

THE EVALUATION OF FINNISH HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

1996 - 2004

Final Report

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Disclaimer:

This is an independent evaluation. The views expressed herein, are those of the evaluation. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland.

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FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This is the final report of the evaluation of humanitarian activities funded from Finland's official aid from 1996 to 2004¹. The priority objective is to provide the Ministry for Foreign Affairs with *practical* guidance on its Humanitarian Assistance (HA) *policies*. The evaluation was carried out by a four-person team, in late 2004 and early 2005, applying standard evaluation methods.

The terms 'Finnish Aid', 'Finnish Funded Aid', or similar, in this report refer to Finland's Official MFA funded Humanitarian Assistance, unless otherwise stated. The acronym 'HA' covers 'Humanitarian Assistance', 'Humanitarian Aid', or the now more common term, 'Humanitarian Action'. The latter term includes 'protection' activities, in addition to material relief. The term 'Disaster' is frequently applied to so-called 'natural disasters'. 'Emergency' is applied to conflict situations. For ease of drafting and comprehension, in this report the terms 'emergency' and 'disaster' are used inter-changeably.

Humanitarian programmes include more than just acute-emergency activities. The term '**non-acute-emergency aid**' refers to humanitarian activities which are *not* in response to a dramatic, life-threatening deterioration in living conditions (measured, for example, in terms of mortality and morbidity). These are frequently termed '**grey-zone**' activities, in that they are neither acute-emergency, nor long-term development activities. They fall into an intermediate, ill-defined category. They include **post-emergency, recovery, transition and chronic-emergency activities**. Examples of the latter include responses to, for example, situations in Central Africa (such as DRC and Burundi) or Colombia, where crises have festered for years, even decades. While the crises persist, living conditions deteriorate slowly, or have stagnated, or, in some cases, show slight, sporadic, rarely permanent improvements. Aid responses differ, therefore, from those to a sudden-onset crisis ('acute-emergency'), for which rapid stabilisation and continual, gradual improvement might be expected.

Finland funds humanitarian activities in a number of ways. **Core funding** is provided to the central budgets of certain large humanitarian organisations (such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and UNHCR). Such support is a main funding strategy. Funds are also provided for activities in certain regions or countries ('**loosely earmarked**'). Finally, they are also provided for **specific projects** or programmes.

It is, therefore, difficult to define exactly what can be regarded as Finnish funded humanitarian activities, and what is not. **In essence, any humanitarian activity carried out by the main Finnish funded HA partners (including UNICEF and WFP, which are core-funded through development funds) could be regarded as relevant to this evaluation.** The evaluation comments, therefore, on both activities funded directly and specifically by Finland (e.g. specific projects), and activities which are not specifically

¹ The Terms Of Reference state that the 'The period under review is 1996–2003'. Though planned for early 2004, the evaluation took place in late 2004 and was finalised in 2005. Thus it has included, with the agreement of the MFA, some HA activities in 2004, with brief reference to issues in 2005.

funded by Finland, but which are conducted by Finland's key partners who receive core-budget or loosely-earmarked funding.

The report has been finalised, based on comments to previous drafts, from both the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and partner organisations. Interviewees are listed in the annexes. They contributed in Finland, Geneva and Ethiopia. The evaluation team thanks all those who have generously assisted with this evaluation, MFA staff and partners alike. Their support, opinions, information and insights have been much appreciated. The ever efficient and effective organisation and support by Ms. Pirjo Virtanen, of the MFA Evaluation Unit, deserves particular mention. She has expertly guided the evaluation to finalisation, calmly and professionally. The team owes her their deep gratitude.

This report is being written as what has been termed the largest international humanitarian operation in history² unfolds. Despite that possible exaggeration, the tsunami generated by the massive³ undersea earthquake near Sumatra on December 26th 2004, has led to an extraordinary local and global response. The number of countries⁴ seriously affected by a single, sudden-on-set emergency has not been equalled since the post-Second-World-War period.

The tsunami disaster struck when the evaluation had been almost complete. Thus, the response to that disaster is not a central theme in this report. Finland's response is briefly analysed, however, as is the importance of the disaster. The experience of this immense human tragedy and the enormity of the human response, including from Finland, serves to under-pin many of the report's conclusions.

² Media sources quoting the UN. It remains to be seen whether this is true, however. The system for measurement and comparison is not clear. Arguably, the post-second-world-war humanitarian operations, taken in their totality, and measured by numbers of 'beneficiaries' and expenditure in current-dollar terms, were greater. Similarly, the Rwanda crisis, of 1994 - 95, including the genocide and subsequent exodus from Rwanda, resulted in several times more than the currently reported 210,000 deaths due to the tsunami and earthquake.

³ Level 9 on the Richter scale.

⁴ Deaths and damage to property have been concentrated mainly in nine countries. At least that number has been affected to a lesser extent, mainly due to the deaths or disappearance of tourists holidaying in the disaster affected areas. These latter have been estimated in thousands.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS

Term	Explanation
ACT	<i>Action by Churches Together</i>
ADB	<i>African Development Bank</i>
AFP	<i>Agence France Presse</i>
AHA	<i>African Humanitarian Action</i>
AI	<i>Amnesty International</i>
ALNAP	<i>Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action</i>
AP	<i>Associated Press</i>
ARRA	<i>Ethiopian State Administration for Refugee/Return</i>
BBC	<i>British Broadcasting Corporation</i>
BUSD	<i>Billion US dollars</i>
CI30	<i>Hercules cargo plane</i>
CAP	<i>Common Appeal Process</i>
CARE US	<i>US NGO, a member of CARE International</i>
CBS	<i>US News station</i>
CD-ROM	<i>Compact Disk - Read Only Memory</i>
CEB	<i>Council of Europe Development Bank</i>
CHF	<i>Swiss Franc</i>
CIA	<i>Central Intelligence Agency</i>
COWIconsult	<i>Consultancy company, authors of the 1996 Thematic evaluation of the Finnish Humanitarian Assistance</i>
CUAHA	<i>Churches United in the Struggle against HIV/AIDS</i>
DCI	<i>Development Cooperation Ireland</i>
DEC	<i>Disasters and Emergency Committee</i>
DFID (UK)	<i>UK Department For International Development</i>
DFID/CHAD	<i>Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department</i>

Term	Explanation
<i>Disaster</i>	<i>Term commonly applied to natural catastrophes (see also 'emergency')</i>
<i>DPPC</i>	<i>Ethiopian state Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission</i>
<i>DRC</i>	<i>Democratic Republic of the Congo</i>
<i>ECHO</i>	<i>European Commission Humanitarian Office</i>
<i>EFCT</i>	<i>Emergency Field Coordination Training</i>
<i>EIB</i>	<i>European Investment Bank</i>
<i>Emercom</i>	<i>Russian state emergencies Committee</i>
<i>(Acute-) emergency</i>	<i>A (sudden-on-set) situation, in which extraordinary or extreme conditions of human suffering exist (e.g. extraordinary levels of mortality and morbidity)</i>
<i>EMG</i>	<i>Emergency Management Group (Albania)</i>
<i>ENN</i>	<i>Emergency Nutrition Network</i>
<i>EPN</i>	<i>Emergency Personnel Network</i>
<i>ERU</i>	<i>Emergency Response Unit(s)</i>
<i>EU</i>	<i>European Community</i>
<i>FACT</i>	<i>Field Assessment and Coordination Teams</i>
<i>FAO</i>	<i>(UN) Food and Agriculture Organisation</i>
<i>FATS</i>	<i>WFP trucking fleet operation in Ethiopia</i>
<i>FCA</i>	<i>FinnChurchAid</i>
<i>Fida Int'l</i>	<i>Mission and Development Co-operation activities of Pentecostal Churches in Finland</i>
<i>FIDIDA</i>	<i>Finnish Disabled People's International Development Association</i>
<i>FinnRescue</i>	<i>Finnish Civil Defence Rescue Team</i>
<i>Four Rs/4Rs</i>	<i>Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction</i>
<i>FRC</i>	<i>Finnish Red Cross</i>
<i>GAM</i>	<i>Global Acute Malnutrition</i>
<i>GHDI</i>	<i>Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative</i>
<i>GNI</i>	<i>Gross National Income</i>
<i>GO</i>	<i>Governmental Organisation</i>

Term	Explanation
<i>Grey-zone</i>	<i>The indistinct phase of aid activities between acute emergency and development</i>
<i>HA</i>	<i>'Humanitarian Assistance' 'Humanitarian Aid' or the recently more common term 'Humanitarian Action'</i>
<i>HAP-I</i>	<i>Humanitarian Accountability Partnership – International</i>
<i>HATR</i>	<i>Humanitaarisen Avun Työryhmä, Finnish for Humanitarian Assistance Working Group</i>
<i>HAU</i>	<i>MFA HA Unit</i>
<i>HIC</i>	<i>Humanitarian Information Centre</i>
<i>HIV/AIDS</i>	<i>Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome</i>
<i>HLWG</i>	<i>High Level Working Group</i>
<i>HPG</i>	<i>Humanitarian Policy Group</i>
<i>HPN</i>	<i>Humanitarian Practice Network</i>
<i>HRW</i>	<i>Human Rights Watch</i>
<i>IASC</i>	<i>Inter Agency Standing Committee</i>
<i>ICG</i>	<i>The International Crisis Group</i>
<i>ICRC</i>	<i>International Committee of the Red Cross</i>
<i>IDB</i>	<i>Inter-American Development Bank</i>
<i>IDP</i>	<i>Internally Displaced Person</i>
<i>IFRC</i>	<i>International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</i>
<i>IGO</i>	<i>Inter-Governmental Organisation</i>
<i>IHL</i>	<i>International Humanitarian Law</i>
<i>IHT</i>	<i>International Herald Tribune</i>
<i>INGOs</i>	<i>International Non-Governmental Organisation</i>
<i>IO</i>	<i>International Organisations</i>
<i>IOM</i>	<i>International Organisation for Migration</i>
<i>IRC</i>	<i>International Rescue Committee</i>
<i>ISDR</i>	<i>International Strategy for Disaster reduction</i>
<i>JAICA</i>	<i>Japan International Cooperation Agency</i>

Term	Explanation
KCAL	<i>Kilo-calorie</i>
KEPA	<i>Service Centre for Development Cooperation, Finland</i>
LRRD	<i>Linking of Relief, Rehabilitation and Development</i>
LWF	<i>Lutheran World Federation</i>
M	<i>Million</i>
MEP	<i>Member of European Parliament</i>
MFA	<i>Ministry for Foreign Affairs</i>
MSF	<i>Médecins Sans Frontières</i>
MT	<i>Metric Tonne</i>
NATO	<i>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</i>
NBC	<i>Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (warfare)</i>
NGO	<i>Non-governmental Organisation</i>
OCHA	<i>(UN) Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</i>
ODA	<i>Official or Overseas Development Aid</i>
ODI	<i>Overseas Development Institute, London</i>
OTI	<i>Office for Transitional Initiatives</i>
PAHO	<i>Pan-American Health Organisation (or OPS, in Spanish)</i>
PEM	<i>European Pentecostal Missions</i>
PI	<i>Public Information</i>
PIA	<i>People-in-Aid</i>
POP	<i>People-Oriented-Planning</i>
POWs	<i>Prisoners-of-War</i>
PRM	<i>US Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration</i>
PRT	<i>Provincial Reconstruction Team(s)</i>
RCRC	<i>Used in this report as short for 'The Movement of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies' including national societies (e.g. the Finnish Red Cross), the ICRC and IFRC. As noted on the ICRC website, the term 'International Red Cross' may also be applied.</i>
RC CC	<i>Red Cross and Red Crescent Code of Conduct</i>

Term	Explanation
<i>RRN</i>	<i>Relief and Rehabilitation Network</i>
<i>SC</i>	<i>Save the Children (Movement)</i>
<i>SCF</i>	<i>Save the Children Finland or Save the Children Fund, whichever applies (SCUK is Save the Children UK and SCUS is Save the Children US)</i>
<i>SDC-HA/SDR</i>	<i>Swiss Development Cooperation – Humanitarian Aid/Swiss Disaster Relief</i>
<i>SPHERE Project</i>	<i>Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response</i>
<i>TOR</i>	<i>Terms of Reference</i>
<i>UK</i>	<i>United Kingdom</i>
<i>UN</i>	<i>United Nations</i>
<i>UNDAC</i>	<i>United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (teams)</i>
<i>UNDP</i>	<i>United Nations Development Programme</i>
<i>UNESCO</i>	<i>United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation</i>
<i>UNHCR</i>	<i>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</i>
<i>UNICEF</i>	<i>United Nations Children’s Fund</i>
<i>UNRWA</i>	<i>United Nations Relief Works Authority</i>
<i>URD</i>	<i>Urgence, Rehabilitation et Development</i>
<i>US(A)</i>	<i>United States (of America)</i>
<i>USAID</i>	<i>US Agency for International Development</i>
<i>UV</i>	<i>Ultra-violet (rays)</i>
<i>WB</i>	<i>World Bank</i>
<i>WCC</i>	<i>World Council of Churches</i>
<i>WB&G</i>	<i>West Bank & Gaza</i>
<i>WFP</i>	<i>(UN) World Food Programme</i>
<i>WHO</i>	<i>World Health Organisation</i>
<i>€M</i>	<i>Millions of Euro</i>

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Summary Overview of Finnish HA

Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) HA is governed by the general policy papers for development cooperation and a sector-specific strategy paper from 1997. According to these policies:

- 1) The main goal of humanitarian aid is to save lives, ease human distress and aid all people who are in the most need.**
- 2) The principles of impartiality, equality and humanity are upheld during the provision of humanitarian aid.**

Additionally:

The aid should focus on the poorest countries ... Humanitarian aid is not an isolated phenomenon, but an important tool that helps the international community to forecast, prevent and solve crisis.

Finland's humanitarian aid was originally conceived as a funding mechanism to respond to acute-emergencies, such as natural catastrophes. It now funds both emergency *and non-acute-emergency*⁵ activities. Some 10–15% of the annual development cooperation budget is allocated to humanitarian aid (approximately €42 M in 2003). In real terms, the aid has increased consistently since 1996, except for a brief drop from a high in 1999 (the year of the Kosovar refugee crisis).

The MFA definition of humanitarian aid changed during this period. Humanitarian aid had previously included 'preventive' aspects, such as human rights activities. Also, Humanitarian Mines-Action has been included since 1997, which amounted to approximately €5 million euros for the years 2002, 2003 and 2004. (See the Quantitative Analysis, later in this report).

Finland concentrates most HA funding on a number of large organisations (e.g. UN and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement). This is mostly either 'core', or loosely earmarked funding, rather than individual project funding. The overall effectiveness and efficiency of these organisations is, therefore, relevant to this evaluation.

⁵ See foreword for an explanation of these terms.

Summary Strengths of Finnish Funded HA

Effective Humanitarian Aid

Overall, Finnish funded HA has been effective. Apart from a perceived shortage of global capacity⁶ to meet current crises, successful responses and quality advances noted in this report out-weigh failures and weaknesses. While the latter have been, on occasion, serious, Finnish funded partners have shown themselves capable of stabilising critical humanitarian situation in short periods of time (e.g. emergency level mortality and morbidity due to natural and human made causes); averting large-scale famine; repatriating large numbers in safety; protecting and assisting civilians in combat zones; and supporting populations in recovery phases.

Important quality advances have been achieved in techniques, materials, equipment and institutional preparedness, including staff development. All of these aspects more than compensate for cases of ineffective aid in the same period. The overall conclusion of this evaluation is positive. This effectiveness is mainly due to the concentration of flexible funding on large, capable organisations.

A 'Good', Well Respected Donor

Finland rates highly as a donor, based on broadly accepted indicators of 'good humanitarian donorship'. These indicators include flexibility, predictability, generous 'core-funding', and loose ear-marking. As is noted later in the report, the same approaches are not applied uniformly to all partners, however (e.g. core funding is provided to only a small number of partners).

MFA can React Rapidly

Funding for emergencies *can be* provided rapidly, mainly in response to Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (RCRC⁷) appeals. Responses in a matter of hours are possible, as was the case for the 2004 Asia tsunami and previous disasters.

Pragmatic Concentration of Funding on Few, Large Partners

Partners vary significantly in capacity and focus. Most are large, global, HA-focussed organisations, while some are small and development-focussed. The concentration of funding on a small number of large organisations is more efficient than multiple-project, multi-organisation funding. It is a pragmatic strategy for a relatively small MFA funding unit. Those large partner organisations are well-chosen, appropriate, global and capable of large-scale, effective responses.

⁶ Quote from the TOR for a recently commissioned OCHA study to review global HA capacities: ... *there is an overall concern that there is insufficient humanitarian capacity to respond to the demands of concurrent major crises.*

⁷ The term Red Cross, or the acronym 'RCRC', is applied to cover both Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, ICRC, IFRC and the Movement as a whole, as may be appropriate, unless otherwise specified.

Finns have a Positive Opinion of Finland's ODA

According to annual surveys, Finland's Official Development Aid (ODA) is seen in a positive light by the Finnish public. The public in general and decision-makers in particular regard development cooperation as a positive, worthwhile phenomenon.

Summary Weaknesses of Finnish Funded HA

HA Quantities are Relatively Small

Specific impact and effect are difficult to attribute to Finnish HA funds, because they are mostly provided with little or no earmarking. Also, 'lives-saved' can be classified as both long-term impact and more immediate effect. On a *case-by-case basis*, impact and effect can be significant (as in Ethiopia, where Finland contributed significantly to recent international efforts to avert large-scale famine).

The overall, *global* impact and effect of Finland's HA will always be small, however, compared to both global needs and the total HA funding available to meet them. The percentage balance between development aid and HA is not the issue. The overall size of *total* ODA is, however. The global impact and effect of HA will continue to be small, despite real and consistent gains each year, until overall ODA approaches at least the promised 0.7% of GNI.

The 1997 HA Policy Paper is Inadequate and not Applied

Recommendations from the 1996 evaluation of Finland's HA, and subsequent MFA policy statements propose that HA be funded within a Finnish 'crisis-management' focus:

The Finnish emergency response must: treat any crisis with humanitarian implications as a foreign policy category in itself, to be dealt with in a coordinated way within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, with a primary responsibility placed on its crisis instruments, so as to restore sustainable development and to support responsible government⁸ ... To change the place of [Finland's] humanitarian response ... to becoming an active coordination of inter-ministerial action in times of crisis is to acknowledge the ... security and political implications of humanitarian assistance⁹ ... Humanitarian assistance ... should be seen as an integral part of Finland's foreign policy, with definite linkages to the country's security policy, development aid policy and human rights policy¹⁰.

⁸ P. xiv, COWIconsult. Thematic evaluation of the Finnish humanitarian assistance. Evaluation report 1996:2. Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1996.

⁹ P. 58, COWIconsult. Thematic evaluation of the Finnish humanitarian assistance. Evaluation report 1996:2. Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1996.

¹⁰ P. 17, COWIconsult. Thematic evaluation of the Finnish humanitarian assistance. Evaluation report 1996:2. Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1996.

Humanitarian aid is one of Finland's tools for human rights policy ... Furthermore humanitarian aid is a tool for Finland's refugee and immigration policy¹¹.

This aspiration is neither achieved, realistic nor desirable. Finland does not have the institutional capacity to apply HA *systematically* within coordinated, coherent approaches to crises. Apart from resource and capacity limitations, attempts to apply HA within such policy-driven strategies could conflict with basic HA principles, especially independence, impartiality and needs-based responses. The out-dated policy should be revised.

Need is not the only Criterion for Funding

While most funding is free of political and strategic influence, media and political considerations have come to bear on funding decisions (regarding, for example, Iraq and Afghanistan and during the Asia 2004 tsunami¹² response). Need is not, therefore, the only consideration in making funding decisions. ('Need' is a function of objective living conditions¹³ and the resources available to address those conditions¹⁴).

Partner Performance can be Deficient

Partner performance varies greatly, including within the same organisation in different situations. Partners are capable of being highly effective. They have also shown themselves to be susceptible to failures and ineffectiveness. While most are competent most of the time, serious weaknesses exist (as evidenced, for example, during the evaluator's visit to Ethiopia), which merit closer MFA monitoring and, possibly, supportive action.

Examples of ineffectiveness include: Slow and inadequate responses to major emergencies, including 'forgotten-crises'; failure to protect refugees and prisoners; technical and managerial weaknesses, resulting in seriously below-standard relief programmes, including chronically high levels of Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) over a period of years; ineffective coordination; inadequate monitoring and supervision, resulting in sexual exploitation of refugees; and a failure to prevent repeated violations of IHL by powerful states.

¹¹ Policy Paper for Humanitarian Aid, 5.11.1997 (unofficial translation, by the evaluation team).

¹² The imbalance in funding was noted, for example, in the Helsingin Sanomat newspaper, on the 29.12.2004 as follows: *Head of UNICEF Finland: there is also a catastrophe in Darfur, but it does not receive any attention.*

¹³ That is, access to life-saving goods, services and protection, such as food, medical attention, water, sanitation and legal and physical protection.

¹⁴ According to some analysis, there are 45 'fragile states' in the world to-day. ECHO has developed a tool called the Global Index for humanitarian Needs Assessment. It measures a number of variables. It does not, however, take account of resources available from, for example non-aid sources (e.g. through political funding, as in the case of Iraq), nor rapidly increased commercial revenues, again, as in the case of Iraq, through its oil production. Consequently, Iraq appears in the index as a 'High Need' country, when, in fact, many other less-assisted states and populations merit greater aid (e.g. Burundi, DRC, and Sudan).

Improve Linking of Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD)

Finland does not systematically promote the linking of its relief with longer-term aid initiatives. A number of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative (GHDI)¹⁵ indicators relate to such linking by donors. In Finland's case, it is largely left to the partners themselves. Where it is achieved, it is on a case-by-case basis, where partners apply core, or loosely earmarked funds to create such connections between types of aid. Alternatively, it may be as a result of MFA consultations in the HATR¹⁶ meetings.

This is a realistic, pragmatic approach. It is unrealistic to expect HA funding to meet consistently the competing needs of fast, effective crisis funding, while *also* attending to longer-term needs. Ideally, however, such linking would be addressed through highly flexible application of HA *and* development funding together, as needs require, and opportunities present. This would best be achieved at the affected country, or embassy level. Given that development aid is limited to only a few countries, it is recognised by the evaluation that this is currently not feasible.

Funding Processes are Unclear; can be Slow

There is a marked absence of detailed, explicit funding criteria and practical, written guidance for prioritising funding. The funding processes and criteria are unclear to some Finnish NGOs (e.g. the differentiated relationships between the MFA and certain partners). Explicit guidelines have not been issued explaining the specific criteria for natural-disaster, core and other HA funding.

Non-natural disaster funding is not particularly rapid, is subject to considerable MFA preparation and internal consultation, and is conducted in two 'rounds' annually, spring and autumn, respectively. While some partners regard the process as relatively rapid, comparing it favourably with other donors, others see it as unduly cumbersome and slow.

MFA HA Technical Expertise is Limited

As noted, the evaluation regards MFA management of funding as pragmatic and relatively efficient. Few resources are required, compared to other, similarly sized donors. MFA technical and 'field' expertise in HA is limited, however. Individual MFA managers have as many as seven years experience in managing HA funding, or ample experience in Geneva, where many humanitarian organisations are based. Never-the-less, MFA capacities include neither technical expertise nor direct field-experience of HA operations implementation. This is an important limitation, at both Helsinki and embassies, when it comes to prioritising, monitoring and supporting organisations and aid activities.

¹⁵ A donor initiative to improve practices among official HA donors. The indicators were developed by UN OCHA for the GHDI Burundi pilot study.

¹⁶ Humanitaarisen Avun Työryhmä, Finnish for Humanitarian Assistance Working Group - Regular MFA HA funding consultation meetings, involving a range of actors.

Religion and Basic HA Principles; a Possible Conflict

Religious organisations have, historically, carried out impressive aid work globally. Many religious workers have given their lives to assist others. Recently, however, the religious objectives and values of NGO partners are at increasing risk of being perceived to be in conflict with basic HA principles. This is within a global context in which religious differences have, for certain influential groups, taken on increased significance.

There is no suggestion that faith-based NGOs are, a-priori, biased. All partners explicitly espouse core principles such as *impartiality* and *independence*. The issue is a matter of perceptions, however. Partners work through networks over which they do not have direct control.

Experience during field visits, and research show this to be a potentially serious issue. Great care is required, in an increasingly charged and polarised HA working environment, to ensure that partners are perceived as strictly impartial and independent. This issue is as much to do with personal security as it is with HA principles.

MFA Funding of Search-and-Rescue Merits Review

While sums are relatively small, MFA funding to the FinnRescue team is costly for the limited returns it provides. While potentially useful in specific circumstances, analysis of the costs, use and returns of this funding lead the evaluators to raise questions as to the efficiency of such funding¹⁷.

Public Understanding of HA is Limited

The generosity of the Finnish public in response to the Asia tsunami has been overwhelming, as has been the case in other countries. The huge imbalance, however, between donations (public and private) for that crisis and those for other crises is disturbing. Improved access is required by the public to information and analysis on HA needs, priorities and funding trends and comparisons. Education regarding the role of the media and other groups in focussing attention on certain humanitarian situations, versus 'forgotten-crises', is of particular importance.

Challenge to Independence and Impartiality

Arguably, the greatest challenge now facing HA organisations and donors alike is not that of logistical and technical capacity, rather to provide humanitarian protection for people in need of such protection.

The constraints facing humanitarian organisations in this task are immense. The means available to them are inadequate. A conclusion of this evaluation is that, in important cases, international humanitarian organisations have failed to protect human beings from gross violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law, committed, in particular, by powerful states: states that happen to be among

¹⁷ See later in the report, based on, inter-alia, interviews with relevant managers and research.

the most important donors to those organisations and which are seen to set standards of behaviour globally.

As reflected in observations by senior managers of these organisations, in parts of the world, they are no longer perceived to be independent, impartial purveyors of relief and protection, be they UN, Red Cross/Crescent, or International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs). In some important cases, the result is distrust, even outright animosity. Humanitarian organisations must ask themselves honestly whether their ineffectiveness in the face of exceptional abuses by powerful nations has ameliorated, or exacerbated, such perceptions.

Future Trends and Challenges

Refugee Numbers Dropping; but Crises and HA Actors Increase

Refugee numbers have dropped significantly over the past decade (to some 17 million, down from over 20 million in the mid-1990's). While refugees are fewer, people displaced within their own countries (Internally Displaced Persons, or IDPs) are, however, on the increase. No multi-lateral organisation has an international mandate to assist and protect such people.

Inconclusive evidence and expert opinion¹⁸ suggest that emergencies are both more frequent and occur on a greater scale than in previous decades. Examples include the unprecedented Pan-African war - fought largely within the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), previously Zaire - which has resulted in an estimated three million deaths since 1994. Numerous natural disasters are also being recorded, of ever greater impact, including cases of flooding, seismic activity and landslides. The Asia tsunami is the most recent, exceptionally large example.

The trend will most likely continue, resulting in pressure to continue to increase the proportion of HA as a percentage of global development aid. The notable proliferation of HA organisations, groups and networks will also, in all likelihood, continue, as will the slow, erratic trend towards greater technical proficiency.

Competition for funds, at times quite bitter, has encouragement 'mandate-creep' among multi-lateral organisations (i.e. to stretch their areas of specialisation and international mandate, in response to both increased need and greater opportunities for fund-raising).

'Grey-Zone', Chronic, Recurring Crises the Norm; LRRD Remote

The stereo-typical, sudden-onset, acute, natural disaster, upon which the Western HA 'system' has been built, with its continuum from disaster to stabilisation, recovery, reconstruction and development, is no longer the norm. This conclusion was correctly

¹⁸ Pierre de Senarclens, Vice President of the Swiss Red Cross, interviewed in the Sud-Ouest Dimanche, 09.01.05.

arrived at by the authors of the 1996 evaluation of Finland's HA. Festering and recurring crises last for years, even decades.

The failure of many development aid programmes has left swathes of the globe permanently vulnerable to emergencies, rooted in socio-economic marginalisation and environmental degradation. Though both HA and development aid actors are both sucked into this 'grey-zone', the gap between their respective methods, approaches and cultures is still disturbingly wide. Systematic Linking of Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) remains an elusive goal.

Increased Military and Political Involvement in HA

Governments increasingly wish to apply HA as a tool for visibility and Foreign Policy. Overtly politically motivated HA is increasingly evident. Military and Civil Defence international-response units have become more common¹⁹. Small countries, such as Finland, will be under increased pressure to take part in such bi-lateral and joint-initiatives.

While the military have a lot to offer in, for instance, response to natural disasters, the potential and actual blurring of the lines between independent, impartial and neutral HA and political, military and economic objectives is a cause for serious concern. The most glaring example was the 1999 'humanitarian war' waged on Serbia.

Frequently, bi-lateral HA action has eclipsed multi-lateral channels, the initial Asia tsunami response being not the least of such cases.

Mushrooming of 'Accountability' and Research Initiatives

Over the past decade, a plethora of HA 'accountability' and 'performance' mechanisms and research initiatives have emerged. They include the GHDI, the HAP-I, ALNAP, People-in-Aid, 'Compas Quality initiative', and HPG/HPN²⁰. All differ significantly in aims, methods and organisational structure, some even being quite critical of others²¹. Most have, however, highlighted the importance of HA principles, especially independence, impartiality and funding based solely on need.

Partners as Channels of Aid, not Direct Implementers

Partner organisations continue to 'corporatise', centralise and operate through large, global networks. Most, if not all partners rarely implement programmes directly. They operate through ever larger networks, acting as channels of funding, rather than direct implementers. Standard measurements of organisational capacity, effectiveness and

¹⁹ The NATO linked Partnership for Peace (PFP) has been one of many driving forces in this direction.

²⁰ For full titles, see the glossary. These are all initiatives commenced in the last decade, partly as a response to the Rwandan crisis and subsequent humanitarian operations. Most of them have emphasised the importance of HA actors being accountable for their actions, and technically proficient, especially in relation to basic HA principles, as set out in the RC code of conduct.

²¹ E.g. 'Compas Quality initiative' and the SPHERE Project.

efficiency have traditionally concentrated on actual implementation. Unless funding is re-directed to actual implementers, partners should be judged primarily on their effectiveness, efficiency and transparency in channelling funds to those who actually implement aid activities.

Dominance of Western Agencies; Independence at Serious Risk

Western INGOs, the UN and the RCRC movement continue to be the main recipients of international HA funding, be it from public or private donations. This is despite the emergence of organisations such as Islamic Relief, African Humanitarian Action (AHA) and Japan's official JAICA, to name but a few.

Western NGOs, including Christian organisations, are increasingly seen as agents of Western values, policies and interests²². These perceptions have coincided with a marked increase in the security risk to the staff of HA organisations, both international and local.

The greatest single challenge facing HA organisations globally, including Finnish funded partners, is to demonstrate their unequivocal independence from economic, political and military agendas, including those of their main donors.

Finland's Role; Greater Monitoring and Support

As a relatively 'agenda-free' donor, Finland has a role to play in meeting this challenge, along with 'like-minded' donors. The MFA should continue to monitor and support HA partners to meet their HA obligations. The MFA can also support mature reflection on such issues in Finland. This could be fostered among HA partners, academic institutions and media or 'opinion-making' actors, through MFA support for discussion, research, education and advocacy initiatives.

Summary Recommendations Table

The following table sets out the main recommendations from the report. It is included here at the request of the MFA, as a tool for future analysis and action. Due to the simplified format, the reader should consult the main text, for additional supporting information and arguments.

Findings	Conclusions	Lessons and Recommendations
Continue to be a flexible donor		
The current approach is flexible and predictable for most partners. It fits	This has proven to be a pragmatic and relatively	Finland should continue to avoid tight conditioning of its HA funding. Its

²² See quotes later in this report.

Findings	Conclusions	Lessons and Recommendations
well with the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative (GHDI). Most partners rate Finland very highly as a donor.	effective and efficient approach.	flexible approach, funding through a small number of large partners, applying loose regional ear-marking, should be continued.
Maintain existing balance between HA and development		
In the mid-1990's, a paradigm shift took place globally, in how crises were viewed. At the policy level, the focus in addressing crises moved from emergency aid, to 'risk management'. The main component was vulnerability reduction.	High quality development aid fights poverty and thus reduces human vulnerability. The most effective manner to address and reduce crises is through preventing or mitigating them. This is best done through high quality development aid, more than HA.	Development should continue to be the unequivocal priority for international aid. The current 10 -15% of ODA made available by Finland for HA is a reasonable portion. This is despite emotive calls for increased emergency aid (e.g. in the media).
Clarify criteria to ensure funding by 'need' and partner capacity		
Finland funds significantly in accordance with need and levels of poverty (as set out in its HA policy). Important exceptions exist, as shown in the quantitative analysis. Funding for Iraq, Afghanistan, Cambodia and Asia following the tsunami, were cases where levels of objectively measured need did not justify the funding levels provided, compared to 'forgotten crises'. Finland is not the only, nor the worst donor in this respect, however, as seen from quotes from recent studies.	Need has not been the only criterion for funding. Media and other considerations have influenced decisions. This is contrary to the GHDI principles. It is also contrary to basic principles of impartiality and independence (e.g. independence from ulterior motives).	Finland should ensure that it funds HA based solely on need and not as a response to perceived media or political pressures or interests. This requires explicit criteria (e.g. operations where basic international relief standards are not being met ²³); funding targets for 'forgotten-crises' (e.g. a percentage of funding going to chronically under-funded crises); prioritisation of regions (e.g. explicit percentages of funds for chronic crises in Africa, such as Burundi and DRC); and close, systematic tracking and monitoring of appeals. High levels of expertise are required at both Helsinki and in embassies to track and respond appropriately to appeals (see further recommendations, below).
Concentrate aid on existing channels		
The main current partners are major multilateral or 'global' organisations, movements or	Concentration of funding on a small number of partners is an efficient	The MFA should continue to concentrate funding on a small number

²³ Such as daily food rations, acute malnutrition rates, shelter and water provision, etc.

Findings	Conclusions	Lessons and Recommendations
<p>networks.</p> <p>The MFA HA Unit (HAU) is relatively small.</p> <p>Core and loosely earmarked funding through a small number of global, capable partners has been effective.</p> <p>Other donors have found that funding large numbers of individual 'projects' to be highly demanding in terms of resources, time and staff knowledge and skills.</p>	<p>and pragmatic approach. There is no compelling evidence to change this approach.</p> <p>An increase in the number of, for instance, NGO partners, would require a significant increase in MFA capacities. Existing partners could probably provide any capacity new NGOs might provide.</p> <p>MFA funding is for people in need, and not to develop an indigenous Finnish HA NGO capacity, however desirable that may, or may not be.</p>	<p>of partners.</p> <p>Criteria for the selection of partners (such as capacity, mandate, demonstrated adherence to HA principles, global presence, speed and quality of response, expertise in emergency and/or transition programmes, etc.) should be set.</p> <p>Partners should be reviewed regularly against these (e.g. each five years). Such reviews could be conducted jointly with other donors.</p> <p>The application of such criteria might lead to the gradual replacement of existing partners by new ones (as opposed to adding news ones).</p>
Influence partners at headquarters level		
<p>Partners are generally effective and well chosen. As shown through cases of ineffectiveness, partner performance can be erratic. On occasion, performance has been seriously ineffective.</p> <p>Experience has shown that one determinant of international organisation performance is the level of donor and public pressure to act rapidly and successfully.</p> <p>In particular, this influences the quality of staff made available to respond.</p>	<p>Concentration on a small number of partners presents an opportunity for greater MFA monitoring of and influence on these partners, regarding their performance.</p> <p>(This can be through, for example, 'select' donor mechanisms; and/or acting as members of the executive boards of these international organisations; and/or through multi-donor initiatives).</p>	<p>The MFA should develop an explicit strategy to influence key partners to operate consistently effectively and in line with international standards, good-practices and principles.</p> <p>This should be done in conjunction with EU, Nordic and/or 'like-minded' donors. Such 'advocacy' could be combined with periodic, systematic reviews, evaluations or 'institutional audits' of key partners (e.g. every 5 years).</p>
Greatly improve monitoring of partner performance		
<p>The administrative review paper of 2004²⁴ proposed greater decentralisation to embassies.</p>	<p>Mechanisms are required to strengthen MFA monitoring of partners.</p>	<p>HA unit and embassy staff should conduct more monitoring missions in the field. Ideally, they would be</p>

²⁴ Study on the Administrative and Resource Development Needs of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland to ensure efficient and effective implementation of the White Paper on the Development policy of the Government of Finland, Final Report Submitted by Saana Consulting Oy (Ltd.) Helsinki, 30 September 2004.

Findings	Conclusions	Lessons and Recommendations
<p>MFA funding is conducted primarily focussed on choosing 'good' partners, more than 'good' projects. Few embassies have the resources to monitor partner performance appropriately. Embassies are currently not required to report to the HAU about their field visits.</p> <p>Theoretically, embassies in development 'focus' countries ought to be able to monitor HA systematically, thanks to their aid-oriented presence.</p> <p>Practice has shown that this is rarely the case. It is widely recognised that embassies generally lack the time, resources, staff and specialised expertise and guidance to monitor HA partners and activities appropriately.</p>	<p>Professional needs-assessments are key to good programmes and good monitoring.</p> <p>Current MFA resources and capacities are inadequate.</p>	<p>accompanied by experienced Finnish HA experts with whom they could develop monitoring methods and techniques. Embassies should be required to report on field missions. (See also recommendation re specialist staff, tools and training, below)</p> <p>Where embassies are present, a small percentage of HA grant budgets (e.g. 1 – 3%) might be made available to the embassy to contract local consultants to monitor or evaluate performance and results, according to the importance of the funding.</p> <p>In the case of individual projects (which are a small portion of funding), the MFA should consider reimbursing the costs of agency assessments, if they are seen to have been well conducted and lead to funding. This could be done, especially for joint-assessments involving a number of partners addressing the same crisis (e.g. the Asia tsunami response, 2004-05).</p>
Introduce specialised staff, tools, and training		
<p>HA is a specialised area of aid. Frequent staff rotation leads to loss of 'institutional memory'.</p> <p>As noted above, current resources within the MFA, including specialist HA staff, are very limited. The important potential role of embassy staff (e.g. in proposing and monitoring HA activities) is inhibited due to a shortage of such capacities.</p>	<p>The MFA HA Unit and embassies/liaison offices should be able to call upon HA expertise for support on funding decisions and monitoring.</p> <p>Knowledge management and document archiving systems need to be effective to compensate for the loss of experience as staff rotates.</p>	<p>Specialist expertise could be provided in the form of Finnish experts, called upon through short-term contracts, or standby framework-agreements²⁵.</p> <p>University trainees or interns are another option. As a priority, the services of a full-time HA technical expert should be available to the MFA for support to both the HAU and embassies/liaison offices.</p> <p>Funding guides, training and management tools (such as proposal review and monitoring checklists) should also be developed, including specialised tools for monitoring the overall, institutional performance of partners²⁶.</p>

²⁵ DCI Ireland (MFA) has established such framework agreements with a number of experts. The experts advise on funding proposals and monitoring.

²⁶ Guidance on the use of the Local Cooperation Funds as a tool for HA, is one example.

Findings	Conclusions	Lessons and Recommendations
		<p>Knowledge and information management systems should be strengthened to compensate for the rotation of experienced HAU staff.</p>
Accelerate funding		
<p>Finland funds two categories of activities under its HA budget. This is done through two quite separate processes – a relatively rapid, agile process responding mainly to natural disasters (funding principally, the FRC), and a more complex, consultation based process for other funding.</p> <p>Two categories of HA activity are well described in the 1997 policy paper. They are acute-emergency (both natural disaster and conflict related) and non-acute emergency (e.g. transition, recovery or chronic crisis activities).</p>	<p>These two categories (acute-emergency and non-acute emergency) are quite different in nature and require distinct approaches.</p> <p>Some partners are more adept at addressing one than the other. Finnish ‘development oriented’ NGOs have, for instance, shown greater capacity in the latter than the former.</p>	<p>Despite the capacity to respond rapidly to natural disasters, the ‘non-natural disaster’ funding process should be accelerated and simplified.</p> <p>Targets should be set for the speed with which appeals or proposals will be processed. These targets could act as indicators, among others, for measuring HAU efficiency. They would also facilitate partner planning and response.</p> <p>Non-acute emergency funding (e.g. ‘transition’ or ‘recovery’ funding) should be according to separate criteria and processes, including specifically chosen partners who demonstrate capacity and expertise in that type of activity.</p>
Clarify funding criteria and processes		
<p>Linked to the above recommendation, differentiated relationships between the MFA and a variety of partners justifiably exist (e.g. according to mandate, size, nature and partner capacity, including multi-lateral versus NGO, and access to core-funding or not).</p> <p>The FRC has a privileged relationship with the MFA. The speed and procedures for funding the FRC differ from those of other Finnish NGOs.</p> <p>As already explained, acute-emergency and non-acute emergency (e.g. transition) programmes are quite different (importance or not of speed, type of</p>	<p>Greater transparency of funding criteria and processes is required, including explicit criteria for choosing one partner over another, or for dealing with one partner differently from another.</p> <p>Monitoring of partners and programme activities requires specific criteria and indicators.</p> <p>Similarly, MFA and partner performances should be measured on the basis of the appropriateness of funding processes and aid</p>	<p>The <i>Key Points for Operationalisation of the Development Policy (2004)</i> document²⁷ states that guidance will be provided on how to apply for HA, how agreements are made and how to report on HA funding.</p> <p>The MFA should explicitly document such criteria and funding processes. The priority importance of emergency funding (more than ‘transition’ or ‘recovery’ aid) should be recognised.</p> <p>This should be done through the provision of guidelines and periodic briefings to partners and key external observers (e.g. other international organisations, politicians, the media and academics).</p>

²⁷ Dated 29th June 2004.

Findings	Conclusions	Lessons and Recommendations
<p>aid, duration, relationships with authorities, etc.).</p> <p>A number of partners also receive funding from other MFA budget lines (e.g. NGO and/or development funds). Some of them do not know what criteria are applied for HA funding.</p>	<p>responses, according to differentiated types of programme activities.</p>	<p>Regarding partners, such criteria should be based on an objective analysis of the capacity to deliver quality HA in a rapid and efficient manner, in line with HA principles and good practices. The objective application of such criteria may lead to the selection of proven, specialist HA INGOs (such as MSF or SCUK) ahead of Finnish NGOs.</p>
Transition and recovery require a specific approach		
<p>To quote one experienced observer: <i>Transition situations require a completely different set of instruments and analysis (from those of HA), with which HA actors are not equipped.</i> The 1997 HA policy distinguishes between emergency and ‘transitional’ phases²⁸.</p> <p>The increasingly common ‘grey-zone’ (described in this report under ‘Global Trends’) requires aid approaches that are neither classical HA nor developmental, rather, a flexible mixture of the two. That mixture should be capable of adapting, in an agile manner, to rapidly changing needs and contexts.</p>	<p>The ideal is that all aid funding be highly flexible. Such terms as emergency, HA and development aid would thus gradually become redundant.</p> <p>Given that this is some time away, HA funding should, at least, be differentiated between acute emergency (natural disaster and sudden onset ‘human-made’ crises) and non-acute emergency aid.</p>	<p>As already noted, each type of aid should be managed through distinct criteria and processes.</p> <p>As one important step, the <i>Key Points for Operationalisation of the Development Policy (2004)</i> document states that coordination between HA and development aid administrators will be strengthened.</p> <p>This is especially relevant regarding countries receiving Finnish bi-lateral <i>development</i> aid. (The 1997 policy states that HA may be ‘cut short’ in such cases. Irrespective of whether this happens or not, closer coordination is required).</p>
Strengthen advocacy, education and research		
<p>As pointed out in the Council of Europe Global Education report on Finland²⁹, the MFA should play an</p>	<p>Advocacy and education can be conducted in cooperation with partner</p>	<p>Education about HA should be included within education initiatives aimed at the general public (both</p>

²⁸ The unofficial translation of the policy by the evaluation team distinguishes the two as follows:
Emergency aid (is applied) in acute and long-term emergency situations that arise as a result of armed conflicts or natural disasters. Aid work will be centred on the satisfying of people’s basic needs. In the acute phase, aid work normally comprises of the distribution of food, medical supplies and other necessities and the providing of protection for those in need. If the crisis persists, aid work will develop into a “care and maintenance” type of aid that focuses on maintaining basic services. The more persistent the crisis, the more permanent these services will become.
The **immediate reconstruction period** follows an emergency situation, whereby living conditions are stabilized through the use of humanitarian aid, through, for example, programmes for the return and re-integration of refugees and evacuees, mine extraction and the re-training of former soldiers. This phase is seen to be a **transitional phase** leading to a more long-term reconstruction period and the start of developmental co-operation.

Findings	Conclusions	Lessons and Recommendations
<p>important role in educating the Finnish public regarding international development aid³⁰.</p> <p>The Asia tsunami illustrated the importance of public understanding of the complexities of HA, such as the following: ‘forgotten, versus high profile emergencies; the root causes, commercial links³¹ and long-term effects of international crises; links between crisis and development; ‘good’ and ‘bad’ humanitarian responses (including ‘supply-driven’ HA, whereby unwanted or expired goods, medicines and clothes are wastefully donated); basic standards in HA; and the central importance of humanitarian protection, including the protection of refugees and asylum-seekers (be they in crisis-affected regions or in developed countries).</p>	<p>donors and/or Finnish HA partner organisations.</p> <p>Finnish NGOs have an impressive track record and important role to play in facilitating public education about international aid.</p> <p>It can also be conducted with Kepa, The Service Centre for Development Cooperation, and Finnish educational and research institutions, universities (especially specialised aid departments) and academics.</p>	<p>children and adults).</p> <p>Finland should also advocate nationally (e.g. with the Ministry of Defence) and internationally for due respect for HA principles. This includes advocacy for greater ‘needs-based’ HA funding, independent from extraneous policies, interests or agendas³².</p> <p>Advocacy should also aim to break down the artificial administrative barriers between HA and development aid, including advocacy for greater flexibility within partner organisations, between types of aid (development and HA).</p>
Consider framework agreements		
<p>The MFA strategy to fund partners more than projects is efficient and practical. Aid is concentrated among a few partners.</p> <p>While the MFA can fund rapidly, this is not always the case.</p>	<p>Increased clarity on criteria and processes can be complemented by increased speed and flexibility in funding.</p> <p>This would increase effectiveness and efficiency.</p>	<p>Special ‘draw-down’ funding contracts should be considered. These, could be similar to those used by the US Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), whereby funding does not require individual projects or contracts.</p> <p>Funds are drawn down by the recipient agency (e.g. UNHCR) from an approved envelope, as required. This would enhance Finland’s already highly regarded flexibility in funding.</p>

²⁹ Global Education in Finland; The European Global Education Peer Review Process National Report on Finland, launched 04/10/2004.

³⁰ *Funding and support for global education must, of necessity, begin with Ministries for Foreign Affairs as part of the task of garnering critical public support and ensuring public transparency in a country’s development cooperation endeavours. The Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs is to be commended for the foresight and commitment with which it undertakes this task. But if it must start with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, it cannot end there, but must also be fundamentally inter-ministerial.*

³¹ E.g. linkages between mobile phone companies and the extraction and commercialisation of coltan in conflict areas of Eastern DRC.

³² Switzerland, has for example, adopted advocacy as part of its approach to international aid.

Findings	Conclusions	Lessons and Recommendations
Continue to be non-operational		
<p>As is evident post-Asia tsunami, governments are often tempted to 'become operational' in HA crises (e.g. through using national Civil Defence Units as HA teams).</p> <p>Some have become increasingly operational in the last decade (e.g. the UK and US). Other governments are now reviewing their policy and capacities in this respect (e.g. Sweden and Ireland).</p> <p>Such a change for Finland would have major capacity, structural and policy implications. If more HA capacity is required, existing partners could be funded to provide such capacity.</p>	<p>Such calls for 'operationality' are often driven by a perceived need for 'visibility'; to be seen to be responding rapidly and effectively, but also visibly, to crises.</p> <p>Victims of crises would gain little through Finland becoming operational. More efficient and effective solutions exist.</p>	<p>The Finnish MFA HA unit should continue to be non-operational. It should not establish direct, operational teams for emergency response.</p> <p>If there is a need to be seen to respond, greater public education and improved visibility for Finland's donations to partners might be a better option than the major and hugely expensive, and possibly ineffective (due to lack of experience and expertise) step of 'going operational'.</p>
Re-write policy paper, based on these recommendations		
<p>The 1997 HA policy paper contains a wide range of guidance, covering most aspects of HA. The paper is 'all-things-to-all-people' and impractical.</p> <p>It proposes, as a core thesis, that crises should be managed not just from a HA perspective, but through an integrated government/foreign policy approach, in which the HA component would complement all others, and vice versa.</p>	<p>This would require time, expertise and staff numbers well beyond what is currently available to the HAU.</p> <p>It would potentially tie HA to other foreign and official policy objectives. This could be contrary to HA principles of independence and impartiality.</p>	<p>The 1997 policy paper should be re-written to meet changed circumstances and priorities.</p> <p>A new policy paper should be more realistic. Recommendations contained in this report should be considered, among a range of issues, when drafting a new policy paper for Finland's Official HA.</p>

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. This Evaluation

The evaluation was conducted throughout the last quarter of 2004 and first quarter of 2005 by a four-person team (two Finnish nationals and two non-Finnish nationals – a female and male in each case). As stated in the Terms of Reference (TOR – see annexes):

The main purpose of the evaluation is to underpin the forthcoming revisions of the Finnish humanitarian aid policy and practice. Therefore, the evaluation needs to provide future visions and clear recommendations for policy development and aid actions ... An additional objective is to review how the recommendations of the previous evaluation were received in the administration and how these have been implemented ...

The period under review is 1996–2003. The evaluation should focus on disaster relief and assistance to victims of armed conflicts. It should cover all humanitarian aid funded with the ODA budget ...

Aid to prevention of conflicts and disasters, humanitarian mine action, support to human rights organisations and democratisation efforts should be reviewed only descriptively.

1.2. Evaluation Methods

The evaluation began with a desk review phase and interviews with MFA staff, NGOs, researchers and other relevant informants. These were followed by continued research of global issues. Three geographical cases were researched in particular: Ethiopia (including a field visit), Sudan and Afghanistan. Given its importance, aspects of the recent Asia Tsunami response were also analysed.

Field work was conducted in Ethiopia during December 2004, including data collection and interviews (with government officials, UN, Red Cross, and NGO staff, and other key informants, including programme beneficiaries). In addition to the capital, programme areas in the Eastern ('Somali') region, the South and South East were visited. Food shipment and distribution, refugee and rehabilitation activities were examined.

2. MFA FUNDED HA: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

2.1. Funding Distribution

Globally, annual HA allocations from all recorded sources are estimated at 10 billion dollars (BUSD)³³. Finland's share of this, while generous per capita³⁴, is small. According to the 1997 policy document³⁵:

Humanitarian Aid became a separate funding objective for the first time in the 1974 budget. From that basic level of 5 million marks [approximately €0.85 M] humanitarian aid funds have followed the general level of development cooperation funds and reached their peak in 1991 of 400 million marks [approximately €66.5 M]. After this, a drastic fall took place and humanitarian aid funds dropped to 100 million marks [16.5 million €] at the same time as need in the world increased rapidly ... the level has been raised slightly in the past few years, (165 million marks [€27.5 M] in 1997)

Currently, 10–15% of Finland's annual development cooperation budget is allocated to humanitarian aid. In 2003, for instance, Finland provided 42 million Euros (M€) for humanitarian aid and 5M€ for humanitarian mines action. This increased significantly in 2004 and 2005. Following the Asia tsunami response (which has absorbed 20M€ of the 2005 MFA HA budget), the total 2005 annual HA budget has been increased to 54M€, 8M€ above the originally planned 46M€³⁶.

Approximately 10% of Finland's HA is for natural-disaster responses³⁷. The rest goes towards so-called 'complex-emergencies' (armed-conflict) and intermediate or transition activities (during or after armed-conflict crises, such as recovery activities).

The following graphs provide an overview of MFA HA funding. The years selected for each category vary according to relevance and ease of presentation. The source is the Unit for Humanitarian Assistance (HAU), Department for Global Affairs, MFA of Finland.

2.1.1. Humanitarian Aid Funding Evolution 1996 – 2004

The graph below indicates total humanitarian aid funding from 1996 to 2004.

³³ ALNAP *Review of Humanitarian Action*, 2003; and *Managing Ambition and Ambiguity*, NGO consortium publication Tufts University, 2004.

³⁴ Currently, some €10 per capita.

³⁵ Policy Paper for Humanitarian Aid, 5.11.1997 (unofficial translation, by the evaluation team).

³⁶ All figures valid up to the end of February 2005.

³⁷ Interview with the former Head of the HAU.




Figure 1: MFA HA Funding 1996 – 2004

It should be noted that the MFA definition of humanitarian aid has changed during this period. Humanitarian aid previously included ‘preventive’ aspects, such as human rights activities. Humanitarian mines action has been included since 1997, amounting to some 5M€ annually in 2002, 2003 and 2004. From the above graph, we can see that humanitarian aid has increased almost every year since 1997. The 1999 peak is due to the Kosovo crisis.

2.1.2. Humanitarian Aid by Geographical Region 2002 – 2004

The following graph shows the distribution of HA funding by region, 2002 – 2004.




Figure 2: MFA HA Funding by Region 2002 – 2004

The graph shows a percentage increase in funding to Africa, despite a drop in 2003. Significantly, in 2003, Afghanistan and Iraq were the two largest recipients of Finnish HA. In 2004, the largest recipients were Sudan and Angola. In 2001 and 2002, Afghanistan was by far the largest recipient country. In 2000, Cambodia received about twice the amount of funds of the next biggest recipient, Afghanistan.

2.1.3. Humanitarian Aid by Country

Some 30 countries or regions received Finnish HA funds from 1996-2004. The following three graphs show the division of HA funds by country (top ten) between 2000 and 2004.




Figure 3: MFA HA Funding by Country in 2004




Figure 4: MFA HA Funding by Country in 2003




Figure 5: MFA HA Funding by Country in 2002




Figure 6: MFA HA Funding by Country in 2001




Figure 7: MFA HA Funding by Country in 2000

From the graphs, it seems that there has been a trend to spread funding among a number of countries. Need plays a significant role in funding. Many recipient countries have experienced crises generating high levels of humanitarian need. It is not the only criterion, however. Countries such as Iraq in 2003, Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002 and Cambodia in 2000, have, received the lion's share. Objective need was far from greatest in these countries during this period compared to others (as measured by both HA indicators, such as SPHERE³⁸, and the availability of funding from other donors, especially donors with political, military and economic objectives).

³⁸ The SPHERE handbook includes minimum standards and indicators for disaster response.

In the case of Iraq in 2003, it has been pointed out by MFA staff that funding decisions were influenced by the *possibility* of major needs resulting from the military invasion. Though these did not actually occur, precautions had to be taken, it is argued. That line of argument did not, however, apply in other notable cases where not only could large-scale need have been anticipated, but such needs did eventually take place (e.g. the Great Lakes region of Africa, during the Pan-African war, which saw invasions of DRC by a number of states).

It has also been argued by MFA staff that the exceptional possibility of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) warfare necessitated exceptional funding. Again, if that is a genuine criterion for funding, one would have reasonably expected similarly large funding for areas of Pakistan and India over recent years where, arguably, the world has come closest to nuclear conflagration since the end of the Cold-War. Given that this has not been the case, one can only conclude that need, actual or expected, has by no means been the only criterion in funding for Iraq and Afghanistan. (In the case of Iraq, it is notable that at least one European donor shied away from significant funding in recent years. This has been on at least three grounds. Firstly, Iraq's oil reserves represent a source of revenue sufficient to meet basic humanitarian needs. Secondly, major donations have been readily available from governments with a direct interest in the region. Thirdly, greater need exists in, for instance, areas of Africa).

2.1.4. Humanitarian Aid by Channel: Multilateral vs. NGO

The following graph shows the distribution of Finnish HA funding between multilateral agencies and NGO's, from 1997 to 2004:




Figure 8: MFA HA Funding by Channel 1997 – 2004

Funds donated to the Finnish Red Cross, ICRC and IFRC are recorded under the NGO category. The percentage for NGO's has been steady at around 30%, except for 1999,

when it reached 38%. Humanitarian mines activities are not included for the years 2002, 2003 and 2004 (approximately 5 M€ annually).

2.1.5. Humanitarian Aid by Channel: Multilaterals




Figure 9: MFA HA Funding by Multilateral Channel 1997 – 2004

Below, MFA HA funding by Multilateral Organisation, 1997 – 2004 is presented in a table. Figures are in M€

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
UNHCR	10.93	10.85	13.66	11.88	12.95	13.13	13.10	13.10
WFP	2.75	2.52	4.10	5.38	5.80	7.50	6.90	7.36
UNRWA	1.68	1.85	1.85	1.93	3.03	3.20	3.20	3.60
UNICEF	1.38	1.68	1.68	1.18	2.35	2.40	3.40	3.50
OCHA	0.34	0.51	0.75	0.84	0.56	0.60	1.00	1.00
IOM	0.04	0.03	0.29	0.30	0.59	1.00	1.00	0.70
WHO	0	0.08	0.35	0.34	0.34	0.30	0.30	0.50
FAO	0	0	0.38	0.17	0.34	0.30	0.30	0.35
ISDR	0	0	0	0	0.07	0.07	0.10	0.10

Table 1: MFA HA Funding by Multilateral Channel 1997 – 2004

UNHCR is, by far, the largest recipient of Finnish HA funds. It experienced a peak in 1999, dipped in 2000, and evened off since 2001. This predominance may have been justified in the 1990's when, as noted in the 1996 evaluation of Finland's HA, the agency was, arguably, the 'core' UN HA organisation (following the its huge growth to record annual budgets of well over 1 BUSD). Global refugee numbers have dropped notably, however, in recent years (to some 17 million, from a high of well over 20 million in the 1990's) and its annual budget has fallen to under 1 BUSD.

The agency has also changed tack, emphasising the developmental aspect of its mandate to promote 'durable solutions' for refugee situations. This is expressed through its *Four R's* approach (*Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction*). Given that the agency has, so far, not become globally involved in responding to Internally Displaced Person (IDP) situations³⁹, it is reasonable to ask whether such dominance is still justified.

WFP funding has increased steadily since 1998, in line with its shift, over the last ten-to-fifteen years, from mainly development activities to a predominantly humanitarian focus. Funding for UNRWA and UNICEF has also increased steadily during the period. The other multilateral organisations have experienced relatively stable and modest levels of funding. (Small funding has been provided to UNDP. Amounts dropped sharply in 2001).

³⁹ The role of the agency in IDP situations has been a continual source of internal debate, over the last decade. Despite a number of IDP programmes in recent years (such as Sri Lanka, Colombia and in South East Europe), the agency has so far not taken on a larger role. Involvement, according to a number of policy papers, has been subject to a number of strict conditions (including an invitation from the UN Secretary General, and provision of additional funds, over and above those available for refugee programmes).

2.1.6. Humanitarian Aid by Channel: NGO's




Figure 10: MFA HA Funding per NGO 1997 – 2004

The above graph depicts the evolution of the MFA's HA funding to NGO's. Again, it should be noted that the humanitarian mines activities are not included in this graph.

The Finnish Red Cross, ICRC and IFRC receive, by far, the largest funding, which has increased steadily throughout the period. FinnChurchAid is a distant second and Fida International and SCF receive relatively small amounts. A peak was reached in 1999, during the Kosovo crisis.

FRC/ICRC/IFRC, FinnChurchAid and Fida International have received HA funds during the entire period. The Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Mission was funded only in 1998 and Save the Children Finland (SCF) in 2003 and 2004.

2.1.7. Humanitarian Aid by Type of Funding

The following graph shows the distribution of HA funding by type – core (un-earmarked funding to organisations' core budgets) and ear-marked (usually, loosely at country or regional levels):




Figure 11: MFA HA Funding by Type 2002 – 2004

As a percentage of the total, ‘core-funding’ has remained relatively stable at between 25 and 30% from 2002 to 2004.

2.1.8. Finnish HA in 2005: The Case of the Asian Tsunami

Following the December 26th, 2004 tsunami in Asia, the total budget for Finnish MFA funded HA in 2005 has been increased to €54 M.⁴⁰ In addition, €5 M have been budgeted for humanitarian mines-action. The following table shows the distribution of the *initially* allocated 13.5 M€ pledged for the tsunami response, all regionally ear-marked for “Southeast Asia”. The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement has received the largest share, at over €4M.

⁴⁰ Situation on 24.1.2005.




Figure 12: MFA Asian Tsunami Funding by Channel in 2005

2.2. Conclusions from Funding Quantitative Analysis

In gross amounts, Finland's HA is similar to that of Ireland. Per capita of population, however, Finland is a more significant official donor than, for instance, the USA. The 10-15% portion of the Finnish development cooperation budget that HA represents, is in line with a number of donors⁴¹. Though senior MFA staff members have suggested⁴² that it be increased, the evaluation concludes that the proportion should not be increased.

Firstly, the commitment to increase overall ODA to the UN target of 0.7% of GNI will automatically increase the real amount of Finnish HA. Secondly, development aid should continue to be the absolute priority in ODA, in line with Finnish public opinion and current global 'risk management' approaches. Poverty underpins human vulnerability to crises, both natural and human-made⁴³.

A 'risk management approach', has, for at least the last decade, been widely accepted as preferable to a more narrow 'emergency management' approach. The most logical, effective and efficient way to address humanitarian crises is to prevent them⁴⁴. Disaster

⁴¹ Again, Ireland is an example.

⁴² Interviews in Helsinki.

⁴³ As noted repeatedly at the Yokohama conference in the mid-1990's, and again during the recent World Conference on Disaster Reduction convened under UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/58/214, in Kobe, Japan (18-22, January 2005).

⁴⁴ As was, yet again, painfully evident in the case of the recent Asian tsunami. At the cost of a few million dollars, an effective early-warning system (using maritime-based transmitters, as part of a larger, satellite linked, disaster warning and evacuation network) could have been installed in the seas off the coastlines, and among the communities devastated by the tidal-waves.

prevention, vulnerability reduction and risk management are long-term objectives, which cannot be adequately addressed through HA. They should be integral parts of development programmes.

Lastly, and by no means of least importance, the Finnish public has unequivocally identified 'sustainable-development' goals as priorities. According to them, the elimination of poverty should be a primary aim of all aid programmes.

Regarding types of HA, the distribution of funding between core and loosely ear-marked funds is pragmatic and reasonable, as is the small number of individual, project-based grants. Approaches allow for considerable flexibility, more so than most official donors, who apply tighter earmarking. So too is the channelling of large portions of HA to multilaterals and the RCRC movement, both of which have undeniably greater capacity than non-RCRC Finnish NGOs.

The geographical distribution of the aid, as stated in the 1997 policy paper, broadly addresses the poorest countries in the world, mainly in Africa, where most people in need of humanitarian aid live. As already noted, however, there are exceptions. Significant funding is destined for countries, neither among the poorest, nor experiencing the most acute humanitarian need. These include oil-rich Iraq, and relatively aid-rich Afghanistan, and Kosovo (in 1999). People in all these areas have undeniably needed HA, but less acutely than populations in many Sub-Saharan African countries.

It is worth noting recent media criticism of the MFA response to the December 2004 Asia tsunami. As of early January 2005, some €20 M had been donated, approaching half of recent annual budgets. As already noted, the total 2005 annual HA budget has, however, been increased to 54M€, 8M€ above the originally planned 46M€

The generosity of the Finnish people is impressive, through both individual, private donations and government funding. The evaluators are not convinced, however, that such significant MFA funding is justified, compared to both funding levels available from all other sources and unmet needs elsewhere (such as Darfur, Sudan, or Ethiopia for refugee feeding). Some organisations, such as MSF-France, stopped fund-raising soon after the event, arguing this very point. Donors have also expressed concern about the capacity of some INGOs to use such enormous funding effectively and efficiently. The pressure to spend, irrespective of need ('supply-driven' programming), was highlighted by a recent mission by staff of 'accountability initiatives'⁴⁵ to the region.

2.3. HA and Finnish Public Opinion

According to public opinion surveys⁴⁶, the level of public knowledge about development cooperation in Finland has increased rapidly from 1997 to 2003 (In 1997, 'decision-

⁴⁵ SPHERE and HAP-International, as noted in their *Joint quality and accountability initiative/ Assessment and Scoping report/ 4-13 Feb., 2005*.

⁴⁶ Taloustutkimus public opinion surveys for 1997, 1999, 2000, 2001 & 2003.

makers' had regarded their knowledge of development cooperation as quite poor). A majority of Finns are in favour of keeping funding at current levels, or to increase them. Development cooperation was regarded as efficient by two-thirds of those surveyed in 2003. Regarding HA, about 90% of respondents were content with the speed of response, amount of aid and choice of target countries.

Two-thirds of those surveyed are content with the amount of information they receive regarding aid. Showing the impact of the media, and perhaps the need for alternative sources (such as MFA and partner aid-education strategies), however, the main sources of public information on aid are television, newspapers and radio.

Regarding priority use of aid, 'sustainable development goals' are seen to be of far greater importance than HA. The 2003 survey respondents listed the following goals for development cooperation in order of importance. *Overall-goals*, for the years surveyed, were seen to be sustainable development, an end to hunger, and humanitarian aid. *Specific goals* were: developing country self-sufficiency and poverty reduction; global security and peacekeeping and the prevention of disease (respondents had to choose from a list of goals provided by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs). In 1997, opinion-makers noted that development cooperation can be tied to politics. The general public saw it as a tool for foreign policy in surveys from 1997 to 2001. (The question was not asked specifically in 2003).

Africa was seen as the main target region for development cooperation in 2003. 'Close-border' countries and Asia were also seen as important target regions. This was the case in previous years, but to a lesser extent each year. (Interestingly, in 2003, 5% of respondents would see Finland as the main target country.) Health, population issues and education were seen as the principal forms of cooperation. All-in-all, the surveys indicate that the Finnish public and decision-makers see development cooperation as a positive phenomenon.

3. EFFECTIVENESS

3.1. Definitions

‘Effectiveness’ measures the achievement of performance against objectives⁴⁷. Most Finnish funding is not donated for specific projects. Key partners are funded through core-budget funding and loose regional ear-marking. An analysis of effectiveness requires, therefore, an overview of the effectiveness of these large HA organisations. This chapter examines specific cases, based on a variety of sources⁴⁸. It concludes that, overall, and despite important exceptions, Finnish-funded HA has been effective.

According to the evaluation TOR, ‘Finland seeks ... to advance the application of international quality standards in (its) work.’ The SPHERE Project Handbook⁴⁹ sets out technical standards and indicators for disaster response. It also contains what the project terms a ‘Humanitarian Charter’, which, according to the SPHERE Handbook ... *affirms the fundamental importance of the following principles: The right to life with dignity; The distinction between combatants and non-combatants; The principle of non-refoulement [of asylum-seekers and refugees].*

The Charter draws on sources such as International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Refugee Law, and the RCRC Code of Conduct⁵⁰. (The principles also reflect rights and principles relevant to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and other International Human Rights Law instruments.) While aimed solely at emergencies, these standards, especially the Humanitarian Charter, provide useful benchmarks against which to measure effectiveness.

The Charter includes principles which are also emphasised by the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative (GHDI). In its June 2003 Stockholm meeting, the GHDI concluded that Humanitarian Action (a term covering aid and protection) should be refocused. Rather than being a wide-ranging, diffuse concept, covering many, ill-defined types of aid, HA should focus on core concepts and principles, rooted in the founding of the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement. The GHDI proposes that the objective of

⁴⁷ These are commonly termed ‘intermediate’, or ‘short-term’, as opposed to ‘impact’, which measures longer-term change.

⁴⁸ Including: the ALNAP 2003 Review of Humanitarian Action; and ‘Ambiguity and Change’, Humanitarian NGOs Prepare for the Future’, the Alan Shawn Feinstein International Famine Center – Tufts University, August 2004; specific programmes reports and documentation; human rights reports, such as by Amnesty International; HA agency press releases; and media reports.

⁴⁹ ‘Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster response’, 2004 Edition. The SPHERE Project has been contested by certain organisations and individuals who oppose the idea of setting ‘one-size-fits-all’ standards to widely diverse situations. Mostly French based, they include, Francois Grunewald, Groupe *Urgence, Réhabilitation et Développement*, and the alternative Projet Qualité/COMPAS, which emphasises a specific approach to each crisis, based on detailed beneficiary consultation and ‘participation’.

⁵⁰ Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief (1994).

humanitarian action is **to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters**. Humanitarian action is guided by the principles of **humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence**. These principles can be applied as measures of the effectiveness of HA.

3.2. The Effectiveness of the International HA 'System'

A tightly coordinated HA system does not exist globally. The term is applied vaguely to the myriad Governmental Organisations (GOs), International Organisations (IOs), Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and local communities and individuals who regularly respond to humanitarian crises globally. **Finland funds international organisations which are among the most important components of this system**. The effectiveness of this system in general and these partners in particular is an indicator of the effectiveness of Finland's aid.

The conclusion of this chapter is that the international HA system can respond effectively. It has been shown to achieve its objectives⁵¹ to save lives and reduce suffering. In that sense, Finland's aid has been broadly effective.

On the other hand, the 'system' can also be guilty of failures, omissions, and neglect. Short-comings can be alarming. One-and-the-same organisation can be notably effective in one situation and ineffective, to the point of neglect, in another. This has been found to happen particularly when operations are not under the international spotlight, and 'forgotten'.

Three conclusions emerge from this point. Firstly, though effective international HA capacity exists, monitoring of partner performance is essential. All donors have a responsibility to monitor the effectiveness of the main HA organisations and to hold them to account when they fail to achieve what they themselves set out to achieve, using tax-payers funds. Secondly, based on this monitoring, donors can support and encourage partners to improve operational effectiveness. Donors who have few explicit political agendas may have an advantage in exercising this responsibility in a principled manner.

Thirdly, the principle that forgotten crises should be funding *and operational* priorities, while oft invoked, is erratically respected. Not only do objective needs go unmet, but also, once out of the spot-light, partner performance may be inadequate, sometimes to disturbing levels.

3.3. Successes

Notable successes during the evaluation period include:

⁵¹ These are not particularly ambitious objectives, compared to the Millennium Development Goals.

3.3.1. Advances in Expertise, Standards, Techniques and Methods

HA organisations have advanced notably over the last 10 years, in terms of technical capacity and expertise⁵². During the post-genocide, 1994 Rwanda refugee crisis, an estimated 50,000 refugees died of preventable causes, in large part, from inadequate attention⁵³. The dramatic ineffectiveness of the response to that crisis led to many of the HA initiatives witnessed since 1995, including among Finland's main partners.

HA methods (e.g. feeding protocols, water and sanitation techniques, and the plethora of technical guidance made available in the last decade); materials (e.g. improved plastic sheeting, therapeutic feeding formulae and communications equipment); staffing (e.g. professional preparation and training); and management (e.g. operational and staffing standards, procurement, and logistics systems) have all demonstrably improved. Internationally agreed standards have been set and tested (e.g. SPHERE and the GHDI). Research, evaluation, oversight and monitoring groups and mechanisms have been established (e.g. HPG/HPN, ALNAP, HAP-I and People-in-Aid). Major international organisations are now capable of stabilising most emergency scenarios, provided resources are made available on time.

In addition to technical capacities, new coordination mechanisms have mushroomed, including field Humanitarian Information Centres (HICs) and centrally, a strengthened Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the High Level Working Group (HLWG), and numerous other GO, IGO, and NGO coordinating mechanisms. While mechanisms overlap, field coordination has been shown to work⁵⁴, whenever the will and resources are available.

3.3.2. Stabilisation of the Kosovo Refugee Crisis, 1999

Despite immense pressures and significant capacity limitations, the hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing Kosovo, in the Spring of 1999, were received, processed, transported, accommodated, and attended to faster and more effectively than were those fleeing Rwanda half-a-decade earlier (and, arguably, more effectively than in any other large-scale refugee movement). While, as ever, the generosity of local populations, was a critical factor, outbreaks of disease, malnutrition, acute suffering, and lack of basic services were all largely avoided, in a massive, combined governmental, UN, RCRC/NGO and (NATO) military effort. New levels of service were provided. These included, for example, the provision of telecommunications centres in refugee camps, to facilitate family reunion and onward movement. Finland, through its exceptional levels of funding for the crisis, contributed to this effectiveness in a significant manner.

⁵² See the ALNAP 2003 Review of Humanitarian Action; and 'Ambiguity and Change', Humanitarian NGOs Prepare for the Future', the Alan Shawn Feinstein International Famine Center – Tufts University, August 2004.

⁵³ Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, ODI, conducted 1994-96.

⁵⁴ Experienced observers and practitioners have noted success in a number of recent operations, including, on a case-by-case basis, Asian countries affected by the December 2004 tsunami and Ethiopia during the latest food crisis.

Despite a critical independent evaluation of its operation⁵⁵, and, at times fierce donor reproach, UNHCR eventually played an important role in many aspects of that operation. These include the humanitarian evacuation programme, camp management, coordination (in both Kukes, Albania and Skopje, Macedonia) and international protection (in the face of less than cooperative governments).

The operation served, once more, however, to highlight the imbalance in standards of assistance, globally. Ironically, refugee feeding had been so effective that a HA nutritionist subsequently argued that health risks existed due to the large quantities of rich foods made available to refugees⁵⁶. This contrasts sharply with the current seriously inadequate rations provided to refugees in Ethiopia, noted elsewhere in this report.

3.3.3. Effective Responses to Natural Disasters

Similarly effective responses have rapidly stabilised many natural disaster situations over the last ten years. A wide range of actors were responsible, including military and civilian organisations, groups and individuals. The RCRC Movement has been particularly effective. Among first, most comprehensive and prepared responses have been those RCRC Movement actors, largely and impressively through National Societies. This has been the case in, for instance, Colombia ('coffee-zone' earthquake, January 1999); India (Gujarat, January 2001); and Iran (Bam, December 2003). This has been recognised by evaluators, donors and, above all, locally affected populations, in all three cases. Finland's standard strategy to fund the RCRC Movement to respond to major natural disasters is justified.

3.3.4. Averting Famine in Ethiopia

All observers consulted, and documentation reviewed coincide that large-scale famine has been averted in Ethiopia, during recent years (especially 2002). Weaknesses existed in the operation, including a slowness to respond in the early stages, as highlighted by a number of INGOs. There is little doubt, however, that massive food operations over the last four years have prevented significant starvation turning into large-scale famine, compared to previous experiences in Ethiopia⁵⁷.

The response involved the Ethiopian government DPPC (responsible for much of the storage and final distribution), donors, (especially the US and the EU Commission, but also significantly Finland); WFP (and other UN organisations, such as UNICEF and OCHA in a much smaller role); INGOs (such as SCUUK, who conducted important

⁵⁵ The Kosovo refugee crisis: An independent evaluation of UNHCR's emergency preparedness and response, February 2000, www.UNHCR.ch, under 'Research/Evaluation'.

⁵⁶ Quote: *By July 1999, it became clear that the main nutritional problem among Kosovars [in Albanian refugee camps] was not under-malnutrition, but obesity ... The UN used the same procedures to work out food-aid needs as elsewhere ... but donor countries provided funding direct to NGOs to buy additional foods ...* Susanne Jaspers, freelance HA Nutritionist, New Statesman, 15.05.00, on how Kosovar refugees were, she argued, over-fed in the camps during the 1999 crisis. Somali refugees in Ethiopia were found, during this evaluation in 2004, to have received at most 1,500 Kcal. per person per day, while the international *minimum* standard is 2,100.

⁵⁷ E.g. the catastrophic 1984 famine.

nutrition monitoring and food delivery; and LWF who ran rural programmes) and local communities and NGOs (especially involved in community level distribution). Most of the international organisations mentioned above have been, or are regularly funded by Finland.

A determining feature of the operation was WFP's logistical capacity which moved hundreds of thousands of Metric Tonnes (MT's) of food from Djibouti port to primary and secondary distribution points in Ethiopia⁵⁸. This has been recognised as an exceptional feat and a major success.

3.3.5. The Afghanistan Refugee Return Operation

The return of refugees mainly from Pakistan and Iran to Afghanistan, particularly since 2002, has been hailed by a variety of commentators as a significant success. This was a concerted effort, led by UNHCR. Despite the controversial military PRT's⁵⁹ (see under Global Issues later in this report), and on-going conflict and disrespect for basic human rights and IHL by warring factions, the operation is deemed to have been broadly effective, both quantitatively (in terms of numbers repatriating) and qualitatively (in terms of the conditions for return, as established under international refugee law i.e. 'safety and dignity').

Most of the 3.5 million 'voluntary returnees' recorded by UNHCR in 2003, were Afghans returning from Pakistan and Iran⁶⁰. Success has been due to a combination of factors including donor funding and 'in-kind' support such as logistics, strong UNHCR/international agency/NGO teams, host country support and a desire on the part of the refugees to return. UNHCR is Finland's main HA partner globally.

3.3.6. Red Crescent Assistance in Palestine and Iraq

Red Crescent staff has been particularly effective and brave in delivering basic HA in both the West Bank & Gaza (WB&G), and Iraq. The almost total absence of Western INGOs and other international organisations at the outskirts of Falluja following the 2004 ferocious attacks on that city was notable. Red Crescent workers valiantly attempted to distribute basic relief items to displaced or returning inhabitants of the city, despite US military restrictions on access to the city proper.

In the WB&G, similarly brave, effective and costly (in human terms) assistance is provided on a continual basis by the Red Crescent, since the recent 'Intifada' began in 1999. This was especially noteworthy in the response in early 2002 (along with locals and other organisations), following the raising of a large part of the Jenin refugee camp.

⁵⁸ For instance, relief food distributed throughout 2003 came to 1,515,338 MT, of which 27% were supplied through WFP (donations or local procurement): Lessons Learned Review of WFP's Emergency Response in Ethiopia, June 2002 to December 2003.

⁵⁹ PRTs are teams of military personnel, many reservists, tasked with conducting and overseeing rehabilitation projects throughout Afghanistan (e.g. school reconstruction). They operate in uniform.

⁶⁰ It should be noted that most returnees were 'spontaneous', and not through UNHCR organised movements, however. None-the-less, returnee programmes in places of origin potentially benefit all returnees, both 'spontaneous' and 'organised'.

3.3.7. Effective International Humanitarian Protection Activities

Effective detainee visits and prisoner exchanges; human remains exhumations and identifications; family-tracing; and dissemination of and training in IHL have been conducted in conflict, or post-conflict zones from Colombia to the Balkans, and from Iraq to Indonesia. Despite increased security risks to its staff⁶¹, resulting in killings and maiming, the ICRC has shown itself capable of being a specialised, effective humanitarian actor.

This is especially so whenever resources and political conditions permit. According to the ICRC, in 2003, the agency *visited nearly 470,000 detainees, held in nearly 80 countries around the world. Of these, nearly 127,000 were individually registered and followed.*

No other HA actor can fulfil its international protection role. As noted elsewhere in this report, it has been referred to as the 'Rolls Royce' of HA agencies. Finland is the 10th largest governmental donor to the ICRC.

3.3.8. Impressive NGO LRRD Activities

A strength of Finnish funded INGOs is their commitment to linking relief, rehabilitation and development. This was noted in the 1996 evaluation of Finnish HA. It is still a notable feature of their work, as witnessed in Ethiopia. Projects in chronically crisis-affected areas, focusing on the same populations over years, have permitted practical linking of, for instance, food relief with water-harvesting, animal husbandry, agricultural activities, health education, and community development activities.

3.3.9. Asia Tsunami Response, 2004-2005

Though still early to tell, and amid initial criticisms, it seems that the aftermath of the 2004 Asia tsunami has also been managed relatively effectively. Despite significant delays in accessing remote areas, especially in Northern Sumatra, mortality and morbidity rates have been stabilised quite rapidly. Again, the exceptional scale of the international funding and the resultant emergency response was a major factor in, what appears to be a successful humanitarian operation.

While it is early to come to a definitive conclusion, initial evidence suggests that a wide range of agencies, including UNICEF, managed to deploy staff and materials effectively (e.g. from UNICEF's Copenhagen, Denmark central store, and the Finnish RC's store, Kalkku, in Tampere, Finland).

3.3.10. Advocacy in Palestine

OCHA advocacy activities regarding the humanitarian impact of the 'separation wall' around the West Bank, have been effective in bringing to world opinion evidence of the humanitarian impact of the 'wall'. Use of aerial photography showing relentless, systematic destruction of houses in Gaza, has also been effective in advocating for

⁶¹ Five ICRC staff were killed in Iraq and Afghanistan last year: 28-06-2004, ICRC Press Release 04/44.

respect for IHL and International Human Rights Law and in exposing the humanitarian impact of such policies.

3.3.11. Operation FOCUS, Serbia 1999

In contrast with most other donors, the Swiss, Russian and Greek governments mounted a jointly-funded HA operation into Serbia, to assist Serbs (not just Kosovars) during the attacks on Serbia by NATO (mainly US and UK forces) during 1999. This operation was conducted in conjunction with RCRC movement actors. While this operation was not directly funded by Finland, the RCRC movement is a strategic HA partner for Finland.

Irrespective of individual motivations, operation FOCUS was an example of concerted donor action which highlighted the importance of ‘impartiality’ and ‘independence’ in HA operations, especially when powerful states are party to a conflict. DFID (UK) had, for example, conditioned its funding to UNICEF to aiding victims inside Kosovo⁶².

3.3.12. Successful Coordination in Albania

In 1999, the Emergency Management Group (EMG) was established by the government of Albania and donor governments, to coordinate the Kosovo refugee crisis response in that country. It has been recognised as an exceptional example of national and international relief coordination. OCHA, and eventually UNHCR, played a central role in developing this mechanism.

3.3.13. Finnish Warehouses in Hartisheik, Ethiopia

Finland’s funding of a warehouse complex in the vicinity of the Hartisheik refugee camp for Somali refugees, in Eastern Ethiopia has been particularly effective. The permanent, hard-structure warehouses were constructed in the early 1990’s. Food storage had been a major challenge during the early days of the refugee crisis. The warehouses provided effective service for over a decade and are now being handed-over to the authorities to continue their use for other activities. They are not only still standing and operational, but are repeatedly mentioned by officials and aid workers as visible signs of Finland’s support to the refugees and the region. The massive camps (housing, at one stage, reportedly a quarter of a million people), have just been closed (2004).

3.4. Overall Effectiveness

On balance, the HA system, including Finnish partners has been effective. The above successes and quality advances (and many others not mentioned here), outweigh the failures listed below. Overall, the report concludes that Finnish HA has been effective over the past decade. The following weaknesses and failures should be seen in this light.

⁶² Joint DFID-UNICEF evaluation; UNICEF Preparedness & Response in the 1999 Kosovo Refugee Emergency, January 2000.

3.5. Failures

Notwithstanding the above successes, major HA organisations have encountered failures, be it by omission or commission. HA actors do not control all variables, or even most, which determine the success or failure of HA operations. The effectiveness and performance of these organisations is, however, of major relevance to Finnish tax-payers. The following examples have not all involved *direct* funding from Finland. Organisations involved are funded, however, *directly or indirectly*, by the MFA, including, in important cases, through generous ‘core-funding’.

3.5.1. DRC Forgotten Crisis

According to NGO, advocacy group and UN reports, as many as three million people may have died over the last ten years, as a result of the chronic crisis in the DRC. Many of these people have been killed in violent conflict, fuelled by the avarice of international companies⁶³ and competing western governments, in what is in many respects, a proxy, pan-African war.

Countless thousands of others have died, and continue to die from preventable causes, including disease, malnutrition, de-hydration and exposure to the elements (e.g. while hiding for long periods in jungle areas). This is a major failure of the international political, but also HA systems. Donors and international organisations alike have failed to address adequately the humanitarian needs generated by, arguably the greatest, chronic-humanitarian crisis of modern times.

3.5.2. Darfur, Sudan Refugee Crisis

The international response to the Darfur, Western Sudan, crisis has been regarded by many observers and practitioners⁶⁴ as seriously ineffective and slow. Reports state that ‘an ethnic-cleansing campaign has left as many as 300,000 people dead and two million villagers displaced⁶⁵. The International Crisis Group emphasises the tardy, failed response⁶⁶:

Two years into the crisis in Darfur, the humanitarian, security and political situation is deteriorating. Atrocity crimes are continuing, people are still dying in large numbers from malnutrition and disease and a new famine is feared. The

⁶³ According to various sources, including statements by locals, the thirst of multi-national corporations for diamonds, coltan and other minerals has been a major cause of conflict.

⁶⁴ NGO, UN, donor, media, human rights and academic sources, including evaluations by, for instance, UNICEF, UNHCR, MSF-Holland, Oxfam GB/International, CARE International and an interagency study coordinated by OCHA.

⁶⁵ The New York Times, as published in the International Herald Tribune, Friday, March 25, 2005, Paris edition.

⁶⁶ Darfur: The Failure to Protect; ICG Africa Report N°89, 8 March 2005.

international community is failing to protect civilians itself or influence the Sudanese government to do so.

An MSF-Holland evaluation put it even stronger⁶⁷:

The distinguishing feature of the Darfur crisis has been the lateness and inadequacy of the humanitarian response. It has been so serious that it amounted to 'systemic failure'.

Such conclusions are echoed throughout evaluations, media reports and advocacy statements. For example, the initial UNHCR response to the Darfur Refugee crisis in neighbouring Chad has been recognised by the organisation itself as flawed⁶⁸. This tardy recognition led to major changes in the operation, which has subsequently been judged by independent observers as markedly more successful⁶⁹.

A just-published, joint DFID/UNICEF evaluation concluded that ... *the early UNICEF response, along with that of other UN agencies, NGOs and institutional donors [resulted to be] by and large inadequate.*⁷⁰

All-in-all, therefore, the provision of international protection and, secondarily, material aid for victims of the Darfur crisis have been ineffective⁷¹. Consequently, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator has commissioned 'an independent, in-depth system wide review of humanitarian response capacities'⁷².

3.5.3. Refugee Return Programme from Tanzania and Zaire/DRC

The 1996/1997 Rwanda refugee return operation from Tanzania has been criticised as 'forced'. It resulted in thousands of refugees (or hundreds of thousands, according to some reports⁷³) forced to return to Rwanda, or to flee elsewhere. Many died in the process, or are still 'missing'⁷⁴. Rape was allegedly used as a form of coercion.

⁶⁷ Darfur 2004: A Review of MSF-Holland's Responsiveness and Strategic Choices, January 2005.

⁶⁸ Quote from the UNHCR Real Time Evaluation of the UNHCR response to the emergency in Chad, August 2004: *No consistent protection strategy was in place to systematically respond to the manifold protection issues in evidence. On the assistance side, pockets of severe destitution persist both among the population of spontaneous arrivals and in some of the newly-opened camp sites. UNHCR's field structure is not fully functional and plagued by both communication and coordination problems. The absence of a functioning telecommunications network in this operation, for instance, is a glaring system failure and has had a serious impact on UNHCR's operational effectiveness.*

⁶⁹ International Herald Tribune article on Sudanese refugees in Chad, December 2004.

⁷⁰ Joint UNICEF-DFID Evaluation of UNICEF Preparedness and Early Response to the Darfur Emergency, 2005.

⁷¹ As an indirect result, a major evaluation of the international HA system's technical and operational capacity was called for in 2004, at the request of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator.

⁷² TOR for this study: Review of Global Humanitarian Response Capacity. Draft - 03 November 2004.

⁷³ *Over 500,000 Rwandese refugees were forced to return to Rwanda ... In early December, the government issued a written statement, endorsed and co-signed by the UNHCR, which announced that all Rwandese refugees were expected to leave the country by 31 December. Refugees who feared for their safety if they returned to Rwanda were not informed of any mechanism whereby they could remain in*

According to Amnesty International, UNHCR *endorsed and co-signed the government issued, written statement, which announced that all Rwandese refugees were expected to leave the country by 31 December*. This was despite inadequate guarantees for the safety of the refugees. The operation caused considerable internal disquiet among staff and partner organisations. In this case, UNHCR proved ineffective in protecting refugees' rights to 'voluntary return, in conditions of safety and dignity'⁷⁵.

3.5.4. Refugee Feeding in Ethiopia 2004-2005

WFP, UNHCR and ARRA (the Ethiopia state Refugee and Return agency) issued a statement⁷⁶ in December 2004, announcing a second dramatic shortfall of food in refugee camps in Ethiopia during that year. WFP points to the donors as the cause, in that they had not responded adequately to appeals for food and/or funds. To Finland's credit, Finnish funds were used to purchase food⁷⁷ in order to breach the gap for some months. At the end of 2004, those funds had run out, however. The net result of this decision is that refugee food rations will decrease from the internationally accepted⁷⁸ minimum target of 2,100 KCAL per day to 1,500 KCAL per day. This was described by one of the nutritionists involved as 'a death sentence' for refugees.

This major failure is compounded by the Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) Rates in the Shimelba camp which houses some 6,000 Eritrean refugees. According to the latest nutritional survey, GAM rates there have oscillated between 14% and 30% *since 2002*. They are currently recorded at 19.1% (October, 2004), up from 18.1% a mere 3 months earlier (July, 2004). By any standards, and irrespective of causes, these figures are shocking. According to Ethiopian government nutrition guidelines⁷⁹, a rate of '15% or over, in the presence of aggravating factors', is a '*critical* situation'. In the absence of aggravating factors, it is '*serious*'.

WFP and UNHCR disagree on the causes (and therefore, the remedies) for this situation. A variety of factors, including a recent re-location of the camp, sale of food and tribal tensions within the camp, have all been cited. Irrespective of their disagreement, and the root causes, WFP, UNHCR and ARRA are proving to be markedly ineffective in dealing

Tanzania, or that they had any other option but to leave. Tens of thousands of refugees who fled the camps and attempted to escape into the interior of the country were intercepted by the army and police and redirected to the border. There were reports that excessive force and rape were used as means of coercion. By the end of the year, approximately 500,000 refugees had returned to Rwanda and 50,000 Rwandans remained in Tanzania. - Amnesty International, 1997 Annual report, chapter on Tanzania.

⁷⁴ Based on eye-witness reports, interviews and reports from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and others.

⁷⁵ For detailed background, see: Refugee Return from Zaire to Rwanda: The Role of UNHCR by Kurt Mills (Chapter in Howard Adelman, ed. *Analyzing and Evaluating intervention in Zaire, 1996-97*, Africa World Press/The Red Sea Press, 2003).

⁷⁶ Urgent funds needed to prevent ration cuts for refugees in Ethiopia – Joint news release, WFP, UNHCR and ARRA, Addis Ababa, 8 December, 2004.

⁷⁷ WFP used loosely ear-marked donations for this purpose.

⁷⁸ SPHERE Handbook, 2004 Edition, P. 189.

⁷⁹ Emergency Nutrition Intervention Guideline, ENCU, Addis Ababa, August, 2004, P.34.

with these alarming levels of acute-malnutrition (for 3 years in a row), in what is a small camp.

3.5.5. Ineffective Coordination

*Doctors differ; and patients die*⁸⁰

Coordination, as noted in the evaluation TOR, is linked with effectiveness. A rational division of tasks and combined efforts should improve effectiveness. Despite successes already described, examples of ineffective or absent coordination abound in recent HA operations. Here are two examples, one at a global level and another at country level.

The lack of coordination at the initial stages of the response to Asia tsunami disaster in 2004-2005 was disturbing⁸¹. It underlined the importance of multi-lateral coordination, through the UN. Specifically, it illustrated the need for UN conferences and secretariat support to donor, affected government, international organisation and national/local responses.

In Ethiopia, this evaluation team noted a lack of agency coordination involving the government, UNHCR and WFP, over the refugee feeding crisis noted in this chapter. An official of a key UN organisation flatly contradicted and refused to accept as valid the joint-nutritional survey produced by the three organisations concerned. The survey had been produced involving the nutritionist from that official's *own* agency. Sniping and bickering between UN agencies, and within them, is not uncommon. It can have tragic consequences. Donor support for *and close monitoring of partner* coordination mechanisms should go hand-in-hand.

3.5.6. West Africa and Nepal 'Sex-for-food'

The 'sex-for-food' abuse cases in refugee camps in West Africa⁸², and subsequently in Nepal, have shown that the many international organisations involved have been incapable of protecting the females concerned. They were also responsible for seriously ineffective field monitoring of their own staff. Organisations affected by the scandal include UN, (I)NGO and governmental organisations, including some regularly funded by Finland. A HAP (now HAP-I) report⁸³ refers to *impunity and the failure to protect refugees*:

On 27 February 2002, the UNHCR and Save the Children UK released a report on the sexual violence and exploitation of refugee children in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone. Agency workers from international and local NGOs as well as UN agencies were reportedly the most frequent sex exploiters of girls under 18, often

⁸⁰ An old adage which reflects the impact of inadequate coordination among experts.

⁸¹ Media reports dwelt upon the acrimony among major donors, which at one stage resulted in a small group of donors 'going it alone'. This was eventually mitigated by the calling of a UN pledging conference.

⁸² UNHCR and NGO reports and subsequent media coverage.

⁸³ By Agnes Calmard, Hap (now HAP-I), March 1st, 2002.

using the very humanitarian aid and services intended to benefit the refugee population as a tool of exploitation.

The allegations contained in the report are very serious: they point to patterns of sexual exploitation of refugee girl children, and to a culture of impunity.

They highlight the failure of the UNHCR to fulfill its protection mandate ... The UNHCR/SCUK report is a sad reminder that much remains to be done ... As reactions to the UNHCR-SCF report highlight, all humanitarian agencies are tarred with the same brush. They are and will be held collectively responsible for the abuses of power, negligence, or incompetence of some of their members, and more generally for the inconsistent lack of quality. It especially highlights the failure of the UNHCR to meet its main international obligation and mandate, as defined by the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and the UNHCR Statute: protecting refugees.

As a secondary, though related point, interviewees and direct observation⁸⁴ suggest that HA staff are increasingly desk-bound, working more at computers, than with the people they purport to assist. Moreover, relatively inexperienced, junior staff is placed in positions of responsibility with surprising frequency, in charge of large operations, teams, material and financial resources (e.g. heads of sub or field offices⁸⁵).

3.5.7. Failure to Prevent Repeated Violations of IHL by Powerful States

The evaluators understand the constraints facing all HA actors. This evaluation is, however, instructed to examine the effectiveness of Finnish funded HA. In 2003, the ICRC received 13,581,245⁸⁶ Swiss Francs (CHF), some €3.3 M⁸⁷, from Finland. Finland's HA policy states that 'Finland's participation in humanitarian aid is based upon the recognition of international humanitarian principles and norms.' Despite MFA comments (see below, regarding Guantanamo Bay, Cuba) and ICRC complaints, the effectiveness of the ICRC is most relevant to this evaluation.

Regarding the especially important cases addressed below, *according to a variety of independent sources*, interventions by organisations, including the ICRC, have been ineffective, or, according to observers, 'ignored'. The ICRC complained (in a formal letter to the Finnish Ambassador in Geneva, containing as an attachment, comments on a

⁸⁴ Interviews and observations conducted during the evaluation, especially in Ethiopia.

⁸⁵ An important UN agency headed its sub-offices in Ethiopia as follows: one sub-office visited during the evaluation was headed by a UN Volunteer. Another, was run by a consultant, while a third, by local staff. A fourth was managed by a mid-to-junior level professional. All told, annual resource turnovers in their areas of responsibility totalled tens of millions of dollars.

⁸⁶ ICRC Annual Report, 2003.

⁸⁷ 1 CHF = 0.69 €, rate of 1st January, 2003.

previous draft of this report) that [s]uch conclusions are unfounded and unsubstantiated⁸⁸.

This evaluation begs to differ. In reply, it sets out the following quotes, many from the ICRC itself. Such abuses, and the failure to prevent them, are *especially* important. They have been committed by powerful states, which have exercised, and still exercise a strong influence on the establishment of practices and standards regarding the treatment of detainees globally. This section is especially important for the conclusions of this report.

The ICRC includes among its objectives:

*... protecting prisoners and detainees in wartime ... to ensure humane treatment⁸⁹
... The ICRC's visits to prisoners are aimed at preventing or putting an end to disappearances, extra-judicial killings, torture and ill-treatment, and improving conditions of detention.*

It solicits and accepts tax-payers donations to achieve this. According to its publicity materials and reports⁹⁰, the organisation has been effective in this task in many cases, as these quotes from its website testify:

The ICRC, by bringing us mail and visitors, changed our lives.

The ICRC had won a first, hard-fought victory. Through their stubbornness, they had finally gained families the right to visit their detained relatives ...

Thanks to its neutrality and independence, the ICRC is able to help those affected by conflict.

It is thanks to the ICRC that we found our dignity as human beings ... it is the work of the ICRC that always gave us hope ...

Unfortunately, however, this is not always the case:

The Red Cross took a lot of criticism over Abu Ghraib ... People were saying: 'Yes, you're making these representations, but prisoners are still being treated inhumanely. What are you actually doing?' ... My own view is that we need to be prepared to speak up.

Sir Nick Young, chief executive of the British Red Cross⁹¹

⁸⁸ The attachment to that letter stated that: *Such conclusions are unfounded and unsubstantiated. They are based on selective media reports and have not been the subject of consultations with ICRC representatives ... most [information] comes from the media. ... This indicates the relatively poor sources of information at [the evaluators'] disposal.* The team-leader has replied to the RC regarding their criticisms. This section and that entitled *The Main Challenge: To Be and Be Perceived to Be Independent*, at the end of this report, also respond to the ICRC comments. Both sections are of central importance to this evaluation and its conclusions.

⁸⁹ ICRC website www.icrc.org, page 'protecting prisoners and detainees in wartime'.

⁹⁰ See www.icrc.org.

A senior ICRC manager⁹² is also quite honest about the reality the ICRC faces:

... the main risk we [ICRC] face today is twofold. On the one hand, [the] risk of being rejected for being associated with the west, or identified as a western organisation ...and ... being instrumentalised by actors that see the integration of political, military and humanitarian objectives as the way forward ...

ICRC will be very adamant in its insistence on neutral and independent humanitarian action as being a real added value ... Saying that is not enough [however]: we accept that we will have to be judged on what we do and how we do things.

Well documented⁹³ violations by western military forces have been committed in Serbia/Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Guantanamo. The Guantanamo detention centre/prison enters its fourth year of existence, with some 500 people still detained. According to Amnesty International⁹⁴, the first detainees were transferred to Guantanamo on the 10-11 January 2002, and the following month the White House announced that the Geneva conventions would not apply to them.

MFA personnel have argued that the Guantanamo prisons have been *totally beyond the control of any HA agency* and that the ICRC should be praised for having *managed to negotiate access to these places ... the ICRC has to think of the current and future situation of the prisoners*. The ICRC, by its own admission, however, does not know what that *current situation* is for an *unknown number of people captured as part of the so-called global war on terror and held in undisclosed locations* (see ICRC's March 29th, 2005 operational update, quoted later in this section).

Detainees have been held in undisclosed locations, by the USA, or transferred to other countries. According to US Defence Department officials, there were as many as 100 'Ghost detainees' held in prisons in Iraq⁹⁵. Human Rights Watch adds that⁹⁶... *the Pentagon prepares to build a permanent prison at its Guantanamo base, and the US government still ignores the need to provide legal justification for those who remain in detention.*

⁹¹ As reported in 'Caught in the crossfire', article by Annie Kelly, Wednesday December 15 2004, The Guardian (UK National Daily Newspaper).

⁹² Pierre Krähenbühl, Director of Operations, in an audio report on ICRC website, on the launch of the ICRC 2003 Annual Report.

⁹³ E.g. by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and academics e.g. *NATO has installed a reign of terror in Kosovo*, by Michel Chossudovsky, Professor of Economics at the University of Ottawa, Ottawa, July 1999 (see www.tenc.net).

⁹⁴ Report United States of America: Human dignity denied - Torture and accountability in the 'war on terror' (<http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAMR511452004>).

⁹⁵ Josh White, Washington Post, Friday, March 11, 2005, page A16.

⁹⁶ HRW, Guantanamo, three years of lawlessness: Detainees still held indefinitely without basic rights, January 2005.

Under the title *Reports of Abuse Ignored*, regarding Iraq, Human Rights Watch notes⁹⁷ that:

... [an] ICRC report states that it alerted U.S. authorities to abuses orally and in writing throughout 2003. In May 2003, the ICRC sent a memorandum based on over 200 allegations of ill-treatment of prisoners of war during capture and interrogation at collecting points, battle group stations and temporary holding areas ... In early July 2003, the ICRC presented a paper detailing approximately 50 allegations of ill-treatment in the military intelligence section of Camp Cropper, at Baghdad International Airport. According to the ICRC these incidents included: "... acts of violence aimed at securing the co-operation of the persons deprived of their liberty with their interrogators; threats (to intern individuals indefinitely, to arrest other family members, to transfer individuals to Guantanamo) against persons deprived of their liberty or against members of their families (in particular wives and daughters); hooding; tight handcuffing; use of stress positions (kneeling, squatting, standing with arms raised over the head) for three or four hours; taking aim at individuals with rifles, striking them with rifle butts, slaps, punches, prolonged exposure to the sun, and isolation in dark cells. ICRC delegates witnessed marks on the bodies of several persons deprived of their liberty consistent with their allegations."

In one case, a detainee: "alleged that ... When he said he would complain to the ICRC he was ... beaten more. An ICRC medical examination revealed haematoma in the lower back, blood in urine, sensory loss in the right hand due to tight handcuffing with flexi-cuffs, and a broken rib." ... according to one senior U.S. Army officer who served in Iraq, Army officials responded to the report of abuses at Abu Ghraib prison by trying to curtail the ICRC's spot inspections, insisting that the ICRC should make appointments before visiting the cellblock.

The International Committee of the Red Cross has repeatedly sought information on detainees. In a March 2004 public statement⁹⁸, it noted:

The ICRC is increasingly concerned about the fate of an unknown number of people captured as part of the so-called global war on terror and held in undisclosed locations. For the ICRC, obtaining information on these detainees and access to them is an important humanitarian priority and a logical continuation of its current detention work in Bagram [Afghanistan] and Guantanamo Bay [Cuba].

Complaints were 'sometimes' dealt with by US authorities at the 'lowest level':

According to US General John Abizaid, the ICRC's complaints and recommendations may not have reached top brass. "For example, the ICRC

⁹⁷ Human Rights Watch: The Road to Abu Ghraib, June 2004, (Section IV. Iraq: Applying Counter-Terrorism Tactics during a Military Occupation) <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/usa0604/usa0604.pdf>.

⁹⁸ International Committee of the Red Cross, "United States: ICRC President Urges Progress on Detention-related Issues" Press Release, March 4, 2004.

report of February 04, I first saw in May," Abizaid told a Congressional hearing last month. "I won't make any excuses for it, Senator. I'll just say that we don't all see them. Sometimes it works at a lower level. Sometimes commanders at the lowest level get the report."⁹⁹

There is evidence that prisoners were hidden, as reported by Amnesty International¹⁰⁰. Similarly, Human Rights Watch¹⁰¹ (HRW) states that:

In June, Erof Bosisio of the ICRC complained: "We are more and more concerned about the lot of the unknown number of people captured in the context of what we would call 'the war against terror' and detained in secret places ... We have asked for information on these people and access to them. Until now we have received no response from the Americans." HRW continues;

... In June 2004, U.S. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld admitted that ... he ordered an Iraqi national held in Camp Cropper, a high security detention centre in Iraq, to be kept off the prison's rolls, and not presented to the International Committee of the Red Cross. ... [Secretary] Rumsfeld also admitted that there have been other cases in which detainees have been held secretly.

Recent reports show that abuse has been more widespread than had otherwise been understood: *An Army investigation found systematic abuse and possible torture of Iraqi prisoners at a base near Mosul just as top military officials became aware of abuse allegations at the Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad, documents released Friday showed*¹⁰².

Thanks to courageous individuals and media reports, a measure of public accountability has been established. In the USA, media reports and the publication of photos, taken by American soldiers and shown to the public in the *60 Minutes* programme on the CBS network, in April 2004, precipitated events which have led to trials of military personnel. In Britain, according to the BBC, the UK government knew of the abuses, but claimed ignorance: *Questions were asked in Parliament on why a minister told the Parliament on May 2004 that he had received no adverse reports from any outside body on the treatment of prisoners by British soldiers, when the government recognized that the ICRC had raised concerns on the issue in February*¹⁰³. There, similar to the USA, abuses

⁹⁹ Regarding prisoners under US control in Iraq: Resignation Prompts Red Cross Questions: 06-June-2004, By Firas Al-Atraqchi, SOURCE: AlJazeera.

¹⁰⁰ USA: Guantanamo – an icon of lawlessness. January 6, 2005
<http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAMR510022005>).

¹⁰¹ Human Rights Watch, The United States' "Disappeared": The CIA's Long-Term "Ghost Detainees", a Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper October 2004, section III, as reported in *Rights Groups Raise Concerns over Secret U.S.-run Prisons in Afghanistan*, Agence France Presse, June 19, 2004.

¹⁰² Probe: Prisoner Abuse at Base Near Mosul, Friday, March 25, 2005 Associated Press.

¹⁰³ UK Minister faces Iraq prisoners abuse claims. May 10 2004, ABC News on line
www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/s1105078.htm.

became public when an employee, who had received a film to develop containing photos of the abuses, was so appalled by what she saw, that she alerted the police¹⁰⁴.

In its document “The Road to Abu Ghraib”, June 2004, Human Rights Watch states: *Even after the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, Secretary Rumsfeld ... told a television interviewer the Geneva Conventions “did not apply precisely” in Iraq but were “basic rules” for handling prisoners. Visiting Abu Ghraib on May 14, Rumsfeld remarked, “Geneva doesn’t say what you do when you get up in the morning.”*

The recently published tome, *The Torture Papers*¹⁰⁵ contains ‘Memorandum 7’ (page 119), sent by the newly appointed US Attorney General, Alberto Gonzalez, which states that: *In my judgement, this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners.*

‘Renditions’ are another practice, in the face of which no humanitarian organisation has been effective. Through this practice, the US sends prisoners to other countries for interrogation, where they may be tortured¹⁰⁶.

Such actions by the US, are potentially more significant than if they were carried out by, for example, Bolivia or Burundi. According to Human Rights Watch:

The U.S. government’s use of torture at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq poses a different kind of challenge: not because the scale of the abuse is as widespread as those committed in Darfur [Western Sudan], but because the abuser is so powerful ... when a government as dominant and influential as the United States openly defies that law and seeks to justify its defiance, it also undermines the law itself and invites others to do the same¹⁰⁷. And according to Amnesty International: All too often where the US leads, others follow ... governments have disregarded human rights obligations; ... by using the phrase ‘war on terror’, they have challenged the very framework of human rights and international humanitarian law¹⁰⁸.

We have now arrived to the situation in which a court of appeal in the UK has ruled that ‘evidence’ obtained under torture is admissible in that country¹⁰⁹. The following is truly stunning:

¹⁰⁴ See “The Army on Trial”, Observer, January 23rd, 2005,

<http://observer.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,5110074-110863,00.html>.

¹⁰⁵ Cambridge University Press, 2005, compiled by Karen Greenberg and Joshua Dratel.

¹⁰⁶ See The New York Times March 11, 2005, “Pentagon seeks to transfer more detainees from Base in Cuba”, by Douglas Jehl.

¹⁰⁷ Darfur and Abu Ghraib: Kenneth Roth, January 2005

<http://www.hrw.org/wr2k5/darfurandabughraib/1.htm>.

¹⁰⁸ *United States of America: The threat of a bad Example, August 2003*

<http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engamr511182003>.

¹⁰⁹ *The use of torture to obtain evidence against suspected terrorists was endorsed yesterday by the [British] Court of Appeal ... Two of the country’s senior judges granted the Home Secretary the right to hold terror suspects on the basis of intelligence from tortured prisoners at Guantanamo Bay and other US detention camps.* Robert Verkaik, Legal Affairs Correspondent, 22.08.2004 Indymedia UK

The only reaction, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Falconer, could manage to [the judges] extraordinary decision was ... that he had the 'awful feeling' that learning to live with torture 'is probably the right conclusion'¹¹⁰.

According to Olivia Ward:

... a Toronto Star journalist who has researched and written about the ICRC and abuses at Abu Ghraib ... "As far as I can tell from my research and reading, the ICRC's secrecy about the abuses inside Abu Graib has not helped the prisoners in any way. To me, the biggest dilemma they faced was seeing that the abuse was in fact getting worse, while their recommendations to the U.S. were completely ignored."¹¹¹

Finally, the ICRC's March 29th, 2005 operational update¹¹², after so many years of abuse, makes for disturbingly grim reading:

According to public statements by official US sources, a number of detainees are ... being held incommunicado at undisclosed locations ... The ICRC has been visiting detainees in Bagram and Kandahar, Guantanamo Bay, and in Charleston. The ICRC has also repeatedly appealed to the American authorities for access to people detained in undisclosed locations ... The ICRC believes that the US continues to detain two juveniles i.e. detainees under 18 years of age at Guantanamo Bay ... For the ICRC, the question of the legal status of the persons detained by the US at Bagram, Guantanamo Bay or at so-called undisclosed locations, as well as the legal framework applicable to them remains unresolved

... The ICRC has had regular access to the persons detained at Bagram, but not immediately after their arrest. Initially detainees were only held for limited periods of time before being transferred to Guantanamo Bay or released. However, since mid-2003 many persons have been detained for longer periods at Bagram, in some cases for more than a year. Therefore, the ICRC is increasingly concerned by the fact that the US authorities have not resolved the questions of their legal status and of the applicable legal framework ... The ICRC's observations regarding certain aspects of the conditions of detention and treatment of detainees in Bagram and Guantanamo have not yet been adequately addressed ... Beyond Bagram, Kandahar and Guantanamo Bay, the ICRC is increasingly concerned about the fate of an unknown number of people captured as part of the so-called global war on terror and held in undisclosed locations ...

<http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2004/08/296665.html>. Additional AI report at <http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGEUR450192004>.

¹¹⁰ There is no case for torture, ever: Nick Cohen, Sunday October 24, 2004, The Observer.

¹¹¹ Red Cross defends confidentiality mandate, By Firas Al-Atraqchi, Sunday 06 June 2004, 1:32 Makka Time, 22:32 GMT.

¹¹² 29-03-2005 ICRC Operational update: US detention related to the events of 11 September 2001 and its aftermath - the role of the ICRC: The article explains the purpose of the ICRC visits and its procedures, and outlines its concerns, including the fate of people held at undisclosed locations.

In conclusion, the best efforts of international organisations, over years, have proved ineffective. In these especially important cases, the ICRC has failed to fulfil its objectives to *protect prisoners and detainees in wartime ... [and] to ensure humane treatment*. This includes protection of those disappeared in *undisclosed locations*: Among them, children.

3.6. Effectiveness of Finland as a Donor

According to interviews with main partners, Finland is regarded as a ‘good’ donor by its main partners. Finland is seen to be flexible, predictable and relatively undemanding and non-interfering. For some, especially Finnish NGOs, the funding process is insufficiently clear, however. They are unclear on what criteria and how decisions on funding are made.

A measure of donor effectiveness is the ‘Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative’, or GHDI. This initiative aims to improve donor performance, transparency and adherence to humanitarian standards and principles. According to the following GHDI principles and good practices, Finland is a comparatively ‘good’ donor. The following list paraphrases succinctly GHDI principles, along with a short commentary on how Finland rates regarding each:

3.6.1. Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship¹¹³

1. Save lives and prevent suffering

As noted in this chapter, Finland’s HA is effective in saving lives and reducing suffering.

2. Autonomy from political action

No evidence is available that Finland has linked its HA to specific political actions. Given the strong funding of multi-lateral and RCRC organisations, partners are, arguably, more independent of Western political agendas than, for instance, HA agencies in other western countries. Considerations *other than need do come into play*, however, in the allocation of funding (c.f. principle no. 6, below).

3. Fund protection of civilians

Finland funds protection activities generously, through both the UNHCR and the RCRC movement. As noted in this report, protection has, however, been ineffective in especially important cases.

4. Respect international humanitarian law (IHL)

In addition to the above points, Finland shows respect for IHL in its international affairs.

¹¹³ These are paraphrased from the original, for the sake of clarity. For the complete text, see International Meeting on Good Humanitarian Donorship - Stockholm, 16-17 June 2003 www.odi.org.uk.

5. Show flexibility and timeliness of funding

Generally speaking, Finland is regarded as a highly flexible, timely and predictable donor by its partners.

6. Allocate funds on the basis of needs and needs assessments

As noted in the quantitative analysis, while need is a major criterion, Finland does not allocate uniquely on the basis of need, nor needs assessments (c.f. Iraq, Afghanistan and the amounts made available for the tsunami response).

7. Promote beneficiary involvement

This is left to partners. Beneficiary involvement is a principle espoused by all partners.

8. Strengthen local capacity

Finland's HA funding approaches do not emphasise local capacity building. Partners conduct capacity building on a case-by-case basis, including, for instance, within the RCRC Movement. UNWRA, another important partner, hires predominantly locals in its sizeable staff, which is a significant capacity-building approach in itself¹¹⁴. Many Finnish NGO projects contain capacity-building components.

9. Link HA and long term development

Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development is not a notable strength of Finland's approach to HA funding. It does not actively, nor *systematically* seek to link longer-term development and humanitarian programs. This is left to partners on a case-by-case basis, by applying the flexibility afforded under core and loosely ear-marked funding.

The MFA HATR consultations may, however, facilitate linkages on a case-by-case basis. Though Finland tends not to fund longer-term, or multi-year activities under its HA budget, the fact that repeated, annual funding is predictable for the main partners, provides an element of longer-term commitment to these agencies and their work.

9. Support the central role of the UN

Finland supports UN HA organisations and activities generously. Most of its funding goes to UN organisations.

¹¹⁴ According to UNRWA, the agency: *employs 24,324 staff, of whom more than 99 per cent are locally-recruited Palestinians, almost all of them Palestine refugees. The United Nations covers the costs of 98 international staff posts, and the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) second senior staff to the Agency. The Agency is by far the largest United Nations operation in the Middle East, besides being one of the biggest employers in the region. UNRWA services are labour intensive and the majority of staff are directly involved in providing services to refugees, for example, as doctors, teachers, social workers or sanitation labourers. Staff costs account for two-thirds of the Agency's regular budget.*
Source: <http://www.un.org/unrwa/organization/staff.html>

10. Remember forgotten crises

Finland contributes significantly to 'forgotten crises'.

11. Show predictability and flexibility in funding

See principle no. 5

12. Less earmarking

Finland's ear-marking is loose, compared to that of many donors. Core funding, while less than ear-marked funds, is generous, compared to most donors.

13. Support inter-agency appeals

Finland funds the appeals generously, including through the consolidated and emergency appeals process.

14. Promote good practice by partners

Finland's partners are among the main HA international organisations. As noted elsewhere in this chapter, they can be very effective. They have developed many good practices and techniques. Core funding has supported such developments.

15. Promote the RCRC Code of Conduct, IASC guidelines and guiding principles on internal displacement

Finland has clearly stated its adherence to basic HA principles, such as the Code of Conduct. The MFA encourages and expects partners to adhere to these principles. In practice, this is left to partners in their operations, including application of the 'Francis Deng' guiding principles on internal displacement¹¹⁵.

16. Support for humanitarian access

Finland does not get involved actively in specific operations nor in the day-to-day details of HA provision in the field. Respect for basic principles forms part, however of Finland's funding approach and policy.

17. Support contingency planning

Finland supports contingency planning indirectly through provision of core and loosely ear-marked funding to partners who, in turn, conduct such planning (e.g. UN organisations, the RC and Finnish NGOs).

¹¹⁵ These UN principles, colloquially referred to under the name of the main author, set out guidance for addressing the protection of and assistance to IDPs, in a chronological sequence from pre, to during, to post displacement phases.

18. Affirm primacy of civilian humanitarian response

With the exception of MFA funding for Ministry of Defence activities in Afghanistan and MFA support for international Civil Defence operations (FinnRescue, part of the Ministry of the Interior), as a rule, Finland does not apply military or Civil defence assets in MFA funded HA operations. Whether this continues to be the case, however, remains to be seen¹¹⁶.

19. Support guidelines on the uses of military and civil defence assets

Finland abides by the guidelines generated on this issue, by, for instance, the UN.

20. Encourage learning and accountability

Independent evaluation is an important tool for Finnish HA (see below). Systematic learning activities are not pursued, however.

21. Encourage regular evaluations

Finland does not have a policy to evaluate systematically all, or most of its HA funded activities. Monitoring is not systematic, either. It does, however, evaluate its overall funding on a regular basis (e.g. twice in the last eight years).

22. Adhere to accuracy, timeliness, and transparency in donor reporting

Finland reports its disasters contributions to OCHA, regularly and transparently.

3.7. Room for MFA improvement

As is evident from both the field case study and reports, such as the 2004 ODA Policy White Paper and the report on administrative capacities¹¹⁷, MFA monitoring of HA activities should be improved. This, in turn, requires a strengthening of the MFA, both in Helsinki and, importantly, in the embassies. This includes:

- Increased field visits, mentoring in the field, and training
- Guidance materials and practical checklists (for assessment and monitoring, including, but not limited to emergency standards and indicators, such as SPHERE)
- Increased staff numbers in the field

¹¹⁶ Interest was expressed in some quarters, during the evaluation, for greater involvement of such actors.

¹¹⁷ Study of the Administrative and Resource Development Needs of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland to Ensure Efficient and Effective Implementation of the White Paper on Development Policy of the Government of Finland, Final Report Submitted by Saana Consulting Oy. (Ltd) Helsinki, 30 September 2004.

- Funds for short-term contracting of local experts

Communication between the NGOs and the MFA appears to be regular and professional. Major disagreements have not been evident¹¹⁸. Some aspects need clarification, however. There is a call from FCA, Fida and SCF for improved reporting guidelines and more communication on MFA decision-making. The objective criteria under-pinning the special relationship¹¹⁹ between the FRC and the MFA are unknown to other Finnish partners. In addition to greater clarity on funding criteria, the organisational location of the HAU within the MFA has been raised as an issue. In the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Humanitarian Aid Unit is located within the Department of Global Affairs and not the Department of Development Policy. The implications of this for MFA aid funding and coordination, if any exist, are not clear for all NGOs. Clarifications would not go astray.

Finally, Finnish NGOs, would welcome HA framework agreements and/or core funding to be instituted.

¹¹⁸ A common saying in interviews with NGOs was “when I do not understand something or have a question, I call Leo (Olasvirta, formerly an MFA official in the HAU).”

¹¹⁹ The flexibility, frequency, and informality of contacts between the MFA and the FRC have been noted, in this respect, as have the speed and level of trust associated with MFA funding for the FRC.

4. EFFICIENCY

4.1. Definitions

Efficiency is a measure of the cost and speed of the HA funding process. Aspects relating to the efficiency of Finland's funding are examined in this chapter. Given the strategy to fund organisations more than specific projects, emphasis is placed on the MFA funding process, and the overall 'HA system'.

4.2. MFA Administrative Costs

The MFA HA Unit has a relatively light funding bureaucracy, compared to most other donors (including the UK, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland). The evaluators estimate the running costs of the unit at between €400,000 and €500,000 per annum. Small staff numbers (6), who restrict travel to more important meetings (though the previous Head of the Unit travelled considerably more than other staff), and who work on a relatively small number of partners and projects, results in a relatively cost-efficient unit.

4.3. The Funding Process

Overall, the funding process is efficient. The choice to fund few individual projects, and concentrate on core and loosely ear-marked funding is both practical and efficient. The process is 'two-track'; one for acute-emergency response (principally, for natural disasters) and one for non-acute emergency funding (see foreword for explanations of these terms). Disaster funds (some 10% of the total¹²⁰) are allocated largely in function of RC emergency appeals, in an uncomplicated manner¹²¹. Non-acute emergency funding is allocated principally through two-rounds per annum, one in the first quarter¹²² and another in the third quarter of the year.

While disaster funding can be provided rapidly (the 2004 Asia tsunami is a case in point), the latter process is considerably more complex, less rapid and less efficient. That process prioritises consultation (within the MFA and with the individual partners) over speed. It is, therefore, not particularly agile. It involves the preparation and presentation of proposals, and the coordination of a relatively heavy consultation process. Consequently,

¹²⁰ Interview with the former head of the HAU.

¹²¹ Reportedly, at times on the basis of a telephone call, followed up with subsequent exchanges of documents.

¹²² Through the HATR consultations process, accounting for some 70% of funding (Interview with the former head of the HAU).

it is less efficient than the disaster funding process. (That process emerged partly as a result of recommendations made in the 1996 evaluation of Finland's official HA.)

4.4. Partner Systems and Reporting

The FRC response is generally rapid, especially in disaster response, through the wide RCRC movement, including, deployment of Emergency Response Units (ERU) and Field Assessment and Coordination Teams (FACT - reportedly, these can be mobilised in less than 24 hours). The FRC is the only Finnish NGO partner with the capacity to call upon large, rapidly available humanitarian stocks (stored at Tampere).

Partners are ever-more efficient at soliciting and channelling funds. The capacities to prepare proposals and appeals and report on them, has improved over the past decade¹²³. FRC reporting from the field is, for example, regular and efficient. Reporting from the field to FCA is efficient and constant. Fida's reporting is impressive, although not as frequent as that of the FRC or FCA. SCF's reporting is also regular.

All partners apply quantitative methods in recording and reporting Finnish aid, including aspects of efficiency. It was difficult, however, to get precise times for how fast partner funds reach affected populations. For FCA, for example, funds take more time to reach the field than for the FRC ERU and FACT. The time-lag depends considerably on MFA decision-making, however, which varies on a case-by-case basis. Multi-lateral and RC movement reporting is regular and generally timely. These organisations have established large fund-raising, reporting and donor-relations departments. Specific mechanisms have been established, including, in some cases, secure website access for major donors.

4.5. Examples of System-wide Efficiencies

The following are examples of system-wide efficiencies:

4.5.1. Efficient Food Transport in Ethiopia

The WFP 'FATS' (trucking fleet) operation in Ethiopia, established in 1999/2000, has been an efficient mechanism for transporting tens of thousands of MT of food (from Djibouti port into Ethiopia). Through restrictive, though relatively generous contract conditions, trucks were continually available for a 'just-in-time' reception of food at the port, for immediate shipment to Ethiopia. This system achieved at least three things.

Firstly it avoided the need to store large amounts of food at the port. (This is a regular and costly under-taking in food operations. It requires large storage facilities and double-handling - once from the ship to storage and again from storage to trucks for onward

¹²³ Based on review of documents and systems, and interviews.

shipping). Secondly, it reduced the unloading time from ship to truck and from port to the delivery point (in Ethiopia). Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, ships were unloaded, in record times. Not only was total through-put accelerated dramatically, but also waiting costs were reduced. The immediate mechanical bagging of the bulk-grain at the ship-side, using mobile bagging machines, contributed to this speedy ship turnaround. Once bagged, the grain was mechanically lifted on conveyor belts to the trucks for immediate dispatch. The overall result was a notably efficient operation.

4.5.2. Improved Efficiency in Procurement and Logistics

Many international HA organisations, including Finnish partners, have made materials procurement more efficient. Medical supplies are a good example. Purchases made from centralised, specialised medical materials suppliers include generic drugs. Prices are competitive and quality-control is assured.

UNICEF stocks are, for example, made available through its Copenhagen central store. While inefficiencies were detected subsequent to recent emergencies¹²⁴, the mechanism is widely recognised as a necessary capacity in UNICEF supply-chain management, as was evident in its response to the recent Asia tsunami.

UNHCR can call upon similarly centralised stores in Copenhagen and in regional centres (e.g. in the Middle East). As with UNICEF, inefficiencies have been detected. None-the-less, the emergency supplies network is a necessary capacity for any such global humanitarian organisation. UNHCR has also developed specially designed and reinforced, UV ray resistant plastic tarpaulins. These are now widely used by HA agencies. They can be packed compactly, and shipped easily and relatively inexpensively to shelter thousands of beneficiaries in a speedy and efficient manner.

The 1996 evaluation of Finnish HA recommended that the MFA establish its own emergency standby supplies arrangement. This was not done. Rather, the FRC draws on its own supplies from the Kalkku warehouse in Tampere (such as tents, blankets and field hospitals), as required. This is a pragmatic approach, welcomed by this evaluation. It would have been inefficient to have established separate MFA/Governmental facilities.

4.5.3. Faster International HA

International HA emergency response times have improved over the last decade. Indicators include:

- The prevalence of dedicated emergency units (within UN agencies, NGOs and GO's)
- The availability of specifically designed standby arrangements for staff, materials, and funds
- The quality and quantity of emergency training

¹²⁴ E.g. during the 1999 Kosovo emergency response.

Most specialised emergency response agencies aim to have teams ready for deployment within seventy-two hours, and in some cases, within 24 hours. The RCRC movement, especially its national societies in affected countries, regularly respond in less than 24 hours. This preparedness capacity, at a national and local level, has on many an occasion far outstripped that of international organisations.

4.5.4. DEC INGO Fundraising System in UK

Joint-appeals have been conducted in Finland in the past (e.g. between UNICEF and SCF) and now FRC, FCA and UNICEF, following the Asia tsunami. This approach should be supported.

The Disaster and Emergency Committee (DEC) is a mechanism established by UK based INGOs. It is an interesting example of formalised, joint fund-raising. It coordinates emergency appeals and shares out the resulting funds among the more than half-a-dozen participating HA INGOs. It also coordinates and manages reporting, monitoring and evaluations of the joint-appeals. It helps reduce overlap, competition among INGOs and repeated evaluations of similar operations. Though the FRC argues that it is 'not cheap' (due to costs of advertising, for example), it improves transparency, in that a common appeals strategy is followed and overall appeal accounts are published. This contrasts with other countries where a multitude of competing appeals are launched, and no overall, consolidated accounts are published.

4.5.5. Cost-efficient, Civilian Air-transport

An interesting example of the efficiency of civilian operations over military can be seen in the case of HA logistics and transport. During the mid-1990's, LWF managed to rent a Hercules C130 cargo plane for operations out of Southern Africa, for the Great Lakes region, at a fraction of what it costs for similar military cargo flights¹²⁵. The military cost was a multiple of four over the LWF price. LWF is the main partner for FCA. Many such examples exist.

4.5.6. Efficient Long-term Investment in Ethiopia

Finally, the cost-efficiency of the Finland funded warehouses at the Hartisheik refugee camps, in Eastern Ethiopia (see under effectiveness), is impressive. The norm is, and was then, to import tented warehouses (e.g. Norwegian produced 'Rubb-Halls') for such operations. The decision to fund a compound of permanent, 'hard-structure' ware-houses was wise, indeed. The initial investment in the early 1990's is still producing returns almost a decade-and-a-half later. Though the camps have now closed (in 2004), the warehouses are still potentially operational and will be turned to other uses by the authorities.

¹²⁵ Joint donor evaluation of the Rwanda crisis, 1996.

4.6. Examples of Inefficiency

The following are examples of inefficiencies:

4.6.1. Security Costs Soaring

The costs of staff security have soared for HA organisations (including Finnish funded partners) in the last 10 to 15 years. Some 15 years ago, costs were negligible. Now, training, security experts, armoured vehicles, sophisticated radio networks, anti-ballistic vehicle blankets, physical infra-structure reinforcements and deterrents, manuals and guidelines development, specialised consultancies, large security guard contingents, risk assessments, security planning and special insurance premiums have inflated the costs of HA operations dramatically. In some operations, entire, heavily-armed units have been contracted locally. The evaluation is unable to estimate global staff security costs. It is convinced, however, that such additional costs run to tens of millions of USD per year¹²⁶.

4.6.2. Networks are Cumbersome, but give Greater Coverage and Capacity

Most Finnish partners work in regular, direct partnership with other HA organisations. In Ethiopia, all Finnish funded agencies were found to contract others to conduct some or, in most cases, all of the funded activities. An efficiency gain is potentially provided in that such 'networking' provides much greater potential coverage (geographic, resources and expertise) for individual HA organisations. On the other hand, it creates 'layers' of contractors and sub-contractors. Partners insist that working through networks is more efficient for the MFA than working with individual implementing agencies.

4.6.3. INGOs are no Longer Particularly Agile nor Flexible

An oft quoted 'value-added' of NGOs is that they are flexible, agile, fast and operate in close contact with the people they are assisting (the 'grass-roots'). This can no longer be taken for granted. The evaluation team found evidence of centralisation and cumbersome management practices (including inadequate coordination with close partners) among Finnish INGOs. In the past, such aspects were more commonly associated with UN bureaucracies.

For instance, field staff on more than one occasion referred an evaluator to central offices when basic information and reports regarding their own field work were requested. Many programming decisions are reserved for central offices, as was evident when an evaluator enquired about the origins of programme activities, copies of assessments and background on how strategic choices had been made.

During the coordination of field visits, it became clear on more than one occasion, that partner left-hands did not know what their right hand was doing. This was encountered in

¹²⁶ For further information, see the recent ECHO Security Review, ECHO 2004.

UN, RCRC and NGO organisations, alike. Layers of relationships, and organisational structures had to be navigated in order to organise quite straight-forward field visits.

4.6.4. Serious Corruption within International Agencies

HA organisation general project management and financial control appear to have improved over the last decade. Reporting, audit and evaluation are more common and systematic. Published accounts are also more common, and presented in accordance with international standards.

None-the-less, cases of serious corruption within international HA operations have occurred during the last ten years. The ‘Oil-for-Food’ scandal¹²⁷ has been widely publicised, with its accusations of ‘kick-backs’, bribes, and preferential deals. The evaluation is aware of important corruption cases involving Finnish funded partners¹²⁸. Most of these cases have not been well publicised. Details are rarely publicly available. Suffice it to say that the evaluation estimates financial losses to run into millions of USD. Such estimates are, however, well nigh impossible to prove.

Financial cost is one thing. Human cost is another. When it comes to corruption in the sale, or diversion of services, the resulting human suffering is incalculable. This is so for both those who must purchase or provide ‘favours’ for services, and those who cannot access them, despite legitimate entitlement (i.e. the ‘opportunity cost’ of corruption).

Despite the above, no evidence of corruption specifically regarding ear-marked Finnish funds was received by the evaluation. The issue merits mention, however, in that donors have a responsibility to make key, regular partners accountable for funds received, results achieved and principles respected.

4.6.5. Commercial Fundraising is Costly

Many INGOs and UN organisations (including Finnish funded partners) have turned to professional fund-raising systems, over the last decade. While this may have been effective in attracting additional funds, the proportion of funds raised which actually go to operations has, consequently, decreased¹²⁹.

Many UN agencies and INGOs are reluctant to share exact details on commissions and administrative costs of fund-raising. Reportedly, these can run to above 20%. While the evaluation has not found evidence of such commissions among Finnish NGO’s, the trend is of obvious importance to all tax-payers and donors.

¹²⁷ See the report by Paul Volker, former chairman of the US federal reserve, to the UN Secretary General (2005).

¹²⁸ Cases involve procurement fraud, and sale of access to HA services, involving UN agencies. Investigations have taken place within the agencies concerned. Details and evidence are known to the agencies concerned.

¹²⁹ The difference goes to pay for the fund-raising ‘machinery’ – staff, publications, advertising space and time, materials, equipment and office space, etc.

4.6.6. Search-and-Rescue: Rarely Efficient

The window of opportunity for saving lives through search-and-rescue is narrow indeed. Normally, it lasts a mere 3 or 4 days after a sudden onset, natural disaster such as an earthquake or tsunami. In the case of the Asia Tsunami, FinnRescue was criticised in the Finnish media for what was perceived to have been a slow deployment. The cost of placing fully autonomous units on-site, ready to be operational in a matter of hours, is, however, exorbitant.

The high cost of search and rescue operations has been well documented in literature on disaster response¹³⁰. This conclusion has been borne out during this evaluation. On occasion, and by their own admission, the expensive mechanism has been deployed even when a clear need did not exist¹³¹. The MFA should re-assess the extent to which the FinnRescue system represents an efficient use of MFA funds. The government should seriously consider covering the entire FinnRescue budget through the Ministry of the Interior and not the MFA.

4.6.7. Donor Competition Leads to Inefficiencies

The ‘Beauty Contest’¹³², which resulted from donors attempting to out do each other in the aftermath of the 2004 Asia tsunami was not only unseemly, but also inefficient.

The GHDI commits donors to funding on the basis of needs assessments. Patently this was not always so in this case. MSF-France famously stopped soliciting donations mere weeks after it launched its appeal, arguing that it would have difficulty in absorbing more funds for this operation and that other crises are under-funded (e.g. DRC and Darfur).

It is reasonable to assume that funding decisions which have been based, at least in part, on media pressure and/or political priorities may not be used efficiently. In the past, funds donated for crisis response, in the absence of objectively verified needs, have ended up being wasted. While these do not involve individual Finnish funded projects, they do involve Finnish funded partners. (Cases include, for example, aspects of the post Hurricane-Mitch, Central America, response. Housing and infra-structure reconstruction is a case in point¹³³).

4.6.8. HA is Costly; Prevention through Human Development is the Priority

The need for HA is unquestionable. Crisis responses are necessary. They are also costly, however. For example, the costs of sending an entire field hospital from the FRC Kalkku

¹³⁰ Examples can be found in PAHO/OPS library, ‘La Red’ disaster prevention network, and RC annual Disasters Reports.

¹³¹ A team was deployed to a natural disaster site in early 2004, at a cost of some 100,000 USD, using MFA funds, even though they ‘knew we would not find people (alive in the rubble) but (they) needed training and motivation and experience. You need to use your people and equipment’.

¹³² Term used by a Senior EU official to describe the unseemly competition for funding visibility and publicity.

¹³³ See the Provention/World Bank ‘Recovery’ study, 2003.

standby store is about €1 million, out of which the freight costs can be €200,000¹³⁴. (The total cost for the hospital components dispatched to Sri Lanka during the recent Asia tsunami response came to €300,000).

In many of the poorest regions of the world, which are prone to crisis, €M could build and equip a permanent facility. In some cases, it would build and equip several permanent facilities. Naturally, they cannot be built in a matter of days, which is the understandable rationale for dispatching expensive field hospitals. None-the-less, every penny spent on HA is one less for prevention. The popular wisdom that ‘a stitch in time, saves nine’ still holds. Human development, which would eliminate most crises before they occur, is a more cost-effective and efficient mechanism to address potential crises than HA (see also, chapter on impact and sustainability).

¹³⁴ This is an estimate based on recent deployments. Naturally, the destination and context will influence costs.

5. THE LONGER-TERM; IMPACT & SUSTAINABILITY

Humanitarian aid is a band aid: development aid is a vaccine.

Editorial, *International Herald Tribune*, 6th January, 2005

5.1. Definitions

‘Impact’ is defined as the longer-term changes in the environment produced by aid, whether intended or unintended. Such changes may be, for instance socio-economic, political, cultural, or environmental. ‘Sustainability’ refers to the duration of the effects and impact of the aid. Such definitions have evolved from development aid. They are somewhat inadequate when it comes to measuring HA objectives and results. Is a life saved an immediate effect, or a longer-term impact? In such cases, effect, impact and sustainability become blurred.

The overall conclusions of this chapter are, therefore, twofold. Firstly, HA in general, and Finnish funded HA in particular, aspire to short-term goals. Finland has chosen to concentrate HA on organisations or programmes of an emergency, or quasi-emergency nature. Measurement of the longer-term impact of Finnish HA is less meaningful than the measurement of its effectiveness (achievement of objectives). Secondly, the examples of effectiveness shown earlier in this report, are also, in many cases, measures of impact and sustainability (e.g. averting famine in Ethiopia). In that sense, and with those caveats, the impact of Finland’s HA can be said to be positive.

5.2. Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD)

LRRD is a key issue regarding longer-term impact (as was amply illustrated in the 1996 evaluation of Finnish HA). The 1997 HA policy paper emphasised the importance of strengthening the continuum of humanitarian aid and development cooperation. It states that HA and development should not be seen as opposite or competing.

LRRD is left to partners on a case-by-case basis, by applying the flexibility afforded them under core and loosely ear-marked funding. The MFA HATR may also facilitate linkages on a case-by-case basis, through its consultations with actors not directly involved in HA funding.

WFP, UNICEF and now UNHCR all profile themselves as both development and HA agencies. At the instigation of the latest High Commissioner, UNHCR has moved decidedly towards what it terms the *Four R’s* - Return, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Reintegration. This move to a more development oriented approach is put forward as a corner stone to ‘durable solutions’ for refugee situations, especially ‘voluntary repatriation’. Finland does not fund such approaches, which UNHCR regrets.

With the exception of the FRC, Finnish INGOs dedicate most of their resources to development aid activities. They frequently focus on and are adept at implementing 'intermediate' HA programmes, as opposed to acute-emergency activities. (These are conducted through, for instance, small-scale, integrated rural, or village development programmes, in crisis or post-crisis areas: this is their strength, more so than the provision of relief in isolation.)

In Ethiopia, the evaluation team visited a number of such initiatives, being implemented on behalf of Finnish funded INGOs (such as FCA/LWF and SCUK) and WFP. Relief (food, in this case) was provided through community mechanisms, within a small-scale, rural development framework (e.g. linking relief with seeds and tools, water harvesting, and animal husbandry activities).

The RCRC movement has also made a move towards 'livelihoods' support, as part of its programming. They seek to address not only immediate humanitarian needs, but also broader 'household security', including security of sources of water and food. Such approaches are being taken by the movement in Eastern Ethiopia, for instance.

5.3. Small, Isolated HA Projects are Rarely Sustainable

Development is a highly complex process. It requires state support and coordination, continuously over decades. Small, isolated projects by HA organisations cannot be expected to have lasting development impact for significant areas or communities. Key variables, such as infrastructural investment, access to large-scale credit schemes, enhanced access by the poor to services, including education, and macro-economic aspects such as fiscal policy, are all outside the control of NGOs and other international organisations.

So too are other phenomena. In Ethiopia, climate change may be playing its part. A Finnish funded agency, which prided itself in its success at river diversions for irrigation and personal water consumption, showed an evaluator one such project. The works looked impressive. Locals spoke in appreciation of the expensive infrastructure: except, of course, for the fact that the river diversion had been bone-dry for some months and now failed to provide water as planned. No one could explain why. Locals pointed out that the river had never run dry in this manner before. Possible causes include climate change, or the effects of water schemes outside the project area.

Individual states may or may not be able to do much about climate change in the short-term. Other than advocacy, NGOs have even less opportunities to influence such phenomena. These are fundamentally political issues, requiring international action by states, working through global cooperation.

5.4. Negative Impacts of HA

By its very nature as a short-term, rapid injection of life-saving services and materials, HA runs the risk of being a distorting, even damaging influence¹³⁵. Food aid is alleged to upset, or flood local markets. Environmental damage is often caused by new settlements for displaced people (e.g. deforestation for firewood and shelter materials, when imported materials do not adequately meet these needs). The provision of external services, including the introduction of foreign medical practices and supplies, is blamed for damaging local coping mechanisms. HA organisations are repeatedly accused of 'poaching' promising, qualified staff from state institutions.

Anecdotal evidence of such impacts was noted in Ethiopia. Good practices are being developed to mitigate such negative impact (such as linking HA operations with environmental programmes, including soil conservation and reforestation¹³⁶). None-the-less, observers ought to recognise that emergency action cannot readily meet both immediate goals (saving lives and reducing suffering) and longer-term needs. Just as emergency, life-saving surgery often leaves permanent scars, so too HA will often leave behind longer-term, negative impacts.

5.5. The Dilemma: Short-term Need or Longer-term Impact

Finnish humanitarian aid targets saving human lives, relieving human distress and helping those most in need. This objective can be valid for any kind of aid, however. Finland relies on most partners to make strategic choices on how HA aid will be applied. For the FRC, HA includes rehabilitation and de-mining. For FCA, HA includes rehabilitation, reconstruction and de-mining. For Fida, HA includes rehabilitation. For SCF HA can include school-feeding.

In Ethiopia, SCUK, for example, are faced with a dilemma. Should they remain in areas where they have provided emergency aid, and attempt to link that relief with longer-term development, or move to areas (e.g. deeper into the Ogaden Desert) where emergency conditions, drought and food insecurity are reported to be more acute? Apart from the security risks for staff in the Ogaden, the choice raises the question of agency profile, strategy and policy. If they concentrate on areas where LRRD might more easily take place, they may be ignoring areas of greater humanitarian need. On the other-hand, if they continually decide to go to wherever need is most apparent, they will greatly reduce the possibility of having any longer-term impact.

This question sums up the dilemmas facing HA agencies in trying to manage artificially differentiated types of aid. Ideally, funding would be entirely flexible, so that partners could apply a variety of approaches, funded from any one or any number of aid budgets

¹³⁵ See works by widely recognised academic and commentator, Alex De Waal, such as *Bad Aid*.

¹³⁶ As witnessed by the evaluators at a WFP project in Eastern Ethiopia.

(HA, development or NGO, for example), wherever and whenever these might be feasible and appropriate.

How the MFA determines what results are expected from an HA activity and what are not, is unclear. NGOs deduce such definitions post-factum, based on what the MFA HAU decides to fund under the HA budget and what it does not. This is less an issue for the FRC than it is for other NGO partners given the close relationship the former shares with the MFA, compared to the three other NGOs. Clearer criteria are, however, required. There has not been much discussion on this issue to date. A joint partner-MFA discussion forum could examine definitions, expectations and priorities, including how the MFA view may differ from those of the NGOs.

5.6. Need for Separate Criteria: Emergency and Transition

As stated in the 1996 evaluation, and as noted above, different types of aid should be applied flexibly, as situations evolve. The ideal is that no boundaries exist between relief, rehabilitation and development activities. The best place for administering such flexible, integrated funding is at the level of affected countries i.e. through the Finnish embassies in affected countries or regions.

Pragmatism suggests, however, that this ideal of totally flexible aid (HA, development and NGO), applied locally, according to rapidly evolving, local conditions and needs, is unrealistic for the coming years. Legal changes, involving parliament, would be necessary, in combination with structural and administrative adaptations.

Section four of the 1997 policy on HA, differentiates emergency aid from transition and recovery initiatives. It states that 're-building and multi-year project support' are not anymore part of Finnish HA. Most western donors have encountered this same issue. Some are considering, or have created a separate 'Transition Fund'¹³⁷.

The MFA should develop separate criteria for emergency and transitional activities. In addition to rehabilitation, and reconstruction, a 'Transition and Preparedness' category could cover transition/recovery, preparedness, prevention, and mines-action activities. The MFA could also provide follow-on funding for emergency programmes under such a category. It could be used to support programmes such as the Safety Net, currently being launched in Ethiopia. The Safety Net is an (controversial) attempt to move from chronic food insecurity, and related dependence on food aid, to an ambitious multi-annual food-security programme¹³⁸.

¹³⁷ E.g. Sweden and Ireland. USAID has the Office for Transitional Initiatives (OTI), though this is more oriented to communication and political development projects.

¹³⁸ The Safety Net is a part of the Ethiopian Government's policy to make some 5.1 million chronically food-insecure people food-secure, over a 3 year period. It will start in January 2005 and is supported by the World Bank, USAID, SCUS, SCUK and Ireland, among others. It is considered by some donors as an 'Anglophone initiative'. Nordic countries are not participating, seemingly due to concerns regarding human rights and the questionable resettlement programme. The Government would like to see all international

Separate criteria would facilitate better measurement of programme success, in that the wide range of possible aims (covering both short and longer-term) would be more clearly articulated. The objective of emergency HA should include words such as 'acute suffering', 'basic and extreme needs', 'immediate relief', 'in line with HA principles', etc. to differentiate it from non-acute-emergency and transition aid.

5.7. Cross-cutting Issues

The TOR request that the following 'cross-cutting' policy issues be examined in this evaluation:

- **Gender:** Have the actions provided equal access to and control over resources and services as well as participation in decision-making on different levels for both sexes. How do the interventions affect roles and position of both men and women in the target areas?
- **Environment:** Have environmental aspects in the widest sense been taken into account in design of interventions? Have there been any environmental impacts?

Coverage of these issues in Finnish funded HA is dependent on partner priorities and approaches. Most agencies have, at least on paper, explicit policies regarding these two policy issues. Some have made considerable strides. WFP, as witnessed in Ethiopian refugee camps, have a policy of distributing food to female-heads-of-household. They also monitor distributions through female monitors selected from beneficiary communities. The apparent success of this policy has confounded critics of yester-year (e.g. in the mid-nineties) who argued adamantly that this could and should not happen for a variety of cultural, historical and gender-role reasons.

Similarly, UNHCR and UNICEF have 'main-streamed' gender issues. In the case of UNHCR, a blanket People-Oriented-Planning (POP) staff and partner training and sensitization programme. This was carried out mainly in the nineteen-nineties.

In FRC programmes, women are considered a special group meriting specially designed approaches. For Fida, women are also seen as a special group. According to interviews, SCF does not have a particular focus on women and disabled people, but through their child focus, mothers and girls are, in practice, a priority.

In most agencies, positive discrimination is applied in staff recruitment and promotion. This, after some ten years, is showing marked results at the junior-to-middle-management

organisations, especially NGOs work according to the approaches and conditions set out in the Safety Net. Interestingly, the number of people who have been resettled through this programme is significant. Some have returned, while others have required general food distributions, due to food insecurity in the new settlements. HA activities, such as nutritional monitoring, are clearly required as a complement to such 'transitional' programmes.

levels. The 'glass-ceiling' at higher levels continues to exist in most agencies, however, despite notable exceptions (e.g. female senior managers in UNICEF, and UNRWA).

That said, the answer to the above question from the TOR, has to be negative. Categorically, there is no 'equal access to and control over resources and services'. The participation of female beneficiaries in programme decision-making, while positive in the food distribution cases above, is generally marginal at best. The field visit to Ethiopia, was typical of most other HA programmes world-wide. Men still speak for women and control their access, resources, services and programme managers and evaluators. Worse still, exploitation of females and children in HA programmes is not uncommon. If experienced aid workers are to be believed, the deeply disturbing cases noted elsewhere in this report regarding 'sex-for-food' are probably only the tip-of-the-iceberg.

Most of the large agencies also have policies on protection of the environment. Advances have been notable in the development of guidance materials (UNHCR guidelines regarding refugee settlements and the environment, for instance) and technologies (e.g. improved family stoves). Reforestation of crisis affected areas is now common, even during crises (such as the WFP reforestation programme in food distribution areas of Eastern Ethiopia), as opposed to the hither-to-fore, after-thoughts following large operations. Post crisis 'clean-up operations' are now also common, if not quite standard (such as those in disused refugee settlements in areas affected by the influx of Kosovar refugees in 1999).

Again, however, these approaches have had a marginal effect, at most. Agencies are all, collectively, a long way from systematically integrating an environmental approach into HA operations. Strategies and approaches have not been developed, by any agency, to protect the environment in a systematic manner, while also meeting acute humanitarian needs.

Finally, disabled people have special needs, and require specifically designed responses. This was emphasised during the evaluation¹³⁹. This point is increasingly accepted by Finnish partners, many of whom take such an approach.

¹³⁹ In the interviews with FIDIDA and Kynnys r.y.

6. RELEVANCE: 'NEED' AND REGIONS

'Relevance' measures how appropriate the aid has been within the context of a specific crisis and according to the specific needs to be addressed. It asks the question whether the aid was used for to do the 'right things', as opposed to 'doing things right' (effectiveness).

6.1. Poverty: a Priority

The TOR state:

Poverty: The ultimate goal of development co-operation is to alleviate poverty and to improve the position of the least privileged and marginalised groups of society. Although the approach in humanitarian aid is mainly for short and medium-term actions, it will be necessary to assess the justification of the aid from the poverty point of view: e.g. who were the actual beneficiaries, and how much did they benefit.

According to the 1997 policy, HA should focus on the poorest countries. This is largely the case. Currently, prioritisation is more pragmatic and ad hoc, than formal. As shown in the quantitative analysis of Finland's aid over the past decade, most aid has gone to the poorest countries in Africa. For example, in 2003, 57% of earmarked funds were destined for Africa. This is an appropriate choice, given that most acute HA need is found in African countries.

It is difficult to state, however, whether most beneficiaries have been among the poorest. All, certainly have not. Targeting of the poorest and most vulnerable is notoriously difficult. In Ethiopia, nomadic community leaders answered an evaluator in no uncertain terms that targeting of the poorest was not done and would not be done. The gist of the reply was that 'we live in a community and we distribute to all in the community, rich and poor'. Muted objections from one of those 'poorest' were perfunctorily swept aside with the wave of an authoritative hand. This example was repeated at other sites in the Somali region of Ethiopia. It was repeatedly confirmed by partner and other agency staff in interviews.

International opinion is divided on the issue of targeting. Nutritional experts have published detailed guidance, arguing strongly for better targeting:

The key alleged problems surrounding food aid – displaced international trade, depressed producer prices in recipient countries, labour supply disincentives, delivery delays, misuse by intermediaries, diversion to resale or feeding livestock or alcohol brewing, dependency, inattention to beneficiaries' micronutrient needs, etc. – all revolve ultimately around questions of targeting. If the donor community could improve the targeting of food aid, it could improve the effectiveness of food aid in accomplishing its primary humanitarian and development aim – the

maintenance of valuable human capital – and reduce many of the errors that sometimes make food aid controversial, ineffective or both¹⁴⁰.

On the other hand, in a global review of HA which draws on a variety of evaluations¹⁴¹, we find that:

Agencies share a world view centered around individuals as the basic unit of society... but this is not a world view shared by most rural communities in Southern Africa for whom a collective unit comes first ... there is overwhelming evidence from a large number of evaluations that ... communities are forced to redesign emergency programmes to fit with their culture of sharing. There are two important implications: resources are wasted by agencies determining targeting strategies that only partly work; and the effectiveness of interventions may be undermined.

In short, HA organisations are not particularly adept at targeting the poorest individuals and families. Secondly, there is a clear lack of consensus as to whether and how it should be done. Thirdly, Finland, as a donor, does at least a reasonable job at targeting poor countries with its aid, through loose, regional ear-marking.

6.2. HA not Always According to Needs

A number of exceptions to the above successful targeting of poor countries stand out. Firstly, the residual funding for South East Europe, though rapidly diminishing in the late 1990's, indicated a politically-strategic motivation, shared by Western donors. They funded those crises much more generously than in, for example, the DRC, and for much longer into the post-crisis phase¹⁴².

Secondly, Afghanistan, in 2001 and 2002, was by far the largest recipient country of Finnish HA. In 2003, HA funding for Afghanistan came to €3M and €1M for mines action (this latter funding is provided, even though the US occupying power funds and manages such activities in the country). As noted by the ALNAP 2003 Review of HA, in 2002, the Afghanistan Common Appeal (CAP) was 50% higher than all CAP appeals for Africa. Some 7.5 M beneficiaries were targeted in Afghanistan, compared to 15 M in Africa.

Afghanistan has been in chronic crisis for decades. None-the-less, the levels of aid being provided by the US and UK, for instance, combined with the virtual absence of acute emergency conditions (as measured by global acute malnutrition levels, for instance)

¹⁴⁰ Barrett 2002, Quoted in 'Targeting Food Aid in Emergencies' Emergency Nutrition Network (ENN) Special Supplement Series no.1, July 2004, by Anna Taylor, John Seaman, SCUK.

¹⁴¹ ALNAP Review of Humanitarian Action in 2003.

¹⁴² For example, UNHCR is still present in Bosnia & Herzegovina, a decade after the Dayton negotiations, despite repeated plans to close its operations there. In situations of greater post-conflict need, such as Central America, UNHCR terminated its presence soon after the conclusion of peace agreements.

makes the aid less relevant than it would be in either Darfur, Sudan, or to meet refugee feeding needs in Ethiopia (see elsewhere in this report). Finland has provided aid for both these crises, but it is not enough. Interviewees in the MFA accepted that need is not the only criterion for funding activities in Afghanistan.

Thirdly, in 2003, Iraq topped the funding list with some €4.3M (followed closely by Afghanistan). Some donors¹⁴³ have chosen not to provide significant funding for Iraq. The country has access to massive oil revenues (potentially over 2 M barrels of oil per day, at recent near record prices). Secondly, the occupying powers, according to the Geneva Conventions, have the responsibility to provide humanitarian assistance to those in need. The US alone, provides over 5 BUSD per month for its activities in Iraq. It has recently been accused of siphoning off an additional 4 BUSD from Iraqi oil sales¹⁴⁴.

Fourthly, in 2000, at over €3.2 M, Cambodia received about twice the amount of funds of the next largest recipient, Afghanistan, and three times those destined for conflict ravaged Sudan. Humanitarian needs in Cambodia do not, and did not, justify such an imbalance in funding.

Fifthly, the dramatic increase in funding to the 2004-2005 Asia tsunami response, once media coverage and pressure grew, begs the question regarding relative needs (and partner absorption capacity). In the first two weeks of 2005, almost half Finland's entire average annual HA budget had been pledged for this crisis. While additional funds were subsequently called forward for the 2005 HA budget (it has been increased to some 54M€), international organisations such as UNICEF and MSF have both noted the irony that other emergency appeals for equally acute crises, are under-funded (e.g. Darfur and DRC). A recent WFP press statement¹⁴⁵ illustrates starkly the impact of funding imbalances:

The United Nations World Food Programme said today that for the first time since WFP's major emergency operation for Darfur began, a drastic shortage of funds will force it to cut rations for more than one million people. ... WFP will have to cut by half the non-cereal part of the daily ration. This is a last resort to help stretch food supplies through the critical months of July and August. ... While the reduction will not affect the programmes for malnourished children and nursing mothers, it will impact significantly on the diet of more than one million poor and vulnerable people.

Finally, while small in scale, the significance of 'cross-border' HA to Russia cannot be ignored. The MFA states that 'this happened some years ago ... soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union and this operation does not continue any more. The circumstances behind the border were at that time exceptional and miserable.'¹⁴⁶ Harsh as conditions

¹⁴³ Such as Ireland.

¹⁴⁴ The Guardian: *Fraud and corruption: Forget the UN. The US occupation regime helped itself to \$8.8 bn of mostly Iraqi money in just 14 months.* By George Monbiot, Tuesday February 8th, 2005.

¹⁴⁵ Dated 8th of April 2005: Shortage of Funds Forces WFP to Cut Food Rations for Darfur.

¹⁴⁶ An additional comment received on a previous draft of this report states that: *Cross-border HA (which was for a very short period), has a special historical and political background due to the fact that Karelia*

there may have been, greater, objectively verifiable, unmet emergency needs exist in many parts of the world (e.g. for IDPs in Colombia).

In short, Finland meets its commitment to fund ‘forgotten crises’ only partially. Many forgotten crises remain exactly that, in the shadow of others which cannot be regarded as priorities on the basis of objective, acute need. Part of the problem is that the funding appeals of large organisations (such as the UN) are also significantly affected by the media influences. Even with its small funding, however, Finland can ensure that more money is made available to forgotten crises, and less to media and politically driven responses.

This sentiment is shared by others. As noted in the July 2004 issue of Field Exchange (by the Emergency Nutrition Network - ENN):

Two articles¹⁴⁷ in a 2003 issue of the Lancet [medical journal] question the overall level of aid given and pledged to post-conflict Iraq ... (Singh) highlights the uncritical appraisal of the 33 billion dollars allocated and pledged at the US-driven, and UN endorsed, Madrid donor conference in October 2003. He argues that many countries in Africa, South America and Asia are beset by lower levels of human development, deadlier pandemics, higher infant mortality rates and greater social instability than Iraq ...

A piece ... by staff from the World Health Organisation (WHO) broadly agrees with these points. The authors [cite the] ‘Good Humanitarian Donorship’ ... meeting [which] endorsed ... good practice amongst donors [including]... to ‘allocate humanitarian funding in proportion to needs and on the basis of needs assessments’. The WHO piece argues that donor pledges at the Madrid conference were generous but necessary. However, support for Iraq’s recovery and reconstruction should not be provided at the expense of other crises.

Finally, a report by the Feinstein International Famine Centre¹⁴⁸ concludes that:

The perception that double standards are being applied by the North to suffering in the South is reinforced by the wide disparity in funding patterns. High profile crises “suck up the cash” while forgotten and often more deadly emergencies languish.

had belonged to Finland. A number of families are divided by the common border. It is very “human and natural” that there was a pressure to provide funding there.

¹⁴⁷ Singh J (2003). Is donor aid allocation to Iraq fair? And Nabarro D, Loretto A and Colombo A (2003). Increased equity in post-conflict reconstruction. The Lancet, vol. 362, Nov 15th 2003.

¹⁴⁸ The Future of Humanitarian Action Implications of Iraq and Other Recent Crises; Report of an International Mapping Exercise by the Feinstein International Famine Center, Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy Tufts University, Prepared by consultant Antonio Donini, in consultation with Peter Walker and Larry Minear, January 14, 2004.

MFA staff has rightly summed up the issue by saying:

It would be good to refer to the principles and objectives of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative in this context: more equitable and needs based distribution of HA globally and proper attention to "forgotten crisis".

6.3. The 1996 Evaluation Policy Recommendations

Finnish humanitarian aid was last evaluated in 1995–1996¹⁴⁹. The 1997 policy paper and the 2004 Development White Paper, both drew substantively on that evaluation for guidance on HA funding policy. The evaluation diagnosis was accurate:

Permanently fragile regions around the globe may still grow in number, and the ability to move quickly between multilateral and bi-lateral aid, emergency and development, conflict management and reconciliation, is essential.

Regarding focus, it correctly described Finnish HA as ‘all things to all people’¹⁵⁰. The prescription was less correct, however:

In sum, what has emerged from the evaluation is the following conclusion: to improve what is already an effective programme of humanitarian assistance does not require much institutional change or management reform. It requires instead the development of a policy of prevention and response to crisis, and a new level of national coordination and mobilisation. There is a need to refine the use of different strategies and elucidate their complementarity and incompatibilities¹⁵¹.

The problem seems to lie primarily in the absence of a clear objective to prevent or resolve the crisis¹⁵².

The evaluation stated that ‘The new environment requires a new approach, so as to make a measurable difference’¹⁵³. It recommended:

- the policy focus should be increased to achieve a more appreciable effect for Finnish humanitarian aid
- coordination among different actors should be strengthened to improve coherence in crisis management

¹⁴⁹ COWIconsult. Thematic evaluation of the Finnish humanitarian assistance. Evaluation report 1996:2. Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1996.

¹⁵⁰ P 52, Thematic Evaluation of The Finnish Humanitarian Assistance evaluation report 1996:2.

¹⁵¹ P. xix, Executive Summary 1996 evaluation op cit.

¹⁵² P53 1996 evaluation op cit.

¹⁵³ P. 51, Thematic Evaluation of The Finnish Humanitarian Assistance evaluation report 1996:2.

- the Ministry for Foreign Affairs should play a more active role in the mobilisation of resources towards a specific agenda, to get the maximum result from the national and international capacities.
- each line of action should be implemented using specific objectives against which progress can be measured.

Summarising, the evaluation recommended that HA should be funded within an overall, integrated MFA policy, focussed on 'crisis management', for any particular region, country or crisis. As explained below, this has not been done and probably, within current resources, cannot be done. Also, it should not be done.

6.4. Integrated Crisis Management: Unfeasible and Undesirable

In practice, and contrary to policy statements, Finnish humanitarian assistance is *not* an integral part of Finland's foreign policy. Nor should it be. Were it to be 'an integral part of Finland's foreign policy', it would be neither independent, nor based solely on need, both of which are conditions for principled international HA. Nor is HA used as 'an important tool that helps the international community to forecast, prevent and solve crises'¹⁵⁴. Such an approach for HA is neither practical nor desirable.

Flexible funding, subject to minimal ear-marking, conflicts with targeted, strategic funding. Secondly, flexible funding makes measurement of progress against specific objectives (such as crisis resolution) difficult. Core-funding a few large international organisations implies measurement of results at a broader, global level.

Thirdly, tightly targeted, strategic funding implies that HA will not respond on the basis of need, in accordance with HA principles, especially impartiality and independence. HA, if coordinated closely with political actors (i.e. as part of a coherent Foreign Policy response to crises), will respond to crisis-specific policy decisions and priorities. As noted elsewhere in this report, global trends are moving towards increased military and political use (and abuse¹⁵⁵) of HA. This conclusion is backed up by a 2001 HPG report, which states:

*There is a growing sense from humanitarian and political actors of mutual distrust, with the former concerned at the apparent politicisation of aid, and the latter frustrated by the political naivety of aid*¹⁵⁶.

The point is also well made by the ICRC:

¹⁵⁴ The 1997 MHA HA Policy Paper.

¹⁵⁵ ALNAP Review of Humanitarian Action in 2003; www.alnap.org.

¹⁵⁶ Shifting sands: The Search for Coherence between Political and Humanitarian: Responses to Complex Emergencies, By Joanna Macrae and Nicholas Leader, HPG Report 8.

This explains, unsurprisingly, why the ICRC is so adamant in insisting on respect for the individual identities, mandates and operational approaches of the various organizations working in the humanitarian field. Integrated approaches combining political, military, reconstruction and humanitarian elements, as advocated by the United Nations and a number of States, conflict with the principle of independence as understood by the ICRC and the entire International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Therefore, while these policies can be very effective for organizations with other mandates, the ICRC cannot and will not subscribe to them¹⁵⁷.

Finally, and perhaps definitively, even if it wanted to, the HA Unit simply does not have the resources to participate systematically in the design of appropriate crisis-specific and integrated crisis-management strategies.

¹⁵⁷ Pierre Krähenbühl, Director of Operations in The ICRC's approach to contemporary security challenges: A future for independent and neutral humanitarian action, RICR Septembre IRRC September 2004 Vol. 86 No 855 505.

7. RELEVANCE: HA FUNDING CHANNELS

This chapter examines the appropriateness of the main channels through which Finland funds i.e. its main partners. The chapter is complemented by data and observations contained in other chapters.

The most important channels of Finnish funded aid have been the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestinian Refugees in the Middle East, and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). Finnish channels have included the Finnish Red Cross, FinnChurchAid and Fida International. Save the Children Fund, Finland, is a recent addition.

The percentage funding channelled through NGOs has been roughly steady at around 30%, except for 1999 when it went up to 38%. This includes primarily funding for the RC movement. Almost all the rest goes through multilateral agencies, primarily UNHCR, WFP, UNRWA and UNICEF, in that order.

7.1. NGO Partners

The four NGO's analyzed, the Finnish Red Cross, FinnChurchAid, Fida International and Save the Children Finland, are quite different in terms of size, background and humanitarian aid capacity. Each has its respective strengths and weaknesses, preferences and operational philosophies or approaches. In this section, the various issues related to these NGO's functioning as channels of humanitarian aid are discussed separately.

FRC has excellent, even privileged communication with the MFA. The MFA decides very rapidly on funding for the FRC, especially regarding natural disasters. FCA, Fida and SCF have clearly less intimate channels of communication with the MFA. Fida and SCF claim that they lack basic information on, for instance, MFA decision-making and funding priorities.

All the NGO's have a long history – FRC was founded in 1877, FCA in 1947, Fida in 1927 and SCF in 1922. Nonetheless, some have a much longer history in humanitarian aid than others – FRC started HA in 1877 and has around 100 delegates in the field, FCA in the 1960's and has 3 staff in the field, Fida in 1984 and has 10 field personnel and SCF in 2000 and has 2 representatives in the field.

FRC is very much humanitarian focused in its international programmes: over 75% of expenditures for international programmes are for HA. (HA programmes represent 16.5% of its total turnover in Finland). FRC's HA funding from the MFA represents about 60% of total HA funding. Out of FCA international programmes, 33% are humanitarian aid. HA programmes represent a little over 12% of total turnover. FCA's HA funding from

the MFA represents about 30% of total HA funding. Fida's HA expenditure represents 12% of international expenditure and less than 5% of total expenditure. Fida's HA funding from the MFA represents about 50% of total HA funding. SCF's HA expenditure represents around 10-15% of international expenditure and around 2% of total expenditure. SCF's HA funding from the MFA represents about 80-90% of total HA funding.

Although FRC has experienced some cuts in its capacity, it has apparently not significantly affected its HA capacity. The NGO is still much larger than the other three in terms of turnover (100 million euros) and personnel (HQ: 138). Personnel are experienced, including considerable field experience. FRC's HA staff represent 14.5% of the total HQ Staff.

FCA turnover is around €17.5 M and it has 37 staff at its headquarters. FCA's HA staff represent about 8% of total HQ Staff. Fida's turnover is €2.5 M and HQ employees number 27. Fida's HA staff represents less than 4% of its total HQ staff. SCF's turnover is around €10 M, and has a HQ staff of about 35, of whom none are solely dedicated to HA.

FCA has MFA supported programmes in eight countries in Africa, Asia and Europe and it attempts to address forgotten crises. Fida has HA programmes in Africa, Europe and Asia and SCF only in Africa. The choice of countries depends much on the larger networks within which the NGO's operate.

All the NGO's analyzed operate as part of larger networks. The Finnish Red Cross is part of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, which is made up of 181 national societies. Cooperation is wide through the IFRC and with individual national societies. FRC staff has served in the IFRC in senior positions, in both Geneva and the field.

FinnChurchAid channels funds mainly through the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), the World Council of Churches (WCC) and ACT (Action by Churches Together). "ACT is a global alliance of protestant and orthodox churches and their related agencies from the membership of the World Council of Churches and the Lutheran World Federation" (ACT International 2004e). It was created in 1995. Finland represents 5.1% of donor contributions to ACT appeals in 2003 (8th largest donor). ACT is in charge of coordination, capacity building and appeals, but does not implement. LWF implements programmes in the field.

Fida International functions through its missionary network and with local churches. Fida is part of the European Pentecostal Missions (PEM). Fida International is not part of a larger NGO; the appeals come straight from the field. The NGO is also a member of Churches United in the Struggle against HIV/AIDS (CUAHA) in Eastern and Southern Africa.

Save the Children Finland is part of the International Save the Children Alliance, which is present in over 120 countries and is formed by 27 national Save the Children

organisations and a Secretariat in London, England. This Alliance has two very strong members, Save the Children US and Save the Children UK, which each represent a third of the Alliance in terms of turnover.

In the field, the national Save the Children organisations use their own name. For example, all seven Save the Children Organisations present in Ethiopia function as separate organisations. In humanitarian operations, however, they always function as one organisation. In Ethiopia, SC UK has been selected to be the leading agency of humanitarian aid programme. In Asian Tsunami relief programmes SC UK is the lead agency in Sri Lanka and India. In Indonesia, SC US is leading the Save the Children emergency relief programme. Thus, all four have rather strong networks, which provide wide presence in the field.

FRC has extensive know-how in training and initiated its basic training courses in 1970. The organisation has trained around 1,200 persons since then. FRC is a leader in HA training in Finland and within the IFRC. FCA has limited training (only orientation) and has an active HA roster of 20 people. Fida organizes orientation training courses for field personnel. SCF has organized basic training courses for four years and has trained around 100 persons. FCA counts on the training of FRC more than do Fida and SCF.

The four NGO's have had little cooperation with each other specifically regarding HA, with the exception of the joint-appeals already noted. The FRC and FCA have cooperated in training. They have not had joint field missions. Close cooperation between the FRC and other Finnish NGO's may be impractical, given the marked differences in focus and HA capacity.

Similar to the UK DEC emergency public-appeals mechanism described elsewhere in this report, the MFA could take the initiative in establishing a joint-MFA-NGO discussion forum, to improve coordination. This could subsequently be managed by the NGO's, once up-and-running.

7.2. UN Organisations

In the 1990's, UNHCR was in the ascendancy. Its involvement in emergencies and response capacity has since declined¹⁵⁸, concurrent with the significant decrease in refugee numbers globally. Its new-found emphasis on 'Durable Solutions' has led the agency to attempt to profile itself as both a humanitarian and a development actor. Nevertheless, UNHCR retains a significant emergency infrastructure, including staffing-rosters, training programmes, stockpiles and a variety of stand-by arrangements with governments and other international organisations.

WFP is now the UN humanitarian agency making significant advances. Its steady shift towards emergency operations more than development programmes, its notable increase

¹⁵⁸ Interviews in Geneva and statements from High Commissioner on the '4 R's', orienting the agency more towards 'durable solutions' and developmental approaches.

in emergency capacity, and marked success in recent crises, including Ethiopia, make it arguably the most effective UN humanitarian agency. Additionally, the bulk of all global HA is food related.

UNRWA's unique mandate regarding Palestinian refugees in the Middle East makes it an obvious partner for Finland's HA. The agency has been criticised by NGOs and the media for operational weaknesses. It has also suffered the unmitigated disdain of the occupying forces in the West Bank & Gaza. None-the-less, no other international organisation can fulfil that role. For that reason alone, it merits support in what is one of the most chronic refugee and military occupation crises in recent history. Additionally, its large staff, made up mainly of locals, provides a 'value-added' in the form of income generation and capacity building (see earlier in the report, under 'capacity building').

Similarly, UNICEF has managed to carve out its own niche, through its guardianship of the Convention of the Rights of the Child. In what it terms the 'Martigny¹⁵⁹ Process, the agency has attempted to mainstream emergency programmes into all its activities. This has not been entirely successful, as demonstrated in recent evaluations¹⁶⁰. None-the-less, and as noted in the response to the recent Asia Tsunami, UNICEF is extraordinarily effective in collecting funds from the public for emergency activities. It is supported by a network of highly active and motivated national support organisations, and a dynamic public information (PI) and media capacity.

OCHA (part of the UN Secretariat, and not an 'agency') has gradually expanded to take on a multi-faceted role. It provides coordination services both centrally at Geneva and New York, and in the field. It has developed a wide variety of services including information centres and tools (not least of which, 'Relief Web', the widely consulted website), and financial tracking. It also supports the IASC and UN conferences, and provides a home for UN units, offices and initiatives (such as the IDP Unit).

OCHA has absorbed UN natural disasters coordination mechanisms such as UNDAC, and combined these structurally with its 'complex' emergency resources and 'Desks'. Its field presence has expanded significantly, to the point that it has staff deployed in most areas of international HA operations. It has developed training programmes such as the Emergency Field Coordination Training (EFCT). It is currently sponsoring a system-wide evaluation of global HA capacities (as a result of the perceived poor response to the Darfur crisis).

7.3. The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

As described above, the FRC receives most funding and has the largest capacity among NGOs in Finland. The RC Movement is the historical cornerstone of the international humanitarian system. Its capacity is potentially immense, counting on a network of 181 National Societies throughout the globe, in addition to the Geneva based ICRC and IFRC.

¹⁵⁹ Named after the meeting place in Switzerland, where such an approach was put forward.

¹⁶⁰ E.g. the joint DFID-UNICEF evaluation of the UNICEF emergency response to the Kosovo crisis.

The ICRC has been referred to as the ‘Rolls Royce’¹⁶¹ of international HA. The capacity of the overall movement is unequalled by other international HA organisations. As such, it undoubtedly merits a primary place among partners for Finnish HA. The privileged FRC relationship with the MFA is, however, according to some interviewees, taken for granted by the FRC and the MFA. The interviewees would appreciate greater transparency regarding how funding for the RC movement is decided and managed, especially compared to that for other partners.

Elsewhere in this report, the effectiveness of international HA organisations, including the RC movement, is examined. This includes the issue of protection of prisoners from serious violations of their human rights and IHL in Afghanistan, Iraq and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

7.4. Utilisation of Finnish Expertise

The evaluation TOR includes examination of the role of Finnish expertise in Finnish funded HA. Throughout the evaluation, about a dozen Finns were encountered (e.g. in Ethiopia and Geneva), who are working in Finnish funded HA organisations. Many were interviewed. (Notably, the Executive Secretary of the IFRC, Mr. Markku Niskala, had been Secretary General of the Finnish RC. He was not encountered during the evaluation).

While the new IFRC Head of Delegation to Ethiopia had come from the FRC, SCF is the only Finnish NGO maintaining a field presence in Addis Ababa¹⁶². The SCF staff have the opportunity to follow up on the HA funding channelled to their partner (SCUK). SCF manages development projects (in ‘quality education’), but no directly implemented HA action in Ethiopia.

FRC claims not to “wave the Finnish flag” in the field, but participates to in the development of Finnish HA capacity through the provision of training. Finnish RC delegates have managerial or coordination posts in the field. FCA, Fida and SCF see the development of Finnish capacity as important.

That said, and in answer to the question in the TOR, compared to the total staffing of those organisations, and with the exception of the Finnish Red Cross, relatively little Finnish expertise is used in MFA funded programmes. This is even the case among the Finnish NGOs. In most cases they sub-contract, or pass funds to others to implement.

The evaluation does not see, however, the limited Finnish presence in HA programmes as a major issue. Finnish funded HA is to assist people in need, rather than to develop Finnish capacity or employment opportunities.

¹⁶¹ A term used by an official of a large EU donor organisation.

¹⁶² Following regular missions, SC-F will soon have a full-time Finnish coordinator in Addis Ababa.

7.5. Aid and Proselytism

All humanitarian organisations which subscribe to the RC ‘Code of Conduct’¹⁶³, claim to adhere to the principle that aid should be provided impartially and independently of any ulterior objective or motive.

Many Finnish NGOs (and aid workers) spring from religious roots and have assisted countless people globally, from within their religious structures. Fida International is a church-based organisation – the Finnish Pentecostal Church. The organisation also claims to be strict in avoiding discrimination in its HA programmes and in following humanitarian principles. Fida works through local churches, who act as partners in the field (e.g. in the case of its work with refugees in Tanzania). Fida International regards field personnel to be ‘missionaries’¹⁶⁴. According to Fida, some Fida partners see development cooperation as missionary work. Fida sees this as a potential problem, but not as a major issue. The Fida goals are, however, unambiguously religious¹⁶⁵.

FinnChurch Aid also states clearly and unambiguously its adherence to the Code of Conduct¹⁶⁶, as does its main partner, LWF. FCA strictly forbids discrimination on any basis, including religion. The organisation claims to follow humanitarian principles and that it does not cooperate with religious organisations whenever a doubt exists regarding their objectivity regarding their aid activities. LWF have run impressive programmes throughout Ethiopia, both HA and development. The evaluators witnessed well run activities in various parts of the country (e.g. Shashemene).

Never-the-less, according to Archbishop Jukka Paarma¹⁶⁷, ‘The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland’ prides itself in being ‘A Missionary Church’, which aims at ‘developing the contact between our missionary organisations and Finn Church Aid’:

‘The Church today is charged, as were the apostles, to proclaim the gospel to all nations... there are two basic tasks ... spreading the message of Christ and putting brotherly love into effect – missions and diaconia ... “The parish and its members are to promote missions work, the purpose of which is to spread the gospel among those who are not Christians.”... Developing the connection between missions and international diaconia is a particularly timely issue for us domestically at the moment. This means on the one hand developing the contact between our missionary organizations and Finn Church Aid; and on the other,

¹⁶³ See IFRC website www.ifrc.org.

¹⁶⁴ Interview, Helsinki.

¹⁶⁵ From the Fida website, English version: *Fida International is a servant. Missionaries are servants. Our goal is to spread the best news in the whole world. The powerhouse and heart of missionary work is the church. ... Its enthusiasm to proclaim the Good News and vision for lost souls is the key for success in missionary work. Fida serves churches in order to give them possibility to maximise their contribution in missionary work. Fida International represents both churches and missionaries. Fida is responsible for the coordination of missionary work and for the implementation of a common strategy prepared by the partnership unit.*

¹⁶⁶ Interviews.

¹⁶⁷ Address given at the "Faith and Mission - Shared Commitment" Consultation in Paltamo, Finland, on June 11, 2001.

coordinating resources and clarifying the common vision of missions and diaconia at the domestic local congregation level. The old saying that one's homework must be done first and well is applicable here too.

Both Fida and FCA unequivocally accept the 'Code of Conduct'. This fact should be accepted as a clear indication of their avowed impartiality and independence. None-the-less, even if Fida and FCA could vouch for all their potential partners, no one can foresee how their work, and crucially, that of their partners, will be perceived by others. Nor can the risks such perceptions may generate be predicted.

It is in a spirit of deep respect for dedicated religious aid workers that the following harsh reality is highlighted. During this evaluation, the evaluators witnessed first hand the competition among churches (Christian and Muslim, alike) in their quest to extend their respective influences in Ethiopia¹⁶⁸. Many countries in the world are experiencing similar phenomena.

Religion, especially strong religion, mixes increasingly uneasily with humanitarian aid. The detention of western aid workers accused of proselytising by religiously extreme Taliban in Afghanistan, prior to US military action against that country, is a sobering example. While such perceptions may have always existed, now that humanity is being led into 'crusades'¹⁶⁹ and 'clashes of civilisations'¹⁷⁰, the stakes are higher. Events and perceptions affecting HA organisations are being driven by others. They will have a profound effect on how the works of HA organisations, faith based ones in particular, are viewed. The following quotes are not included lightly. Their relevance is disturbingly obvious:

It is urgent to analyze and understand the roots of the threat but also to find ways to restart some kind of conversation with the belligerents, perhaps through proxies or Islamic scholars, to try to reestablish the bona fides of humanitarians vis-à-vis militant/extremist groups and their supporters. Given the widespread perception of a western crusade against Islam, this is likely to be a tall order¹⁷¹.

And:

Army Lt. Gen. William G. Boykin ... has made several speeches - some in uniform - at evangelical Christian churches in which he said the U.S. was fighting a war with Satan. A decorated veteran of foreign campaigns, the three-star general said

¹⁶⁸ E.g. The mushrooming of, reportedly competing evangelical churches and mosques in towns and villages, countrywide.

¹⁶⁹ *On Sunday [Sept.15, 2001, President] Bush warned Americans that "this crusade, this war on terrorism, is going to take awhile."* Christian Science Monitor, September 19, 2001 edition.

¹⁷⁰ *World politics is entering a new phase ... international conflict will be cultural ... With alien civilizations the West must be accommodating if possible, but confrontational if necessary.* The Clash of Civilizations. Samuel P. Huntington Foreign Affairs. Summer 1993; Summary.

¹⁷¹ The Future of Humanitarian Action Implications of Iraq and Other Recent Crises; Report of an International Mapping Exercise by the Feinstein International Famine Center, Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy Tufts University, Prepared by consultant Antonio Donini, in consultation with Peter Walker and Larry Minear, January 14, 2004.

of a 1993 battle with a Muslim militia leader in Somalia: "I knew that my God was bigger than his. I knew that my God was a real God, and his was an idol."¹⁷²

7.6. Conclusion: A Pragmatic Choice of Channels

As stated elsewhere in this report, the pragmatic approach of choosing a small number of large, appropriate, core-funded partners is, on balance, realistic and relevant. This conclusion is based on analysis of international mandates, capacities and performance. As indicated in the report, significant ineffectiveness and inefficiencies also exist, however.

Future measurement of relevance and results should be conducted through more systematic monitoring, including multi-annual, global partner performance reviews (e.g. a significant review of each of a small number of partners every three-to-five years). Such reviews could be combined with close monitoring of and influence on the organisations through Finland's membership of executive boards, and/or as a member of the EU, Nordic and 'like-minded' donor groups, and operation-specific field monitoring (e.g. by embassy contracted consultants).

The 1996 evaluation of Finnish HA recommended that the MFA increase funding of Finnish INGOs¹⁷³. Based on the analysis of MFA capacities and partner profiles, the evaluation does not subscribe to this recommendation. If increased funding should be directed to INGOs, many *non-Finnish INGOs* have developed equal or greater HA capacity than those currently funded in Finland (e.g. the MSF 'family', SCUK, IRC and CARE US, etc.). Such an increase is not required, however, in that existing RC and multi-lateral partners can absorb current levels of Finnish funding, and provide HA capacities at least equal to those offered by INGOs. In addition, they have specific and universally recognised mandates which represent an important value-added, compared to INGOs.

¹⁷² CBS News, WASHINGTON, Oct. 17, 2003.

¹⁷³ P. 33, The Thematic Evaluation of the Finnish Humanitarian assistance, 1996.

8. GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN ISSUES

The evaluation has been requested to review global issues and trends of potential relevance to MFA HA funding (*issues of [the] changing humanitarian environment*). The following is a selection of such issues. They are included here as background to the evaluation and in answer to the TOR. They are not presented in any particular order.

8.1. Decrease in Refugees and Increase in IDPs

The global refugee population has *decreased* steadily from a high of over 20 million in the mid-1990's to a current figure of just over 17 million¹⁷⁴. In 2003, alone, numbers dropped by 18%. In the meantime, the number of IDPs globally has *increased* by similar proportions. This is significant in that no single multi-lateral agency is mandated to protect and care for IDPs. Around 3.5 million displaced people returned to their countries last year, mostly Afghans from Pakistan and Iran.

8.2. Proliferation of HA Actors

The ALNAP 2003 Review of Humanitarian Action quotes an IFRC evaluation (Afghanistan; 2003), which states that:

... 350 INGOs and 670 UN international staff took up residence in Afghanistan during 2002. This proliferation of international agencies - one for every day of the year, as was noted in Kosovo - led to competition for resources and profile, national flag flying, skyrocketing rents, and competition for national staff. This undermined rather than strengthened indigenous capacity, and once again coordination was challenged.

This scenario is repeated in many major crisis scenarios, be they natural disaster or conflict related. The 'bazaar' atmosphere, as agencies chase funds, staff and their own 'humanitarian space', is off-putting and ultimately, damaging. Again, Finland's concentration of funding on a small group of capable actors is as pragmatic as it is healthy.

8.3. LRRD Gap only Slightly Narrower

The gap between relief and development is still wide. Most multi-lateral banks (including the CEB, IDB, WB, EIB, ADB) are involved in post-natural disaster and conflict reconstruction much earlier than was the norm ten years ago, including the provision of

¹⁷⁴ UNHCR statistics.

emergency loans (see the Inter-American Development Bank emergency reconstruction loans). Equally, most HA organisations recognise the need to link their relief with development. They attempt this in modest terms, through small-scale, scattered, generally unlinked projects (such as so called Quick Impact Projects), or integrated rural community-development programmes. UNHCR, through the '4 R's' approach (see elsewhere in this report), is an example of a traditionally HA focussed agency trying to take a longer-term operational perspective.

None-the-less, initiatives such as the late 90's The Brookings Process, involving the then UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Mme. Ogata, ultimately failed in bridging the 'emergency-development gap'. The difference in organisational cultures, funding processes, criteria, and working approaches all result in few solid linkages on the ground.

8.4. Increased Aid and Crises

While there is no definitive evidence that emergencies are more common now than previously in history, anecdotal evidence suggests that they are. For instance, the incidence of drought has doubled over the last 30 years¹⁷⁵. Globally, HA has expanded as a percentage of Official Development Aid (ODA) over the last 15 years¹⁷⁶. This is only partly explained by the perceived increase in the number, duration and intensity of emergencies and chronic humanitarian crises¹⁷⁷. An argument frequently put forward is that HA has become an alternative or complement to political and military agendas (see 'humanitarian war' in this chapter).

8.5. 'Grey-Zone' Scenarios Becoming the Norm

The Western HA 'system' has been built on the assumption that disasters (principally 'natural') are unpredictable, occur suddenly, and are typified by a continuum from disaster to stabilisation, recovery, reconstruction and development. This is no longer the case. Whole regions of the world have descended into chronic and recurring crises, which increasingly last years and often decades¹⁷⁸. The failure of socio-economic and political development, evident in extreme socio-economic marginalisation and environmental degradation, has left swathes of the globe permanently vulnerable to emergencies.

¹⁷⁵ Study by US National Center for Atmospheric Research, presented at the annual meeting of the American Meteorological Society. Source, P.3, Financial Times, January 14, 2005.

¹⁷⁶ HPN studies, ODI, London.

¹⁷⁷ Various sources, including interview with Juhani Koponen, Professor and Director of the Institute for Development Studies, University of Helsinki.

¹⁷⁸ Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, West African Countries, DRC and the Great Lakes region of Africa, Colombia, Bangladesh and parts of Indonesia are examples.

Chronic, absolute poverty has diluted the concept of extreme humanitarian need¹⁷⁹, to the point that the separation of classical HA and development aid approaches may no longer be meaningful. The norm is increasingly a 'grey-zone' which, optimistically, might be termed 'transition'. New, highly flexible aid mechanisms and approaches are required.

In this context, the HIV/AIDS epidemic is particularly relevant. A recent report¹⁸⁰ sets out its relevance for both HA *and* development programmes. As noted in the current issue of Field Exchange (by the Emergency Nutrition Network);

Considering the numbers affected and dying with HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa, the authors consider HIV/AIDS a humanitarian problem and a long-term crisis, which requires both a humanitarian response to suffering and a long-term perspective.

It is interesting to note the conclusions of a recent ECHO paper and guidelines on this theme:

- *In the Concept Paper and Model Guidelines the authors have given their justifications for their opinion that ECHO should not become a front line agency in the fight against HIV/AIDS based on the facts that: other international organisations have been given a specific mandate; it is too early to judge whether those organisations with a mandate have succeeded or not; and that for ECHO to become a front line agency in the fight would require that ECHO is reorganised and reinforced not only financially but also in terms of human resources*
- *The Concept Paper and Model Guidelines recommend, that ECHO should adopt a two-pronged strategy aiming at mainstreaming do-no-harm measures, with focus on awareness and on avoiding to spread the virus by negligence wherever relevant (defined as "Priority 1" essential activities in chapter B.3.3. of the Model Guidelines), and (ii) funding selected activities in order to mitigate the effects of HIV/AIDS in humanitarian emergency situations, as a component of already existing multi-sector programmes, with various levels of pre-conditions ("Priorities 2 and 3" in the Model Guidelines).*

8.6. Organisations Increasingly Technically Proficient

Recent studies argue that HA has become technically more proficient over the past decade. Advances in feeding techniques and materials, is one example. The emphasis on technical emergency indicators and standards, as set out in the SPHERE standards, is another. The increased number of technical experts in the field, the availability of a wide

¹⁷⁹ Populations in absolute poverty frequently live in conditions which do not meet even SPHERE minimum emergency relief standards for water supply, sanitation, nutrition, shelter, and health.

¹⁸⁰ *HIV/AIDS and humanitarian action*. Paul Harvey, Humanitarian Policy Group, HPG Report 16, April 2004, available online at <http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg>.

range of technical training programmes, guidelines and the creation of professional networks¹⁸¹ all support this conclusion. ‘The HA system’ has shown itself to be capable of stabilising immediately life-threatening humanitarian conditions in a remarkably short time (e.g. the immediate response to the Mitch Hurricane in 1998-99).

8.7. HA Increasingly Linked to Donor Military and Political Agendas

Adherence to the key principles of independence and ‘needs-based-programming’ is under threat. The overt delivery of HA by armed military personnel (e.g. the military reconstruction teams [PRTs] in Afghanistan); the unseemly ‘beauty contest’¹⁸², to be the highest donor in the 2004/2005 Asia Tsunami response; the huge imbalance of aid and assistance standards between the Balkans and Africa; and the ‘embedding’ of reputable international HA organisations with active combatants (Iraq 2003 and 2004), are examples.

The increased involvement of donor country military and political actors in HA is notable. In the words of one interviewee, *ODA (including HA) is more and more linked to military aims*. This is to the point of being ‘embedded’ with western forces who are directly involved as combatants in conflicts such as Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Western NGOs, especially Christian, the UN and now even the RC movement, are increasingly seen as agents of Western values, policies and interests:

Another element of risk is that of being instrumentalized, resulting from the tendency of some State authorities to integrate humanitarian action into the range of tools available to them in the conduct of their campaign against terrorist activities. This tendency has been manifested in various ways during recent months. They include statements by governments describing their military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan as “mainly humanitarian”.

The concept of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and their establishment by the Coalition forces in Afghanistan is another example. The ensuing blurring of lines between the role and objectives of political and military players on the one hand and humanitarian players on the other creates serious problems for an organization such as the ICRC, with regard to perception, acceptability and security at the operational level.

Pierre Krähenbühl, Director of Operations in The ICRC’s approach to contemporary security challenges: A future for independent and neutral humanitarian action, RICR September IRRIC September 2004 Vol. 86 No 855 505

Following the Asia tsunami of 26th December 2004, the idea of an EU ‘rapid Humanitarian Reaction Force’ has re-surfaced. This suggestion was last made in 1991,

¹⁸¹ E.g. the Emergency Nutrition Network (ENN); Emergency Personnel Network (EPN); and the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP).

¹⁸² Words of Louis Michel, EU Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, in advance of the January 2005 Jakarta Conference.

during the post Gulf-War, Northern Iraq, Turkish and Iranian Kurdish refugee crisis. (At that time, the debate led to the creation of ECHO, the non-operational EU Commission Humanitarian Office, which funds HA activities implemented outside the EU.)

8.8. Dominance and ‘Corporatisation’ of Western INGOs

Despite the emergence of relief organisations such as Islamic Relief, African Humanitarian Action (AHA) and the Japanese official JAICA, international HA remains the preserve of Western agencies.

International NGOs (INGOS) are increasingly corporate in nature. Some have budgets larger than UN HA organisations¹⁸³. They increasingly operate as multi-national organisations or networks, with offices, staff and structures placed in key regions globally (CARE, Oxfam, MSF, World Vision, SCF, LWF, etc.). The result is a growth in capacity on the one hand, and a loss of agility, flexibility and proximity to beneficiary populations, on the other.

8.9. ‘Complex Emergency’, ‘Natural Disaster’ Response Actors Merging

The merging of the, up-to-then quite separate ‘natural disaster’ and ‘complex emergency’ wings of UN OCHA, has mirrored a similar process among other UN, donor and INGOs emergency response units. Increasingly over the past decade, these two communities have merged within their individual countries or organisations. State examples include Emercom (the Russian state emergency agency), UK DFID/CHAD, and US OFDA.

8.10. Side-lining of Multi-lateral Channels

Direct involvement of donor states in HA has increased in the past 15 years, culminating with the unseemly squabbles over aid coordination, or lack thereof, among donors to the 2004-2005 Asia Tsunami response.

While on the one hand, Nordic donors in particular, supported by the Swiss and UK, have firmly supported and funded UN HA coordination (e.g. through OCHA, UNHCR and WFP), on the other, UN coordination has been bi-passed systematically in major crises, such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Asia¹⁸⁴.

¹⁸³ E.g. World Vision and CARE International, both of which have budgets in excess of 1 Bn. USD, compared to that of UNHCR (consistently less than 1 Bn. USD in the last 5 years).

¹⁸⁴ In the initial days after the Tsunami, the US government established a HA donor coalition, including, among others, the US, Australia, and India. Subsequently, at the Jakarta Conference, the US publicly accepted UN coordination.

The INGO SPHERE project established agreed standards and indicators for disaster/emergency response, with limited involvement of the UN system. Many of the standards are rooted in UN developed standards (e.g. by UNHCR and WHO). The UN had failed, over decades, to achieve such wide, formal acceptance of these standards and indicators, despite this being a key multi-lateral coordination function.

8.11. Plethora of 'Accountability' and Research Initiatives

The post Rwanda crisis, and 'HA bubble' of the mid-1990s, led to a dramatic increase in networks and initiatives aimed at increased accountability, research and performance improvement. The alphabetical soup includes RRN/HPG/HPN; ALNAP; HAP-I; People-in-Aid; EPN; ENN; and perhaps the best known, SPHERE.

While most of these focus on operational agencies, donors too have recently joined the trend. The Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative (GHDI) aims to improve donor practices, performance and accountability. Finland is a supporter of the initiative.

The increased number of evaluations of HA is also notable¹⁸⁵. This is partly linked to the adoption of a 'results based management' philosophy which under-pins many of these initiatives.

8.12. Opposition to SPHERE and 'One-Size-Fits-All' Approaches

The SPHERE Project (already explained, and subsequently termed 'McSPHERE'¹⁸⁶ for its perceived standardization of emergency aid, similar to the way McDonalds restaurants have standardized their fast-food outlets) has been criticized consistently since its inception. One Francophone based initiative, entitled the 'Compas Quality initiative' (formerly *Projet Qualité*), by the French group Urgence, Réhabilitation et Développement (URD¹⁸⁷), managed to galvanize such criticism and opposition to SPHERE.

Quoting Montesquieu that 'To every complex problem there is a simple answer ... and it is the wrong one', this project proposed that every crisis and beneficiary, or victim group was so different that global minimum standards and indicators could not be usefully applied to guide responses. The project continues its development, and the debate, albeit, in a less 'noisy' fashion, as pointed out to this evaluation by one of SPHERE's strongest critics.

¹⁸⁵ See ALNAP database and statistics, www.alnap.org.

¹⁸⁶ McSPHERE: FRANCHISING HUMANITARIAN AID? Ed Schenkenberg van Mierop, ICVA, 2001

¹⁸⁷ At www.urd.org or www.compasqualite.org.

In the words of the 'McSphere' article, the issue is far from over:

The debate concerning the value and impact of Sphere remains unresolved. Several French NGOs and the Sphere project seem to be walking on different planes as they try to convince each other of their infallibility: there is a need to explore common ground. A debate is needed about the real value of standards. Hence, the debate will, and should, continue ... [to] help to ensure that we do not accept the institutionalisation and manipulation of humanitarian action. Hopefully, humanitarian aid will not be franchised in 2010: largely thanks to Sphere and its critics.

8.13. Humanitarian Advocacy

Advocacy has become a more widely accepted component of HA activities. INGOs such as Oxfam, MSF, CARE Int., and Save the Children Fund, include it as a priority within their HA strategies. Concerted campaigns have been mounted by alliances of organisations regarding, for example, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child¹⁸⁸.

Through another example, the Kimberley Agreement urges multi-national corporations not to procure diamonds emanating from sources linked to the exploitation or engendering of humanitarian crises (e.g. in The Great Lakes region of Central Africa or West Africa)¹⁸⁹. Switzerland (SDC-HA/SDR) is one of the few donors which has formally adopted an advocacy strategy.

8.14. Mandate Creep among International Agencies

Multi-lateral agencies are susceptible to 'mandate creep' as a response to ever more humanitarian demands and opportunities. Their eternal hunt for funds, dependent as most are on 'voluntary funding', is also a factor. UNHCR has, for the first time in its history, appealed for and received tens of millions of dollars and launched a major natural disaster response operation (to assist in the Asia tsunami natural disaster response). It has done this given links with its existing presence and activities in Indonesia, and at the invitation of the Indonesia authorities.

IOM assumed IDP camp management in Afghanistan. The FAO, until recently clearly a 'development' organisation, has established an emergency unit. Similarly, UNESCO is now developing an emergency/post-conflict staff roster and training initiative.

¹⁸⁸ E.g. Save the Children, World Vision Germany. Save the Children was one of the actors in drafting the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and is a leading NGO in promoting child rights programming and participation.

¹⁸⁹ See www.kimberleyprocess.com.

8.15. 'Humanitarian War'

EU MEPS such as Bernard Kouchner (France), Jose Maria Mediluce (Spain) and others, have long argued that forceful humanitarian intervention is justified, even against the wishes of sovereign authorities.

We now have the term 'Humanitarian War', befitting of George Orwell's '1984'. The war on Serbia (1999), related to Kosovo and Kosovars, was justified on the grounds that it was a humanitarian intervention. The concept of killing and maiming hundreds of civilians (many roasted alive, torn-apart, decapitated or permanently maimed¹⁹⁰) ostensibly for humanitarian goals is new: as is the condemnation of future generations through nation-wide depleted uranium pollution.

8.16. The Main Challenge: To Be and Be Perceived to Be Independent

Arguably, the greatest single challenge now facing Finland's HA partners, and all HA organisations, is how to ensure their adherence to basic humanitarian principles, especially independence, impartiality and the allocation of 'assistance based on need'. As with justice, organisations must be independent *and seen to be independent*. The bombing of the UN Baghdad headquarters on the 19th of August, 2003, soon followed by the attack on the ICRC headquarters in the same city, have marked what may yet prove to be 'points of no return' for the international HA 'system'. Only time will tell.

Changing perceptions regarding the role and independence of HA agencies, including the International Red Cross, will have a far-reaching (as yet unknown) impact. This is increasingly recognised by a wide range of independent observers, commentators and practitioners.

The following quotes are included here as an illustration of how serious this reality is for even the most internationally respected of HA movements.

(It should be noted that the following information and perceptions could just as well refer to major UN multi-lateral aid organisations and many international NGOs.)

... Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) announces today the closure of all medical programs in Afghanistan ... in the aftermath of the killing of five MSF aid workers an attack on June 2nd [2004] ... unprecedented in the history of MSF

¹⁹⁰ See *Cooking the books* - NATO's ethnic cleansing claims challenged by Professor Michel Chossudovsky (Revised 2-10-00) *Emperors Clothes* - www.tenc.net; also media and International Human Rights organisations reports, 1999, 2000, 2001.

... a Taliban spokesperson claimed responsibility ... and stated later that organisations like MSF [who] work for American interests, are therefore targets and would be at risk of further attacks. This false accusation is particularly unjustified as MSF honours the separation of aid from political motives as a founding principle.

... The violence directed against humanitarian aid workers has come in a context in which the US backed coalition has consistently sought to use humanitarian aid to build support for its military and political ambitions ... to “win hearts and minds”. By doing so, providing aid is no longer seen as an impartial and neutral act, endangering the lives of humanitarian volunteers and jeopardizing the aid to people in need ... on May 12th 2004, MSF publicly condemned the distribution of leaflets by the coalition forces in southern Afghanistan in which the population was informed that providing information about the Taliban and al Qaeda was necessary if they wanted the delivery of aid to continue.

MSF press release, July 28th, 2004

I had a very strong sense that we were regarded as the occupying powers ... And this was something I hadn't felt before ...

Sir Nick Young, chief executive of the British Red Cross¹⁹¹

The people who did this are against everything foreign. They see no difference: everything that isn't Iraqi is lumped in with the occupying troops and fought

Pierre Gassmann, Head of the ICRC delegation in Baghdad¹⁹²

Two of ... three deliberate [security] attacks, namely those north of Kandahar in March 2003 and south of Baghdad in July 2003, seem to have been the result of an apparent association of the ICRC's presence with the broader international political and military activities taking place in the countries concerned. The same could apply to the October 2003 car-bomb attack on the ICRC offices in Baghdad.

Pierre Krähenbühl, ICRC¹⁹³

¹⁹¹ As reported in 'Caught in the crossfire', article by Annie Kelly, Wednesday December 15 2004, The Guardian (UK National Daily Newspaper).

¹⁹² AFP, as reported on Al Jazeera website Monday 27 October 2003.

¹⁹³ Director of Operations in The ICRC's approach to contemporary security challenges: A future for independent and neutral humanitarian action, RICC September 2004 Vol. 86 No 855 505.

In some countries, the credibility or effectiveness of the ICRC's long-established confidential approach has been questioned.

Michael A. Meyer, British Red Cross¹⁹⁴

"Seven of our local colleagues went into Falluja, into the centre of the city, for a few hours," [ICRC] spokesperson Florian Westphal said. The aid agency ... insisted that it did not want an armed escort, but US soldiers said it was too dangerous for a civilian vehicle to travel unaccompanied, the spokesman said. As a result, US army vehicles drove slightly ahead of the ICRC team when it ventured through Falluja's battle-scarred neighbourhoods. "This is something we will take up with the US authorities again," said Westphal, noting that the ICRC "would like to be able to act independently and to be seen to be acting independently".

AFP, Friday 10 December 2004¹⁹⁵

Many ... feel that humanitarian action has been politicized to an extent rarely seen and tainted by its association with the Coalition [Iraq] intervention: it has become a partisan action ... most humanitarian actors seem to agree that the Iraq crisis has resulted in a dangerous blurring of the lines between humanitarian and political action and in the consequent erosion of core humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence. Serious compromises from which it will be difficult to disentangle have been made. The bombs directed against the UN headquarters in Baghdad, and against the ICRC a few days later, have added a tragic element to widespread fears ... about the future of independent and effective humanitarian action ...

The fact that traditional humanitarian agencies and activities are funded by a small club of western donors, and the ready availability of huge donor funds for Iraq, reinforce the perception, and the reality, that humanitarianism is rooted in the North. ... Is there a direct link between the attacks against the UN, ICRC and NGOs in Iraq and Afghanistan and the perception of cooption into the Coalition strategy? ... it is clear that the emblems have lost their protective nature and that humanitarian agencies have lost their ability to interact with one set of belligerents (as well as with the communities that tolerate or support them.

¹⁹⁴ Head of the International Law Department at the British Red Cross, in his review of the English-language version of François Bugnion's *The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Protection of War Victims*; *Affaires courantes et commentaires* Current issues and comments, RICR Septembre IRRC September 2004 Vol. 86 No 855.

¹⁹⁵ Entitled: ICRC team makes limited Falluja visit.

... Such pressures have resulted in the widespread perception in the region that the UN, the assistance community, and even the ICRC have taken sides. They led to considerable internal hand-wringing -- but little open debate -- on how to confront such pressures in the future.

Feinstein International Famine Center, Tufts University¹⁹⁶

Like Iraq, Rwanda and Sierra Leone are wracked with continuing political instability and strife, yet the international community failed to react with the swiftness and urgency it has shown it is capable of in ... Iraq ... In July 2003, the total amount pledged to the Global fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria, since its creation in January 2002, stood at 4.7 billion dollars. Inexplicably, some countries pledged more to Iraq in 2 days, at the behest of the USA, than they have contributed to the fund since its inception.

Field Exchange (by the Emergency Nutrition Network)¹⁹⁷

*The west's military intervention in Kosovo turned the tables on aid agencies. "In Kosovo, we let our human concern be directed exclusively as politicians wished," says Vaux. "... we had not behaved as impartial humanitarians, but as if we were part of NATO." ... his new book, *The Selfish Altruist* ... was inspired in part by this loss of impartiality and the threat posed to humanitarianism by governments increasingly taking the lead in emergency intervention ... resulting in the role of aid agencies arguably being relegated to that of government contractor.*

Alison Benjamin, Guardian¹⁹⁸, on Tony Vaux's book, *The Selfish Altruist*

... the war on terror undermines (the Red Cross's) famed neutrality - and threatens not only its staff but its very existence ... Colin Powell, the former US secretary of state, notoriously called humanitarian aid "an important part of our combat force" in Iraq.

The Guardian (UK National Daily Newspaper)¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁶ The Future of Humanitarian Action Implications of Iraq and Other Recent Crises; Report of an International Mapping Exercise by the Feinstein International Famine Center, Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy Tufts University, Prepared by consultant Antonio Donini, in consultation with Peter Walker and Larry Minear, January 14, 2004.

¹⁹⁷ July 2004 issue, quoting an article in a 2003 issue of the Lancet medical journal.

¹⁹⁸ Wednesday May 16, 2001, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4186978,00.html>.

¹⁹⁹ 'Caught in the crossfire', article by Annie Kelly, Wednesday December 15, 2004.

Pashtuns are being targeted [with serious human rights abuses] because their ethnic group was closely associated with the Taliban regime, whose leadership consisted mostly of Pashtuns from Southern Afghanistan.

MSF-H evaluation, May 2002²⁰⁰

Despite the fact that the situation was predictable, the international community failed to protect them [the Pashtuns]

IFRC, 2002²⁰¹

... aid flows have ... been politicised and the lack of proportionality as well as contestation over control of resources have been a central feature of aid disbursement in Afghanistan. Of the approximately US \$10 billion disbursed in Afghanistan for the year beginning October 2001, some 84 per cent was committed to the coalition's war effort, 9 per cent to humanitarian action, 4 per cent to international peacekeeping, and 3 per cent to reconstruction.

...For some observers, Afghanistan marked a watershed in the incorporation of humanitarian actors by the military. OCHA and some of the larger UN humanitarian agencies detached liaison staff to the coalition's central command in Tampa, Florida, in an effort to promote coordination and foster security for humanitarian staff and convoys. US humanitarian NGOs in particular were viewed as one partner in the 'war on terror', and significant questions have been raised about humanitarian actors' neutrality and independence. However, this issue is not well covered in evaluation reports.

Review of Humanitarian Action in 2003; ALNAP

... the most obvious casualty has been the neutrality of aid organisations. In particular, there is great concern that they have become indistinguishable from the occupying forces from the perspective of local populations ...The bombing of the Baghdad headquarters of the UN and ICRC in August 2003 are graphic illustrations of the new situation that aid agencies find themselves in.

Mark Duffield and Nicholas Waddell, October 2004²⁰²

²⁰⁰ As quoted in ALNAP annual review 2003, P.121.

²⁰¹ As quoted in ALNAP: 2003:121.

²⁰² Human Security and Global Danger: Exploring a Governmental Assemblage, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Lancaster, October 2004.

Why do the emblems of the UN, the Red Cross and NGOs no longer protect them? Has something gone wrong in the way we are understood by the people we say we are there to help? ... The deliberate targeting of aid workers is a reminder that taking sides, or simply the perception that we have taken sides, can have devastating consequences ...

What is new is the extent to which humanitarian action has been infiltrated and penetrated by political agendas that are at odds with humanitarian principles. In high profile crises where the US is directly involved, humanitarian action is unable to safeguard its neutrality. The “you are for us or against us” rhetoric of the post 9/11 war on terror is rapidly shrinking the space for neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian action ...

There is a vast parallel universe of Islamic charities and funds for humanitarian assistance provided by Arab and other Islamic countries, remittances from diasporas and contributions from local entities in crisis countries that are not recorded in the official statistics of humanitarian assistance ... The principles may well be universal, but in reality, humanitarian action is based on the views and action of the handful of western states that hold the purse strings, along with the operational agencies they fund ...

The logical consequence ... [is] a bifurcation between those who will accept that they are a part of the political designs of the West, ... and those who will strive at all costs (including the cost of forsaking government funds) to resist cooptation or manipulation. Given the current ominous frequency of attacks against aid workers, bluffing or waffling is not advised.

Antonio Donini, Tufts University²⁰³

... the ICRC’s identity is perceived in some circles as mainly Western — because of issues related to funding, the emblem, the location of its headquarters — the risk of being mistaken for an integral part of the broader political and military presence in these countries is high. Such a perception might result in rejection of the ICRC as an independent and neutral player and a refusal to grant it access to the victims to whom it wishes to lend its assistance.

Pierre Krähenbühl, ICRC²⁰⁴

Mr. Krähenbühl has, openly and honestly, put his finger on it. Correctly, he signals the importance of funding sources in shaping perceptions about the independence of HA organisations.

²⁰³ Visiting scholar at Feinstein, International Famine Center: As published in the Humanitarian Affairs Review, Autumn 2004 issue.

²⁰⁴ Director of Operations in The ICRC’s approach to contemporary security challenges: A future for independent and neutral humanitarian action, RICC September 2004 Vol. 86 No 855 505.

His agency's top donors include the following²⁰⁵:

1 CHF = 0.69 € rate of 1st January, 2003

Donor	Total Amount in CHF	% of total Government Contributions	% of Total Contributions	Ranking Among Governments	Ranking overall ²⁰⁶
USA	231,716,011	32.4%	25.9%	1	1
UK	113,685,048	15.9%	12.7%	2	2
Switzerland	91,005,261	12.7%	10.2%	3	3
EU Commission	79,154,410	-	8.8%	4	4
RCRC Nat'l Societies	53,471,313	-	6.0%	5	5
Finland	13,581,245	1.9%	1.5%	10	13

Table 2: Contributions to ICRC in 2003

N.B. EU Commission funds include UK contributions through the Commission, additional to its bi-lateral funding. Figures in these tables are rounded off, may vary slightly from the amounts presented in other documents and may result in rounding off addition differences. Amounts are in Swiss Franc. Total Government contributions, 2003 = 716,071,939 CHF; Total Contributions, (incl. EU Commission, Nat'l Societies, Private sources, IO's, etc.) = 896,502,352 CHF.

Mr. Krähenbühl affirms that:

The ICRC is strongly determined to maintain its principled operational approach in place, convinced that it remains as effective and as necessary as ever.

This commitment to humanity could hardly be more vital:

Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.

President Bush, 18 September 2001

²⁰⁵ Source – ICRC Annual Report, 2003.

²⁰⁶ Including, in addition to governments, the EU Commission, National Societies, and 'Private Sources', all three recorded as greater than Finland's total donations.

8.17. Conclusion on Independence

Independence, and being perceived to be independent, are among the most important challenges now facing humanitarian agencies. As noted, UN multilateral humanitarian organisations, the ICRC and the IFRC receive substantial annual and operation specific contributions from the USA²⁰⁷. They also receive major funding from the UK. Both these countries have been associated with serious violations of IHL in recent years (see elsewhere in this report). The need is ever more urgent for all international HA organisations to counter perceptions that their independence is compromised. With honest self-analysis²⁰⁸, decisive humanitarian-action, and luck, it will not be too late.

8.18. Finland's Role in These Developments

As already stated in this report, the MFA should continue to monitor and support HA partners to meet their objectives and obligations. As a relatively 'agenda-free' donor, it has a role to play, along with 'like-minded' donors.

With the exception of the GHDI, however, Finland has not been particularly active in public debates and processes relating to these issues (it generally does not, for instance, fund research and development, pilot programmes, or academic and educational initiatives.) Room and a need exist for the MFA to encourage and support healthy, mature reflection on such issues in Finland. This could be fostered among HA partners, academic institutions and media or 'opinion-making' actors.

²⁰⁷ This can be in the region of 20 – 25% of their funding for most of these organisations.

²⁰⁸ The ALNAP 2003 Review of HA states: *[I]t is illustrative to compare how human rights issues have been dealt with by evaluations of the Southern Africa and Afghanistan emergencies. The human rights record and accusations of politicisation of food aid by the Government of Zimbabwe – a government which had already been heavily criticised in the international media and by western governments – are consistently raised in the evaluations [reviewed]. In Afghanistan only one evaluation – by MSF-H – raised human rights and protection issues in any detail, replicating the situation in Kosovo five years back. A case of double standards, or not biting the hand that feeds, perhaps?*

ANNEX 1 – 1997 HA POLICY PAPER OUTLINE

The evaluation team has translated the above paper to English, in full. Here is the Table of Contents.

Finland MFA – Policy paper on Humanitarian Aid – 5.11.1997

1. Introduction
 - 1.1. Changes in the international environment
 - 1.2. Need to re-evaluate Finnish humanitarian aid
2. Humanitarian aid as part of Finnish foreign policy
3. Humanitarian principles and standards
4. Content of the aid
5. Criteria for choosing aid targets
 - 5.1. Need for aid
 - 5.2. Supporting activities that enhance stability
 - 5.3. Geographical proximity
 - 5.4. Possibilities of Finnish participation
 - 5.5. General (non-ear-marked) and ear-marked aid
6. Aid channels
 - 6.1. General
 - 6.2. Aid coordination
 - 6.3. UN agencies
 - 6.4. ICRC
 - 6.5. NGO's
 - 6.6. Other organisations
7. Finland's and the EU's humanitarian aid
8. Development of Finnish resources
9. Aid administration
10. Communications

ANNEX 2 – INTERVIEWEES

- Aarnio, Kirsti. Chargé Affaires E.T, Embassy of Finland.
- Abdi, Mowlid. Field Monitor, World Food Programme.
- Abebe, Ato. Planning Monitoring and Evaluation, Lutheran World Federation.
- Alemayuhew Messele, Getachew. Desk Officer, East and North Programme, ARRA.
- Alemu, Kifelew. Branch Secretary, Ethiopian Red Cross, Dire Dawa Branch.
- Andersén, Raija. International Aid Officer, Kalkku Logistics Centre, Finnish Red Cross.
- Anttila, Ulla. Member of Parliament, Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Finland.
- Asamoah, Frederick. Deputy Head of Sub-Office, World Food Programme.
- Assefa, Haymanot. Programme assistant, Nazareth Sub-Office, World Food Programme.
- Assefa, Tadessa. Technical Manager, Coordination Office, Lutheran World Federation.
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- Belgasmi, Daly. Head of Office and Representative, Geneva, World Food Programme.
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- Brudermann, Marco. Head of Delegation, International Committee of the Red Cross.
- Chake, G. Administrator, Coordination Office. Lutheran World Federation.
- Chapagain, Jagan. Regional Officer, Asia and Pacific Department, International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
- Chapman, Cassandra. Emergency and Food Security Director, HO, Save the Children UK.
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- Faller, Martin. Team Leader, Business Processes, International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
- Feleke, Aschalew. Field Monitor, World Food Programme.
- Fortier, Marcel. Resource Mobilisation, International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
- Frelander, Harry. Ministerial Adviser, Rescue Services Unit, Ministry of the Interior of Finland.
- Geldcha, Bodja. Relief and Rehabilitation Project Manager, ECMY.
- Giorgis, Gebre. Programme Coordinator, Ethiopian Red Cross, Dire Dawa Branch.

- Greenwood, Judith. Head of Unit, External Resources Division, International Committee for the Red Cross.
- Gren, Tanja. Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations.
- Haaranen, Anne. Acting Director of International Programmes, Save the Children Finland.
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- Halmari, Tuija. Director, FIDIDA.
- Halvorson, John L. Reverend, Resident Representative, Lutheran World Federation.
- Hannus-Erkintalo, Gunilla. Finance Controller, Finnish Red Cross.
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- Hilfiker, Claude. M&E Officer, Evaluation and Studies Unit, Policy Development Section, United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
- Jolkkonen, Ritva. Director General, Department for Global Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland.
- Jundi, Mohammed. Field Monitor, World Food Programme.
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- Kronman, Gunvor. Chair, Development Policy Committee, Finland.
- Kuusela, Janne. Defence Policy Adviser, International Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence of Finland.
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- Ladowani, Lokule. Head of Sub-Office, Dire Dawa, Jijiga, World Food Programme.
- Lahnalampi, Raili. Counsel to the Foreign Affairs Committee, Finland.
- Lal, Prakash. International Programme Delegate (Liberia), Save the Children Finland.

- Larson, Robert. Officer in Charge, Jigiga Field Office, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
- Legg, James, Head of Sub-Office, World Food Programme.
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- Luukkanen, Merja. Project Secretary, FinnChurchAid.
- Löövi, Kalle. Head of International Aid, Finnish Red Cross.
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- Maillard, Marie-Claire. Head of Sub-Delegation, Harar, International Committee for the Red Cross.
- Makonnen, Alemo. Field Monitor, World Food Programme.
- Malletta, Robert. Field Coordination Officer, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
- Manninen-Visuri, Helena. Senior Programme officer/Humanitarian Aid, FinnChurchAid.
- Mengesha, Addisu. CD officer, Coordination Office, Lutheran World Federation.
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- Miettinen, Antti. Controller, Fida International.
- Muktar, Mohammed. NGO coordinator, Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau Office.
- Mustonen, Eija. Coordinator, Training and Advice Network, Kepa (Service Centre for Development Cooperation).
- Mäki, Hannu. Warehouse Manager, Kalkku Logistics Centre, Finnish Red Cross.
- Nair, K.S. Head of Sub-Office, Save the Children UK.
- Newton, Kate. Head of Office, World Food Programme.
- Ngandu, Ilunga. Regional Liaison Representative, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
- Nur Abib, Ahmed. Acting Project Manager, Lutheran World Federation.
- Olasvirta, Leo. Development Cooperation Counsellor. Unit for Humanitarian Assistance. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland.
- Omar, Dika. Food Distribution Monitor, Save the Children UK.
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- Sh. Aden Ismael, Mohammed. Acting Head, Pastoral Development Coordination Office, Somali Regional State.
- Shaver, Georgia. Representative and Country Director, Ethiopia. World Food Programme.
- Shewarega, Mekonnen. Programme Officer, Western Region, ARRA.
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ANNEX 4 – EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE

DRAFT 5.5.2004

ANNEX B

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EVALUATION OF FINNISH HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Introduction

As a component of official development cooperation, Finnish humanitarian assistance is an integral part of Finland's foreign policy. It is guided by the general policy papers for development cooperation and a sector-specific strategy paper from 1997. Annually, 10–15% of the development cooperation budget is allocated to humanitarian aid.

The Finnish humanitarian aid targets saving human lives, relieving human distress and helping those most in need. The aid should focus on the poorest countries. Humanitarian aid is not an isolated phenomenon, but an important tool that helps the international community to forecast, prevent and solve crisis. Finland seeks to promote the efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian aid, and to advance the application of international quality standards in the work.

In 2003, Finland spent 42 million EUR on humanitarian aid and 5 million EUR on humanitarian mine action. Non-ear-marked general support to humanitarian organisations amounted to 12 million EUR. Of ear-marked funds, 57% were allocated to Africa, 37% to Asia and 5% to Europe. As the percentage distribution reflects, most people in need of humanitarian aid were in Africa. The start of the reconstruction phase in the Balkans explains the declining share of Europe, as humanitarian aid funds are no longer needed.

The most important channels of aid were the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestinian Refugees in the Middle East, and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). Finnish channels were the Finnish Red Cross, FinnChurchAid and Fida International.

The Finnish humanitarian aid was last evaluated in 1995–1996.²⁰⁹ Overall, the conclusions were satisfactory, e.g. based on effectiveness, efficiency and relevance criteria. The evaluation report recommended that:

- the policy focus should be increased to achieve a more appreciable effect for Finnish humanitarian aid,

²⁰⁹ COWIconsult. Thematic evaluation of the Finnish humanitarian assistance. Evaluation report 1996:2. Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1996. 178 p.

- the coordination among different actors should be strengthened to improve coherence in crisis management, and
- the Ministry for Foreign Affairs should play a more active role in mobilisation of resources towards a specific agenda, to get the maximum result from the national and international capacities.

It was further recommended that each line on action should be implemented using specific objectives against which progress could be measured. There were further specific recommendations regarding the humanitarian aid administration, relations with international organisations and NGOs. The recommendations were used as guidance, when the strategy paper for humanitarian assistance was finalised in 1997 (Annex H). The Finnish approach to humanitarian assistance was last re-affirmed in the Development Policy Programme of the Government early in 2004. The policy paper emphasised the importance of strengthening the continuum of humanitarian aid and development cooperation.

An appropriate period of time has now passed to review the progress and to re-evaluate the Finnish policy and practice on humanitarian aid against the background of international development in the sector. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) has thus decided to carry out a comprehensive, independent and objective programme evaluation of the work since 1996.

Objectives

The main purpose of the evaluation is to underpin the forthcoming revisions of the Finnish humanitarian aid policy and practice. Therefore, the evaluation needs to provide future visions and clear recommendations for policy development and aid actions.

Specific objectives are to analyse and assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the Finnish humanitarian aid. An additional objective is to review how the recommendations of the previous evaluation were received in the administration and how these have been implemented.

Issues to be Covered

The period under review is 1996–2003. The evaluation should focus on disaster relief and assistance to victims of armed conflicts. It should cover all humanitarian aid funded with ODA budget, including bilateral, multilateral and NGO actions. Aid to prevention of conflicts and disasters, humanitarian mine action, support to human rights organisations and democratisation efforts should be reviewed only descriptively.

The descriptive part of the evaluation should cover at least the following issues:

- Brief historical background
- The overall position of humanitarian aid in Finnish development cooperation

- Previous evaluation report: how this was received and how the recommendations have been implemented
- Programme and policy development since 1996
- Aid actions and allocations since 1996
- The current policies for humanitarian aid
- How does Finland address the issues of changing humanitarian environment and efforts to improve aid relevance and quality? (To what extension is attention paid to on-going donor community's thematic discussions on cross-cutting issues like continuum, LRRD/4R, forgotten crisis, good humanitarian donorship and other quality and impact related matters?)
- The humanitarian aid administration, decision-making process and its resources
- The capacity of the Finnish NGO sector to contribute to the delivery of humanitarian aid: current strengths and development issues
- The influence of civil society actions and of the media in focusing humanitarian aid actions

The analytic part of the evaluation needs to address the following issues:

- Relevance

Has the implementation of humanitarian assistance been in line with general and sector specific policies of the Department for Development Policy? How does the Finnish policy and practice compare with those of international actors?

- Efficiency/cost-effectiveness:

Were the financial and staff resources and other inputs used efficiently to achieve results? Relevant questions include the balance between non-ear-marked vs. ear-marked aid, the optimal sizing of aid targets, the appropriate number of small projects, and the utilisation of Finnish expertise.

- Effectiveness/timeliness

To what extent did the assistance achieve its purpose? Has the aid been focused on greatest needs and largest funding deficiencies? Proper timing of assistance.

- Relevance/Appropriateness

"Relevance" refers to the overall goal and purpose of a programme, whereas "appropriateness" is more focused on the activities and inputs.

- Connectedness

To what extent have the humanitarian activities taken into account the country-specific contexts and longer-term and interconnected problems?

- Coherence

Refers to policy coherence, and the need to assess security, developmental, trade and military policies as well as humanitarian policies, to ensure that there is a consistency and, in particular, that all policies take into account humanitarian and human rights considerations.

Coherence can also be analysed solely within the humanitarian sphere - to see whether all actors are working towards the same basic goal.

- Co-ordination

Finnish interventions in relation to what others are doing. International coordination. The role of Finnish embassies abroad.

- Protection

Assessment of the levels of security and protection in the area of the project or programme and, where relevant, the steps taken to improve them.

Cross-cutting and thematic issues need also be addressed:

- Poverty: The ultimate goal of development co-operation is to alleviate poverty and to improve the position of the least privileged and marginalised groups of society. Although the approach in humanitarian aid is mainly for short- and medium-term actions, it will be necessary to assess the justification of the aid from the poverty point of view: e.g. who were the actual beneficiaries, and how much did they benefit.
- Gender: Have the actions provided equal access to and control over resources and services as well as participation in decision-making on different levels for both sexes. How do the interventions affect roles and position of both men and women in the target areas?
- Environment: Have environmental aspects in the widest sense been taken into account in design of interventions? Have there been any environmental impacts?

Methods

The evaluation shall begin with desk work comprising a study of relevant background papers and reports, and interviews with representatives of the MFA, consultants, NGOs, researchers and other relevant informants. Part of the informants, including international actors, may be interviewed through questionnaires.

The field work comprises further collection of data and interviews with the MFA representatives both in Helsinki and in the embassies and liaison offices, government officials at various levels, consultants, workers of NGOs and other key informants, local stakeholders, beneficiaries and other donor agencies working in sector and includes also eventual visits to the field.

The Appraisal Team

The work will be carried out by a team, which should have the following expertise:

- solid professional training in political, social or other relevant sciences
- practical experience in and in-depth understanding of humanitarian aid issues
- familiarity with the work of international humanitarian aid agencies
- high proficiency in evaluation methods
- knowledge of international agreements on standards and performance, such as the Red Cross/NGO Code of Conduct and the SPHERE criteria for quality of humanitarian aid as well as relevant aspects of international humanitarian law

The team should be balanced by gender, and preferably include representation from developing countries. Because part of the internal documentation cannot be translated, the team should include at least one member with fluency in Finnish.

Reporting and Timetable

The evaluation is expected to start in June/July 2004 and shall be completed by the end of the year 2004. The draft final report shall be submitted to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by the end of November 2004. The tenderer is requested to suggest its own time-table and whether field visits are included in the assignment.

After the desk study, *an inception report* will be prepared to present the future activities of the evaluation, and to adjust the scope of the study, if necessary. The report may include a proposal for eventual field visits, with proposed specific targets for project or programme evaluation. The inception report shall be submitted electronically in Word format.

After the field work, *an interim report* will be prepared and the preliminary findings will be discussed with key stakeholders to ensure the completeness of the study. The interim report shall be submitted electronically in Word and PDF formats within 4 weeks after the completion of the field work phase.

At the final stage *a draft final report* shall be prepared. After the discussion and comments from the MFA, the reporting shall be completed in *a final report*

The final report shall address in a balanced way both the positive aspects and the existing or likely problems. The recommendations must be clearly based on the findings and analysis of the evaluation. The report must contain an executive summary, not exceeding 15 pages, in which the main findings, conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations should be summarised. The main report should preferably not exceed 140 pages, excluding appendices. The reporting language is English.

The final report shall be submitted in Word and PDF formats, both electronically and as CD-ROM and in such a condition that it can be printed and published directly as hard copy. In addition, 10 printed copies of the final report are needed to the MFA.

Mandate

The Evaluation Team shall discuss all relevant issues related to the work with authorities, officials and contributors concerned, but is not authorised to make any commitments on behalf of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland.

Helsinki, 5 May, 2004

ANNEX 5 – Finnish Summary

1. Esipuhe

Suomen humanitaarisen avun evaluaatio tarkastelee Suomen antamaa virallista apua vuodesta 1996 vuoteen 2004²¹⁰. Evaluaation ensisijaisena tavoitteena on antaa *käytännöllisiä* ohjeita Suomen humanitaarisen avun linjauksiin. Nelihenkinen tiimi suoritti evaluaation käyttäen vakiintuneita evaluaatiomenetelmiä. Evaluaatio tehtiin loppuvuodesta 2004 ja alkuvuodesta 2005.

Termit “Suomen hätäapu”, “Suomen rahoittama apu” ja muut vastaavat termit viittaavat tässä raportissa Suomen viralliseen, ulkoasiainministeriön (UM) rahoittamaan humanitaariseen apuun, mikäli toisin ei ole mainittu. Lyhennys HA kattaa ”humanitaarisen avustamisen”, ”humanitaarisen avun” ja viime aikoina yhä yleistyneen ”humanitaarisen toiminnan” termit. Viimeksi mainittu sisältää ”suojeluun” liittyvät toiminnot materiaalisen hätäavun lisäksi. Termiä ”katastrofi” (disaster) käytetään usein niin sanottujen luonnonkatastrofien yhteydessä. ”Hätätila” (emergency) puolestaan viittaa konfliktitilanteisiin. Lukemisen selkiyttämiseksi tässä raportissa näitä termejä – katastrofi ja hätätila - käytetään vaihtelevasti vastaamaan toisiaan.

Humanitaariset ohjelmat sisältävät muutakin kuin vain akuutteihin hätätiloihin liittyviä toimintoja. Termillä **pitkäaikainen hätäapu** (non-acute-emergency aid) viitataan humanitaariseen apuun, jossa ei vastata dramaattiseen, elämää uhkaavaan elinolojen huononemiseen (mitattuna esimerkiksi kuolleisuudella tai sairastavuudella). Näitä tilanteita nimitetään usein toiminnan ”harmaaksi alueeksi”. ”Harmaalle alueelle” kohdistuva toiminta ei ole sen enempää akuuttia hätäapua kuin pitkän aikavälin kehitysyhteistyötäkään, vaan sisältää **hätätilan jälkeisiä toimintoja uudelleenrakentamisen, muutosvaiheen ja kroonisen hätätilan aikana**. Esimerkkeinä tämän tyyppisestä toiminnasta voidaan mainita mm. Keski-Afrikan tilanne Kongossa ja Burundissa tai Kolumbia, joissa kriisit ovat jatkuneet vuosia, jopa vuosikymmeniä. Pitkään jatkuvien kriisien aikana ihmisten elinolot huononevat hitaasti tai ne pysähtyvät paikalleen tai joissain tapauksissa osoittavat satunnaisesti lievää kohenemistä, mutta vain harvoin niissä tapahtuu pysyvää paranemista. Näissä tilanteissa apu on luonteeltaan erilaista kuin yllättäen syntyneissä kriiseissä, akuuteissa hätätilanteissa, joissa nopeaa tilanteen tasaantumista ja jatkuvaa, asteittaista parantumista voidaan odottaa.

²¹⁰ Toimeksiannon mukaan tarkasteltava ajanjakso oli 1996 – 2003. Evaluaatio suunniteltiin tehtäväksi vuoden 2004 aikana, mutta se toteutettiin loppuvuodesta 2004 ja viimeisteltiin alkuvuonna 2005. Tämän vuoksi siihen on yhteistyössä UM:n kanssa lisätty muutamia HA:n toimintoja vuodelta 2004 ja lyhyt katsaus vuoden 2005 aiheisiin.

Suomi rahoittaa humanitaarisia toimintoja useilla eri tavoilla. Eräät suuret humanitaariset organisaatiot (kuten Punaisen Ristin Kansainvälinen Komitea ja UNHRC) saavat **yleisavustusta**. Tämä on pääasiallinen käytössä oleva tukistrategia. Lisäksi tietyille alueille ja maille annetaan rahoitusta ("löyhästi korvamerkitty rahoitus"). Lisäksi rahoitetaan tiettyjä **projekteja ja ohjelmia**.

Näin ollen on vaikea määritellä tarkasti, mitä voidaan sisällyttää Suomen rahoittamaan humanitaariseen toimintaan ja mikä ei kuulu sen piiriin. **Niinpä kaikkea humanitaarista toimintaa, jota Suomen rahoittamat humanitaarisen avun kumppanit tekevät (ml. yleisavustusta saavat UNICF ja WFP), voidaan pitää relevanttina arvioinnin kohteena tässä evaluaatiossa.** Tästä syystä evaluaatio käsittelee sekä Suomen suoraan ja kohdistetusti rahoittamia toimintoja (esim. erityiset projektit) että toimintoja, jotka eivät ole erityisesti vain Suomen rahoittamia, mutta joita Suomen yleisavustusta tai "löyhästi korvamerkittyjä avustuksia" saavat avainkumppanit suorittavat.

Tämän raportin viimeistelyssä on hyödynnetty sekä ulkoasianministeriön että kumppanijärjestöjen kommentteja evaluaatioraportin aikaisempiin versioihin. Evaluaatiota varten haastatellut henkilöt mainitaan liitteissä. Haastatteluja tehtiin Suomessa, Genevessä ja Etiopiassa.

Raportin kirjoittamisen aikaan on päättynyt historian ehkä suurin kansainvälinen humanitaarinen operaatio²¹¹. Liiottelematta voitaneen sanoa, että massiivisen²¹² vedenalaisen maanjäristyksen aiheuttama tsunami lähellä Sumatraa 26. joulukuuta 2004 johti epätavalliseen paikalliseen ja kansainväliseen toimintaan. Toisen maailmansodan jälkeen mikään muu yllättävä hätätilanne ei ole koskettanut niin monia maita²¹³ kuin tsunami.

Joulukuun 26. päivänä 2004 Aasian tsunamikatastrofin iskiessä evaluaatioraportti oli viimeistelyvaiheessa. Näin tähän hätätilaan vastaaminen ei ole evaluaation keskeisiä teemoja. Suomen toimintaa tarkastellaan kuitenkin lyhyesti katastrofin laajuuden vuoksi. Tämä valtaisa inhimillinen tragedia ja sen aikaansaama suurimittainen toiminta, myös Suomen taholta, korostavat useita tämän raportin johtopäätöksiä.

²¹¹ YK:a lainaavien tiedotusvälineiden mukaan. Tämä jää kuitenkin nähtäväksi, sillä mittaamisessa ja vertailussa käytetyt menetelmät eivät ole selkeitä. Kiistämättä toisen maailmansodan jälkeiset humanitaariset operaatiot, olivat kokonaisuudessaan, jos niitä mitataan "hyödynsaajien" lukumäärällä ja niihin käytettyjen varojen määrällä (nykyisellä dollarin arvolla), suurempia. Samoin Ruandan kriisissä vuosina 1994–1995 kuolleiden määrä ylitti tsunamissa ilmoitettujen 210 000 määrän.

²¹² Maanjäristyksen voimakkuus oli 9 Richterin asteikolla.

²¹³ Ihmishenkien menetykset ja omaisuusvahingot keskittyivät pääasiassa yhdeksän valtion alueille. Katastrofialueella lomailevien turistien kuolemilla tai katoamisilla (jotka arvioidaan tuhansissa) lienee tiedotusvälineissä kuitenkin ollut suurempi merkitys kuin näiden valtioiden lukumäärällä.

2. Yleiskatsaus Suomen humanitaariseen apuun

Ulkoasianministeriötä ohjaavat yleiset kehitysmaapolitiikan linjaukset sekä vuodelta 1997 oleva sektorikohtainen strategia, Suomen humanitaarisen avun linjaus. Tämän linjauksen mukaan:

- 1) Avun perustavoite on ihmishenkien pelastaminen, inhimillisen hädän lievittäminen ja kaikkein heikoimmassa asemassa olevien ihmisten avustaminen.**
- 2) Apua annetaan puolueettomuuden, tasapuolisuuden ja humanisuuden periaatteita noudattaen.**

Lisäksi todetaan:

Avun tulisi kohdistua köyhimpiin maihin...Humanitaarinen apu ei ole erillinen ilmiö, vaan se on tärkeä väline, joka auttaa kansainvälistä yhteisöä ennakoimaan, estämään ja ratkaisemaan kriisejä.

Suomen humanitaarinen apu syntyi rahoitusmekanismiksi vastaamaan akuutteihin hätätiloihin, kuten luonnonkatastrofeihin. Nykyään sillä rahoitetaan toimintoja, jotka liittyvät sekä akuutteihin hätätilanteisiin että pitkäaikaisiin hätätilanteisiin. Noin 10 – 15 % vuosittaisesta kehitysyhteistyöbudjetista suunnataan humanitaariseen apuun (n. 42 M€ vuonna 2003). Avun määrä on noussut tasaisesti vuodesta 1996 lähtien, poikkeuksena vuoden 1999 (Kosovon pakolaiskriisin vuosi) jälkeen tapahtunut lyhytaikainen avun määrän laskeminen.

Ulkoasiainministeriön humanitaarisen avun määritelmä on muuttunut vuosien myötä. Humanitaarinen apu sisälsi aikaisemmin myös ennaltaehkäiseviä alueita, kuten ihmisoikeustoiminnan. Humanitaarinen miinanraivaus ja miinatoiminta ovat olleet osa humanitaarista apua vuodesta 1997 alkaen ja on määrältään noin 5 M€ vuosina 2002, 2003 ja 2004 (tarkemmin raportin luvussa 2).

Suomi keskittää suurimman osan humanitaarisen avun rahoituksestaan suurille järjestöille (esim. YK ja Punaisen Ristin ja Punaisen Puolikuun liike). Rahoitus on suurelta osin yleisavustusta tai ”löyhästi korvamerkittyä” rahoitusta ja pieneltä osin yksittäistä projektirahoitusta. Näiden järjestöjen yleisen tuloksellisuuden ja tehokkuuden arviointi on näin ollen oleellista tässä evaluaatiossa.

3. Yhteenveto Suomen humanitaarisen avun vahvuuksista

Tuloksellista humanitaarista apua

Suomen rahoittama humanitaarinen apu on yleisesti ottaen ollut tuloksellista. Lukuun ottamatta tiedossa olevaa nykykriisien hoidossa tarvittavaa maailmanlaajuisten resurssien puutetta²¹⁴, tässä raportissa mainitut onnistuneet toimenpiteet ja laadun paraneminen painavat vaa'assa enemmän kuin epäonnistumiset ja heikkoudet. Silloinkin kun nämä viimeksi mainitut ovat olleet vakavia, suomalaisten tukemat kumppanit ovat osoittaneet pystyvänsä tasapainottamaan kriittiset humanitaariset tilanteet lyhyessä ajassa (esim. luonnon tai ihmisen aiheuttamista syistä johtuvan hälyttävän kuolleisuuden ja sairastuvuuden), torjumaan suuren mittaluokan nälänhätää, kotiuttamaan suuria ihmisjoukkoja turvallisesti sekä suojelemaan ja avustamaan siviilejä taistelualueilla ja tukemaan väestöä jälleenrakennusvaiheessa.

Tärkeitä laadunparannuksia on saavutettu menetelmissä, materiaaleissa, välineissä ja institutionaalisessa valmiudessa, mukaan lukien henkilöstön kehittäminen. Näitä tekijöitä on riittävästi kompensoimaan samalla ajanjaksolla esiintyneet esimerkit tehottomasta avusta. Tämän evaluoinnin yleisarvio on positiivinen ja tuloksellisuus on pääosin seurausta tuen joustavasta keskittämisestä suurille ja kyvykkäille organisaatioille.

“Hyvä” ja arvostettu avunantaja

Suomi arvostetaan korkealle avunantajana käytettäessä laajalti hyväksytyjä “hyvän humanitaarisen avunantajan” indikaattoreita. Näitä indikaattoreita ovat mm. joustavuus, ennustettavuus, antelias ”yleisavustus” sekä ”löyhä korvamerkintä”. Kuten raportissa myöhemmin todetaan, samoja toimintatapoja ei kuitenkaan noudateta kaikkien kumppaneiden kohdalla (esim. yleisavustusta annetaan vain muutamille kumppaneille).

Ulkoasiainministeriö pystyy toimimaan nopeasti

Hätätilanteissa rahoitusta on mahdollista myöntää nopeasti, pääasiassa vastauksena Punaisen Ristin ja Punaisen Puolikuun liikkeen anomukseen. Vastaaminen muutamien tuntien kuluessa on mahdollista, kuten tapahtui vuonna 2004 Aasian tsunamin yhteydessä sekä muissa aikaisemmissa katastrofeissa.

²¹⁴ Lainaus OCHAN (Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, YK:n Humanitaaristen asioiden koordinaatioyksikkö) tilaaman tutkimuksen toimeksiantonnasta koskien maailmanlaajuisia HA-kapasiteeten arviointia: *...vallitsee yleinen huoli siitä, että on olemassa liian vähän HA:n kapasiteettia vastaamaan samanaikaisesti tapahtuvien suurien kriisien vaateisiin.*

Rahoituksen käytännöllinen keskittämien muutamille suurille kumppaneille

Kumppanit vaihtelevat merkittävästi kapasiteettinsa ja suuntautumisensa suhteen. Useimmat ovat suuria, humanitaariseen apuun keskittyneitä kansainvälisiä organisaatioita, osa puolestaan pieniä ja kehitysyhteistyösuuntautuneita järjestöjä. Keskittyminen muutaman suuren organisaation rahoittamiseen on tehokkaampaa kuin monien projektien ja järjestöjen tukeminen. Tämä on käytännöllinen strategia ulkoisainministeriön suhteellisen pienelle Humanitaarisen avun yksikölle. Suuret kansainväliset kumppanit ovat hyvin valittuja ja soveliaita sekä kykeneviä laajamittaiseen tulokselliseen toimintaan.

Suomalaisten näkemys Suomen virallisesta kehitysyhteistyöstä on myönteinen

Vuosittain tehtävien mielipidetutkimusten mukaan suuri yleisö näkee Suomen virallisen kehitysyhteistyön myönteisessä valossa. Kansalaiset yleensä ja päätöksentekijät erityisesti pitävät sitä myönteisenä ja arvokkaana ilmiönä.

4. Yhteenveto Suomen humanitaarisen avun heikkouksista

Humanitaarisen avun määrä on suhteellisen pieni

Suomalaisen humanitaarisen avun rahoituksen erityisiä vaikutuksia ja tuloksia on vaikea osoittaa, koska rahoitusta ei juurikaan ole ”korvamerkitty”. Myös ”elämää pelastava” voidaan lukea sekä pitkän aikavälin vaikutukseksi että välittömämmäksi tulokseksi. *Tapauskohtaisesti* vaikutukset ja tulokset voivat olla merkittäviä (kuten Etiopiassa, missä Suomi avusti merkittävällä osuudella kansainvälisiä pyrkimyksiä torjua suuren mittakaavan nälänhätää).

Suomen humanitaarisen avun yleiset, *maailmanlaajuiset* vaikutukset ja tulokset tulevat kuitenkin aina olemaan vähäisiä, verrattuna sekä vallitsevaan tarpeeseen että saatavilla olevaan humanitaarisen avun rahoitukseen. Prosentuaalinen tasapaino kehitysyhteistyön ja humanitaarisen avun välillä ei ole sinällään ongelmallista, mutta virallisen kehitysyhteistyön *kokonaismäärä* kuitenkin on sitä. Huolimatta humanitaarisen avun vuotuisesta, todellisesta jatkuvasta kasvusta, sen maailmanlaajuiset vaikutukset ja tulokset tulevat olemaan vähäisiä, kunnes virallinen kehitysyhteistyömääräraha saavuttaa vähintään luvutun 0,7 % osuuden BKT:stä.

Humanitaarisen avun linjaus vuodelta 1997 ei ole ajanmukainen, eikä sitä noudateta

Suomen humanitaarisen avun evaluoinnin suositukset vuodelta 1996 ja sitä seuranneet ulkoasiainministeriön linjaukset ehdottavat, että humanitaarista apua rahoitettaisiin lähtien suomalaisesta ”kriisinhallintanäkökulmasta”:

The Finnish emergency response must: treat any crisis with humanitarian implications as a foreign policy category in itself, to be dealt with in a coordinated way within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, with a primary responsibility placed on its crisis instruments, so as to restore sustainable development and to support responsible government²¹⁵ ... To change the place of [Finland's] humanitarian response ... to becoming an active coordination of inter-ministerial action in times of crisis is to acknowledge the ... security and political implications of humanitarian assistance²¹⁶ ... Humanitarian assistance ... should be seen as an integral part of Finland's foreign policy, with definite linkages to the country's security policy, development aid policy and human rights policy²¹⁷.

Humanitaarinen apu on yksi Suomen ihmisoikeuspolitiikan väline... Edelleen, humanitaarinen apu on yksi Suomen pakolais- ja siirtolaispolitiikan välineistä²¹⁸.

Tällainen tavoite ei ole saavutettavissa, eikä se ole realistinen tai toivottava. Suomella ei ole institutionaalista kapasiteettia toteuttaa humanitaarista apuaan *systemaattisesti* koordinoitulla ja yhtenäisellä lähestymistavalla kriiseihin. Olemassa olevien resurssien ja kapasiteetin rajoitusten lisäksi yritys toteuttaa humanitaarista apua tällaisten strategisten linjausten sisällä voisi joutua ristiriitaan humanitaarisen avun perusperiaatteiden, erityisesti riippumattomuuden, puolueettomuuden ja tarpeeseen perustuvan vastaamisen kanssa. Vanhentunut linjaus tulisi päivittää.

Avun tarve ei ole rahoituksen ainoa kriteeri

Vaikka pääosa avun rahoituksesta onkin vapaata poliittisista ja strategisista vaikutteista, niin tiedotusvälineet ja poliittiset näkökulmat ovat alkaneet vaikuttaa tukipäätöksiin (esim. Irakin ja Afganistanin tilanteiden sekä Aasian vuoden 2004 tsunamin²¹⁹ yhteydessä). Tarve ei siten ole ainoa huomioonotettu seikka tukipäätöksiä tehtäessä.

²¹⁵ P. xiv, COWIconsult. Thematic evaluation of the Finnish humanitarian assistance. Evaluation report 1996:2. Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1996

²¹⁶ P. 58, COWIconsult. Thematic evaluation of the Finnish humanitarian assistance. Evaluation report 1996:2. Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1996

²¹⁷ P. 17, COWIconsult. Thematic evaluation of the Finnish humanitarian assistance. Evaluation report 1996:2. Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1996

²¹⁸ Humanitaarisen avun linjaus 5.11.1997

²¹⁹ Rahoituksen epätasapainosta mainittiin esim. Helsingin Sanomissa 29.12.2004 Suomen UNICEFin pääsihteerin todetessa, että myös Darfurissa on katastrofi, mutta se ei saa osakseen huomioita.

(”Tarve” on objektiivisten elinolosuhteiden²²⁰ ja käytettävissä olevien resurssien suhde vastata näihin olosuhteisiin²²¹).

Kumppaneiden suorituskyvyssä saattaa olla vaihtelua

Kumppaneiden suorituskyky vaihtelee suuresti, myös saman organisaation sisällä erilaisissa tilanteissa. Kumppanit voivat olla erittäin tehokkaita. Ne ovat myös osoittaneet olevansa herkkiä epäonnistumisille ja tehostomuudelle. Suurin osa kumppaneista on useimmiten kyvykkäitä, mutta vakavia heikkouksiakin esiintyy (kuten oli nähtävissä evaluaation Etiopian kenttämatkalla). Nämä poikkeamat edellyttävät ulkoasiainministeriön tarkempaa seuranta ja mahdollisesti tukitoimia.

Esimerkkejä tehostomuudesta ovat mm. hitaus ja riittämättömät toimenpiteet suurissa hätätilanteissa, mukaan lukien ”unohdetut kriisit”, pakolaisten ja vankien suojelun epäonnistuminen, tekniset ja johtamiseen liittyvät heikkoudet, joiden seurauksena avustushjelmat alittavat standardit merkittävästi (esim. vuosia korkealla pysynyt akuutin aliravitsemuksen taso, Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM)), tehoton koordinointi, riittämätön seuranta ja ohjaus, joka on johtanut pakolaisten seksuaaliseen hyväksikäyttöön sekä epäonnistuminen estää voimakkaiden valtioiden toistuvaa kansainvälisen humanitaarisen lain rikkomista.

Humanitaarisen avun, jälleenrakennuksen ja pitkäjänteisen kehitysyhteistyön yhdistämisen (LRRD) parantaminen

Suomi ei järjestelmällisesti edistä humanitaarisen avun liittämistä pitkän aikavälin avustushankkeisiin. Eräät GHDI:n (Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative²²²) mittarit sisältävät avunantajien tämän tyyppisen toiminnan. Suomen tapauksessa tämä on pääosin jätetty kumppaneille. Mikäli tätä on tapahtunut, se on ollut tapauskohtaista ja kumppanit ovat käyttäneet yleisavustusta tai ”löyhästi korvamerkittyä” rahoitusta luodakseen eri

²²⁰ Ts. elämää ylläpitävien tarvikkeiden, palvelujen ja suojelun, kuten ruuan, lääketieteellisen hoidon, veden, sanitaation ja laillisen ja fyysisen suojelun saatavuus.

²²¹ Eräiden arvioiden mukaan tällä hetkellä maailmassa on 45 ”heikkoa” (fragile) valtiota. ECHO:n (European Commission Humanitarian Office, Euroopan komission humanitaarinen toimisto) on kehittänyt mittarin nimeltään **the Global Index for humanitarian Needs Assessment** (Humanitaarisen tarpeen arvioinnin kansainvälinen indeksi), jolla mitataan tiettyjä avun tarpeen muuttujia. Se ei kuitenkaan huomioi resursseja, joita on saatavilla esim. muista kuin avustuskäytöstä (esim. poliittisena rahoituksena Irakin kohdalla), eikä nopeasti kasvavia taloudellisia voittoja, joita syntyvät esim. juuri Irakin öljyntuotannon kautta. Tämän seurauksena Irak asettuu indeksissä ”korkean avuntarpeen” maaksi, vaikka itse asiassa monet vähemmän apua saaneet valtiot ja kansanryhmät tarvitsisivat apua enemmän (esim. Burundi, Kongon demokraattinen tasavalta ja Sudan).

²²² Hyvän humanitaarisen avunantajan aloite, joka tavoitteena on parantaa virallisten HA-avunantajien käytäntöjä. OCHA kehitti GDHI-mittarit Burundissa tehtyä pilottitutkimusta varten.

avustustyyppien välisiä yhteyksiä. Lisäksi HATR:n²²³ kokousten tekemästä muiden ulkoasiainministeriön toimijoiden konsultoinnista on voinut seurata tällaista yhteyksien luomista.

Tämä on realistinen ja käytännöllinen lähestymistapa. On epärealistista olettaa humanitaarisen avun rahoituksen täyttävän keskenään kilpailevat nopean ja tehokkaan kriisituen tarpeet ja *samalla* myös ottavan osaa pitkän aikavälin tarpeisiin vastaamiseen. Ihannetilanteessa tällainen yhdistäminen voitaisiin kuitenkin saavuttaa humanitaarisen avun ja kehitysyhteistyön erittäin joustavalla yhteiskäytöllä tilanteissa, joissa tarve tätä vaatii ja mahdollisuudet ovat olemassa. Tätä voitaisiin parhaiten toteuttaa avustuksen kohteena olevan maan tai edustuston tasolla. Ottaen huomioon, että Suomen kehitysyhteistyö on rajoitettu vain muutamiin maihin, on kuitenkin myönnettävä, että tämä ei tällä hetkellä ole toteutettavissa.

Rahoitusprosessit eivät ole selkeitä ja ne ovat ajoittain hitaita

Yksityiskohtaiset, tarkoin määritellyt rahoituskriteerit ja rahoituksen priorisoinnin käytännölliset, kirjalliset ohjeet puuttuvat. Rahoitusprosessit ja kriteerit ovat epäselviä myös joillekin suomalaisille kansalaisjärjestöille (esim. ulkoasianministeriön ja eräiden kumppaneiden väliset erityiset suhteet). Luonnonkatastrofien, yleisavustuksen ja muun humanitaarisen avun rahoituksen erityisvaatimuksia selittäviä, yksityiskohtaisia ohjeita ei ole julkaistu.

Muiden kuin luonnonkatastrofien rahoitus ei ole erityisen nopeaa, sillä se edellyttää huomattavaa valmistelutyötä ja ulkoasianministeriön sisäistä konsultaatiota. Rahoituspäätökset tehdään vuosittain kahdella kierroksella, keväällä ja syksyllä. Joidenkin kumppaneiden mielestä prosessi on suhteellisen nopea muihin avunantajiin verrattuna, toiset puolestaan näkevät sen luvattoman kömpelönä ja hitaana.

Ulkoasiainministeriön humanitaarisen avun tekninen asiantuntemus on rajoittunutta

Evaluaatio katsoo, kuten aiemmin on mainittukin, ulkoasianministeriön avustusten hallinnoinnin olevan käytännöllistä ja suhteellisen tehokasta. Suomelta puuttuu kuitenkin eräitä resursseja verrattuna muihin samankokoisiin avunantajiin. Ulkoasianministeriön tekninen ja ”kenttäosaaminen” on rajoittunutta. Yksittäisillä johtavilla ulkoasianministeriön virkamiehillä saattaa olla jopa seitsemän vuoden kokemus

²²³ HATR, HA-yksikön Humanitaarisen avun työryhmä, joka kokoontui säännöllisesti ja konsultoi laajasti UM:n muita toimijoita rahoituspäätöksien tueksi.

humanitaarisen avun rahoituksen hallinnoinnista tai laajaa kokemusta Genevestä, missä useat humanitaariset organisaatiot sijaitsevat. Tästä huolimatta ulkoasianministeriöstä puuttuu teknistä asiantuntijuutta ja varsinaiseen humanitaarisen avun operaatioiden toteuttamiseen tarvittavaa kenttäosaamista. Tämä on huomattava rajoite niin Helsingissä kuin edustustoissakin liittyen organisaatioiden ja avustustoimien priorisointiin, seurantaan ja tukeen.

Uskonnon ja humanitaarisen avun peruseriaatteiden mahdollinen ristiriita

Uskonnolliset järjestöt ovat historiallisesti tehneet kansainvälisesti vaikuttavaa avustustyötä. Monet uskonnollisten järjestöjen työntekijät ovat menettäneet henkensä avustaessaan muita ihmisiä. Viime aikoina kansalaisjärjestöjen uskonnolliset tavoitteet ja arvot ovat olleet yhä enemmän vaarassa tulla tulkituiksi olevan ristiriidassa humanitaarisen avun peruseriaatteiden kanssa. Maailmanlaajuisesti tietyissä vaikutusvaltaisissa ryhmissä uskonnolliset erimielisyydet ovat saaneet yhä kasvavaa merkitystä.

Ei ole epäilystäkään, etteivätkö uskonnolliset kansalaisjärjestöt pyrkisi olemaan uskonnollisesti riippumattomia. Kaikki kumppanit nimenomaan kannattavat humanitaarisen avun peruseriaatteita, kuten *puolueettomuutta ja riippumattomuutta*. Kysymys on kuitenkin siitä, miten asiat tulkitaan. Kumppanit toimivat verkostojen kautta, joihin niillä ei ole suoraa kontrollia.

Evaluaation kenttämätka ja tutkimukset osoittavat tämän olevan mahdollisesti vakavan asian. Suurta tarkkuutta vaaditaan, jotta kumppaneita pidettäisiin puolueettomina ja riippumattomina yhä kasvavassa määrin latautuneessa ja kahtiajakautuneessa humanitaarisen avun työskentely-ympäristössä. Tämä liittyy yhtäläisesti niin avustustyöntekijöiden henkilökohtaiseen turvallisuuteen kuin humanitaarisen avun periaatteisiin.

Ulkoasiainministeriön rahoittama FinnRescue -toiminta vaatii arviointia

Vaikka ulkoasianministeriön rahoitus FinnRescue-tiimille²²⁴ on sinällään vähäistä, niin sen rajoitettuihin hyötyihin nähden sitä voidaan pitää kalliina tukimuotona. Vaikka toiminta onkin potentiaalisesti hyödyllistä erikoisolosuhteissa, niin evaluaatio haluaa nostaa esiin kysymyksen tällaisen rahoituksen tehokkuudesta arvioitaessa sen kustannuksia, käyttöä ja saavutettavissa olevaa hyötyä.

Suuren yleisön tietämys humanitaarisesta avusta on rajoittunutta

Aasian tsunamin yhteydessä suomalaisten anteliaisuus on ollut ylitsevuotavaa, kuten se on ollut muissakin maissa. Tämän katastrofin ja muiden kriisien saamien lahjoitusten (sekä julkisen että yksityisen) määrissä on kuitenkin häiritsevän suuri epätasapaino. Suuri yleisö tarvitsee enemmän tietoa ja analyysejä humanitaarisen avun tarpeista ja prioriteeteista sekä rahoitustyypeistä ja -vertailuista. Erityisen tärkeää on ohjata tiedotusvälineitä ja muita ryhmiä kiinnittämään huomiota tiettyihin humanitaarisin tilanteisiin, kuten esim. ”unohdettuihin kriiseihin”.

Riippumattomuuden ja puolueettomuuden haasteet

Tämän hetken suurin haaste humanitaarisen avun järjestöille ja avunantajille ei liity kuljetuksiin tai tekniseen kapasiteettiin, vaan humanitaarisen suojelun tarjoamiseen sitä tarvitseville ihmisille.

Humanitaaristen järjestöjen tällä alueella kohtaamat rikkomukset ovat merkittäviä ja käytettävissä olevat keinot ovat riittämättömiä. Evaluaation johtopäätös on, että eräissä tapauksissa kansainväliset humanitaariset järjestöt ovat epäonnistuneet suojelemaan ihmisiä vakavilta rikkomuksilta, jotka ovat kansainvälisen humanitaarisen lain (IHL) ja kansainvälisten ihmisoikeuslakien (IHRL) vastaisia. Näitä rikkomuksia ovat tehneet erityisesti voimakkaat valtiot, jotka ovat myös avustusjärjestöjen merkittävimpien avunantajia ja joita pidetään maailmanlaajuisten toimintastandardien asettajina.

Humanitaaristen järjestöjen johtohenkilöiden havainnot osoittavat myös, että niitä ei enää pidetä kaikkialla maailmassa riippumattomina ja puolueettomina hätäavun ja suojelun tarjoajina, edustivatpa ne sitten YK:a, Punaista Ristiä/Punaista Puolikuuta tai jotain muuta kansainvälistä kansalaisjärjestöä (INGO, International Non-Governmental Organisation). Joissain merkittävässä tapauksissa lopputuloksena on ollut epäluottamusta

²²⁴ Kansainvälinen pelastuspalvelu-tiimi

tai jopa välitöntä vihamielisyyttä. Humanitaaristen järjestöjen tuleekin rehellisesti kysyä itseltään, onko niiden tehottomuus voimakkaiden valtioiden tekemien väärinkäytösten edessä parantanut tai pahentanut tällaisia näkemyksiä.

5. Tulevaisuuden suunnat ja haasteet

Pakolaisten määrä vähenee, mutta kriisien ja humanitaarisen avun toimijoiden määrät kasvavat

Pakolaisten määrä on pienentynyt merkittävästi viimeisen vuosikymmenen aikana (1990-luvun puolivälin 20 miljoonasta noin 17 miljoonaan). Pakolaisten määrän vähentyessä, evakkojen (IDP, Internally Displaced Persons) määrä on kuitenkin lisääntymässä. Millään monikansallisella organisaatiolla ei ole kansainvälistä mandaattia auttaa ja suojella tällaisia henkilöitä.

Tilanteesta tehtyjen arvioiden ja asiantuntijoiden²²⁵ näkemysten mukaan hätätilanteet ovat yleistyneet ja ne esiintyvät suuremmassa mittakaavassa kuin aikaisempina vuosikymmeninä. Esimerkkeinä voidaan mainita mm. aikaisemmin kokemattoman Pan-Afrikan sodan, jota käytiin pääosin Kongon Demokraattisen tasavallan, entisen Zairen, alueella ja joka on johtanut arviolta kolmen miljoonan ihmisen kuolemaan vuodesta 1994 alkaen. Lukuisia vaikutuksiltaan yhä suurempia luonnonkatastrofeja on myös rekisteröity, ml. tulvia, maanjäristyksiä, tulivuorenpurkauksia ja maanvyöryjä. Aasian tsunami on tästä viimeisin, erityisen huomattava esimerkki.

Suunta tulee todennäköisesti jatkumaan ja aiheuttaa paineita humanitaarisen avun osuuden lisäämiseksi maailmanlaajuisessa kehitysyhteistyössä. Humanitaarisen avun järjestöjen, ryhmien ja verkostojen huomattavan nopea lisääntyminen tulee myös todennäköisesti jatkumaan, samoin kuin hidaskasvu kohti suurempaa teknistä kyvykkyyttä.

Ajoittain kova kilpailu rahoituksesta on rohkaissut monikansallisten järjestöjen mandaattien ”hiipivää” laajentumista (esim. erikoisalueiden ja kansainvälisen mandaatin laajentaminen vastaamaan kasvaneeseen avuntarpeeseen ja suurempiin varainhankintamahdollisuuksiin).

²²⁵ Pierre de Senarclens, Sveitsin Punaisen Ristin varapresidentti, haastattelu Sud Ouest Dimanche, 9.1.2005.

”Harmaa alue” ja krooniset, toistuvat kriisit ovat muodostuneet normeiksi ja LRRD²²⁶ on tavoittamattomissa

Länsimainen humanitaarisen avun järjestelmä on rakennettu vastaamaan stereotyyppisiin, yllättäen syntyviin, akuutteihin luonnonkatastrofeihin, joissa on jatkumo katastrofin tasaantumisvaiheesta jälleenrakennukseen ja pitkäaikaiseen kehitysyhteistyöhön. Nämä eivät kuitenkaan ole enää normi, kuten vuonna 1996 tehty Suomen humanitaarisen avun evaluaatio aivan oikein päätteli. Pysyvät ja toistuvat kriisit kestävät vuosia, jopa vuosikymmeniä.

Monien kehitysyhteistyöohjelmien epäonnistuminen on jättänyt maapallolle alueita, jotka ovat pysyvästi haavoittuvia katastrofeille, jotka syntyvät sosiaaloudellisesta marginalisaatiosta ja ympäristön huononemisesta. Vaikka sekä humanitaarinen apu että kehitysyhteistyö ovat laajentuneet ”harmaille alueille” on niiden käyttämien menetelmien, lähestymistapojen ja kulttuureiden välillä edelleenkin häiritsevän suuri kuilu. Systemaattinen humanitaarisen avun, jälleenrakentamisen ja pitkäjänteisen kehitysyhteistyön yhdistäminen (LRRD) on edelleenkin saavuttamaton tavoite.

Sotilaallinen ja poliittinen osallistuminen humanitaariseen apuun on lisääntynyt

Hallitukset haluavat yhä enenevässä määrin käyttää humanitaarista apua välineenä sekä näkyvyytensä lisäämiseen että ulkopoliittikkaan. Avoimesti poliittisesti motivoitu humanitaarinen apu on selvästi kasvanut. Kansainväliset sotilas- ja siviilipuolustusyksiköt ovat tulleet yhä yleisemmiksi²²⁷. Suomen kaltaiset pienet maat tulevat olemaan lisääntyvän paineen alla osallistua tämän tyyppisiin kahdenkeskisiin tai yhteisiin hankkeisiin.

Vaikka sotilailla on paljon annettavaa esimerkiksi luonnonkatastrofeihin vastaamisessa, niin potentiaalinen ja todellinen sekaannus humanitaarisen avun riippumattomuuden, puolueettomuuden ja neutraalisuuden ja poliittisten, sotilaallisten ja taloudellisten tavoitteiden välillä ovat huolestuttavia. Loistavana esimerkkinä tästä voidaan pitää Serbiassa vuonna 1999 käytyä ”humanitaarista sotaa”.

Usein kahdensivuliset humanitaarisen avun toiminnot ovat jääneet monikansallisten toimijoiden varjoon, kuten tapahtui mm. vastattaessa Aasian tsunamiin.

²²⁶ Humanitaarisen avun, jälleenrakennuksen ja pitkäjänteisen kehitysyhteistyön yhdistäminen.

²²⁷ NATO:n linkittyvä Rauhankumppanuusohjelma (Partnership for Peace, PFP) on ollut yksi huomattava tekijä kehityksessä tähän suuntaan.

Seuranta- (accountability) ja tutkimusaloitteiden nopea nousu

Viimeisen vuosikymmenen aikana on syntynyt runsaasti humanitaarisen avun seurantaan (accountability) ja suorituskykyyn liittyviä mekanismeja ja tutkimusaloitteita. Näihin kuuluvat mm. GHDI, HAP-I, ALNAP, People-in-Aid, 'Compas Quality initiative' ja HPG/HPN²²⁸, jotka eroavat toisistaan huomattavasti tavoitteidensa, metodiensa ja organisatoristen rakenteidensa puolesta. Eräät näistä ovat olleet sangen kriittisiä toisiaan kohtaan. Useimmat ovat kuitenkin painottaneet humanitaarisen avun periaatteita, erityisesti riippumattomuutta ja puolueettomuutta sekä vain avun tarpeeseen perustuvaa rahoitusta.

Kumppanit toimivat avun kanavoijina, eivät suorina toimijoina

Kumppanijärjestöjen ”korporatisoituminen”, keskittyminen ja toimiminen suurien maailmanlaajuisten verkostojen kautta, jatkuu. Suurin osa kumppaneista ei toteuta ohjelmiaan suoraan. Ne toimivat yhä suurenevien verkostojen kautta, toimien enemmänkin avun kanavoijina kuin suorina toimijoina. Käytössä olevat mittarit, jotka koskevat organisaation kapasiteettia, tuloksellisuutta ja tehokkuutta, ovat perinteisesti keskittyneet varsinaiseen toimintaan kentällä. Mikäli rahoitusta ei ohjata uudelleen takaisin varsinaisille toteuttajille, tulisi kumppanit arvioida pääasiassa suhteessa niiden tuloksellisuuteen, tehokkuuteen ja transparenssiin rahoituksen kanavoinnissa niille, jotka todellisuudessa ovat toiminnallisesti läsnä kentällä.

Länsimaisten toimijoiden hallitseva osuus: vakava vaara riippumattomuudelle

Länsimaiset kansainväliset kansalaisjärjestöt, YK ja Punaisen Ristin ja Puolikuun liike, saavat edelleenkin eniten kansainvälistä humanitaarisen avun rahoitusta ml. sekä julkinen rahoitus että yksityiset lahjoitukset. Tämä siitäkin huolimatta, että on syntynyt useita uusia organisaatioita, kuten esim. Islamic Relief, African Humanitarian Action (AHA) ja Japanin virallinen kehitysapu (JAICA).

²²⁸ GHDI, (Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative), HAP-I (Humanitarian Accountability Partnership – International), ALNAP (Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action), HPG/HPN (Humanitarian Policy Group/Humanitarian Practice Network). Nämä kaikki aloittivat toimintansa viime vuosikymmenellä, osaksi vastauksena Ruandan kriisiin ja sitä seuranneisiin humanitaarisiin operaatioihin. Useimmat näistä painottavat HA-toimijoiden olevan tilivelvollisia toimistaan ja edellyttävät näiltä teknisestä kyvykkyyttä erityisesti suhteessa HA:n peruseriaatteisiin, kuten Punaisen Ristin katastrofiavun eettisiin sääntöihin (RC Code of Conduct).

Länsimaiset kansalaisjärjestöt, ml. kristilliset järjestöt, nähdään yhä enenevässä määrin länsimaisten arvojen, politiikan ja etujen ajajina²²⁹. Samanaikaisesti tämän kanssa on tapahtunut huomattava avustusjärjestöjen henkilökunnan turvallisuusriskin nousu sekä paikallisesti että kansainvälisesti.

Humanitaarisen avun järjestöjen, ml. Suomen rahoittamien kumppaneiden, suurin yksittäinen kansainvälinen haaste onkin osoittaa horjumattoman riippumattomuutensa taloudellisista, poliittisista ja sotilaallisista tavoitteista – myös päärahoittajiensa kohdalla.

Suomen rooli: tarkempi seuranta ja tuki

Suhteellisen ”agenda-vapaina” avunantajana Suomella on tärkeä tehtävä tämän haasteen kohtaamisessa yhdessä muiden samanmielisten avunantajien kanssa. Ulkoasianministeriön tulisi jatkaa humanitaarisen avun kumppaneiden seurantaa ja tukemista myös näiden humanitaarisen avun velvoitteiden täyttämiseksi. Ulkoasianministeriö voi myös tukea näiden kysymysten syvällistä pohdintaa Suomessa. Tämä voisi tapahtua humanitaarisen avun kumppaneiden, akateemisten instituutioiden ja tiedotusvälinen sekä ”mielipiteen muokkaajien” kanssa ulkoasianministeriö tukiessa keskustelun, tutkimuksen, kehityskasvatuksen ja vaikuttamisen lisäämistä.

6. Yhteenveto suosituksista

Alla oleva taulukko esittää raportin tärkeimmät suositukset tiivistetysti. Mikäli lukija haluaa tarkemman kuvan havainnoista, johtopäätöksistä ja suosituksista, on suositeltavaa perehtyä alkuperäiseen raporttiin.

Havainnot	Johtopäätökset	Suosituks
Joustavana avunantajana toimiminen		
Nykyinen toimintamalli on luonteeltaan joustava ja useimmille kumppaneille ennalta selkeä. Tämä on GHDI (Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative) periaatteiden mukaista. Useimmat kumppanit arvostavat Suomea suuresti avunantajana.	Toimintamalli on osoittautunut käytännölliseksi ja suhteellisen tulokselliseksi ja tehokkaaksi lähestymistavaksi	Suomen tulisi jatkaa HA:n tiukan ehdollistamisen välttämistä. Käytössä olevaa joustavaa lähestymistapaa, muutamien suurien kumppaneiden rahoittamista ja löyhää alueellista ”korvamerkintää”, tulisi jatkaa

²²⁹ Tästä tarkemmin evaluaatioraportissa.

Havainnot	Johtopäätökset	Suosituks
Nykyisen tasapainon säilyttäminen humanitaarisen avun ja kehitysyhteistyön välillä		
<p>1990 – luvun puolivälissä tapahtui maailmanlaajuinen paradigman muutos kriisien tulkinnassa. Linjausten tasolla tämä tarkoitti siirtymistä hätäavusta riskienhallintaan. Pääkomponenttina oli haavoittuvuuden vähentäminen.</p>	<p>Korkeatasoinen kehitysyhteistyö taistelee köyhyyttä vastaan ja näin vähentää inhimillistä haavoittuvuutta.</p> <p>Tuloksellisin tapa vastata ja vähentää kriisejä on niiden estäminen ja lieventäminen. Tämä tapahtuu parhaiten korkealaatuisella kehitysyhteistyöllä, enemmänkin kuin HA:lla.</p>	<p>Kehitysyhteistyön tulisi jatkossakin olla kansainvälisen avun kiistan painopistealue.</p> <p>Suomen HA:n nykyinen 10 – 15 % -osuus koko kehitysyhteistyövaroista on järkevän suuruinen, huolimatta (esim. tiedotusvälineiden) tunteisiin vetoavista vaatimuksista hätäavun lisäämiseen.</p>
Kriteerien selventäminen, jotta rahoitus perustuu avun tarpeeseen ja kumppanin kyvykkyyteen		
<p>Suomen rahoitus ohjautuu selkeästi tarpeen ja köyhyyden tason mukaisesti (kuten Suomen humanitaarisen avun linjauksessa todetaan).</p> <p>Tilastolliset analyysit osoittavat kuitenkin tästä olevan eräitä huomattavia poikkeuksia. Irakin, Afganistanin, Kamputsean ja Aasian tukeminen tsunamin jälkeen ovat tapauksia, joissa objektiivisesti mitattu avun tarpeen taso ei vastannut annettua rahoitusta verrattuna ”unohdettuihin kriiseihin”:</p> <p>Suomi ei kuitenkaan ole ollut tässä suhteessa ainoa, eikä suinkaan ”huonoin” avunantajamaa, kuten viimeaikaiset tutkimukset osoittavat.</p>	<p>Tarve ei ole ollut rahoituksen myöntämisen ainoa kriteeri.</p> <p>Tiedotusvälineet ja muut tekijät/painotukset ovat vaikuttaneet päätöksiin. Tämä on vastoin sekä CHDI -periaatteita että puolueettomuuden ja riippumattomuuden peruseriaatteita (esim. riippumattomuus ulkoa tulevista motiiveista).</p>	<p>Suomen tulisi varmistua siitä, että HA:n rahoituspäätökset perustuvat vain avun tarpeeseen, eikä se ole vastaus tiedotusvälineiden tai poliittiseen painostukseen/ intresseihin.</p> <p>Tämä edellyttää selkeää kriteeristöä (esim. operaatiot, joissa ei ole saavutettu kansainvälisiä avun perustandardia²³⁰), rahoitustavoitteiden asettamista ”unohdetuille kriiseille” (esim. kroonisesti alirahoitettujen kriisien prosenttiosuus), alueellista priorisointia (esim. selkeät rahoitusprosentit Afrikan jatkuviin/kroonisiin kriiseihin kuten Burundissa ja Kongon Demokraattisessa tasavallassa) sekä hakemusten tarkkaa ja systemaattista seuranta ja arviointia.</p> <p>Korkean tason erityisosaamista tarvitaan sekä Helsingissä että edustustoissa, jotta anomuksia voidaan seurata ja niihin voidaan vastata asianmukaisella tavalla.</p>

²³⁰ Kuten päivittäiset ruoka-annokset, akuutti aliravitsemustaso, suojan ja veden saanti jne.

Havainnot	Johtopäätökset	Suosituks
Avun keskittäminen nykyisiin kanaviin		
<p>Nykyiset pääasialliset kumppanit ovat suurimpia monikansallisia tai maailmanlaajuisia organisaatioita, liikkeitä tai verkostoja.</p> <p>Humanitaarisen avun yksikkö on suhteellisen pieni.</p> <p>Yleisavustuksen ja ”löyhästi korvamerkityn” rahoituksen kanavoiminen muutamien maailmanlaajuisten ja kyvykkäiden kumppaneiden kautta on ollut tuloksellista.</p> <p>Muut avunantajat ovat havainneet useiden yksittäisten projektien rahoittamisen olevan hyvin vaativaa resurssien, ajan ja henkilöstön tietotaidon suhteen.</p>	<p>Rahoituksen keskittäminen muutamille kumppaneille on tehokasta ja käytännöllistä. Mikään ei viittaa siihen, että tätä käytäntöä tulisi muuttaa.</p> <p>Kumppaneiden määrän nostaminen, esim. kansalaisjärjestöjen osalta, edellyttäisi huomattavaa UM:n kapasiteetin lisäystä. Nykyiset kumppanit pystyisivät todennäköisesti tarjoamaan kaiken sen kapasiteetin, mitä uudet kumppanit voisivat mahdollisesti tarjota.</p> <p>UM:n rahoitus on tarkoitettu hädässä oleville ihmisille, ei kehittämään suomalaista alkuperää olevien HA:n kansalaisjärjestöjen kapasiteettia – kuinka toivottavaa se olisikin.</p>	<p>UM tulisi jatkaa keskittymistä muutamien kumppaneiden rahoittamiseen.</p> <p>Kumppanien valintakriteerit tulisi määritellä (kuten kapasiteetti, mandaatti, HA:n periaatteiden noudattaminen, maailmanlaajuinen läsnäolo, vasteen nopeus ja laatu, hätäavun ja/tai siirtymävaiheen erityisosaaminen jne.)</p> <p>Kumppanit tulisi arvioida säännöllisesti näillä kriteereillä (esim. viiden vuoden välein). Arvioinnit voitaisiin suorittaa yhdessä muiden avunantajien kanssa.</p> <p>Tällaisten kriteereiden käyttöönotto saattaa vähitellen johtaa nykyisten kumppaneiden korvaamiseen uusilla (eikä kumppanimäärän lisäämiseen).</p>
Kumppaneihin vaikuttaminen päättävällä tasolla		
<p>Kumppanit ovat yleisesti ottaen tehokkaita ja hyvin valittuja.</p> <p>Kumppaneiden toiminta voi olla tuloksiltaan myös vaihtelevaa kuten tehottomuudesta kertovat esimerkit osoittavat. Eräissä vakavissa tapauksissa toiminta on ollut huomattavan tuloksetonta.</p> <p>Kokemus on osoittanut, että eräänä vaikuttavana tekijänä kansainvälisen järjestön suorituskykyyn toimia nopeasti ja onnistuneesti ovat avunantajien ja julkisuuden painostuksen taso.</p> <p>Tämä vaikuttaa erityisesti siihen, minkä tasoista henkilökuntaa työskentelee kentällä.</p>	<p>Keskittyminen muutamiin kumppaneihin antaa UM:lle suuremman mahdollisuuden seurata ja vaikuttaa näiden toimintaan.</p> <p>(Tämä voidaan toteuttaa esim. valituilla avunantajatoimilla, toimimalla näiden kansainvälisten järjestöjen päättävissä elimissä ja/tai useiden avunantajien yhteisillä aloitteilla.)</p>	<p>UM tulisi kehittää selkeä avainkumppaneihin kohdistuva vaikuttamisstrategia, jotta niiden toiminta olisi johdonmukaisesti tuloksellista ja HA:n kansainvälisten standardien ja hyvien käytäntöjen ja peruseriaatteiden mukaista.</p> <p>Tämä tulisi tehdä yhdessä EU:n, pohjoismaiden ja/tai ”samanmielisten” avunantajien kanssa. Tällainen vaikuttaminen voitaisiin yhdistää avainkumppaneiden säännöllisiin ja systemaattisiin arviointeihin, evaluaatioihin tai ”institutionaalisiin” auditointeihin (esim. viiden vuoden välein).</p>

Havainnot	Johtopäätökset	Suosituks
Kumppaneiden suorituskyvyn seurannan huomattava parantaminen		
<p>Vuonna 2004 tehty Hallinnon arviointi ehdotti toimivallan suurempaa hajauttamista edustustoille²³¹.</p> <p>UM:n rahoitusta ohjataan pääasiassa valitsemalla "hyviä" kumppaneita, enemmän kuin valitsemalla "hyviä" projekteja.</p> <p>Harvoilla edustustoilla on resursseja seurata toimintoja riittävällä tasolla.</p> <p>Teoriassa edustustojen, jotka sijaitsevat kehitys yhteistyöhön suuntautuneissa maissa, pitäisi "apu-orientoituneen" läsnäolonsa avulla pystyä seuraamaan HA:a systemaattisesti.</p> <p>Käytäntö on osoittanut, että näin tapahtuu harvoin. Yleisesti ottaen edustustoilta puuttuu aikaa, resursseja, henkilöstöä ja erityisosaamista sekä ohjeistusta seurata ja valvoa HA:n kumppaneita ja toimintoja riittävällä tasolla.</p>	<p>UM:n kumppaneiden valvonnan vahvistamiseen tarvitaan erityisiä menetelmiä.</p> <p>Ammattimaiset tarve-analyysit ovat avainkeinoja pyrittäessä hyviin ohjelmiin ja hyvään seurantaan.</p> <p>UM:n nykyiset resurssit ja kapasiteetti ovat tähän riittämättömiä.</p>	<p>HA -yksikön ja edustustojen henkilöstön tulisi tehdä enemmän seurantamatkoja kentälle. Ihannetilanteessa heidän seuranaan olisi kokenut suomalainen HA-asiantuntija, jonka kanssa he voisivat kehittää seurantametoja ja -tekniikoita. (Ks. seuraava suositus).</p> <p>Niissä maissa, missä Suomella on edustusto, pieni osa HA-budjetista (1 - 3 %) voitaisiin osoittaa edustuston käyttöön paikallisten konsulttien palkkaamiseen, jotta he voisivat seurata ja arvioida suorituskykyä ja tuloksia suhteessa avustuksen tärkeyteen.</p> <p>Yksittäisten projektien kohdalla (jotka ovat pieni osa rahoitusta) UM:n tulisi harkita järjestöarviointien maksamista, mikäli ne ovat olleet hyvin tehtyjä ja johtaneet rahoitukseen. Tämä voitaisiin tehdä yhteisarviointina, joissa on mukana useampia kumppaneita, jotka avustavat samaa kriisiä (esim. Aasian tsunami 2004–2005).</p>
Erityishenkilöstön sekä erityisten välineiden ja koulutuksen käyttöönotto		
<p>HA on avun erityisaluetta. Henkilöstön jatkuva kierto aiheuttaa "institutionaalisen muistin" rapautumista.</p> <p>Kuten aikaisemmin on todettu, UM:n nykyiset resurssit, ml. HA:n erityishenkilöstö, ovat hyvin rajalliset. Edustustojen</p>	<p>UM:n HA-yksikön ja edustustojen tulisi voida käyttää HA:n erityisosaamista tukemaan rahoituspäätöksiä ja seuranta.</p> <p>Tiedonhallinnan ja asiakirjojen arkistointijärjestelmien tulee olla tehokkaita, jotta niillä voidaan kompensoida henkilöstön kierrosta</p>	<p>Suomalaiset asiantuntijat voisivat tarjota erityisosaamista joko lyhytaikaisilla sopimuksilla tai pysyvillä kehyspimuksilla²³².</p> <p>Yliopisto-opiskelijat ja harjoittelijat ovat eräs vaihtoehto. Ensisijaisen tärkeää</p>

²³¹ Study on the Administrative and Resource Development Needs of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland to ensure efficient and effective implementation of the White Paper on the Development policy of the Government of Finland, Final Report Submitted by Saana Consulting Oy (Ltd.) Helsinki, julkaistu 30.9.2004.

²³² DCI Irlanti (UM) on solminut kehyspimuksia useiden asiantuntijoiden kanssa. Asiantuntijat toimivat neuvonantajina rahoitusehdotuksiin ja –seurantaan liittyvistä kysymyksissä.

Havainnot	Johtopäätökset	Suosituks
<p>mahdollinen tärkeä rooli esim. HA-toimintojen ehdottamisessa ja seurannassa on rajoittunutta em. resurssipulan vuoksi..</p>	<p>aiheutuva kokemuksen menettäminen.</p>	<p>kuitenkin olisi, että UM:llä olisi käytössään päätoiminen HA-erityisasiantuntija, jonka palveluja voitaisiin käyttää tukemaan sekä HA-yksikköä että edustustoja.</p> <p>Rahoitusoppaita, koulutusta ja hallinnoinnin välineitä (kuten esitysten arviointi- ja valvonnan tarkistuslistat) tulisi kehittää, kuten myös kumppaneiden yleisen institutionaalisen suorituskyvyn seurannan erityismenetelmiä²³³.</p> <p>Tiedon- ja informaation hallintajärjestelmiä tulisi vahvistaa, jotta voidaan kompensoida kokeneen henkilöstön kiertoa HA-yksiköstä.</p>
<p>Rahoitusprosessin nopeuttaminen</p>		
<p>Suomi rahoittaa HA-budjetilla kahden tyyppistä toimintaa. Tämä tapahtuu kahden sangen erillisen prosessin kautta, joista toinen on suhteellisen nopea prosessi, jolla vastataan pääasiassa luonnononnettomuuksiin (rahoitus lähinnä SPR:lle) ja toinen on monimutkaisempi ja konsultaatioon perustuva prosessi muulle rahoitukselle.</p> <p>Nämä kaksi HA:n osa-alueita on kuvattu HA:n linjauksessa vuodelta 1997: akuutti hätäapu (sekä luonnononnettomuuksiin että aseellisiin konflikteihin liittyvä) ja hätätilan jälkeinen apu (esim. siirtymävaihe, vakiintumisvaihe ja krooniset kriisit).</p>	<p>Nämä osa-alueet (akuutti hätäapu ja pitkäaikainen hätäapu) ovat luonteeltaan erilaisia ja vaativat erilaisia toimintatapoja.</p> <p>Tietyt kumppanit soveltuvat paremmin vastaamaan jompaan kumpaan näistä osa-alueista. Esimerkiksi suomalaiset kehitysyhteistyösuuntautuneet kansalaisjärjestöt ovat osoittaneet suurempaa kyvykkyyttä vastata jälkimmäiseen alueeseen.</p>	<p>Vaikka HA-yksiköllä on kykyä vastata nopeasti luonnononnettomuuksiin, tulisi myös ”ei-luonnonkatastrofien” rahoitusprosesseja nopeuttaa ja yksinkertaistaa.</p> <p>Anomusten ja ehdotusten käsittelyprosessille tulisi asettaa aikataavoitteet, jotka voisivat toimia myös eräinä indikaattoreina mitattaessa HA-yksikön tehokkuutta. Lisäksi ne helpottaisivat kumppaneiden suunnittelua ja toimintaa.</p> <p>Pitkäaikaisen hätäavun rahoitukselle (esim. siirtymä- tai vakiintumisvaiheessa) tulisi olla erilliset kriteerit ja prosessit sekä erityisesti valitut kumppanit, jotka ovat osoittaneet kyvykkyyttä ja erityisosaamista tämän tyyppisestä toiminnasta.</p>

²³³ Esimerkiksi ohjeistus koskien lähetystöjen paikallisten kehitysyhteistyövarojen käyttöä HA:n välineenä.

Havainnot	Johtopäätökset	Suositukset
Rahoitusprosessien ja -kriteereiden selkiyttäminen		
<p>Yllä olevaan suositukseen liittyen, UM:n ja kumppaneiden väliset suhteet ovat ymmärrettävästi erilaistuneet (esim. kumppanin mandaatin, koon, luonteen tai kapasiteetin mukaan, esim. monikansallinen apu vrt. kansalaisjärjestöyhteistyö, yleisavustuksen saajat jne.)</p> <p>SPR:llä on erityisasema suhteessa UM:öön. Rahoituksen nopeus ja käytännöt eroavat muiden suomalaisten kansalaisjärjestöjen vastaavista.</p> <p>Kuten aiemmin on mainittu, akuutin hätäavun ja pitkäaikaisen hätäavun (esim. siirtymävaiheen) -ohjelmat eroavat huomattavasti toisistaan (esim. onko toiminnan nopeudella merkitystä vai ei, avun luonteen, keston ja viranomais-suhteiden suhteen)</p> <p>Osa kumppaneista saa rahoitusta myös muilta UM:n -budjettimomenteilta (esim. kansalaisjärjestövaroista). Kaikki järjestöt eivät tiedä, mitä kriteereitä käytetään HA:n rahoituksessa.</p>	<p>Rahoituksen kriteereihin ja prosesseihin tarvitaan suurempaa läpinäkyvyyttä, ml. selkeät valintakriteerit kumppaneille ja sille, miksi kumppaneiden kanssa toimitaan eri lailla.</p> <p>Kumppaneiden ja ohjelmien seuranta edellyttää erityisiä kriteerejä ja indikaattoreita.</p> <p>Samoin UM:n ja kumppaneiden suorituskykyä tulisi mitata erityyppien ohjelmatyypin mukaan rahoitusprosessien sopivuuden ja avun antaman vastineen pohjalta.</p>	<p><i>Kehityspoliittisen ohjelman toimeenpanon painopisteet 2004 – 2005</i> – asiakirjan mukaan HA:n hakumenettelyyn, sopimusten tekoon ja raportointiin liittyviä ohjeita uudistetaan.</p> <p>UM tulisi selkeästi dokumentoida nämä kriteerit ja rahoitusprosessit.</p> <p>Tämä tulisi tapahtua tuottamalla toimintaohjeita sekä antamalla kumppaneille ja ulkoisille avainryhmille (esim. kansainvälisille järjestöille, poliitikoille, tiedostusvälineille ja yliopistoyhteisölle) säännöllisiä tilannekatsauksia.</p> <p>Kumppanien osalta kriteerit tulisi pohjautua objektiiviseen analyysiin näiden kyvystä laadukkaan HA:n tuottamiseen nopealla ja tehokkaalla tavalla HA:n periaatteiden ja hyvien käytäntöjen mukaisesti. Näiden kriteereiden objektiivinen soveltaminen voi johtaa siihen, että suomalaisten kansalaisjärjestöjen edelle kumppaneiden valinnassa asetetaan erikoistuneet HA:n kansainväliset toimijat (kuten MSF (Lääkärit ilman rajoja) tai SC-UK (Pelastakaa lapset–UK)).</p>
Siirtymä- ja vakiintumisvaiheet edellyttävät erityistä lähestymistapaa		
<p>Erästä kokenutta tarkkailijaa lainaten: <i>Siirtymävaiheen tilanteet edellyttävät täysin erilaisia työmenetelmiä ja analyysejä kuin mitä HA:n toimijoilla on käytössään.</i> Vuoden 1997 HA:n linjaus</p>	<p>Ihanteellista olisi, että kaikki avustusrahoitus olisi erittäin joustavaa. Tietyt termit, kuten hätätilanne, HA ja kehitysyhteistyö kävisivät näin asteittain tarpeettomiksi.</p>	<p>Kuten jo aiemmin on todettu, kumppanin tyyppinen apu tulisi hallinnoida selvästi erilaisilla kriteereillä ja prosesseilla.</p> <p>Tärkeänä askeleena kohti yhteistyötä on <i>Kehityspoliittisen</i></p>

Havainnot	Johtopäätökset	Suositukses
<p>erottaa hätätilanteen ja välivaiheen toisistaan.²³⁴</p> <p>Yleistyvä "harmaa alue" (jota on kuvattu tämän raportin luvussa 8) edellyttää avulle lähestymistapoja, jotka eivät ole klassista HA:a tai kehitysyhteistyötä, vaan enemmänkin näiden kahden joustavaa yhdistelmää. Sen tulisi kyetä nopeasti sopeutumaan äkillisesti muuttuviin tarpeisiin ja toimintaympäristöihin.</p>	<p>Koska tähän kulunee vielä aikaa, HA-rahoitus tulisi eriyttää vähintään akuuttiin hätäapuun (luonnononnettomuudet, yllättävät ihmisen aiheuttamat kriisit) ja pitkäaikaiseen hätäapuun.</p>	<p>ohjelman toimeenpanon painopisteet 2004 – 2005 – asiakirjan toteamus, että koordinaatiota HA:n ja kehitysavun välillä vahvistetaan.</p> <p>Tämä on erityisesti oleellista niiden maiden kohdalla, joiden kanssa Suomella kahdenvälistä kehitysyhteistyötä. (Vuoden 1997 HA:n linjaus toteaa, että HA voidaan näissä maissa lopettaa aiemmin. Tapahtuipa näin tai ei, niin tarkempi koordinaatio on tarpeen).</p>
<p>Vaikuttamisen, kehityskasvatuksen ja tutkimusyhteistyön voimistaminen</p>		
<p>Euroopan neuvoston "Global Education report on Finland"²³⁵ toteaa, että UM:lla tulisi olla huomattava rooli suomalaisen suuren yleisön valistamisessa kansainvälisestä kehitysyhteistyöstä.²³⁶</p> <p>Aasian tsunami kuvastaa kuinka tärkeää suuren yleisön on ymmärtää HA:n monitahoisuutta. Esimerkkeinä tästä</p>	<p>Vaikuttamista ja kehityskasvatusta voidaan tehdä yhteistyössä muiden avunantajien ja/tai suomalaisten HA:n kumppanijärjestöjen kanssa.</p> <p>Suomalaisilla kansalaisjärjestöillä on ollut ja tulee edelleenkin olemaan huomattava merkitys suuren yleisön kehityskasvatuksessa.</p> <p>Kehityskasvatusta voivat antaa</p>	<p>HA:a koskeva kehityskasvatustulisi liittää osaksi suurelle yleisölle (sekä lapsille että aikuisille) tarkoitettuja valistushankkeita</p> <p>Suomen tulisi myös vaikuttaa sekä kansallisesti (esim. yhteistyössä Puolustusministeriön kanssa) että kansainvälisesti HA:n periaatteiden todellisen</p>

²³⁴ Humanitaarisen avun linjauksen mukaan apu sisältää:

Hätäavun akuuteissa ja pitkäaikaisissa hätätilanteissa, jotka syntyvät aseellisten konfliktien ja luonnononnettomuuksien seurauksena. Avustustoiminta painottuu ihmisten perustarpeiden tyydyttämiseen. Akuuttivaiheessa kyse on useimmiten elintarvikkeiden, lääkkeiden ja muiden välttämättömyshyödykkeiden jakelusta sekä suojan järjestämisestä hädänalaisille ihmisille. Kriisin pitkittyessä apu muodostuu "care and maintenance" – tyyppiseksi peruspalveluja ylläpitäväksi toiminnaksi. Mikä pitkäaikaisempi kriisi, sitä pysyvämmiksi toiminnot muodostuvat.

Hätätilanteen jälkeinen **välitön jälleenrakennusvaihe**, jossa humanitaarisella avulla tuetaan olojen vakiintumista, esim. pakolaisten ja evakkojen paluunmuutto- ja re-integraatio-ohjelmia, miinanraivausta ja sotilaiden uudelleen koulutusohjelmia. Tämä vaihe voidaan ymmärtää eräänlaisena **välivaiheena** siirryttäessä pitkäaikaisempaan jälleenrakennustyöhön ja varsinaiseen kehitysyhteistyöhön.

²³⁵ Global Education in Finland; The European Global Education Peer Review Process National Report on Finland, julkaistu 4.10.2004.

²³⁶ Funding and support for global education must, of necessity, begin with Ministries for Foreign Affairs as part of the task of garnering critical public support and ensuring public transparency in a country's development cooperation endeavours. The Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs is to be commended for the foresight and commitment with which it undertakes this task. But if it must start with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, it cannot end there, but must also be fundamentally inter-ministerial.

²³⁷ Esim. yhteydet matkapuhelinvalmistajien ja coltanin kaivausten ja kaupallistaminen välillä Kongon Demokraattisen tasavallan itäosissa

²³⁸ Esimerkiksi Sveitsi on ottanut vaikuttamistoiminnan osaksi kansainvälistä apuaan.

Havainnot	Johtopäätökset	Suosituks
<p>monitahoisuudesta mainittakoon "unohtuneet kriisit versus tiedotusvälineiden profiloimat hädät", kriisien syntymiseen johtaneet perimmäiset syyt, kansainvälisten kriisein kaupalliset yhteydet²³⁷ ja pitkän aikavälin vaikutukset, kriisien ja kehityksen väliset suhteet, "hyvä" ja "paha" humanitaarinen vastine (ml. "tarjonta-painotteinen" HA, jossa lahjoitetaan tarpeettomia tai vanhentuneita tuotteita, lääkkeitä ja vaatteita), HA:n perusstandardit sekä humanitaarisen suojelun keskeinen merkitys, ml. pakolaisten ja turvapaikanhakijoiden suojele (sekä kriisialueilla että kehittyneissä maissa).</p>	<p>myös Kepa (Kehitysyhteistyön Palvelukeskus) ja suomalaiset koulutus- ja tutkimuslaitokset, yliopistot (erityisesti kehitysyhteistyöhön erikoistuneet yksiköt) sekä tutkijayhteisöt.</p>	<p>kunnioittamiseen. Tämä sisältää myös vaikuttamisen siihen, että tarve-painotteinen HA:n rahoitus lisääntyisi riippumattomana ulkoapäin tulevista linjauksista, intresseistä tai agendoista.²³⁸</p> <p>Samalla tulisi vaikuttaa keinotekoisien hallinnollisten rajojen purkamiseen HA:n ja -kehitysyhteistyön väliltä ml. suuremman joustavuuden edistämisen kumppanijärjestöjen eri toimintamuotojen (kehitysyhteistyön ja HA) välillä</p>
Kumppanuussopimusten solminen		
<p>UM:n strategia rahoittaa enemmän kumppaneita kuin projekteja on tehokas ja käytännöllinen. Tuki on keskitetty muutamille kumppaneille.</p> <p>Vaikka UM voi antaa tukea nopeastikin, niin näin ei tapahdu aina.</p>	<p>Kriteereiden ja prosessien suurempaa selkeyttä voidaan täydentää rahoituksen suuremmalla nopeudella ja joustavuudella.</p> <p>Tämä lisäisi toiminnan tuloksellisuutta ja tehokkuutta.</p>	<p>Erityisiä "draw-down" rahoitussopimuksia tulisi harkita. Nämä voisivat olla verrattavissa esim. USA:n PRM:n (Väestö-, pakolais- ja maahanmuuttovirasto) ja maahanmuuttovirasto) käyttämiin sopimuksiin, joissa rahoitus ei edellytä yksittäisiä projekteja tai sopimuksia.</p> <p>Varat ovat vastaanottajayhteisön (esim. UNHCR) käytössä tarvittaessa. Tämä lisäisi Suomen jo nykyisellään korkealle arvostettua rahoituksen joustavuutta.</p>
Ei toiminnallisuudelle kentällä		
<p>Aasian tsunamin yhteydessä ilmeni, että hallituksia usein houkuttelee ryhtyä toimimaan itse humanitaarisissa kriiseissä (esim. käyttämällä kansallisia valmiusjoukkoja HA:n tiiminä).</p> <p>Viime vuosikymmeninä eräät hallitukset ovat lisänneet omaa</p>	<p>Vaatimukset toiminnallisuuteen kentällä perustuvat usein "näkyvyyden" tarpeeseen, haluan tulla nähdyksi nopeana, tehokkaana ja näyttävänä avunantajana kriiseissä.</p> <p>Kriisien uhrin hyötyisivät vähän Suomen operationaalisuudesta.</p>	<p>UM:n Humanitaarisen avun yksikön tulisi jatkaa ei-operationaalisenä yksikkönä. Sen ei tulisi perustaa toiminnallisia tiimejä vastaamaan suoraan hätäavun tarpeeseen kentällä.</p> <p>Mikäli Suomella on tarvetta tulla selkeämmin tunnitetuksi</p>

Havainnot	Johtopäätökset	Suosituksset
<p>toimintaansa kentällä (esim. UK ja USA) ja toiset ovat parhaillaan tarkastelemassa linjauksiaan ja kapasiteettiaan tämän asian suhteen (esim. Ruotsi ja Irlanti).</p> <p>Suomelle tällaisella muutoksella olisi huomattavia kapasiteettiin, rakenteeseen ja linjauksiin liittyviä seurauksia. Mikäli tarvitaan HA-kapasiteetin lisäystä, niin sitä voidaan saada rahoittamalla nykyisiä kumppaneita.</p>	<p>Tehokkaampia ja tuloksellisempia ratkaisuja on jo olemassa.</p>	<p>avunantajana, niin laajempi kehityskasvatus ja suurempi näkyvyys Suomen kumppaneilleen antamille avustuksille ovat parempia vaihtoehtoja kuin suuret ja suunnattoman kalliit – ja mahdollisesti (kokemuksen ja asiantuntemuksen puutteesta johtuvat) tehottomat askeleet kohti ”suoraa toimintaa”.</p>
<p>Suosituksiin pohjautuva linjausten uudelleenkirjoittaminen</p>		
<p>Vuonna 1997 valmistunut Humanitaarisen avun linjaus sisältää laajan ohjeistuksen, joka kattaa suurimman osan HA:n eri muodoista. Linjaus tarjoaa ”kaikkea hyvää kaikille ihmisille” ja on näin ollen epäkäytännöllinen.</p> <p>Keskeisenä lähtökohtana linjauksessa on, että kriisejä ei tulisi hallita vain HA:n näkökulmasta, vaan niitä tulisi tarkastella integroituna osana hallituksen ulkopoliittista lähestymistapaa, jossa HA täydentää muita osa-alueita ja päinvastoin.</p>	<p>Tämä edellyttäisi huomattavasti enemmän aikaa, asiantuntemusta ja henkilöstöä, mitä HA-yksiköltä on tällä hetkellä käytössään.</p> <p>Tämä mahdollisesti sitoisi HA:n muuhun ulkopoliittikan ja virallisen politiikan tavoitteisiin. Mikä puolestaan saattaisi olla HA:n peruseriaatteiden, kuten itsenäisyyden ja puolueettomuuden, vastaista.</p>	<p>Vuoden 1997 HA:n linjaus tulisi kirjoittaa uudelleen vastaamaan muuttuneita olosuhteita ja painotuksia.</p> <p>Uusi linjaus tulisi olla luonteeltaan realistisempi. Tämän raportin suosituksia – monien muiden asioiden lisäksi - voidaan käyttää osana hahmoteltaessa Suomen virallisen humanitaarisen avun uusia linjauksia.</p>