

Articles from national delegations

Austria	117
Canada	120
The Czech Republic 1	124
The Czech Republic 2	129
Finland	136
France	141
Germany	144
Greece	150
Hungary	153
Norway	159
Poland	166
Spain	168
Sweden	173
United Kingdom	195
United States	200

Comprehensive Approach: Austria's Viewpoint Contribution to the Comprehensive Approach Seminar held in Helsinki on 17 June 2008

1. Concept

Comprehensive approaches to security questions have been known in Austria since the Cold War and have been implemented to varying degrees. In 1975, the concept of *Comprehensive National Defence* was formulated and anchored in the Austrian constitution¹. Subsequently, this concept of Comprehensive National Defense was further developed when the federal government introduced a new Security and Defence Doctrine and, with it, the principle of a *Comprehensive Security Strategy (CSS)*, which was passed by the National Council in 2001. In 2002, based on the Comprehensive Security Strategy, the Austrian Security-political Concept (Overall Strategy) was adopted, which comprises the three following principles:

- ⇒ The principle of comprehensive security
- ⇒ The principle of preventive security
- ⇒ The principle of European security

This means that the Austrian security policy is, firstly, to make use of all available actors and instruments in a whole of government approach and, secondly, to use preventive political action by actively taking part in international measures of conflict prevention and crisis management. Thirdly, Austria seeks to protect its security by means of international solidarity (i.e. in cooperation with the EU, OSCE, NATO-PfP, UN, etc.).

Austria is currently working on a refinement of its Comprehensive Concept for International Operations, which translates the strategic requirements mentioned above into operational and concrete processes for analysis, crisis prevention and crisis management. In 2006, an extensive study group comprising national institutions and NGOs developed proposals on Austria's civil-military cooperation abroad, which concentrate on operational command and control and the preparation of operations. This is to encourage long-term planning processes, to optimise coherence within policies and to guarantee an effect-oriented use of assets.

2. Planning, decision-making – and command control processes

The concepts described above constitute the basis for Austria's decisions regarding international crisis management. Currently, the majority of administrative decisions are taken according to the principle of ministerial competence, whereby comprehensive matters require a vote in the Council of Ministers. Furthermore, a unit has been created in the federal chancellery in order to ensure coherence within Austria's national security policy, which closely cooperates with all security related departments of ministries involved. To advise the Federal Government on matters of security policy, a National Security Council (NSC) has been established, which comprises, apart from a core

1 Article 9a of the Federal Constitution

group of ministers, members of parliament from all parties as well as experts from the national administration. They can, if required, be supplemented by other ministers and further experts.

Under the National Security Council a coordinating body consisting of civil servants from security-relevant core ministries (Federal Chancellery, representative of the vice-chancellor, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Defence and Ministry for European and International Affairs) was set up, which not only prepares the sessions of the NSC but also permanently develops and evaluates the overall national security policy. It is on this level that the overall national planning coordination takes place.

In order to ensure comprehensive situation assessments and coordination among top officials, an informal high level committee comprising the Chief of Defence Staff, the Director General for Public Safety and the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs convenes at least once a month, even if there is no ongoing crisis.

Since 2004 an annual situation report is drawn up by all services involved. This report provides an approx. 18-month perspective and includes recommended actions.

3. Legal basis and financing

The deployment of Austrian officers (civilian as well as military) abroad is regulated by a federal constitutional act. As a matter of principle, any participation in an international mission takes place on a voluntary basis. Secondly, the deployment of Austrian officers abroad requires a decision of the council of ministers and the subsequent assent of the National Council (resolution of the Principal Committee). Only in urgent cases of disaster relief the deployment may be approved in retrospect.

Costs for international engagement are borne by the respective ministries and are met for the largest part within their regular budget, with special increases being made possible by Federal Acts. The use of financial resources within the framework of development cooperation and the international disaster fund is carried out through different funds which are regulated in Federal Laws.

4. Training, interoperability and evaluation

The relevant ministries take part in training activities within the EU and NATO-Pfp and Austria also hosts training courses in the EU or NATO-Pfp framework. Moreover, relevant ministries conduct training seminars for their own staff and invite representatives from other countries and int. organisations in order to create an international learning experience. Concerning national and international disaster relief, joint exercises of civilian as well as military actors are offered on a regular basis (also as staff or framework exercises).

Military equipment and planning for international operations is interoperable according to NATO and EU standards and is also offered on the international level. The Austrian operational organisations strive for interoperability. In 2008 a roster of Austrian experts for activities in security sector reform, in which also NGO's and other non-governmental persons are included, will be established

The evaluation of the international engagement is mainly performed within the respective ministries. However, the Court of Audit revises in non-regular intervals individual cases of Austrian international engagements with regard to their economy, expediency and efficiency. Measures of the recently created international disaster relief fund will, for the first time, be evaluated by independent experts. Through the envisioned overall national security-political planning process a special evaluation procedure for all ministries is to be introduced, which will also have a direct connection to current operational experience.

5. Challenges and possible developments

There is the need to establish a national as well as a multinational steering mechanism for policy coherence and effect orientation, which is to synchronise crisis management in medium and long-term engagement (prevention, post-crisis management, development, etc.)

This requires the development on the national as well as on the multinational level of:

- a common understanding concerning Comprehensive Approach and Effects-based Approach to Operations in all international organisations, such as the UN, EU, NATO, OSCE, World Bank, IMF, etc.
- a common understanding of background and the roots of conflicts and possible developments.
- the development of standardised civil-military planning and command and control procedures, as well as relevant mechanisms (including manuals, knowledge transfer, and lessons learned processes).
- precise and realistic definitions of strategies and operations with the aim to synchronize all political, economical, social, civilian and military measures and ensure the sustainability of all measures.
- an institutional mix which is reflected in the allocation of specific tasks to specially qualified organisations.
- permanent evaluation structures which especially review the effectiveness of the assets employed and influence planning and operational control.
- a mechanism which initiates an adjustment of strategies and operations, as well as a consistent information policy concerning these activities.

CANADA AND THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

Introduction

Canada strongly supports the development and use of the comprehensive approach concept to address the present and future challenges in the increasingly complex security environment. Promoting international peace and stability has become progressively more difficult since the end of the Cold War. A myriad of new, less responsible, uncontrollable, often transnational actors are challenging established but often weak governments in many states, disrupting international security, and contravening global norms. The root causes that have allowed these challengers to arise include loot-able wealth – a greed driven dynamic, and regimes that have provided few services to their populations that have left them in stages of chronic underdevelopment – a grievance based dynamic. A fundamental aim of the Government of Canada is to aid other nations to improve governance and social conditions, as well as to facilitate the transition from conditions of conflict and the reconstruction afterwards. No individual department or functional areas, such as defence or development, has the expertise or means to effectively solve these problems in isolation hence the need for a new methodology. Therefore, Canada has initiated and is further developing the use of a comprehensive approach to these security challenges. In the Canadian view, the comprehensive approach can be described as the interaction of a diverse range of actors in a cooperative, collaborative, and constructive manner in order to bring coherence to the planning, implementation, and evaluation of efforts to resolve complex problems. For international issues, this constitutes the unified efforts of all relevant actors to enable security, democracy, and self-sustainability in a host nation.

Background

The genesis of the need to develop the comprehensive approach is Canada's international engagement whether this takes the form of war fighting, peacekeeping, humanitarian operations, humanitarian assistance or long-term development. Doctrinally, successful counter-insurgency operations are constructed on the effective use of the comprehensive approach. The layered coordination committees of the 1948 – 1960 Malayan Emergency reflect the detailed implementation of this methodology. More recently, most United Nations operations, based on having captured their best practices, seek to achieve cooperation and coordination amongst all actors within their operational areas. Canadians deployed on United Nation missions have ably contributed to these core processes, crucial to mission effectiveness. This has been particularly notable in Haiti, proof that solutions have to progress beyond a military only focus, where Canada continues to make a significant contribution to the mission in non-military aspects, primarily with police and corrections advisors. The operational need for the comprehensive approach is also obvious in war-fighting theatres like Afghanistan. Here Canadians are not only engaged in combat operations but also core reconstruction tasks in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and in significant state building activities in the Strategic Advisory Team. Especially in a war-fighting scenario, all these inter-related actions benefit from the adoption of a comprehensive approach strategy. Canada's development of this strategy is therefore informed by its legacy of wide and diverse operational experience.

The development of the Canadian strategic view of the comprehensive approach has been an evolutionary process. In the early days of the engagement in Afghanistan, it was clearly recognized that the solutions to the problems that beset that nation extended beyond the capabilities of solely military actions. The immediate proposal to improve effectiveness was to adopt the 3D approach, a combination of defence, development and diplomacy. This keyed on the inputs of the three main departments involved: the Department of National Defence, the Canadian International Development Agency, and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Shortly, it was realized that the skills and expertise from many more actors from across government needed to be drawn upon in order to improve the planning and execution of our support to the Afghan people. The 3D approach evolved into a “whole of government” one. While this improved the delivery of Canadian Government policies and programs by enhancing the contributions from other departments and agencies it was still considered too limiting. The concept was further extended therefore to the much more inclusive comprehensive approach. In this culminative view, all departments, agencies and actors within and outside government that can effectively aid in the planning and delivery of Canadian assistance to those in need will be engaged to do so.

The Canadian Framework

The Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) was established in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in September 2005. It remains the lead mechanism at the strategic level in Canada to implement the comprehensive approach in consideration of international crisis management. Canada’s crisis management experiences in the 1990s and early 2000s allowed the Government of Canada and other like-minded governments to consider the types of tools and mechanisms required to respond effectively to crises and longer term situations fully recognizing that the ad hoc methods used during that period were insufficient. Furthermore, in light of significant, complex conflicts with important implications for stability and international security, Canada recognized the growing need for a coordinated, broad approach to responding to countries in or at risk of crisis, such as Sudan, Afghanistan and Haiti. This led to the establishment of START.

START’s mandate touches on the broad issues of conflict prevention, disaster response and post-conflict reconstruction while at the same time focussing on key enablers such as peace operations, the rule of law, security system reform, mediation, landmine issues, small arms and light weapons, and civilian protection. START’s mission is as follows: to ensure timely, coordinated and effective responses to international crises (natural and human-made), requiring whole of government action; and to plan and deliver coherent, effective conflict prevention, crisis response, and civilian protection and stabilization initiatives in states in transition, implicating Canadian interests. Under the umbrella of START representatives from DFAIT, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Department of National Defence (DND), Public Safety Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Privy Council Office, Justice Canada, and related organizations have worked closely together to coordinate responses to significant international crises. The oversight body for this organization, the START Advisory Board, ensures coherent policy development and integrated conflict prevention, crisis response, and stabilization initiatives.

Through a variety of initiatives, START supports key Canadian priorities:

- greater international support for security, freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law;
- accountable and consistent use of the multilateral organizations to deliver results on global issues of concern to Canadians; and
- greater policy coherence and better alignment of results across all government programs, to ensure the most strategic use of resources.

START is organized into five teams that support a variety of targeted security and crisis management needs:

- **Prevention and Peacebuilding Conflict:** This team's responsibilities include environmental scanning, which involves conflict assessment, early warning detection of potential conflicts for rapid response and tracking media coverage. This team also conducts contingency planning and development of conflict prevention and peacebuilding projects where incipient, actual conflicts and post-conflict situations exist. It also conducts evaluations, lessons learned/best practices and simulation exercises.
- **Peacekeeping and Peace Operations:** Key responsibilities focus on policy, planning and coordination of Canadian engagement in integrated international peace operations. This unit also delivers on Canada's commitment with G8 colleagues, from the St. Petersburg Summit, to enhance global capacity for the conduct of peace support operations.
- **Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Response:** Co-managed with DFAIT's Global Issues Bureau, this START team develops, implements and coordinates Canadian policy on international humanitarian affairs and Canadian responses to humanitarian crises.
- **Mine Action and Small Arms:** This team continues Canadian leadership in the campaign to ban anti-personnel mines and assume responsibility for promoting Canada's people-centred approach to combating small arms and light weapons proliferation.
- **START Executive Office:** Turning human and financial resources into practical projects to improve international security, while ensuring accountability to taxpayers, requires financial management, planning and project design, as well as communications outreach is provided by the Executive Office.

As START enters its third year, it continues to demonstrate policy and programming leadership. It applies coordination models that facilitate DFAIT work, that enable the comprehensive approach, and for strategic partners, various international organizations—the African Union, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the UN Development Programme, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, that assist in their efforts. START is extremely active in organizing support and programs in Haiti, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Sudan. These activities have included items such as deploying and supporting Canada's Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan, initiating programs on correctional and policing capacity in Kandahar, and establishing Afghan capacity to destroy between 150,000 and 200,000 tonnes of landmines and ordnance; reinforcing correctional and policing capacity in Haiti; and providing essential enabling support for the Darfur, Sudan, peace talks and the 7,700 African Union peacekeepers in Darfur, along with critical support for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs in Southern Sudan.

The View of Department of National Defence

Military planners in the Department of National Defence are realizing the full value and utility of the comprehensive approach. In current and future conflicts a wide range of actors, both national and international partners, can usefully contribute to the improvement of the security conditions in operational theatres. Gaining a better understanding of these other actors, sharing situational awareness with them and leveraging each other's functional utility enables the goals and objectives of the Government of Canada to be delivered more integrated, networked fashion in theatre. Similarly, the inclusive planning environment engendered at the strategic level by the comprehensive approach permits military task forces to be better prepared for commitment and better supported once deployed. A number of existing subordinate concepts enable the comprehensive

approach at the operational and tactical level. The Canadian military currently uses the concept of Joint Interagency Multinational and Public (JIMP) to construct the planning and coordination methodology to be used on deployment. While still under development it shows solid potential to affect improved liaison, planning and coordination in the land environment. Another subordinate concept is that of civil-military coordination (CIMIC). This durable concept keys on the provision of staff to carry out liaison with civil and civilian actors to assist military planning and coordination with these elements. These nested concepts operationalize the comprehensive approach at the operational and tactical levels.

The Way Ahead in Canada

In the near term, Canada is seeking to more fully develop its national concept of the comprehensive approach. A variety of START initiatives are progressing key issues including establishing funding mechanisms and analysing training needs across government. Elsewhere, a team has been established within DND to full explore the concept and its implementation. It has established close liaison with START and will assist START teams in leveraging their own efforts. Exploring the concept will include as a minimum examining issues such as the policies and mechanisms required to implement the concept, how to institutionalize the concept, the education and training requirements associated with it, and how to capture best practices including perspectives on operational learning and adaptation. Canada continually seeks to capture best practices and lessons learned in the field, as demonstrated in the recently released Chief of Review Services report on Canada's PRT efforts. While pursuing this strong internal focus, Canada will remain engaged internationally bi-national or multi-nationally, such as on Multi-National Experiment 5, in efforts to refine and improve the comprehensive approach concept.

Conclusion

Canada sees great promise in the concept of the comprehensive approach. It is a useful concept when addressing international or domestic issues and has applicability from the strategic to the lowest levels. The concept both serves to clearly focus national planning, to assist in risk mitigation by ensuring all relevant actors participate in mission planning, and to bring broader solution sets to the table. Most of the legal framework, planning processes, and resources required to allow the adoption of the comprehensive approach in Canada already exist within existing departmental structures. More work remains to study, collate and codify evaluation criteria to measure this unified strategic approach in practice. While the first steps have been taken to establish and embed the comprehensive approach into Canadian governmental procedures, further work is required to educate and inculcate strategic planners and operational implementers that engage in our international efforts with the concept. The establishment of START has proven to be a cornerstone for this combined effort. As START further develops and with assistance from other departments and agencies the comprehensive approach within Canada will be further successfully refined.

The Czech Republic 1

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH: trends, challenges and possibilities of co-operation in crisis prevention and management in the Czech Republic

1 Concept

The Government of the Czech Republic has established a system of tools and procedures that can be used to deal with crisis management challenges, both nationally and internationally. The national crisis management system integrates efforts of all governmental authorities and organisations. Roles, responsibilities and tasks of individual crisis management bodies are stipulated in respective legal acts, and selectively also in the national Security Strategy and Military Strategy (authorised by the government). Military roles, responsibilities, tasks and procedures are described in national doctrinal publications.

Respective legal acts define the powers of the president, parliament and government when dealing with crisis situations. They also define roles, responsibilities and tasks. The national government sets up working and advisory bodies to deal with specific crisis situations.

Crisis management bodies of the Ministry of Defence identify measures and develop procedures for identification of threats and risks and means for their elimination.

The crisis staff of the MOD is a permanent body, authorised by the ministerial order and is supported by the Joint Operation Centre as an interface to NATO SITCEN.

2 Planning, decision making and leadership


Crisis management encompasses systems and methods for management of emergencies. Its territorial structure consists of:

- National Security Council, Chaired by the Prime Minister;
- Central Crisis Staff;
- Regional Security Council;
- Designated Municipal Security Council;
- Regional / Municipal Crisis Staff.

The government of the Czech Republic identifies possible crisis situation scenarios (Governmental decision No. 846, dated 8 Sept 2004).

The Central Crisis Staff is the governmental working body for crisis management. It can be, depending on the nature of the crisis situation, chaired either by the Minister of Defence or Minister of Interior.

It consists of another 35 members from all ministries (at the level of Deputy Minister) and relevant Agencies and authorities (represented by their general directors/directors).



Elimination of domestic threats is dealt with Integrated Rescue System (IRS), where all its elements have defined roles and cooperate together. The main components of the IRS are the Rescue Brigades, Police and Medical Rescue Units, all having the primary responsibility. Other components that include designated military units and special assets such as humanitarian components, Search and Rescue (SAR), but also municipal police, voluntary fire brigades, and in some cases even some hospitals, can be called only upon request. Request for military support is ordinarily addressed to the CHOD by Rescue Brigades that are, depending on the decision of the government, regional or local authority, usually in charge of the whole mission. In some cases when there is a danger of a delay and subsequently threat to loss of life or property damages, military units, located close to the event can be called upon directly and should provide necessary help.

Assigned military units maintain their military control but they are under the command of a regional or MOI (Ministry of Interior) authority. While Police, Rescue Brigades and Medical Rescue Units are responsible for the immediate response, the military is called upon for disaster relief when other elements of the IRS are insufficient. In most situations a military response is not extremely urgent.

Crisis management in the MOD is focused on developing procedures and measures for how to eliminate threats and risks and how to participate in operations when needed.

The decision to participate in military missions abroad is the responsibility of the government within limits approved yearly by the parliament; when exceeding these limits of participation, parliamentary approval is needed.

The MOD Joint Operation Centre is responsible for crisis management involving multinational and domestic military missions. It manages providing support to the units and individuals, including assigned civilians. The director of the JOC, who is also Deputy Chief of General Staff, controls level of pre-deployment training, and controls the deployment to the operational area and Transfer of Authority.

The main MOD planning and decision-making documents for crisis management are:

- ⇒ Contingency Operational Plans for the use of Armed Forces and
- ⇒ CHOD Guidance for the use and cooperation of the Armed Forces and military assets within the integrated rescue system and in providing police support.

3 Legal framework

The main legal acts related to the crisis management are:

Legal Act No 219/1999 on Armed Forces;

Legal Act No 239/2000 on Integrated Rescue System;

Legal Act No 240/2000 on Crisis Management;

Legal Act No 241/2000 on Economical Measures in Crisis Situations.

In principal, for domestic crisis operations, legal regulations are applicable both for military and non-military situations and for civilian and military crisis management. Specific procedures are described in related legal regulations and fulfilled in accordingly.

Operations are conducted in accordance with operational plans developed in compliance with the mandate for a given operation, Rules of Engagement and operational standards, including the use of appropriate doctrine.

4 Training

The training of military and civilian personnel is organised separately. Every soldier is required to take basic training, lasting 3 months. Further training is different for individual military categories. There are strict training standards for individual training modules and for other special courses which are described in the training manuals developed by the national Doctrine Centre of TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command).

Currently, 29 international courses are being conducted by educational and training institutions, in our TRADOC, with almost 1000 foreign students trained annually. Courses for civilian personnel are gradually increasing within the structure of international training. The most significant are:

- ⇒ Special training course for coping with crisis situations, designed for journalists and members of humanitarian organizations that has been running since 1994 with 219 graduates by now;
- ⇒ Special training course for personnel of the Czech Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, designed for students of the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The course is obligatory for all future diplomats and is a regular part of the studies at the Diplomatic academy.

The Czech Republic won the competition among nine NATO member countries for running the NATO Civilian Pre-Deployment Course. In 2007, TRADOC conducted three courses for 82 NATO civilian personnel. In 2008, it is anticipated that 200 NATO civilians will be trained in 5 courses. The National Defence University, conducts courses to educate not only military but also civilian students for crisis management. After the studies, they are mostly employed as governmental employees in different ministries involved in crisis management matters.

Within the MOD, crisis management and peace operations training is organized yearly for at least 1000 people only within TRADOC courses. The bulk of the courses are pre-deployment courses, including courses for UN observers. Additionally, military units and personnel preparing to deploy are trained in mission specific collective pre-deployment training in units of Joint Forces Command. Training includes exercises involving crisis management procedures including the interaction and cooperation with the other components of the Integrated Rescue System and participation in other international crisis management exercises (CMX, CME).

Additionally, there are many training and education activities, organized by the national Institute of Civil Protection, which is a part of the Ministry of Interior and functions as a focal point and centre of excellence for research and education in civil emergency planning and crisis management for Rescue Units and governmental authorities (mayors, etc.). Approximately 3000 students per year participate in different courses and international conferences, including those organized under the auspices of the UN, NATO and EU.

5 Resources

The involvement in planned operations, to include the number of troops and overall cost, is agreed each year by the National Security Council, by the government and parliament, and financially covered from the MOD chapter of the governmental budget. The involvement in NATO Reaction Force (NRF) and/or EU Battle Group (BG) operations should be covered by the governmental reserve fund.

Personnel are regularly trained for participation in missions. This training includes individual training, collective training and pre-deployment training. Due to the frequent participation in missions, many personnel are experienced and well trained. Availability of the personnel differs for individual branches of the Armed Forces due to the different demands imposed by functional specialty. Recruitment is independent to the operational deployment and is part of military education and training. It relates to the general requirements on numbers of armed forces. Operational deployments are planned well advanced for all dedicated units. There are, however, different requirements for the rotation rate of individual military branches and special functional areas. It is preferred that organic units should be deployed instead of creating them ad hoc.

Deployment of civilian personnel, as is for instance the case of our PRT in Afghanistan, is planned, financed and organised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

6 Interoperability

There is an effort to ensure national interoperability for all components of the integrated rescue system with particular emphasis on the communication and information systems.

International military interoperability is driven mainly by a long-term effort to meet NATO requirements delineated by various standardisation agreements (STANAGs). All standardisation agreements, in operational, technical and administrative areas are successively implemented, administered and periodically evaluated by the national standardisation agency. The overall progress achieved in the past years is very good. The main challenge is to include STANAGs as part of our doctrinal and technical publications and to educate and train military and civilian personnel based on these publications.

7 Evaluation

Operational effectiveness is periodically evaluated by the Joint Operations Centre both during missions and by debriefings after their completion. Additionally, the lessons learned system is used to identify problems and best practices occurring during deployments. The Lessons learned system is managed by a dedicated group of people in our Training and Doctrine Command. It requires inputs from commanders, staff and individuals in order to evaluate, publish and disseminate lessons identified in operations or during military exercises. The Lessons learned process is described in a publication that is binding for all operational commanders. Lessons are identified

from all phases of an operation, starting with training and finishing with redeployment. Selected lessons learned from the NATO JALLC (Joint Analysis Lessons Learned Centre) and some allies are also exploited.

Important events that are used to evaluate and exercise crisis management procedures and interoperability are crisis management exercises — CMX's and CME's. They allow the periodic exercise of all procedures related to a given scenario and involve national governmental agencies and international consultation necessary for proper decision making by the National Security Council and the government.

8 Challenges

The main challenges to further develop crisis management procedures are:

- to improve coordination of all instruments of national power and multinational coordination in dealing with recent complex crises;
- to be better prepared for the greater involvement of civilians in military missions, including provisions for their appropriate legal status;
- to change the system for calling up the forces and assets;
- to increase the efficiency of the evaluation system of the employed forces and assets.

9 Opportunities

An important national opportunity exists for increased support of international crisis management efforts. It relates to our advanced capability developed for pre-deployment training of national and NATO civilians. A more detailed explanation of the current situation and achievements in this respect is provided in a separate article.

The Czech Republic 2

**Training of civilian personnel for crisis management and peace operations:
NATO Civilians Pre-deployment Course (NCPC)
By Jaromír ZŮNA¹**

The Armed Forces of the Czech Republic (AFCR) have developed longtime traditions and have gathered rich experience in training not only the armed forces personnel, but also civilian officials in public administration, diplomats, media reporters, representatives of international and non-governmental organizations for crisis management and peace operations.

Since 1990, training of civilian personnel for crisis management and peace operations in the AFCR has been extended to the international dimension, which has gradually become an ambition of the Czech Republic and its contribution to fulfilling international commitments resulting from its membership in NATO and the EU.

Ambitions for international training of civilian personnel stem from the experience, knowledge, and organizational capabilities of selected organizations in the defense sector and their ability to provide training and education at the required level for the needs of both the Czech Republic and its allies.

These ambitions are based on longtime historical and cultural traditions and the availability of qualified personnel, lecturers, instructors and staff that are indispensable for running these activities. The ambitions have been proven by rich longtime lessons learned in the field of training of personnel for meeting the AFCR requirements and, in many cases, by running educational and training activities at an international level. The ambitions are also backed with modern training facilities and a sufficient number of training areas needed for practical training.

The main organization in the AFCR which is responsible for international training is the Training and Doctrine Command in Vyškov (TRADOC AFCR).

TRADOC is a specialized joint organization, the mission of which is to run:

- Training of professionals - basic, specialized;
- Military career education for officers and NCOs;
- Development and elaboration of the doctrinal system;
- Development and management of simulation centers and simulation technologies;
- Development and management of military training areas;
- Language training;
- Training of personnel earmarked for NATO, the EU and other international organizations and those who shall be deployed on NATO/EU/UN-led multinational operations.

¹ Col Gst Ing. Jaromír ZŮNA, MSc. Commander, Training and Doctrine Command, Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, zunaj@seznam.cz

Besides other educational and training functions, TRADOC is also being built as a center of international cooperation in the AFCE. HQ TRADOC and all its institutions are located in the garrison of Vyškov, which thus has become a unique complex of educational, training and research facilities that also includes modern equipment and technologies, efficient logistic support, a military training area and comprehensive life-quality services.

Some of the institutions located in the garrison of Vyškov:

- Military Academy Vyškov;
- Training Base Vyškov;
- Center of Simulation and Training Technologies Vyškov;
- Defense Language Institute Vyškov;
- CBRN Defense Institute of the Defense University Vyškov;
- NATO JCBRN Defense Center of Excellence Vyškov;
- BMATT-CZ British Military Advisory and Training Team Vyškov;
- Doctrine Administration Office Vyškov;
- Military Police School Vyškov;
- Research Institute of the Ground Forces Vyškov;
- etc.

The above-stated list of educational and training facilities placed in the garrison of Vyškov (which is far from being complete) is an indicator proving our intentions to shape Vyškov garrison so as to gradually become a center of international training and education.

Currently, 29 international courses are being conducted by educational and training institutions in the garrison of Vyškov, with almost 1000 foreign students annually. Courses for civilian personnel are gradually becoming more and more significant within the structure of international training.

The contemporary dynamics of the relations between civilian and military actors in peace operations, crises and complex humanitarian emergencies is caused by changing character of the security environment, subsequent changes of national security strategies of the states and the character of employment of the military forces in operations conducted in support of international peace, stability and security in the world. The traditional division of the roles between military and civilian actors in peace operations, resulting from the principles of international humanitarian law, which differentiate between combatants and non-combatants in war conflicts, is less explicit in current peace operations and some crisis situations than before. This fact stems from the changing character of military activities in peace operations (stabilization operations) and the growing number of actors engaged in them. Peace operations are becoming the main effort of contemporary armies and a crucial instrument in securing world peace and stability. From the global perspective, the world is safer today.² This result has been achieved, inter alia, through joint cooperation between military forces and international/non-governmental organizations. On the other hand, there are approximately 50 weak and collapsing states, where about 2 billion people live in the conditions of internal conflicts and humanitarian crises that can outgrow in various forms of complex humanitarian emergencies with global political, economic and security consequences for Western democracies.³ In today's security environment peace operations and humanitarian activities are considered as important tools to eliminate the abovementioned threats. These conditions necessitate the appropriate setting of functional and balanced mechanisms of coor-

2 MACK, Andrew. "Peace on Earth? Increasingly, Yes." The Washington Post, December 28, 2005, str. A 21.

3 ROTBERG, Robert I. "When States Fail: Causes and Consequences", Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004, s. 23-24, ISBN 0-691-11672-5.

dination between military and civilians actors in peace operations. The most effective means for achieving that goal is comprehensive and systematically organized pre-deployment training for civilian personnel.

As an example of implementation of such concept into practice and 15 years of gathering experience in the AFCR, we can highlight the Special Training Course for Crisis Situations and the Special Training Course for Personnel of the Czech Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) that are run at TRADOC AFCR.

<i>Year</i>	<i>No. of Graduates</i>
1994	12 graduates
1995	19 graduates
1996	11 graduates
1997	11 graduates
1998	26 graduates
2000	7 graduates
2001	14 graduates
2002	19 graduates
2003	18 graduates
2004	24 graduates
2005	20 graduates
2006	19 graduates
2007	19 absolventů
Total	219 graduates

Special Training Course for Crisis Situation for journalists and members of humanitarian organizations has been running since 1994. The course is designed for representatives of media and humanitarian organizations so as to prepare them for potential risks and dangerous situations that they may encounter during their deployment. Since 1995, the course has also been attended by representatives of the Czech Republic state administration, i.e. personnel of press centers or Regional Administration Offices, who are responsible for territorial crisis management missions. At present, the course is also available for students of secondary schools and universities studying similar sciences (humanitarian sciences – journalism, sociology, psychology, etc.).

Special Training Course for Personnel of the Czech Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs is designed for students of the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The course is obligatory for all the future diplomats and is regular part of the studies at the Diplomatic academy. Foreign students at the Diplomatic academy are also obliged to take the course. Two courses will be opened in 2008: Special Training Course for the MFA Personnel – Juniors, September 21 – October 1, 2008, and Special Training Course for the MFA Personnel – Seniors, May 11 – May 23, 2008.

Both the courses last 14 days and their objective is to practically prepare attendees for executing crisis management positions and providing them with the basic knowledge, habits, and acquirements that are necessary for survival in dangerous situations, which they may encounter when assigned in crisis areas. Because of the longer duration of the courses, they are in terms of content and practical training more demanding than the NATO Civilians Pre-deployment Course. The all inclusive cost of the training in the courses is carried by the AFCR as its contribution to the crisis management system of the country.

Based on the experience of the Czech Republic in organizing courses for civilians, in January 2006 the NATO Deputy Secretary General for Human Resources submitted, via the Czech Republic Military Representative to NATO/EU, the request for preparing the NATO Civilians Pre-Deployment Course.⁴

With the increasing deployment of NATO civilian staff in support of NATO operations, NATO needed to ensure that civilians serving in the NATO staff positions are fully prepared for any conditions they may face. This requires effective and thorough training. Currently, NATO offers staff training

4 NATO: Deputy Assistant Secretary General – Human Resources, Letter to the Permanent Representative of the Czech Republic to NATO, FM-HR (2006)0002, 19 January 2006.

in a number of important areas. Nonetheless, with the aim to increase staff awareness of security and safety issues there was the need for a comprehensive pre-deployment training program.⁵ NATO required that the pre-deployment training would, besides many others, be also covering topics such as:

- coping with stressful situations;
- handling negotiations;
- basic human rights;
- effective radio communications;
- handling potential hostage situations;
- map reading;
- making security and threat assessment.

The Czech Republic project won the competition among nine NATO member countries. Subsequently the Czech Republic has been accredited for running **the NATO Civilians Pre-Deployment Course (TDD-U3-001)**.⁶ In 2007, 3 courses for 82 NATO civilian personnel were conducted in Vyškov. As for 2008, 200 NATO civilians will be trained in 5 courses.

The aim of the course is to help prepare NATO civilian personnel to deploy on operations and missions approved by the North Atlantic Council. Attendance at the NATO Civilians Pre-deployment Course is mandatory for all NATO International Civilian personnel who will deploy in support of a Council Approved Operation, outside of NATO's boundaries.

a) Structure of the NATO Civilians Pre-Deployment Course:

Theoretical Part:

Current NATO Operations;
International and Humanitarian Law;
Role of Media, Religion and Culture Awareness;
Force Protection;

Theoretical-Practical Part

CBRN Protection;
Mine Awareness;
Topography;
Special Psychological Aspect of the Mission;
Survival Skills and Knowledge;
Radio Communication;
Medical Training;

Leisure Time Activities

Austerlitz Battlefield , Macocha Abyss.

5 NATO Civilians Pre-deployment Course, NATO Course Catalogue, <http://jatl.act.natoint/npetn>, other links <<http://hr.act.nato.int/portal/NATOCiviliO/>>, <<http://www.predeploymentcourse.com>> .

6 NATO: Accreditation – NATO Civilians Pre-deployment Course. 5000 TI-3110/Ser: NU 0324, 25 May 2007.

b) The course is scheduled over 8 training days:

Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed
Arrival	Theoretical-Practical Part			Leisure Time Activities	Complex Field Training		Departure

c) The course curriculum and its organization are aimed at achieving the maximum quality of training.

Theoretical - Practical Part (3 days, 10 training periods per day):

International Humanitarian Law;

1. Fundamentals and principles of International and Humanitarian Law (IHL);
2. UN Charter and peaceful settlements of disputes;
3. IHL and NATO peace operations;
4. Mission mandate and its application;
5. Rules of engagement;
6. Rights of Prisoners of War and hostages.

Media on Missions and Contact with Them;

1. Role and impact of media in current operational environment;
2. Lessons learned from current operations;
3. Basic principles and skills for communication with media.

Cultural Awareness;

1. Perception of cultural awareness as an essential to understanding the operational environment;
2. Mission oriented cultural training;
3. Principles of successful meeting;
4. Religion, Islam.

Mine Awareness;

1. Lessons learned from current operations – Iraq, Afghanistan;
2. Emphasis – basic rules when in a minefield, with and without mine accident.

Medical training;

1. First Aid Course – organized in the form of the Basic First Aid Course accredited within the EU countries (Certificate);
2. Rules for individual and collective hygiene;
3. Medical characteristics of the operational environment – mission oriented;
4. Dangerous animals and plants in the operational area – mission oriented;
5. CASEVAC/MEDEVAC;

Force Protection;

1. Force protection in general;
2. Basics of force protection on base, in convoy, or other activities;
3. Practical drill.

Communication and Principles of Radio Communication;

1. NATO radio communication procedures and practical training.

CBRN Protection;

1. Operating NATO standardized individual NBC protection kit;
2. Basic skills, procedures and practical training.

Topography;

1. WGS 84 System;
2. Map features and their utilization;
3. Practical day and night land navigation exercise using map, azimuth, GPS;
4. Orientation by using improvised means.

Basic Survival Skills and Knowledge;

1. Building of shelters, finding water, finding and preparing food from natural resources, building fireplace;
2. Secured movement, observation, crossing lines of communication, deception.

Special Physical Training;

1. Fundamentals of movement in mountainous, rocky and difficult terrain;
2. Usage of harness, improvised harness;
3. Improvised transport of the injured.

Psychological Training (emphasis is laid on stress factors in missions and rudiments of negotiations);

1. Psychological aspects of missions, ultimate and life threatening situations;
2. Psychological aspects of captivity;
3. Psychological aspects of negotiating under psychological, physical, and life threatening pressure;
4. Basics for successful negotiation.

Fire Fighting.

1. Fundamentals of fire fighting, fire protection, reaction on signals, usage of technical and improvised means.

Complex Field Training (2 days – 36 hours day-night-day training based on a realistic scenario in the field and Forward Operating Base - FOB):

The complex field training is based on solving specific situations with use of knowledge and lessons learned from the theoretical-practical part. Training is continuous and includes day and night activities. Complex field training is conducted in the military training area and a base, which is built and equipped like FOB in current NATO operations. Course participants operate in small teams of 3 to 4 persons. Tactical and situational scenarios are designed to make trainees reach logical solution. During the training the participants must display variety of needed skills and knowledge. For illustration, listed below, there are some situations that students must practically solve or go through during the course:

- Encountering a check-point manned by the paramilitary group and negotiating free passage through a hostile territory;
- Driving into a minefield and solving practical situations with and without mine accident, evacuation of injured, first aid;
- 4 km forced movement on foot from an endangered area in rough terrain;
- Evacuation from the base under artillery attack with usage of chemical agents;
- Falling into an ambush, captivity, transport in captivity on different vehicles (trucks, armored personal carrier, etc), imprisonment, interrogation, humiliation, deterrence and adaptation to stress situations and psychological pressure;
- Night march on foot, night orientation by maps, azimuth, GPS, spending night out in improvised shelters, building of shelter, perimeter security, basic survival skills, fire building, preparation of food in field conditions;
- Crossing fire and smoke obstacle course including sub-terrain avenues;

- Setting radio communication, radio operating skills, practical training in a sending situational report (SITREP);
- Providing first aid to a local wounded person in a refugee camp;
- Rescue of hostages by a friendly force and reaction to tasks and instructions given by soldiers and coordination of mutual activities;
- Gaining control over fear of armored vehicles – run over by armored vehicles while in ditches and trenches;
- Marking of a landing zone for helicopters, identification procedures, flight to a base, after action review;
- etc.

The following skills are trained during the abovementioned situations:

- practical ability responding to the situation of driving into a minefield;
- negotiating skills;
- application of first aid skills;
- survival skills;
- behavior under pressure of culture shock;
- overcoming captivity stress and humiliation, followed by discussion with a psychologist;
- employment of individual CBRN protective equipment and individual protective material;
- orientation and topographic skills;
- radio communication skills;
- ability to cooperate with military and civilian actors;
- endure real battle feelings and stress;
- etc.

At the end of the course, instructors and students conduct evaluation of the course and have a meeting with the organizers. The evaluation includes discussions on individual subjects, study areas and phases of training. The students also have to complete the evaluation report which is subsequently sent to NATO. The graduation ceremony takes place in the Chateau of Slavkov.

During one year of its existence, the NCPC has won a great deal of reputation within the Alliance. While organizing the course, TRADOC has fully applied its longtime experience, quality of personnel and unique educational and training facilities. TRADOC is also being shaped within NATO as an expert body for training of civilian personnel and other related issues. The Czech Republic intends to further enlarge its ambition to provide unique capabilities for training of civilian personnel of the international and non-government organizations for crisis management and peace operations. Based on the growing international reputation the EU has already expressed interest for training of the EU diplomats for crisis management in the Czech Republic.

The CR/AFCR fully realizes the current trend of sharing experience and lessons learned among allies and partners. For this purpose, TRADOC AFCR has offered to NATO the opportunity to hold an international seminar in 2008 that would be focused on exchange of lessons from training of civilian personnel for crises management and peace operations.

Finland

Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of the Interior

21.4.2008

Existing crisis management practices and future development of comprehensive crisis management

1 Concept

Finland considers it crucial to handle conflict prevention, civilian and military crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction so that a spectrum of instruments best suited to the situation is available at the various stages of conflict.

Comprehensive approach and co-ordination between instruments are constantly being elaborated, under close guidance of The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Finnish parliament, to better meet the challenges of increasingly complicated crisis management environment.

In accordance with its Programme from 2007, the Government of Finland will enhance Finland's capacity to participate in international crisis management operations by means of international cooperation related to use of military and civilian capabilities and promoting civilian crisis management. Finland's aim is to make a significant contribution to international crisis management while paying particular attention to the position of women in conflicts and crisis.

Another key document is "Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004", the government white book that is published on a regular basis. The report outlines that Finland engages in an active and comprehensive policy of conflict prevention and crisis management and promotes coherent objectives in security, development and trade policies. It stresses the coherent use of civilian and military activities in crisis management operations. In joint operations, this means that civilian and military instruments have to be examined together and that planning, joint action and readiness in the different administrative sectors will have to be developed further, both at national and international level.

A national strategy for civilian crisis management is being prepared and Finland's involvement in civilian crisis management activities will be expanded. A working group on drafting the strategy has been established by the Ministry of the Interior. The working group has representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Defence, Education, Social Welfare and Health as well as from the Ministry of Finance. Representatives of NGOs are included to the work as appropriate. The strategy will be finalised in June 2008.

2 Planning, decision making and leadership

The President of the Republic decides on Finland's participation in military crisis management, on a proposal put forward by the Government and after parliamentary process (Committee of Foreign Affairs / entire Parliament provided with a report).

Participation to crisis management and other security policy matters concerning Finland's relations with other states and the coordination of these issues are handled at the joint meeting of the President of the Republic and the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy. The Government directs, supervises and coordinates the securing of these functions.

From the Finnish perspective, the EU is a key actor in the development of civilian crisis management activities and the civilian-military coordination. Finland will contribute to the development, implementation and timely use of resources in EU-approved priority areas, including civilian military coordination.

In Finland, the responsibility for civilian crisis management rests with two ministries. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is responsible for policy guidance of civilian crisis management. I.e., the MFA decides on which crisis management missions civilian personnel are sent and, approximately, how many people are sent on such missions. Participation of Finnish experts is financed through the MFA budget. The Ministry of the Interior in turn maintains, develops and coordinates national capabilities for civilian crisis management. This division of duties is based on the Act on the Participation of Civilian Personnel in Crisis Management (1287/2004), which came into force on 1 January 2005.

Military crisis management instruments are developed in the line with the MoD Strategy for International Defence Policy 2007-2025.

3 Legal framework

Provisions on the legal status of civilian crisis management experts are laid down in the Act on the Participation of Civilian Personnel in Crisis Management (1287/2004) and the Ministry of the Interior Decrees on the Terms and Conditions of the Employment Relationship (35/2005 and 947/2007) and in the military crisis management operations under the Act on Military Crisis Management (211/2006). Other provisions on the legal status of persons in employment relationships are laid down in the State Civil Servants Act (750/1994).

4 Training

Two international training centres, Finnish Defence Forces International Centre and the Crisis Management Centre Finland (civilian crisis management) plan and carry out the civilian-military-training programmes. The cooperation between the two centres has been fruitful. Both contribute to the conceptualisation of the civil-military comprehensive approach. The Defence Forces international Centre has created, for example, training networks based on virtual instruction system. The centres' training material and handbooks have been translated into English and used, for instance, in African training Centres. The UN Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook (2007) as well as handbooks planned to specific operations – as the PRT- Handbook (2007) – are used in the training programmes. Pori Brigade, which ultimately forms the Readiness Brigade of the Western Command, is the fast developing Training Center for the Army and the Finnish Rapid Deployment Force (FRDF).

Finland has contributed to the Civil-Military Coordination Programme 2004-2007 and the ongoing African Peacebuilding Coordination Programme carried out by ACCORD (African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes) and plans to establish an African Training Programme possibly in the context of the EU:s capacity building objectives.. Finland participates in the G8 + African Clearing House process, as well as in CIMIC training programmes in the Balkans (Nordcaps framework). Finland participated as an ISAF troop contributor in the process of having a comprehensive strategic politico-military plan for Afghanistan.

Crisis Management Centre (CMC) Finland, under the Ministry of the Interior, has been responsible for training personnel for civilian crisis management missions since autumn 2006. CMC Finland organises two EU Concept Core Courses annually for potential recruits for civilian crisis management operations. The Core Courses follow the curriculum set out by the European Group on Training (EGT) network.

CMC Finland also organises mission-specific training for civilian experts, of which as an example three Integrated Rule of Law (Kosovo) courses for EULEX Kosovo mission. This course followed the training criteria set by the EU Planning Team in Kosovo.

In November 2008, CMC Finland together with Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) will organise a joint civil-military course "Integrated Crisis Management", aimed at training civilian experts and soldiers, as well as representatives of NGOs in order to facilitate coordination in the field.

CMC Finland trains approximately 40-50 Finnish civilian experts a year for crisis management missions. Finnish Defence Forces International Centre trains approximately (450) military personnel a year for crisis management operations.

5 Resources

The budget line Civilian Crisis Management, managed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, is 14,5 million euros for the current year. The budget covers sending of about 100 experts - on annual level - to crisis management missions, this part of the budget has been directly allocated to the Ministry of the Interior. The budget can also be used to cover the costs of experts sent for election observation missions.

The Ministry of the Interior allocates the budget for CMC Finland for training. The amount of the allocated the CMC training budget for 2008 is 1,3 million euros for 2008. EU Concept Courses, organised by CMC Finland, are partly financed by the Community training budget.

For military crisis management operations there is a budget of 120 million Euros for 2008. This budget makes it possible to deploy approximately 800 troops to missions. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence get an almost equal share of the military crisis management budget. In addition to this there is a budget of 10 million Euros for covering the costs of acquisition of specialist materiel that is not required for national defence needs.

The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for recruiting individual experts that Finland sends on civilian crisis management missions. A valuable tool in this respect is the register of experts maintained by the Ministry. Finnish citizens may apply for civilian crisis management tasks by entering their details in the register, which is currently including around 900 experts. The recruitment will be transferred to the CMC Finland during the summer 2008.

Recruitment for military crisis management missions is always based on volunteers. To date it has always been possible to recruit enough competent people from the reserve and troops trained by Pori Brigade, FINCENT and other units. There are rosters for volunteers.

6 Interoperability

Nationally, the advantage of a relatively small state as Finland is the tradition of cross-administrative cooperation and coordination between the different administrations. As an example, for preparedness in special or abnormal situations and in crisis management in case of emergencies, Finland has in 2006 prepared a cross-administrative and comprehensive strategy, "The strategy for securing the functions vital to society" which is taking into account comprehensively the co-operation and co-ordination in order to ensure the vital functions of the society, applicable to society at large, the business community, and non-governmental organisations. According to the strategy different ministries take principal responsibility for the vital functions in their own field of administration.

Relating to training, CMC Finland functions in close cooperation with Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) and Pori Brigade, mainly via exchanging of trainers and students. At EU-level, Finland has been and will be active in participation in the Civilian Headline Goal process. As mentioned above, Finland will support and contribute to the CHG 2008 target to take in and find synergies out of the use of the different available means and instruments in order to improve and achieve a comprehensive approach in crisis management and to find new models for the co-operation between different actors. Interoperability is promoted with Finland's active engagement with Headline Goal 2010 process and participation to international exercises such as MNE 5. In addition there are a number of Nordic and bilateral initiatives ongoing. The current level of interoperability is perceived to be good and tested in the missions.

7 Evaluation

From the training perspective, CMC Finland systematically evaluates the level of each of the training courses, based on feedback from the students, trainers and observers. Relating to Kosovo specific training, there is an ongoing research project in CMC Finland to study the relevance and impact of training provided for the experts that will be deployed to Kosovo.

From military perspective the operations are constantly evaluated with built-in lessons identified and feedback process. These processes focus on comprehensive approach and force protection. Different studies on specific issues are also launched frequently.

8 Challenges

The main challenges in implementing a comprehensive approach are related to the general tendencies in the crisis management: the complex operations, asymmetric threats and multitudinous actors. The division of labour, resources and responsibilities (for instance on security) are specially difficult to agree between civilian and military structures and mandates.

One of the key challenges in multinational operations is the varying background, experience and training in the field of co-operation between authorities and NGOs. This is highlighted in the planning phase of operations as foundation for co-operation is built at this stage. There is room for improvement in this field.

Concerning the development of civilian-military training or other similar activities derived from the comprehensive approach, Finland would be ready to consider reviewing the OECD/DAC-principles in order to achieve coherent and transparent criteria.

Finland has established the National Action Plan to implement the UN Resolution 1325. The implementation of the Action Plan, taking into account the comprehensive approach to mainstream gender and equal opportunity perspective into crisis management planning and operations, is a challenge.

9 Opportunities

It should be noted that the target has been set by the Government, the Parliament and the parliamentary foreign affairs committee and other committees which have systematically ever since mid-1990 called for comprehensive approach for crisis management, taking into account the co-operation and coordination between different ministries, resources and the synergies, highlighting the linkages between the military and civilian crisis management, between development and security and the importance of human rights and gender issues to be included in all aspects of crisis management.



French interagency experience for conflict prevention and crisis management

Regarding short-term crisis management and long-term reconstruction efforts, France is one of the most active countries, handling the whole spectrum of aspects concerning crisis management. French experience draws on lessons learned from past operations, either in the Balkans, in Africa or in Afghanistan. French security forces, including the police, the gendarmerie and the military, have developed a recognized know-how in the field of crisis management. France is currently reviewing its instruments and doctrine to adapt itself to the new faces of crisis management operations and like its partners, develop a more comprehensive approach to crisis management

French efforts should be grasped within EU's activities to prevent conflicts and crises management operations and missions. As a global actor on the world stage, the European Union has developed a unique ability to combine civilian and military mechanisms to address crises.

Strengthening interagency cooperation is of utmost importance in the field of civil-military relations when diplomats, development experts and the military are engaged in a regular dialogue concerning fragile states and particularly war-torn countries. The respective competences and comparative advantages of each administration reinforce the understanding and in-depth analysis of volatile situations and the issues at stake. They also provide an opportunity to integrate each actor's perception into a broader vision under circumstances where security and development are increasingly intertwined.

It is of great importance to underline today the work that has been previously achieved within an interagency framework; in this context, we would like to emphasize and present to our partners the policy Paper on Fragile States and Situations of Fragility adopted in 2007. It lays the foundation for a broad, interdisciplinary and comprehensive approach to conflict prevention and post-conflict environments. It also reflects the interconnected challenges of governance, economic performance, insecurity and poverty.

* * *

If the French approach to fragility has been conceptualised particularly in the development sphere, the contributions of diplomatic and defence actors but also from Ministries of Interior, Justice and Finance have proved to be essential in order to build a multidisciplinary view of complex situations. The continuing consultation and share of analysis has reinforced the interest for cross-department cooperation and coordination, underlining the need for a long-term involvement in supporting democratic governance, society and state reform, and economic development.

Fragile Situations, the French Concept

Over the last few years – all the more so since the 9/11 attacks – situations at risk of deteriorating have warranted more and more international attention to prevent crises from breaking out, alongside situations of post-conflict. Bilateral (DFID and USAID) and ever more multilateral organisations – the World Bank and the African Development Bank in particular – have developed, or are developing, instruments aimed specifically at fragile states and situations of fragility. The OECD has adopted and reviewed recently principles for good engagement in these states¹. However much this issue is of interest, **an international definition of fragile states still does not exist**. At best, most agree that fragile states have unique characteristics: they find it hard to provide law and order and guarantee their citizens' security, ensure the rule of law and efficient governance (especially in terms of public finance management), deliver MDG-established social services, and underpin regional and international order and stability.

In this context, the French ministry of Foreign affairs launched two debates on fragile states: at the international level with selected African partners in the Franc Zone; and at the national level by creating an interagency working group which produced a "grid of fragilities" based on six categories of fragility. These categories can subsequently be broken down into characteristics or symptoms depending on the case studied: failure of rule of law; impotent State; illegitimate or non-inclusive state; weak economy; fragile society and vulnerable regional environment.

Following this, an implementing two-level strategy was put in place relying on sustained inter-agency involvement in order to provide bottom-up analysis on particular cases (Haïti, Kosovo, Sudan, Central African Republic, Tchad, Mali, Niger and Democratic Republic of Congo).

1. Embassies in the selected states are requested to fill in the fragility grid and organise cross-sectoral analysis with Defence, Development, Ministry of Interior and Diplomatic French representatives.
2. An interagency network led by the Democratic Governance Section inside the ministry of Foreign affairs was set up. It meets regularly to share analysis based on the work of embassies and identify the priority areas for France which more specifically call for concerted action.

This approach is based on the consideration that one of the greatest challenges of our system throughout the different stages of the development and stabilisation process is the improvement of a coordinated, multisectoral, preventive approach associating the various players (political, military, humanitarian, development, etc.).

Reinforcing the national apparatus and building flexible tools

France's Position Paper on Fragile States and Situations of Fragility does not represent the only effort to reinforce the linkages between the different ministries engaged in crisis management. **A strong will to enhance coherence of national external action and improve comprehensiveness is underlying many political and institutional initiatives.**

For contingency crisis management, a dedicated crisis management cell inside the MFA has been created. Named the COVAC, it will be operational by summer 2008 and will be in charge of crisis response planning and monitoring. It will link into partner units or departments inside the Defence, Interior, Health ministries and Development agency.

1 Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States adopted in 2005 and updated in 2007.

France has also initiated an internal review of Security Sector Reform (SSR) activities and doctrine in parallel with its commitment to promote the specific OECD/DAC guidelines on SSR. The multiple actions undertaken on the ground by the various Ministries in support of Rule of Law and Public Liberties (police, justice), Defence administrations or Parliamentary sector will be integrated into a holistic framework following a consultative process between the various French official stakeholders.

From a broader perspective, through the ongoing drafting of our foreign affairs and national defence and security white papers, the French government are also committed to improve inter-agency planning and management of crises. The reform of the state and institutions which will be validated by the General Review of Public Policies by early summer 2008 will accompany substantial administrative changes. Funding issues, in particular, are being considered with the potential establishment of a specific post-conflict fund to complete current financial and technical instruments.

Engaging international partners with the French Strategy

The French policy paper on fragile states and situations of fragility advocates for stronger commitment and dedication in multilateral fora to improve aid effectiveness and international engagement in situations of fragility. Regarding fragile post-conflict states, the major concern is their stabilisation and longer-term reintegration into the global economy. This requires the international community to define and adopt case-specific intervention strategies.

Following this approach, **France has strongly supported the growing involvement of the European Union in the international debates regarding fragile situations**, and notably the adoption of Council of the European Union conclusions “An EU Response to situations of fragility” (20 November 2007). In the immediate aftermath of this declaration, a specific working-group gathering experts from European Commission and Member-States was formed to implement the recommendations of the council and make innovative propositions for a unified European (European Commission and Member-States) approach to fragile situations, paving the way to a stronger political dialogue between Europe as a whole and partner-countries from the South.

From a national point of view as in the European perspective, but also as a contribution to the multilateral debate, France is committed to achieve progress towards greater comprehensiveness in international engagements. It will co-host a round table on fragile situations during the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (“Accra Agenda for Action”) will be held in Accra (Ghana) in September 2008.

* * *

As recent lessons-learned and the conduct of the Multi-National Experiment 5 have demonstrated, crossing valuable civilian with military expertise can be challenging. However, it remains of utmost importance and relevance to address complex post-conflict situations. The requirements for active cooperation do not only stand for crossed-analysis, but also for integrated planning and concerted action. The French approach to fragility in this regard provides a useful framework for collaborative management of fragile and post-conflict situations.

Existing crisis management practices and the future development of comprehensive crisis management in Germany

1. Concept

Multilateral fora provide the primary framework for action for the German Federal Government's crisis prevention activities. This, on the one hand, applies to the United Nations (UN) as the only crisis prevention actor at the global level and on the other hand, to the crisis prevention activities of regional multilateral actors such as the EU, NATO or the OSCE.

Crisis management requires coherent and coordinated action on the part of all state and non-state actors. Only if various policy areas are harmonised, measures intended to eliminate the causes of national or regional conflicts can be effective and sustainable. In its national Action Plan "Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace Building" adopted in May 2004, the Federal Government therefore sets out the basic principles and strategies of the German crisis prevention policy. The Action Plan assesses the new conflict scenario after the end of the Cold War and provides recommendations for concrete actions to be implemented by the government and the creation of a conflict management infrastructure. The objective of the Action Plan is to strengthen the Federal Government's capabilities in the areas of civilian conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict peace-building.

"The White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (2006)" follows the Action Plan's comprehensive approach. Both documents are based on a fundamentally preventive political approach. Although the instruments of crisis prevention are primarily civilian in nature, this does not signify any dissociation from or exclusion of military means. The use of terms such as "networked security", "integrated / comprehensive approach", or "whole of government approach" recognises that efficient crisis management is only possible through a holistic approach in which both civilian and, where appropriate, military elements are considered.

Action by the Federal Government is based on an extended security concept that embraces political, economic, ecological and social stability. Consequently, crisis management must be multi-dimensional, in other words, it must address a number of different levels. No single actor has all the strategies and instruments for crisis prevention in his toolbox.

2. Planning, Decision-Making, and Command and Control

The Federal Government's approach, which is adapted to each respective crisis situation with priority being given to civilian measures, has proven its worth. Under the responsibility of the individual Ministries, decisions on the necessary approach for each crisis are taken on an ad hoc and flexible basis.

With the "Interministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention", the Federal Government has established a working body for the mutual exchange of information and coordination regard-

ing crisis prevention issues. This Interministerial Steering Group is composed of the commissioners and/or contact points for civilian crisis prevention in individual Federal Ministries. It is headed by an Ambassador, the Commissioner for Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building in the Federal Foreign Office. By appointing the commissioners for civilian crisis prevention in the Federal Ministries and establishing the Interministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention in September 2004 as well as the corresponding civil-society advisory board which was established in May 2005, the Federal Government has created an institutional framework for the implementation of the above mentioned Action Plan.

3. Legal Parameters

There are no specific legal provisions dealing with comprehensive crisis management. It is though important to note, that Article 65 of the Federal Constitution states that the Federal Chancellor shall determine and be responsible for the general guidelines of policy and that within these limits each Federal Minister shall conduct the affairs of his or her department independently and on their own responsibility. This means that there is a general presumption that one Federal Ministry should always be in the lead and provide the necessary framework for a comprehensive approach in order to deal with the individual case at hand.

4. Training

Training is organized at two levels: the more general level training of civil servants including military personnel, and the more specific training right before a deployment.

The Federal Foreign Office – in addition to its own training programmes for diplomatic staff, in which crisis prevention is an important element – mainly draws on the Centre for International Peace Missions (CIPM) for advanced training of civilian personnel for peace missions and crisis prevention-oriented reconstruction endeavours. The Federal Ministry of Defence not only has numerous facilities of its own for the advanced training of senior German personnel in the field of security policy but can also draw on those of NATO and Germany's partner countries. The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development conducts further training courses for its own staff – as do the specific German Implementing Agencies (GTZ, KfW, DED, inWent and CIM). The Federal Ministry of the Interior prepares its Police forces in special training programmes at the Federal Police Academy and in special training-centres in Lübeck (Federal Police) and elsewhere. All Ministries use the Federal College for Security Policy Studies (BAKS) for the advanced training of their senior staff in security-policy issues with a special focus on crisis management.

The Centre for International Peace Missions (CIPM) was founded in 2002 to meet the increased demands of the UN, OSCE and others for qualified personnel. Since then, it has provided training for approximately 1300 specialists and has placed more than 1000 German experts in international peace missions. Within the framework of the Civil Peace Service (CPS), financed by the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 260 peace experts have been trained by the end of 2007. Since 1999, the CPS has been developed as a joint effort on the part of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, the German Development Service (DED), churches and NGOs.

The Interministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention sponsors the project “assignment of a development policy adviser to the Bundeswehr Command and Staff College” which aims to achieve a common understanding of the interactions of civilian and military measures on the part of all actors and to convey a clear understanding of the distribution of roles and tasks to future leaders. The effort to heighten the awareness of the actors in the Ministries for the cross-sectoral task of crisis management and post-conflict peace-building at an early stage also has the support of the advisory board to the Interministerial Steering Group.

5. Resources

In September 2001, the Federal Government’s existing personnel resources and material capabilities in the field of civilian crisis prevention were considerably reinforced through the Government’s anti-terrorism programme. More than 1.5 billion Euros were made available to support the Ministries involved in elaborating and implementing a comprehensive approach to prevent and combat international terrorism. Figuring centrally in this approach, along with steps to enhance internal and external security, were concrete initiatives of a preventive nature that above all targeted the factors conducive to the emergence and spread of terrorism. It was thus possible to shoulder new tasks, visibly reinforce existing crisis management activities and gain experiences in critical areas.

In its Action Plan “Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building”, the Federal Government has committed itself to working towards the consolidation of the budgetary funds for crisis management. Federal Foreign Office funds for crisis prevention were substantially increased for the federal budget in 2008. Hence, the funds for the support of international measures in the areas of crisis prevention, peacekeeping and conflict management increased from around 12 million Euros so far to 62 million Euros. Thus, the possibilities for implementing measures aimed at improving peace and security throughout the world are greatly enhanced.

The budget of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development has increased by 640 million Euros or 14% in 2008. This increase will far and foremost be used to fight poverty in Africa. Due to the close correlation between factors of poverty and factors of crisis these funds are expected to have also a considerable effect on the aim of crisis mitigation.

Part of the additional Federal Foreign Office funds consists of a so-called “crisis fund” amounting to 25 million Euros. The Federal Government has thus created a possibility of rapidly contributing measures aimed at direct conflict management in the case of a conflict. This is the remedy for a noticeable shortcoming. In addition, 133.3 million Euros have been provided for tailored strategies in the context of emergency and transition aid measures.

Moreover, the funds of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development in direct support of the Civil Peace Service (CPS) were constantly increased from 14.5 million Euros in 2005 to 19 million Euros in 2008. CPS is a joint effort on the part of state and non-state executing agencies with the objective of promoting a non-violent approach to dealing with conflicts and conflict potentials. In June 2008, 141 peace experts were deployed.

Planning and Number of Personnel Dispatched

Germany has become a substantial contributor in international peacekeeping. At present, around 7,300 Bundeswehr troops are deployed on international peace missions. Germany is also one of the largest troop contributors to missions in the Balkans and in Afghanistan.

Germany currently participates in various UN-led peace missions (“blue helmet missions”) with just under 670 military personnel as well as 160 police officers (as of: April 2008). The current focus is on the participation in UNIFIL in Lebanon, Germany having exercised command over the maritime component until February 2008. German development policy also provides support not only to UN missions, but also to many other crisis-afflicted countries, with 1,300 civilian specialists on the ground. In the 2008 Federal Budget, around 346 million Euros have so far been earmarked for UN-led peace missions.

In addition, the Federal Government sustainably supports NATO’s commitment to crisis prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict peace-building. In addition to its participation in the NATO-led ISAF operation with up to 3,500 troops to ensure a secure environment for UN personnel and other international civilian personnel and to support the Afghan government in the establishment of its own security structures, Germany makes a significant contribution above all to the stabilisation of Kosovo.

The honing of its profile as a predominantly civilian power will enable the EU to even more effectively pursue an exemplary policy to promote a more stable world order – for peace, security, and the safeguarding and creation of opportunities in life all over the world. The Federal Government is therefore working to further improve the coherence of EU policy and strengthen the Union’s capacity for action in the field of crisis management.

Since 1999, within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), military and civilian capabilities for international crisis prevention and conflict management have been developed in parallel, and concrete military and civilian headline goals have been agreed. The German Federal Government has pledged substantial contributions to the military headline goals and has undertaken a civilian commitment to make up to 910 police officers available for international peace operations, both at the Federal level and at the state level of the “Länder”, 90 of whom to be deployable within a reaction time of 30 days.

6. Interoperability

National and multinational interoperability is one of the major prerequisites for modern and effective crisis management. As far as this is concerned, efforts have been undertaken towards the better networking of the different Federal Ministries in Germany.

The further development of the “Effects-Based Approach to Multinational Operations” (EBAO) concept understood as the military contribution to a Comprehensive Approach, for which NATO is responsible has been given momentum in connection with the Riga and Bucharest summit declarations. Bringing these enhancements to life within the Alliance is accompanied by Germany with a view to shaping her own interministerial approach.

7. Evaluation

The concept for crisis prevention, conflict management and post-conflict peace-building in German development cooperation established by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development refers, among other things, to the challenge of conducting so-called impact assessments in post-war situations. These are difficult to measure, both from a practical perspective and in terms of the method applied. At the same time, it is a necessary tool for the ongoing conceptual development of crisis management measures.

Thus, the Federal Government, in cooperation with academics from the Free University of Berlin, is conducting a study over three years since 2006 of the effects of international development cooperation, good governance and conflict transformation in Northeast Afghanistan. By observing changes over time, effects may also be attributed under the difficult conditions of a post-war situation. The use of conflict analysts, survey and qualitative case studies ensures the conflict-sensitive nature of the evaluation. A first interim report provides largely positive results.

Within the German Armed Forces the conceptual underpinnings and the first practical applications of a consistently top-down campaign assessment have been adopted, primarily in the context of the German engagement within the ISAF-framework in Afghanistan and by placing the main emphasis on measuring non-kinetic, social effects among the populations.

8. Challenges

For the crisis prevention endeavours to be effective and ultimately successful, they need to focus both on the causes of war and on the processes and actors involved in the escalation of violence. Each course of action should be examined to determine whether it might not unintentionally do more harm than good ("do no harm" principle). It is therefore essential to create institutions and political regulatory mechanisms for permanently settling conflicts by non-violent means. Crisis management endeavours are not just important for the phase in which an escalation of violence is imminent but must instead be launched earlier on. The containment and settlement of violent conflicts and peace-building activities after the end of hostilities likewise help prevent future wars.

Crisis prevention endeavours should be primarily civilian in nature and should be launched at a very early stage of conflict. Also, armed intervention cannot replace civilian conflict management activities and efforts to combat the structural causes of crises. Experience in Bosnia, East Timor, Afghanistan and Macedonia, however, has shown that military means as an instrument of crisis prevention and crisis management may be necessary in order to prevent or end the violent waging of conflicts or in order to first establish conditions under which the causes of conflict can be addressed by civilian means.

Seeing crisis management as a cross-sector task to be performed by the government, it is necessary to develop methods, instruments and procedures which ensure that crisis management is taken into account in all phases and sectors of government activity.

The need for coordinated and coherent action across all Ministries and actors is today generally accepted. It is a question of how the different instruments of the ministries can be employed synergistically and brought to bear in terms of a "whole of government" approach. The challenge is to find ways of optimising the coordination of work processes and procedures in the head offices and in theatre with the aim of pooling the instruments of the different Ministries to form a com-

pact and efficient German contribution. At the same time, this assumes a common understanding of the tasks involved. Coherence begins in the minds of the actors. To facilitate coordination between Ministries with regard to the planning and conduct of operations in the long term, the Federal Government is, inter alia, investing in the inter-ministerial training of current and future executive personnel.

9. Opportunities

Apart from contributing to enhancing coordination between the Ministries, the Federal Government's Action Plan "Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace Building" has also given the policy areas of crisis prevention and conflict management a higher profile. As a result of the Action Plan, crisis prevention has increasingly established itself as a part of security policy. The Action Plan as a political reference document together with the creation of national structures for crisis management show the importance Germany is putting on the subject and the innovative approach it is willing to take. It is the first time that an inter-ministerial and coherent political approach which involves the civil society has been so clearly elaborated and implemented.

The financial increases in the state budget underline once more the importance of crisis management for action by the Federal Government. Thus, its possibilities for implementing measures aimed at improving peace and security throughout the world are greatly enhanced. This applies both to the provision of support to international actors such as the United Nations (UN) and its relevant sub-organisations as well as to bilateral measures. In this regard, the focus is on countering structural causes of conflicts such as poverty or the lack of social justice, conveying procedures for peaceful conflict resolution, promoting democratic and rule-of-law structures, supporting reforms in the security sector (police, judiciary) and managing the consequences of conflicts (reintegration of former combatants, "transitional justice").

CRISIS MANAGEMENT A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Throughout history, all countries have gone through crisis in the fields of Security and Defense, as a result of an eventual conflict of unknown duration and extent with neighboring or rival states. Statistics show that countries are bound to go through such crisis in the future, as well.

To deal with such crisis in an efficient way, it is imperative to develop and organize a crisis management system at national level to the extent and level that such crisis can be predicted.

Crisis management is more an art than a science, and depends on the judgment, capability, knowledge and other qualities. Predetermined procedures of crisis management do not constitute tailor-made solutions, but assist those participating in the managing of a crisis and making the least possible mistakes.

During a crisis, making the right decisions may be the most critical and vital problem that those responsible for the crisis management are required to solve. However, the right decisions demand the right information.

The first hour, after the crisis has broken out, is possibly the most important period of time, in defining the mode of dealing with the crisis. Immediate and accurate information is the basic criterion that enables the group members to make the right decisions.

There are no recipes for crisis management. Each crisis is unique, and dealing with it, mainly depends on the choices of those who decide and who will bear the sole responsibility for their actions.

The causes of crisis may be Economic, National, Military, or other as well. They are delicate situations that have their own dynamics. They escalate in a climate of tension and dispute, and there is always the possibility for the situation to get out of control. Regarding the military aspect, we have concluded in the following definitions, in regard with the “**tension**”, “**crisis**” and the “**crisis management**”:

Tension is a situation that includes diplomatic or political action, accompanied by military incidents, situations or threats for military action, disputing territorial sovereign rights or vital interests; it is a situation that demands preventive military measures and actions, in order to deter escalation and support national interests.

Crisis is an incident or a situation threatening the country and more specifically the welfare of the citizens, the territorial integrity, national independence and national interests. It develops rapidly creating a need for political, diplomatic, economic and finally military actions, in order to confront the threat successfully and fulfill national objectives

Crisis management focuses on preventing escalation, controlling the crisis and achieving an acceptable outcome.

At national level and according to the National Defense Policy, there is the Crisis Management System, that is a group of administrative bodies, services, premises, coded actions and procedures, on the basis of current documents, that assist in the management of a single or multiple crises.

The purpose of the crisis management system is to:

- a. Cope with a crisis in the field of Security and Defense. It includes properly planned and coordinated actions, so as to protect territorial integrity, national independence and interests of the country.
- b. Ensure civil and military readiness and capability to deal with Security and Defense challenges and armed conflicts, if inevitable.
- c. Provide the necessary guidelines to Military Commanders before and after the outbreak of hostilities.

The bodies dealing with crisis management in Greece are the Governmental Foreign and Defense Policy Council, the Defense Council, the Minister of National Defense, the Joint Chiefs of General Staff Council, and the Chief of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff (HNDGS).

The Governmental Foreign and Defense Policy Council is the main body responsible for a crisis management, that finally determines whether a situation is developing into a crisis and decides the mode to deal with it. In wartime period it is renamed to War Council. The Governmental Foreign and Defense Policy Council consists of the Prime Minister, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of the National Economy and Finance, the Minister of the Environment and Public Works, the Minister of Merchant Marine, the Minister of Development, the Minister of Macedonia and Thrace, the Minister of the Aegean Sea and the Chief of the HNDGS.

The Defense Council consists of the Minister of National Defense, the Chief of the HNDGS and the Chiefs of the three General Staffs (Army, Navy, Air force).

The Joint Chiefs of General Staff Council includes the Chief of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff (HNDGS) and the Chiefs of the three General Staffs (Army, Navy, Air Force).

A number of other divisions and departments in the HNDGS act supportively to the above bodies in a crisis management, such as the Joint Military Intelligence Directorate, the Crisis Situation Evaluation Team, and the Crisis Management Team etc. All above bodies have liaisons with the relevant Ministries and General Staffs.

Staffing and evaluating the situation and proposal of necessary measures to face the crisis is a responsibility of the Crisis Management Team, that functions as an instrument of the Chief of HNDGS. The members of the Crisis Management Team present the situation, as it rises, until that moment, the appropriate evaluation on the escalation of the situation; they also present the recommendations on how to face the situation, engagement or dis-engagement measures and Rules of Engagement, as well as all preparation in the military and civil sector.

All above recommendations are subject to detailed discussion and analysis, and after having evaluated the current situation and the possible impacts derived from the implementation of the proposed measures, a final suggestion is formatted and presented to the Chain of Command for appropriate decisions.

The decision to be taken on the above measures depends on the gravity the measures will have at different levels. There are measures that require approval of the Governmental Council on Foreign Policy and National Defense, and others that need decision by the Minister of Defense or the Chief of HNDGS. For such military measures, the execution order is issued by the Chief of HNDGS, following a relevant decision by the Governmental Council on Foreign Policy and National Defense.

However, to face a crisis is not only a matter of taking military measures. In a number of cases civil support is also required, so in such cases there are national plans that get activated, on the basis of an alert and readiness system by the Governmental Council on Foreign Policy and National Defense, or the Minister of Defense, or the Chief of the HNDGS and refer to the support of all co-relevant ministries and their appropriate services and bodies.

At national level, the coordination of the ministries and other organizations in the execution of such plans that support the national defense and face emergency situations, is accomplished by the Civil Defense and Civil Emergency Planning Division of the HNDGS.

A relevant department of Civil Emergency Planning functions in every Ministry for planning and coordination purposes. Similar departments function in each geographical area of the country, at prefecture, municipality and community level, having the responsibility of the coordination among various services and bodies evolved in confronting emergencies.

In case the measures of the civil sector also include plans within the responsibility of Civil Emergency Planning, then the whole mechanism of the State is activated, through the appropriate liaison of the HNDGS in the Crisis Management Team, in order to fulfill implementation of necessary measures.

The responsibilities of various bodies and services involved in a crisis management are defined in a State law under the title "Organization and Function of the Ministry of Defense, Command and Control of the Armed Forces and other provisions". They also refer to the Policy for the National Defense of the country.

Training of military and civilian personnel manning the bodies that are responsible for a crisis management, and the rest of the military and civilian personnel to the extent required, is fulfilled through participation in:

- a. Planning and conduct of crisis management exercises, or/and joint exercises, where there is a parallel test of the crisis management system.
- b. Organization and conduct of seminars or conferences on crisis management.
- c. Participation in seminars and training of the Multinational Peace Support Operations Center, that operates in Greece, in a PfP training role.

Public information sector is also a significant factor for a successful management of a crisis, tension or emergency. Greece considers this an important sector, while the fundamental prerequisites for a successful public information procedure is the complete and successful coordination of clear and well defined responsibilities and procedures.

THE NATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN HUNGARY

INTRODUCTION

The Hungarian recent contribution to the different crisis management operations underlined the importance of development of cooperation among different players in the actions. Implementation of non-military actors to the operations became a solid fact and the guaranty of the future success. Hungary has already a decade experience in MFO (Multinational Forces and Observers) mission in Egypt how to operate a mixed military-police unit together in a classical peace-keeping operation. Also the PRT concept in Afghanistan is even a better example for the cooperation of civil-military assets on the ground. Running these different multifunctional operations Hungary recognized the importance of development of the methodology of the Hungarian National Crisis Management System and the comprehensive approach concept in the conflict prevention and crisis response operations for more efficient participation of Hungary in these activities.

Hungary recognized the necessity of the development of national crisis management system to:

- Evaluate and predict the possible crisis situation and its solution.
- Establish an efficient decision making process and decision-support system.
- Effectively operate in different conflict situations.

The article is based on the next outlines:

- **Concept**
- **Main characteristics of Hungarian National Crisis Management System**
- **Legal environment**
- **Comprehensive approach**
- **Conclusions and challenges**

Firstly couple of words about the key principles and factors related to the National Crisis Response System. Concerning these key factors in Hungary, let shortly introduce the Hungarian interests and relationship to different international organizations from crisis management aspects.

1. CONCEPT

Political environment:

One favorable development in South-Eastern Europe has been that the countries of the region committed themselves to the Euro-Atlantic values and expressed their intention to join the European Union and NATO. As a result of the crisis-management activities taking place as a common effort of international organizations (UN, OSCE, NATO, EU), the threat of destabilization in the region and of an outbreak of internal or interstate conflicts has diminished, with states of the region mostly **heading in the direction of self-sustaining stability**.

International organizations:

As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Hungary enjoys the Alliance's guarantees, the purpose of which is to protect the territorial integrity, political independence and security of its member states.

Along with the preservation of the Alliance's traditional defense tasks and capabilities, **NATO's activities ever-increasingly include the management of crises emerging in the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond**, and the relations of partnership established with countries of these regions. **Hungary has a fundamental interest in NATO remaining the primary forum of transatlantic security policy dialogue and co-operation**, preserving its effectiveness by adapting to the changing security policy environment of the 21st century, and by contributing to the extension of the zone of security and stability.

Like other member states, Hungary contributes to the Alliance's adaptation and – both out of self-interest and in the spirit of fair burden sharing – takes part in the implementation of the tasks the Alliance needs to fulfill. It is making continuously renewed efforts to fulfill the political and military requirements stemming from allied co-operation, particularly those required by the implementation of military operations, and to adapt its own decision-making and crisis-management system to NATO's decision-making and crisis-management system, as well as to ensure public support for NATO's decisions and the resources and legal conditions required for their implementation.

The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy represents an ever-increasingly important framework of Hungarian foreign policy. By laying the grounds of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, that serves as a means of the Member States of the European Union have taken a significant step towards playing a greater role in world politics and the enhancement of the European Union's crisis management capabilities. Hungary takes an active part in the realization of the European Security and Defense Policy and in the implementation of military and civilian crisis management operations, mainly in its immediate vicinity but also beyond that.

Furthermore, it seeks to be involved in the European structures and programs to enhance defense capabilities, while preventing unnecessary duplications, and to develop those capabilities and forces, which may enhance its contribution to the European Union's activities in the field of crisis management, whether in a national or multinational framework.

The success of conflict-management in the Euro-Atlantic region and its vicinity may significantly increase, if **NATO and the European Union deepen the strategic partnership between the two organizations in the fields of crisis management and development of capabilities.** There is a need for the coordinated application of military and non-military means available to the two organizations in the process of planning and implementing crisis-management and peace-keeping operations.

The OSCE is particularly active in the field of preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. An element of outstanding importance in the organization's political-military dimension has been the existence of arms control regimes and confidence- and security-building measures. Hungary participates within the range of its possibilities in OSCE missions.

One of the tasks of Hungarian foreign and security policy is to take an active part – in co-operation with its Euro-Atlantic allies and international organizations such as the UN, OSCE,

NATO and the EU – **in crisis management operations** taking place in the region. Beyond and additionally to the military capabilities we need to enable Hungarian experts from the fields of public administration, law enforcement, as well as legal and economic experts to contribute with their experience to the crisis response efforts and the post-conflict management, as well.

2. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF HUNGARIAN NATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

When we make an essential evaluation on national crisis management and conflict prevention system we should answer the following questions:

- What kinds of specific tasks Hungary has to solve and fulfill?
- How should we strike a balance between the defense of country and contributing to operations asymmetric threats?
- Should we make any adjustments in our capabilities to give more weight to the contributions of collective efforts to the crisis response of international community?
- What are the roles of the different international organizations (UN, EU, NATO, OSCE, other institutions) in tackling the asymmetric threats?

Hungary established a crisis response system, based on the evaluation of possible risks and threats.

These are /National Security Strategy, Governmental Resolution No 2073/2004.(IV.15.):

- Regional instability (from Africa to Central-Asia, including the Balkan)
- Proliferation of WMD (Rogue States and non-state actors)
- Transnational threats (refugee movement, terrorism, organized criminal activities, environmental protection issues, etc.)
- Failure of democracy (human right abuses, fanatic ethnic and religious groups, economic disparities)

There is some overlap between these categories and in certain cases different risks and threats can happen together. If the crisis is complex the solution for the situation also should be complex.

This complexity characterized by:

- More active use of diplomatic, political and economic means,
- More flexibility of use of tools and means,
- Comprehensive approach of all civilian and military capabilities,
- Close interaction with international organizations.

Besides the global threats and challenges the National Security Strategy takes into consideration the chance the organized crime, black market, migration and political and religious outlaw activity to appear.

3. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF NATIONAL CRISIS RESPONSE SYSTEM

The Hungarian National Crisis Management System in connectivity with the International Organizations based on the national. These are mainly the Constitution of the country, the different legal documents and basic governmental and ministerial rules and regulations.

According to the Constitution there are four qualified periods of time (emergency measures need to be taken in case of qualified situations):

- **State of national crises** (war or danger of war)
- **State of emergency** (civil war, natural and industrial disaster)
- **State of danger** (natural disaster, public disorder and lack of safety)
- **Unexpected military attack**

National Defense is supported by the constitutional system of qualified periods state of emergency, crisis situation, emergency situation and Const. 19./E§ situation. As you can see the qualified periods take into consideration changes of nature of threat, of the constitutional status and of power center.

4. HUNGARY AND THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

As it's mentioned the National Crisis Response has civilian and military tasks, but is supported with a planning process that is based on the basic documents, discussed earlier and as a result of interactions of the Hungarian Government's Plan for Country's Defense, Crises Response System, Ministerial plans and operations, NATO and EU harmonization results a system defining who, what, by what time, by what way and under what type of orientation should do for the preparation and execution of Hungary's military and civilian measures.

Different phases of national crisis response procedure:

- ⇒ Preventive Options:
 - Diplomatic
 - Economic
 - Preventive military
 - Arms control
 - Special anti-terror
- ⇒ Crisis Response Measures
- ⇒ Counter-surprise
- ⇒ Counter-aggression
- ⇒ National Alert States

The elements of National Crisis management System:

The Hungarian national capabilities are de-centralized by all those ministries, who may concerns in the crisis respond activities. The main characteristic of the National System is a centralized coordination and the decentralized capabilities. All the effort organizes and authorizes by the Government, however the capabilities necessary to fulfill the tasks allocated at the different ministries and other organizations. Assign the existing capabilities in certain cases mainly happening on the preauthorized way, nevertheless in extraordinary cases the government can act immediately.

The organizations, taking part in national crisis response activities can be divided into two main parts: the central, so called governmental level and the local, so called territorial level of the system. These two parts, including all involved organization and professional experts with their responsibilities, legal and practical regulations, as well as all the measures which, should be taken by these organizations or experts.

In order to crisis management, Hungary – according to the National Laws – formed its own Crisis Management System. On the top of the system are the Prime Minister and the Government. Below the Government are the ministries involved in the operation. The main responsibilities dedicated to that certain minister whom in the specific case gives the main coordination task also. For example, in case of disaster relief situation (natural disaster, the flood situation, or others) the Ministry of Environment and Water, the Ministry of Local Municipalities and the Ministry of Defense have the main role.

Each of the ministries has an own disaster management system and organization, which are designed to participate in disaster management and to direct their own organizations during the operation. Also similar the situation in terrorist threats situation, when the main coordination role dedicated to the Ministry of Legal Affairs and Law Enforcement, but the Ministry of Local Municipalities and the Ministry of Defense has their significant role also. All the activities organized in the framework of country's defense administration system on central and on the local level as well.

Also we have some other special organizations, which are playing a certain role in different situation. For example the Crisis Management Centre has been established in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from 15 February 2005. The Centre was established in order to help and make the help more efficient granted to Hungarian citizens residing or staying abroad in the case of international catastrophes like the tsunami in South Eastern Asia in December 2004. The Crisis Management Centre is continuously in the state of readiness. It is the minister, or in his/her absence the permanent state secretary, who simultaneously appoints the head of the Centre, and who may order to activate the system in case of a crisis situation.

Additionally to the national interest, Hungary needs to possess the military capabilities required for the collective defense of Hungary within the framework of NATO, for the collective defense of its allies, as well as capabilities required for crisis management, peacekeeping operations, and disaster-relief launched with the participation of NATO-allies.

Hungary needs to be able to participate also in crisis-management activities taking place within the framework of the European Union. The Hungarian Defense Forces need to possess rapidly deployable and sustainable forces suited for flexible use and available also for expeditionary operations that are able to co-operate with allied forces and can be used in crisis spots without any geographical limitations.

Besides military operations, law enforcement, medical, and humanitarian activities, as well as activities of civilian nature also play an ever-increasing role in crisis management operations undertaken by the international community. The geographical distribution of such operations has changed as well; besides the Western Balkans and the European peripheries (e.g. Caucasus), Central Asia and the Middle East have increasingly moved into the focus of international crisis management. As a result of membership in the UN, OSCE, NATO and the EU, Hungary has to prepare for an increasing and permanent involvement in the fields of crisis management and peacekeeping.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND CHALLENGES

The final goal is that the whole government takes part and will be involved in the decision making and the implementation face of the crisis management operations as well. In harmony with the development of the comprehensive approach theory and based on the recent lesson learned - PRT in Afghanistan, NATO CMX 08 exercise - Hungary will develop the concept of the more efficient cooperation of all national authorities and ministries whom may it concern.

The complexity of the crisis management operations – characterized with the multinational environment and the harmonization of the national legal framework with the needs of International Organizations – requires the complex approach from the players as well. The main challenges of the implementation of the comprehensive approach concept at the national level in Hungary are:

- Harmonization of the structure and mandate of the national contingent between civilian and military participant.
- Create the common training requirements both for military and civilian actors; establish similar background for civilian and military contributors.
- More active involvement of all players from the early stage of the crisis management process.
- Centralization of the decision making process supported by the professional situation analysis and advisory teams.

During the crisis situation all the capabilities should be used more effectively, including the civil and the military elements. Basically the coordination among them in Hungary improved, but the cooperation between the actors needs improvement from both sides, and more responsibility should be given to the leader on certain task for gaining time, which is a key factor in crisis situation.

Before and during the crisis making the right and timely decisions is the key factor in the solution of the problem. Recognizing this fact Hungary gives more attention and focus to the development of the inter-agency decision making process in governmental level.

The recent experiences of Hungary demonstrated the importance of civilian part in the crisis management operation. The valuable cooperation between the military and the civilians can be a guarantee for the successful crisis management operations in the future.

Comprehensive Approach: Trends, Challenges and Possibilities of Co-operation in Crisis Prevention and Management

Norwegian Perspectives

Introduction

Over the last two decades, the transformation of the nature of conflicts has necessitated both a conceptual change in our perception of conflicts as well as in our strategic and operational approach to conflict prevention and conflict mitigation. There is a growing awareness of the shifting features and nature of modern conflicts, their complexity, and their non-linear nature. However, more has to be done to link peacemaking, conflict management (including peacekeeping) and peacebuilding in order to achieve greater impact and obtain sustainable dividends on the ground.

Today, there is a clear realization that international military presence can never provide the solution in and by itself. Military power, when applied wisely, can establish territorial control, dissuade parties to a conflict from certain negative options and provide a basic level of security; but it can not provide the many other essential ingredients that are needed to build peace. It is only effective and useful as part of an overall strategy backed by a clear and strong political process. In other words, sustainable security must be based on more than a single element and cannot be restored or maintained in a political vacuum.

In recent years we have seen a change from a narrow framework approach to peacekeeping, designed simply to mitigate the impact of war, to a much more holistic and multidimensional approach. While the success of peacebuilding efforts often depends on successful peacekeeping, the reverse is also true; the success of peacekeeping depends on the achievement of essential peacebuilding goals. The objective of multidimensional approaches is to increase the effectiveness of peace operations by optimizing coordination and division of labor between political, security, development, and humanitarian approaches.

The challenge is to combine the many-faceted elements of our international efforts to assist war-torn societies in their transition from war to peace, overcoming the typically stove-piped nature of our domestic and international political and administrative systems.

Who should lead?

The need for a holistic and multidimensional approach is widely recognized, not only by the UN, but also by other multinational actors such as the EU, NATO and the AU, and by individual states. Despite the fact that these stakeholders have very different mandates and structures and operate within their own discourse (UN-“integration”, NATO - “comprehensive approach”, EU - “security and development”), the overall strategic aim is the same; to improve strategic

and operational approaches to conflict and post-conflict situations by adopting a more coherent approach. But even the drive for more coherence seems fragmented and uncoordinated. The goal of gatherings such as this should be to bridge analytical gaps, streamline understanding and avoid duplication of efforts.

The United Nations has to be at the forefront of the effort to achieve more coherence. Only the UN system has the global legitimacy needed. Furthermore, the UN has the whole range of peacebuilding tools and mandates at its disposal – given that it manages to use them in a coherent manner. The UN is in the forefront in terms of both conceptual thinking and operational development of multidimensional approaches, reconciling the different mandates and tools. At present there are more UN peacekeeping troops deployed than ever before, in increasingly complex situations. Still, the UN has a long way to go. As member states and contributors, it is our responsibility to enable the UN to perform its tasks in the most effective way possible.

We need to strengthen the UN and its capacity to make optimal use of available resources, while respecting humanitarian imperatives, internalizing the need for long-term thinking and planning, and instituting a demographically and gender-sensitive approach at all levels in order to better enable the UN to build lasting peace in countries affected by war.

Why?

We believe that our interests are best served by a world order based on international law, human rights and social and economical development. As we see it, the UN is the only organization capable of bringing the broad legitimacy and the full panoply of tools needed to address conflict and post-conflict situations the world is faced with today. Consequently, the Norwegian government has adopted an approach which entails strengthening the UN's role in conflict resolution and enhancing our contributions to UN-led international operations.

Despite the rumors of its "imminent demise", the UN during the last three four years has become the largest multinational peacekeeping actor in the world. The UN is currently directing more operations and more personnel than NATO, the EU, the AU and other regional organizations combined - and it does so under severe resource constraints.

Parallel with the increase in UN-led operations, the UN is increasingly authorizing regional organizations such as NATO, the EU and the AU to carry out or assist UN-mandated operations – i.e. NATO's ISAF mission in Afghanistan, EU's mission in Chad, etc. This enhances the importance of the UN and the legitimacy of regional organizations in ensuring international peace and security. Participation in UN and NATO international operations is an integral part of Norwegian political, security and development policy. Furthermore, the EU is aiming at a broader approach and larger responsibility for peace and security, both in Europe and globally. With its broad specter of economic, political and military assets, the EU is well suited to take on all the challenges of peacebuilding.

As a UN member state we have a clear responsibility to provide sufficient financial resources for peace operations, and to ensure sufficient military and civilian capacity. The ability of the UN to plan and lead complex peace operations has improved, but is still vulnerable because of continued internal stove-piping.

Mission mandates, as adopted by the Security Council, are increasingly ambitious, and multi-pronged approaches are called for ever more frequently. Indeed, contemporary UN mandates are often more impressive than the apparatus provided for implementation. If left unattended the gap between expectations and means may undermine the credibility of the UN operations.

Enhancing the UN's capacity to implement peace operations can not be left to the Secretariat alone, effective reforms require political and financial backing by Member States.

UN Multidimensional and Integrated Missions: A Norwegian project

As a particular contribution, the Norwegian Government in 2006 launched a project (UN's Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Trends and Challenges). Through a series of regional seminars and consultations, the project has engaged a broad range of actors in dialogue on how to increase the effectiveness and accountability of the UN peacekeeping operations.

One of the most essential lessons learned from this project was that no single actor could resolve the challenges on its own. The project concluded that, given the complex range of approaches and instruments that are employed in peace operations, more coherence (or "integration") is necessary both within and outside the UN system, in order to adequately address the realities on the ground. The term "integration", however, must not be misinterpreted to mean ready-made organizational solutions or the end of diversity. Instead it is a way to manage diversity and to provide a framework for handling operational challenges and dilemmas on the ground. A strong conclusion from the project is that organizational form should be determined by the situation in question and the desired impact of the international engagement. Integration is not an end in itself, but rather a means to an end. There can be no fixed template on how to integrate. All actors are encouraged to take context as their starting point.

Though the project specifically encompassed the UN's multidimensional and integrated peacekeeping missions, many of the recommendations that were put forward are relevant for other multinational and national organizations.

The project thus also touched upon the issue of inter-organizational integration. Recent examples of collaboration between the UN, the EU, NATO and the AU attest to a growing convergence of efforts. But more can and must be done to i.e. break down cultural barriers and optimize the collective insights and resources of the various organizations. Some initial ideas in this direction are presented towards the end of the paper.

Another key challenge in many conflict/post-conflict situations is the need to balance the need for coherence with the need to maintain a sufficient space for humanitarian actors to operate, in line with their particular mandates. Humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, MSF and other predominantly humanitarian NGOs, can not and should not be formally integrated in political or military structures. This does not mean, however, that humanitarian actors should not be part of integration efforts.

A principal distinction must be drawn here between humanitarian actors and development actors. In a post-conflict reconstruction situation, development is and has to be a part of an overarching political plan, because long-term development needs a clear direction. While the line between humanitarian and developmental is clear in principle, it may be rather blurred in theory, and at times the same actors are active in both areas. Hence, a sophisticated understanding of the practical

implications of the need to match “integration” with “respect for mutual roles” must be built into the strategic framework and any strategic leadership structure. Because of the need to make these distinctions, we attempt to avoid the more “binary” distinction between “civilian” and “military” implied in much of today’s “civ-mil” lingo.

The key issue is to develop effective strategic, coordination and dialogue between all actors. The UN has come a long way in finding effective ways of making this relationship work. One recent example is Afghanistan, where UNAMA is now strengthening its humanitarian pillar in close dialogue with NGOs, balancing the need for integration with the need to uphold humanitarian principles.

In line with the recommendations put forward by the UK during the Security Council debate recently, we fully agree that strengthening leadership on the ground is essential. It is critical to ensure that the senior UN representative in the field has at her or his disposal a clear and a robust mandate, leverage and resources to direct the UN’s effort on the ground in a way that informs, generates and underpins political solutions to the problems and conflicts in the country concerned. The UN representative also needs to be backed by a strong and integrated leadership team.

It is also essential to improve relations between strategic level HQ policy processes and operational implementation on the ground. Strengthening a “field based” organizational and management structure is needed. Integration is best built “bottom up”, around an agreed set of strategic priorities and the development of a collective “ideology” to guide the process. In this regard, it is important to create better incentives for greater system-wide coherence and integration. There is a need to create greater incentives for inter-agency mobility to break down barriers and optimize the collective insights and resources of the various stakeholders.

Another essential crux hindering the effectiveness of peacekeeping/peacebuilding efforts is the need for more predictable and sustainable funding. The current system for financing multidimensional peace operations does not allow for adequate resources to be available to multidimensional mandates with strong peacebuilding and recovery components. More than a new fund, there is rather a need to adapt the current funding regime for post-conflicts in general and recovery in particular, so as to avoid gaps in funding during the most critical phases. This requires closer dialogue between the UN Security Council, the UN system at large, and other multilateral partners, donors and stakeholders.

Again taking the example of Afghanistan, the need to increase UNAMA’s capacity in the development and humanitarian field is suffering from financial constraints and administrative rigidity.

There is need for a more coordinated donorship in most operations: The potential negative role of bilateral donors and other arrangements for undermining coherence in the field is also a potential problem, especially the earmarking of funds and specific donor priorities.

The issue of local ownership and capacity building is also vital. The importance of aligning capabilities in support of national priorities and objectives should be implemented systematically yet asymmetrically. Securing ownership by the host state, and building capacity is vital for the success of both peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Usually, it was noted, in countries emerging from war and/or in a post-conflict reconstruction situation, there is a clear tension between speed and ownership. At the same time as it is important to deliver peace dividends quickly to the local population, it is also essential that the (re-)building of local capacity takes place right from the planning stage. The question of how to better link internal and system-wide planning frameworks with concurrent national processes was also addressed. New ways of linking the process of defining

and implementing nationally-owned programs for peace and development with the programs of the UN system, and other partners and donors, should be explored. The UN's efforts to develop country-specific compacts or, in other words, country-specific frameworks or strategies that bring on board all stakeholders, including national partners, to set out priorities, make implementation plans and define responsibilities in line with both national and international programming objectives, were referred to as a very positive development that should be further explored.

More gender sensitive approaches

In 2000, the United Nations Security Council adopted the ground-breaking Security Council Resolution 1325 (SCR 1325) on Women, Peace and Security. For the first time the UN was given a mandate and framework to respond to the specific gender concerns and needs of women in conflict and post-conflict situations.

Norway alongside other key actors is working to strengthening the implementation of SCR 1325 in present and future multidimensional and integrated peace operations by incorporating gender perspectives in all peacekeeping missions and to ensure that the specific experience and knowledge that women can bring to the peace process is maximized.

A special area of concern is the way in which UN-missions can work with the host government and local civil society to implement UNSCR 1325, and how Norway and Norwegian NGOs can also support this process.

Politics at the centre stage

Within all of these complexities and our efforts to improve our operational endeavors, it is however important to bear in mind that despite these initiatives, we can not afford to lose sight of the overarching principle that has to be in place if our efforts to build lasting peace is to succeed; a shared and agreed upon political common objective. In other words, we have to avoid making peacekeeping and peacebuilding a substitute for political dialogue and processes. There has been a tendency to put soldiers on the edge of a conflict rather than diplomats in the middle - a case in point is Afghanistan - one cannot solve political problems by military means alone.

A key operation - Afghanistan

The Afghanistan experience underlines the need for investing further in more effective UN multidimensional and integrated missions. Building on the UN's Multidimensional and Integrated Missions concept, Norway has been a strong advocate for a more prominent and stronger role for the UN in Afghanistan as the main coordinator of international efforts and the main provider of strategic guidance to the Afghan government. At the same time the UN's strategic role must be enforced by a robust ISAF-operation. Reconstruction and development cannot take place if ISAF does not succeed in providing security and stability. This is solidly embedded in the agreement between Heads and States of Governments at the recent NATO-Summit in Bucharest.

In order to achieve a coherent, well coordinated and unified government effort in Afghanistan, the Norwegian Government has established a standing cross-government committee at the political-strategic level – i.e. the so-called “Afghanistan-forum”. It consists of deputy ministers from the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry for International Development, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Justice and the Police and the Office of the Prime Minister. The forum develops policy in order to promote a shared understanding of challenges, aims and objectives for the engagement in Afghanistan.

The committee, backed by a cross-cutting operational team, is working strategically to strengthen UNAMA's coordinating role in Afghanistan. Financing several positions in UNAMA has been a first step in this regard.

The committee also focuses on developing relevant policies and practices for cross-governmental joint training, both civilian and military staff, including pre-deployment training. These include exercises, courses, seminars etc. For instance, as part of preparations for civilian and military personnel to be deployed to the Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team in Northern Afghanistan, we conduct cross governmental pre-deployment training with emphasis on developing a common understanding of how to conduct the activities of the PRT in a comprehensive and coherent way. In order to be more comprehensive in our efforts to support local ownership in Afghanistan, Norway argues in favor of reviewing the concept, structure and activities of NATO's Provincial Reconstruction Team. The PRTs need to increase its focus on how to better facilitate and create the conditions for enhanced Afghan leadership and responsibility.

Norway has for some time highlighted two – closely interlinked – challenges in terms of achieving integration and a coordinated multidimensional approach in Afghanistan. First, in contrast to “pure” UN-led missions, in Afghanistan there are several actors side by side and an uneven balance between political, military, developmental and humanitarian efforts. Secondly, so far there has been no clear lead agency responsible for strategic guidance and coordination of efforts.

However, the need for a more integrated, strategic and multilateral effort is increasingly recognized among all actors involved in Afghanistan. It is urgent that a coordinated multidimensional approach on the ground now be implemented. In this regard, we need to ensure the implementation of the renewed and enforced mandate for UNAMA, including full support behind the challenging tasks of the new SRSG in Afghanistan, Mr. Kai Eide.

Challenges

There's a need to develop coherent mechanisms for lesson learning-processes, as well as for monitoring and systems to measure effects as a basis for sharing best practices and future planning.

In order to strengthen our multidimensional and integrated approach to crisis prevention and management, Norway emphasizes the need for enhanced cooperation and coordination between involved actors – i.e. the United Nations, NATO, the European Union and other international organizations, non-governmental organizations and relevant local bodies.

We are also working on developing a more coherent and coordinated approach to public information – i.e. enhancing consistency of strategic communication for the involved actors in crisis management missions.

Opportunities

Contact group

In extension of the project on multidimensional and integrated peace operations, Norway will facilitate the establishment of an “Integrated Missions Contact Group”. The idea is that the group would be established at the intergovernmental level, in close collaboration with all stakeholders, especially at field level, to discuss specific issues as a follow-up to the project. The group would not in any way substitute official forums that already exists, or aim to have any political decision-making authority. On the contrary, the aim would be to provide an informal “meeting place” that encourages open and frank discussions, in the hope that this small initiative could also bring the “integration” debate forward.

Strengthening civilian capabilities

At present there is a clear deficit of readily, qualified and deployable civilian capabilities that can be deployed into complex multidimensional peace operations. Some early initiatives are underway in several countries and organizations. Norway believes this is a crucial area that needs to be addressed urgently and that we must make a collective effort to identify, retain and train sufficiently a cadre of qualified civilian personnel which the UN and other relevant organizations can call upon. Building or strengthening a civilian capability also requires putting in place conditions and training systems that will sufficiently prepare them for operating in a multidimensional and integrated mission framework.

As part of our focus on multi-dimensional peace support operations and security sector reform (SSR), the Norwegian MoD has established a standing pool of personnel and resources able – at high readiness – to conduct SSR related operations aimed at enabling the recipient country to assert effective democratic control of armed forces, focusing on ministerial and parliamentary levels. Defence reform is aimed at enabling armed forces to effectively carry out their tasks, with special focus on participation in international peace support operations.

The newly established Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre is also another relevant supplement in this debate. The aim of the Peacebuilding Centre is to facilitate the integration of analytical and other forms of knowledge and expertise to peacebuilding activities and promotes the interchange of operational and scientific knowledge and expertise in the development of peacebuilding policy and practice.

In its operational support to peacebuilding, the Centre relates to a range of peacebuilding actors, not least the United Nations and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as relevant government agencies and civil society organizations around the world. In its support to policy and practice, the Centre seeks to act as one resource in a global community of peacebuilding practice across a range of professions, disciplines and regions. The Centre works to ensure that the best available knowledge and expertise is brought to bear on policy and practice.

Poland

WHAT ARE THE FUNCTIONS OF THE NATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

NATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM

- MULTI-DEPARTMENTAL !

ENABLES CO-OPERATION WITH NATO AND EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

- COMPATIBILITY !

ENABLES BETTER USE OF CAPABILITIES AND ASSETS, CONCENTRATION OF EFFORTS AND HARMONISATION OF TASKS


- EFFECTIVENESS !

ENABLES EFFECTIVE AND SMOOTH MANAGEMENT, COUNTERACTION AND RESPONSE TO VARIOUS THREATS


- UNIVERSAL !

ENABLES STABILITY AND CONTINUITY OF STATE FUNCTIONING

- FUNCTIONALITY !



CM TASK ORGANISATION





OBSTACLES

LACK OF CLEAR ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
POOR CM STRUCTURE
LONG DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
CENTRALISED DECISION-MAKING PROCESS



LACK OF KNOWLEDGE
TOO MANY DEFINITIONS OF A CRISIS
LACK OF INFORMATION (AVAILABLE RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL)



AREAS OF IMPROVEMENT



1 Shortened by the editor.

The Comprehensive Approach

Trends, challenges and possibilities of cooperation as seen from Spain

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the world has witnessed the unprecedented rise of intra-state conflicts. This has led to an increasing involvement of the international community in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction around the globe.

Spain is steadily advancing in the coordinating of her principal mainstays of national power as applicable to crisis management, through a Comprehensive Approach (CA) in order to offer a unified and integrated “whole-of-government” approach to the resolution of crises and conflicts.

Although any response to these complex crises must call for the employment of political, military, civilian, economic, developmental and humanitarian means, in most cases the tasks are rarely focused or coordinated towards shared objectives and goals. It is obvious that all government agencies need ground rules for understanding and cooperation in the coordination of their activities; in fact that they lack a CA.

Spain and the Comprehensive Approach

At present, Spain is working to approve a unified concept and framework for the different perceptions as to the CA. This does not mean the starting point is from ground zero; for pragmatic reasons, national agencies have steadily refined their cooperation in multi-dimensional or interagency frameworks in order to achieve economies of scale and avoid any duplication of efforts. The organizational approaches to crisis management are today much broader and more coordinated than in the past, but they are still far from being as comprehensive as they should be when coping with new challenges. The first official reference to the CA (Enfoque Integral) was coined in the “Master Plan for International Cooperation 2005-2008” of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation

The Plan was broad enough to include all the potential facets and actors involved in the national strategy for development cooperation, but it also recognized the need for a more comprehensive strategy, to include governmental and non governmental actors and further dimensions involved in Conflict Prevention and Resolution. Since then, the claim for further integration within national agencies and non-governmental organizations has steadily increased.

In conclusion, although Spain has several organizational strategies (military, development, humanitarian, civil emergency...) which, developed by ministerial directives, are used to guide their intervention in each particular crisis, there is no comprehensive strategy to crisis management, neither national nor multinational.

Planning, decision making and leadership

There are two different and synergic crisis management systems in Spain that depend upon the nature of the crisis. The National Crisis Management System (NCMS) is mainly oriented towards civil protection and emergencies, that is, safety and security within the Spain's own borders. The NCMS is made up of three different bodies: political (Intergovernmental Commission for Crisis Situations), executive (the Intergovernmental Supporting Commission) and technical (National Committee for Civil Emergency Planning). The NCMS involves the Prime Minister's office (Presidency), and the Ministries for Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior and other national agencies this depending on the variable dimensions of the crisis in question.

When the crisis implies "Defence" as such, there is a Defence Crisis Management System (DCMS) that includes two different but complementary sub-systems: a ministerial one for military operations abroad and an intergovernmental one to assist the Prime Minister over crises (the National Defence Council). The latter sub-system involves the same participants as for the NCMS plus the Defence Staff while the former involves the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Staff. In addition, Spain relies on a network of liaison missions and officers at International Organizations and to Coalitions to offer council in the decision-making process.

For crisis management abroad there are two chains of command to cope with the non-military and military dimensions of every crisis. Coordination within the civilian chain of command comes from an interagency body: the Interministerial Commission for International Cooperation (ICIC) run by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation while the military rely on the operational chain of the Ministry of Defence. The planning system for international cooperation to development is based on multi-annual planning (Master Plans) or organized on an ad-hoc basis by the ICIC interagency body. The operational planning system for military cooperation is based on a standard operational planning, this based on periodic those guidelines, that are issued in accordance with multinational commitments.

Situational analysis and effective management are based on the adequate exchange of information between both chains. In so much as there is no permanent body to ensure the centralized management of crisis, every crisis requires the settling up of an ad-hoc mechanism to coordinate political control and strategic direction for the length of the crisis. The "Intergovernmental Commission for Crisis Situations" (Comisión Delegada del Gobierno para Situaciones de Crisis) is at the top of these coordination mechanisms while day by day contact among director-generals of the different ministries ensures political coordination. At lower levels, the Peacekeeping Operations Unit of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs or the Crisis Cell within the Ministry of Defence coordinates their actions with third parties through liaison officers and informal contacts.

Legal framework

Spain has organisational regulations at her disposal that cover crisis management, these dealing with organisation and competences in the fields of civilian protection, development, peacekeeping operations, humanitarian aid and military operations. National Laws regulate cooperation towards international development and the participation of the armed forces in international operations abroad.

Training

Since the end of the 80's, when the active participation of Spain in Peacekeeping Operations really began, the need for synergic training of civilians and military was noted. At present, the Army War College and the Defence College host different courses which take into account the lessons we have learnt and try to correct any flaws in civ-mil cooperation.

Specifically civilian training for crisis management operations is undertaken through different academic, non-governmental and governmental means. The academic path offers post-graduate courses on crisis management and conflict resolution. These courses are primarily focused on the civilian or civilian-military aspects of crisis management including national and multinational procedures. For its part, NGOs like the International Red Cross or the Institute of Studies on Conflict and Humanitarian Action organize courses dealing with International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and Humanitarian assistance in crisis management operations. Finally, the leading agencies organize specific courses for the personnel involved in forthcoming operations regardless of their agency of origin. To this end, the National Institute of Public Administration has started to coordinate crisis management and peacekeeping courses for Spanish officials at the Centre for Institutional Cooperation.

Resources

Spain contributes to financing the common costs of multinational operations within multilateral organizations/coalitions, according to agreed upon funding procedures. For instance, contributions to the UN Peacekeeping Operations Fund are included within the Spanish regular budget and assigned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, which manages up to 4% of the GDP; while Spanish contributions to EU-led crisis management operations with military or defence implications are financed through the ATHENA mechanism.

For non-shared costs of crisis management operations, extraordinary contributions for their civilian aspects are funded through the budget for international co-operation towards development. In this sense, the Action Plan for 2006 foresees the funding for civilian and military projects in outside missions. For the military related funding of crisis management operations under a UN Mandate, the Ministry of Defence can request extraordinary credits here.

Personnel are recruited from three different tiers: active officials, members of national agencies and rosters of experts at the organisational level. Personnel for security and defence positions is recruited only from the two first tiers while all three can provide personnel for posts related to civilian crisis management.

Interoperability

Interoperability with other nations and international organisations in the non-military aspects of crisis management is achieved through the Spanish presence in multinational operations, the convergence of best practices and the training in collective standard procedures. Lessons learned in the field are analyzed to improve the organisational skills to interoperate with third partners. Common training in international organisations helps to overcome the reluctance to cooperate with different cultures and working methods. In what regards the purely military interoperability, it is based on UN, NATO and EU standards.

Evaluation

The evaluation of operations calls for a systematic approach when assessing all the different and interrelated aspects of national contributions to crisis management operations. Evaluation is still based on organisational versus national analysis and aims to match expected outcomes with achieved results. In broad terms, the assessment is carried out by the leading agency in order to inform the Government on the current status of the operations and to prepare them for their periodic reviewing at which time the participants must decide on whether to continue or not, alter or leave the ongoing operation. Evaluations as to organisational effectiveness tend to be conducted by the organisations and personnel in charge of the execution of the crisis management operations themselves which reduces any objectivity here.

The main considerations up for appraisal are military, diplomatic and developmental. Diplomatic assessments are conducted at the Peacekeeping Operations Unit of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. The evaluation of the developmental aspects is carried out by the Undersecretary General for Assessment and Planning of Development Policies, a body of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation that is not associated with the management of the operations to ensure its independence. Military assessment is undertaken by the General Staff and the MOD.

Challenges

- The elaboration of a multinational overall strategic planning process to foster the convergence of national and organisational assessments in crisis management.
- A strategic culture within UN agencies and NGO,s, to coordinate their planning systems and procedures with the rest of actors.
- A national system with its procedures, this to integrate dispersed planning, decision-making and leadership capabilities and thus achieve a comprehensive response for crisis management.
- Better national and multinational procedures these to: define, on the one hand, the capabilities required for crisis management and, on the other, meet the challenge of integrating them and optimizing their effects in the field; thus improving e situational analysis and effective management, in particular with regard to the measurement of those indicators proper to any desired end state.

Opportunities

The interaction between international and national processes of experimentation encourages further development of a CA.

The co-operative development of CA promotes that exchange of concepts, optimum practices and experience-sharing among participants that allows establishing benchmark for the future.


The drive for developing of CA in Spain has three goals. The first is to consolidate a crisis management community up to supporting the conceptual elaboration required and to analyzing the implications of the CA for international, national and organisational crisis management in depth. Such an inclusive community is an adjunct necessary to any devising of a multidimensional strategy involving a “whole of government” approach compatible with the approaches of the NGO, s and the private sector. To achieve this goal, Spain has set up a Working Group with the help of a

national think-tank, to facilitate the socialization of different cultures of crisis management and to foster joint analysis between the principal governmental and non-governmental actors. This community is functioning as a clearing-house where the inputs, these coming mainly from Multinational Experiment-5, interact with national reflections on crisis management.

The second goal is to increase interaction between the community and existing organisations to promote a deepening and widening of CA. For this, the community provides conceptual materials for internal discussions within and between agencies and organisations in order to foster convergence towards a comprehensive approach to crisis management.

A third goal is to identify or promote the settlement of an authority to lead the comprehensive approach concept. Given the existence of different organisations and approaches to crisis management, the pace and extent of its integration must depend upon the emergence, or not, of an authority to take it in hand. Formal and informal interaction among the community, officials and experts emphasizes the benefits of a centralised management and the costs of not-having one. An ongoing search is exploring the capabilities of the current coordinating bodies and mechanisms at the highest possible level and taking into account international trends as to this question.

Government Communication 2007/08:51



Government
Communication
2007/08:51

National strategy for Swedish participation in international peace-support and security-building operations

The Government submits this Communication to the Riksdag.

Stockholm, 13 March 2008

Fredrik Reinfeldt

Carl Bildt
(Ministry for Foreign Affairs)

Main contents of the Communication

This Communication presents a national strategy for Swedish participation in international peace-support and security-building operations.

The aim is for the strategy to provide general guidance for Swedish action in international peace-support and security-building operations, based on the Government's objectives in this area. The strategy will have a long-term perspective and provide support for combined civil and military action in the areas of operations in which Sweden takes part.

Contents

Comm. 2007/08:51

1	Policy objectives and guidelines.....	3
1.1	Purpose.....	3
1.2	Swedish involvement – fundamental principles, values, interests and security	3
1.3	Political objective.....	5
1.4	Objectives and guidelines	6
1.5	Issues of international law.....	9
2	Relationship with the EU, international organisations and regional cooperation	10
2.1	The EU European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) .	10
2.1.1	EU-UN	11
2.1.2	EU-NATO.....	11
2.2	The United Nations (UN).....	12
2.3	NATO-Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).....	12
2.4	OSCE and the Council of Europe	13
2.5	Cooperation with the African Union (AU) and regional organisations	14
3	Nordic cooperation	15
4	Means and methods	15
4.1	Introduction.....	15
4.2	Security and development	15
4.4	The need for security sector reforms (SSR)	17
4.4	Military resources and capabilities.....	18
4.5	Civil resources and capabilities.....	19

1 Policy objectives and guidelines

Comm. 2007/08:51

1.1 Purpose

The aim behind a national strategy for Swedish participation in international peace-support and security-building operations is to provide a complete picture of the raised level of aspiration in this area which the Government announced in the 2007 Budget Bill and which is manifested for instance in a gradual increase in resources for peace-support military operations in 2007, 2008 and 2009. Meeting this raised level of aspiration is a key policy objective.

The Government links foreign, development, security and defence policy more closely together in these efforts. The prospects of Sweden contributing to peace, security, democracy and development in the world are consequently improved.

The strategy will also provide general guidance for Swedish action in international peace-support and security-building activity. It will also indicate the policy aims, create the basis for more effective use of resources and provide support for combined civil and military action in areas of operations in which Sweden takes part.

The strategy, which has a long-term perspective, does not anticipate the forthcoming Orientation of the Armed Forces Bill, other priorities or other considerations in the budget bill for each year. Nor does it anticipate the work of the Defence Commission. There is policy interest in ensuring that Sweden continues to have the freedom of action needed to be able to take responsibility in new and unforeseen peace-support and security-building operations.

1.2 Swedish involvement – fundamental principles, values, interests and security

Swedish involvement in international peace-support operations is ultimately intended to contribute to maintaining international peace and security and consequently to facilitate fair and sustainable global development. Swedish participation in peace-support operations is also concerned, in the longer term, with promoting national security and Swedish interests.

Underlying the strategy is defence of a number of universal norms and values, such as democracy, human rights, gender equality, human dignity and development. In addition, Swedish participation in international operations contributes to safeguarding and promoting general interests such as a world order, founded in international law, to attain peace, freedom and reconciliation.

Swedish policy for global development, with the aim of contributing to fair and sustainable development, is a key basis for Swedish operations in developing countries. The military, civil and reconstruction operations undertaken in a specific region should be viewed as mutually

complementary and collaborating parts of Sweden's combined support of security and development in that region or country.

Sweden's involvement is an act of solidarity with the people and countries threatened by conflict.

Swedish international operations today are rarely concerned with peace support in conflicts between countries. Present-day conflicts and trouble spots are often of a partially different nature, requiring a broad approach and great flexibility.

Swedish security has been strengthened by European integration and development in the nearby world. The threats to Swedish security are constantly changing, however, and new risks and challenges are being added. Threats that are geographically remote may now be just as tangible as threats close to home.

Regional armed conflicts, terrorism, international organised crime, the presence of weapons of mass destruction and the massive proliferation of small and light weapons threaten international security, and consequently also threaten Swedish security. Events that pose threats and serious risks may be difficult to predict and arise suddenly.

Swedish membership of the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) is a key factor in the country's foreign, security and defence policy. Close cooperation with the defence alliance NATO is another key element. Close operation is also maintained with the other Nordic countries on these issues. There is a great need for international operations in various parts of the world, and there continues to be strong demand for Swedish assistance. Alongside the quantitative increase, operations are becoming increasingly complex and mandates broader.

EU cooperation occupies a special position in Swedish foreign and security policy. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) are a key platform for security-policy interests. The role of the EU as a player in security policy has changed and been reinforced. The opportunities for the Union to influence the security situation in the wider world also entail greater opportunities to safeguard Swedish interests. Sweden has established itself as a credible and influential player through its great conceptual involvement and extensive participation in ESDP operations.

The threats and challenges faced by Sweden also apply to a great extent to the rest of Europe. The diversity of foreign-policy instruments at the EU's disposal, from development policy, trade policy and political dialogue to civil and military crisis management operations under ESDP, provides a unique opportunity to convert the Union's capability into political action.

Another key factor in Swedish foreign and security policy is the United Nations (UN). An effective multilateral system is crucial to successful peace-support work. It is in Sweden's interest that the UN, with its primary responsibility, as well as other leading multilateral players in international peace-support activity such as the EU, NATO and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are active, develop close cooperation and act in accordance with the principles of international law. Sweden will be a responsible member and/or partner that makes an active contribution to international peace and security and to fair and sustainable global development. The prospects of Swedish

values and interests having an impact in these organisations are consequently also increased.

Work on both crisis management and development is permeated by a realisation that security, development and respect for human rights and democratic principles are closely interlinked and reinforce one another. A stable security situation, which is the principal task of a peace-support operation, is essential if democracy, human rights, rule of law and prosperity are to be attainable.

Fair and sustainable development cannot be attained without peace and security. The raised level of Swedish aspiration will be implemented in an environment in which threats are globalised, operations become more complex and demand is expected to increase.

Swedish participation in peace-support and security-building operations must always be founded in international law. Protection of and respect for international law, including human rights and international humanitarian law, is of key importance. This should pervade action in all phases of an operation, including the wording of the mandate.

Sweden will press for the duty to protect populations against gross violations of international humanitarian law and human rights to be weighed into all phases of peace-support operations.

Swedish participation in peace-support operations should be guided by foreign and security-policy assessments and priorities. Attention will also be paid to defence policy and the policy area of the system of justice. Overall, discussions on possible operations must be based on these policy areas.

Opportunities for combined Swedish involvement will be assessed following the initiation of a new operation. An all-embracing view of Swedish participation will, as far as possible, be a feature of the process.

1.3 Political objective

The overarching objective is for Sweden to take greater and more coordinated responsibility in peace-support and security-building operations.

The raised Swedish level of aspiration will be met through active Swedish involvement, in which the opportunities offered by the multilateral system are fully utilised. Swedish operations will essentially take place in the framework of the UN, the EU, NATO and the OSCE.

It is very important that the multilateral system is able to take its responsibility for global conflict prevention and peace support. Constructive Swedish involvement in relation to the international players should have the overarching objective of strengthening this system, in particular the ability of the institutions to collaborate effectively.

The underlying principle is that Sweden's contribution to peace-support and security-building operations should increase, in both qualitative and quantitative terms. Sweden will have capability both for rapid response and for long-term and briefer operations. Military involvement will increase so that international force capability is doubled.

International operations are an integral part of Swedish security, foreign and defence policy. By contributing to international operations, Sweden does not just contribute to the security and development of others, we also increase our own security while gaining experience beneficial to the development of our national crisis-management capability.

Swedish participation in peace-support and security-building operations will be formulated as integrated and combined policy towards the country or region concerned. Our involvement will, on principle, be long-term. Swedish contributions should take the form of combined operations, with both military and civil elements. Development assistance can be a significant element in the combined Swedish involvement in this context. Possible and practicable synergies with development assistance will always be aimed for.

1.4 Objectives and guidelines

The following objectives and guidelines will contribute to putting the overarching objective into effect:

Active international player

Sweden will be an active international player and fully exploit the opportunities offered by the multilateral system. Swedish operations in multinational cooperation will essentially take place in the framework of the EU, the UN, NATO and the OSCE and be based on real and expressed needs.

- Swedish action will be notable for advance planning and a proactive approach.
- The Swedish Government's work on peace-support operations will be based on the objective of upholding the UN Charter and maintaining the UN's primary responsibility for peace and security.
- A principle underlying Swedish involvement in the area of peace support is to promote and strengthen international peace and security, and to develop and protect democracy, the principles of the rule of law and human rights.
- Operations will essentially take place in the framework of the EU, the UN, NATO and the OSCE, as a clear and deliberate element of our policy towards these organisations.
- Sweden will press for increased Swedish influence on and insight into the operations to which it contributes, for instance through efforts to ensure that Swedish personnel to a greater extent attain higher posts and senior positions both in the operations and in the organisations through which the country contributes to peace-support operations.
- Sweden will make better use of opportunities for Nordic collaboration in peace-support and security-building efforts.
- Sweden should be able to contribute substantially to the ability of the EU to make civil and military rapid-response resources available.

Swedish leading role in a Nordic battle group in the EU gives us special responsibility.

- The speed and sustainability of Swedish contributions will be improved, as will capability to reinforce operations in progress if necessary.
- Sweden will have the capability to conduct long-term operations in all phases of a conflict.
- Development-promoting and security-building operations and measures should work together.

Improved Swedish capability

Swedish capacity for international operations will be improved. Military participation in operations must increase so that international force capability is doubled. Swedish participation in peace-support and security-building operations will also become more effective. This improvement will be achieved in part through more coherent operations.

- The armed forces will be capable of participating in international operations, when requested to do so, with a broad range of different types of units. The aim is for Sweden to contribute in areas in which we can add value to the combined operation. A Swedish contribution can be characterised by being among the first units on the scene in the area of operations, being a significant element in the total unit used in the operation or carrying out critical tasks for the operation.
- To attain more effective utilisation of resources, the aim will be for contributions with military units in international operations to be greater and more coherent. Sweden will have the capability to simultaneously command and take part in two operations of battalion size and three smaller operations.
- Demand for civil participation in international peace-support and security-building operations is increasing. Sweden should contribute to meeting this demand by taking part with police, judges, prosecutors and other judicial support personnel, while retaining its leading position in the area of operational support. Sweden will also contribute with a range of other categories of personnel for which there is demand, such as political advisers, advisers on development issues and experts in human rights and gender issues.
- Sweden should continue to be broadly represented geographically by military observers, staff officers, police officers, civilian observers and civilian experts in peace-support operations. This provides Sweden with an insight into and influence on various missions and makes a Swedish contribution possible where there is a need and demand for it.
- Swedish participants in international operations under UN, EU, OSCE and NATO command will be appropriately trained and equipped. Sweden will actively assist by continuously developing and offering relevant training for participation in international operations.
- The proportion of women taking part in Swedish contributions to international peace-keeping operations must increase in accordance

with UN Security Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and Sweden's national action plan to implement the resolution.

- Sweden will strengthen the participation of women in international peace-support operations in accordance with UN Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. Sweden's national action plan can be viewed as a tool with which to implement the resolution.
- Swedish operations will be capable of contributing to desirable operational benefit, development of capability and build-up of skills and expertise for the seconding authority.

Combined contributions

Swedish peace-support and security-building operations will be formulated so that they form an integral and collective part of Swedish policy towards the country or region concerned. Swedish contributions should take the form of combined contributions, with both military and civil elements in those operations where there is demand and where this is possible. Development cooperation is an important element in combined Swedish capacity. Possible and practicable synergies with development cooperation will always be aimed for.

- Improved collaboration between civil and military participants in multifunctional peace-support operations should be aimed for. The aim should be for the Swedish contributions to international operations, when there is demand and where this is possible, to take the form of combined contributions, with both military and civil elements.
- Sweden will do what it can to ensure that the composition of the operations of the international community is such that that they encompass all available players and resources, as far as possible.
- Sweden's combined operations in a conflict area or post-conflict area, i.e. areas in which a conflict is in progress or has recently ended, should be covered by an overarching national objective. Which policy areas are concerned depends on the nature of the conflict.
- Swedish operations in a country or area must endeavour to meet the same overarching aims. The link between security and development assistance is of key significance. Possible and practicable synergies with development cooperation must always be aimed for.
- Swedish efforts to implement Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security mean that we must aim for a gender-equality perspective to be integrated into all stages of international operations. At national level this means, for example, strengthening training efforts for military and civil personnel who may be considered for participation in an international operation. At regional/global level it is a case of being a credible discussion partner and player in regional and global implementation.
- Sweden will press for all parts of the judicial chain to be integrated into international police and/or rule-of-law operations. The build-up of police in a post-conflict situation must be paralleled by a build-up of the other parts of the judicial chain. Swedish participation with

police should, as far as possible, comprise a minimum of two persons for each operation. The aim should be to make greater contributions in prioritised operations.

Comm. 2007/08:51

1.5 Issues of international law

A clear mandate under international law is essential for Swedish participation in peace-support operations. This also applies to guidelines on the use of force. The UN has primary responsibility for international peace and security through the Security Council.

The principal requirement is that Swedish participation in peace-support operations will be based on a mandate from the Security Council. This applies in particular to peace-enforcing operations in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. A Security Council mandate must always be sought in such cases.

Clear support from the Security Council is also aimed for in peace-keeping operations in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter. At the same time, international law only permits such operations to be carried out with the consent of the recipient state and other relevant parties.

A military peace-support operation can use force in all these situations and in self-defence, but the use of force may also be permitted in other situations in which it would be allowed under international law. This view is shared within the EU. The right of self-defence is accompanied by a right for the state that is contributing troops, if it proves necessary in order to relieve its own personnel, to reinforce the operation and also use military means to evacuate the force.

The great challenge is in the exceptional situations in which the Security Council is unable to prevent genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or other large-scale abuse, including systematic rape of women and exploitation of children in armed conflicts. The UN summit in September 2005 established that the international community has joint responsibility to prevent serious abuse, genocide and ethnic cleansing. Sweden was one of the instigators of this agreement in principle on the obligation to protect. This represents an important step in the development of the international system of norms. In acute situations, when the Security Council fails to bear its responsibility, Sweden must carefully consider what can nevertheless be done to alleviate human suffering. Such an assessment must always be based on the individual, relevant situation and take account of international-law, political and humanitarian aspects.

This does not make it any less vital that Sweden supports reform efforts so that the UN Security Council will better take its full responsibility to maintain international peace and security and protect people against large-scale abuse.

Sweden should press for the mandate for a peace-support operation to include prosecuting and reporting violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and for cooperation to take place with the International Criminal Court (ICC) if necessary, so that it is possible to prosecute the worst violations of international law.

9

Personnel in peace-support operations will comply with applicable rules that follow from human rights and humanitarian law, as well as the normative and ethical guidelines drawn up for peace-support operations. This applies both to the global conventions on human rights, such as the covenants on civil and political rights and on the human rights of women and children and the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its optional protocol on children in armed conflicts. Attention needs to be paid to these issues at a very early stage in the planning of a peace-support operation. Particular attention should be paid to respect for the norms that protect the civilian population, particularly women and children, as well as applicable norms concerning detention and human trafficking.

2 Relationship with the EU, international organisations and regional cooperation

2.1 The EU European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)

The EU is an increasingly important player in the area of foreign and security policy, with a broad range of instruments at its disposal. It can act in a unified way on issues of common interest through Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). European Security and Defence Policy is a key element of CFSP. Within the framework of ESDP, the EU conducts both civil and military operations for conflict management in various parts of the world. The challenges in the area of foreign and security policy are becoming ever more complex, and the link between security and development, for example, has attracted increasing attention. The Union has unique opportunities in this context to combine long-term development with operations for conflict management.

It is the Government's aspiration that Sweden should be at the core of European cooperation and drive the development of the Union forward as a foreign and security policy player. Sweden's objective is to contribute actively to developing the EU's capability to conduct operations in support of international peace and security under ESDP. This is manifested in Sweden's leading role in the Nordic battle group in the spring of 2008 and in Sweden having also given notice of its willingness to fulfil a leading role in 2011. Another manifestation is the fact that Sweden has taken part in all civil and military operations under ESDP. Sweden will continue to contribute actively to the conceptual development of the EU's conflict management capability, on both the military and civil sides. As an element in this work, Sweden has an objective of developing the concepts for civil and military rapid-response capabilities and strengthening civil-military coordination in conflict management operations.

Sweden will also press for there to be close coordination with regard to operations for development and operations in support of international peace and security. With regard to contributions of personnel and other

resources to the EU's operations for conflict management, Sweden will continue to contribute on a substantial scale. Sweden will press for intensified implementation of and compliance with the code of conduct for personnel in ESDP operations.

The development of civil capacity for crisis management has been a priority issue for the EU and Sweden since 1999. The European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted by the EU in 2003 states that civil instruments are required to manage present-day conflicts. The EU's civil crisis management capacity has emerged as a key element in ESDP in a short time. The combination of civil and military capabilities means that the EU is well placed to act in a multifunctional context.

2.1.1 EU-UN

The EU's enhanced capacity to conduct civil and military operations in support of international peace and security has increased the need for close cooperation between the EU and the UN. The EU has the explicit aim of being able to assist the UN by conducting operations to reinforce an existing UN operation or as an initial operation before the UN has arrived on the scene with its own personnel. The value of providing the EU with such support has already been shown for example by the EU's civil and military operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, EU support for the UN and the African Union in Sudan and the current parallel involvement of the EU and the UN in Chad/Central African Republic – operations to which Sweden has contributed or plans to contribute.

The joint declaration in 2003 provides a broad basis for EU/UN cooperation. Sweden intends to continue to contribute to strengthening the relationship between the EU and the UN with the aim of increasing effectiveness in operations in support of international peace and security. Sweden is, for instance, urging increased exchange at member-state level between the two organisations. Contact between officials at various levels is another way of improving mutual knowledge and understanding between the EU and the UN. Sweden is also pressing for improved cooperation in the field.

2.1.2 EU-NATO

Cooperation between the EU and NATO has become increasingly important in the light of the EU's enhanced conflict management capability. It has not, however, been possible to realise the full potential of the relationship. It is crucial from the Swedish point of view that this happens. As well as cooperation on military crisis management – as in Bosnia since 2005 – the organisations today have parallel military and civil commitments that necessitate dialogue and coordination. The increased interfaces ensue in particular from the military and civil operations side-by-side in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Several EU member states, including Sweden, will have personnel both in EU operations and in the operations conducted under NATO auspices. Sweden's objective is

to strengthen the cooperation between the EU and NATO, for instance by advocating expanded formal and informal exchange between the two organisations. In addition, Sweden attaches particularly great importance to expanded contacts in the field.

2.2 The United Nations (UN)

The primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security rests with the UN. The UN's General Assembly and Security Council represent the core of the international legal system and multilateral cooperation. Because of its world-wide membership, the UN enjoys unique political legitimacy in managing acute crises and facing up to long-term global challenges. The UN as an organisation can provide international legitimacy for, and authorise, the use of force, as the possibility of Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter reflects the organisation's special position in the collective security system. Sweden has a strong interest in a powerful and effective UN. It requires a wide range of countries to contribute to UN operations, including western countries.

The UN has strengthened the peace-support tools in recent years through its ongoing process of reform. Mediation, peace-building, the obligation to protect and human rights are areas in which the UN has built up new institutions and guidelines. Alongside this, demand for the UN's peace-support operations has increased to a significant degree.

Sweden's aspiration is to increase efforts to take part in international troop operations, including UN operations. Sweden will additionally support the Peacebuilding Commission, on whose steering committee it has a seat in 2008. Sweden supports the UN's development of integrated missions and adopts a broader approach in peace-support efforts. It also supports the Secretary-General's reform of the UN's department for peacekeeping operations. The introduction of civilian observers would be a crucial complement to the UN's military observer activity and would make it possible to reinforce multinational operations with specific knowledge and a higher proportion of women. Stronger cooperation between the UN and regional organisations is a priority for Sweden.

Sweden will continue to support the implementation and follow-up of the UN system's joint action plan for Resolution 1325, which was adopted in 2005. The Government adopted a national action plan to implement the resolution in 2006.

2.3 NATO-Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)

Crisis management has become an increasingly important part of NATO's combined activity since the 1990s. Sweden has extensive and well-developed cooperation with NATO under EAPC/PfP (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council/Partnership for Peace). It is in the interests of Sweden to continue to try to extend the scope of this cooperation. As far as Sweden is concerned, the possibility of participating in NATO-led crisis management operations is a key element in cooperation. Sweden

consequently contributes to creating stability and security in conflict areas of security-policy interest to it. Participation lends the country credibility, which benefits it in other areas of cooperation in EAPC/PfP.

The partnership cooperation, including participation in NATO-led operations, also represents a key instrument in the development and strengthening of the Armed Forces' interoperability and capability for participation in international crisis management operations in general. NATO offers a unique set of standards, exercises and a number of programmes aimed at such development. Sweden needs cooperation with NATO in order to be able to meet its need to develop capability to take part in international peace-support activity, regardless of whether this takes place under NATO, UN or EU command.

Sweden intends to continue to develop its cooperation with NATO in the area of crisis management, as an instrument with which to strengthen Swedish international crisis management capability.

NATO's rapid reaction force, which has to be capable of deployment in the most demanding of military operations, has also been open to contributions from partner countries since 2006. Partner countries can declare supplementary units for the force, provided these units fulfil the same quality requirements as apply to NATO units.

Sweden is considering the NATO offer of participation by partner countries in the NATO Response Force (NRF) with supplementary contributions.

When Sweden reviews possible participation in the NRF, the options for cooperation with other Nordic countries and the Baltic states will be examined, that is to say both with the partner country Finland and with the NATO member states Denmark, Norway, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

2.4 OSCE and the Council of Europe

It is the OSCE's extensive field activity in particular that gives the organisation its added value. Sweden's contribution to the OSCE will continue to be made through support for its conflict-preventing activity. In addition, Swedish personnel will be made available to the OSCE for service in the organisation's secretariat, in its institutions and field missions. Sweden will continue to be proactive with regard to implementation of the 2005 ministerial resolution on women in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. In addition, Sweden will continue to act as an election monitor and election observer in the election monitoring missions carried out in various countries under the auspices of the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). Sweden also takes part in election monitoring through the Council of Europe's parliamentary assembly.

The strength of the Council of Europe lies principally in an extensive binding set of rules and in strong institutions. This is true in particular of the European Convention for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European Court of Human Rights, but there are also a large number of conventions and monitoring bodies for various aspects of

human rights. The institutions provide support for the build-up of the legal system in various countries. Sweden will continue to press for a focus on the Council of Europe's core areas of human rights, democracy and the principles of the rule of law, particularly during the Swedish chairmanship of the Council in 2008.

2.5 Cooperation with the African Union (AU) and regional organisations

Sweden supports the construction of a strong and sustainable African Union. Capacity-building should be a key element in Swedish cooperation with the African Union (AU). Sweden should establish an intensified dialogue with the AU and additionally contribute financial and technical support to the AU Commission and, where appropriate, other AU bodies. In cooperation with the AU, Sweden should press for build-up of the Union to progress as quickly as possible. The principle of African ownership will be respected.

The AU has made most progress in the key area of peace and security. Swedish support for various components in the African peace and security structure, which is being built up, is important. The orientation of the support will be guided by Swedish added value and Swedish comparative advantages.

Sweden should additionally seek to contribute to effective forms of coordination under crisis management operations that involve the AU and other players, such as the UN and/or the EU. Strengthened capability to jointly plan and implement multifunctional peace-support operations on the African continent is essential in the light of future challenges. Sweden should additionally consider closer military cooperation with the AU, including exercises and other forms of build-up of expertise, with the aim of being able to take part in AU-commanded operations with units.

The regional African cooperation organisations – including ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) are key elements in implementing the AU's objectives to carry development forward in the region concerned. The goal of Swedish cooperation with the regional organisations is to promote effective and sustainable regional cooperation for peace and support, sustainable and fair development and poverty reduction. Swedish support should be focused on strengthening capacity and institutions.

The EU's successful cooperation with ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and the five member states Brunei, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand during the Aceh Monitoring Mission in 2005/06 contributed to putting crisis management on the agenda for the dialogue between the EU and ASEAN. Sweden should support expanded exchange of experience and initiatives for cooperation with ASEAN, particularly in civil crisis management.

3 Nordic cooperation

There are great opportunities in the framework of Nordic defence-related cooperation for exchange of experience, coordination and joint contributions to international operations, on both a bilateral and a multilateral basis. A good example of this is the cooperation undertaken under the EU Nordic Battle Group and the NATO-led ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) operation in Afghanistan. Many areas of operations and forms of cooperation have been continuously under discussion for many years at all levels. Sweden will aim to further increase the extent of Nordic cooperation, for instance by examining the options for Nordic collaboration ahead of each international operation.

All the Nordic countries are taking part in operations under the UN, the EU and NATO. Joint Nordic operations can contribute to great coordination benefits and lead to more effective operations. There is a Nordic consensus that closer cooperation between the countries improves the prospects of maintaining versatile and broad defence capability and also providing a number of economic and security-enhancing benefits. This cooperation can also serve as the basis for more coordinated Nordic action in the NATO and ESDP processes for development of capability.

NORDCAPS (Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support) exists to support the implementation of Nordic joint operations. This cooperation was established by the Nordic defence ministers in 1997 and is an effective and flexible Nordic consultation and coordination body for peace-support operations under the UN, the EU and NATO/PfP. This cooperation also includes exercises and training activities.

4 Means and methods

4.1 Introduction

There are number of policy instruments to contribute to peace and security. Contributions to military and civil peace-support operations are important instruments of this kind. There are also other instruments of direct relevance to creating peace and security. Conflict-preventing measures, mediation efforts, dialogue, sanctions and reconstruction operations are all areas in which Sweden is active with a view to preventing and averting conflicts and creating the necessary basis for lasting peace. Sweden will continue with work to enhance the instrument of sanctions and strengthen Swedish capacity to act on mediation issues.

4.2 Security and development

Security, development, democracy and human rights are dependent on and reinforce one another. A stable security situation is essential if it is to

be possible for democracy, respect for human rights and the principles of the rule of law and economic and social development to be achieved. This must be borne in mind in efforts to assist fragile states and post-conflict countries. Similarly, democracy, human rights and development are essential for long-term peace and security.

The complex conflict-management and reconstruction operations of today necessitate the international community – as in Sweden nationally – coordinating available tools in both the planning and implementation phases. An example of the interaction between security and development is the operation in Afghanistan, where Sweden has made an active contribution with development assistance over many years. Poverty and lack of democracy and respect for human rights have contributed to the country being racked by conflict and instability in recent decades. The western Balkans and the Democratic Republic of Congo are other examples where there is a need for more coherent solutions, which in addition to acute crisis management also include operations aimed at ensuring more long-term reconstruction and development.

Although Swedish operations in a post-conflict area to a large extent are principally aimed at supporting UN and EU peace efforts, the operations should as far as possible be covered by an overarching national objective. This will be based on strategic planning and improved coordination between short-term and long-term aims, as well as between different players. In order to promote a sustainable solution to conflicts, Sweden should as far as possible coordinate peace-support operations with both humanitarian and more long-term reconstruction and development support. The aim should be for Swedish contributions to the international operations to be of a combined nature, with both military and civil elements.

Swedish action in the humanitarian area is the subject of the Government Communication entitled “Swedish Policy for Humanitarian Assistance” (Comm. 2004/05:52). In view of the differing and short-term aims of humanitarian operations, saving lives, alleviating distress and contributing to restoring/preserving human dignity, it is important that the coordination of peace-support operations respects the different roles, tasks and mandates of these players. To be able to carry out their specific assignment, humanitarian players depend on being perceived as neutral. If they are regarded as closely associated with a political or military agenda there is a risk of their access to civilians in distress being severely restricted, which ultimately will also make it more difficult for overarching political and military aims to be achieved. It is therefore in the interests of all players to press for the best possible coordination, provided this cooperation does not have an adverse impact on how the neutrality and independence of humanitarian operations is perceived.

Sweden will also act to ensure that the operations of the international community are all-embracing and structured according to a plan that covers all available players and instruments. Operations will take place in response to expressed needs and in satisfactory coordination with the government of the country concerned. They should also be offset against the principal aim of reinforcing the capability of countries afflicted to conflict to solve their own problems. This contributes to making the operations more effective and improving the prospect of achieving the

aims, as well as putting the donor country in a better position to plan its contributions over time by clarifying tasks and interaction.

Humanitarian and development-policy aspects will form part of the overall assessment made in relation to the initiation or completion of international peace-support and security-building operations. The aim will be for Sweden, as far as possible, to utilise the instruments available to it in a coordinated way in order to contribute towards attaining the overarching objectives of the international community. This will be done in accordance with the Paris Declaration for more effective development assistance. The cooperation is based on the situation, goals and priorities of the local partner.

4.4 The need for security sector reforms (SSR)

It is crucial that the authorities responsible for maintaining defence against aggression and for preserving legal certainty, primarily the armed forces and the judicial authorities, respect human rights, are effective and capable and are under democratic control and insight. Only then can society work smoothly. Major deviations from this are, however, a reality in many countries.

Measures to reform these areas of activity, often referred to as a country's security sector, are therefore often essential for development in post-conflict countries and have featured increasingly strongly on the international agenda. Security sector reforms (SSR) is an accepted term for such reforms.

In order to be able to bring about democratic governance of the security sector there is a need for combined operations both by development players, with expertise for instance in civil public administration, and players whose principal task is peace-support operations.

Swedish SSR involvement, in the same way as the peace-support activity in general, will form an integral and combined part of a long-term policy towards the country or region concerned. SSR support will be based on a broad analysis of needs with regard to the various security threats faced by states and individuals and be implemented in conjunction with the partner country and any other supporting countries and organisations. Local ownership of the reform process is crucially important in order to create long-term and sustainable changes. Tailored packages of operations must be designed depending on the country's needs. The circumstances relating to SSRs may differ sharply between countries and regions. Swedish support for SSRs will consequently also show great variation depending on which countries the support relates to.

SSRs are a long-term activity in which multilateral arrangements will be considered a prime alternative in each individual case. Sweden may, for example, support a UN, EU or NATO operation with smaller contributions, but also opt to take the lead in larger operations possibly with a more long-term orientation.

At the time of, or prior to, an SSR operation it is important to contribute to operations that relate to disarmament, demobilisation and

reintegration of armed forces (known as DDR operations) in order to be able, during the often fragile initial phase of the concluded conflict, to make possible continued peaceful development that contributes to creating security so that a development phase can begin.

4.4 Military resources and capabilities

The Armed Forces contribute to fulfilling Sweden's security-policy objectives by developing a modern, flexible and usable rapid-response defence with high availability. The principal task of the Armed Forces is the capability to engage in armed combat.

The task of conducting international operations will be fundamental, but not the sole determining factor, in the development of Armed Forces units. Priority will primarily be given to capability, together with other countries, to prevent, limit, mitigate and end conflicts. Sweden has to be able to make contributions to these operations where it can add value to them.

The armed forces have the dual task of safeguarding Swedish territorial integrity and contributing to peace and security. These tasks are closely related. The experience gained from international operations strengthens the capability to safeguard Sweden's territorial integrity. The experience gained is also significant in maintaining and developing the capability of the Armed Forces to counter various forms of extensive military operations against Sweden following a serious and extended deterioration of the situation in the world around.

The Armed Forces will have the capability to command and participate in two concurrent battalion size operations, while also committing smaller units to three additional operations. The aim is to contribute larger and more cohesive military units to international operations. One element in this higher level of aspiration is Swedish participation in the EU's rapid reaction forces. Larger cohesive unit contributions can make it possible to obtain more high-level positions in high-level commands and organisations, which contributes to strengthening and developing expertise in the Armed Forces. In turn, this can lead to improved prospects of exerting influence and make it possible for Sweden to have an impact on the individual operation and at the same time have greater influence in various organisations. This contributes to attaining the goal of Sweden being able to be an active international player. Larger operations also contribute towards developing the capability of the Armed Forces to command larger units.

Sweden will have the capability to arrive on the scene quickly in a new area of operations in the context of established rapid-response capability cooperation. In addition, the Armed Forces will be able to reinforce an operation already under way. The need to reinforce an operation that is in progress may arise very quickly. Reinforcement is carried out over a shorter period with light units, with the aim of stabilising a situation that has suddenly become unstable and threatening or of supporting an evacuation operation. Reinforcement may also entail a somewhat slower deployment of units with heavier equipment which can act in an area of operations over an extended period.

If there is a sudden need for such reinforcement, it is important that the Government is able to take decisions quickly on changes to the military operations Sweden is conducting. The personnel ceilings for such possible changes are therefore already included in the Riksdag's original mandate for the operation concerned. In recent years – in part because the peace-support operations Sweden takes part in have become increasingly demanding and more risky and difficult to assess from the point of view of security – these reserves have also accounted for a higher relative share of the combined permitted personnel ceiling. As well as it being important that the Armed Forces are able to act quickly in such situations, the Riksdag has an interest in receiving information. The Government therefore intends to keep affected committees in the Riksdag informed about decisions to utilise permitted scope for an urgent reinforcement or evacuation operation. This arrangement must not, however, have a delaying effect on the possibility of quickly launching reinforcement and evacuation operations. The information to relevant committees in the Riksdag is given in conjunction with Government decisions on changes in Swedish military presence in an operation.

Although Sweden will have capability for rapid-response operations, most of the operational capability will comprise units that are deployed or have somewhat lower operational readiness. There must also be a greater degree of flexibility in the supply of materiel. It must be possible for certain materiel to be supplemented and supplied to the armed forces quickly in the face of specific needs in an international operation.

The composition of Swedish contributions to international peace-support operations will be rational on the basis of Swedish interests and available resources and expertise, which also has some impact on participation in peace-support operations. It is not always possible to gauge the value of military international operations in terms of the number of individuals taking part in the international force.

In order to achieve the greatest possible effectiveness in peace-support operations, it will also continue to be an aspiration, on the basis of established principles, partly in the framework of the UN's peace-support activities, to carry on developing Swedish capability with regard to civil-military collaboration in operations. An important element in this is continued implementation of UN Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. A higher proportion of women in operations results in greater operational effectiveness, in part because Sweden thereby creates the necessary basis from which to reach out to the whole population in the area of operations. This makes it easier for example to gather information, but it is also a significant factor in the possibility of the force fulfilling the tasks it is given.

4.5 Civil resources and capabilities

The number of civil peace-support and security-promoting operations in the UN, the EU and the OSCE has increased in recent years, and this increase appears to be continuing. This also leads to increased demand for personnel for such operations.

The development of Swedish civil capability should be based on actual demand from international operations, principally the EU and the UN. There is great demand for Swedish civil contributions to operations, but these contributions have traditionally applied principally to police resources. Sweden has a long tradition – principally under the UN – of taking part in international peace-promoting activities with police, and the police have long been the largest element in most civil operations. A further increase in demand for personnel from other parts of the legal system, i.e. prosecutors, judges and prison and probation personnel, is now anticipated. Experience has shown the importance of a broad approach with complementary operations that cover a broad spectrum of the judicial chain. It is therefore important that Sweden can also contribute personnel for example from judicial authorities.

There has also been increased demand in recent years for other expertise, such as civil personnel who can assist a peace-support operation.

Sweden is an important player internationally in various support functions for operations, such as logistics and IT infrastructure. Business can also make important contributions, for example by providing environmentally sustainable solutions that can be used both in the humanitarian phase and at the reconstruction stage. Collaboration between business and development cooperation aimed at reinforcing Sweden's combined contributions to peace-keeping operations will be strengthened. Sweden should also continue to be able to contribute expertise in the areas of human rights and gender equality. In addition, Sweden should actively press for an increased proportion of women in civil operations.

Personnel for international operations today are recruited from government agencies such as the National Police Board, the Swedish Prosecution Authority, the National Courts Administration, the Swedish Prison and Probation Service, the Swedish Rescue Services Agency and Sida. With effect from the start of 2008, the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) will also be recruiting civil personnel. In close collaboration with affected authorities, the FBA will maintain a coherent overview of the combined national civil expertise and categories of personnel the authority concerned can contribute, and already contributes, to ongoing operations. Sweden's capability to respond to international demand can be strengthened further by increased collaboration between the various agencies.

Participation in international operations has several positive effects for government agencies and their personnel, as international work provides knowledge and experience the agency and its personnel can use in their operational tasks. It is important that such effects of international operations and the interests of the agencies are taken into account when contributions to civil operations are considered and planned.

Against this backdrop it should be natural for international experience to be viewed as advantageous when positions are filled nationally.

A long-term approach in the planning and funding of contributions to civil operations is required to enable Swedish civil capability to be developed and reinforced. A long-term approach is necessary for national agencies to be able to maintain and develop good capability to meet

international needs. It is also important for the agencies to be able to calculate the extent to which their resources will be put to use so that the requirements of national activity are met.

Comm. 2007/08:51

Many present-day operations take place in areas where the levels of risk are high. Safety aspects must therefore be weighed into considerations on contributions, particularly for those agencies that do not have the same knowledge and experience of critical situations as the police, for example.

Areas in which civil development of capacity should take place include, for example, police and the rule of law (police, prosecution service, courts and the prison and probation service), administration, operational support (e.g. logistics, healthcare and communication), civilian observers and rapid-response capability. Development should lead to more integrated operations. An underlying principle for Sweden in this respect will be, as far as possible, to attach an element of rule of law to future police operations.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Extract from minutes of cabinet meeting held on 13 March 2008

Present: Prime Minister Reinfeldt, Ministers Olofsson, Odell, Bildt, Ask, Husmark Pehrsson, Leijonborg, Larsson, Erlandsson, Torstensson, Carlgren, Hägglund, Björklund, Littorin, Borg, Sabuni, Billström, Adelsohn Liljeroth, Tolgfors

Minister responsible: Minister Bildt

The Government adopts Government Communication 2007/08:51
National strategy for Swedish participation in international peace-support
and security-building operations.

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH: TRENDS, CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES OF CO-OPERATION IN CRISIS PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT – UK ARTICLE

1. Concept

The United Kingdom recognises the key role of the United Nations, European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, as well as other regional organisations such as the AU, in effective conflict mediation and mitigation, and contributing to post-conflict stabilisation and peace-building.

We believe that the interdependence between drivers of conflict means that some of the policy trade-offs we seem to be faced with are in fact false choices: for example, just as it is wrong or short-sighted to talk of a choice between economic development and environmental protection, so too it is wrong to talk of a choice between security and economic development, or security and good governance. Building stability out of conflict or state failure is a complex undertaking that requires concerted, sustained, and integrated effort across security and governance, and economic development. We are clear that any stabilisation effort must be multilateral, as part of a fully integrated mission, multitalented, with expertise drawn from across the spectrum of government, and carried out in partnership with local government and partners.

The UK broadly interprets the comprehensive approach as an effort to bring together government departments and other stakeholders in international crisis management to: promote a shared understanding and common aims and objectives – especially when military action is foreseen; develop structures and processes to help align planning and implementation; and establish relationships and cultural understanding through common training, exercising, analysis and planning.

Some UK departments have their own guidelines on comprehensive approach crisis management. In particular, the UK military – through the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre – have published material delineating their perspective on the rationale for, and the implementation of, a comprehensive approach in conflict situations.

2. Planning, Making Decisions and Leadership

The UK's objective for achieving a more integrated civil-military approach has clear strategic political commitment, and is a major theme of the UK National Security Strategy, published in March 2008¹. Specific campaigns also produce frameworks for better civil-military co-operation as part of their overall strategy; the UK strategy for Afghanistan announced in December 2007 is a clear example of this.

1 www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/reports/national_security_strategy.aspx

The Ministerial Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development (NSID) provides part of the overarching structure and direction that helps guide the work of the different departments.

Beneath this, we can separate other actors into those concentrated in and working from London, and those situated in-theatre. In London we have various groups and units dealing with geographically specific issues, cutting across departments. These include the Afghan Strategy Group and units like the Sudan Unit and Afghan Drugs Interdepartmental Unit. Both these latter units are composed of officers drawn from a number of different departments, who are co-located and managed as a single entity. Overseas we have joint authorities with overall responsibility for the implementation of a plan within which comprehensive thinking and acting plays a key role. The British Embassy in Afghanistan embodies the new joint way of working, with an integrated and inter-agency approach – with diplomatic, political, governance, economic and financial, developmental, cultural, security, military and British Council staff co-located and working together on agreed objectives.

Bridging the strategic and operational actors we have an initiative to improve government-wide early warning and horizon scanning as covered in the National Security Strategy. Bridging the operational and in-country efforts sit various combined assessments and UK plans, for example joint strategies for Bangladesh, Nepal, Sudan and Helmand.

The UK's Stabilisation Unit (formerly the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit) supports cross-government working. Its key tasks are:

- assessment and planning: helping UK Government departments and the military develop a common understanding of the issues in a country emerging from violent conflict and then to plan together so that there is a single UK aim and strategic framework;
- providing experienced civilian personnel to work in insecure environments to implement stabilisation plans, and
- lesson learning, identifying and sharing best practice both in the UK and internationally on how to support countries emerging from conflict.

The UK does not have a single, overarching system for integrated analysis and planning. Where we have been most successful in implementing common approaches, we have adapted methodologies and tools to the specific needs and capacities of the agencies involved.

3. Training

The UK recognises the fundamental importance of joint training for staff from across government departments. Traditionally separate, departmental training programmes are increasingly integrated to ensure that practitioners from across government learn and apply skills collectively. Currently, a significant amount of effort is directed towards integrating civilian aspects in to military training. One manifestation of these efforts is the frequency with which civilian departments like the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Stabilisation Unit are now providing speakers and participants to the UK military's established programme of officer training.

Cross-Government involvement in pre-deployment training for military units preparing to be rotated into theatre – primarily Iraq and Afghanistan – is also significant. By way of example, the recent Mission Rehearsal Exercise for the UK's eighth roulement into Afghanistan had participation from a number of government departments other than the military, providing

more realistic training, and rehearsing the levels of comprehensive activity now demanded of UK staff working in Southern Afghanistan.

Cross-government foundation courses in crisis management are now available to participants from all relevant government departments. Many exercises are also being run as jointly civil-military. In September 2007, the Stabilisation Unit hosted an exercise primarily to examine integrated strategic planning among civilian departments, but with significant military involvement. In November 2008, the UK military's Joint Venture exercise will be civilian led, working from a strategic plan developed across five government departments to develop a military campaign plan, in a departure from their usual military-only biannual event. Alongside these high-profile shared events, civilian departments are increasingly playing a role in military-owned exercises, extending the scope for comprehensive working and helping to break-down cultural barriers separating the various entities of government.

4. Resources

The UK's two most important sources of funding for joint overseas crisis management are the Stabilisation Aid Fund (SAF) and the Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP). The SAF is a £269m pool jointly owned by the FCO, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Department for International Development (DfID), managed primarily by the Stabilisation Unit. Worth £327 million over the next three years, the CPP is also jointly managed by the three departments, to enhance the effectiveness of the UK's contribution to conflict prevention.

The UK advocates the development of a stronger international capacity, to deploy civilian stabilisation experts, including judges, lawyers and police, at short notice and in large numbers and to make them available for multilateral deployment. This builds on the EU civilian headline goal process, but must also include the UN. We are looking at increasing the number of civilian staff in Afghanistan, and at strengthening the capacity within the armed forces to work alongside civilians for certain specific, short-term reconstruction and development tasks in hostile environments, and to provide a stabilisation presence in the immediate aftermath of a military operation.

5. Interoperability

We interpret "interoperability" as a challenge of equipment and planning. We have historically experienced difficulties in the field with departmental IT systems that fail to communicate with one another, particularly where such conversations are confidential. Recently we have made improvements in this area.

Nationally, we are establishing co-ordination structures for planning through our efforts at joint training and exercises. These structures are put into practice in jointly assembled national strategies for bilateral assistance; the UK strategy for assistance to Nepal was jointly drafted and approved by all relevant departments. We have also used joint planning methodology in producing campaign plans for in-theatre civil-military operations, as in Helmand. We co-operate internationally in real-world analysis, through for example the Somalia International Contact Group. Such discussions are more often than not built on requirements in the field, and how we can take measures to improve our interoperability in-theatre.

The UK believes the MNE5 series is a good example of international exercising that can lead to improvements in interoperability, specifically in planning. It acts as a useful forum through which to share knowledge, experience, ideas and best practice with our international partners.

6. Evaluation

The Stabilisation Unit acts as the repository for lessons learned and best practice on the civilian side. The MoD and DfID have systematic approaches to evaluating their individual operations, but these processes are seldom integrated.

Programmes that are jointly owned and designed (like for Sudan, Nepal and Afghanistan) incorporate by extension some joint evaluation methodology. But individual departmental spending programmes are designed with their own performance evaluation process incorporated, and it is often hard to re-adjust planning/ programmes in light of emerging lessons.

Smaller efforts are ongoing to bridge some of the lack of co-ordination in institutionally identifying and disseminating lessons learned. One of the recent tasks of the cross-government Comprehensive Approach Working Group (a group of mid-ranking officials from across government) has been to set up a process for assembling and recording lessons learned by individuals serving in various overseas theatres.

7. Challenges

The UK's perspective on the interrelationship between drivers of conflict implies a commitment to identifying and deploying civilian experts to potentially hostile environments. We recognise the significant security challenges this presents. But we also believe that across all the key international institutions, the level of ambition in the face of new challenges remains too low, and the response to crises too slow.

Secondly the difficulty of establishing and achieving a single realistic and achievable national objective is important – it is key for unified government effort, but challenging to achieve in the face of competing cultures and perspectives caused by bringing departments or nations together. A third challenge would be the competition for resources, both between departments and between missions. Different cultures lead to differing perspectives on where resources should be delegated, both in terms of the individual work of each department and the theatres in which the government can have/ needs to have the best effect. A fourth challenge would be the joint challenge of language and culture – how to overcome the idiosyncratic practices of individual departments without compromising on the rationale behind those cultures and without advocating a single language and single process of planning – almost certainly destined to be the lowest common denominator of our collective expertise. Finally, it is a particular challenge to maintain momentum through the whole conflict cycle, i.e. from assessment, planning, implementation, monitoring, reviewing, adjustment, implementation, monitoring etc. Changes in staff, changes in perspective on the best method to achieve goals, and indeed changes in the goals themselves can corrupt this process and inhibit the efficacy of the comprehensive approach.

8. Opportunities

The UK will continue to press for further strengthening and reform of international institutions to deliver the specific objectives on conflict prevention, peace support operations and post-conflict stabilisation/ reconstruction. We are committed to building a better rules-based framework for intervention across all those scenarios. In particular, we need a stronger UN system for protecting vulnerable populations, preventing state breakdown and the descent into violence, building peace, and laying the foundations for longer-term development.

The UK sees greatest opportunity in supporting reforms that build international capacity in this area, including delivering the UN's commitment to genuinely integrated missions, ensuring that the Peacebuilding Commission takes on an effective leadership role in shaping longer-term peacebuilding, and developing a stronger international capacity, in the UN and EU, to deploy civilian stabilisation experts at shorter notice and in larger numbers. We will work for greater formal international support for developing the capacity of regional organisations, including the African Union.

We will continue to work for a stronger NATO, capable of taking on a wide range of challenging security and stabilisation tasks in complex and demanding situations, building on its experience in Afghanistan. And we will work for a stronger and more effective European foreign and security policy, and for more integrated EU effort across security, stabilisation and development. The challenge for both is to work together in as integrated a manner as possible, and in close partnership with other key international actors, most notably the UN.

United States

**U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 44
MANAGEMENT OF STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS
COMPREHNSIVE APPROACH SEMINAR
HELSINKI, FINLAND
JUNE 17, 2008**

INTRODUCTION

United States national interests and security are challenged by a range of states and non-state actors, many of regional or even global reach, that seek to perpetrate acts of terrorism, criminality and to incite internal and regional instability. Fragile states and poorly governed areas can become breeding grounds for extremism, terrorism, weapons proliferation, trafficking in humans and narcotics, organized crime, and humanitarian catastrophes. These complex challenges for the United States and our international partners require a comprehensive government planning and operational response that weaves together a spectrum of capabilities in counter-insurgency, counterterrorism, stability and reconstruction operations, with the full complement of civilian skills and approaches in stabilizing and reconstructing failed states; preventing conflict; and tackling terrorist financing, organized crime, and the illegal arms trade.

We face a shifting, dynamic and demanding world that will test our national capabilities, constantly requiring new approaches, new coalitions, and the best practices and doctrine we can learn and impart to our men and women working in the field. As a nation we must have tools that are highly flexible and capable in a range of situations. The steps to successfully meeting this challenge include building the necessary human capacity, develop planning and management systems, training these experts in the necessary skills and in the situations they will likely encounter, and repeatedly exercising with partners to prepare and refine our capabilities. At the center of this preparation is the effort to strengthen the partnership within the U.S. government between civilians and the military, so that as these challenges and threats evolve, and possibly rise to the level of military engagement, we have the relationships and systems in place to respond effectively.

National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) recognizes the challenges of stabilization and reconstruction and calls on both civilian and military elements of the federal government to promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation. NSPD-44 makes the Secretary of State responsible for integrating U.S. efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization operations, and calls on the Secretaries of State and Defense to harmonize civilian and military efforts so that civilians are planning and operating with the military before and during the start up of any operation.

The Department of Defense Directive on Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations (3000.05) supports NSPD-44. The State Department and civilian agency partners have worked closely with DOD to synchronize transformation under DOD Directive 3000.05 with NSPD-44 implementation. Intensive DOD involvement has been critical in the

two year process we have just completed to identify the civilian capacity that is needed going forward. Our civilian agency partners are taking significant action to build capacity and support the implementation of NSPD-44.

Our work in NSPD-44 implementation rests in a context of a much larger process to continually build a ready, seamless civilian-military partnership, which is often described as a comprehensive approach or whole of government effort. For the United States, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization has been designated to lead and ensure that the civilian agencies and departments are prepared, equipped, and trained to partner with the military in stabilization and reconstruction planning and operations.

Since S/CRS was established in 2004, it has built a modest and promising planning and rapid response capability within the State Department. This capability consists of a growing cadre of civilian planners and deployable stabilization experts in our office of 80 experts. S/CRS is an inter-agency office with detailees over the past three years from USAID; the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; the Departments of Defense, Treasury, Justice, Homeland Security, and Labor; the Intelligence Community; and other parts of the State Department. Our team is currently providing planning, operations or assessment assistance in Afghanistan, Sudan, Haiti, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Kosovo, and Liberia. We deployed personnel to AFRICOM and to SOUTHCOM, and we have increasingly stronger relationships with a number of the combatant commands, including EUCOM, PACOM, JFCOM and SOCOM.

Over the last two years, we have piloted new concepts and engaged in important planning and operations. For example, we opened the U.S. office in Darfur's capital of El Fasher, helped coordinate assistance on the ground in Lebanon for the Ambassador there, and have deployed teams to Afghanistan to facilitate planning with Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Pilot engagements such as these have proven the value of our whole of government approach approach. It is now time to expand our efforts. The President and his national security team are working with the Congress to ensure that the civilian agencies have a robust capability to take on these challenges in a significant way so that armed forces do not have to intervene and where military engagement is needed in stabilization crises, to be a true partner to the military. This requires an innovative change in the way the U.S. Government approaches and resources conflict response. Just as the U.S. military underwent tremendous reform in the 1980s following the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act (legislation?), we are proposing shifts across our civilian agencies and departments that will bring all elements of national power to bear in the defense of America's vital interests.

BUILDING CIVILIAN CAPACITY FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION

Throughout 2007 and 2008, we have been working together across 15 civilian and military agencies to answer President Bush's 2005 call in NSPD-44 to significantly improve the management of U.S. Government reconstruction and stabilization operations. This unprecedented process has brought together experts from the National Security Council staff, U.S. Agency for International Development, Departments of State, Justice, Agriculture, Commerce, Treasury, Transportation, Energy, Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, Office of Management and Budget, Office of Personnel Management, and the Intelligence Community to sit together and determine in detail the U.S. civilian capacity needed to succeed in a stabilization operation. It has required an extraordinary commitment of staff and expertise that has also benefited from extraordinary support from Members of Congress and outside experts, including the academic community.

This group examined U.S. responses in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, East Timor, and Lebanon and looked at a range of possible future countries at risk to identify the skill sets, range and number of civilians required to meet the need. This examination identified three required levels of deployable expert civilians: an Active Response Corps of up to 250 first responders from civilian federal agencies, a Standby Response Corps of up to 2000 other government officials, and a Civilian Reserve Corps drawn from private sector experts and state and local government officials from across the United States. The President embraced this recommendation, and confirmed his support yet again when he presented to Congress the Civilian Stabilization Initiative in his FY 2009 budget.

The Civilian Stabilization Initiative, as outlined in the President's budget request, will provide a full complement of U.S. civilian personnel that can respond quickly and flexibly to stabilization challenges. It provides for new positions within State, USAID and in other partner agencies devoted to increasing civilian reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) expertise, and it strengthens the ability of our civilians and military to work together on this complex challenge. The experts within the Active, Standby and Civilian Reserve Corps will also provide the civilian partner our armed forces need to convert military success into longer-term stability in R&S missions. Within 48 hours after a crisis erupts, CSI will allow us to deploy, for example, rule of law (including law enforcement) experts from State and Justice, economic experts from Commerce and Treasury, border security experts from Homeland Security, and governance, infrastructure, and conflict recovery officers from USAID, according to a unified plan.

The proposed CSI Active and Standby Response Corps will be supplemented, as needed, by the Civilian Reserve Corps. With trained and equipped Civilian Reserve personnel on call, we will be able to deploy experts drawn from the private sector and state and local government from across the country with the necessary specialties and training – such as police officers, judicial advisors, agronomists, and city managers -- within 30 days. This capacity will allow the high-level of flexibility and agility necessary to meet the needs of these complex missions.

COMPREHENSIVE GOVERNMENT PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR R&S OPERATIONS

The Civilian Stabilization Initiative is the critical first step to ensure we have the right people, with the right skills, at the right time. However, making sure that these experts are doing the right activities and tasks, synchronized between civilian and the military leadership on the ground (when the military is engaged), according to one strategic plan continues to be the most complex and challenging task of NSPD-44. In response to this challenge, the Interagency Management System (IMS) was developed and the Interagency Reconstruction and Stabilization planning framework has been revised; feats that could not have happened without the full commitment and participation of the 15 agencies involved, including participants from throughout DOD.

The principal value of the IMS is that it creates unity of purpose through an agreed comprehensive government planning and management process, translating that purpose into unified effort through integrated operations in the field. It clarifies roles, responsibilities, and processes for interagency R&S planning and operations. The IMS is scaleable to the situation and integrates personnel from all relevant agencies. This system is designed for highly complex crises and operations. However, it is important to note that it is not intended to respond to the political and humanitarian situations that are regularly and effectively handled through current organizations and systems. The IMS is designed to operate in the context of other multinational partners' activities

and efforts and to provide a command and control structure for stabilization operations that would oversee all civilian activities including contracting. It would avoid duplication of effort and facilitate oversight of all civilian expenditure.

DOD was a full partner in the development of both of these systems and, as part of its implementation of NSPD-44 and DOD Directive 3000.05, has provided talented staff, civilian and uniformed, to help hone the concepts from their original theory to everyday practice. We have applied the interagency planning framework or its principles in U.S. Government efforts in Afghanistan, Haiti, Kosovo, and Sudan.

ACHIEVING A NEW LEVEL OF READINESS THROUGH TRAINING

It is clear, as we prepare for this complex environment, that we have much to learn about training our civilians to be ready for the range of issues they will confront. We need to draw from various sources of expertise in training, including DOD. To fulfill the President's Directive and team with DOD on their efforts with DOD Directive 3000.05, S/CRS established a training working group bringing together representatives from the State Department, USAID, Defense, Justice, Commerce, USDA, HHS, DHS, Treasury, and the U.S. Institute of Peace. This group fosters collaboration among participating agencies to develop the training necessary to prepare officers for reconstruction and stabilization operations. The training working group is building on and leveraging existing resources. It is therefore connected with the National Security Education Consortium, the Security, Stabilization, Transition, and Reconstruction Senior Leaders Roundtable activities, and many other U.S. government training venues. This effort supports the President's May 2007 Executive Order on National Security Professional Development.

To better prepare those engaged in R&S issues, S/CRS has an increasingly robust training program with the State Department's Foreign Service Institute. S/CRS, partner offices within the State Department and U.S. government civilian agency partner staff regularly provide expertise to civilian institutions, the National Defense University and the Army, Navy and Air War Colleges to prepare a wide range of personnel from PRT staff to senior level staff from across the U.S. Government. We have a close relationship with a number of U.S. military professional education institutions and collaborate to ensure NSPD-44 concepts and processes are built in to their curricula. S/CRS has strong relationships with U.S. civilian academic and research institutions.

In addition to these institutional training processes, we regularly partner with our military colleagues for training that builds relationships between civilians and military in the field and practices the type of interagency collaboration that is so essential to effectiveness in the R&S environment. S/CRS and USAID colleagues regularly participate in the U.S. Army's Certain Trust exercise and training series at Ft. Bragg, which is the culminating exercise of the Civil Affairs officer course. Working with USAID's Office of Military Affairs, we recently completed training for the Provincial Reconstruction Teams currently deploying to Afghanistan.

As we look to move forward with the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, these types of training that build relationships between civilian and military colleagues, teach common planning and assessment practices, and expose our personnel to the methods, mechanisms and processes of the other agencies before facing the demands of the mission itself, will be critical to success.

PREPARING WITH INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS AND THE MILITARY THROUGH EXERCISES

The U.S. has been partnering among civilian and military agencies, and with international civilian-military partners to develop, test and refine the Interagency Management System, working out planning, systems and potential challenges in the exercise environment, so that we will be ready to respond effectively when the next crisis emerges.

Within the USG, an interagency Civilian-Military Activities Review Team directs this process and works closely with DOD in the effort to engage civilian agencies more effectively in military experiments and exercises and is developing a civilian-led exercise strategy for future years. The main focal points for United States R&S exercises are Unified Action (UA) 2007-2008 and Multinational Experiment 5. UA 2007-2008 is a civilian-led experiment conducted in support of the NSPD-44 implementation process, focusing on refining interagency conflict assessment and interagency planning at the strategic and operational levels. In 2008, we are placing particular emphasis on refining the civil-military planning and operational interfaces necessary to implement the IMS. S/CRS provided advice and input into the Multinational Experiment 5 experiment series, led by U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) which includes participation by civilian and military actors.

We are increasing the engagement of U.S. government agencies in exercises with Geographic Combatant Commands which focus on using the IMS and exercise the integration of civilian activities into the scenario. In February 2008, eighty-four personnel from more than twenty offices across the U.S. Government conducted a major exercise with SOUTHCOM. This exercise required over one year's worth of civil-military planning and used the three levels of the IMS in a highly complex mission. This is the third year of this exercise and each time we gain invaluable insight that has improved and strengthened the system and built a strong partnership with SOUTHCOM. We observed a major PACOM exercise this year and are developing an overall exercise strategy for future years.

In the international arena, we have been grateful for opportunities to contribute and participate in exercises and events led by partners such as Australia, Canada, France, Sweden, the UK, among others. This collaboration has provided valuable learning on other governments efforts to develop and implement a comprehensive approach, which we have sought to reflect in our implementation of NSPD-44 planning and operational concepts and processes.

These exercises have allowed us to practice and build relationships not only with the U.S. military but with a range of international civilian and military partners who are essential to the effectiveness of ongoing and future operations. Building civilian capacity for R&S is not just a U.S. priority. We share a commitment with our international partners to prevent states from failing and to resolve both the causes and the consequences of violent conflict. From the beginning, S/CRS has worked closely with USAID, State Department Offices, and DOD to build close working relationships with international partner organizations ranging from the United Nations, to NATO and the European Union, and partner countries like the United Kingdom and Canada. We are also reaching out to other countries such as Australia, France, Germany, Japan and South Korea. Our work with these international partners has spanned both collaboration on civilian activities and understanding how civilians and militaries can plan and operate together more effectively.

CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that failing states and ungoverned territories can quickly spawn threats to the security of our nation, its citizens and interests, and our allies and partners. The nature of these threats, their complexity and lethality are constantly evolving. As the United States and our international partners develop our respective national capacities to meet these threats militarily across a range of complex scenarios, we must continue our intensive efforts on the civilian side to strengthen our capacity to be an effective partner and leader going forward, particularly in missions where an early civilian lead may avoid military intervention entirely. We cannot continue to make do with a resource imbalance that leaves the military as the default for undertaking sustained, large-scale reconstruction and stabilization missions. Civilians must increase the capacity to effectively engage. This is true not only because most of the critical R&S tasks are civilian in nature and require a civilian lead, but also due to the burden placed on our armed forces, which detracts from our overall military readiness.

Building the U.S. civilian planning and operations capacity embodied in the Civilian Stabilization Initiative will ensure that we are able to partner with the military when necessary for the challenges that lie ahead and to deal with some crises without having to invoke U.S. military power. Continually improving and expanding our joint training and exercises will help us ensure this new capacity is truly ready for what lies ahead. In the end, the effort we make – and the expenses we incur – to develop a strong, fast U.S. civilian response capability will reduce the cost we ultimately pay, both in dollars and in lives, to manage the national and international security dangers arising from failed and destabilized states and the non-state actors that exploit these environments.

