt på den finska regeringens åtstramningsåtgärder.

I vissa länder har tidigare uppnådda resultat delvis gått förlorade på grund av regimförändringar och konflikter, till exempel i Afghanistan, Etiopien, Myanmar och Palestina, eller kan gå förlorade i framtiden, till exempel i Palestina och Ukraina. Generellt sett krävs det funktionella system, tillgänglig kapacitet och ett starkt ägarskap hos myndigheter eller intressenter för att resultat ska vara bärkraftiga. I kontexter där det inte finns någon regeringspartner är resultat på individ- och lokalsamhällsnivå mer bärkraftiga än resultat på institutionsnivå, men förutsättningar kan saknas för att dessa resultat ska kunna bidra till mer långsiktiga resultat på högre nivå.

Landprogrammets mervärde: Landprogrammen har varit viktiga för att främja resultatstyrning och en resultatorienterad arbetskultur inom UM. Ett programbaserat tillvägagångssätt möjliggör planering och uppföljning av större program, i motsats till enskilda projekt, då planering och rapportering fokuserar på resultat snarare än aktiviteter. Landprogrammen bidrar till att en gemensam vision av utvecklingssamarbetets syfte, mål och mekanismer kan delas med intressenter, vilket ökar Finlands synlighet. Detta har bidragit till mobilisering av ytterligare medel för projekt genom, till exempel, delegerad EU-finansiering till Finland i Nepal.



Även om landprogrammets mervärde begränsas av deras fokus på bilateralt utvecklingssamarbete har de försett Finland med landsexpertis, kontakter och ingångar som också kan gynna andra finländska politiska prioriteringar utöver det bilaterala utvecklingssamarbetet, särskilt politiska, ekonomiska och handelsrelaterade prioriteringar. Detta är en viktig tillgång inte bara för det framtida utvecklingssamarbetet i landet, utan även för andra politikområden som den finska regeringen prioriterar. Finlands rykte och landprogrammen ger tillträde och möjligheter för andra finländska prioriteringar och instrument.

De dokument och processer som styr landprogrammen ses av landsteamerna som användbara överlag, men de upplevs också som tidskrävande och oflexibla. Landprogrammets resultatramverk har blivit komplicerade, är ofta på för hög nivå och för beroende av kvantitativa indikatorer för vilka data inte alltid är tillgängliga. De täcker inte alla resultat som uppnåtts inom landprogrammen, till exempel resultaten från Finlands påverkansarbete eller från deltagande i projektkommittéer och arbetsgrupper. Uppföljningen försvåras av bristen på information för vissa indikatorer och av att landteamerna inte alltid slagit fast mål för indikatorerna i resultatramverken.

Utbetalningssiffror används men landprogrammets riskmatriser och planer för monitorering, utvärdering och lärande utnyttjas inte regelbundet. Större uppmärksamhet ägnas åt uppföljning på projektnivå. Den process som omgärdar landprogrammets 'management response' ses som mycket nyttig då den ger landsteamerna en möjlighet för diskussion med, och för att få feedback från, UM:s högsta ledning.

Slutsatser. På basis av dessa resultat drogs sex övergripande slutsatser:

1. **Resultat har uppnåtts inom landprogrammen:** Under de första två åren av den nuvarande programcykeln uppnåddes de flesta av de 10 landprogrammets planerade resultat inom de avsedda resultatområdena. Detta trots betydande utmaningar relaterade till den pågående pandemin, konflikter och regimförändringar i vissa länder.
2. **Landprogrammen har stärkt kontinuiteten och resultatstyrningen av Finlands bilaterala utvecklingssamarbete:** Den programbaserade modaliteten gjorde det möjligt för UM att planera, förvalta och rapportera om den finska utvecklingssamarbetets aggregerade resultat på landnivå, samt bidrog till en resultatkultur inom UM som betonar ledning och ansvarsutkrävande för resultat, snarare än bara för att genomföra planerade aktiviteter.
3. **För att stärka deras mervärde måste landprogrammen återspegla verkligheten på plats, men att uppdatera programdokument och resultatramverk efter drastiska förändringar i partnerländerna krävde en orealistisk kraftansträngning med tanke på landprogrammets nuvarande format och befintliga personalresurser:** Efter regimförändringarna i Afghanistan och Myanmar uppdaterades slutligen endast landprogrammet i Myanmar helt. Landprogrammet i Ukraina har ännu inte uppdaterats efter Rysslands anfallskrig, och det senaste Gaza-kriget har inte föranlett en uppdatering av resultatramverket i Palestina. Sådana grundläggande uppdateringar krävde mycket tid, ansträngning och resultatstyrningsexpertis, som överträffar den begränsade personalkapaciteten i de flesta landsteam på grund av andra konkurrerande prioriteringar.
4. **Proaktiv planering för bärkraftiga resultat och uthållighet blir allt viktigare för landprogrammen, med tanke på okända, men sannolika, framtida dramatiska förändringar:** Det räcker inte nödvändigtvis längre att reagera på händelser i efterskott, med tanke på den fortsatt höga osäkerheten om den framtida utvecklingen i de flesta av de



10 länder som varit i fokus för denna metaanalys. Ett bättre alternativ kan vara att förutse och stärka uthållighet genom att proaktivt utveckla program, tillvägagångssätt och resultat som kan förbli intakta i olika framtida scenarier.

- 5. Förutom minskad utvecklingseffekt riskerar Finland, med den nya regeringens prioriteringar och åtstramningsåtgärder, att förlora ett viktigt fotfäste i partnerländerna:** Landprogrammets mervärde har inte begränsats till utvecklingssamarbetets resultat. Betydande fördelar har uppnåtts med hjälp av den expertis, de kontakter och de ingångar som skapats inom utvecklingssamarbetet men som också gynnar andra politiska prioriteringar. Det finns en risk att dessa fördelar, som skulle kunna gynna även Finlands utrikes- och handelspolitiska mål, går förlorade till följd av budget- och personalåtstramningar och minskningen av antalet långsiktiga partnerländer inom utvecklingssamarbetet.
- 6. En bättre samordning av det bilaterala utvecklingssamarbetet och andra finländska prioriteringar i partnerländerna är möjlig, och kan gynna andra politikerområden utöver det bilaterala utvecklingssamarbetet:** De regionala avdelningarna i UM har ansvar för utvecklingssamarbetet med enskilda länder, men också för politiska, handels- och handelspolitiska frågor. De regionala avdelningarna skulle kunna utarbeta samordnade planer för att skapa synergier mellan alla dessa områden jämte en samordnad rapportering. Detta kunde innefatta ett mer effektivt utnyttjande av landprogrammets resurser, även till nytta för andra politikområden utöver det bilaterala utvecklingssamarbetet.

Rekommendationer. Baserat på dessa slutsatser och syntesen av landspecifika resultat har meta-analysen genererat sex övergripande rekommendationer:

- 1. UM bör fortsätta med ett program- och resultatbaserat tillvägagångssätt i det bilaterala utvecklingssamarbetet:** Landprogrammen har bidragit till resultatuppfyllelse, förbättrat synligheten och kontinuiteten i Finlands utvecklingssamarbete, stärkt Finlands rykte och närvaro i de flesta länder, tillåtit rapportering av och ansvarsutkrävande för resultat, och kan bidra till ett mer samordnat tillvägagångssätt för att främja Finlands utrikes- och handelspolitiska prioriteringar i dessa länder.
- 2. Landprogrammets format och processer bör förenklas och anpassas:** Nästa generations landprogramsdokument och resultatrapporter bör ha samma grundläggande struktur och innehåll, men även ett kort avsnitt om påverkansaktiviteter och deras resultat. Resultatramverket bör förenklas genom att sänka (men inte överge) kraven på indikatorer och mål, särskilt i instabila kontexter. Metaanalysteamet rekommenderar att man fortsätter med att använda trafikljus för att kategorisera måluppfyllelse men att dessa i första hand baserar sig på självbedömning av de framsteg som gjorts mot förväntade resultat.
- 3. Framtida landprogramutveckling bör mer systematiskt omfatta scenarioanalys och beakta uthållighet mot möjliga dramatiska förändringar.** Lämpliga tillfällen för scenarioanalys är innan en ny programcykel förbereds (som i denna metaanalys), eller efter plötsliga förändringar, som i fallet med Afghanistan och Myanmar 2021. UM bör också proaktivt använda sig av insikter som erhållits genom att analysera konsekvenser av eventuella framtidsscenarier för Finlands bilaterala utvecklingssamarbete och för andra engagemangsområden.



4. **Vid genomförandet av Finlands regerings prioriteringar och åtstramningsåtgärder, inklusive utfasningen av vissa landprogram, bör UM fokusera på att tillförsäkra bärkraftiga resultat och i möjligaste mån upprätthålla befintliga ingångar och inflytande i partnerländerna.** Landteamen bör uppmuntras till att fortsätta fokusera på att bevara och stärka partnerskap med myndigheter och externa partners, samt på påverkansaktiviteter. Med tanke på att landteamens resurser kommer att vara begränsade, bör dessa aktiviteter få högre prioritet än ny programutveckling.
5. **UM bör ytterligare samordna planeringen och rapportering av bilateralt utvecklingssamarbete på landnivå med utrikes- och handelsprioriteringar samtidigt som man bibehåller en god resultatstyrningspraxis i landprogrammen:** Detta är möjligt genom att fortsätta med den vedertagna resultatbaserade planeringen och rapporteringen för det bilaterala utvecklingssamarbetet, men att sedan utnyttja dessa planer och rapporter för mer samordnad planering och rapportering för olika politikområden.
6. **UM bör tillämpa lärdomar från resultatbaserad bilateral programutveckling för att främja resultatbaserad förvaltning av utrikes- och handelsprioriteringar:** Under de senaste två decennierna har betydande erfarenheter samlats in om hur man tillämpar resultatstyrning inom det bilaterala utvecklingssamarbetet. Samtidigt som dessa framgångar bevaras, bör UM överväga att tillämpa några av dessa processer och format för planering och rapportering av landspecifika resultat inom andra politikområden.



Summary

Introduction. This report summarises the results of a meta-analysis of Finland's 10 Country Programmes (CPs) for the 2021-2024 programme cycle, in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Palestine, Somalia, Tanzania, and Ukraine. The objectives of the meta-analysis were to inform development cooperation planning beyond the current programming cycle in the 10 countries and to assess how CPs had contributed to results. The analysis did not concentrate on individual interventions, but on aggregate and consolidated results against broader areas of achievement. Compared to a classical evaluation, the meta-analysis relied more on the views and experiences of the country teams who – beyond sharing information – participated in interpreting and assessing the evidence at hand.

Findings. The meta-analysis produced 29 distinct synthesis findings across the 10 CPs, regarding the *context* in which CPs were implemented, how they were *adaptively managed*, how and what *results* they delivered, how *sustainable* these results were, and what the *added value* of CPs was compared to planning and implementing projects without a programmatic modality. In addition, more detailed country-specific findings for the 10 CPs are summarised in Volume II of this report.

Context: All countries experienced evolving contexts, including some with dramatic and unexpected impacts on CPs. This had implications with some CP documents and results frameworks becoming obsolete and several country teams experiencing challenges in implementing and monitoring planned activities. The most dramatic examples were Afghanistan, Myanmar, Palestine and Ukraine, with the Taliban take-over in Afghanistan, the military coup in Myanmar, the war in Gaza and Russia's illegal war of aggression in Ukraine. This led to changes in Finland's priorities in response to the loss of government partners or changing needs of the recipient country due to conflict. Some contexts that the CPs operate in will continue to remain volatile or be uncertain in the next programme cycle, with corresponding implications for future programming.

There were also changes in the context in Finland, with new Government of Finland's priorities and austerity measures influencing the planning of future bilateral development cooperation. Four countries – Afghanistan, Kenya, Mozambique and Myanmar – will not have CPs in the next programming cycle and will have very limited resources for bilateral development cooperation. Except for Ukraine, the remaining CPs in Ethiopia, Nepal, Somalia and Tanzania and the programme in Palestine will operate with significantly reduced budgets. Changes in the Finnish context also caused a mismatch between programme ambition and staff resources for some CPs, leading to staff being overstretched. The Ukraine programme had limited staff resources at the beginning of the CP period, and as the programme budget has expanded significantly, increase in staffing has lagged behind.

Adaptive management: CPs were actively and successfully managed to remain relevant when country contexts changed. In several instances (Myanmar, Afghanistan, Mozambique and Tanzania), changing country contexts were usefully reflected in temporary policies and updated CP documents. However, fully updating CP documents required much time, effort and results-based management (RBM) expertise, and proved to be challenging given limited staff capacities. In Ukraine, the CP was not updated, so it became outdated, although additional interventions were added, and the original programming pivoted to address the new needs that arose due to the



conflict. Nonetheless, all CPs demonstrated continuity in terms of the respective impact areas across programmatic cycles and even during drastic changes of context. Targeted influencing activities played a central role in adaptively managing CPs. According to country teams, another factor supporting adaptation were strong staff expertise and effective team work, but this may be impacted in the future by a loss of staff due to the austerity measures.

Results: In 2022, 82% of all planned CP outputs (and 85% of outcomes) were reported as “satisfactory” or “good”. This was after two difficult years 2020 and 2021, the last year of the previous programme cycle and the first year of the current cycle, during which the Covid-19 pandemic, conflicts and regime changes significantly affected results, especially in the more fragile countries that Finland has prioritised as partner countries. Finland’s targeted influencing activities contributed to significant results beyond its own financial contributions, especially vis-à-vis programme partners and by shaping multilateral projects. Influencing activities and results were however not systematically monitored or reported. Average CP budget utilisation was high at 86% in 2021 and 84% in 2022, but the utilization rate itself does not provide a full picture of challenges on the ground. All CPs contributed to MFA’s human rights-based approach and cross-cutting priorities such as gender equality and non-discrimination, but with a weaker focus on climate resilience and low emission development. Going forward, CPs are expected to continue delivering results at output level, although the achievement of longer-term outcomes especially in fragile contexts strongly depends on enabling conditions.

Sustainability: Sustainability of results is extremely dependent on development scenarios for most partner countries. A positive finding is that results are expected to remain in place for some years or more for most countries if development contexts become more favourable or, at least, do not further deteriorate. Expected longer-term results depend strongly on how conducive the country context is for the intended changes. This can significantly differ between CP impact areas even in the same country and depends on the level of volatility and the evolving contexts in partner countries, and forthcoming Finnish Government austerity measures. In some countries, previously achieved results have been partly lost because of regime change and conflict, for example in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Myanmar, and Palestine, or could be lost in the future, for example in Palestine and Ukraine. Generally, sustainability of results requires functional systems, availability of capacities, and strong ownership by government or other stakeholders. In contexts where there is no government partner, individual and community-level results are more resilient than institution-level results but may lack the enabling environment that would allow contributing to longer-term and higher-level results.

CP added value: CPs have been important for supporting the development of a results-based management approach and a results-oriented work culture within the MFA. A programmatic approach allows for planning and monitoring of larger programmes, as opposed to individual projects, with the focus on planning for and reporting on results rather than activities. Through CPs, a coherent vision of Finland’s development cooperation goals, objectives and mechanisms for achievement, is shared with internal and external stakeholders, thereby increasing Finland’s visibility. This has also generated additional funding for projects for example through delegated EU funding managed by Finland in Nepal. Although the value-added of CPs is limited due to the focus on bilateral development cooperation, they have provided Finland with country expertise, contacts and access that can also support advancing other Finnish policy priorities beyond bilateral development cooperation, particularly political, commerce and trade priorities. This represents an important asset not only for future development cooperation in the partner country, but also for other policy areas prioritised by the Finnish government. Finland’s reputation and CPs provide an entry point and opportunities for other Finnish policy priorities and other instruments.



Although the documents and processes for CPs are seen by country teams as useful overall, they are also perceived as time-consuming and inflexible. The CP results frameworks have become complicated, too high-level, and too dependent on quantitative indicators for which data is not always available. They do not cover all results achieved by CPs, for example from Finland's influencing activities or from participation in project steering committees and working groups. The unavailability of some data for indicators and a lack of indicator targets set by country teams in results frameworks can hinder monitoring. Financial disbursement data is used but the CP risk management annexes and monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) plans are often not regularly utilized, with more attention paid to project level monitoring. The CP management response process is seen as very useful for providing the country teams with an opportunity for discussion with MFA senior management and feedback.

Conclusions. Building on these findings, six overall conclusions were drawn:

1. **CPs have delivered results:** In the first two years of the current programme cycle, the 10 CPs achieved most of their planned results in their targeted impact areas. This was despite significant challenges related to the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, conflicts and regime changes in some countries.
2. **CPs have strengthened continuity and results-based management of Finland's bilateral development cooperation:** A programmatic modality allowed the MFA to plan, manage, and report on aggregated country-level results of Finland's bilateral development cooperation and contributed to a results culture at the MFA that highlights management and accountability for results rather than only for implementing planned activities.
3. **To add programmatic value, CPs need to reflect the realities on the ground, but updating CP documents and results frameworks after drastic changes in partner countries required an unrealistic level of effort with current CP formats and staff resources:** After regime changes in Afghanistan and Myanmar, only the Myanmar CP was eventually fully updated. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has not yet been reflected in an updated CP, and the recent Gaza war has not been reflected in an updated results framework. Such fundamental updates required much time, effort and RBM expertise that exceed the limited staff capacities in view of other competing priorities in most country teams.
4. **In country programming, proactive planning for sustainability of results and resilience in view of unknown but likely future shocks becomes increasingly important:** Due to the continued high level of uncertainty of the future trajectory in most of the 10 countries of this meta-analysis, reacting to events after they have happened may not suffice anymore. A better option may be to anticipate and increase resilience by proactively programming approaches and results that will remain intact across different future scenarios.



5. **In addition to reduced development impact, new Government of Finland's priorities and austerity measures carry the risk of losing important seats at the table in partner countries:** The value-added of CPs have been broader than just the results from development cooperation activities. There have been significant benefits from the expertise, contacts, and access that supports Finnish policy priorities beyond development cooperation. There is a risk that through the reduction of CP budgets and staffing and the reduction in the number of long-term development partner countries, these benefits, that would be available to take advantage of in furthering Finland's foreign and trade policy goals, will be lost.
6. **Closer integration between bilateral development cooperation and other Finnish priorities in partner countries is feasible and may benefit other Finnish policies beyond bilateral development cooperation:** The regional departments are not only responsible for development cooperation with specific countries, but also for political, trade and commercial issues. There is no reason why at regional department level there cannot be integrated plans to create synergies between all these areas and combined reporting undertaken at regional departmental level, including more effective use of assets associated with CPs for advancing other Finnish policy priorities beyond bilateral development cooperation.

Recommendations. Based on these conclusions and the synthesis and country-specific findings, the meta-analysis team issued six overall recommendations:

1. **The MFA should continue a programme and results-based approach in bilateral development cooperation:** CPs have contributed to delivering results, strengthened the visibility and continuity of Finland's development cooperation, established Finland's reputation and presence in most partner countries. They have allowed for reporting on and accountability for results, and they can contribute to a more comprehensive approach to advancing Finland's foreign and trade policy priorities in these countries.
2. **CP formats and processes should be simplified and adapted:** Next generation CP documents and results reports should retain their basic structure and content, with an additional brief section on influencing activities and respective results. The results framework should be simplified by relaxing (but not abandoning) requirements for indicators and targets, especially in fragile contexts. The meta-analysis team recommends continuing with the traffic-light effectiveness ratings but to base them primarily on self-assessments of progress made towards intended results.



3. **Future country programming should embrace scenario analysis and consider resilience vis-a-vis possible shocks more systematically.** Useful occasions for scenario analysis are before preparing a new programming cycle (as in this meta-analysis), or after sudden changes, as in the case of Afghanistan and Myanmar in 2021. The MFA should also make proactive use of insights gained by analysing the implications of possible future scenarios on Finland's bilateral development cooperation, and for other areas of engagement.
4. **When implementing the Government of Finland's priorities and austerity measures, including the phasing out of some CPs, the MFA should focus on sustaining results and conserve, to the extent possible, existing access and influence in partner countries.** Country teams should be encouraged to continue to focus on maintaining and building partnerships with government and external partners, as well as influencing activities. These activities should be prioritised over new programming given that country team resources will be limited.
5. **The MFA should further integrate country-level planning and reporting of bilateral development cooperation with that of its foreign and trade priorities while conserving the good RBM practices established in CPs.** This could be done by continuing with the established results-based planning, monitoring and reporting for bilateral development cooperation but then to draw on these plans and reports for more integrated planning and reporting across policy areas.
6. **The MFA should apply lessons learned from results-based bilateral programming to support results-based management of its foreign and trade priorities.** Over the past two decades, substantial experience has been accumulated in how to apply results-based management to bilateral development cooperation. While conserving these achievements, the MFA should consider applying some of these processes and formats for planning and reporting of country-specific results in its other policy areas.



Table of Key Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

FINDINGS	CONCLUSIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS
Finding 5: CPs were actively and successfully managed to remain relevant when country contexts changed.	Conclusion 1: CPs have delivered results.	<p>Recommendation 1: The MFA should continue a programme- and results-based approach in bilateral development cooperation. (All conclusions contribute to this recommendation)</p> <p>Recommendation 2: Current CP formats and processes should be simplified and adapted. (Conclusions 1-3 contribute to this recommendation)</p> <p><i>It is addressed to MFA senior management and senior advisers of the concerned departments (the Department for the Americas and Asia, the Department for Africa and the Middle East, the Department for Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia). It should be implemented as soon as possible, for instructions to be published in time for the 2025-28 programmatic cycle.</i></p>
Finding 6: Targeted influencing activities played a central role in adaptively managing CPs, often with effects beyond Finland's own contribution.		
Finding 8: CPs demonstrated continuity in terms of their impact areas across programmatic cycles and even during drastic changes of context.		
Finding 11: After a difficult year 2021, overall reported results performance returned to pre-pandemic levels in 2022.		
Finding 12: The Covid-19 pandemic, conflict and regime change are among the key factors affecting results in 2021 and 2022.		
Finding 13: Average CP budget utilisation was high (86% in 2021 and 84% in 2022) but the rate itself does not provide a full picture of challenges on the ground.		
Finding 14: The results of targeted influencing activities are significant but not systematically monitored or reported.		
Finding 15: All CPs contribute to MFA's cross-cutting priorities of a Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA), gender equality and non-discrimination, with a weaker focus on climate resilience and particularly low emission development.		



FINDINGS	CONCLUSIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS
<p>Finding 8. CPs demonstrated continuity in terms of their impact areas across programmatic cycles and even during drastic changes of context.</p> <p>Finding 21: The CP has been an important instrument for supporting an RBM culture within the MFA, and for demonstrating programme-level results.</p> <p>Finding 22: A programmatic approach gives a coherent vision of Finland's development cooperation goals, objectives and mechanisms for achievement to internal and external stakeholders.</p> <p>Finding 23: CPs provided Finland with country expertise, contacts and access that can also support other Finnish policies beyond bilateral development cooperation.</p> <p>Finding 25: CP documents and processes are overall useful but time-consuming and lack flexibility.</p>	<p>Conclusion 2: CPs have strengthened continuity and results-based management of Finland's bilateral development cooperation.</p>	<p>Recommendation 1: The MFA should continue a programme- and results-based approach in bilateral development cooperation. (All conclusions contribute to this recommendation)</p> <p>Recommendation 2: Current CP formats and processes should be simplified and adapted. (Conclusions 1-3 contribute to this recommendation)</p> <p><i>It is addressed to MFA senior management and senior advisers of the concerned departments (the Department for the Americas and Asia, the Department for Africa and the Middle East, the Department for Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia). It should be implemented as soon as possible, for instructions to be published in time for the 2025-28 programmatic cycle.</i></p>
<p>Finding 3: There was a mismatch between programme ambition and staff resources in many CPs.</p> <p>Finding 7: In several instances, changing country contexts were usefully reflected in temporary policies and updated CPs.</p> <p>Finding 9: Staff capacity and expertise dominate self-perceived strengths of country teams – and their loss is considered a threat.</p> <p>Finding 25: CP documents and processes are overall useful but time-consuming and lack flexibility.</p> <p>Finding 26: The CP results frameworks are rather complicated, too dependent on quantitative indicators and do not provide information on influencing & project steering results.</p> <p>Finding 27: Unavailability of indicator data and a lack of targets hinders the monitoring of results frameworks.</p> <p>Finding 28: Financial disbursement data is used but the risk management annex and monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) plans are often not regularly monitored.</p> <p>Finding 29: The CP management response process is useful.</p>	<p>Conclusion 3: To add programmatic value, CPs need to reflect the realities on the ground, but updating CP documents and results frameworks after drastic changes in partner countries required an unrealistic level of effort with current CP formats and staff resources.</p>	



FINDINGS	CONCLUSIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS
<p>Finding 1. All countries experienced evolving contexts, including some with dramatic and unexpected impacts on CPs.</p> <p>Finding 2: Some contexts that the CPs operate in will remain extremely volatile and uncertain in the next programme cycle.</p> <p>Finding 16. Going forward, CPs are expected to continue delivering immediate results. The achievement of longer-term results strongly depends on enabling conditions.</p> <p>Finding 17: Sustainability of results strongly depends on development scenarios for most countries.</p> <p>Finding 18: Sustainability is expected to be high when systems are functional, capacities remain available, and there is strong ownership by government or stakeholders.</p> <p>Finding 19. In some countries, results achieved have however been (or could be) lost because of regime change and conflict.</p> <p>Finding 20: In contexts where there is no government partner, individual- and community-level results are more resilient than institution-level results (but may lack the enabling environment for contributing to higher-level results).</p>	<p>Conclusion 4: In country programming, proactive planning for sustainability of results and resilience in view of unknown but likely future shocks becomes increasingly important.</p>	<p>Recommendation 3: Future country programming should embrace scenario analysis and consider resilience vis-a-vis possible shocks more systematically.</p> <p><i>It is addressed to MFA senior management and senior advisers of concerned departments (the Department for the Americas and Asia, the Department for Africa and the Middle East, the Department for Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, but possibly also the Department for Development Policy and other departments representing policy priorities to be addressed in the scenario analysis). It should be implemented as soon as possible, in time for inclusion into the instructions for the 2025-28 programmatic cycle. If the scenario analyses conducted as part of the self-assessment workshops is considered sufficient, these can be used as a basis for the 2025-28 cycle but should be repeated if further dramatic changes of context occur.</i></p>
<p>Finding 4: New Government of Finland's priorities and austerity measures will shape the planning of future bilateral development cooperation.</p> <p>Finding 10: New Finnish government priorities led to a period of MFA-internal uncertainty and left the MFA with little free resources for future country programming.</p> <p>Finding 22: A programmatic approach gives a coherent vision of Finland's development cooperation goals, objectives and mechanisms for achievement to internal and external stakeholders.</p> <p>Finding 23: CPs provided Finland with country expertise, contacts and access that can also support other Finnish policies beyond bilateral development cooperation.</p>	<p>Conclusion 5: In addition to reduced development impact, new Government of Finland's priorities and austerity measures carry the risk of losing important footholds in partner countries.</p>	<p>Recommendation 4: When implementing new Government of Finland's priorities and austerity measures, including the phasing out of CPs, the MFA should focus on sustaining results and conserve, to the extent possible, existing access and influence in partner countries.</p> <p><i>It is addressed to MFA senior management and senior advisers of concerned departments (the Department for the Americas and Asia, the Department for Africa and the Middle East, the Department for Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia). It should be implemented as soon as possible.</i></p>
<p>Finding 4: New Government of Finland's priorities and austerity measures will shape the planning of future bilateral development cooperation.</p> <p>Finding 10: New Finnish government priorities led to a period of MFA-internal uncertainty and left the MFA with little free resources for future country programming.</p> <p>Finding 14: The results of targeted influencing activities are significant but not systematically monitored or reported.</p> <p>Finding 21: The CP has been an important instrument for supporting an RBM culture within the MFA, and for demonstrating programme-level results.</p> <p>Finding 23: CPs provided Finland with country expertise, contacts and access that can also support other Finnish policies beyond bilateral development cooperation.</p> <p>Finding 24: The value-add of CPs was limited by their focus on bilateral development cooperation.</p>	<p>Conclusion 6: Closer integration between bilateral development cooperation and other Finnish priorities in partner countries is feasible and may benefit other Finnish policies beyond bilateral development cooperation.</p>	<p>Recommendation 5: The MFA should further integrate country-level planning and reporting of bilateral development cooperation with that of its foreign and trade priorities while conserving the good RBM practices established in CPs.</p> <p>Recommendation 6: The MFA should apply lessons learned from results-based bilateral programming to support results-based management of its foreign and trade priorities.</p> <p>(Conclusion 2 also contributes to Recommendation 6)</p> <p><i>They are addressed to MFA senior management and senior advisers of concerned departments (the Department for the Americas and Asia, the Department for Africa and the Middle East, the Department for Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, but possibly also the Department for Development Policy and other departments representing other priority policy areas). It should be adopted as soon as possible, with rollout over the next couple of years.</i></p>



1. Introduction

This report summarises the results of a meta-analysis of Finland's 10 Country Programmes (CPs) in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Palestine, Somalia, Tanzania, and Ukraine. CPs serve to plan, implement and report on Finland's bilateral development cooperation in these countries in a results-oriented way.

1.1 Motivation and purpose

The principal motivation for the meta-analysis is to inform development cooperation in the next programming cycle in the 10 countries, and to render an account on contribution to results. Ultimately, the analysis will support the achievement of Finland's development policy objectives in these countries. In addition, it will also provide information for how to further develop the country-level programmatic modalities of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA).

1.2 Meta-analysis questions

The meta-analysis answered six overarching questions (Table 1). Questions 1-5 were addressed by analysis findings (Section 3), and the sixth question by the conclusions and recommendations (Sections 5 and 6).



Table 1 Meta-Analysis Questions

#	ISSUE	META-ANALYSIS QUESTION
1	Context	What key developments with relevance for the 2021-24 Country Programmes took place and are taking place in the ten partner countries? What key developments with relevance for the next programming cycle ¹ are expected?
2	(Adaptive) management	How have the 2021-24 Country Programmes been managed and adapted to respond to these developments and to other changing conditions to remain relevant?
3	Results	To what degree, how and why did/do the Country Programmes contribute (or did/do not contribute) to intended and unintended results?
4	Sustainability	How sustainable will Country Programme results likely be and what can be done to further sustain them?
5	Added value	What value have Country Programmes added compared to planning and implementing separate projects?
6	Next cycle	Based on what has been learned (questions 1-5), what should be changed and what should be maintained in the next programming ² cycle?

Source: *Terms of Reference (Annex 3)*.

1.3 Scope of the meta-analysis

The meta-analysis was conducted at the *aggregated level* of each CP. While it relied on information about activities and contributions made by individual projects and programmes, these were not separately evaluated. For example, results were assessed at the aggregated level of the programme and not at the level of the individual contributing projects.

Regional programmes were excluded from the meta-analysis to retain the focus on partner countries and the CP modality.

The meta-analysis focused on the *2021-24 programming cycle*. Information about earlier periods was included whenever contextually relevant but did not represent the main object of the analysis.

As explained below, the meta-analysis primarily relied on desk review of available MFA and non-MFA documentation, and on self-assessments by the respective country teams. The meta-analysis team also collected feedback from selected in-country stakeholders but was not expected to conduct an independent evaluation of each CP (which would have required verification and validation of reported and self-assessed results through independently collected evidence). Rather, stakeholder feedback was used to generate ideas for discussion during the workshops, and to challenge the country teams' own views and perceptions with an outside perspective.

1 "Country Programme cycle" in the Terms of Reference (Annex 3). The wording was adapted because not all countries will have CPs in the next programming cycle.

2 Ibid.




1.4 Approach and methodology

The assessment is a meta-analysis of Finland’s CPs. Compared to a classical evaluation, it relied more on the views and experiences of the country teams who – beyond sharing information – participated in interpreting and assessing the evidence at hand.

The focus of the meta-analysis was forward-looking, with an aim to establish a holistic understanding of the developments and achievements under each CP. The analysis did not concentrate on individual interventions, but on aggregate and consolidated results against broader areas of achievement and meta-analysis questions.

The meta-analysis team’s role in this analysis was to collect, analyse and present available information to the country teams, professionally guide, support and challenge them towards “making sense” of this information during the self-assessment workshops, and to exercise its independent expert judgment when synthesising overall responses to the meta-analysis questions from the evidence at hand.

Figure 1 Principal meta-analysis activities and end products



Source: Meta-analysis team & inception workshop presentation.

For each of the 10 countries, the meta-analysis team conducted a desk review of relevant documentation, interviewed selected country stakeholders (68 total) and facilitated a 2.5 day-long self-assessment workshop with the respective country teams.

Based on the information gained through these exercises, the meta-analysis team then compiled country reports for each country and validated them with the country teams. The final country reports are provided in Volume II of this report.

The meta-analysis team conducted several additional interviews on a more aggregated level with persons involved in earlier and current country programming at the MFA, and reviewed additional documentation at that level, such as for example instructions and templates for CP documents and reports. Overall, including workshop participants and external stakeholders, 149 people were consulted for the meta-analysis.



Based on this information – and on insights gained from the country-level analysis – the meta-analysis team exercised its independent judgment when deriving the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the present synthesis report.

The main activities and end products of the meta-analysis are summarised in Figure 1. Additional detail on the meta-analysis approach and methodology is provided in Annex 4.

1.5 This report

This report is organised as follows. After this introductory section, the 2021-24 CPs are introduced in Section 2, followed by a summary of findings along the first five meta-analysis questions (Section 3). Section 4 sums up experiences made with the meta-analysis approach. Conclusions and recommendations are provided in Sections 5 and 6, respectively, responding to the sixth meta-analysis question.

There are five annexes in this volume: list of references, introduction of the meta-analysis team, the Terms of Reference, more detail on the meta-analysis approach and methodology, and a list of organisations in which staff was consulted. Country-specific meta-analysis findings are summarised in 10 country reports in Volume II of this report.



2. Overview of Finland's Country Programmes

The Country Strategy modality was introduced by the MFA in 2012 as an instrument for results-based management (RBM) in long-term partner countries. From 2013 the Country Strategies set out the main strategic goals and objectives in each partner country, as well as the expected results for the development cooperation programme and related political and policy dialogue. For the 2021-2024 cycle this was split into two documents with Country *Strategies* focused on the main strategic goals in the partner country and the Country *Programmes* focused on RBM of the development cooperation under the Regional Departments. Ambassadors' Strategic Plans are also prepared for all partner countries. These outline the Ambassadors' annual aims and objectives for their term as Ambassador.

The "Country Programmes for Development Cooperation" (CPs) define the results that Finland aims at within its development cooperation programme in its partner countries, including contributions towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The CPs are supported by the development of theories of change that articulate the linkages between programme (or project) activities and policy/strategy goals, SDGs, impacts and outcomes. The objectives and indicators defined in the CPs' results frameworks are used to monitor progress and report on results. Monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) plans and the risk matrix are designed to support the management of CPs throughout the implementation and result management cycle. Country teams are responsible for the management of programmes and report annually to their respective departments. These results are then discussed by management and the country teams and respective departments give management responses to the teams as guidance for the coming year.



Figure 2 Key indicators in the 10 partner countries

Indicators	Afghanistan	Ethiopia	Kenya	Mozambique	Myanmar	Nepal	Palestine	Somalia	Tanzania	Ukraine	Finland
Population (2022) <i>(in millions)</i>	41.1	123.4	54.0	33.0	54.2	30.5	5.0*	17.6	65.5	38.0	5.6
Population growth <i>(annual % - 2022)</i>	2.5%	2.5%	1.9%	2.7%	0.7%	1.7%	2.4%*	3.1%	3.0%	-14.3%	0.3%
Human Development Index tier (2022) <i>HDI ranking out of 193 countries</i>	Low 182	Low 176	Medium 146	Low 183	Medium 144	Medium 146	High 111	Low 193	Low 167	High 100	V. high 12
GDP per capita <i>(current US\$) (2021)</i>	355.8	925	2069.7	504	1231.7	1229.4	3679*	576.5	1146	4827.8	53504.7
Income Group <i>(2022)</i>	Low	Low	Lower middle	Low	Lower middle	Lower middle	Upper middle	Low	Lower middle	Lower middle	High
Lower secondary completion rate total <i>(% of relevant age group) (different years)</i>	59.7% 2019	29.7% 2015	81.5% 2016	42.2% 2022	72.4% 2018	101.4% 2022	92.1%* 2022	- -	36.4% 2022	85% 2021	99.6% 2021
Maternal mortality ratio <i>(modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births) (2020)</i>	602	267	530	127	179	174	20	621	238	17	8
Contraceptive prevalence, any method <i>(% of married women ages 15-49) (diff. years)</i>	23% 2016	38% 2020	65% 2020	27% 2015	52% 2016	47% 2019	57% 2020	7% 2019	38% 2016	66% 2012	86% 2015
Proportion of pop. using safely managed drinking water services <i>(%, 2022)</i>	30%	13%	-	-	57%	16%	80%	-	11%	88%	100%
Fragile State Index rank <i>Ranking out of 179 countries (2023)</i>	6	11	35	21	12	55	34	1	65	18	177
Corruption Perception Index rank <i>Ranking out of 180 countries (2023)</i>	162	98	126	145	162	108	n.a.	180	87	104	2

Source: In order of appearance in the Figure: World Bank. (2022). Accessed at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>; World Bank. (2022). Accessed at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=KE-AF-ET-MZ-MM-NP-PS-SO-TZ-UA&name_desc=false; UNDP. (2022). Accessed at: <https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI>; World Bank. (2021). Accessed at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?view=chart>; World Bank. (2022). Accessed at: <https://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/the-world-by-income-and-region.html>; World Bank. (n.d.). Accessed at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY?view=chart>; World Bank. (n.d.). Accessed at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.CMPT.LO.ZS>; World Bank. (n.d.). Accessed at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS>; World Bank. (2020). Accessed at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT>; World Bank. (n.d.). Accessed at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.CONU.ZS>; UN. (2022). Accessed at: <https://www.sdg6data.org/en>; Fund for Peace. (2023). *Fragile State Index*. Accessed at: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/>; Transparency International. (2023). *Corruption Perceptions Index*. Accessed at: <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023>.


For the 2021-2024 cycle, a CP for each of the 10 MFA long-term partner countries was prepared: Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Palestine, Somalia, Tanzania, and Ukraine. The CPs responded to the different situation in each country (Figure 2) and identified the areas of cooperation, forms of support, objectives, and indicators, building on the partner countries' own development plans and discussed with the authorities of the partner countries and with other development partners, including civil society organisations (CSOs) and other donors. Regional units organised consultations with other departments in the ministry and Finnish stakeholders before their final approval by the minister. Consultations in conflict and very fragile



situations varied from the normal process, as a full consultation process was not always possible due to the challenging context.

Disbursements to CP projects between 2016 and 2022 varied between years and countries (Figure 3). Over this period, the Afghanistan CP was largest programme with a cumulative total of EUR 132.7 million, followed by the Ethiopia CP with EUR 95.7 million. The smallest CP over this period was Kenya with EUR 28.7 million. The largest single annual disbursement to a CP was EUR 25.8 million to Ukraine in 2022. Total disbursements for the 10 CPs averaged at EUR 103.0 million per year between 2016-22.

Figure 3 CP disbursements 2016-22³



Source: MFA financial reporting system – Ratsu.

The CPs are organised by impact areas with usually two or three impact areas for each CP. These impact areas relate to Finland’s development policy priorities of the rights of women and girls; quality inclusive education, sustainable economies and decent work; peaceful and democratic societies; climate and natural resources; and humanitarian assistance. Each CP contributed to three to five development policy priorities, with humanitarian assistance the exception as this is managed by the Unit for Humanitarian Assistance and it is not part of the CPs. All CPs included the rights of women and girls as it is an MFA cross-cutting issue. Most CPs included quality inclusive education and peaceful and democratic societies. Sustainable economies and democratic societies and climate and natural resources were addressed in several CPs.

3 The data includes Finnish funding to interventions under the 2021-2024 Country Programmes and 2016-2020 Country Strategy as per the MFA’s financial reporting system Ratsu. For consistency across the 10 countries, it excludes country-specific appropriations from other budget lines. The meta-analysis team notes that Finnish funding was supplemented by delegated funding from the EU in e.g. Nepal. This is not captured in the above figure, as such funding is recorded under a different budget line.



3. Findings

1.1 Key developments affecting the Country Programmes

This section assesses the key developments with relevance for the 2021-2024 CPs that took place during the programme cycle and the key developments that will be relevant for the next programme cycle from 2025-2028.

Finding 1: All countries experienced evolving contexts, including some with dramatic and unexpected impacts on CPs.

The landscape that the CPs were designed for experienced changes during the programme cycle in the majority of countries (see Figure 4). The most dramatic examples were in Afghanistan, Myanmar, Palestine and Ukraine, with the Taliban take-over in Afghanistan, the military coup in Myanmar, the war in Gaza and Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. This led to changes in Finland's priorities to respond to the loss of government partners they could work with in Afghanistan and Myanmar and to changing needs due to the conflicts in Palestine and Ukraine.


This had implications for the CPs that became less relevant as the circumstances changed and brought challenges in implementing and monitoring planned activities. In response, a temporary policy was developed in Myanmar for 2021, followed by a short-term CP for 2022-24. In Afghanistan, a temporary policy replaced the original CP from 2022 onwards. Additional activities were added to the Ukraine CP which were outside the original impact areas and some planned activities could not be implemented under the Palestine CP.

Other countries were also impacted by significant developments. Somalia continued to experience instability with internal conflicts and periods of political instability. This impacted programming and increased humanitarian needs, while Mozambique and Ethiopia both experienced periods of sporadic conflict. In contrast, a change of government in Tanzania in 2021 positively changed the context from an earlier government that had had little contact with development partners and had allowed very limited space for any civil society activities, to one that was more open. This allowed the CP to move into different areas of programming focused on rights and inclusion, and a new CP was developed in 2022. In Nepal and Kenya the context remained more stable over the CP period with both countries experiencing relatively peaceful elections and stability.

All long-term partner countries experienced negative macro-economic impacts due to the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine, which increased food prices and inflation, reducing government fiscal resources. This compounded the on-going effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, particularly in the health and education sectors which had experienced severe disruption and pressure on resources. Climate change continued to have an impact with droughts and flooding in the Horn of Africa, as well as natural disasters in Afghanistan.



Figure 4 Overview of key events with relevance for the CPs in the 10 countries



Source: CP country reports (Volume II).

Finding 2: Some contexts that the CPs operate in will remain extremely volatile and uncertain in the next programme cycle.

There is currently a high degree of uncertainty about the outcome of the conflicts in Ukraine and Palestine and in the medium-term about the future trajectory of Myanmar and Somalia. These countries are all experiencing conflict that may lead to improvements or deterioration in governance with a resolution of conflicts, or more intense conflicts developing. Regardless of the outcomes, these contexts will remain uncertain and volatile during the next programming cycle.

Trends in global geo-politics and diminishing Western influence particularly in Africa, and the rise of non-traditional donors such as China and Middle Eastern Countries may also increase tensions and uncertainty, particularly in the Horn of Africa. Climate change is another factor that has become more prominent in the current programme cycle through some partner countries experiencing prolonged drought and flooding, while all countries are highly vulnerable to natural disasters and extreme weather. Ukraine is also facing more intense environmental damage due to the war, which also makes it more vulnerable to climate change.

All these factors will have a major impact on the shape and direction of Finland's future development cooperation programming, particularly the need to use a triple nexus approach encompassing humanitarian assistance, development cooperation and peace building. This approach is already integrated into some CPs, such as Afghanistan, Myanmar and Palestine, but it is likely to become more prominent in the next programme cycle.



Finding 3: There was a mismatch between programme ambition and staff resources in many CPs.

The CPs were developed under the assumption that the level of staff resources would remain the same throughout the programme cycle. This assumption held in the case of Kenya, Mozambique and Tanzania, but in the other CPs posts were amalgamated, not filled when staff left and there were long gaps in filling vacancies in all country teams. For example, in Somalia the Head of Co-operation position was not filled by a new member of staff, but the education advisor moved into this position, with the advisor not replaced. In Afghanistan there were only between two and three staff fully dedicated for the CP, and only one was certain to continue in her position going forward, while the Nepal CP has experienced long gaps before vacant positions were filled.

As argued elsewhere, staff capacity represented the number one worry of country teams (Finding 9), and reduced levels of staffing (for both the country teams in embassies and in Helsinki) represented the anticipation of as well as a reaction to austerity measures brought in by the new Government of Finland. Also, the fact that influencing activities are not systematically planned and reported in CPs may have contributed to not allocating sufficient staff resources for these important efforts.

The size of the CPs has remained more or less the same, so in many instances they are now too ambitious for the staff resources available to manage them, with staff being overstretched. Some of the CP processes such as annual reporting and monitoring are over-elaborate in comparison to the size of the country teams and also to some of the CPs which are quite small, which is discussed in more detail later in this report (Section 3.5.2). The Ukraine programme had very limited staff resources at the beginning of the CP period, but due to the Russian war of aggression has responded to emerging needs and the overall increased need for support so the programme budget expand significantly. Even so, the size of the country team has not kept pace with the increase in the CP budget.

Finding 4: New Government of Finland's priorities and austerity measures will shape the planning of future bilateral development cooperation.

In February 2024, the Minister of Foreign Trade and Development announced significant reductions of the MFA's bilateral development cooperation budget and a reduction in the number of long-term partner countries. Afghanistan, Kenya, Mozambique and Myanmar will no longer have CPs after the current programming cycle, with development cooperation being phased out, although some individual projects may remain. Somalia, Tanzania, Palestine, Ukraine, Nepal and Ethiopia will continue with another programming cycle, while development cooperation in Ukraine will be based on the Reconstruction Plan for Ukraine, Part Two which is currently being drafted.

A reduction of the country and region-specific development cooperation budget by around EUR 500 million was announced for 2024-2028 with the budget item for development cooperation managed by the MFA⁴ expected to vary between EUR 600 and EUR 630 million per year. These reductions will impact Finland's development cooperation in all present CP countries except for Ukraine which

⁴ The funds managed by the MFA ("*varsinainen kehitysyhteistyömäärä*" in Finnish) include e.g. bilateral development cooperation, funding to the UN, development banks and Finnish non-governmental organizations as well as humanitarian aid. Other development cooperation not included in this budget item includes e.g. investments made by Finnfund, the cost related to receiving refugees, Finland's share of the EU's development cooperation budget, funding from other administrative branches categorized as ODA, as well as other financial investments in development cooperation.



will maintain or increase its development cooperation budget (MFA, 2024a). An additional round of austerity measures for the MFA are expected after the Government of Finland's announcement of further government budget cuts in April 2024 that includes an additional reduction of EUR 200 million over four years for the development cooperation budget (MFA, 2024b).

New government priorities are focused on strengthening the link between trade and development cooperation through a focus on private sector cooperation and collaboration with Finnish companies, as well as initiatives such as Team Europe. However, Finland's reputation and CPs provide an entry point and opportunities for other Finnish policy priorities and other instruments. The existence of a development cooperation programme was found by the team to provide a good opening for diplomatic and foreign relations, by enhancing Finland's profile and demonstrating Finland's commitment to a country.

The MFA is also undertaking an institutional reform which will result in the re-organisation of some departments which may also have an impact on development cooperation programming (MFA, 2023e).

3.2 Adaptive management of Country Programmes

Finding 5: CPs were actively and successfully managed to remain relevant when country contexts changed.

The process for developing CPs for the current 2021-24 programming cycle began in 2019 but was finalised only in early 2021 after the previous programming period had been extended by one year (from 2016-19 to 2016-20). This was useful as it allowed the programmes to adapt to new needs and changed operating environments because of the Covid-19 pandemic. Some of the preparatory activities such as comprehensive political economy analyses and country team self-assessments were however conducted in 2019, before the pandemic broke out.

During the present programme cycle, CPs have continued to adjust to changing contexts and needs in the partner countries. Apart from formally updating CP goals and objectives (Finding 7), these adjustments concerned how CP goals were being reached.

Several CPs responded to the Covid-19 pandemic through dedicated pandemic response funding. Additional needs at the humanitarian/development interface were addressed by shifting CP budgets towards humanitarian assistance when this was considered relevant, and budgets were available. Several new projects were started in response to developing needs.

One illustrative example of useful adaptive management is Finland's support to the "Education Cannot Wait" project in Ethiopia. It began in response to the Covid-19 pandemic but then acquired additional relevance for addressing urgent education needs caused by the war in northern Ethiopia.

Finding 6: Targeted influencing activities played a central role in adaptively managing CPs, often with effects beyond Finland's own contribution.

As a relatively small donor, Finland often works in concert with other donors towards common development objectives in a country. The meta-analysis team found strong indications that Finland has been influential in shaping multilateral projects beyond its own financial contributions.



Interviewed stakeholders reported that Finland had been supportive and influential, both in terms of providing direction to implementing partners and in coordinating and advocating among donors. This mirrors findings of an earlier evaluation that, among other, reviewed multi-bi projects in Nepal and Kenya in 2019 (MFA, 2020b).

In the meta-analysis, Finland was, for example, considered to have influenced other development partners towards establishing and supporting the “Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan” (STFA) as a joint and pooled UN fund. In Palestine, Finland was perceived to influence and use what is a small amount of funding to achieve greater results by pooling with other donors and bringing Finnish expertise on gender and disability to joint donor programming in education. In Mozambique, Finland’s active role in policy influencing and sector working groups helped to keep teacher training high on the agenda of the education sector programme.

Finding 7: In several instances, changing country contexts were usefully reflected in temporary policies and updated CPs.

The regime changes in Myanmar and Afghanistan fundamentally changed the context for Finland’s CPs in these countries. In both cases, Finland halted any direct development cooperation with the new de-facto authorities, and refocused development cooperation through other channels.

In Myanmar, the coup d’état happened before the 2021-24 CP was approved. It was replaced by a temporary policy which was approved in May 2021, three months after the coup. Reporting for 2021 was done with respect to that temporary policy. For the remaining three years of the programme cycle, a short-term CP was approved and used to manage the programme.

In Afghanistan, a 2021-24 CP had been developed (but not formally approved) before the Taliban takeover in August 2021 and was used as a basis for reporting in that year even though it had lost relevance. From 2022 onwards, a temporary policy guided the work and replaced the earlier CP.

In both countries, country teams conducted scenario analysis exercises to inform Finland’s future programming. In Afghanistan this was done in December 2021 prior to approving the temporary policy for 2022; in Myanmar scenario analysis was included into the 2022-24 Short-Term CP, as well as in earlier strategies. These analyses also provided a useful starting point for similar exercises during the self-assessment workshops held with both country teams for the present meta-analysis.


In 2022 and 2023, Ukraine and Palestine/Gaza experienced equally severe shocks: Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, and Hamas’ attack on southern Israel and the ensuing war in Gaza in October 2023. In the case of Ukraine, the existing CP document became outdated as Finland’s goals and objectives changed, and the programme pivoted to address needs due to the new context without formally updating its CP document. In Palestine the situation is still evolving and not all the CP is now able to be implemented as expected. The impact areas themselves however remain intact. For both countries, the results frameworks have now become outdated.

In addition to these fundamental changes of context, the CPs in Mozambique and Tanzania were also updated after one year, reflecting evolving contexts: the ongoing pandemic and the re-emerging insurgency in the north of Mozambique, and new opportunities related to the change of government in Tanzania.



The periods covered by CP documents and temporary policies in the present programme cycle are summarised in Figure 5.

Figure 5 CP documents and temporary policies 2021-24



Source: CP country reports (Volume II).

The meta-analysis team finds that the changes made to the Myanmar CP represent a good practice example for how to safeguard the relevance of a CP by timely adjustments of goals, approaches and targets to what is realistic after the drastic developments in the country. The 2021 and 2022 results reports provide insight into what worked and what didn't in the reprogrammed temporary policy and the subsequent short-term CP. The same can be said about the reporting in Afghanistan for 2022 whereas, in 2021, reporting was still done against the previous results framework which had been rendered obsolete by the takeover. For Ukraine and Palestine, the meta-analysis team expects that future reporting along the old results frameworks will mainly show that some of the earlier objectives and targets have become unrealistic rather than providing insights into how well interventions (that have been adapted to the new contexts) actually perform. For meaningful RBM, results frameworks in both CPs and – in the case of Ukraine – also overall goals and objectives will need to be updated, to ensure that they act as 'living' documents.

Finding 8. CPs demonstrated continuity in terms of their impact areas across programmatic cycles and even during drastic changes of context.

CPs maintained the thematic areas they worked in across programme cycles, and also when goals and targets were adapted in reaction to changes in country contexts during the current cycle.

Ethiopia (Figure 6) is a typical example of a long-term partner country with consistent thematic priorities from the first Country Strategy in the current format in 2013 until today. Already decades earlier, when development cooperation between the two countries started in 1967, there had been a focus on sustainable growth through agriculture, and on education.⁵ Similarly, for Nepal the programme is well established and the areas of focus have stayed consistent over time. Water,

5 In addition, early development cooperation also included forestry, democracy and human rights.



sanitation and hygiene (WASH) has been a long-term focus of the Nepal programme, with the Rural Village Water Resources Management Project which ended in 2022 running for 16 years. Both WASH and the education sector were key themes in the first Nepal Development Cooperation Strategy 2013-2016. In Tanzania, the forestry sector, leadership training and tax modernization have been supported for a long time and in Mozambique, Finland has supported the education sector programme FASE since 2002.

Figure 6 Evolution of impact areas in the Ethiopia CP since 2013

2013-16 CS*	2016-20 CS	2021-24 CP
1 Accelerated and sustained agricultural growth and rural development secured	1 By 2025 people in rural Ethiopia are empowered to enjoy sustainable growth and decent livelihoods	1 Sustainable economic growth and improved livelihoods for people in rural areas
2 Improved access to potable water and improved sanitation and hygiene services in rural Ethiopia	2 By 2025 people are empowered in WASH practices, have access to clean water and enjoy improved health	2 Improved health and wellbeing through more sustainable and climate resilient WASH
3 Improved quality of general education & addressing inequalities improved, especially with regard to children with special educational needs	3 By 2025 equitable access to quality general education is assured for all children	3 More equitable, inclusive education of good quality

LEGEND Sustainable Growth Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Education


* The second and third country development objectives of the 2013-16 CS are replaced by the respective sector goals as these describe more clearly the themes covered.

Source: Ethiopia CP country report (Volume II).

In Myanmar (Figure 7), the three impact areas of the previous Country Strategy were maintained in the (unapproved) draft CP and the 2021 Temporary Policy. The impact area on sustainable forest management & agricultural value chains was not included in the subsequent 2022-24 Short-Term CP, while the related project is being gradually phased out in line with recommendations made in an earlier review (MFA, 2022d). Going forward, it was decided that the education impact area will be dropped because of the reduction in bilateral development funding. Afghanistan is another example of continuity of impact areas between programmatic cycles even though there were drastic changes of context.



Figure 7 Evolution of impact areas in the Myanmar CP since 2016



* This impact area contains three different thematic objectives: i) Children in Myanmar have safe, quality and continuous learning opportunities, that help them to develop their full potential and socio-emotional well-being, ii) Women organisations have strengthened capacity for continued operations and women and girls receive SRHR, GBV and MHPSS services despite the political and security crisis, and iii) Improved and resilient rural livelihoods through licit sustainable agricultural value chains.

Source: Myanmar CP country report (Volume II).

In Ukraine, projects in additional thematic areas were funded from the CP budget after the war broke out in 2022, but also here other work continued in the earlier impact areas. The country team indicated that the CP helped keep a thematic focus, which would not have occurred without any predefined impact areas.

The continuity of topics addressed by CPs represents an important value-add. Among others, it allows Finland to establish itself as a recognised and reliable development partner in specific thematic fields of recognised expertise. This would be harder if Finland’s development cooperation would not be thematically focused. After drastic changes of context, goals, approaches and targets can be re-calibrated to remain realistic, but remaining focused on the same themes represents an advantage in terms of already existing expertise, relations, and partners.


Finding 9: Staff capacity and expertise dominate self-perceived strengths of country teams – and their loss is considered a threat.

During each of the 10 self-assessment workshops, a participatory SWOT⁶ analysis was conducted. It focused on strengths and weaknesses of the country team when planning, managing, and reporting on CPs, and about opportunities and threats/risks for future programmatic approaches in the wider MFA-internal and external context. The aggregated SWOT analysis (Figure 8) provides a useful synthesis of what country teams perceive as their strengths and weaknesses and what they hope for and worry about.

6 SWOT stands for Strengths and Weaknesses (of the country team) and for Opportunities and Threats (in the larger MFA context and beyond).



Figure 8 Aggregated SWOT analysis



Source: CP country reports (Volume II). The text size corresponds to how frequently the issue was brought up during the 10 self-assessment workshops.

Staff-related issues dominated the SWOT analysis. Expertise and experience of the country teams involved in the CPs, including locally hired embassy staff, were considered a core strength. A high level of staff competence was also highlighted in interviews the meta-analysis team conducted with non-MFA country stakeholders, alongside positive feedback on accessibility and supportiveness. Uncertainty about professional futures, loss of key staff and of their expertise in the embassy and Helsinki through job rotations, non-filled positions, and job cuts were considered the main vulnerability and threat to effective country programming.

The existence of coherent and relevant CPs was considered an important strength. CPs contributed to establishing Finland as a recognised and trusted development partner in long-term partner countries. The ensuing reputation and ability to influence especially development partners was considered both a strength and an opportunity going forward.

While budget cuts were mostly perceived as a threat, new Finnish policy priorities – the stronger integration of Finland’s development policy with foreign and trade policies and with supporting the Finnish private sector – were framed as an opportunity. For example, for increasing collaboration between different MFA departments and units in charge of different instruments, and for developing and applying innovative policy instruments. Country teams however noted that also for such activities, sufficient staff resources are required. As noted elsewhere in this report, existing CP tools and processes were mentioned as an issue.

Finding 10: New Finnish government priorities led to a period of MFA-internal uncertainty and left the MFA with little free resources for future country programming.

On 20 June 2023, Prime Minister Petteri Orpo’s Government took office. Its new Government Programme “A strong and committed Finland” (Finnish Government, 2023) announced cuts to development cooperation and a reduction of the number of partner countries. Among others, the programme announced a shift of focus from bilateral CPs to development cooperation delivered through Finnish CSOs. The programme did not yet indicate the size of the cuts, or which of Finland’s 10 CPs were to be discontinued. It did however state that cuts would take into account



existing commitments. Development cooperation with Ukraine is financed from a separate budget line. It was exempt from cuts and was increased.

In February 2024, the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development specified that the CPs with Afghanistan, Kenya, Mozambique and Myanmar would be discontinued during the government term and that budget reductions set out in the Government Programme would focus especially on region and country-specific development cooperation. Concrete budget figures emerged over the following weeks and months.

From June 2023 to February 2024, MFA leadership and country teams remained uncertain about which CPs would be discontinued, to what extent development cooperation could continue in countries without a future CP, and what budget remained available for country programming in 2024 and beyond. The ongoing organisational reform of the MFA and the announcement of further cuts to bilateral development cooperation contribute to continued uncertainty also during the writing of this report in April and May 2024.

This prolonged period of uncertainty took a toll on MFA staff. Country teams were concerned about whether the work they had invested themselves in would continue. In some cases, thematic experts hired directly for a CP worried about their personal professional future. In spite of these challenges, country teams and workshop participants generally showed a continued high level of motivation and participation during and around the self-assessment workshops, including the intent to safeguard programmes, their results, existing in-country networks and lessons learned.

In this period, several decisions were made in anticipation of yet undefined cuts. For example, in Somalia it was decided not to continue with the funding for the Recurrent Cost and Reform Financing component of the World Bank Multi-Partner Fund. In Somalia, a planned local development programme was not implemented. In Ethiopia, management advised in mid-2023 to end planning for a Technical and Vocational Education and Training component in the CP because of likely future budget adjustments.

With more clarity on the magnitude of budget cuts and on which countries will continue to have CPs, it has become increasingly evident that the room for new country programming is overall very limited. With the exception of Ukraine, the remaining CPs in Ethiopia, Nepal, Somalia and Tanzania, and the continuing programme in Palestine will operate with significantly reduced budgets. Although Nepal is receiving delegated funding from the EU which supplements the CP budget and may also potentially receive more delegated funding in the future for other projects. Future development cooperation in the countries without a future CP (Afghanistan, Kenya, Mozambique and Myanmar) will have very limited resources. Apart from Ukraine, planning for the next programming cycle will hence focus on continuing, adapting or ending ongoing and planned work, with very limited room for new initiatives.



3.3 Results

Finding 11: After a difficult year 2021, overall reported results performance returned to pre-pandemic levels in 2022.

The meta-analysis team analysed previously reported output and outcome⁷ performance data in the 10 CPs between 2016 and 2022. This is shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10, respectively. The traffic light system is briefly explained in Box 1. A similar analysis was part of Finland's Development Policy Results Report to parliament in 2022 (MFA, 2022e).⁸ In contrast to that earlier analysis, a fifth "not reported" category was included by the meta-analysis team. This was used for outcomes or outputs of interventions that were ongoing but not rated (i.e. left blank or rated as "not applicable") in the traffic light scheme of the annual results reports, for example because indicator data was unavailable. Unavailability of data was most common in conflict settings, during the pandemic (particularly in the education sector), and for indicators that rely on national statistics that are not collected annually.

Box 1 Traffic light assessment of results in CP results reports

Country teams annually report on CP results using a traffic light scale:

- Green (good, fully on track, no need to adjust plans and/or strategies),
- Yellow (satisfactory, generally on track, but adjustments and/or speeding up necessary),
- Red (unsatisfactory, off track, major corrective measures are necessary), and
- Gray (not applicable, for not yet started interventions and for interventions that have ended during the programming period⁹).

Reported traffic lights are linked to how well quantitative indicator targets in the respective results frameworks are met: "good" results imply more than 80% target achievement, "satisfactory" results more than 60%, and "unsatisfactory" results less than 60%.

Two types of results are reported in this way: "outputs" and "outcomes". Outputs refer to the more immediate results of projects supported by Finland, outcomes to longer-term results.

Source: Templates for 2022 results reports.


7 The MFA uses (MFA, 2023g) the OECD DAC definitions for outputs, outcomes and impacts: outputs are "The products, capital goods and services which result from a development intervention; may also include changes resulting from the intervention which are relevant to the achievement of outcomes"; outcomes are "The likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs; impacts are "Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended" (OECD, 2010).

8 That analysis covered one year less (2016-21). Differences between that analysis and the analysis presented here are due to i) the fact that this analysis includes indicators not reported on (but applicable) and ii) adjustments made for 2021 results in the 2022 results reports that were published after the report to parliament.

9 The template for the annual results reports instructs CTs to only use "N/A" for new interventions for which contracts/ implementation/financing agreements have not yet been signed. In the 2022 Results Report to parliament, N/A was also used for interventions that had ended during the programming period (MFA, 2022e). This report follows the same categorization as the 2022 Results Report to parliament.




Figure 9 CP outputs (immediate results) reported 2016-22 in the 10 countries



Source: MFA (2021 and 2022 Results Reports on Country Programmes and 2016-2020 Results Reports on Country Strategy for Development Cooperation).

Figure 10 CP outcomes (long-term results) reported 2016-22 in the 10 countries




Source: MFA (2022 and 2021 Results Reports on Country Programmes and 2016-2020 Results Reports on Country Strategy for Development Cooperation).

The analysis shows that in 2022, 82% of all intended outputs and 85% of outcomes were considered satisfactory or good. Over time, after a positive trend from 2016 to 2019, the following two years (2020 and 2021) were particularly difficult in terms of achieving planned results. After only 9% of all reported outputs were unsatisfactory in 2019, this share increased to 15% and 18% in 2021 and 2022, respectively. For outcomes, the increase was even more pronounced: from 5% in 2019 to 9% in 2021, and to 22% in 2022.




The breakdown by country in Figure 11 and Figure 12 show that most CPs experienced most difficulties in achieving their results in 2021, when seven of the nine countries covered in this analysis¹⁰ reported unsatisfactory results.

Figure 11 Percentages of unsatisfactory immediate results (outputs) by country (Ukraine excluded)



Source: MFA (2022 and 2021 Results Reports on Country Programmes and 2016-2020 Results Reports on Country Strategy for Development Cooperation).

Figure 12 Percentages of unsatisfactory long-term results (outcomes) by country (Ukraine excluded)



Source: MFA (2022 and 2021 Results Reports on Country Programmes and 2016-2020 Results Reports on Country Strategy for Development Cooperation).

¹⁰ Ukraine was excluded from the analysis as that CP did not report on outputs (and on outcomes only 2021-22).



There are several contextual factors contributing to the drop and subsequent recovery of reported results performance. These “real world” causes are reviewed in the next finding.

But reported performance data is also affected by other factors, for example when goals and targets are adapted from one year to the next. For individual indicators this is always allowed, as long as changes are well documented. Two CPs however made more fundamental changes.

In Myanmar, the level of ambition in terms of goals and targets was adjusted twice, in 2021 and 2022, to reflect the significantly more difficult operating environment after the coup d'état in February 2021. Consequently, the improving results performance for the Myanmar CP in Figure 11 and Figure 12 from 2020 to 2021 and 2022 shows that the newly set targets in 2021 and 2022 were mostly reached but does not allow a comparison of absolute results across these three years because the targets have changed. The same effect is visible for the Afghanistan CP in 2022, when a temporary policy replaced the earlier CP and reported results performance improved compared to the year before because of more realistic targets.

The example of Afghanistan also shows the limitations of this type of reporting when country contexts fundamentally change but CP goals and targets cannot be immediately adapted because the team rightly prioritises immediate managerial reaction over updating documentation. As results in 2021 were still reported against the CP designed before the Taliban takeover, the very high shares of unsatisfactory results in Figure 11 and Figure 12 for 2021 mostly demonstrate that the CP had become obsolete after the regime change and do not provide an insightful measure for how adapted interventions have performed.

Apart from changes to goals and targets, reported results performance is also affected by the availability of indicator data and by how country teams complement indicator data with their own qualitative assessment of the degree to which results have been achieved. Sometimes, these assessments depend strongly on the exact wording of output and outcome statements, and on how these statements are interpreted by the country teams and in discussions with the respective MFA departments and units.¹¹ This implies that more guidance may be needed in how to formulate results statements in a clear and unambiguous way.

Finding 12: The Covid-19 pandemic, conflict and regime change are among the key factors affecting results in 2021 and 2022.


In CP results reports, country teams also indicate what factors have supported or hindered the achievement of results. For 2021 and 2022, this is summarised in Figure 13 across the 10 CPs.

The five first factors are “prompted”, i.e. they are always listed in the respective standard table in results reports and can be selected by country teams. These factors can therefore be expected to be selected frequently. The other factors are additional factors added by the country teams to the standard set. Because they are unprompted, several CPs sharing the same factor represents relatively strong evidence.

¹¹ One example is Outcome 1.2 in the 2022 Afghanistan results report which is worded as “Livelihoods and food security supported”. This can be understood as implementing activities with the intention of improving livelihoods and food security, or as actually improving livelihoods and food security, which is more demanding.



Figure 13 Reported factors limiting or supporting the achievement of results



Source: "Analysis of factors behind the effectiveness" tables in CP results reports 2021 and 2022.

Standard factors. The five standard factors represent general elements considered necessary for successful country-level development cooperation. Clearly, all five have been in place to relevantly support CP results in some projects, in most countries. At the same time, if absent, they hindered the achievement of results.

Most CPs reported national capacity and national/local ownership issues for some of their projects. In several cases, this was related to factors such as the Covid-19 pandemic and increased conflict and deteriorating security, which are discussed below. Lacking capacity also reflected weak government institutions and implementing partners, and slow counterpart decision-making and project implementation processes. The central importance of ownership by government counterparts was highlighted both as an opportunity and threat/risk in several self-assessment workshops. Several countries reported limited political will and agency of government counterparts, often with pronounced differences between sectors even in the same country. At the community level, ownership was sometimes affected by prevailing conflicts and dire humanitarian needs.

While mentioned as a supportive factor for at least some projects in all countries, support modalities also represented an issue for other projects in several countries. In some cases, Finland was a partner in large multi-donor trust funds that took a long time to prepare and get off the ground. Or government frameworks proved too rigid for the necessary adaptive management. In some cases, previously chosen modalities were not considered the best choice anymore because of changing contexts or poor earlier performance (Box 2).



Box 2 Example for a modality-related lesson learned from Tanzania

“The previous efforts (of UN Women and Finland over the past 8 years) to increase the numbers of elected women among the MPs [members of national parliament] and local councillors [members of district councils] had largely failed. Thanks to the Tanzanian gender quota legislation the share of women among MPs and local councillors is over 30%, but in reality the number of elected women has not increased and has remained at a low level of under 10%. The new strategy of UN-Women and the Tanzanian Ministry of Gender (supported by Finland) is now to invest into the leadership skills, alliance formation and inspiring learning experiences of interested, capable women leaders, starting mainly from the local level, but also working on the national level women leaders’ leadership skills development together with the Uongozi Institute and the EU.”

Source: Cited from the 2021 Tanzania CP results report.

Policy dialogue was generally noted as a supportive factor as well, in line with other observations made in this report (Findings 6 and 14). In some instances, effective influencing was however hindered, for example during political turmoil, conflict, because of ineffective donor coordination mechanisms, and after undemocratic regime changes.

Expertise was generally seen as a supporting factor. This matches the self-assessment of most country teams (Finding 9). Lack of expertise occurred for example when recruitments into implementing partner organisations were not possible, when counterparts lacked project management skills, or when open positions in country teams were not restaffed.

Other factors. Most other factors are related to limitations, and several have previously been addressed in this report (Finding 1). The most important ones highlighted in the CP results reports being the Covid-19 pandemic (peaking in 2021), conflict and deteriorating security (peaking in 2022), and elections and regime changes (in both years).

In all partner countries, the achievement of results was significantly hindered by the Covid-19 pandemic from early 2020 onwards. In 2021, eight of the 10 CPs reported the pandemic as a limiting factor in the table format on which Figure 13 draws, but the remaining two, Mozambique and Tanzania, also described pandemic-related limitations to CP implementation and results in other parts of their respective results reports. The pandemic began to ebb in 2022 but aftereffects linger until today. Apart from direct health impacts, the pandemic also affected other sectors in partner countries, impacting education, livelihoods, and economic growth. In Myanmar, for example, public schools were closed in February 2020 and remained closed for most of the next two years.¹² In Kenya, the pandemic pushed an estimated two million people into poverty. In Nepal, growth of real Gross Domestic Product fell from 6.7% in the 2018/19 fiscal year to -2.1% in 2019/2020, mainly due to a pandemic-related decline in tourism, domestic activity and volatile levels of remittances. Moreover, in all countries, contact and travel restrictions during the pandemic meant that projects could oftentimes not be implemented as planned. The pandemic also made data collection for reporting on results difficult, as implementing partners and partner governments did not produce the necessary data and statistics.

¹² 532 days between February 2020 and February 2022 (Volume II, Myanmar CP country report).



Increased levels of conflict were reported in half of the countries and represent the overall second-most important reported limiting factor towards achieving planned results (Figure 13), after insufficient local and national capacities. Conflicts increased humanitarian needs, destroyed livelihoods and infrastructure, and rendered project implementation difficult. While the security situation in Afghanistan actually improved somewhat after the Taliban takeover, major conflicts broke out or continued in Myanmar, Ethiopia (the 2020-22 Tigray war and sporadic conflicts since then), Mozambique (the Cabo Delgado insurgency intensified in 2020), and Somalia (ongoing conflict with Al-Shabab). Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine in 2022 had major impacts not just in the country itself but also globally, through rising energy and food prices. In 2023, the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza fundamentally changed development cooperation needs and options in the region.

Several countries experienced additional shocks with severe impacts on their development, which affected the degree to which their CPs could deliver on planned results. The coup by the Tatmadaw in February 2021 and the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan in August of the same year made existing plans and approaches partly obsolete. In both cases, Finland ended all direct government cooperation while support through other channels continued but had to be adapted to remain effective under drastically changed operating conditions. In Afghanistan, severe restrictions imposed by the Taliban de facto authorities for women's participation and increasing conflict and deteriorating security in Myanmar posed major challenges.


Democratic changes of government also influenced results. In 2021, both Tanzania and Ethiopia moved to more open governments enabling more and more effective development cooperation. In Somalia, the 2022 elections ended a year-long political crisis. Nepal also saw peaceful elections, which were however followed by a period of parliamentary stagnation.

Several countries also experienced major natural disasters. Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia suffered from extended and repeated droughts (and floods). Mozambique suffered from cyclones, storms, flooding and a cholera outbreak between 2020-24. Afghanistan, one of the world's most environmentally fragile countries, was hit by floods, droughts and earthquakes in recent years.

Finding 13: Average CP budget utilisation was high (86% in 2021 and 84% in 2022) but the rate itself does not provide a full picture of challenges on the ground.

The degree to which CPs were able to disburse their allocated annual budgets was usually high. The total weighted average between 2016-22 is 90%, with annual average rates between 84% in 2022 and 95% in 2020. When analysed by country, some variations become visible (Figure 14).

Figure 14 CP budget disbursement rates 2016-22



Source: MFA financial reporting system – Ratsu.



- In Kenya, disbursement rates were affected in 2018 (71%) by delays in the launching of the UNDP devolution programme, and in 2021 (71%) and 2022 (75%) by delays in programming of the impact area 2.
- The Myanmar CP could disburse only 70% in 2021 because of delays and reprogramming after the Tatmadaw takeover and increased again to 89% in 2022.
- In Nepal, 2019 disbursement was 74% and later rates of disbursement in 2020-22 were 92%, 85% and 78%, respectively. This was mainly due to the number of bilateral projects in the CP as these projects operate according to the Nepali fiscal year which is different from Finland's and disbursements are made against actual expenditures and not as advances as is the case with multilateral organisations.
- In Tanzania, the disbursement rate was lowest in 2018 (77%) related to the slow implementation of the basket-financed tax modernisation programme with the Tanzania Revenue Authority but then recovered.
- The Ukraine CP disbursed 55% and 67% in 2021 and 2022, respectively. Among other reasons, this was due in 2021 to the Covid-19 pandemic impacting energy security and climate resilience projects and personnel changes and capacity constraints in the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine slowing down project implementation. A disbursement of EUR 0.5 million to the Council of Europe was also transferred from 2021 to 2022 for financial management reasons. Low disbursement levels in 2022 also relate to the fact that part of the new funding allocated to Ukraine in 2022 was intentionally saved and carried over to 2023.

Two considerations should however be noted when interpreting disbursement rates. First, disbursements to multi-donor initiatives do not equal disbursement to project implementers. For example, Finland fully disbursed all of the budgeted EUR 2.7 million to the Myanmar Education Coalition multi-donor trust fund in 2022. That fund then reported 83% budget utilisation for the year (which was considered satisfactory). Such next-in-line disbursement figures are however not systematically available across CP portfolios. Disbursement levels were high for both Somalia and Palestine with disbursements at 92% and 98% in 2021 and 2022 respectively for Somalia and 100% for both years for Palestine. Again for the reason that most funding was to multi-donor initiatives.

Second, the disbursement figures do of course not show the full extent to which project implementation was changed and delayed to remain relevant and effective in changing contexts. Nor do they portray non-budget efforts such as influencing activities with implementing partners and peer donors. Some CP projects received funds but then operated on no-cost extensions, others chose different, lower-cost (online) approaches to work towards their objectives, for example when direct interactions in the field had become too difficult or unsafe because of the pandemic or conflict. In several instances, CP budgets were repurposed to address urgent humanitarian crises. Examples for such additional humanitarian funding are EUR 8.9 million to the World Food Programme (WFP) in Afghanistan in 2021-22, EUR 4.1 million to WFP in Ethiopia in 2021, and EUR 3 million to UNHCR in Myanmar in 2022. In Somalia 2022, the CP supported UNFPA Somalia's humanitarian activities with an additional allocation of EUR 1.5 million. In Mozambique, the CP funds were used as a response to the crisis after the cyclones in 2019, when EUR 2 million were disbursed through the UNDP reconstruction fund. The meta-analysis team considers such flexibility in (re) allocating funding a positive attribute of adaptive management at the MFA, which is also in line with a related recommendation particularly for fragile contexts (MFA 2020a).



Finding 14: The results of targeted influencing activities are significant but not systematically monitored or reported.

The meta-analysis team identified several instances in which Finland's influencing activities have very likely contributed to important development results. Interviewed stakeholders in several countries described examples of how Finland had supported its development partners in adapting to changing country contexts or when developing new programmes by providing targeted input and direction. Across the 10 countries, influence appeared strongest with respect to its multilateral implementing and donor partners. Influence on partner country governments varied and depended strongly on the degree these were accessible and aligned with and open to Finland's policies.

In Afghanistan, for example, interviewed stakeholders considered Finland to “punch above its weight” in terms of its significant influence in relation to the amounts of funding it could allocate. This was done through vocal participation in donor coordination mechanisms and in dialogue with multilateral implementing partners, for example when navigating the much reduced space for supporting women and girls under the Taliban regime. As in Myanmar, Finland does not provide any support to the de facto authorities in Afghanistan.

Finland's long-term and constant involvement in selected sectors in Ethiopia was considered a strength and an opportunity. It had increased professional trust and relationships between Finland, the Ethiopian government and its institutions, and with other development partners. This bolstered Finland's influence and access to decision-makers. Interviewed external stakeholders for example described how Finland's long-term engagement and experience in the education sector had significantly shaped the current USD 583 million 2018-2025 phase of the “Ethiopia General Education Quality Improvement Program for Equity”.

In Mozambique, Finland was considered to have a strong reputation and play an active role in policy influencing and sector working groups, especially in the education sector, for example by chairing the high-level dialogue on how to address challenges in institutional capacity, school construction, and provision of textbooks.

Through its past engagement in these and other countries, Finland built a reputation as a steady, reliable, and knowledgeable development partner. Stakeholders described MFA staff involved in the CPs consistently as having strong expertise, being understanding of the realities on the ground, and as reliable, accessible and pragmatic.

An earlier evaluation (MFA 2020b) also came to very positive conclusions about Finland's capacity for influencing its multilateral partners, including in multi-bi projects at the country-level. The evaluation stressed the importance of country-level information drawn from local interactions and experience with multilateral partners in partner countries for informing Finland's multilateral engagement strategies at the global level.

While there are strong examples of influencing results, these are not systematically planned, monitored and reported as part of the CPs. Several country teams mentioned that they employed “influencing plans” for some development partners, but these remained separate from CP documents and reports.

Finding 15: All CPs contribute to MFA's cross-cutting priorities of a Human Rights-Based Approach, gender equality and non-discrimination, with a weaker focus on climate resilience and particularly low emission development.



The meta-analysis found that a Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA) was applied by all country teams in project planning, reporting, policy dialogue and advocacy with the development partners, government, and other implementing partners. This was confirmed by the 2023 MFA evaluation of HRBA that found that HRBA has become part of the “DNA” of Finland’s approach to development (MFA, 2023f), after a related recommendation for more rigorous treatment of the HRBA in fragile contexts in an earlier evaluation (MFA, 2020a). In Nepal the evaluation found that the country team used multiple means to promote gender and human rights and in the Palestine CP, the human rights perspective was systematically included in the analysis of all impact areas. The evaluation also found that a human rights-based perspective is reflected in the Somalia CP, particularly regarding results on women’s and girls’ rights, especially in relation to sexual and reproductive health and rights and participation in decision-making.

Gender and non-discrimination were consistently focused on in CPs, with gender particularly strong through specific impact areas on gender or incorporation into CP interventions. For example, in Afghanistan the temporary policy has a component on human rights and gender equality. In Ethiopia, non-discrimination and especially the rights of children with disabilities were one focus of work on education, while in Kenya, gender equality was targeted in all interventions aiming at enhancing girls’ and women’s rights. In Ukraine, all education and rule of law projects included gender and non-discrimination analysis and there are specific activities and indicators that focus on gender, disability and ethnic minorities.

Finland’s strength in gender and non-discrimination and HRBA was also consistently raised by donor partners interviewed by the meta-analysis team.

Climate-resilient development was less integrated into programming, although it was more of a focus than low-emission development. The exceptions are Ukraine where the focus of one impact area is solely on climate change and in Nepal where there have been significant efforts to incorporate climate-resilient development into programming, although in both countries there has been less focus on low-emission development.

In most other countries climate resilience has been incorporated to a degree into some programming, but not all the CP, and actual results achieved are moderate or not reported. In Afghanistan climate resilience is covered by one output of the Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan but does not represent a principal focus of the fund’s work. Similarly in Ethiopia, climate sustainability and low carbon development have been considered in impact areas 1 and 2 with a focus on adaptation to climate change but these issues were not an overall focus of the CP. In Tanzania, in impact area 2 on “improved forest-based livelihoods and climate resilience” one of the three outcomes focuses on strengthening the capacity of government, citizens, and businesses to adapt to climate change. In Palestine, climate resilience is addressed as part of resilience programming, although other aspects of climate resilience such as low-emission development and biodiversity have not received much attention. In Kenya, there was some integration of climate concerns into programming, but again this has not been the main focus.

In Somalia, climate sustainability and low carbon development are not included in the current CP, although it is recognised in terms of its significance in Somalia’s development and there has been some limited integration into programming and projects. While climate sustainability and low carbon development are acknowledged as critical issues in Myanmar and were included in the earlier unapproved draft CP, there was limited focus on these issues under the temporary policy and the subsequent revised Short-Term CP. Similarly in Mozambique, climate sustainability and low carbon development have not been strongly addressed in the CP.



Finding 16. Going forward, CPs are expected to continue delivering immediate results. The achievement of longer-term results strongly depends on enabling conditions.

During the 10 self-assessment workshops, one session was dedicated to expected results for the last two years in the current programme cycle, 2023 and 2024, as described in the respective country reports (Volume II of this report).

While the ongoing budget cuts to Finland's bilateral development cooperation will affect project activities and results in 2024, this was however not analysed during the self-assessment workshops because they were held before reliable budget figures for 2024 were available.

Instead, expected results were discussed during the workshops assuming continued funding according to plans. Estimated results for 2023 and 2024 should nevertheless remain relevant for large multi-donor projects in which Finland is a relatively small partner, and for projects for which signed contracts exist for 2024. But even in other cases some general insights were gained which are summarised here. To this end, it is important to differentiate between outputs and outcomes. Outputs refer to the immediate results CP projects are largely in control of, whereas outcomes refer to longer-term changes the projects aim to contribute to but which they cannot control.

Generally, continuing CP projects were expected to continue delivering their outputs as planned. Some projects that had to be fundamentally adapted to new contexts, for example in Afghanistan and Myanmar, were now expected to become more effective again in producing their intended outputs. Output-level performance depended on the evolving situation in countries insofar as it affected project implementation. Potentially increased conflict and insufficient partner capacities were among the most frequently discussed issues that could limit project implementation and outputs. This may for example impact Ukraine where there is not only conflict, but CP budget absorption has been low in the past and may not be sufficient to match the increased budget, particularly if not also supported by sufficient staffing within the country team.

Instead, expected longer term results depend strongly on how conducive the country context is for the intended changes. This can significantly differ between CP impact areas even in the same country.

One example is Afghanistan, where the Taliban de-facto authorities put in place severe restrictions for women's participation and girls' education. As a consequence, actually upheld human rights for Afghans, especially for Afghan women, girls, and inclusion, are shrinking and retrograding despite all international efforts. Consequently, the human-rights-related outcomes in impact area 2 of the current temporary policy are expected to be unsatisfactory, even while the contributing projects are expected to deliver well against their output targets. In contrast, because the de-facto authorities exempt health services from these restrictions and allow women's participation in most private sector activities, the related outcomes in impact area 1 of the Afghanistan temporary policy are expected to be reached.



3.4 Sustainability of results

During the meta-analysis workshops, an estimation of the sustainability of results at outcome level was undertaken by participants. This is not part of the regular CP reporting and was hence based solely on the current judgment of the country teams. The exercise was undertaken based on the different scenarios expected for each country. Sustainability of results was estimated to be **high** if results achieved would remain in place for many years, **medium** if only for a few years and **low** if outcomes were not expected to be sustained even after 2024.

Finding 17: Sustainability of results strongly depends on development scenarios for most countries.

For most countries the extent to which results are sustainable were scenario dependent. For the more stable countries such as Nepal, Tanzania, Mozambique and Kenya, it was considered that sustainability was likely to be medium to high if the status quo continued and would only reduce if the context deteriorates significantly. The results and sustainability of the new Myanmar CP were also judged to be high to medium, although likely to be less sustainable if the operating environment deteriorates further. In Somalia, current instability means that if the status quo continues there is only expected to be medium levels of sustainability, and sustainability is likely to be very low if the situation worsens further.

In Ukraine and Palestine, the sustainability of results was judged to be reasonably high assuming an optimistic scenario and therefore a positive outcome from the current conflicts. Sustainability was only expected to fall to a medium level if a pessimistic scenario occurs in Ukraine due to the focus on system strengthening and capacity building, particularly in education which will likely remain.

The Palestine CP makes clear that sustainable development results for the Palestinians can only be achieved when the political drivers of fragility and de-development are properly addressed. A pessimistic scenario is likely to result in low levels of sustainability, although again some sustainability is expected in the education sector. However, for Afghanistan, the sustainability of past results achieved in the previous CP before the takeover by the Taliban is likely to be low, while the sustainability of newer results under the temporary policy may be higher.

In Ethiopia, sustainability was estimated to be high in a scenario of further reduced conflict and strengthened economic growth. In contrast, sustainability would be negatively impacted by increased conflict and/or weak economic growth. The same factors – increased conflict and a slow economy – would also limit Ethiopia's financial contributions and capacity for maintaining and strengthening basic services in all three impact areas. Some projects were considered more resilient vis-a-vis conflict than others, for example regarding land administration information (which continues to be available even if local access and storage is temporarily lost) or simple and community-owned WASH infrastructure (more likely to be rebuilt if damaged).

Finding 18: Sustainability is expected to be high when systems are functional, capacities remain available, and there is strong ownership by government or stakeholders.

Sustainability of interventions is expected to be high where capacity and systems have been strengthened. This is anticipated in the education sectors in Ukraine, Nepal and Mozambique, where systems have been established, capacity has been built and there is government ownership. This means that education systems are likely to continue to function more or less regardless of the scenario as the necessary building blocks are in place.



Where interventions have been embedded within government systems or existing legal frameworks and there are high levels of ownership, sustainability is also expected to be relatively high independent of the scenario. For example, in Nepal, WASH interventions have been aligned with government systems and there are high levels of ownership among beneficiaries and stakeholders. A recent evaluation of the Rural Village Water Resources Management Project also noted that there “is a solid foundation for sustainability”. Strengthened individual capacities of farmers and along agricultural value chains in Ethiopia were highlighted by the country team as likely to have enhanced sustainability. In Myanmar, current interventions should be sustainable as they have increased the focus on capacities of individuals and community-level systems and institutions in both impact areas (peace work and learning opportunities for children), which were considered most relevant and resilient under current circumstances.

In several countries, for example Mozambique, Kenya, Nepal and Tanzania, interviewed stakeholders suggested that Finland should be bolder to communicate the good CP results achieved, and that making them more visible to decision-makers, development partners and other stakeholders would also contribute to their sustainability.

Finding 19: In some countries, results achieved have however been (or could be) lost because of regime change and conflict.

In Afghanistan and Myanmar, the takeover by the Taliban and the Coup by the Tatmadaw means most of the previous results from Finland’s cooperation are not likely to be sustainable. Particularly investments to develop national state structures which no longer exist, such as the security structures, the police, the judicial system, as well as good governance activities are likely lost given the change in government and that Finland is no longer working with either de facto authority as a partner.

For Palestine, some of Finland’s investments have been destroyed during the current CP due to the Israeli occupation and the war in Gaza. The CP was designed in the expectation that there would be some destruction of facilities funded by Finland and there has been the demolition of educational facilities in both East Jerusalem and Gaza and the destruction of some resilience interventions in Area C¹³.

In Ukraine, some programming is focused on the rehabilitation of infrastructure destroyed due to the Russian war of aggression. This naturally raises the risk that some may be damaged again. A similar risk is that hardware and equipment related to Finland’s energy and meteorology interventions from the current CP may be destroyed. Similarly, with Palestine as the Israel-Hamas war is ongoing there may well be further loss of CP results.

Moreover, sustainability of results in recently launched projects such as the social protection projects in Mozambique or the TVET project in Kenya is at risk because of the short implementation period before the respective CPs are phased out.

¹³ Under the Oslo Accords the occupied West Bank was divided into three administrative areas: A, B, and C. In area A, the Palestinian Authority (PA) is granted full responsibility for internal security, public order, and all civil affairs. In Area B, the PA controls all Palestinian public order and civil affairs issues. Israel retains control of internal security issues in Area B, in coordination with the PA. In Area C, Israel controls all internal security and public order issues, as well as civil affairs matters, except that the PA has been granted responsibility for all civil affairs of the Palestinians that reside in Area C.



Finding 20: In contexts where there is no government partner, individual- and community-level results are more resilient than institution-level results (but may lack the enabling environment for contributing to higher-level results).

Individual and community-level results are likely to be more resilient than institution-level results where there are difficult or deteriorating environments. In both Afghanistan and Myanmar, as there is no government partner, a focus has been on the capacities of individuals, communities, and community-level systems and institutions. This approach was judged by country teams to increase the likelihood of sustainability as these capacities and systems are expected to remain in place even under difficult circumstances. For Afghanistan and Myanmar it was highlighted that due to the previous CP it is possible that strengthened capacities of people in terms of acquired knowledge and skills still remain as they have been unaffected by the takeovers. Although they may not always have the opportunity currently to use these skills.

Another example of this is Ukraine where although education systems are still functioning, teachers outside of Ukraine are still teaching remotely indicating that they are still able to use the capacities that have been built, even if they are no longer in-country.

However, while strengthened capacities of individuals and communities showed resilience, they may not translate into higher-level results because the enabling environment lacks. This applies particularly in instances where the government or political context does not allow individuals to use them.

3.5 Added value of the programmatic approach

3.5.1 General findings

Finding 21: The CP has been important instrument for supporting an RBM culture within the MFA, and for demonstrating programme-level results.

A programmatic approach allows for the planning and monitoring of programmes as a whole, as opposed to just individual projects. With their focus on planning for and reporting on results (rather than budgets and activities), CPs have been important for supporting the development of an RBM approach and a results-oriented work culture within the MFA.

CP documents, reports and results frameworks are structured along a hierarchy of results, from impact to outcomes and outputs. This theory of change-based approach to planning and reporting helps understanding why results have been achieved (or not), in addition to reporting on contributions to results. The value-add of this approach was evident during the workshops held because it allowed a clearer understanding of how contextual factors beyond the control of CP projects affected higher-level results.

The processes of setting four-year goals and objectives in the CP documents and subsequent annual results reporting define an RBM framework that enhances transparency and accountability towards both MFA leadership and the Finnish public. For example, in 2022, the MFA used previously reported CP results from 2016 to 2021 in Finland's Development Policy Results 2022 report to parliament (MFA 2022e, p. 73).



The strong view of MFA staff was that, without a CP, projects and programmes would be assessed individually, but the overall impact of programming would not be visible or reflected on as a whole. This was even though the processes are seen as too heavy and out of proportion with resources available. The annual cycle aids team reflection through annually documenting and validating results and facilitating discussion on programme progress both within the country teams and with senior management. There is little space to reflect on lessons learned in the annual reporting however and although cross-cutting issues at a programme level are considered, in most cases this takes the form of a general discussion on how they have been incorporated, rather than how this has impacted results.

Finding 22: A programmatic approach gives a coherent vision of Finland's development cooperation goals, objectives and mechanisms for achievement to internal and external stakeholders.

Through a framework which sets out goals and objectives and the results expected to be achieved, the CP is important for providing clarity on Finland's development cooperation over the medium-term. This is valued by country teams who know the goals they are working towards, while there is certainty in programming as the CP has been approved by the Minister and is based on Finnish and country government priorities.

This increased stability and reliability in terms of Finland's bilateral development cooperation in a given country and contrasts with country-level programming before the introduction of Country Strategies and CPs. Additional projects or activities were sometimes added during the cycle that were not always aligned with the country and MFA priorities. The CP hence reduces fragmentation and allows links to be created between the programme impact areas, to leverage synergies, integrate cross-cutting issues at programme level and enhance results and promote more strategic thinking. For example, in Nepal WASH has been included not only under its own specific impact areas, but also into education activities which is a separate area of programming.

The CP is a also good way of "branding" Finland's development cooperation support as it outlines succinctly Finnish priorities in a way that is easily understandable to other development partners and stakeholders and gives one coherent and credible message. Even if not all external stakeholders interviewed by the meta-analysis team knew Finland's CP in their country, all were aware of Finland's impact areas of the respective CP.

The CP can also provide a good entry point and platform for dialogue with government partners and signals to stakeholders where Finland's comparative advantage lies. It does not however include all Finland's activities in a country, even though Finland's foreign and security policy, development cooperation and humanitarian aid are intertwined. As pointed out later (Finding 24 below), this limits the value-add of CPs.

Finding 23: CPs provided Finland with country expertise, contacts and access that can also support other Finnish policies beyond bilateral development cooperation.

CPs have contributed to Finland's ability to influence its partner countries. Expert staff is required in the embassies, in projects, and in the MFA in Helsinki to manage and implement its bilateral development cooperation. Arguably, the increased focus and thematic constancy CPs provided has further deepened this expertise and allowed MFA staff and long-term consultants to establish and maintain important working relationships with government and other country stakeholders,



and with development partners. These contacts and relationships provide Finland with important access to key stakeholders in these countries.

Finland is a trusted partner, who is considered to have a pragmatic approach and be willing to be active in donor and government working groups and is highly valued for the expertise of staff, particularly in education and gender. This provides Finland with an opportunity to influence other stakeholders on programming, approaches and cross-cutting issues. For example, the European Union (EU) in Nepal has delegated EU funding to Finland's WASH, education and climate change programmes, which supplements CP funding. and in Ethiopia Finland was extremely influential in the design of a World Bank education programme it was co-funding. In Palestine, the influential role of Finland was noted by stakeholders in gender and inclusion through policy dialogue, particularly in the education sector when Finland has been the lead donor in education. Chairing sector working groups effectively means defining substance discussions with the country and donors.

The meta-analysis team finds that this represents an important asset not only for future development cooperation in partner countries, but also for other policy areas prioritised by the Finnish government. Finland's reputation and the CPs provide an entry point and opportunities for other Finnish policy priorities and other instruments. The existence of a development cooperation programme was reported to provide a good opening for diplomatic and foreign relations, by enhancing Finland's profile and demonstrating Finland's commitment to a country.

In principle, CPs can create opportunities for private sector instruments, although the meta-analysis team found only a few examples of this to date. During the previous Somalia CP a Finnish company had taken advantage of an opportunity to collaborate with the MIDA FINNSOM IV project in Somaliland on digital systems. In Tanzania, Finnfund is investing in forestry companies that received funds from the outgrowing program which was part of the CP in 2019-22. It appears that even if links between the CP and the private sector have been developed, their full exploitation to support Finland's trade and development agenda has usually not happened. Based on feedback received during the self-assessment workshops, issues may be related to limited staff resources and the organisational separation between the MFA departments and units managing CPs and those managing private sector instruments.

The MFA is however at risk of losing some of this expertise as a result of the recent austerity measures and consequent staff reductions. These can impact the extent to which staff in-country are able to develop contacts and leverage access and Finnish influence.

Finding 24: The value-add of CPs was limited by their focus on bilateral development cooperation.

The CPs focus is on bilateral development cooperation that is managed by the MFA's regional departments and units. While CPs make some reference to other development cooperation channels, they cannot plan for or report on development cooperation results in these other channels. As these other channels are managed by other MFA departments and units that are independent of the regional departments, they have their own planning and reporting frameworks. For example, support for Finnish Non-Governmental Organisations is managed by the Unit for Civil Society, and the Unit for Humanitarian Assistance plans and coordinates humanitarian aid. Both these units have their own systems for coordination and monitoring which are separate from bilateral development cooperation. This means that one unit cannot responsibly plan and report on the other unit's work. A more comprehensive approach to planning and reporting on all of Finland's development cooperation in a given country was considered desirable but, at the same time, difficult to realise because of these MFA-internal structures.



Country *Strategies* for 2021-24 do offer a broader perspective, defining Finland's strategic goals in a given country across different policy areas, but there is no systematic reporting of results against them. While the meta-analysis team considers integrated country-level planning and reporting across all development cooperation channels difficult, a further integration of bilateral development cooperation with some of Finland's other policy objectives in a country might be possible. For example, the Unit for the Horn of Africa and Eastern Africa in the MFA's Department for Africa and the Middle East handles Finland's relations with four of the 10 countries covered in the meta-analysis (Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania), as well as with several others. Similarly, the regional departments for Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, include the Unit for Eastern Europe and Central Asia that covers Ukraine and the Unit for Southern Asia that includes Nepal, Myanmar and Afghanistan, which is part of the Department of the Americas and Asia. These departmental responsibilities include political, trade and commercial issues beyond bilateral development cooperation.

While some staff positions in these units are focused on development cooperation, others, for example Team Leaders and the Unit Directors, have broader responsibilities. In a similar vein, Finland's embassies have responsibilities that also extend beyond development cooperation. The embassy of Finland to Kenya, for example, also promotes the networking of Kenyan and Finnish citizens, institutions and business partners. This means that, structurally, a closer integration of bilateral development policy with other Finnish policies is possible.

3.5.2 Specific findings on CP planning and reporting in 2021-24

Finding 25: CP documents and processes are overall useful but time-consuming and lack flexibility.

The process of developing the CPs is valued by country teams as it provides a unique opportunity to reflect as a team on programme strategy, progress, results and discuss potential new programming. The exception was Ukraine where the country team was very small in 2020 and new to development cooperation processes, so did not have sufficient expertise or time to develop the CP. Also, in Mozambique where the CP was redeveloped not only due to a change in government, but also as the country team felt the earlier approved version drafted during the Covid-19 pandemic could be further improved.

The current CP planning and reporting processes are however perceived to be too heavy and cumbersome, as well as time-consuming. The annual reporting, although useful, is seen as too lengthy and focused on the achievement of indicators from the results framework, which limits the space for the discussion of other achievements not reflected in the results framework (policy influencing, charring of working groups) or challenges and lessons learned. The time allocated to these processes was seen as out of proportion to the size of the programmes and the staff resources available. In this context it should be noted the MFA instructions and guidance for CPs do not explicitly ask for a focus on quantitative indicators, nor do they discourage reporting on influencing activities.

Also a standard approach for both planning and reporting in all countries and contexts is seen as unnecessary. In the case of Mozambique, much work had gone into developing the 2021-24 CP document, also because of staff changes during that process. Subsequent updating of the CP then took several additional person-weeks of senior staff time, and the embassy staff would have preferred a much lighter exercise. Similarly, a full CP process was not seen as necessary when



there is a well-established programme, in a relatively stable country such as for example Nepal, with most funds already committed for the next development cooperation cycle.

Additionally, in fragile states with rapid and unpredictable context changes, detailed planning for a four-year period was not considered very meaningful. This is reflected in the fact that the CPs soon became outdated in Afghanistan, Myanmar and later in the programming cycle in Ukraine. Recommendations of an earlier evaluation (MFA, 2020a) to conceptualise CPs as a tool for adaptive management in fragile contexts have not fully materialised, also because another recommendation of that evaluation – to ensure the necessary human resources for more technical rigour – was not implemented.

Finding 26: The CP results frameworks are rather complicated, too dependent on quantitative indicators and do not provide information on influencing & project steering results.

The CP results frameworks are used by country teams to compile programme level results, with the monitoring of individual projects undertaken at the project level. The results frameworks are seen as generally useful by country teams although too complicated due to an increasing number of outcomes and outputs to be tracked, and the heavy reliance on a large number of quantitative indicators – several for each output and outcome – which are often quite high level and very time-consuming and too cumbersome to adapt.

For the Palestine CP it was noted that the high-level results framework reflects unrealistic theories of change, with expected impacts and outcomes unlikely to be achieved given the level of CP inputs. While for the Ethiopia CP, the results framework is more realistic and includes outputs that are mostly in control of the projects, with outcomes that the projects can influence but depends on contextual factors beyond what the projects can control.

The large number of quantitative indicators included in results frameworks also puts a significant burden on staff to collect indicators from project partners. For example, in Ethiopia in 2022 there were almost 70 indicators and around 60 in Mozambique, Nepal and Somalia (Figure 15), while there were around 30 or less in Afghanistan, Kenya, and Myanmar.


The total number of objectives used in results frameworks has increased over time from 84 outputs in the 2016 CPs to 116 in 2021 and 103 in 2022. The number of outcomes increased from 40 in 2016 to 57 in 2021 and 53 in 2022.

The increasing number of results targets and the focus on quantitative indicators have developed over time and are not required by the MFA's instructions and guidelines which do neither encourage a large number of indicators, nor that these have to be all quantitative.

Additionally, countries sometimes have different reporting cycles to the MFA which creates problems with monitoring when data is unavailable. This is an issue in Nepal where the reporting years of the government and the MFA do not coincide.



Figure 15 CP Results frameworks outcome and output objectives, and indicators, 2022



Source: Results frameworks annexed to the 2022 CP Results Reports.

The evolved pronounced focus on quantitative indicators limits the extent to which qualitative indicators and alternative forms of tracking or inferring progress made are reflected within the results frameworks and the reports. This means that activities such as policy influencing and participation in project steering committees or donor/sector working groups are usually omitted from results reporting.

Finding 27: Unavailability of indicator data and a lack of targets hinders the monitoring of results frameworks.

Unavailability of data has been a problem for all CPs due to the Covid-19 pandemic, as data could not be collected or national surveys were not undertaken, particularly in education. In conflict situations such as in Ukraine and Palestine, access to certain areas was limited and hindered data collection or the programme changed significantly and not all projects were then reported as part of the results framework.

Another reason for data being marked as unavailable is that indicators often become out of date as they are taken from project indicators and projects are often not implemented for the whole CP cycle. When these projects stop, the related indicators become redundant. Also, data for outcome level indicators is often not available, particularly if they are not published on an annual basis, suggesting that these indicators are not well specified in the results frameworks. Moreover, it may be generally difficult to find meaningful indicators in some areas, one example being change related to the Finnish-funded governance programmes in Mozambique.

The share of indicators defined in CP results frameworks that are actually used in results reports is shown in Figure 16. It indicates that for example in Ethiopia only three quarters of all indicators were reported on in 2022, although 100% of indicators were reported on in Afghanistan and Myanmar. The latter because the CPs and the results frameworks were revised to make indicators




and targets more realistic. For Ukraine only outcome indicators were included within their results framework and due to the conflict, these became outdated and difficult to report on.

The results framework and indicators are relatively rigid which causes problems for reporting, as in theory indicators are changeable, but in practice amendments are not often made during annual programming cycles. Indicators are reportedly not changed due to staff time constraints, while there appears to be a tendency to wait with changes until reports are due rather than adapting frameworks continuously. This is exacerbated when a new project's aims and objectives do not fit within the existing results framework, although results are often still included in the annual reporting narrative, which is useful.

A further issue illustrated by Figure 16 is that often indicators are not given targets which makes progress difficult to judge. The percentage of indicators with targets is very low in some countries. In 2022, less than half of all indicators had targets in Afghanistan, Ukraine, Myanmar, and Somalia. In the best cases (Palestine and Tanzania), close to 80% of indicators had targets. Ideally, all indicators should have targets.

Figure 16 CP Indicators (output and outcome) with targets in 2022



Source: Results frameworks annexed to the 2022 CP Results Reports.

Due to this, results frameworks are not operating effectively as a tool for results-based planning and reporting, and for learning from results, as they are not sufficiently adaptable compared to the complex and rapidly changing contexts that the CPs operate in. More flexible and adaptive methods for results-oriented planning and reporting are not being used.

Finding 28: Financial disbursement data is used but the risk management annex and monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) plans are often not regularly monitored.

Country teams made regular use of the MFA's financial management software to track CP project disbursements against budgets, and for managing allocations. Once per year, the disbursement status drawn from this data is annexed to the CP results reports.



The risk management and monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) annexes are useful during the CP planning process but were often not monitored closely during the CP cycle. Instead, the individual project MEL plans and risk management framework were viewed as more important than CP level MEL plans or risk management frameworks. It is notable that many of the CPs are operating in high-risk environments and although risks were captured in the CP annex and country teams were aware of risks, there was little active risk management at the CP level.

The MEL annex was not normally used and it is noticeable that there was little mention of MEL in the annual reports, apart from some examples when outcomes were positive, but lessons learned or reasons for not following up on evaluation recommendations are not normally included. This is a challenge when the four-year programme cycle summary report was compiled, as country team staff are often different from those at the beginning of the period, so it is difficult to reflect over the whole CP period for staff that are in place at that point.

Finding 29: The CP management response process is useful.

The CP management response process is useful for country teams as it provides a valuable opportunity to reflect annually on CP results, have discussions with senior management and be given guidance. It was however noted by country teams that these discussions could be allocated more time due to their value and be more substantive. On the other hand, senior management highlighted that the annual reports are very technical and dense, making it difficult for someone who does not have in-depth knowledge of the programme to engage in a constructive way.



4. Experiences made with the meta-analysis approach

The meta-analysis team found the approach to have worked well, with the meta-analysis yielding credible evidence for the review questions, despite not following a traditional evaluation approach. The country teams and workshop participants participated actively in the workshops and were felt by the meta-analysis team to be sufficiently open about CP progress and challenges experienced. Interviews with selected country stakeholders prior to the workshops were important to gain an external viewpoint and triangulate evidence, as well as with former country team members to gather further information from the earlier period of the CPs.

A self-assessment was an effective approach with workshop participants appreciating a process that was open and transparent which they participated in, in close collaboration with the evaluators. The meta-analysis workshops were valued as they gave country teams an important opportunity to discuss and reflect together on the 2021-24 CPs and future programming cycles. Due to busy work schedules these opportunities are rare and as the evaluators took the burden of workshop preparation and delivery, the lack of additional work or “homework” for country teams was appreciated.

There are several useful learnings for how to conduct future workshops. It is important to ensure that all participants attend in person as an on-line presence did not prove effective, as it did not always allow for active participation. The location of the workshops was unimportant as they worked well in Helsinki or in-country, with MFA staff dedicating their time fully to the workshop. Undertaking a pilot workshop in Nairobi for the Somalia and Kenya country teams was critical, as it allowed the meta-analysis team to fine-tune the approach after feedback from participants.

This resulted in giving clearer instructions for and explanations of why exercises were being undertaken during the workshop. A reduction in the time allocated for introductory sessions and the level of interactiveness of workshop methods to ensure there was a balance between more interactive sessions and traditional plenary approaches that participants would be comfortable with.

The approach of using less digital methods for workshop materials and a more traditional flipchart and paper method worked well and simplified preparation and delivery. The session that was particularly highlighted as appreciated by participants was the scenario analysis as this was seen as extremely valuable for helping to inform the next programme cycle. Also, the country quiz and prizes for winners which added an element of levity and fun at the beginning of the workshop and acted as a good icebreakers.

A challenge has been managing sensitivities in (public) country reports without omitting or distorting important observations. This has required concerns expressed by country teams regarding sensitive information being published to be balanced against the need for reports to include as much relevant evidence as possible. Due to this, an abbreviated version of the scenario analysis was included in country reports and the names of workshop participants have been omitted.



5. Conclusions

Conclusion 1: CPs have delivered results.

This conclusion is based on Findings 5, 6, 8, and 11-15. It contributes to Recommendation 1 and Recommendation 2 (in Section 6).

In the first two years of the current programme cycle, the CPs in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Palestine, Somalia, Tanzania, and Ukraine achieved most of their planned results in their targeted impact areas.

Overall, in 2021, 70% of immediate and long-term results were fully or generally on track, despite significant challenges related to the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, conflicts and regime changes in some countries. In 2022, results performance returned to pre-pandemic levels, with 82% of immediate and 85% of long-term results fully or generally on track. Results related to the country teams' influencing activities and engagement in donor coordination were significant but not systematically monitored, nor were linkages to existing global influencing plans for multilateral partners made. CPs also incorporated Finland's HRBA and contributed to cross-cutting priorities with a focus on gender equality and non-discrimination. Results performance was enabled by active adaptive management of CP projects, i.e. by adapting how objectives were reached in accordance to changing conditions on the ground. Several CPs also adjusted their goals, approaches and targets after conditions in those countries had fundamentally changed.

Conclusion 2: CPs have strengthened continuity and results-based management of Finland's bilateral development cooperation.

This conclusion is based on Findings 8, 21-23 and 25. It contributes to Recommendation 1 and Recommendation 2 (Section 6).

CPs represent a cornerstone of RBM at the MFA. Compared to managing separate projects, this programmatic modality allowed the MFA to plan, manage, and report on aggregated country-level results of Finland's bilateral development cooperation. The CP modality contributed to a results culture at the MFA that highlights management and accountability for results rather than only for implementing planned activities.

Within the MFA and vis-a-vis Finland's development partners, CPs projected a coherent vision of Finland's development cooperation goals, objectives and mechanisms for achievement. CPs also helped to maintain focus on selected impact areas across programmatic cycles, which strengthened Finland's expertise and reputation in related sectors and enabled long-term strategic engagement.

Conclusion 3: To add programmatic value, CPs need to reflect the realities on the ground, but updating CP documents and results frameworks after drastic changes in partner countries required an unrealistic level of effort with current CP formats and staff resources.

This conclusion is based on Findings 3, 7, 9, and 25-29. It contributes to Recommendation 1 and Recommendation 2 (Section 6).



As instruments for RBM, CPs allow for adaptive management in terms of how intended goals and targets are to be reached. If conditions in a country change significantly, existing goals may become obsolete and CP documents and results frameworks therefore need to be updated. Failing to do so reduces the usefulness of CPs for helping to plan and account for results because they become detached from the realities on the ground.

For current CPs, such fundamental updates required a high level of time, effort and RBM expertise that exceed the limited staff capacities in most country teams. A 2020 evaluation had also pointed to the need for additional human resources for rigorous programme management in fragile contexts (MFA, 2020a). After regime changes in Afghanistan and Myanmar, only the Myanmar CP was eventually fully updated. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has not yet been reflected in an updated CP, and the war in Gaza has not been reflected in an updated results framework. For Afghanistan and Myanmar, temporary policies helped to clarify Finland's policy position in the aftermath of regime changes, and for providing some guidance for bilateral development cooperation in the short term.

The meta-analysis identified several options for simplifying CP documents and reports without losing the essential added value of managing for country-level results of this modality. These are detailed in the related findings in this report and are summarised in Recommendation 2 in the next section.

Conclusion 4: In country programming, proactive planning for sustainability of results and resilience in view of unknown but likely future shocks becomes increasingly important.

This conclusion is based on Findings 1, 2, and 16-20. It contributes to Recommendation 1 and Recommendation 3 (Section 6).

Several of Finland's partner countries have experienced profound developments and significant shocks over the past couple of years to which CPs reacted by adapting their goals, targets and approaches. Pragmatic and opportunistic grassroots and community-owned approaches employed in CPs have proven to be more resilient than others in some crisis situations, for example after the destruction of infrastructure because of war and conflict, the loss of acceptable partner governments after regime changes, and in operating environments marked by severe restrictions put in place by de-facto authorities. In several instances, earlier investments into institutions and infrastructure were lost after such dramatic developments.

Finland has been quick and effective in adapting its country programming to the new realities after such dramatic changes of context had happened. However, because of the continued high level of uncertainty of the future trajectory in most of the 10 countries of this meta-analysis, reacting to events after they have happened may not suffice anymore. A better option may be to anticipate change and increase resilience by proactively programming approaches and results that will remain intact across different future scenarios.

Conclusion 5: In addition to reduced development impact, new Government of Finland's priorities and austerity measures carry the risk of losing important footholds in partner countries.

This conclusion is based on Findings 4, 10, 22 and 23. It contributes to Recommendation 1 and Recommendation 4 (Section 6).



The value-added of CPs have been broader than just the results from development cooperation activities. There have been significant benefits from the expertise, contacts and access that can support Finnish policies beyond development cooperation. This is through providing entry points for diplomatic and commercial activities, influencing activities to promote Finnish policies and more generally increasing Finland's visibility and standing in-country.

There is a danger that through austerity measures, the reduction of CP budgets and staffing and the reduction in the number of long-term development partner countries, these advantages – and the associated potential benefits in furthering Finland's foreign and trade policy goals – will be lost.

Where CPs will continue there is likely to be less staff time and resources to nurture contacts with partner governments and other external stakeholders and undertake influencing activities through dialogue and participating in or leading key thematic working groups. In countries where there will no longer be CPs, there is a danger that the influence and visibility that Finland has built up over many years will be lost. This means it will be important to ensure that the phasing out of CPs or the reduction in CP resources is not undertaken in a way that risks Finland losing these important footholds.

Conclusion 6: Closer integration between bilateral development cooperation and other Finnish priorities in partner countries is feasible and may benefit other Finnish policies beyond bilateral development cooperation.

This conclusion is based on Findings 4, 10, 14, 21, 23 and 24. It contributes to Recommendation 1 and Recommendation 6 (Section 6).

Currently the CPs focus is on bilateral development cooperation and it is highlighted where humanitarian, Funds for Local Cooperation or Civil Society Organisation interventions are contributing to programme objectives, while annual reporting notes other Finnish activities in-country. This reflects a pragmatic approach relating to the scope of activities that country teams are responsible for and the fact that funding for Civil Society Organisations and humanitarian support have their own systems and procedures and are managed from separate units.

There is scope however, for further integration between bilateral development cooperation and other Finnish objectives in a given country. The regional departments include development cooperation for specific countries, they are also responsible for political, trade and commercial issues. There is no reason why at regional department level there cannot be integrated plans to create synergies between all these areas and combined reporting undertaken at regional departmental level. An example of this is the new Reconstruction Plan for Ukraine which will combine private sector assistance and development cooperation.

Such closer integration may further increase the effective use of assets associated with CPs – such as country expertise, contacts and access to key stakeholders – for supporting other Finnish policies beyond bilateral development cooperation.

More integrated plans could also include more attention to RBM in areas other than development cooperation. A key value-added of the CPs has been the attention paid to RBM which has been important through the development of theories of change and results frameworks and annual monitoring to develop a culture of results within development cooperation. This approach is used only in development cooperation but would also be beneficial for other areas of MFA's work.



6 Recommendations

Recommendation 1: The MFA should continue a programme- and results-based approach in bilateral development cooperation.

This recommendation is based on all six conclusions. It is addressed to the MFA's political leadership (the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development and his staff, and the Under-Secretary of State for Development Policy and his staff) and to MFA senior management and senior advisers of the concerned departments (the Department for the Americas and Asia, the Department for Africa and the Middle East, the Department for Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and the Department for Development Policy). This recommendation should be implemented as soon as possible to inform the preparation of the next generation of CPs and also the programming for countries without a CP in 2024 for the 2025-28 programme cycle.

The MFA should continue a programme- based approach in all 10 countries covered by the meta-analysis. This is because CPs have contributed to delivering results, strengthened the visibility and continuity of Finland's development cooperation, established Finland's reputation and presence in most countries, allowed reporting of and accountability for results, and can contribute to more comprehensive management of Finland's policy priorities in these countries.

In line with government priorities, new CPs should be developed for the 2025-28 programming cycle in Ethiopia, Nepal, Somalia, Tanzania and Ukraine, as well as a similar programme for Palestine. These next generation CPs must maintain the most value-adding elements of country-level RBM but formats and processes need to be simplified to ensure that they are useful and used (Recommendation 2). They need to reflect current realities on the ground but also anticipate and proactively plan for increased resilience in possible future scenarios (Recommendation 3). The case of Ukraine may differ somewhat as that CP will be closely aligned with the Reconstruction Plan, Part Two. Nevertheless, Finland should work towards ensuring that key RBM elements are reflected in that plan as well.

In the four countries in which CPs are to be phased out (Afghanistan, Kenya, Mozambique and Myanmar), some form of country-level planning and reporting should anyhow be maintained. One option are concise policies defining priorities and approaches without going into detailed planning, like the temporary policies developed after the sudden changes in Afghanistan and Myanmar. Annual reporting against these policies could then happen along the simplified formats introduced below (Recommendation 2).

Recommendation 2: CP formats and processes should be simplified and adapted.

This recommendation is based on Conclusions 1-3. It is addressed to MFA senior management and senior advisers of the concerned departments (the Department for the Americas and Asia, the Department for Africa and the Middle East, the Department for Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia). It should be implemented as soon as possible, for instructions to be published in time for the 2025-28 programmatic cycle.



Because of the mismatch between staff time required for operating the current CP formats and processes and available staff resources, the MFA should develop instructions for simplified plans, reports and procedures for the next generation of CPs in Ethiopia, Nepal, Somalia, Tanzania and Ukraine, and for the continuing programme in Palestine. In parallel, instructions for more basic policy priorities and reporting frameworks in Afghanistan, Kenya, Myanmar and Mozambique should also be developed. Beyond what is described in this recommendation, documents and reports should be adapted also according to Recommendations 3-6.

Next generation CP documents for 2025-28 should retain the basic structure and content of current CPs, including the description of goals, outcomes, and outputs that explains how results are to be achieved. An additional brief section should be added on how influencing activities are intended to contribute to these results, i.e. which stakeholders will be engaged to what end. The brief sections about risk management, MEL, and a tentative financing plan should also be kept.

The results framework annex should be simplified by relaxing (but not abandoning) the requirements for indicators and targets, especially in fragile contexts. These should be added when considered useful for illustrating progress towards a result, and when data is likely to be available, for example from CP project reports. This means that some intended results will remain without indicators, while others may be backed up by more than one. Relaxing requirements for indicators means that (even) more attention needs to be paid to clearly and unambiguously defining intended impacts, outcomes and outputs so that a meaningful assessment and rating of progress can be made also without quantitative data, as described below. For this, the meta-analysis team considers it useful to limit CP outputs to the immediate results of successfully implemented project activities, and CP outcomes as the next-level developmental changes these outputs contribute to and impacts as the longer-term developmental changes of interest. Other annexes (risk matrix; monitoring, evaluation and learning plan; and theory of change graphs) should become optional – these issues should be addressed primarily in the main CP document.

Annual CP results reports should be adapted in a similar manner. Their basic section structure should be maintained, but a section on influencing results should be added. This section does not need to be developed into full country-level influencing plans, but, if relevant, should make a link to existing global-level influencing plans. The meta-analysis team recommends continuing with the traffic-light effectiveness ratings but to base these primarily on self-assessments of progress made towards intended results by the country teams, supported by any available kind of evidence. This implies that instructions should be adapted to better reflect these more qualitative assessments (e.g., by replacing expressions such as “more than 80% of target reached” by qualitative statements such as “expectations for contributing to this result were fully met”). Country teams should indicate to what degree they consider intended results to have been achieved, creatively using their own observations, feedback from implementing partners and other stakeholders, qualitative examples from the field, quantitative and qualitative indicators, logical reasoning along impact area theories of change, and other information and considerations as supporting evidence. The analysis of factors that support or limit effectiveness should be maintained - possibly without predefined standard factors (and without policy dialogue & engagement, as this is now covered elsewhere). The section on the HRBA and cross-cutting topics could be structured further, for example by adding a template for systematic assessments by the country teams along suitable scales (e.g. blind, sensitive, responsive, transformative).

The simplified results framework annex and the financial annex should be annually updated. Further annexes to annual CP reports should not be mandatory, but the main report should contain a



summary of evolving risks and how these are managed, and of key learnings and changes made to the CP because of insights gained through monitoring and evaluation.

Continuing development cooperation in the four countries in which CPs are to be phased out (Afghanistan, Kenya, Mozambique and Myanmar) could be guided by policy documents similar to the temporary policies used in Afghanistan and Myanmar. This would have the advantage of providing guidance and stability without requiring the development of a full CP document. Such policies could be established by year-end 2024 and then be updated whenever required, i.e. they do not necessarily have to follow the four-year programmatic CP cycle. Reporting of progress and results could be done against these policies, following similar formats as suggested above for the ongoing CPs, possibly further simplified to remain manageable with remaining staff capacities.

Recommendation 3: Future country programming should embrace scenario analysis and consider resilience vis-a-vis possible shocks more systematically.

This recommendation is based on Conclusion 4. It is addressed to MFA senior management and senior advisers of concerned departments (the Department for the Americas and Asia, the Department for Africa and the Middle East, the Department for Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, but possibly also the Department for Development Policy and other departments representing policy priorities to be addressed in the scenario analysis). It should be implemented as soon as possible, in time for inclusion into the instructions for the 2025-28 programmatic cycle. If the scenario analyses conducted as part of the self-assessment workshops is considered sufficient, these can be used as a basis for the 2025-28 cycle but should be repeated if further dramatic changes of context occur.

The MFA should systematically use scenario analysis as a tool for mapping out different futures for how countries develop, and for Finland's country-level engagement. Importantly, this tool should be used not only for assessing consequences for Finland's development cooperation, but also for other policy areas, contributing to the more holistic approach recommended below (Recommendation 5). Scenario analysis can be integrated with the current theory-of-change based approach to CP planning and reporting by including the most important scenario attributes as enabling (or hindering) conditions when developing theories of change, and by then avoiding pathways that critically depend on conditions considered unlikely.

Useful occasions for scenario analysis are before preparing a new programming cycle (as in this meta-analysis), or after sudden changes, as in the case of Afghanistan and Myanmar in 2021. Scenario analysis is most meaningful when significant developments can be discussed. This means that the time horizon should range from a few years for fragile countries to providing 10–15-year perspectives for stable countries. Because of the limited human resources of country teams, scenario analyses should be kept to a day or less and be supported by an experienced facilitator.

Apart from continuing to adaptively manage CPs in response to developments in partner countries, the MFA should also make proactive use of insights gained by analysing the implications of possible future scenarios on Finland's bilateral development cooperation, and for other areas of cooperation. Ideally, theories of change and selected approaches should be sufficiently resilient vis-à-vis different kinds of likely shocks and developments.

The meta-analysis team considers this vital for countries facing significant short-term uncertainties in their development. From the scenario and context analyses conducted during the meta-analysis,



this presently applies fully or partly to seven of the 10 countries, i.e. Afghanistan, the north of Ethiopia, the north of Mozambique, Myanmar, the Gaza strip in Palestine, Somalia, and Ukraine.

For such countries, approaches with a high level of sustainability and resilience in different future scenarios should be considered already when planning development cooperation in the next programme cycle.

Recommendation 4: When implementing new Government of Finland's priorities and austerity measures, including the phasing out of CPs, the MFA should focus on sustaining results and conserve, to the extent possible, existing access and influence in partner countries.

This recommendation is based on Conclusion 5. It is addressed to MFA senior management and senior advisers of concerned departments (the Department for the Americas and Asia, the Department for Africa and the Middle East, the Department for Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia). It should be implemented as soon as possible.

Reduced budgets and phased-out CPs in several countries underline the importance of making development cooperation results resilient also towards the prospect of less future Finnish funding. For CPs and projects that are being phased out, a sustainable “sunset” of operations must be planned and implemented, and/or continued funding must be secured from other sources.

Generally, CPs should be encouraged to continue to focus on maintaining and building partnerships with government and external partners, as well as influencing activities. These activities should be prioritised over new programming given that country team resources will be limited. Engagement activities and their results should be acknowledged in CP documents and reports and also be included into results frameworks as highlighted in Recommendation 2.

Where possible resources should still be devoted to these activities in long-term partner countries which will no longer be CPs.

Recommendation 5: The MFA should further integrate country-level planning and reporting of bilateral development cooperation with that of its foreign and trade priorities while conserving the good RBM practices established in CPs.

This recommendation is based on Conclusion 6. It is addressed to MFA senior management and senior advisers of concerned departments (the Department for the Americas and Asia, the Department for Africa and the Middle East, the Department for Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, but possibly also the Department for Development Policy and other departments representing other priority policy areas). It should be adopted as soon as possible, with rollout over the next couple of years.

In line with new Government of Finland priorities, closer integration and synergies between bilateral development cooperation and other Finnish objectives in partner countries should be explored.

Because the departments and units responsible for the present CPs also have responsibilities related to Finland's commercial, trade and political priorities in these countries, ways to more closely link planning and reporting of activities and results in these areas to those in bilateral development cooperation can be explored. One way to do this would be to continue with the established results-based planning and reporting for bilateral development cooperation as described above



(Recommendation 2), but then to draw on these detailed plans and reports for more integrated planning and reporting across all policy areas.

This approach would have the advantage that the good RBM practices achieved in bilateral development cooperation programming could be conserved, while acknowledging that the same practices and standards cannot (yet) be applied to all policy areas (see Recommendation 6). It would also have the advantage that bilateral development cooperation programming could continue to follow government cycles rather than, for example, the appointments and terms of individual Ambassadors as in the case of Ambassadors' strategic plans.

However, because the departments and units responsible for the present CPs are *not* responsible for other development cooperation channels delivered through private sector instruments, CSOs and global multilateral organisations, results-based planning and reporting should continue within each of those channels. Here, only close coordination between the departments and units in charge of these channels can be advised.

At a higher organisational level, aggregate summary reporting across all development and other policy areas is possible. Across Finland's development policy channels, this was for example successfully done by the 2022 report on Finland's development policy results to parliament.

Recommendation 6: The MFA should apply lessons learned from results-based bilateral programming to support results-based management of its foreign and trade priorities.

This recommendation is based on Conclusion 2 and Conclusion 6. It is addressed to MFA senior management and senior advisers of concerned departments (the Department for the Americas and Asia, the Department for Africa and the Middle East, the Department for Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, but possibly also the Department for Development Policy and other departments representing other priority policy areas). It should be adopted as soon as possible, with rollout over the next couple of years.

Managing for results at the MFA was spearheaded by bilateral development cooperation projects more than two decades ago. Since then, substantial experience and expertise has been accumulated in how to apply RBM to bilateral development cooperation projects and, starting from 2012, to country programming. In parallel, the MFA has made progress in managing its influencing activities in a results-oriented way. In future reporting on bilateral development cooperation, the MFA should continue to apply this expertise, acknowledging the changes detailed in Recommendation 2.

Beyond this, the MFA should also consider applying some of the RBM processes and formats developed and tested in the context of CPs for planning and reporting of country-specific results in its foreign and trade policies, to strengthen results-oriented management, learning from results, and accountability for results. Practical and feasible approaches for this might be the use theories of change (for connecting activities and interventions to intended strategic goals), influencing plans, and self-assessed progress reporting towards intended results as used in CP results reports.



Annex 1: References

Standard documents for all 10 countries (referred to by indicating the respective years and if relevant, countries):

- Country Strategies for the previous two cycles (since 2013)
- Country Strategies for the present cycle (2021-24)
- CP documents and annexes for the present cycle (2021-24)
- Annual CP results reports for each year between 2016 and 2022, including all annexes and the management responses
- Ambassador's Strategic Plans since 2016
- Synthesis reports on the CP modality and CP results reports results since 2020
- Guidelines, reporting instructions and templates for Country Strategies, CPs and CP results reports (since 2012)
- Instructions and templates for the Political Economy Analyses and CS self-assessments of 2019
- Finland's relations and development cooperation in bilateral partner countries and country-specific websites. Information for each country on the MFA website. Accessible via: <https://um.fi/bilateral-partner-countries>.
- Finland abroad. Information for each of Finland's embassies on the MFA website, including embassy staff and embassy responsibilities. Accessible through: <https://finlandabroad.fi/frontpage>.

Individual references:

Afghanistan Coordination Group. (2023). Framework for International Partner Support in Afghanistan 2023–2025.

Africa Center for Strategic Studies. (2024). 2024 Elections, Mozambique.

Al Jazeera. (2022). Mozambique court hands out verdicts in \$2bn corruption case. News article. PEA Mozambique.

Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2022). Country Report — Kenya. Accessed in April 2024 at: https://bti-project.org/fileadmin/api/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2022_KEN.pdf.

Centro de Integridade Pública, Moçambique, and Chr. Michelsen Institute. (2021). Costs and consequences of the hidden debt scandal of Mozambique.

Collins, T. (2022). 'Back online': Tanzania's president rights predecessor's wrongs. Al Jazeera.



Conflict and Environment Observatory and Zoï Environment Network. (2024). Assessing Environmental Damage in Ukraine. Accessed in April 2024 at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/assessing-environmental-damage-ukraine-february-2024>.

Council conclusions on Afghanistan. Accessed in March 2024 at: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7264-2023-INIT/en/pdf>.

CoWASH IV. (2021). Gender Transformative and Disability Inclusive WASH Strategy in COWASH IV. Accessed in February 2024 at: <https://cowash.org/gender-transformative-and-disability-inclusive-wash-strategy-in-cowash-iv/>.

Debuyscher, J. and Schotte, J. (2022). Despite the Covid-19 pandemic and external shocks, Tanzania enjoys strong economic growth and relatively low inflation. Country news. Credendo.

Destiny Ethiopia. (2019). Four Scenarios of Possible Futures. Conference Report.

DT Global. (2022). Biennial evaluation of 2018-2019 PEGASE Direct Financial Support (“PEGASE DFS”) to the Palestinian Authority. Final Report – March 2022.

EC. (2021). Council conclusions on Afghanistan. Accessed in March 2024 at: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11713-2021-REV-2/en/pdf>; and EC. (2023).

Eckstein, D., Künzel, V. and Schäfer, L. (2021). Global Climate Risk Index 2021: Who suffers Most from Extreme Weather Events? Weather-related Loss Events in 2019 and 2000 to 2019. Germanwatch.

Education Cluster & UNICEF. (2023). Ethiopia Education Cluster Quarterly Newsletter July - September 2023. Accessible at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-education-cluster-quarterly-newsletter-july-september-2023>.

EIU. (2023). Democracy Index 2023. Age of conflict.

EU. (2023a). Action Document for Addressing basic needs and supporting livelihoods of the people of Afghanistan.

EU. (2023b). TA-School Sector Development Plan SSDP 2016-2021, Nepal. Final Evaluation Report.

European Commission. (2023). European Union Cooperation with Somalia (2014-2021), Vol 2.

FCDO. (2023). Partnership Fund for a Resilient Ukraine Annual Review.

FIIA. (2023). Finland in Afghanistan 2001-2021: From Stabilization to Advancing Foreign and Security Policy Relations. Report #72.

Finnish Government. (2023). A strong and committed Finland. Programme of Prime Minister Petteri Orpo's Government. 20 June 2023. PUBLICATIONS OF THE FINNISH GOVERNMENT 2023:60.



Finnpartnership. (2023). Kenya's outlook after the August 2022 general elections. Accessed in December 2023 at: <https://finnpartnership.fi/en/ajankohtaista/kenyas-outlook-after-the-august-2022-general-elections/>.

Freedom House (n.d.). Freedom in the world 2021: Tanzania. Accessed in March 2024 at: <https://freedomhouse.org/country/tanzania/freedom-world/2021>; World Bank. (n.d.). Population, total – Tanzania. Accessed in March 2024 at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=TZ>.

Fund for Peace. (2023). Fragile State Index. Accessed at: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/>.

Government of Nepal. (2021). Nepal Multidimensional Poverty Index 2021. Report. Accessed in March 2024 at: <https://www.undp.org/nepal/publications/nepal-multidimensional-poverty-index-2021>.

IMF. (2022). Nepal: Request For An Arrangement Under The Extended Credit Facility. IMF Country Report No. 22/24.

IMF. (2023). Country Report. No. 13/154.

IRC. (2023). The IRC and EU collaborate to address urgent needs in Myanmar. Press release. Accessed in February 2024 at: <https://www.rescue.org/eu/press-release/irc-and-eu-collaborate-address-urgent-needs-myanmar>.

Kelly, L. (2019). Legislation on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda and England and Wales. University of Manchester. Accessed in March 2024 at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5d9b558ded915d354c1af0ff/656_NGO_Legislation_East_Africa.pdf.

Kenya National Treasury and Planning. (2020). Public debt management report 2019/2020.

Kuvaja, M. (2023). Thematic Case Study: Teacher Education in Mozambique. In Right to Education, Right to Learn – Finland's Development Cooperation in the Education Sector. MFA Finland.

MFA Denmark. (2022). Transition Programme for Afghanistan 2022.

MFA. (2011). Evaluation: Results-Based Approach in Finnish Development Cooperation. Evaluation report 2011:2.

MFA. (2016). Evaluation of Finland's Development Cooperation Country Strategies and Country Strategy Modality. 2016/3. (Including country reports).

MFA. (2020a). Evaluation of the Country Strategy Approach in Fragile Contexts. (Including country case studies).

MFA. (2020b). Finnish Development Policy Influencing Activities in Multilateral Organisations. Evaluation report.



MFA. (2021a). Finland to suspend development cooperation in Afghanistan. Press release. Accessed in December 2023 at: https://um.fi/press-releases/-/asset_publisher/ued5t2wDmr1C/content/suomi-keskeyttaa-kehitysyhteistyonsa-afganistanissa.

MFA. (2021b): Evaluation of ICI Projects in Afghanistan, Bhutan, India, and Nepal.

MFA. (2022a). Assessment: FROM REACTIVITY TO RESILIENCE. Response of Finnish Development Policy and Cooperation to the COVID-19 Pandemic. 2022/2.

MFA. (2022b). Ex-Post Evaluation of Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project in Western Nepal (RWSSP-WN) 2008-2019; and Final Evaluation of Rural Village Water Resources Management Project (RVWRMP) 2006-2022, Final Report.

MFA. (2022c). Finland as part of international community's crisis management and development cooperation in Afghanistan in 2002-2021. Report to the Parliament.

MFA. (2022d). Facilitated assessment of Finnish peace, democratization, and sustainable livelihoods support in Myanmar.

MFA. (2022e). Finland's Development Policy Results Report 2022.

MFA. (2023a). Evaluation: RIGHT TO EDUCATION, RIGHT TO LEARN – FINLAND'S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN THE EDUCATION SECTOR. (Including country case studies).

MFA. (2023b). Green finance for youth employment. Project design document.

MFA. (2023c). Reconstruction of Ukraine: Finland's National Plan, Part One.

MFA. (2023d). Right to Education, Right to Learn – Finland's Development Cooperation in the Education Sector. Evaluation report.

MFA. (2023e). Työryhmän suositukset ulkoasiainhallinnon uudistamiseksi. Accessed in April 2024 at: <https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/handle/10024/165286>.

MFA. (2023f). Evaluation of Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA) in Finland's Development Policy And Cooperation.

MFA. (2024a). Austerity measures in development cooperation are specified. Press release. Accessed in March 2024 at: <https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/-/austerity-measures-in-development-cooperation-are-specified>.

MFA. (2024b). Ulkomaankauppa- ja kehitysministeri Ville Tavion puhe hallituksen kehitysyhteistyösopeutuksia käsittelevässä tiedotustilaisuudessa. Accessed in February 2024 at: https://um.fi/ajankohtaista/-/asset_publisher/gc654PySnjTX/content/ulkomaankauppa-ja-kehitysministeri-ville-tavion-puhe-hallituksen-kehitysyhteistyösopeutuksia-kasittelevassa-tiedotustilaisuudessa/35732.



MFA. (n.d.a). Suomi osana kansainvälisen yhteisön kriisinhallinta- ja kehitysyhteistyötoimintaa Afganistanissa 2001–2021. Accessed in March 2024 at: <https://um.fi/documents/35732/0/UH+AF+selvitys+FINAL+221222.pdf/3e6065a1-b072-cc9e-e369-f32a1b889450?t=1671717356679>.

MFA. (n.d.b). Unit for the Horn of Africa and Eastern Africa. Online description of responsibilities. Accessed in March 2024 at: <https://um.fi/unit-for-the-horn-of-africa-and-eastern-africa>.

Myanmar Teacher Platform. (n.d.). Accessed in February 2024 at: <https://mmteacherplatform.net/en>.

OECD. (2021). Peer Review. Mid-term Review of Finland.

Oxfam and Humanitarian Accountability Monitoring Initiative. (2019). Fighting Inequality in Nepal: The road to prosperity.

Peltonen, M. (2023). Rule of law develops slowly but constantly in Mozambique. University of Helsinki.

PMCG. (2021). Ukraine in International Rankings. Economic Outlook and Indicators. Accessed in March 2024 at: https://pmcresearch.org/publications_file/cb0261c191953adb1.pdf.

Sentinel. (2017). Social and Environmental Trade-Offs in African Agriculture.

Sentinel. (2018). Scenarios of agricultural development in Ethiopia. Workshop report.

Sinha R., Van der Weide, W., Dev Bhatta, S. & Thwin, M. (2023). A generation of children are at risk of learning losses in Myanmar. Accessed in February 2024 at: <https://blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/generation-children-are-risk-learning-losses-myanmar>.

Somalia Ministry of Planning. (2021). Aid Flows in Somalia 2021. Accessed in March 2024 at: <https://drive.google.com/file/d/174yIBlc7MDjkY39diGI-pjHFDVehUraY/view>.

STFA. (2022). Annual Progress Report 2022. Accessed in March 2024 at: https://mptf.undp.org/sites/default/files/documents/2023-05/consolidated_stfa_annual_report_2022_reduced.pdf.

Team Europe. (2023). The Afghanistan Country Assessment.

Transparency International. (2023). Corruption Perceptions Index. Accessed at: <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023>.

UM. (2024). Finland continues funding UNRWA— funds directed to prevention of misconduct. Press release. Accessed in April 2024 at: https://um.fi/current-affairs/-/asset_publisher/gc654PySnjTX/content/suomi-jatkaa-unrwan-tukemista-varoja-ohjataan-vaarinkaytosten-ehkaisemiseen.

UN. (2022). UN-Water SDG 6 Data Portal. Accessed at: <https://www.sdg6data.org/en>

UNDP. (2022a). Human Development Index. Accessed at: <https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI>.



UNDP. (2022b). Poverty, Human Development, and the Macro-Economy in Ethiopia, 2020-23.

UNDP. (2023). 2023 Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI): Unstacking global poverty: Data for high impact action. Accessed in April 2024 at: <https://hdr.undp.org/content/2023-global-multidimensional-poverty-index-mpi#/indicies/MPI>.

UNDP. (n.d.). Stabilization Programme.

UNESCO. (n.d.). Primary completion rate in Kenya. Accessed in April 2024 at: https://www.education-inequalities.org/indicators/comp_prim_v2/kenya#ageGroups=%5B%22comp_prim_v2%22%5D&years=%5B%222020%22%5D.

UNFPA. (n.d.). World Population Dashboard Mozambique.

UNHCR. (n.d.). Rohingya emergency. Accessed in February 2024 at: <https://www.unhcr.org/emergencies/rohingya-emergency>.

UNICEF & WASH Cluster. (2023). Ethiopia National Wash Cluster Briefing Package, June 2023. Accessible at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-national-wash-cluster-briefing-package-june-2023>.

UNICEF. (2021a). State of Palestine Humanitarian Situation Report End of Year 2020.

UNICEF. (2021b). The Situation of children in Mozambique. Summary Report. Accessed in April 2024 at: <https://www.unicef.org/mozambique/media/4501/file/The%20Situation%20of%20Children%20in%20Mozambique%202021.pdf>.

UNICEF. (n.d.). Country profiles: Kenya. Accessed in April 2024 at: <https://data.unicef.org/country/ken/>.

UNU-WIDER. (2021). The macroeconomic impact of COVID-19 in Mozambique. Working Paper. Accessed in April 2024 at: <https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/macroeconomic-impact-covid-19-mozambique>.

Venäläinen. (2022). Evaluation of Uongozi Institute training outcomes.

World Bank Ukraine. (2024). Third Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA3) February 2022 –December 2023.

World Bank. (2019). TANZANIA Mainland Poverty Assessment.

World Bank. (2020). Data: Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births). Accessed at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT>

World Bank. (2020a). Economic Developments in the Palestinian Territories.

World Bank. (2020b). Kenya Economic Update: COVID-19 Erodes Progress in Poverty Reduction in Kenya, Increases Number of Poor Citizens. Accessed in April 2024 at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kenya/publication/kenya-economic-update-covid-19-erodes-progress-in-poverty-reduction-in-kenya-increases-number-of-poor-citizens>.



World Bank. (2021). Data: GDP per capita (current US\$). Accessed at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?view=chart>

World Bank. (2021a). Climate Risk Country Profile: Kenya. Accessed in April 2024 at: https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/2021-05/15724-WB_Kenya%20Country%20Profile-WEB.pdf.

World Bank. (2021b). Europe and Central Asia: Macro Poverty Outlook.

World Bank. (2021c). Palestinian Territories: Macroeconomic Poverty Outlook.

World Bank. (2021d). Tanzania Economic Update, Raising the Bar, Achieving Tanzania's Development Vision.

World Bank. (2022). Accessed at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

World Bank. (2022). Accessed at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=KE-AF-ET-MZ-MM-NP-PS-SO-TZ-UA&name_desc=false

World Bank. (2022). The World by Income and Region. Accessed at: <https://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/the-world-by-income-and-region.html>

World Bank. (2022a). Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee.

World Bank. (2022b). Tanzania Country Program Evaluation.

World Bank. (2022c). The Multi-Partner Fund: Progress Report January-June 2022.

World Bank. (2023). Climate Risks, Exposure, Vulnerability and Resilience in Nepal.

World Bank. (2023a). Country climate and development report.

World Bank. (2023b). Kenya Economic Update. A balancing act: opportunities for making growth more inclusive during challenging times.

World Bank. (2023c). Nepal Economic Update.

World Bank. (2023d). Nepal: Macro-poverty Update.

World Bank. (2023e). Racing Against Time – World Bank Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee.

World Bank. (2023f). The World Bank Group in Ukraine 2012–20. Country Program Evaluation.

World Bank. (2024a). Breaking Barriers: Empowering Girls with Clean Water and Sanitation Facilities in Ethiopia's Schools. Accessed in February 2024 at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2024/01/19/breaking-barriers-empowering-girls-with-clean-water-and-sanitation-facilities-in-ethiopia-s-schools>.



World Bank. (2024b). World Bank's PEACE Project Supports Key Government Programs in Ukraine. Accessed in March 2024 at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2023/07/10/the-world-banks-peace-project-supports-the-government-key-programs-in-ukraine?cid=eca_fb_ukraine_uk_ext.

World Bank. (n.d.a). Afghanistan Development Updates (several since 2020).

World Bank. (n.d.b). Country Profiles. Gender Data Portal.

World Bank. (n.d.c). Ethiopia General Education Quality Improvement Program for Equity. Accessed in February 2024 at: <https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P163050>.

World Bank. (n.d.d). GDP per capita growth. Accessed in March 2024 at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG?name_desc=false. Reporters without Borders. (2020). Index. Accessed in May 2024 at: <https://rsf.org/en/index?year=2020>.

World Bank. (n.d.e). Myanmar overview. Accessed in February 2024 at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/myanmar/overview>.

World Bank. (n.d.f). Data: Contraceptive prevalence, any method (% of married women ages 15-49). Accessed at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.CONU.ZS>.

World Bank. (n.d.g). Data: Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above). Accessed at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS>.

World Bank. (n.d.h). Data: Lower secondary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group). Accessed at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.CMPT.LO.ZS>.

World Bank. (n.d.i). Data: Poverty headcount ratio at \$2.15 a day (2017 PPP) (% of population). Accessed at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY?view=chart>.



Annex 2: The Meta-Analysis Team

Markus Palenberg (Team Leader) is the Managing Director of the Institute for Development Strategy in Munich, Germany. Since 2005 he works as researcher, evaluator and adviser. His research focuses on evaluation methodology such as tools for efficiency analysis, the concept of results chains, managing for results, and causality. As evaluator, he conducts theory-based evaluations of institutions and their work in the development arena. Markus also advises programmes and networks on impact strategies, internal governance arrangements and Monitoring & Evaluation systems. Previously, Markus managed the consulting practice of the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin and worked as manager and consultant in the private sector. Markus holds a doctorate in theoretical physics and was postdoc at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Ann Bartholomew (Deputy Team Leader) is a macroeconomist who specialises in public finance management and evaluation. She has a PhD in economics from the University of London and a Master's degree in agricultural economics from the University of East Anglia. She has over twenty-five years' experience undertaking consultancy and development work in Africa, the Pacific, Central America, Eastern Europe and Asia. She has wide-ranging consulting experience covering programme design and appraisal, provision of economic policy advice and project monitoring and evaluations. She has led or participated in numerous evaluation assignments for bilateral and multilateral development agencies and has significant experience in using innovative evaluation methodologies, undertaking both formative and summative evaluations. She has also conducted a number of evaluations for the MFA over the past 14 years.

Merja Mäkelä (Senior Evaluator) is an expert of managing and evaluating development cooperation interventions with 35 years of experience in working with governments, international organisations and CSOs. She has conducted a number of evaluations covering natural resources and different funding modalities. She has long-term and short-term country experience from Africa and Asia and numerous assignments with MFA Finland as development cooperation specialist and short-term consultant. Ms Mäkelä holds an MSc in forestry from the University of Eastern Finland and Master's degrees in international forestry and environmental education from universities of Reading and Bologna.

Sonja Huhta (Emerging Evaluator) is a social scientist specialised in monitoring and evaluation of international development cooperation. Sonja is a Senior Consultant at NIRAS International Consulting, where she leads the company's Monitoring & Evaluation services for the EU. She is skilled in qualitative and quantitative research methods and her 15 years of professional experience include monitoring and evaluation assignments in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, both as manager and as team member. Since 2008 she has worked with the MFA as a member of staff, as Monitoring & Evaluation expert in bilateral programmes and as a team member on strategic evaluations. Sonja holds a Master's degree in Development Studies from the University of Helsinki.



Annex 3: Terms of Reference

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland

Development Evaluation Unit (EVA-11)

Date: 04.07.2023

Intervention Code: 89893361

Prepared by: Antero Klemola EVA-11 (first draft), Markus Palenberg / Sari Laaksonen (edits)

Terms of Reference for Meta-Analysis of Country Programmes 2021–2024

1. Background to the assignment

1.1. Programme context

The current Country Strategies and Programmes were developed for the period from 2021–2024. This ToR is based on the strategies and programmes as of July 2023. In case of changes to them – or to Finland’s development policy and cooperation priorities more generally – in the coming months, these will be noted and reflected in the inception phase of the assignment.

The Country Strategy is an internal document that presents Finland’s main strategic goals in the partner country. The purpose of the strategy is to enhance the policy coherence of different MFA country level actions to support set objectives in each partner country. Under the country strategy, the Country Programme for Development Cooperation focuses on the results-based management of the development cooperation under the Regional Department. The Country Programme for Development Cooperation defines the results that Finland aims at within its development cooperation programme, and related political and policy dialogue.

1.2. Description of Country Programmes

The Regional units of the Ministry have prepared a Country Programme for each of its long-term partner countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Somalia, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar, Nepal, Afghanistan, and Ukraine. Country Programmes identify the areas of cooperation, forms of support, objectives, and indicators. They also address such matters as the management of risks involved in the activities as well as monitoring and evaluation activities. In addition, Finland’s strategic goals are set out in Country Strategies and the ambassadors’ Strategic Plans, which are also prepared for all partner countries.



Country Programmes build on the partner countries' own development plans, and they are discussed with the authorities of the partner countries and with other development partners, including civil society organisations (CSOs) and other donors. Regional units also organise consultation with other departments in the ministry and Finnish stakeholders before their final approval by the minister. The partner countries coordinate the cooperation with various donors. Consultation in conflict and very fragile situations vary from the normal process.

Finland follows EU guidance and seeks to focus its activities in each partner country on a few thematic areas in which it has specific expertise. Examples of these include water services, education, food security, forestry, and good governance. The areas of cooperation are agreed in collaboration with the partner country in question and, as far as possible, the activities are coordinated to avoid overlap with the activities of other donors.

Country Programmes apply theories of change (TOCs). TOCs represents the best available hypothesis on how change happens, and how we assume we contribute to these changes. TOCs articulate the linkages between programme (or project) activities and policy/strategy goals, impacts and outcomes – and other results – that support the expected change. It emphasizes the underlying assumptions that we consider necessary pre-conditions for change. TOCs shift the emphasis from heavy planning and compliance in implementation to constant monitoring and revisiting of the chosen pathway, and as such are in line with adaptive management, and the learning approach of results-based management. An analysis of causal assumptions and the TOCs should help reflect the extent to which the development results are realistic. They should also help to choose the right actions that are considered best for contributing to results.

The objectives and indicators defined in the Country Programmes are used to monitor progress and report on results made in the partner countries, and to assess the effectiveness of Finland's activities. As far as feasible, the partner countries' own monitoring systems, such as poverty statistics, are used to follow the results. Finland takes an active part in the development of these systems, too. Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) Plans support the management of Country Programmes throughout the implementation and result management cycle. MEL Plans are tools for the country teams to think strategically and plan what kind of evidence and M&E activities are needed.

Country teams responsible for the management of programmes report annually to their respective departments. Then, the directions of the respective departments give management responses to the teams as guidance for the coming year. On this basis, the country teams can adjust the programmes annually. After reporting, all departments (ALI, ASA and ITA) together prepare a synthesis report of the modality annually to showcase lessons learnt and best practices from individual country reports.

1.3. Results of previous assessments and evaluations

Below are some relevant evaluations and previous assessments that relate to Country Programmes (non-exhaustive and will be further elaborated in the inception report). It should be noted that self-assessments were done for all Country Strategies 2016–2019. These self-assessments will be given to the meta-analysis team.

The OECD DAC Mid-term Review (2021) pointed out that Finland has designed publicly available country strategy and Country Programme documents for each of its long-term partner countries that span a period of four years. Country strategies start with an analysis of the country context and



list Finland's strategic goals and how it will work to achieve these through the different diplomatic, business, development, security, and peace channels. Country Programmes in turn operationalise the country strategies, reflecting funds that come from MFA's regional departments, listing impact areas, and drawing a clear link to Finland's strategic goals, global development policy areas set out in its policy, SDG targets, and national country-level plans. As before, annual results reports of Country Programmes require a management response by regional departments in MFA. Civil society, private sector, and other partners funded from MFA would also be encouraged to make use of selected pooled indicators and to contribute to this annual country-level results report. I was extremely pleased to see that Finland has dealt creatively with the challenge of including all of Finland's development investments, including those of its policy departments that manage humanitarian, multilateral, and support to civil society, but also Finnfund, in a more strategic document, while using a separate Country Programme document to go into greater detail on its development programming. There are many lessons here for all members.

The Evaluation on Development Cooperation carried out by the Department for Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, including the Wider Europe Initiative (WEI) (2021) identified a range of factors that have worked well. Finland's development policy priorities have been well integrated and applied. Finland has a strong reputation as a donor committed to addressing core challenges that face partner countries. The mix of instruments used to implement the development cooperation portfolio has secured results in a holistic fashion, from policy level down to the level of communities and individual beneficiaries. Finland's long-term commitment to supporting interventions has facilitated tangible and sustainable results. Finland's commitment to addressing the needs of persons in disadvantaged positions had led to tangible improvements across the region. The evaluation found issues to be addressed with regard to strategic planning of the development cooperation portfolio, as well as management of implementation, monitoring and reporting. In terms of strategic recommendations, the report suggests an overarching vision for development cooperation for the whole region be developed. Stakeholder participation in programming could be enhanced.

The Evaluation of Country Strategy Approach in Fragile Contexts (2020) acknowledged that the four countries and one region featured in the evaluation are diverse in terms of the root causes, sources and effects of their fragility but the challenges related to the implementation of the cooperation are, to a large extent, common. Despite the challenging circumstances, results were achieved by creating possibilities for peacebuilding. The MFA was recommended to enhance efforts in supporting the peace processes as Finland has a good reputation in the field. According to the evaluation, policy dialogue priorities were relevant and geared to state building, while the development cooperation could be more closely linked to the medium-term policy objectives, including peacebuilding. The main learning is that country strategies need to be more flexible so that they can be adapted to changing circumstances. In addition to this, the funding needs to be resilient and possible risks need to be monitored sensitively. Finally, the analytical basis of Country Strategies in terms of conflict and fragility needs to be improved. The evaluation encouraged the MFA to continue and strengthen the Human Rights Based Approach and its practical implementation.

The Evaluation of Finland's Development Cooperation Country Strategies and Country Strategy Modality (2016) found that country strategy objectives and the assessed interventions relevant to partner countries and to Finland's development policy objectives. The countries evaluated were Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nepal, Zambia, Tanzania, and Vietnam. When implemented, many interventions in the six countries delivered results. However, implementation was often delayed, so that the full allocation of Finnish resources to the strategies was not used efficiently to produce results over the strategy period. The results achieved were found not to be consistently sustainable. Policy influence and coordination are strong contributing factors to country strategy portfolio effectiveness



and impact. The evaluation concluded that the country strategy modality is a highly relevant instrument for the MFA. The focus on bilateral cooperation meant that it was not fully relevant in the transitioning contexts, where strategic thinking about other forms of partnership is required.

2. Rationale, purpose and objectives of the meta-analysis

The ultimate purpose of the meta-analysis is to support the achievement of Finland's development policy objectives in the partner countries, and to provide information for the further development of the Country Programmes and their implementation at the strategic level.

The specific objectives are:

- To synthesise key developments in the ten partner countries with relevance for the respective Country Programmes;
- To assess the degree and usefulness of adaptive management of the Country Programmes during the current programme cycle;
- To assess the degree to which Country Programme have contributed to intended (or unintended) Country Programme results and to analyse the factors explaining these contributions (or the absence of contributions);
- To assess the sustainability of Country Programme results;
- To assess the value-add of Country Programmes compared to planning and implementing separate projects; and
- To support the preparation of the next cycle of Country Programmes.

The meta-analysis and its recommendations will support the regional departments in the programming of the next generation of Country Programmes, and in their subsequent management.

Towards stakeholders and parliament, this exercise provides accountability of MFA actions to support development in our partner countries.

3. Scope of the meta-analysis

The meta-analysis focuses on the current programme cycle (2021–2024). Information about earlier periods will be included where contextually relevant.

The meta-analysis is conducted at the aggregated level of each Country Programme. It relies on information about activities and contributions made by individual projects and programmes. This does however not imply that it separately evaluates each project implemented under the Country Programmes.



As explained in more detail below, the meta-analysis builds on desk review of available documentation and on self-assessments by the respective country teams. The meta-analysis team is not expected to collect primary evidence beyond these sources (e.g. by assessments in the field or from partners).

Regional programmes will be excluded from the meta-analysis due to focus on partner countries and because how different the regional programmes and their management are without clear counterpart.

4. Issues to be addressed and overarching questions

Reflecting the objectives of the meta-analysis, the following six overarching questions should be addressed:

1. What key developments with relevance for the 2021-24 Country Programmes took place and are taking place in the ten partner countries? What key developments with relevance for the next Country Programme cycle are expected?
2. How have the 2021-24 Country Programmes been managed and adapted to respond to these developments and to other changing conditions to remain relevant?
3. To what degree, how and why did/do the Country Programmes contribute (or did/do not contribute) to intended and unintended results?
4. How sustainable will Country Programme results likely be and what can be done to further sustain them?
5. What value have Country Programmes added compared to planning and implementing separate projects?
6. Based on what has been learned (questions 1-5), what should be changed and what should be maintained in the next Country Programme cycle?

The first question is descriptive, while Questions 2-5 also involve evaluative judgment by workshop participants and the meta-analysis team.

Question 1 should, among other developments, also cover the pandemic, in-country conflicts, and the various aspects of fragility. Question 2 should include an assessment of how supportive or hindering the MFA's instructions and procedures (including current approaches to results-based management and risk management) were for adaptive management. Question 3 should also look at cross-cutting objectives, long-term interconnections (e.g. at the humanitarian-development-peace-building nexus), the effectiveness of different development cooperation modalities used (including multi-bi co-operation and policy influencing support) and consider performance-enabling issues such as (local) ownership, inclusive partnerships, and coherence. Question 5 should focus on reported and perceived value-add of Country Programmes in terms of planning, management, and results. Question 6 should provide a useful basis for planning for the next Country Programme cycle in terms of themes, modalities, and types of activities, but does not include programme formulation. Any potential changes in Finland's development policy and cooperation priorities in the coming months should be recognised and integrated in the analysis.



5. Methodology

The focus of this meta-analysis is forward-looking, with an aim to establish a holistic understanding of the developments and achievements. It will not concentrate on individual interventions, rather the meta-analysis team is expected to aggregate and consolidate results against broader areas of achievement and meta-analysis questions. Data and information from interventions will be used to inform this process.

The Country Programmes, including the theories of change, impact areas and results frameworks, risk and MEL plans, as well as the annual results reports, will form the basis for the meta-analysis.

For each country, the meta-analysis will consist of two parts:

1. **Synthesis and triangulation of results:** This will be done on the basis of available documents, e.g. Country Strategies, Country Programmes, results reports on each Country Programme, project and programme reports and evaluations, relevant evaluations/reviews done by other donors/partners and publicly available statistics.
2. **Facilitated self-assessment:** Based on these syntheses, the meta-analysis team will facilitate workshops with each country team to self-assess contributions to results and to discuss future scenarios.

The meta-analysis approach for each country will be finalised by the meta-analysis team during the inception phase of the assignment. The overall approach should be similar across all ten countries, but the specific approach and methods used should take into account i) the degree of fragility and conflict of the countries, and ii) whether or not the team will be able to conduct the workshop in-country.

In terms of fragility, Afghanistan, Myanmar, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Somalia, and Ukraine are considered fragile and/or in conflict, whereas Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and Nepal are considered more stable democracies. For the five “stable” countries, workshops can likely be held in-country. In addition, the workshop for Somalia may be held in Nairobi, and the one for Myanmar in Bangkok. The workshops for the remaining three countries (Afghanistan, Occupied Palestinian Territories and Ukraine), and possibly also for Myanmar, could be held in Helsinki (final workshop locations will be determined during the inception phase, also considering travel-related risks. No evaluator, facilitator or interviewee should be put in risk.).



6. The meta-analysis process and time schedule

The meta-analysis will take place during 2023/2024. It will start in March 2023 by nominating the reference group and launching the process for identifying Team Leader candidates.

The detailed meta-analysis questions and the methodology to best support the achievement of the meta-analysis purpose and objectives will be defined in cooperation between EVA-11, the reference group, and the Team Leader to be recruited by Particip GmbH – Niras Finland Oy.

In line with the Evaluation Management Service (EMS) framework agreement, the final Terms of Reference (ToR), including the final meta-analysis questions, methodology, team composition, schedule, and tentative budget, will be drafted in close cooperation with the Team Leader, the reference group and the EVA-11. The preliminary deadline for the draft ToR is 16 June and final ToR July 2023. A first meeting with the regional advisers took place on May 23, 2023.

The inception phase will include a desk study of existing documentation (e.g. guidelines, country strategies and programmes, annual reports), on basis of which the final definition of scope, sampling and methodology to be applied thereto will be defined. The preliminary deadline for the inception report is late October 2023. Importantly, the Inception Report should also serve to incorporate relevant changes to Finland's development policy and cooperation priorities, should any occur between adoption of this ToR in July and end of October 2023.

The synthesis of results for each country will be carried out first and will be shared with participants of the self-assessment workshops before those workshops are conducted.

The workshops will be sequenced so that the two first ones – one for a fragile and one for a stable country – can both take place in November 2023. If possible, the countries for the first self-assessment workshops could be Kenya and Somalia and the workshop could take place during the same week in Nairobi to allow the participation of all meta-analysis team members to test and fine-tune the approach, and to ensure alignment of the approach used in subsequent workshop. The other self-assessment workshops will take place between November 2023 and February 2024.

With a view on country context and Country Programme priorities, it may be useful to group the remaining countries as follows (i.e. to have them analysed by the same meta-analysis team member):

- Afghanistan & Myanmar;
- Tanzania & Mozambique;
- Occupied Palestinian Territories & Somalia (& possibly Kenya);
- Ukraine.

The reporting/dissemination phase will be in March – May 2024. The preliminary deadline for the draft final report is mid March 2024 and for the final report end of April 2024. The meta-analysis results will be published in the end of May 2024.



7. Reporting

The meta-analysis team shall submit the following deliverables:

- Inception report (draft and final)
- For each country:
 - Country synthesis report (before each self-assessment workshop)
 - Country meta-analysis report (including both the country synthesis and the workshop findings)
- Presentation on high-level draft findings, conclusions, and recommendations across all ten countries
- High-level summary report (draft and final) and presentation across all ten countries

Each deliverable is subjected to specific approval by EVA-11. The meta-analysis team can move to the next phase only after receiving a written statement of acceptance by EVA-11. The reporting schedule is included in the contract.

8. Quality assurance

Internal quality assurance:

The consortium implementing this meta-analysis will put in place a three-layer system of quality assurance for all products/reports: at the level of the Team Leader, through the EMSC&DSC, and in-house senior QA advisors.

The Consultant is in charge of the impeccable quality of English and Swedish texts of the reports and related proofreading. The EMSC will be responsible for the good quality translations in Finnish. All deliverables shall be of publishable quality.

The meta-analysis team should do their best not to exceed the total length of 80 pages for the main report and prepare an executive summary that is publishable as a stand-alone document and that includes visualizations. A separate volume on annexes may be produced. It will be agreed upon during the inception phase which of the final deliverables are to be published. The inception report should also outline the structure of the main report and the planned contents of the annex(es). The report should be kept clear, concise, and consistent. The report must follow the writing instructions and template provided by the MFA, and it should contain, among other things, the meta-analysis findings, conclusions, and recommendations. The logic between those should be clear and based on evidence should be demonstrated in a table format.

The final draft report(s) will be sent for a round of comments by EVA-11. The purpose of the comments is only to correct any misunderstandings or factual errors. All team members will need to subscribe to a confidentiality agreement which will comply to MFA norms for information Security (including the different levels of protection of M F A's internal information management system). All team members will sign a non-disclosure agreement.



External quality assurance:

EVA-11 may recruit (tbc) an internationally recognised expert as a Critical Friend (external peer reviewer) for the whole process. The person interacts directly with EVA-11 and provides expert opinions on the planning and implementation of the meta-analysis. EVA-11 may or may not integrate any such external advice as part of their overall feedback and management responses.

9. Expertise required

One expert shall be nominated as the Team Leader. The meta-analysis team shall ensure solid experience and knowledge in the following fields:

- Programme evaluations and planning in the relevant sector.
- Project cycle management (PCM) and Results Based Management (RBM), and their application in programme design, monitoring and evaluation (M&E);
- Relevant sectoral experience, including experience from the region or country;
- Other experience and knowledge relevant to the meta-analysis.
- Experience in integrating cross cutting objectives in project planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation: Promotion of human rights and gender equality, non-discrimination and climate resilience.
- Quality assurance in accordance to the quality assurance approach proposed in the tender.

Team will include an Emerging Expert and describe their areas for capacity development.

10. Management of the meta-analysis

The meta-analysis is commissioned by the EVA-11. The Evaluation Manager of EVA-11 will be responsible for the overall management of the process. The Evaluation Manager will work closely with other units/departments of the MFA and other stakeholders in Finland and abroad.

This meta-analysis is commissioned within the EMS framework contract, and it will be conducted by an independent team recruited by the EMS Service provider (Particip GmbH - Niras Finland Oy). There will be a Management Team responsible for the overall coordination of the meta-analysis. This consists of the EVA-11 Evaluation Manager, the Team Leader, and the EMS Service Coordinator and/or Deputy Service Coordinator (EMSC&D).

A reference group for the meta-analysis will be established and chaired by the Evaluation Manager. The reference group is constituted to facilitate the participation of relevant stakeholders in the design and scoping of the analysis, informing others about the progress of the analysis, raising awareness of the different information needs, quality assurance throughout the process, and using and disseminating the meta-analysis results.



The mandate of the reference group is to provide quality assurance, advisory support, and inputs to the meta-analysis, e.g., through participating in the planning of the analysis and commenting on deliverables of the Consultant. The reference group is critical in guaranteeing transparency, accountability, and credibility, as well as the use of the analysis and validating the results.

The Team Leader will manage the meta-analysis team. This requires careful planning to ensure that a common, consistent approach is used to achieve comparability of the data gathered and the approach used in the analysis. The Team Leader will develop a set of clear protocols for the team to use and will convene regular online team meetings to discuss the approach. Particular attention should be paid to strong inter-team coordination and information sharing within the team during the process.

The meta-analysis team is responsible for identifying relevant stakeholders to be interviewed and organising the interviews. The MFA and embassies will not organize these interviews or meetings on behalf of the meta-analysis team but will assist in identifying people and organizations to be included in the analysis.

11. Budget

The total available budget for the meta-analysis (excluding VAT) is 400 000 €.

12. Mandate

The meta-analysis team is entitled and expected to discuss matters relevant to this meta-analysis with pertinent persons and organizations. However, it is not authorised to make any commitments on behalf of the Government of Finland or the Ministry. The meta-analysis team does not represent the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland in any capacity. All intellectual property rights to the result of the Service referred to in the Contract will be the exclusive property of the Ministry, including the right to make modifications and hand over material to a third party. The Ministry may publish the result under Creative Commons license to promote openness and public use of analysis results.

13. Authorisation

Antero Klemola, Director, EVA-11



Annex 4: Meta-analysis approach and methodology

The assessment was conducted as a meta-analysis of Finland's CPs. Its focus was forward-looking, with an aim to establish a holistic understanding of the developments and achievements under each CP. It did not concentrate on individual interventions, but on aggregate and consolidated results against broader areas of achievement and meta-analysis questions.

Compared to a classical evaluation, the meta-analysis relied more on the views and experiences of the country teams who – beyond sharing information – also participated in interpreting and assessing the evidence at hand. This reflected the overall good experiences made with a similar approach for developing the earlier 2016-19 Country Strategies.

The meta-analysis team's role in this analysis was therefore also about collecting, analysing and presenting available information to the country teams. This was done in the form of presentation slides or other materials shared before the workshops, with the idea that there should be 'no surprises' for the country teams in terms of desk review findings reported later on. The meta-analysis team professionally guided, supported and challenged the country teams towards "making sense" towards a common understanding of the past and current country context, of possible scenarios for the future, and towards drawing insightful conclusions from the evidence at hand. Throughout this process, the meta-analysis team preserved its independence and ensured methodological rigour and triangulation of evidence.

The meta-analysis was designed with experiences from the development process for the 2016-19 Country Strategies in mind:

- It placed emphasis on ensuring that MFA staff had sufficient time for their participation and avoided any significant 'homework' for staff before the self-assessment workshops. For example, the Political Economy Analyses during the 2019 self-assessment processes were considered too heavy on staff. Therefore, the meta-analysis team prepared a summary of the country context as part of its desk review and shared, discussed, and updated it with the country teams during the self-assessment workshops.
- The meta-analysis team also allowed a great deal of flexibility in adapting the order and content of sessions during each workshop to the respective country context – for example in terms of the countries' stability – and the preferences of the country teams. This was done by designing the desk review and the workshops in a modular fashion, avoiding very detailed and rigid templates that needed to be followed.
- The meta-analysis team contributed to a 'safe space' for an effective self-assessment through very clearly separating the meta-analysis (facilitated by the meta-analysis team) from the MFA's decision-making about future CPs (in which the meta-analysis team is not involved). This was done through consistent, honest, and transparent communication and through respecting the ownership of the country teams over the country-specific end products.



The meta-analysis consisted of country-level analysis, and of more aggregated analysis. Overall, 149 people were consulted. On the country-level, the meta-analysis was implemented in three phases.

- In phase 1, for each country, available MFA and non-MFA plans, reports and evaluations were reviewed and synthesised by the meta-analysis team. References are provided in the country reports (Volume II of this report) and in the reference list (Annex 1). In addition, the team collected high-level feedback from selected country stakeholders. Overall, 68 external stakeholders were interviewed. These interviews were held online and prior to the self-assessment workshops.
- In phase 2, the meta-analysis team facilitated self-assessment workshops with each country team (Table 2), to assess contributions to results and to discuss future scenarios. These workshops were prepared by the meta-analysis team, in consultation with the country teams. Workshop agendas and presentation slides (summarising key insights gained from the desk review and from stakeholder interviews) were shared with the country teams one week before each workshop.
- In phase 3, the findings of the desk review and self-assessment were written up in concise meta-analysis country reports (available in Volume II of this report). The draft country reports were at first only shared within the respective country teams for their feedback and validation, before being screened by the MFA to ensure that they contain no confidential information.

Table 2 Dates and locations of the meta-analysis self-assessment workshops

COUNTRY	LOCATION	DATES
Afghanistan	Helsinki	13-15 December 2023
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa	5-7 February 2024
Kenya	Nairobi	22-24 November 2023
Mozambique	Maputo	29-31 January 2024
Myanmar	Bangkok	15-17 January 2024
Nepal	Kathmandu	12-14 February 2024
Palestine	Helsinki	23-25 January 2024
Somalia	Nairobi	20-22 November 2023
Tanzania	Dar es Salaam	22-24 January 2024

Source: CP country reports (Volume II).



On the aggregate level, the meta-analysis team conducted additional desk review and several interviews to inform the analysis across all 10 countries, including with persons involved in the preparation of the 2016-19 Country Strategies (a process that also included a self-assessment component).

Based on the country-level findings, the meta-analysis team then conducted several internal sense-making meetings and shared and discussed early findings and recommendation options during a “Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations” workshop held April 15 2024 in Helsinki. The present synthesis report summarises insights and lessons across all 10 CPs.



Annex 5: List of organisations consulted

MFA DEPARTMENTS AND EMBASSIES

Department for Africa and the Middle East (ALI)

Department for Development Policy (KEO)

Department for Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ITÄ)

Department for the Americas and Asia (ASA)

Embassy of Finland, Addis Ababa

Embassy of Finland, Dar es Salaam

Embassy of Finland, Kabul (closed)

Embassy of Finland, Kathmandu

Embassy of Finland, Kyiv

Embassy of Finland, Maputo

Embassy of Finland, Nairobi

Embassy of Finland, Ramallah

Embassy of Finland, Yangon

EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS

ADPP, Mozambique

Business Finland, Kenya

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH - GIZ, Nepal

Embassy of Denmark in Tanzania

Embassy of Sweden in Kenya

Embassy of Switzerland in Somalia



EU Delegation to Afghanistan

EU Delegation to Kenya

EU Delegation to Nepal

EU delegation to Tanzania

Finn Church Aid, Nepal

Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Mission (FELM), Myanmar

Green Resources company, Tanzania

HALO Trust, Somalia

Independent consultants

Institute for Multiparty Democracy, Mozambique

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), Myanmar

International Organization for Migration (IOM), Somalia

Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau - KfW, Kenya

Ministry for Economy and Finance, Mozambique

Ministry for Planning and Aid Coordination, Palestine

Ministry of Agriculture, Ethiopia

Ministry of Education and Human Development, Mozambique

Ministry of Education and Science, Ukraine

Ministry of Education, Kenya

Ministry of Education, Palestine

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark



Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Poland

Ministry of Water and Energy, Ethiopia

Mpingo Conservation Development Initiative, Tanzania

MSI Reproductive Choices, Afghanistan

Myanmar Education Consortium (MEC)

New Forest Company, Tanzania

NIRAS International Consulting, Kenya

Prime Minister's Office, Palestine

Representative Office of Ireland, Ramallah

Save the Children, Somalia

Somaliland Ministry of Health Development

State Department on Gender and Affirmative Action, Kenya

Tanzania Forest Conservation Group

Tanzania Revenue Authority

UN Women, Afghanistan

UN Women, Nepal

UN Women, Tanzania

UNAMA, Afghanistan

UNDP, Palestine

UNDP, Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan

UNESCO, Myanmar



UNFPA, Tanzania

UNICEF Nepal

UNICEF, Mozambique

UNICEF, Myanmar

UNODC, Myanmar

UNOPS, Myanmar

UNU Wider

UONGOZI institute, Tanzania

USAID, Nairobi

World Bank, Ethiopia

VOLUME I – SYNTHESIS REPORT



Ministry for Foreign
Affairs of Finland