Edited by
Timo Kivimäki

Islam, the West, and Violence

Sources, Catalysts, and Preventive Measures

ISLAM, THE WEST, AND VIOLENCE:
SOURCES, CATALYSTS, AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES

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Foreword

Islam, the West, and Violence: Sources, Catalysts, and Preventive Measures makes an important contribution to critical debates revolving around the concepts of development and security. The events of September 11th 2001 and the consequent "war on terror" mean that all parties involved in discussions about development must have a better understanding of the field of discourse with regard to security-related matters. The essays published in this volume explore and illuminate the sources and catalysts of international terrorism and radical violence, and offer appropriate strategic perspectives for North-South cooperation in removing their causes and reducing Islamic violence.

The essays contain material derived from the analysis of original texts in their original languages and from interviews with members of several radical Islamic groups. They draw on material from Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. The wealth of data with which the essays are endowed by these sources also complements, and adds further value to, the information provided by counter-terrorism agencies. Particular attention is paid to the economic and political factors that give rise to grievances and provide opportunities for terrorism.

The authors question standard definitions of terrorism by arguing that if terrorism is seen as a tactic or strategy then it must exist within a strategic context and involve interaction between at least two actors. This means that the prevention of terrorism should not only focus on the actions of particular terrorist groups or individuals but must also look at terrorist violence in terms of its being a strategy in a conflict structure.

The authors argue that economic and political conditions become drivers of terrorism only within the context of a specific struggle, and within a specific structure of communication. The latter observation is especially important because it implies that even though the fight against terrorism can make use of statistically significant associations between certain economic and political conditions one should not take these associations as inevitable. It is equally important to try to change the ideological climate within which certain kinds of grievances are perceived as justifying atrocities against innocent people.

In terms of policy responses the authors offer pertinent advice to the international community as it grapples with terrorism. Alleviating the conditions that lead to core grievances, reducing poverty and engaging in dialogue and ideological debate all help to overcome the problem of acceptance and toleration of civilian targeting. In the long run these strategies will bring about changes in the conflict structures that give rise to terrorism in the first place, and they are more effective than actions based on the somewhat naive assumption that violence can be countered by force.

The essays combined in this volume help us to understand terrorism and increase our ability to find ways of preventing it. They also make an important contribution to many current debates in terms of the need to better understand the connections between security and development.

Helsinki, March 2005

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Summary

Aims

This book has two objectives:

- Firstly, it reviews earlier research on the sources and catalysts of international Islamic terrorism/radicalism, and then draws conclusions as to the origins and causes or these sources and catalysts. (Part II).
- Secondly, it offers strategic perspectives for Islam-West cooperation in removing these causes and reducing Islamic violence. (Part III)

In drawing conclusions as to the sources and catalysts of terrorism, the focus is on economic and political grievances as the main sources of conflict, and on the weakness of the state structure of the Middle Eastern and North African states in dealing with these grievances. Some conflicts function as vehicles of legitimation, as well as being catalysts of radicalisation and terrorism. Of these, the perceived global antagonism between the Western and Islamic nations, and the regional conflict in Palestine are most prominent: they are thus studied here in detail. Thus, the analysis in Part II of this book examines the following relationships:

1. Economic and political grievances -> Terrorism
2. Weakness of Middle Eastern and North African states -> Islamic radicalism
3. Palestinian conflict -> Radicalisation and terrorism.
4. Islam-West conflict -> Radicalisation and terrorism.

Part III of the book offers strategic perspectives on the prevention of terrorism by looking at the following instruments:

1. Poverty alleviation and support for democracy
2. Support for state-building
3. Conflict management and resolution
4. Intercultural dialogue

Conclusions: Sources and Catalysts of Islamic Violence

Economic and political grievances -> Terrorism
The review carried out here reveals that individual economic grievances contribute to terrorist recruitment only through their contribution to war mobilisation, and only when individual grievances are political (alienation, "rootlessness", lack of political channels of protest) rather than economic in nature. Terrorist individuals come from less democratic countries and have often been deprived of political rights because of their immigrant status.

Drastic economic decline on a national level contributes to terrorist recruitment directly, and indirectly through its contribution to war mobilisation: a drastic drop in relative economic well-being among groups of people, and ethnic and religious based differences in economic opportunities, are therefore associated with the rise of terrorism.

Economic and political grievances that are most clearly linked with conditions conducive to terrorism are the transnational and international grievances of Muslims. These grievances are used successfully in creating tolerance for terrorism. This tolerance is then the foundation for individual motivation to join terrorist groups, as well as for the creation of opportunities for groups to organize their terrorist recruitment.

Problems in the national economy contribute to the growth of terrorism by increasing the risk that the state will become seriously weakened or break down completely, which again is an important precondition for terrorist organisation.

Weakness of Middle Eastern and North African states -> Islamic radicalism Incomplete state-building in the Arab world has created weak states with serious legitimacy issues regarding the use of force and even the legitimacy of the political system itself, and in which there are inadequate means for political participation and for the provision of services. In the Muslim world, this weakness is a primary cause of the rise of Islamic protest.

Radicalisation of small factions in the political protest movement, to the point where the use of terrorism is accepted, develops step-by step: from the use of extra-parliamentary means of protest, to political disengagement, to challenging the legitimacy of the entire political system, and the creation of strategies for a new order. This radicalisation process is abetted by the lack of parliamentary or non-violent extra-parliamentary means for protest, and by state repression. De-legitimation then appears which is typically directed towards the respective state; but in the case of al-Qaeda related groups, radicalisation also appears which is directed towards the international order and international players on the world political stage.

Palestinian conflict -> Radicalisation and terrorism

The continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict represents to many Muslims the perceived double standards of Western countries. While international terrorists use the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a tool for the legitimation of their actions, Arab regimes use the conflict as an excuse not to make changes in their governing principles.

Since the beginning of the second intifada, the Palestinian Authority (PA) has been in a legitimation crisis and has lacked a functioning socio-economic network. This has increased *Hamas*' popularity, because it has a socio-economic network and is seen as leading the resistance to Israeli policies. Over the past few years, Hamas has gained new supporters from among people who have been disappointed at what they see as inability of the PLO and the PA to deal with the 'Israeli occupation'. In the eyes of many Palestinians, what *Hamas* has done on the ground has become more important than the talks of the PLO and PA.

Because terrorism has to be defeated using all possible means, it is important to secure the basic social needs of Palestinians in order to address their core grievances and reduce their support for the use of violence. If *Hamas* was destroyed and if some Palestinians still faced repression from Israel, this might increase the support for the legitimacy of violent resistance. However, if *Hamas* was brought into the Palestinian political process, many people would see that as a victory for terrorists. Even though bringing *Hamas* into the political process could have a positive effect on the structures of this specific conflict, there is a risk that such recognition could motivate other groups to use terrorist strategies.

Islam-West antagonism -> Terrorism

To a large extent the idea of 'the Western world' and the idea of 'the Islamic world' are fictitious constructs that have relevance only in the context of anti-Islamic and anti-Western groups. Neither extreme of the tense Islam-West relationship is united, and neither is explicitly against the other.

While Muslims tend to perceive Western resentment of Islam more clearly than the West perceives Muslim resentment of the West, in reality Western attitudes towards Muslims and Islam are more positive, while the attitudes of Muslims towards the West are more negative, than conventional wisdom believes, according to recent polls. While it can be shown that the West does not systematically target Islamic people with aggression or discrimination, the global reality of Muslim marginalisation and the power asymmetry of the Islam-West relationship makes it easier for Muslims to perceive the West as an enemy.

The unity of the West as a block in its relationship with the Muslim world is a myth as much as is the unity of the Muslim world in its relationship with the West. In particular the military aspects of Western counter-terrorism seem to put most European

governments and a great majority of their people on the side of the Muslim world rather than on the side of the US.

An antagonistic approach in West-Islam relations originates from the difficulties in finding and the neglect of seeking for mutually acceptable rules for a Western military and economic presence in the Islamic world, and for a Muslim presence, primarily as immigrants, in the West.

The antagonism is fuelled by the logic of tension, which tends to exaggerate the negative perceptions of the Other, the representativeness of the extreme views and deeds against the Other, and the unity of the Other against oneself. Furthermore conflict as a tradition is often used to fuel this antagonism.

Recommendations

Poverty Alleviation and Support for Democracy

The causal links from various levels of poverty to terrorism are such that they can be dealt with by paying attention to the counter-terrorism aspect in many types of poverty reduction measures. ***Rather than just designing interventions specifically to address solely the problem of terrorism, the aim of preventing violence, conflict and terrorism should be integrated into all normal development cooperation programmes.*** Poverty reduction and support for democracy could be made to better serve the purpose of preventing terrorism (while primarily focusing on other development aims) through including them in the following:

1. **Solving the political problems of cooperation**:
    - For successful cooperation in the prevention of terrorism, one needs to develop a common political platform for operations. UN coordination should probably play an important role in the creation of this platform, which should include planks on poverty reduction and support for democracy.
    - When the basic principles of joint action are in place, it is still important to consider carefully the power sharing in actual cooperation. Equal partnership, broad-based societal dialogue and joint development of the rules of counter-terrorism should be the operational principles of counter-terrorist cooperation that aims at avoiding legitimacy problems and counter-productive backlashes.

2. **Refocusing some priorities**:
    - Relative poverty, rather than absolute, is at the core of a great deal of political violence and terrorism. Thus, the focus should be on groups with relatively declining economic and/or political status. Deprived groups might not be subnational, they can also be transnational, for example, groups (such as the Kurds, Islamic Malays of Southern Thailand and Malaysia, and Palestinians in several Middle East countries, etc.) that exist in border areas.
    - Focus on Muslim poverty.
    - Poverty alleviation has to reach difficult areas, some of which may not necessarily fulfil some of the criteria of program countries.
    - Promotion of democracy should seek ways to address the problem of international democracy, not only the problem of national democracy.

3. **Opportunities offered by concrete cooperation in fighting the ideological battle against terrorism should be utilised.** The main ideological problems that could be tackled are:
    - The violent ideology of civilian targeting. This ideology, rather than organisations with imagined or real formal organisational structures, should be seen as the main enemy in counter-terrorism.
    - The linking of Islamic grievances with desperate acts of civilian targeting. Working with the grievances could be paired with ideological work to show that terrorism should not be seen as an automatic, logical consequence of these grievances nor should it be seen as the obvious solution to end them.

Support for State-Building

Support for state-building should be seen as a long-term tool for domestic security and stability in the Arab world. Policies of external actors should be aimed at supporting the states and civil societies in preventing state weakness particularly by increasing political participation and strengthening public services (employment, education, health, social security, income distribution).

General state-building measures should include assistance in:

- Democratisation,
- Anti-corruption measures,
- Election observance,
- Reform of the legal and the court systems,
- Fostering human rights,
- Fostering freedom of the press,

- Constitutional reforms,
- Reform of state bureaucracy,
- Financial and economic aid (e.g. lowering trade barriers),
- Economic and agricultural reforms,
- Prioritizing public investment for education and health sector and
- Supporting effective use of resources (capacity-building).

The Western players should be **vocal on the need for reforms, and consistent and coherent long-term policies** should be formulated. These policies should not be used only as short-term anti-terrorism policies. They should also not be subjected to short term security interests balancing between long term security interests and short term stability may be necessary. Commitment to long-term reforms needs to be in line with policies being implemented. Support for domestic reform must be accompanied by a **re-evaluation of policies towards regional security issues and arrangements** (for example Iraq, Gulf security), **and policies towards regimes and conflicts** (especially the Israel-Palestine question). Uprooting the sources of grievances in the Middle East is of the utmost importance for reducing the legitimacy of terrorist actions. International efforts toward increasing stability in Iraq should be intensified, and a solution to the Israeli-Palestine question should be found. Regional security arrangements should be such that they reduce the external security dilemma of the Arab states and decrease the legitimation of the militarisation of governance.

Use of **conditionality** should be introduced in policies towards regimes. Regimes should not be excused from the application of mutually shared principles, even for security considerations, be it for international, regional or domestic security. The EU should act on violations of the human rights clause in agreements, and should use economic sanctions if necessary.

A **platform for dialogue** should be created for institutionalizing the cooperation in reforms, in order to get commitments from different actors and to have a genuine dialogue. The platform should include the main international players as well as the Arab states. The EU should broaden its cooperation to include the Gulf countries.

Western actors should increase **concrete dialogue** with regimes and provide technical assistance in the formulation of legal and institutional frameworks for political participation, rule of law, good governance and human rights. Technical assistance and education (capacity building) could be provided in regard to reforms of legal systems and the security sector.

There should be an increase in the **promotion of political participation**. The EU should increase its direct "democracy support" substantially. For example, in the year 2002 only 7% of EU aid on democracy and human rights was allocated to the Mediterranean, more specifically to Tunisia, Morocco and the West Bank.

There should be increasing dialogue with civil society stakeholders, and with the political opposition, in diplomacy practiced by the Western states. This would serve to **empower civil society and create partnership/ownership of reforms,** which in turn would enhance peaceful internal debate among different actors. The EU could provide frameworks and facilitate contacts between different civil society actors, from fundamentalist Islamic groups to liberal reformers.

State abilities to provide services in **education, health, social security and employment should be supported** by assistance in reforming these sectors. There could also be assistance for building the basic infrastructure for the information society. External actors can also engage in supporting independent media, educating journalists, building opinion poll agencies, and promoting access to the Internet.

The **ownership of reforms should be within the Arab states.** Previous historical analogies show that external influence can only support the domestic process of reforms. On the domestic level, the reforms must be owned both by the state and the civil society and its different actors. External actors should support dialogue on the reforms among these actors.

Conflict Resolution and Conflict Management in Palestine

For conflict resolution and conflict management in Palestinian areas, as well as for preventing the possibility that Palestinian *Hamas* would begin to extend its operations internationally, several simultaneous actions should be taken:

1. Concrete improvements should be made in the lives of Palestinians so that people would have hope.

Improvements in individual standards of living, and in physical and economic security, could provide hope for the future, diminish frustration and reduce Palestinians' support for the resistance groups. This lack of support should then reduce the number and intensity of terrorist attacks. In order to improve the lives of Palestinians the following measures should be taken:

- International aid should be allocated so that groups which use terrorism, such as Hamas, would be prevented from distributing aid. However, distributing aid through legitimate Islamic charities which have good networks should not be automatically excluded.
- Security should be guaranteed by a legitimate authority.

2. There should be active negotiations with Palestinian groups in order to achieve a genuine armistice.

Currently *Hamas* enjoys support and ideological power. Since it is perceived as a resistance movement, it has also symbolic power. If *Hamas* is excluded from the political process while it still enjoys public support, there is a risk of an escalation of violence within the Palestinian society. Further, if *Hamas* was excluded from the political process but still enjoyed popular support and ideological power, there is the possibility that it would begin to expand its terrorist operations internationally.

On the question of the future of *Hamas*, one view is that if the PA would bring *Hamas* into the political process, *Hamas* might become more moderate and give up its armed operations. As a practical movement, *Hamas* could agree on a truce. *Hamas* also has the power to pressure other Palestinian resistance groups into an armistice. However, the problem with this approach is that, if *Hamas* was brought into the Palestinian political process, many people would see that as a victory for terrorism and the terrorists.

3. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be resolved.

There should be a just solution to the conflict in order to stop the mobilisation of armed forces for terrorism. As long as Palestinians do not see a real political alternative to the use of the resistance groups for ending the Israeli occupation, Islamic extremists will have support among Palestinians. In addition, if there was a clear, strong political authority which could guarantee security, delegitimation of terrorism would be easier than in the current situation in which the PA is undergoing a legitimation crisis.

A just solution to the conflict is needed in order to apply the norms of foreign aid for post-conflict societies. Such a solution would create a situation where aid could be directed to development-oriented projects and the Palestinians' dependency on aid for recurrent expenditures would be reduced.

Intercultural dialogue

Dialogue should focus on finding culturally accommodating rules of cooperation on issues and in areas where the West needs to collaborate with the Muslim world. Instead of seeking agreement on the foundations of inter-cultural norms, the dialogue could utilise Western and Muslim experts in trade and military relations and focus narrowly on the pragmatic normative issues related to the main bones of contention, which are:

- International commodity (oil) trade, which is sometimes seen as Muslim resources being taken by (military) force.
- Western investment in the Muslim world,

- Rights of Muslim immigrants and visitors in the West, an issue which has motivated many immigrant terrorists to commit acts of violence. Correspondingly, the rights of Western individuals in the Muslim world,
- Western military presence, which is often seen as occupation of the Holy Lands, and
- Joint humanitarian crisis-prevention operations in the Muslim world, which, without dialogue and normative consideration is sometimes seen as based on religious and economic objectives.

Failing to establish a functioning, normative dialogue on economic and security issues would prove very costly for economic relations and extremely dangerous for security relationships. The Asia-Europe Roundtable could be taken as the model for establishing a forum for security and economic dialogue between the Islamic world and the West.

Unstable elements in Islam-West power asymmetries should be addressed by means of poverty alleviation and support for both national and international democracy. Addressing the issues fuelling terrorism in the ongoing conflicts in Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq, and Kashmir would also help in reducing tension. Perhaps establishing an institutionalised dialogue forum, along the lines suggested above, for each of these conflicts could be useful, together with serious political and diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflicts themselves. Because of the broad basis of the escalating negative images, any dialogue intended to modify the negative images should also be broadly based. Dialogue should be used to deconstruct the main elements underlying the logic of these negative images. Thus such dialogue should:

- Reveal the diversity of Islam to the West and reveal the diversity of the West to the Muslim World. Cultural dialogue should give visibility to different ethnic and cultural expressions.
- Rehumanise "the Other". There are constructive examples in Foreign Ministry educational programmes about the everyday lives of people "beyond the ethnic barrier". Further, the scheduling of diplomatic events, state visits, etc. could emphasise the ordinary people when diplomacy is dealing with inter-ethnic relations.
- Show how marginal the violent extremist groups opposing the West/Islam really are. This could be done by promoting transparency instead of controlling the media as part of counter-terrorism. Media cooperation should value transparency of the media as an example to be followed and as a move to be reciprocated by governments in Muslim countries.

International cooperation between the Islamic world and the West for the prevention of terrorism would need to be sensitive and sensible. It should put the counter-terrorist aims into perspective. The prevention of terrorism has become a dominant issue on the international agenda, partly because of the threat it poses to Western people. Based on statistics in US State Department annual reports on global terrorism, about 700 people are killed in terrorist attacks in one year. Compare that to the more than 7 million (non-Western) children killed by hunger in one year. The issue of the global international income gap is very low on the international diplomatic agenda. The high priority put on the prevention of terrorism thus exemplifies the West-centric agenda and the lack of global democracy that are sources of some of the grievances that give rise to terrorism. In dealing with the problem of terrorism, Islam-West cooperation should try to avoid exaggerating the gravity of the problem despite the fact that terrorism has the potential for much greater destruction than we have so far seen. Resolving some of the grievances behind terrorism, such as the national and international political and economic grievances of Muslims, alleviating the weaknesses and deficiencies of the states in the Middle East and North Africa, settling the conflict in Palestine, and deconstructing the perceived antagonism between the Western and the Muslim worlds, might prove more important in the long run than simply taking short term counter-terrorist measures today.

Part I:
Introduction

Chapter 1

Introduction

Timo Kivimäki

Aims

This book has two objectives. Firstly, it explores the sources and catalysts of international terrorism and radicalism (Part II). Secondly, it offers strategic perspectives for North-South cooperation for removing these causes and reducing Islamic violence (Part III).

In examining the causes, special emphasis is given to direct economic and political factors which create grievances and provide opportunities for terrorism. The relationship between poverty and political grievances is discussed by Timo Kivimäki, in Chapter 3; in Chapter 4 Heidi Huuhtanen looks at the weaknesses of Middle Eastern and North African states as a factor in failing to create stable political and socio-economic development, thus providing a context and a condition for radicalization.

Certain objective economic and political conditions are instrumental as sources of terrorism even if they cannot be seen as causes of terrorism.[1] More indirectly, certain conflicts affect terrorism by fuelling anger and antagonism that then sometimes culminate in terrorist attacks. While some of these conflicts are regional and specific, there also seems to be a more global problem of perceived antagonism between the West (especially the United States) and the radical Islamic groups: this antagonism acts as a catalyst of terrorism. The most important and most often quoted conflict used in efforts to legitimize violence on the part of Muslims, is the Palestinian conflict. This conflict and its internal potential for the internationalization of violence is analysed by Minna Saarnivaara in Chapter 5; the influence on terrorism of global antagonism between the West and Islam is studied by Hassan Gubara Said and Timo Kivimäki in Chapter 6.

Part III of this book explores ways and means of reducing terrorist violence by addressing the causes and catalysts studied in Part II, through poverty alleviation, support for democracy, support of modern state structures, inter-cultural dialogue and prevention of the internationalization of the regional conflict in Palestine. In

[1] The reason why this is the case will be analysed in the subchapter on methodological problems.

Chapter 7, Timo Kivimäki presents ways in which political and economic grievances could be addressed in order to reduce terrorism. In Chapter 8, Heidi Huuhtanen analyses the ways in which the weak states could be reformed and helped to alleviate conditions providing the context for the radicalization of Islamic movements. Minna Saarnivaara explores in Chapter 9 ways to prevent the internationalization of the Palestinian conflict; while in the final chapter, Hassan Gubara Said and Timo Kivimäki look into ways in which the antagonism between Islam and the West could be defused as a catalyst of international terrorism.

Methodology

This book is based on a review of recent literature on terrorism and political Islam or Islamism[2], including quantitative and qualitative research by authors on these topics. Quantitative analysis methods are explained in detail in Chapter 3, while the qualitative methods range from critical analysis of official texts and rhetoric, to participatory observation within the communities where radicalization has taken place and tolerance to symbols of terrorism has emerged. The authors and research assistants have conducted interviews among diplomats, officials, and counter-terrorism officials in Israel (Sonja Lende), Peru (Christian Fjäder), Saudi Arabia (Heidi Huuhtanen), Thailand (Michael Tivayanond), Malaysia (Timo Kivimäki) and Indonesia (Banyu Perwita, Timo Kivimäki); and among radical Islamists in Palestine (Minna Saarnivaara), Morocco[3] (Heidi Huuhtanen), Pakistan (Imaran Iqbal), Egypt (Heidi Huuhtanen, Hassan Gubara Said), the Sudan (Hassan Gubara Said) and Indonesia (Budi Agustono, Timo Kivimäki). The project has also managed to obtain inside views of several radical, violent Islamic groups, and groups that are contemplating of the use of terrorist means, including the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, MILF (two independent, anonymous interviewers within the MILF HQ on Mindanao), the Free Aceh Movement, GAM (one police interviewer and one activist interviewer + interviews by Timo Kivimäki, Delsy Ronnie), Laskar Jihad (by Budi Agustono & Timo Kivimäki) and Hizbut Tahrir (Budi Agustono). For security reasons, the interviews had at times to be arranged indirectly, so that the author did not know the identity of the interviewer (let alone the informant). However, in these cases, alternative independent interviewers with different partisan interests were used for the sake of reliability assessment.

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[2] The term Islamism is used here to describe Islam as a political ideology which has as its goal the implementation of an Islamic state governed by Islamic law *sharia.*

[3] The Moroccan interviews were made among Moroccans, but not in Morocco.

Reservations and Methodological Problems

There are several methodological issues that cast doubt on research into terrorism. Some of them are conceptual, some theoretical, and some technical data-reliability problems. The most acute are related to the sources. Most publicly available sources on terrorism originate from the counter-terrorism bureaucracy of the United States. As such they are necessarily unreliable, since they represent the selection and the interpretation of facts by a party to the conflict. While this has made it difficult to draw any overall conclusions in terrorism research, there are also methods for going around the problem of unreliable and biased sources. Standard methods of source criticism based on consistency testing and analysis of the interests of the information sources are used here. Furthermore, our participatory observation in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, the analysis of original texts in original languages, together with interviews in Israel, Saudi Arabia, Peru, Egypt, the Sudan, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand have made it possible for us to compensate for most of the problems with unreliable and biased sources.

The study of terrorism either has to redefine the concept of terrorism, and study such things as mutual assured destruction, the strategy of horizontal escalation, area bombings, and so on, that the majority of people would not see as terrorism, or else it has to relate to the mainstream definitions of terrorism. This study has taken the latter position, simply for practical reasons: this book aims at supporting Finland's efforts to contribute to the prevention of terrorism, and thus it has to somehow integrate into the policies and concepts of the Finnish Foreign Ministry. There are, however, some problems with this approach. It might be that terrorism is analytically an inseparable part of something that has to be ruled out as being beyond the scope of the study if standard political definitions of terrorism are followed. The standard political definition might dissociate terrorism from something that should be included as a factor in a comprehensive analysis. If terrorism is seen as a tactic or strategy, then it must exist within a strategic context, and there must be interaction between at least two actors. However, the prevention of terrorism focuses, by definition, only on the prevention of the actions of persons or groups not officially associated with a given state. It seems clear from the experiences of countries like Israel or the United States that one should not rule out the possibility that terrorism cannot be explained outside its context of conflict. Even though generally committed to the standard definitions of terrorism, this book nonetheless acknowledges and deals with the problems associated with this approach by deviating somewhat from the standard conceptualization of terrorism and studying terrorism in its context of escalation. This also affects the focus of the book and the types of recommendations that our analysis leads to. Once we look into terrorist violence as a strategy in a conflict structure, we can no longer arbitrarily avoid

focusing on terrorist strategies and violence by state actors as well as on terrorist acts themselves.

There are also problematic conceptual associations that accompany the standard definitions of terrorism.. The idea of an automatic association between extreme fundamentalism and violence is something that requires a critical look. Fundamentalists of almost any religion are often very peaceful, and thus the idea that living by extremely strict religious precepts would automatically involve violence should not be smuggled into the discussion through misleading conceptual associations.

Similarly the conceptual associations of extremism also smuggle in the idea that extreme commitment to religion would involve violence, and this again should not be assumed without closer empirical scrutiny. In fact, evidence suggests rather that most Islamic terrorists are not very committed to Islamic values as such, but are more committed to the group interests of all Muslims. Thus this book makes a distinction between extreme commitment to a religion, and an extreme commitment to the group interests of a religious group. When speaking of 'religious extremism' here, we refer to the latter.

Furthermore, the implicit association between radicalism and violence still requires an explanation. Radicalism as a position, radically different from that of the status quo position, need not be a position that is defended by force or violence. This book makes a distinction between radical positions and radical methods, and uses the term 'radicalism' to refer here not to an extreme position but to a strategic concept that condones and promotes the use of violent measures.

Sometimes, the concept of religious fundamentalism makes an association between violent promotion of religious group interests and the position according to which religious principles should be seen as political foundations for running a government. This seems especially clear in the debate in the former Soviet Republics in which religious political groups were easily lumped together with terrorists, regardless of their position on violence as a method of political change.[4]

In addition to conceptual problems, there are theoretical problems that make it difficult for this book to come to conclusions that identify the conditions that cause terrorism and/or radicalization, and produce strategies that could help prevent terrorism. The first theoretical problem is the assumption that there are objective conditions conducive to terrorism that could be manipulated like natural objective conditions can be manipulated to produce a desired result (heat water in order to make it boil, for example). The first practical problem is that the nature of causality in politics is evidently

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[4] This association is very clear in the political declarations made by the Uzbek President Karimov, cited in Ahmed Rashid, "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism," *Foreign Affairs* 78 (November-December 1999): 22–35.

less strict and less objective than causality in the natural sciences, and more socially constructed.[5] Politics is not chemistry.

Global terrorism tends to originate in economically and politically deprived global communities living in weak states and threatened by something they perceived as being a global, superior enemy. But terrorism cannot be seen as a logical conclusion of, or necessarily or sufficiently caused by, these conditions: the conditions of Indonesian Muslims did not justify, nor did they force, the perpetration in Kuta Village on Bali Island of the murder of 202 innocent civilians (including 38 Indonesians).

Economic and political conditions become sources of terrorism only in the context of a specific struggle and within a specific structure of communication. Even then purposeful action, conscious decisions and political will play an important, independent role. Consequently, this book defines "causality" as something different from the 'causality' we know from natural sciences. The fight against terrorism can make use of the statistically significant associations between certain economic and political conditions and terrorism, but one should not take these associations as given. In some cases, it would make sense for Finland and the West to not only try to remove the physical and economic conditions conducive to terrorism, but also to fight the ideological construction of the linkage between certain conditions and terrorism. It would be foolish, for example, not to try to influence the ideological climate within which certain kinds of grievances are seen to justify, or to force people to commit, atrocities against other people who are in no way responsible for these grievances.

Another complication in trying to apply a simple, operational setting in which conditions conducive to terrorism are first identified, and then strategies for preventing these conditions are sought, is related to the strategic parameters. A considers what action to take by trying to anticipate the actions of B (C, D, F…), whose actions A knows to be dependent on B's estimate of A's actions, which again are dependent on calculations based on B's anticipated actions, and so on. This complication needs to be taken into account especially when thinking of Finland's or the international community's responses to terrorism. If one believes the actions of the international community are simply stable preconditions for the actions of terrorists, this belief will easily be exploited: If, for example, Palestinian terrorism is believed to be objectively dependent on the lack of political concessions from the Israeli side, terrorism could be mobilised for extracting political compromises from Israel, without moral hazards

[5] The concept of constructed causalities is set forth more fully in Kivimäki (1985): Suomen turvallisuuspolitiikka, peliteoreettinen analyysi (A game-theory analysis of Finnish security policy. M.A. Thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Helsinki). The discussion of this concept here has been influenced by Heidi Huuhtanen's distinction between direct and indirect causes of terrorism, presented at a workshop held on 3.9.2003 in connection with the preparation of this book.

attached to the terrorist acts. Hence, analysis that portrays the dynamics of terrorism in an objectivist context does a disservice by making terrorism a useful political weapon.

There seems to be statistical evidence suggesting that, at least in some conflicts, for example, the war in Iraq or the escalation of the Palestine conflict, conflict fuels terrorism. Yet this might only be because of terrorists choose to make it so. To treat political actions unpleasant for terrorists and their self-claimed constituencies as "natural conditions" for terrorism would only encourage terrorist tactics, because so doing would enable terrorists to control the perception of the international community as to what causes terrorism and how to prevent it.

The principle of not rewarding terrorism is at the heart of this theoretical problem. While considering what to do to remove the conditions conducive to terrorism, this book always bears in mind the strategic setting: resolving one conflict in which terrorism is used cannot be done at the expense of encouraging terrorism in other conflicts.

Last but not least, the final problem with the simplified setting adopted for this book is that of the agency of terrorism. Terrorist actors are not organizations with formally established decision-making structures, and they do not have an agency in the same sense as states, for example, might have. According to Peter Chalk:

> "[I]n many parts of the world (Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Southeast Asia) organized group structures are being eclipsed by the emergence of loosely-affiliated networks composed of individuals that claim no affiliation with a physical militant entity as such (rather coming together for specific, ad-hoc operations that are merely justified according to wider pan-Islamic designs). These "leaderless resistance" cells may well emerge as the new norm in global terrorism, which given their lack of predictability in terms of modus operandi or "tactical footprints," will likely present considerable challenges to counterterrorism."[6]

The question then becomes: how can the international community manipulate conditions to prevent the emergence of groups like those the EU or the UN or the US defines as 'terrorist', if they cannot even identify the collective actors operating in terrorism? Sometimes it seems impossible to try to fight terrorism by using the traditional approach of identifying the actors and fighting them. Alleviating the conditions that lead to core grievances, by reducing international and local relative poverty, and engaging in dialogue and ideological debate, would go a long way toward addressing the question of the acceptance of, and tolerance towards, civilian targeting. This could then be a much more effective way of fighting terrorism than taking measures to fight existing, formal, international terrorist organizations.

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[6] Peter Chalk in Kivimäki, Chalk, Gunaratna & Tan (2004): *Economic Factors in the Recruitment of Terrorism*. Report made to the Danish Foreign Ministry, Copenhagen (Unpublished report).

Chapter 2

Overview of International Islamic Terrorism

Timo Kivimäki and Minna Saarnivaara[1]

What is International Islamic Terrorism?

The 'war on terrorism' structures the current world and offers Western actors a rationale for their actions in this 'war'. World affairs have been seen in the context of a "post-911 world order". In this view, in setting the agenda for international relations in the West the threat of Islamic terrorism has received the greatest share of attention.[2]

Terrorism does not have a commonly accepted definition. The most quoted definitions are American and European (EU). Different departments of the US administration have different definitions. It is nonetheless possible to identify at least four main elements common to both the European and the US definitions: 1) terrorism is premeditated, 2) it targets civilians, 3) its motivations are political/religious rather than criminal, and 4) it is carried out by unofficial actors.[3] The UN definition is somewhat similar, with the exception of element 3), which seems to have been defined less strictly. General Assembly (GA) Resolution 51/210 touched on the definition of terrorism when it condemned "criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political,

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[1] Except for the two paragraphs on jihad and martyrdom, written by Minna Saarnivaara, this chapter was written by Timo Kivimäki.

[2] This priorisation in world affairs has been criticised in Kivimäki (2003) "The Era of Terrorism – the Global Context of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism", in Kivimäki, ed., *Development Cooperation as an Instrument in the Prevention of Terrorism.* Danida, Copenhagen; and in Kivimäki (forthcoming) "Can Development and Democratization Address the Root Causes of Terrorism in Southeast Asia?" in da Cunha, ed., *Globalization and Its Counter-Forces*. ISEAS, Singapore.

[3] The European concept of terrorism is defined in a proposal on combating terrorism prepared by the EU Council of Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs in late 2001 and available at http://Europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/csfp/doc/com_01_521.pdf. The exact wording of the EU definition is the following: "offences intentionally committed by an individual or a group against one or more countries, their institutions or people, with the aim of intimidating them and seriously altering or destroying the political, economic, or social structures of a country."

philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them."[4]

On the one hand, terrorism can be seen as tactics or a strategy of political influence. At the heart of this strategy is the idea of indirect targeting. Terrorists target innocent people in order to influence the morale of those they cannot hit directly. David Jenkins has defined this aspect of terrorism in the following manner: "The identities of the actual targets are often secondary or irrelevant to the terrorists' objective of spreading fear and alarm or gaining concessions. This separation between the actual victim of the violence and the target of the intended psychological effect was the hallmark of terrorism." [5]

At the same time terrorism is communication. According to one of the September 11 perpetrators, Ahmed al-Haznawi, the strike was a 'bloodied message' to the world.[6] Terrorist actions send signals, constitute and implement threats, express grievances of groups, articulate group identities of the oppressed, and aim at proving associations between aggressions and counter-aggressions (say, occupation of Palestine and a suicide bombing in Israel). Terrorism does not aim at directly destroying what it opposes, but instead it strikes at the symbols of abstract enemies – world trade centres that symbolise global capitalism – and seeks influence by proving the vulnerability of these abstract enemies. "The September 11 attacks were not targeted at women and children. The real targets were America's icons of military and economic power."[7] Terrorism as communication explains the "trends" in global terrorism. In the 1970s, a bomb in a world trade centre probably would not have been seen as expressing the grievances of Muslims, but rather those of the "global proletarian class". Today terrorism is aimed at articulating a construction of the world as a struggle between Muslims and the 'infidel' forces of capitalist greed and Western militarism. The new *al-Qaida* targeting manual makes the idea of terrorism as a tool for the articulation of world views very explicit: "[t]argeting Jews and Christians is a proof that it is a religious struggle."[8]

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[4] GA Res. 51/210 Measures to eliminate international terrorism, 1999. See for example: UN Office of Drugs and Crime Webpage: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html.

[5] Michael Jenkins (1999) "Introduction", in Lesser, Hoffman, Arquilla, Ronfeldt, Zanini, Brian, and Jenkins (1999) *Countering New Terrorism*. Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation, p. v,.

[6] http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Ahmed%20Al%20Haznawi

[7] *Dawn*: The Internet Edition, November 10, 2001. The centrality of negative emotions might also explain the negative iconic structure of the ideology of *al-Qaida* and its associates: instead of defining utopias in positive terms, terrorist rhetoric is often much more specific on its resistance of something. The resisted enemy is often so strong that terrorists sometimes target the icons of the resisted order, rather than the order itself.

[8] 'Al-Qaida Targeting Guidance', v1.0, March 29, 2004. Translated in an IntelCenter internet publication, at http://www.asisonline.org/newsroom/aq.pdf

Not only is the struggle part of international communication, international communication is part of the struggle. Definitions related to terrorism are not just definitions, they are political actions in this struggle.[9] Labelling somebody a terrorist has political consequences. This is especially so in the context of the "post-September 11" world when the globally shared images of destruction and pain are associated with both concepts: terrorism and political communication.[10] These associations become political reality when the universally perceived seriousness of the fundamentalist terrorist threat justifies extraordinary, sometimes violent or undemocratic actions for the restoration of security. That is, killing in the name of security or anti-terrorist warfare acquires a different, more acceptable framing.[11] This is how definitions in the prevention of terrorism become matters of life and death. This is how...become matters of life and death.

Along with different definitions of terrorism, the concept of "**new terrorism**" has been articulated. New terrorism refers to the different organisation and strategy of current terrorism, where groups are not coherent, but often based on cells and secret networks like those in the early communist movement. Instead of known leaders with whom it would be possible to negotiate, new terrorism expresses itself in more individualistic arrangements with less formal structures. Further, military professionalism and organisations for combat training are often considered signifiers of new terrorism. [12] Moreover , the easy access to weapons technology and know-how has also changed the patterns of terrorism. Finally, a new division of labour between political (parties related to terrorist groups), socio-economic (terrorist charities), and military functions and factions has become possible with the new looser organisation

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[9] For the approach of treating concepts as speech acts rather than as mere innocent words, see Searle (1969) *Speech Acts.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; and Searle (1995) *The Construction of Social Reality.* New York: Free Press.

[10] For the discursive strategy of associating and dissociating symbols in political argumentation, see Enos and Brown, eds. (1993) *Defining the New Rhetoric.* Newbury Park: Sage; Perelman, and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1968) *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation.* Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press; and Kuusisto (1999) *Western Definitions of War in the Gulf and in Bosnia*. Saarijärvi: Gummerus.

[11] The phenomenon whereby justification is sought for actions by referring to the common condemnation of the threats they seek to prevent is called 'securitization'. See Wæver (1999) "Securitizing Sectors? Reply to Eriksson", in *Cooperation and Conflict*, 34:3 (1999) pp 334–340; see also Ulrich and Kivimäki (2002) *Uncertain Security: Confronting Transnational Crime in the Baltic Sea Region and Russia.* Lanham: Lexington, pp. 11–12.

[12] These ideas are often attributed to Bruce Hoffman. A scholarly account of this can be found in Lesser, Hoffman, Arquilla, Ronfeldt, Zanini, Brian, and Jenkins (1999) *Countering New Terrorism*. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation.

of terrorist groups. This is also now considered a signifier of the new terrorism.[13] The new professionalism in terrorism has highlighted the importance of international contacts and strategic alliances between different terrorist groups.

International terrorism differs from national or subnational terrorism in that its motivations, objectives, targets and/or instruments are international. Very often international terrorism declares its anti-globalist agenda. However, one should distinguish between opposition to globalism and opposition to certain terms and contents of global interaction. Very often international terrorists operate by using international networks, and often even their aims are international, and thus they are not opposed to internationalism or globalism, only the type of westernised, capitalist, or secular ways of international interaction.

The "international" character of terrorist organisations or individuals, should not be seen an absolute in this study. Islamic terrorism often refers to the international Islamic community, and some groups, such as *al-Qaida*, set a global caliphate as their ultimate objective, but their grievances, immediate objectives and projects are repeatedly local. Very often local organisations simply use the international facilities and the help of other groups for training, weapons supply, and so on., without really sharing with each other international aims or strategies. Al-Qaida, for instance, often facilitates operations or training of organisations that share only some marginal objectives. The idea that terrorist groups in the *al-Qaida* orbit would plan their operations internationally is often not realistic at all. It has been suggested in a very illustrative manner by Stein Tønnesson (Public Lecture on Terrorism, Roskilde, March 2003) that *al-Qaida* and other international terrorist organisations are like research-funding agencies. They do not design projects and they do not participate in their implementation, they just offer the multiplier to make the project successful and greater. The example of the millennium plotting in Canada is indicative. According to the CIA briefing for the President of the United States on August 6, 2001 (declassified on April 10, 2004), "convicted plotter … conceived the idea to attack Los Angeles International Airport himself, but bin Ladin lieutenant Abu Zubaydah encouraged him and helped facilitate the operation."

Terrorism that abuses **Islam** by using it as a platform for terrorist acts is in the mainstream of what is currently labelled by international and national organisations as terrorism. Although only 29 of the 56 terrorist groups listed by the UN, the EU and/or the US declare their Islamic objectives, the share in total casualties of the number of casualties caused by Islamic terrorists is disproportional. Terrorism as a strategy, as

[13] See Laquer (1996) "Postmodern Terrorism", *Foreign Affairs* September–October 1996.

well as terrorist strikes as violent communication, have become typical for groups that abuse Islam in their battle against national or global enemies.

When discussing Islamic terrorism in this study, the intention is not to tarnish the image of Islam or associate Islam with violence. It is acknowledged here that there is a range of concepts in the discourse of counter-terrorism that create unfair and empirically misleading conceptual bridges between violence and commitment to Islam. Criticism of these concepts and conceptual practices can be found in our previous analysis.[14] In the present study, Islamic terrorism is defined as terrorism that utilises and/or abuses Islam as part of its motivation, justification, legitimation or mobilisation. On the one hand, therefore, Islamic terrorism can be defined, as Bruce Hoffman puts it, as activity in which "*violence is seen by the actors as a divine duty or sacramental act, which is carried out as a response to some theological demand*".[15] Islamic terrorism can also be activity in which Islam is used in a calculated manner for political objectives, as an instrument in mobilisation or legitimation of violence. The ways in which Islamic discourse is utilised for violence or gives a motive to it are often related to two concepts: "jihad" and "martyrdom".

The term "jihad" has two meanings. The spiritual struggle inside oneself, that is termed "the greater jihad" (*al-jihad al-akbar*) and the defensive war, or holy war, is "the lesser jihad" (*al-jihad al-asghar*). However, the definition of holy war is problematic.[16] It is unclear, because of conflicting verses in the Quran, whether jihad is justified only in defence against aggression (for example verses 2:190 and 9:12) or under all circumstances (for example verses 9:5 and 9:29).[17] In other words, it is not obvious that the Quran refers only to defensive fighting as a 'jihad', it is also possible to interpret the Quran as saying it is acceptable to begin aggression if certain conditions are fulfilled. This is the case, for example, if the Muslim society feels that aggression is its only possibility for surviving. Many Islamist organisations, which legitimise their aggression on religious grounds, refer to their 'religious duty'.

In Islamic society the concept of martyrdom (*shahada*), or self-sacrifice, is closely linked to jihad, and is clearly distinct from suicide (*intihar*), which is generally understood to be forbidden in Islam. Currently, among Islamist movements as well as more widely in the Islamic world, there is a huge discussion about what acceptable

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[14] Kivimäki (2003) "Terrorism and Extreme Fundamentalism – The Problem of Definitions", in Kivimäki, ed., *Development Cooperation as an Instrument in the Prevention of Terrorism.* Danida, Copenhagen.

[15] Hoffman (1999) *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 88.

[16] Bernard Lewis pointed out in his book *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988, p. 71) that there is no word corresponding to 'holy war' in classical Arabic usage.

[17] Peters (1996) *Jihad in classical and modern Islam*. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers , pp. 2–3.

self-sacrifice is and what belongs in the field of forbidden suicide. This discussion is obviously very important, especially since the Palestinian movements have so frequently utilised suicide bombings as a tactic in the second intifada.

Geographical Distribution of Terrorism

Islamic terrorism is an Asian (including the Middle East) and North African phenomenon. The *Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development* is the only (Islamic terrorist) organisation outside this region, and its non-Asian identity as well as its status as a terrorist group are disputed. Its non-Asian identity is disputed because this US-based organisation is Palestinian and is focused on Middle East issues. It is suspected of supporting the Middle Eastern organisation, *Hamas.* Neither the US nor the UN recognise its terrorist identity, and only the EU lists it as a terrorist organisation. All other terrorist groups have their origins in greater Asia (including the Middle East) or North Africa. The geographical distribution of Islamic terrorist groups can be seen in the following graph:

Figure 2.1. Regional distribution of the number of terrorist groups listed by the EU, the US, or the UN



Table 2.1: Islamic terrorist organisations listed by the EU, US, and/or UN

Central Asia:
Al-Qaida
East Turkestan Islamic Movement
Harakat ul-Mujahidin
Islamic International Brigade/ International Islamic Peace Brigade
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organisation (MEK)
Special Purpose Islamic Regiment
Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs
Al-Jihad al-Islami

Middle East:
Ansar al-Islam
Asbat al-Ansar
Great Islamic Eastern Warriors Front/Vasat Hamas
Hezbollah
Islamic Army of Aden
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)

North Africa:
Al-Takfir & al-Hijra
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
Gamaa al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group)
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
Moroccan Islamic Fighting Group
Salafist Group for Call and Combat
Tunisian Combatant Group

South Asia:
Jaish-e-Mohammad
Laskar-e-Jhangvi
Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT)

Southeast Asia:
Abu Sayyaf Group
Jemaah Islamiyya organisation (JI)

Other:
Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (USA)
Stichting al-Aqsa (The Netherlands)

The extent of terrorist problems can be extrapolated on the basis of indicators of the numbers of terrorist organisations (Column 2 in Table 3.2) and known terrorist individuals (Columns 3 & 4) these areas host. To study the severity of the problem we need information on the numbers of casualties caused by terrorist organisations hosted by different areas (Column 1).[18] While the indicators on the number of individuals (Columns 3 & 4) identify areas where terrorist individuals reside, indicators on the number of groups, and the number of casualties by groups hosted, identify the areas where terrorist organisation is extensive and severe.

[18] Since terrorism is collective behaviour, it is not possible to identify the casualties that each individual has caused.

Table 2.2. Ranking of areas on the basis of severity of the problem of Islamic terrorism

Area	1. Ranking of number of casualties caused by groups hosted	2. Ranking of number of groups hosted	3. Ranking of number of FBI wanted individuals	4. Ranking of number of EU wanted individuals	Problem ranking
Afghanistan	1	1	5	5	1
Palestine	2	4	5	5	2
Pakistan	3	4	5	4	3
Syria	5	4	5	5	4
Lebanon	6	7	3	3	5
Egypt	7	7	1	5	6
Algeria	8	7	5	1	7
Russia (Chechnya)	9	2	5	5	8
Iraq	10	3	5	5	9
Indonesia	4	10	5	5	10
Saudi Arabia	11	11	2	2	11
Kenya	11	11	4	5	12

From the data summarised in Table 3.2, we can see that terrorist individuals tend to come from areas others than those where they organise. The five areas with the most organisations tend to be asymmetrical conflict areas, and organisations mainly tend to be parties to the conflict. Also common to the three main terrorist areas is the large number of refugees originating from the asymmetrical conflicts. Three of the areas with the greatest number and severity of terrorist organisations are weak or partially collapsed states. However, terrorist individuals seem to originate from much more authoritarian countries. By looking at the basic political and economic profiles of the main terrorist areas, we can construct a superficial overview of what kind of areas terrorism needs for individual motivation and collective mobilisation.

In the following graphs, the popular sovereignty indicator illustrates how democratic the country is and how many authoritarian characteristics it has. The lower the indicator, the more authoritarian the country. Thus, Saudi Arabia is more authoritarian and less democratic than Egypt. The data has been taken from the most widely used database, the polity database, which has been adopted, i.a. by the UNDP.

Figure 2.2. Authoritarianism in countries of origin of terrorist individuals



Figure 2.3. Authoritarianism and the organisation of terrorism



As can be seen above, the three countries from which the greatest numbers of terrorist individuals originate are consistently more authoritarian than countries with a problem with terrorist organisations. Terrorist organisation seems to take place in more democratic countries with relatively sudden, great changes in the level of democracy,

indicating a weak state structure with frequent collapses of political regimes. The fact that Palestine and Chechnya cannot even be represented in Figure 3 because of a lack of data (neither is an independent polity), further emphasises the chaotic nature of polities within whose territories terrorism organises itself. A look at the development of the economies of these countries and areas tells a similar story.

Figure 2.4. Per capita economic growth in the areas of origin of terrorist individuals



Figure 2.5. Per capita economic growth in areas and countries where terrorists organise



Data is missing from main areas of terrorist organization: Afghanistan, Palestine, Chechnya and Lebanon

Again missing data testifies to the chaotic nature of states in which have a problem with terrorist organisations. The level of relative economic grievances also seems slightly higher in countries where individual terrorists originate compared to areas with terrorist organisations.

The structural conditions of terrorist individuals, organisations, countries and areas are studied systematically in Part II of this book. To provide an overview of terrorism today, the areas of origin of terrorist individuals, and the countries with the greatest problems with terrorist organisations are surveyed here.

Areas of Terrorist Organisation

The organisation of terrorism seems to require some freedoms. Generally these freedoms are often offered either by the existence of democratic freedoms (terrorist organisations in Europe, current Indonesia, the USA, etc.), the failure of state control (organisation of terrorism in e.g. Somalia, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Palestine), or the granting of the freedom to organise by like-minded (rogue) governments (e.g. the Taliban in Afghanistan, previously in Libya). Of the areas where the greatest number of terrorist groups have found these opportunities for organizing, the most dangerous for international security, according to our ranking list of the severity of the problem of Islamic terrorism (Table 3.2), are Afghanistan, Palestine, Chechnya, and Pakistan. Each of these will be discussed in more detail below.

Afghanistan, as an economically poor, failed state with a 20-year history of economic decline, developed into the country making the world's largest contribution to the organisation of terrorism. Afghanistan's traditional economy, based on pastoral herding of livestock, is already a problematic foundation for the building of a stable state.[19] Afghanistan's modern economy has become criminalised: the country was by far the largest global producer of opium poppies even before the advent of the Taliban regime, and its opiate production has been greatly boosted by the fall of the Taliban. Narcotics trafficking has for a long time been a major source of revenue for Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is also a country in conflict, which fought an asymmetric battle against a superior enemy (the former Soviet Union). This conflict has left the area with a large number of refugees. Just as in the other bases for terrorist organisations, also in

[19] For an analysis of the problems of nation-building in pastoral societies, see Kivimäki (2001) *Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali*. Studies in a Nutshell, No 1. CTS, Helsinki and Copenhagen. and Kivimäki (2001) *Explaining Violence in Somalia*. Studies in a Nutshell, No 4. CTS, Helsinki and Copenhagen.

Afghanistan the local battle was meddled in by countries with their own international agendas. For example, according to Gunaratna, the Islamic guerrillas in Afghanistan, including *al-Qaida,* were supported in their resistance to the Soviet occupation by the US, the UK, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, China, and several other countries, under a CIA umbrella of coordination.[20] These same guerrilla groups later turned to terrorism and became the most serious source of terrorist violence in the country, as well as in the world. After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, Afghan radical Islam became global, with an anti-Serbian and later an anti-Western agenda. It has been argued that the jihad in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union created a class of global jihadists, whose reintegration to civilian life would have helped the cause of the prevention of terrorism tremendously.[21] Figure 4.1.below, showing the number of violent incidents committed by Afghani ?? Islamic militants in Egypt and Algeria, seems to support this assertion.

In addition to being the origin of *al-Qaida,* another major contribution that Afghanistan has made to global terrorism has been to offer a safe haven for the organisation and training of a large number of terrorist (as well as ordinary guerrilla) groups. By 1989, the first leader of *al-Qaida,* Abdullah Azzam, had already recruited between 16,000 and 20,000 mujahedin from 20 countries to come to be trained in Afghanistan.[22] Afghanistan became a base for at least two Egyptian terrorist organisations, *Gamaa al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group)*, and the *Al-Jihad al-Islami*, which is also known as the *Egyptian Islamic Jihad, al-Jihad,* and the *Islamic Jihad, Jihad Group.* The Pakistani groups *Laskar-e-Jhangvi* and *Harakat ul-Mujahidin* have also had important bases in Afghanistan for their organisation and training, as did the *Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan*.

Palestine, the second most prominent site for the organisation of groups such as *Hamas*, that in the West are labelled as terrorist, is another non-functioning polity. Economically it is much better off than Afghanistan, but it has also experienced a serious, long-term economic decline. However, if one looks at the periods of radicalisation and intifada in Palestine (end of the 1980s and the turn of the millennium), these do not seem to match with the severest of the economically troubled periods (1992–1996). Our interviews among the parties to the Palestinian conflict indicate that political motivations rather than economic ones are at the core of

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[20] Gunaratna (2002) *Inside al-Qaida.* London: Hurst, p. 18.

[21] This is one of the central arguments in Kepel (2002) *Jihad, The Trail of Political Islam*. London: I.B. Tauris.

[22] Suellentrop (2002) *Abdullah Azzam, the Godfather of Jihad*. MSN Slate, at http://slate.msn.com/id/2064385/ accessed in May 2004.

Palestinian terrorism.[23] Economic and political conditions for terrorism are sometimes combined, as corruption and the partial criminalisation of the economy tend to be phenomena that belong to both spheres.

Palestine is another case of asymmetric warfare in which terrorist groups develop on the weaker side. The Palestinian situation resembles that of Afghanistan in that there has also been considerable international involvement in the Palestinian conflict. As in Afghanistan, the Palestinian refugee communities play an important role in the development of terrorism. Because of the intensity of the local conflict, Palestine has not, like Afghanistan, become a safe haven for groups from other conflicts. On the contrary, at least one of the groups labelled 'terrorist' (although this label is contested), operates outside Gaza and the West Bank territories: the *Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development*, a Palestinian NGO based in the US.

Palestinian terrorism, inside Palestine, has been nationalistic and secular with territorial, as well as religious, objectives. While the *Abu Nidal Organisation* simply aimed at liberating Palestine through pan-Arabic revolution, the a*l-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade* strived to drive Israelis out of the West Bank and Gaza, and to establish a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as the capital. Of the Palestinian Islamic groups two, namely *Asbat al-Ansar* and *Hamas,* are listed as terrorist organisations, the former by the US and the UN and the latter by the US and EU. The former, however, operates in Lebanon for the most part, and its objectives (to establish the Muslim Caliphate system (Salafism) ruled by a "Prince of Believers" in Lebanon) are mainly limited to the territory of that country. This is why in regard to the internal dynamics of Islamic terrorism within the Palestine conflict this book will focus on *Hamas*.

Chechnya is the location of an asymmetrical war between outnumbered, independence-minded, separatist forces and Russian forces. This asymmetric war also has numerous international implications due to the fact that its origins derive from the collapse of one of the two Cold War superpowers. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian government was preoccupied by problems in the centre of the country, which allowed very little attention to be paid to the peripheries, giving relative freedom for the organisation of various types of opportunistic, violent groups. The fact that the area had a major oil deposit fuelled the organisation of such groups. While Russia cannot be considered as a weak or a collapsing state, the transition at the beginning of the 1990s created a situation in Chechnya with conditions relatively similar to those of collapsed state. The informal sector quickly became the only sector with economic potential, and during Dudayev's rule, the Chechen economy soon became severely criminalised.

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[23] Sonja Lende's interviews of leading Israeli counter-terrorism officials, using Timo Kivimäki's questionnaire.

Due to the international ramifications of the Chechen war and its close proximity to Afghanistan, many of the Chechen terrorist groups have close ties with the Taliban regime as well as with *al-Qaida*. According to the UN listing of *al-Qaida* and Taliban associates, both the *Special Purpose Islamic Regiment* and the *Islamic International Brigade a.k.a. the International Islamic Peace Brigade* also belong to the *al-Qaida* family. These organisations, together with the *Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs*, were the groups involved in the Dubrovka theatre seizure in Moscow on 23 October 2002. The US and EU listed terrorist group, *Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT)* has also been suggested as having close Taliban and *al-Qaida* ties.[24] Chechen organisations also play a role as facilitators of violence outside Chechnya. It has further been alleged that Chechnya is a base for the organisation of Dagestan radicalism (interview material) and terrorist acts carried out in June 2004 in the neighbouring Russian republic of Ingushetia.[25]

The asymmetrical war over Kashmir between **Pakistan** and radical Pakistani groups on the one hand, and India on the other, is the context of the emergence of many of the Pakistani terrorist organisations. It was clear in most of the interviews which provide data for this section of the book (interviews conducted by Imran Iqbal inside the *Deoband, Braveli, Ahle Hadis and Shia* religious schools (madrassas) in Islamabad and Lahore), that this religious conflict provides the concrete rationale and justification for violent actions by Pakistani groups against civilians, in the name of Islam.[26]

The political and economic context of the mobilisation of Pakistani terrorism is very similar to that in other major areas where terrorists organise. Perhaps what makes Pakistan different from some of these other countries is Pakistan's strong indigenous tradition of political Islam.[27]

In northern Pakistan, in the areas closest to the border with Afghanistan and the Pakistani areas of Kashmir, the Pakistani state is of very little significance in the traditional roles of the state as the legitimate source of law and order and welfare

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[24] This group exemplifies the Chechen role in terrorist cooperation: the main objectives of the group are in Jammu and Kashmir regions, its main targets are Indian non-Muslims, and yet it has one of its main bases in Chechnya and also carried out operations in support of the Taliban regime against the Northern Alliance.

[25] Tuesday 22 June 2004, 2:51 Makka Time, 23:51 GMT, http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/4A7B86E1-AC94-4858-96D3-C53B62A17FC7.htm

[26] Interviews in November 2003, conducted by Imran Iqbal, using the same Kivimäki questionnaire used by Sonja Lende, mentioned in 23 above.

[27] One of the most influential political jihadists, Mawlana Mawdudi (1903–1979), was from the areas that now are called Pakistan. In 1941 he created the *Jamaat-i-Islami* in Pakistan. This organisation, together with the Islamic Brotherhood, are often considered the two roots of Modern Jihadism.

services. Compared to other areas with terrorist organisations (Iraq included), Pakistan and the Kashmir are of less interest globally, and the conflict over the Kashmir has few global ramifications: thus Pakistani radicalism seems to be less globally oriented.

The growing importance of Pakistan as the centre of international terrorist training, the close financial ties of Pakistani radicalism with Saudi sponsors, and the ties of the Pakistani terrorists with the more global conflict in Afghanistan, however, bring Pakistani Islamic radicalism to the forefront of the international organisation of terrorism. For some time after 1986, for example, *al-Qaida* had important bases in Peshawar in Pakistan, while its most important training camps have always mainly been in the same area between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Important Pakistani bases of groups such as the *Harakat ul-Mujahidin,* the *Laskar-e-Jhangvi* and the *Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT)*, as well as the *al-Qaida* ties of groups like the *Jaish-e-Mohammad*, effectively integrate Pakistani Islamic radicalism with Afghan (and Chechen) terrorism.

Areas Where Individual Motivations for Terrorism Originate

According to Rex Hudson, terrorist leaders are often considerably older (40–60) than the rest of the "terrorist elite", and ordinary terrorists are mostly between 20 and 25 years old.[28] Both the terrorist elite as well as their followers are primarily single (Russell & Bowman 1977, 31) men (80–90%)[29] who are mentally sound. Very often international terrorists tend to be international already at birth: they come from families which do not have the same ethnic background as the people living around them, they do not live in their countries of origin, and move already during their childhood. Terrorist individuals tend to come from strictly controlled countries with harsh policies against deviant religious groups, and these areas tend to lack channels for the expression of protest against the repressive state.

As a result, terrorism is born in these areas, but terrorist individuals tend to move out to areas more conducive to terrorist mobilisation. The four countries from which the greatest number of terrorist individuals or the most deadly individuals come, according to our ranking of countries on the basis of the severity of the problem of Islamic terrorism (Table 3.2), are Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, and Indonesia.

Saudi Arabia's contribution to global terrorism has mainly been in the form of sponsorship of schools preaching a violent, anti-Western, Wahabbist/Salafist

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[28] Hudson (1999) *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?* Washington DC: Library of Congress, p. 41.

[29] Russell and Bowman. (1977) "Profile of a Terrorist," in *Terrorism: An International Journal,* Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 17–34.

interpretation of Islam, and in exporting terrorist individuals to countries where they have opportunities to organise. As an extremely controlled and repressive state, Saudi Arabia is a stereotypical area in which terrorist motivations breed, but never flourish. In addition to motivating individual terrorists, Saudi Arabia has also given birth to both jihadist and violent, political Islamic ideology. The alliance in Arabia between a radical jihadist, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1791), and Muhammad ibn Saud, a local tribal chief, represents an early form of the modern misuse of Islam for purposes of power politics.

Of the 26 non-European terrorists on the EU lists, four are Saudi Arabian in origin; and of the 22 terrorists on the FBI's most wanted list, five are Saudis. Furthermore, Hani Hanjour and Khalid Almihdhar, two of the five hijackers of American Airlines flight 77 on September 11, 2001, were Saudi Arabians. It is believed that Hani Hanjour piloted the plane and crashed it into the Pentagon. A total of 15 Saudis were among the 19 involved in the September 11 plot. More recently, Abu Hajir Abdul Aziz al-Moqrin, the leader of *al-Qaida*'s operations in Saudi Arabia, is believed to have assumed a more regional role in *al-Qaida* operations and targeting. With the exception of Osama bin Laden, all the other Saudis in the EU and FBI lists[30] have been indicted in the Eastern District of Virginia for the June 25, 1996, bombing of the Khobar Towers, a military housing complex in Dhahran, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Very little is know about them. It is however clear that many of them were members of the Saudi elite, as was Osama bin Laden, whose family owns the *Saudi Bin Laden Group* construction company, and who has personal assets worth an estimated 250–300 million US dollars.[31]

The extreme contradictions between a strict interpretation of Islam and the extravagant practices of the absolute authoritarian government of the Saudi family, which does not exclude the prosecution of religious scholars, activists and groups, have often been mentioned as some of the main motivational factors behind Saudi terrorism. The fact that the Saudi family rules territories in which the two holiest Islamic sites are located is certainly associated with the fact that opposition to the Saudi regime utilises religious argumentation.

Osama bin Laden's declaration of war on Americans very clearly describes these feelings of frustration and even hatred toward the ruling Saudi family and of religious fervour associated with the holy sites. In fact, the personal history of Osama bin Laden

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[30] Abdelkarim Hussein Mohamed Al-Nasser, Ahmad Ibrahim Al-Mughassil, Ali Saed Bin Ali El-Hoorie, Ahmad Ibrahim Al-Mughassil, and Ibrahim Salih Mohammed Al-Yacoub are all on both the EU and the FBI lists of most wanted terrorist individuals.

[31] Different estimates of his fortune are presented in Gunaratna (2002) op. cit. p 19.

reveals that a clash with the Saudi family over the protection of these sites during the first Gulf War (1991), was a turning point in *al-Qaida*'s activities. The abandoning of the loyal mujahidins in favour of the United States was one of the main historical motivations for Osama bin Laden to turn against Saudi Arabia and the USA.[32] The *al-Qaida* targeting manual explicitly sees the Saudi Government as the primary actor, while the United States is seen only as a facilitator. In the manual, the Saudi Government is accused of "ignoring the divine *sharia* law; depriving people of their legitimate rights; allowing the Americans to occupy the land of the two holy places; imprisonment, unjustly, of the sincere scholars…"[33]

Osama bin Laden's political grievances could not be addressed or aired through accepted political channels in a country as authoritarian as Saudi Arabia , a fact which makes turning to terrorist channels of protest less unnatural than at first appears. . This fits with the profile of most terrorist individuals, as described above. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's activity abroad was limited by his immigrant background, since he not only lived much of his life outside Saudi Arabia (in Yemen, the Sudan, Pakistan and Afghanistan) but also because his father was from Yemen, and his mother from Syria. Yet the bin Laden family cannot be seen as politically deprived in Saudi Arabia: The Saudi bin Laden Group has been offered many construction contracts through political contacts; Osama bin Laden's brother has been offered a cabinet post in Saudi Arabia; and Osama bin Laden's anti-Soviet mission in Afghanistan was supported financially by the Saudi government and strategically by Saudi intelligence.

Egypt, along with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, is an area with a strong tradition of Islamic radicalism. Egypt is the original host of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (founded in 1928).

Currently, almost one-third (7) of the individuals on the FBI list of the 22 most wanted terrorists, originate from Egypt (concurrently, none of the individuals on the European list is Egyptian). Furthermore, the leader of the entire September 11 operation was an Egyptian, Mohammed Atta. While it seems that Mohammed Atta's upper-class background as a son of a lawyer matches the backgrounds of most other Egyptian terrorists, it is difficult to associate his terrorist motivations too closely with Egyptian conditions. Atta found religion as a non-Western identity for himself in Germany: he became radicalised in Germany and joined the terrorists there.

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[32] For this interpretation, see, for example, Esposito (2002) *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 11–12; and Kepel (2002) *Jihad. The Trail of Political Islam*. London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, pp. 208ff.

[33] 'A Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places; A Message from Osama bin Mohammad bin Laden to his Muslim Brethren all over the World generally, and towards the Muslims of the Arabian Peninsula in Particular', August 1996.

Ayman al-Zawahiri, however, another infamous Egyptian terrorist and the former head of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, deputy to Osama bin Laden and, according to Rohan Gunaratna, *al-Qaida*'s ideological leader,[34] is more of a product of Egypt.

Al-Zawahiri participated in Islamic organisations from an early age and had to struggle with the repression of the Egyptian security services, who wanted to destroy these movements. According to Rohan Gunaratna, clandestine methods were thus taught to al-Zawahiri a long time before he stepped out of the legitimate practice of Islam and entered the world of terrorism. While suffering from the harsh measures that the Egyptian government used against religious groups, al-Zawahiri was not personally marginalised in an economic, political or social sense: his family was one of the most influential and respected families in al-Sharqiyyah, Egypt, and the father of his mother served as Egyptian Ambassador to Pakistan.[35] It is difficult to say for certain what made al-Zawahiri become radicalised, but according to some sources, the Six Day War in 1967 made a great impact on his political thinking; and later in the 1980s, he felt strongly against the Soviet Union and joined the jihad against communism in Afghanistan.[36]

In addition to the central military and operational role of Mohammed Atta in the September 11 attack, Egyptians have in general held important operational and/or military positions in *al-Qaida*. This is because a considerable number of Egyptian terrorist individuals are people who have defected from the Egyptian security apparatus. John L. Esposito claims, for instance that many of the members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad came from the presidential guard and military intelligence.[37] According to Egyptian Supreme State Security Court statistics on convicted jihadists, only 4% are from the police or the military.[38] However, of the four best-known Egyptian *al-Qaida* members, two have that background.

Saif al-Adel (real name: Muhammad Ibrahim Makkawi) was a colonel in the Egyptian Special Forces (the troops that are supposed to keep terrorists in check) before he joined the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and later allegedly became *al-Qaida*'s

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[34] Gunaratna (2002) *Inside al-Qaida.* London: Hurst, p.25

[35] Ibid.

[36] Free Dictionary.com at http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Ayman%20Al-Zawahiri

[37] John L. Esposito 2002. *Unholy war: terror in the name of Islam.* Oxford: Oxford University Press,, p 90.

[38] This data has been used in two studies: Ganeena, Ni'mat Allah, *Tanzim Al-jihad: Hul Howa Al-Badeal Al-Islami Fi Misr* 1988 (The Jihad Organizations: Is it the Islamic Alternative in Egypt?) Dar Al-Huriyyah for Journalism, Printing and Publication, Cairo; and Gubara Said, Hassan (2003). Radical Islam: History, Catalysts, Social Bases and the Ideological Quest for and International Islamic Alternative. Cases of Egypt and the Sudan. Department of Political Science, University of Helsinki 2003.

operational commander. Mohammed Atef (died in November 2001) was a policeman before he became a member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and then *al-Qaida*. He was allegedly the military chief of *al-Qaida*.

Egypt has a tradition of pushing political Islam into violence by suppressing Muslim groups. The father of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), was killed by the Egyptian police, just as was Sayyid Qutb, the main radical ideologist of the Brotherhood. The harsh treatment of the political Islamic groups in Egypt seems also to be related to the personal histories and motivations of three of the four most infamous Egyptian Islamic terrorists. The Egyptian political system was completely inflexible in regard to allowing political protests: even though all three indigenous terrorists were insiders in the system, they could not channel their protests through it. While Egyptian repression of religion and political organisation provided the motives for radicalisation, Afghanistan provided the opportunities for radical organisation. Largely due to the influence of al-Zawahiri, many radical Egyptians found the Afghanistan connection complementary to their terrorist careers. The jihad in Afghanistan, and its facilitation by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the West under the umbrella of the CIA, largely created the three leading Egyptian figures in *al-Qaida*.

Algeria provides a context of harsh treatment of political Islamic groups in the personal histories of terrorist individuals born in that country. Both of the Algerian organisations listed by the EU, UN or US as terrorists, the *Armed Islamic Group (GIA*) and its splinter group, *Salafist Group for Call and Combat*, emerged to topple the government in response to that government's cancellation of the Muslim victory in the election of 1991. The strict government control over Islamic organisations has not suppressed the organisation and activity of these groups. However, it has managed to create the pressure needed for Algerian individuals to organise elsewhere. It is notable that all the Algerians on the European list of terrorist individuals are members of an Egyptian terrorist organisation, *al-Takfir & al-Hira*. Instead of simply organizing in Algeria, another strictly controlled country, this Egyptian organisation has an extensive presence and indeed roots in Europe, where they allegedly receive help from *al-Qaida*[39] and also plan its operations. This is probably the reason why so many of the Algerian terrorist individuals landed on the EU list (17 out of 26 non-European names), while remaining unknown on the American and UN lists. In addition to these individuals, there was an Algerian Quranic scholar, Qaricept al-Jizaeri in the *al-Qaida* consultative council, *Majlis al-shura*. Typical of all the Algerian terrorist individuals has been their

[39] The relationship between *al-Qaida* and the Algerian terrorist individuals and groups is a disputed one. European intelligence agencies tend to see this link, while many experts are more skeptical. See, for example, Gunaratna (2002) op. cit., p. 45.

European (French) connection. While it is clear that especially the motivation for individuals to join the two Algerian terrorist organisations, *Armed Islamic Group (GIA)* and *Salafist Group for Call and Combat*, lies in the Algerian repression of political Islam (or even democratic Islam, which had a majority support in the 1991 elections), the motivational roots of many other Algerian terrorist individuals can (like those of the Egyptian terrorist Mohammed Atta) be traced to Europe and the failures of European integration policies for people from different cultures.

Indonesia was the original home of terrorist individuals who in 2002 caused one-third of global terrorist casualties, mainly in one single incident on Bali, on October 12, 2002. According to some experts, Southeast Asia, and especially Indonesia and the Muslim islands of the Philippines, are developing into the second main area of operations for *al-Qaida* after the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Due to Muslim opposition to the authoritarian rule of President Suharto (1966–1998), Muslim groups have been treated harshly in Indonesia, which has the world's largest Muslim population. In addition to the injustices that specific Islamic groups suffered, the Suharto regime, especially during its first two decades, generally discriminated economically and politically against Muslims. Devoted Muslims were not seen as reliable business partners, and thus 'crony capitalism' developed around the presidential family, using non-Muslim Chinese to run the economy. According to General Benny Murdani, a well-known military official in the 1970s and 1980s, devoted Muslims were not considered reliable enough to be placed in the highest military positions, either, because the main security challenges to the authoritarian order had come from Muslim circles.

The Indonesian economic crisis which started in 1997 caused a drastic 14% annual decline in the Indonesian GDP and forced 20% of Indonesians below the poverty line. As a result, the Indonesian state became subject to international pressure: partly as a result of this pressure, the Indonesian dictator Suharto had to step down, and his successor had to give independence to East Timor which, according to the Indonesians, legally belonged to them. In addition, the Indonesian economy fell largely under the supervision of the IMF. These humiliations were mentioned by several of the violent Islamic militia members interviewed by the current author, when explaining their anger towards the West. Although the motivations of Indonesian terrorist individuals have their origins in local contexts, during the Indonesian transition years (1997-2000) locally created anger also found a channel of expression in the violent international Islamic movement. Suddenly, much more than before, Indonesians are now interested in the fate of fellow Muslims all over the world and see their own agony as part of this global suffering.

In most other cases the differences in the conditions between areas where terrorist organisations are created, and areas from which terrorist individuals originate, cause

terrorist individuals to mobilise outside their own countries. Indonesia, however, has provided both motivations and opportunities for terrorism. The authoritarian decades in Indonesian history, which lasted up until 1998, provided the motivations, while the weakness of the current state, together with the existence of certain democratic freedoms, also provides opportunities. This is why Indonesian terrorism is more self-sufficient and self-contained than the terrorism of most other countries.

From an Overview to a Systematic Analysis of Sources and Catalysts

It seems clear from this overview of Islamic terrorist individuals and regions, that there is a relationship of some kind between the weakness of the state and political and economic grievances in the creation of sources of Islamic radicalisation and terrorism. Equally clearly, the global controversy between the West and the Islamic areas generally, and the conflict over Palestine specifically, aggravate the terrorist conflict and catalyse further radicalisation. However, a more systematic look into these relationships is needed. As explained in the Introduction, Part II will move us from an introductory overview into an in-depth analysis of these relationships.

Part II:
Sources and Catalysts of Radicalism and Terrorism

Chapter 3

Poverty, Lack of Political Channels of Protest, and Islamic Terrorism

Timo Kivimäki

There are traditional military and police methods for limiting terrorist opportunities. These are often the most immediate measures for dealing with the visible surface of the problem of terrorism: the availability of options for terrorism. While not undervaluing the importance of these methods, many countries and international organizations have also started looking at ways and means to begin to eliminate the sources of terrorism.

This chapter looks into two problems that can be found at the roots of terrorism: poverty and the lack of democratic rights. Since terrorism of one sort may have different sources than terrorism of another sort, it is important to specify which type of terrorism is under discussion. This article will look at terrorism that somehow utilizes the Islamic religion in the organization, justification, and motivation of violent acts against innocent civilians. The fact that the adjective 'Islamic' is used here in connection with terrorism does not imply that the religion itself is the true source or even a motivation for this type of violence. Using Islam in the motivation, organization and justification of acts that target civilians in order to create fear, is called 'Islamic terrorism' despite the fact that 'Islamic terrorists' might have only a very shallow commitment to real Islamic principles and beliefs, and despite the fact that in many countries, this type of violence against civilians is typical in secular and not in religious circles.

The main arguments presented in this chapter are, briefly, as follows:

- Individual economic grievances seem to contribute to terrorist recruitment only through their contribution to war mobilization. Terrorist recruitment is more likely when individual grievances are of a political (alienation, 'rootlessness', lack of political channels of protest) rather than an economic nature. Terrorist individuals come from less democratic countries and are often persons deprived of political rights because of their immigrant status.
- Relative deprivation on a national level contributes to terrorist recruitment directly as well as indirectly through its contribution to war mobilization: a drastic drop in the economic well-being of a group of people, and ethnic and/or

religious based differences in economic opportunities are therefore associated with successful terrorist recruitment.

- Problems in the national economy contribute to the growth of terrorism by increasing the risk of the state becoming weaker or collapsing, which again is an important precondition for the formation of terrorist groups.
- The economic and political factors most clearly linked with conditions conducive to terrorism are the transnational and international grievances of Muslims. These grievances can be used successfully in creating a tolerant attitude towards terrorism. This tolerance then becomes the foundation for motivating individuals to join terrorist groups as well as allowing groups to organize their terrorist recruitment.

Methodology and Data

The data on terrorism are not always of very good quality. Often indicators chosen for a study are lacking data or unreliable. Thus it is not possible to conduct a statistically elegant analysis of terrorism. Yet there is a need for empirically oriented, comparative studies on terrorism. Too often, the evidence provided in support of arguments about the relationship between poverty and terrorism is ideologically based, or refers to very shallow or narrowly based empirical evidence. There is a need to attempt to study terrorism by using the best available evidence, despite the fact that that this evidence might not support an argument very convincingly. This Report takes a pragmatic approach by attempting to produce the best available empirical evidence for arguments related to the relationship between poverty and lack of democracy on the one hand, and terrorism on the other. Yet it is clear that the empirical evidence presented here is far from perfect, and in some cases it can only be used to make preliminary conclusions.

When analysing the relationship between poverty, and/or a lack of democracy, and terrorism, simplistic models are not always very fruitful. If Osama bin Laden is rich, this does not mean that economic grievances could be totally eliminated as an explanation of terrorism. The personal economic status or access to political rights of individual terrorists need not be the only reasons for the rise of terrorism; and the emergence of terrorist motivations of individuals need not be the only variable that these factors explain. On the contrary, even a preliminary analysis reveals that both the dependent and the independent variables are layered. In fact, terrorist individuals tend to come from countries other than those where terrorist groups organize. The motivations of both group formation and individual terrorists tend to be associated with national or transnational acceptance or tolerance towards terrorism.

Similarly, although conditions of individual poverty tend to prevent an individual

from engaging in terrorist activities, there is no clear association of any kind between national poverty and terrorism. On the other hand, transnational and international economic grievances are clearly associated with the growth of terrorism. Hence, care needs to be taken in distinguishing between various levels of conditions and various levels of agency. There seems to be a need for at least the following distinctions in the analysis of conditions and consequences in regard to terrorism:

Table 3.1. Conditions and Consequences

Consequences / Conditions	Individual motivations	Emergence of groups/organization	Emergence of national/transnational acceptance
Individual	1	2	3
National	4	5	6
Trans/International	7	8	9

With this three-level analysis of both the dependent and independent variables, we get altogether nine relationships that need to be studied. Each of these relationships presents a question that needs to be answered:

1. Does individual poverty and lack of political rights help create individual terrorist motivations?
2. Does individual poverty and lack of political rights favour the organization and emergence of terrorist groups?
3. Does individual poverty and lack of political rights contribute to the emergence of national and transnational tolerance for and acceptance of terrorism?
4. Do national economic grievances and the lack of state democracy contribute to an individual's motivation to join in terrorist activities
5. Do national economic grievances and the lack of state democracy contribute to terrorist organization?
6. Do national economic grievances and the lack of state democracy contribute to the national and/or transnational rise of acceptance, tolerance and support of terrorism?
7. Do transnational economic grievances and the lack of international democracy contribute to the rise of individual terrorist motivations?
8. Do transnational economic grievances and the lack of international democracy contribute to the rise of terrorist organization?
9. Do transnational economic grievances and the lack of international democracy contribute to the rise of national and transnational acceptance for terrorism?

Some aspects of these relationships cannot be observed, and parts of these questions cannot be answered, unless one has tools for comparison of the effects of different conditions; some other aspects can only be revealed by looking into processes, rather than static structural conditions. Thus one needs to combine quantitative analysis of the static conditions with process tracking of the dynamics, causal chains, and processes that lead to terrorist violence.

Conclusions as to the nature and effects of the individual conditions necessarily need to be based on the existing information about terrorist individuals. The UN "1267 Committee"[1] has listed organizations and individuals known to have associations with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. However, this list does not offer a basis for global analysis of terrorist individuals, because this list concentrates solely on associations with one single terrorist organization. However, there is information about the terrorist individuals the FBI has listed as their '22 most wanted'.[2] The EU has also listed the names and nationalities of individuals it considers terrorists.[3] These lists offer rather different perspectives on terrorist individuals, as the European list concentrates more on European nationals who are terrorist individuals. However, even if the European names are left off the EU list, and the remaining names are compared with those on the American list, there are still clear differences. Looking at the economic backgrounds of the individuals on the European and American lists reveals many apparent similarities, but if the nationalities of these terrorist individuals are compared, they do not seem to have much in common.

The identities, and the economic and political positions, of terrorists convicted by different nations cannot be accessed systematically. According to the US Justice Department, for example, disclosing even the names of the hundreds of people arrested after the September 2001 attacks would help *al-Qaida* terrorists figure out how the US government was conducting its antiterrorist campaign. For political reasons, also Iran, which has detained and convicted a large number of terrorists, will reveal information on their identities only to the relevant United Nations authorities. However, there are lists available of the names, profiles and economic data of the most famous terrorist convicts. The Egyptian Supreme State Security Court has also released information on 101 individuals sentenced as terrorists.[4] The compilation by the

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1 The UN list is available at www.un.org/docs/sc/committees/1267/tablelist.htm.

2 This list is available on the FBI webpages at http://www.fbi.gov/mostwant/terrorists/fugitives.htm

3 Council Decision 2002/848/EC, on 12.12.2002, implementing Art. S(3) Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001.

4 This data has been used by two studies: Ganeena, Ni'mat Allah, *Tanzim al-jihad: Hul Howa al-Badeal al-Islami Fi Misr* (The Jihad Organizations: Is it the Islamic Alternative in Egypt?) Dar al-Huriyyah for Journalism, Printing and Publication, Cairo 1988; and Gubara Said Hassan: Radical Islam: History, Catalysts, Social Bases and the Ideological Quest for an International Islamic Alternative. Cases of Egypt and the Sudan. Department of Political Science, University of Helsinki 2003.

BBC[5] of the key convicted international terrorists, terrorists on trial and terrorists believed to be dead will be used here to provide supplementary information on terrorists. A regional perspective is sought through the analysis of the list of the ten most notorious Southeast Asian terrorist individuals, as listed by the US Treasury Department.[6] There is further quantitative and quantifiable data in existing studies of violent Egyptian Islamic radicals,[7] elites of fifteen terrorist groups[8], 350 individual terrorist cadres and leaders from Argentinean, Brazilian, German, Iranian, Irish, Italian, Japanese, Palestinian, Spanish, Turkish, and Uruguayan terrorist groups active during the 1966-76 period[9], supporters and perpetrators of violent acts in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip[10], as well as qualitative data on terrorists in European prisons.[11]

Regarding data on groups, the US[12] and EU[13] lists of terrorist organizations offer a sound source for the analysis of the organization of terrorism, as defined in official Western discourse. The level of organization of terrorism in certain nations is measured by the number of terrorist organizations in the country and the number of casualties these organization have caused. This study bases quantitative analysis of this factor on two lists of terrorist organizations: The first is the EU list of terrorist organizations. In this list, an organization which had bases in several countries was listed in each of these countries, and casualties were entered by country as well as organization. In the second list, the US and UN lists of terrorist organizations were added to the EU list. However, in the second listing, organizations and their casualties were not entered under many different countries even if the organization had many bases in many countries. The casualty estimates for the first list were originally made by Thorning (2003) for a previous study, and were based on averages of the most authoritative

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5 BBC: America's most wanted terrorists, 10.10. 2001.

6 CNN: "US Profiles of 10 suspected terrorists", September 5, 2003.

7 See note 3.

8 Rex A. Hudson 1999. *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?* Library of Congress, Washington DC.

9 Russell, Charles A., and Bowman H. Miller 1977. "Profile of a Terrorist," No. 1, pp. 17-34. Terrorism: An International Journal.

10 Alan B. Krueger & Litka Maleckova 2002. *Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is there a Causal Connection?* Working Paper 9074, National Bureau of Economic Research. Internet: www.nber.org/papers/w9074

11 Roy, Olivier 1994. *The Failure of Political Islam*. London: I.B. Tauris Publishers.

12 US State Department Fact Sheet, Office of Counter Terrorism: *Foreign Terrorist Organizations.* Washington, DC, October 23, 2002.

13 Council Decision 2002/848/EC, on 12.12.2002, implementing Art. S(3) Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001. This is the same document as in Note 3.

casualty estimates available.[14] The second list relies on the same sources, but casualties caused by United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) were reduced from 2000 to 500 due to the estimate that around three-quarters of all casualties inflicted by this organization fall into the category of "narco-terrorism"(drug trade related violence against civilians), which as a concept is purely political and self-contradictory.

All four indicators (number of groups in the first list, number of groups in the second list, number of casualties in the first list, and number of casualties in the second list) of conditions for terrorist organization were statistically highly significantly associated[15] with one another, and gave very similar results when correlated with independent variables.

The data on national economic indicators of poverty is from UNDP sources. When thinking about such human behaviour as choosing terrorist strategies, human development is a much more relevant indicator of overall economic development than indicators that measure the performance of an economic system. This is why the human development index is used for the measurement of economic development,[16] with

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[14] The authoritative estimates used as the basis for our estimates are
Center for Defence Information http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/terrorist.cfm
Terrorism Research Center http://www.terrorism.com/
International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism http://www.ict.org.il/
South Asia Terrorism Portal http://www.satp.org/default.asp
US Treasury Department http://www.ustreas.gov
nternational Crisis Group http://www.crisisweb.org
Foreign Affairs http://www.foreignaffairs.org/
Al Ahram Weekly http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/
Associated Press http://www.ap.org/
ABC News http://www.abcnews.go.com
BBC World Online http://news.bbc.co.uk/
Cairo Times http://www.cairotimes.com/
Middle East Intelligence Bulletin http://www.meib.org/
The Guardian http://www.guardian.co.uk/
Jane's Defence Weekly http://www.janes.com/
The Straits Times http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg/
Tempo http://www.tempointeractive.com/index,uk.asp
Time http://www.time.com/
Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/

[15] Even though in some cases the correlations were not even 0.25, while in some pairs they were above 0.9. The low correlations were found when numbers of organizations were correlated with numbers of casualties. This does not create reliability problems, since these indicators measure two different sides of the phenomenon. It may be that in one country it is easy to establish terrorist organizations, and yet the conditions do not encourage extreme violence.

[16] To complete the human development data, the analysis has made estimates based on regression analyses of known elements of the Human Development Index for several crucial areas, including Iraq, Palestine, and Afghanistan.

indicators such as access to public health care and level of education used as supplements. The most authoritative comparative data on democracy is from the so-called 'Polity' dataset[17], which is also published by the UNDP in its latest World Development Report. This set is based on the following indicators:

- The level of institutionalization in procedures regarding the transfer of executive power,
- The extent to which executives are chosen through competitive elections,
- The extent to which non-elites have an opportunity to attain executive office,
- The level of institutional (de jure) independence of the chief executive,
- The level of operational (de facto) independence of the chief executive,
- The development of institutional structures for political expression,
- The extent to which non-elites are able to access institutional structures for political expression, and
- The geographic concentration of decision-making authority.

When looking at the development of a climate of opinion which is both tolerant and supportive of terrorism, figures and estimates were based mainly on a respected opinion poll, such as the PEW Global Attitudes Project and the World Values Survey projects, or those carried out by Zogby International or National Society of Public Gallup.

Extensive but shallow quantitative material has been supplemented here with in-depth interviews conducted by the author and others (based on questionnaires compiled by the author) of terrorists and anti-terrorism officials in Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Pakistan, Palestine, Peru, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand.

In what follows, individual motivations for terrorism will be discussed first, followed by explanations for the emergence of terrorist groups and terrorist organizations, and concluding with a consideration of how national, international and transnational support of terrorism emerges.

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[17] POLITY IV project (UNDP 2002. *Human Development Report 2002*. UNDP: New York, NY). The original data was supplemented by labelling all polities of failed states and a non-existing state (Palestine, Afghanistan, Somalia, for example, which tended to lack information), in the category of least democratic nations.

Individual Grievances and the Individual Decision to Support or Engage in Terrorism

Individual decisions to become a terrorist or to support terrorism cannot be explained by individual economic grievances. The profiles of the 19 people involved in the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, reveal that none of these individuals had an income below the global average per capita income of all the nations of the world. Profiles of the 22 most wanted (by the FBI) terrorists, as well as the profiles of known terrorists captured by the United States, indicate the same. It is also clear that these individuals were largely well-educated. Many of them were, however, migrants or people without a state, and thus deprived of political rights. According to many studies on terrorism, terrorists are often politically and socially alienated.[18]

One could assume that the individuals that participated in the September 11 attack, and the individuals on the FBI's 'most wanted' list, are the terrorist elite, and thus care should be taken at this stage before making conclusions about 'ordinary terrorists' let alone supporters of terrorism. The conclusion regarding the 'terrorist elite' is, however, clear: personal economic grievances do not play a role in explaining the development of 'terrorist careers' In fact it seems that a certain amount of wealth and education is needed for "success" in the path of terrorism.

All this is in line with the findings of Rex A. Hudson, mainly based on analyses of profiles of the most visible individuals of 15 terrorist organizations. We do not have information about the people queuing or suicide operations, but we know the profile of those selected. Thus, it is safer to think that these conclusions apply at least to the chosen elite, but, perhaps, with some qualifications, also to the ordinary terrorists.[19]

Data on the 'ordinary terrorists' is available from many countries, but not globally. On the basis of the statistics on violent fundamentalists convicted in Egypt, the above conclusions regarding elitist terrorist can easily be extended to encompass ordinary terrorists. According to the data compiled by the Egyptian Supreme State Security Court, 65 percent of Egyptian terrorists have a university education and belong to the country's intelligentsia.[20]

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[18] Rex A. Hudson 1999. *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?* Library of Congress, Washington DC, p. 44; and Roy, Olivier 1994. *The Failure of Political Islam*. London: I.B. Tauris Publishers.

[19] At least the conclusion that terrorists are in good mental health is biased by the selection criteria. People with mental problems are not selected for suicide or other types of terrorist operations (Margalit 2003, 36–9).

[20] Ganeena, Ni'mat Allah, *Tanzim al-jihad: Hul Howa al-Badeal al-Islami Fi Misr* (The Jihad Organizations: Is it the Islamic Alternative in Egypt?) Dar al-Huriyyah for Journalism, Printing and Publication, Cairo 1988; and Gubara Said Hassan: Radical Islam: History, Catalysts, Social Bases and the Ideological Quest for an International Islamic Alternative. Cases of Egypt and the Sudan. Department of Political Science, University of Helsinki 2003.

Table 3.2. Occupational background of Jihad members sentenced in Egypt

Occupation	Percentage
Students	45%
Professionals	25%
Workers	15%
Shopkeepers	6%
Police & Military	4%
Farmers	2%
Unemployed	4%
TOTAL	101% (rounding)

Studies in Palestinian territories also show that support of terrorism there is not an elite phenomenon. On the contrary, the supporters as well as the perpetrators of terrorism seem to be better educated and economically better off than others.[21]

Table 3.3. Occupational groups and acceptance of terrorism in Palestine

Are there circumstances under which you would accept terrorism to achieve political goals:

	Student	Employee	Housewife	Professional	Unemployed
Yes or definitely yes	41,0%	36,4%	36,0%	43,3%	38,4%
No or definitely no	49,6%	58%	50,6%	48,3%	54,3%
No opinion	9,4%	7,3%	13,4%	8,3%	7,2%

Data from interviews for this study conducted among terrorist individuals and members of violent militias, as well as among experts and counter-terrorism officials, suggests that terrorist individuals in Indonesia, Israel, Thailand, Peru and the Philippines are also perceived as not being from very humble backgrounds, despite the fact that in the media of these countries terrorism is often presented as a reaction to economic grievances. As a Laskar Jihad fighter in Indonesia put it: "Many of our fighters are university people, they are not unemployed people. There is even a doctoral student from Gadja Mada. This is not about economic matters, it is a religious war, fought

[21] Alan B. Krueger & Litka Maleckova 2002. *Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is there a Causal Connection?* Working Paper 9074, National Bureau of Economic Research. Internet: www.nber.org/papers/w9074

because they hate our religion."[22] However, in Pakistan, on the basis of interviews and less systematically collected scholarly evidence, it seems that free religious schools in poor areas tend to be breeding grounds for violent fundamentalism. Some development cooperation officials tend to think that this is also the case in many other African countries, such as Niger, and Ghana. Somewhat similar evidence can be obtained by looking at the rise of violent fundamentalism in Indonesia. Terrorists involved in the Bali bombings in October 12, 2002, were not from particularly humble backgrounds, but were affiliated with a religious school, Ngruki in Solo, Central Java, which has economically deprived students. Similarly, the recruitment of terrorists in Somalia seems to target poor people[23], but whether this turns out to be an efficient strategy remains to be seen. One should not rule out the possibility of the rise of a new type of terrorism which is more directly motivated by poverty on an individual level. However, based on the available evidence, one cannot at present conclude that poverty-related individual motivations for terrorism are on the rise, either.

The fact that terrorist individuals, so far, have not been economically deprived, seems to contradict the rhetoric of terrorism. Public declarations by organizations such as *Hamas*, *al-Qaida* and Hezbollah tend to portray their struggle as the struggle of the poor and deprived against the rich and oppressive. Why then do elitist individuals engage in and support terrorism, while the poor people do not?

Firstly, terrorists do not represent the constituencies they claim to be defending. They are not part of the poor and deprived, and they are not supported by the poor and deprived. Finally, their actions do not benefit the poor and deprived: on the contrary, terrorism has increased grievances and besmirched the very communities terrorists declare they are fighting for. Further, terrorism has contributed directly to the reduction of earnings from tourism, investment, and per capita income in the areas where terrorists are active.

However, the reason for the elite nature of terrorist individuals can be understood from the evidence obtained in interviews of members of violent militias. Terrorism does not require the involvement of the masses for violent activities, and therefore the mobilization of deprived people is not seen as necessary. An Indonesian member of a violent militia (who did not want his name or the name of the militia to be mentioned) explained the elitism of his activities in a way which summarises the comments of so many other respondents*: "I did not get involved in fighting because I was poor, but because I am one of a people who is poor. The fact that I am not poor and uneducated*

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[22] Laskar Jihad fighter, interviewed by the author, November 2000.

[23] CNN: "UN report: Somalia terrorist haven" Friday, November 7, 2003 Posted: 0045 GMT (8:45 AM HKT).

means that I have certain political responsibilities toward the poor people of Indonesia."[24] So, perhaps it is not individual grievances that explain the motivations of terrorist individuals, perhaps the grievances that motivate terrorism are more collective. If so, an analysis of national and transnational grievances is the next step in the study of individual motivations for supporting or engaging in terrorism.

National Grievances and the Individual Decision to Support or Engage in Terrorism

Much of the analysis of the relationship between grievances and violence is based on measurements of grievances on a national level. Absolute economic grievances, however, do not explain individual decisions to support or participate in terrorism. This is clear regardless of whether we look at the US or EU lists of wanted and captured terrorists.[25] The feeling of economic injustice might, however, explain the motivations of terrorist individuals to some extent, as terrorists often seem to come from countries with differences in wealth between religious groups or regions. Yet income inequality as such does not explain terrorism.[26]

National levels of education do not seem to be associated with terrorism, either. Individual terrorist motivations apparently do not arise in countries with significantly

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[24] Interviewed by the author in Jakarta, February 2000.

[25] A country's number of US wanted and captured terrorists has a parametric correlation -0.002 (N=152) with the HDI (as measured by the UNDP World Development Report 2003), The same correlation is positive (but insignificantly so) if we use the EU list of terrorist individuals. A country's number of EU listed terrorist organizations has an insignificant negative correlation of 0.003 with HDI, while a country's number of terrorist organizations in the combined EU/UN/US list has an insignificant positive (the more wealth the more Western listed terrorist organizations) correlation of 0.020. When looking at casualties by organizations listed by the EU or EU/UN/US, the correlations with national economic well-being indicators continue to be completely insignificant (EU: +0.012, EU/US/UN: -0.117) The number of countries with data on all the relevant aspects in all these calculations was 178 (n=N=178 in all these calculations).

[26] The correlation between Gini measures (measuring the difference in consumption among people) seems to be systematically negative (the more unequal a country is the less likely that it becomes a source of terrorism) regardless of whether we measure income inequality of a country and the origin of individual or terrorist organizations, or the casualties caused by them. However, Gini figures are available only for 29 countries, and not available for such countries and areas with a terrorist problem as Saudi Arabia, Libya, Lebanon, Palestine, Iran, Syria, and the Sudan. Often inter-regional differences or inter-religious differences are also not revealed by Gini indicators, which only measure the consumption of richest, second richest etc. quintiles of the entire population.

lower levels of education: the correlations between the numbers of individual terrorists and the level of education are not significant.[27]

Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that terrorist individuals do come from countries with significantly lower levels of democracy. An analysis of the origins of terrorists most wanted by the FBI, and those known terrorists convicted by the USA, reveals a low, but statistically highly significant, negative non-parametric Spearman correlation with democracy. The number of terrorists wanted or convicted by the FBI is associated with a lack of democracy. If the EU list of Islamic terrorists is studied, the negative non-parametric Spearman correlation is still statistically significant (even though below 0.2) with a 95% probability that this association is not coincidental.[28] The number of terrorists listed by the EU is thus also associated with a lack of democracy. Together with the fact that terrorist individuals are often immigrants (Osama bin Laden, Abdul Hakim Murad, Abubakar Baashyir, Omar al-Faruq, Parlindungan Siregar, to take only a few examples), and people from stateless nations (e.g. Palestinian and Kurdish terrorists), it seems that the lack of political rights is one motivating factor for individuals to become terrorists.

Comparative evidence thus suggests that poverty or low levels of education in a nation does not contribute to the motivation of individuals to become terrorists, but the lack of democratic channels for protest might. If there is an association between regional inequalities or religious groups and terrorism, it would seem that terrorist individuals are more motivated by the injustice they perceive around them than they are by personal grievances. At the same time, their perception that they lack political opportunities and channels to fight injustice could be associated with the fact that they select violent means for their fight. When there is a perception of a lack of political, non-violent alternatives, protest against perceived unfairness emerges through violent channels.[29] This also seems clear in the interviews of militia people conducted for this

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[27] The number of terrorist individuals listed by the EU as being hosted by a country is insignificantly positively correlated with that country's level of education (the better the education, the more terrorists), while the correlation becomes insignificantly negative (-0.048) if the US terrorist convicts and most wanted are studied. Education is correlated with neither terrorist casualties, or number of groups. Regardless of which list we use, the result is always an insignificant, positive correlation with levels of education (The more education, the more terrorist organization).

[28] The number of US wanted and captured terrorists hosted by a country has a small but highly significant negative non-parametric (Spearman) correlation –0.214** (N=151) with democracy (as measured by the polity data of 2002), The same correlation is less significant if we use the EU list of terrorist individuals (-0.178* if we look at religious terrorism only). The European list contains many European individuals, and this Europe-centric approach becomes a bias unless the analysis focuses on religious terrorism.

[29] A country's number of US wanted and captured terrorists has a non-parametric correlation -0.214** (N=151) with democracy (as measured by the Polity Data of 2002). This correlation is highly significant. The same correlation is – 178* (151) if we use the EU list of non-European terrorist individuals.

study all over the world: *"The government did not do anything to defend us. We need justice and protection from the government. The guilty ones have to be convicted. Ninety percent of Indonesians are Muslim and yet we do not get protection from the Christians."*[30]

While absolute economic grievances on either individual or national levels do not explain terrorism, there seems to be some evidence suggesting that relative deprivation (mainly a drastic economic downturn) is associated with terrorism. In Egypt, home of 7 of the 22 terrorists on the US most wanted list , the first major incidents of violence took place soon after a serious economic downturn occurred in the latter half of the 1980s. Palestine also experienced a serious economic collapse during the first half of the 1990s, but its radicalization did not take place either during or immediately after its economic problems. Despite its absolute riches, Saudi Arabia, too, can be seen as a case of relative deprivation during the past decades. As in some other cases of relative deprivation, in Saudi Arabia the relative deprivation that took place shortly before the radicalization of Saudi-based Islamic individuals was accompanied by a serious increase in unemployment. Furthermore, the emergence and intensification of the activities of Chechen groups and Indonesian organizations seem to follow the ups and downs of the regional and/or national economy.

However, the question of why terrorist individuals choose to target their aggression against innocent civilians cannot yet be explained. Also our assumption that the motivations of individual terrorists are related to perceptions of unfairness are still rather weakly founded. An analysis of transnational levels is needed. Only rarely do terrorist individuals refer to injustices towards their nations. More often they refer to injustices against transnational entities. When looking at Islamic terrorism, the transnational group referred to is naturally the global Islamic community. Economic grievances can be established as a motivating factor by looking at the people often 'defended' by terrorists, but who are not themselves in any way linked with terrorism, i.e. the so-called 'terrorist constituencies'.

Transnational Grievances, International Grievances, and the Individual Decision to Support or Engage in Terrorism

In most countries it is not possible to obtain data on the per-capita income levels of religious groups. Nonetheless, it would probably be fair to say that in many areas such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, China, India, Israel, Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa, Europe, the United States and Canada, the Islamic populations are

[30] An Indonesian Muslim fighter. Interviewed by the author in October 2000.

economically worse off than the rest of the population on average. It is safe to say – even without hard evidence – that Islamic people are relatively deprived in many parts of the world.

Internationally, the economic position of Muslim populations is easier to verify with hard evidence than is Muslim per capita income. The share of the Islamic population in a country has a considerable, negative correlation with both human development[31] and level of education. Countries with large Islamic populations tend to be poorer and less educated than other countries.[32] Further, the access of the people in these countries to public health care is limited. There was a strongly negative (-0.363**, N=150) correlation of the share of public health funding in GDP with the share of the Islamic population in the total population, indicating that Islamic people are also deprived of public health care. The average level of human development in countries with considerable Muslim populations[33] was more than 23% lower than that of other countries.[34]

Globally, Muslims – for whose protection many of the violent fundamentalist terrorists claim to be fighting – are thus economically deprived. Economic grievances within the terrorist constituencies are relevant to the growth of terrorism.. Without the suffering masses, terrorist individuals would not feel the need to take action against the perceived enemy of the people they feel they need to protect. In the case of international terrorism, terrorist perpetrators consider the global community of Muslims as their constituency, while in the case of national and sub-national terrorism, terrorists only feel responsible for the protection of the local or national Muslims. Muslim grievances can be established on both national and international levels; however, in an analysis of the structures of terrorism, the differences between international and national terrorism do not seem to be very great..

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[31] The cross-country comparability of poverty indicators has often been criticized. However, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) human development index (HDI), which is based on life expectancy, adult literacy, education enrolment and gross national product per capita, describes the essential consequences of poverty in a more reliable manner. This is why this poverty indicator (HDI) was chosen for this study.

[32] For human development and the percentage of Islamic population in the entire population, the Pearson correlation coefficient is -0.510 (N=177), and for education and Islamic population -0.281 (N=173). The data for the percentage of Islamic population were taken from the CIA *Factbook* 2002. The percentage of the Islamic population was coded as 0% only if the proportion of Muslims in the population was less than 5% AND the absolute number was less than 4 million. Human development data was from the UNDP's Human Development Index. To complete the human development data, the analysis has made estimates based on regression analyses of known elements of the Human Development Index for several crucial areas, including Iraq, Palestine, and Afghanistan.

[33] At least four million Muslims or countries with at least 5% share of Muslims in their population.

[34] For the first category, the average was 0.588, while that of other countries was 0.764.

The grievances of the Muslim populations is one of the reasons for their terrorist activities given by the Muslim radicals interviewed for this study. The people interviewed, mostly in Indonesia and Pakistan, emphasized that it was not their personal grievances that motivated their terrorist activities. The fact that Muslim areas are rich in oil, and yet have been robbed of their natural resources and left poor, was mentioned by more than a few violent radicals. The new *al-Qaida* targeting guide says this very clearly: "The purpose of these (economic) targets (such as oil fields) is to … scare foreign companies working there and stealing Muslim treasures."[35]

Ecological stress can also be seen as a parallel phenomenon to economic deprivation. Osama bin Laden's Fatwa against America pays attention not only to the "robbing of Muslim resources", but also to the fact of how Western multinational corporations "eradicate its [Muslim land's] nature."

Islamic people are not only deprived economically, but also politically. Humiliation,[36] political deprivation, and lack of non-violent channels of protest are also clearly articulated in terrorist rhetoric. The dispute in the Middle East over Palestine, which involves Israel and its ally the United States, and the dispute over US bases in the Islamic holy lands in Saudi Arabia, both feature prominently in almost all Islamic terrorist rhetoric. Countries with substantial Muslim populations are less democratic than nations in general. The Spearman correlation between the share of the Islamic population in a country and democracy in that country is –0.664** (N=152). This indicates a very significant negative association between democracy and the size of the Islamic population. The lack of political rights of Muslims is not related to a lack of appreciation of democracy among Muslims. In fact, according to a recent study of religious groups world wide, Muslims were the group with the greatest share of people who answered positively to the question 'Do you approve of democratic ideals?'[37]

The rhetoric of many Middle Eastern terrorist individuals often tends to attribute the lack of democracy to the international oil-related interests, and the indirect rule of the West, particularly the United States. When describing the motivations of

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[35] Al-Qaida Targeting Guide, v1.0, March 29, 2004. Translated in an IntelCenter internet publication, available at http://www.asisonline.org/newsroom/aq.pdf

[36] The link between humiliation and terrorist motivations has been emphasized both by the US study on causes of terrorism and the OECD policy paper. See: Note by the OECD/DAC Secretariat *A Development Cooperation Lens on Terrorism Prevention* (December 12–13, 2002) & National Bureau of Economic Research, (US) 2002. "Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is There A Causal Connection?". USGPO, Washington, DC. However, this link has not been systematically studied from the point of cultural values, even though notions of humiliation and honour clearly are cultural.

[37] Zogby International 2002. National Society of Public Gallup: World Values Survey, cited in *The Economist* Oct 19, 2002.

Mohammad Atta, the mastermind of the September 11 attacks, his German friends have explained how "he grew angry over the Western policy towards the Middle East." According to one "he was most imbued actually over Israeli politics in the region and US protection of these Israeli politics…"[38]

Whether the claims of Islamic grievances and the reality of these grievances are indeed motivating terrorist individuals, cannot be positively verified. These grievances could, of course, be just excuses for violence while the real reason is something completely different. We cannot compare a world without Islamic grievances with our world which has these grievances, and so we are unable to statistically prove this connection. However, even as excuses or ways of legitimizing terrorism, these grievances can play a role. The explanation of individual motivations cannot be made by saying that independent variables simply determine the behaviour of individual terrorists. Individual motivations are entwined with social processes seeking to legitimise terrorist violence. According to Olivier Roy's analysis of Muslim terrorists convicted in Europe, a narcissistic need to be seen as a hero is something very typical of terrorists. Without a perceived legitimacy, based on international grievances providing justification, these individuals could not see terrorism as a way to achieve their narcissistic goals of heroism. International grievances are thus already a link in the causal chain to terrorism on the individual level,. The existence of international grievances is, however, most powerful as a legitimising force among social movements. The way in which Islamic economic grievances are used as a legitimising factor for terrorism can, therefore, only be revealed through an analysis from a national or international social group perspective.

Poverty, Democracy and Terrorist Organization

Since, as was shown above, terrorist individuals are not poor or badly educated, we can deduce that the emergence and activities of terrorist organizations are not dependent on individual grievances. However, national conditions could, in theory, affect a terrorist organization differently than an individual terrorist. If the size of a terrorist organization is measured by using the number of groups in that organization in a nation, and the number of casualties that these groups cause, we quickly realize that national economic grievances do not explain the emergence or activities of a terrorist organization, either. The number of terrorist groups listed by the EU, the US and the UN as hosted (voluntarily or involuntarily) by a given country is not strongly associated with the

[38] http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Mohammed%20Atta

level of human development in that country.[39] Furthermore, there is a positive correlation between the number of groups and casualties caused by terrorist groups hosted by a country on the one hand, and the level of education in that country on the other: the higher the level of education, the higher the number of terrorist groups and casualties caused by those groups.[40] Empirical evidence also does not support the assumption that a lack of public health services would invite terrorism. Public spending on health as a percentage of GDP correlates significantly with neither the number of casualties caused by groups hosted, nor with the number of terrorist groups.[41] Countries listed by the United States as sponsors or safe havens for terrorists are not more likely to have a health sector neglected by the public sector than countries which do not host terrorist groups.[42] Thus, the emergence of terrorist groups cannot be attributed to the poverty of the host country. The organisation of terrorist groups does not seem to occur as a reaction to national economic grievances.

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[39] If measured by the number of terrorist groups on the basis of the EU list, the correlation is –0.003, while if measured by the number of casualties there is a positive non-significant correlation (0.012): terrorism is then on the basis of the EU list associated with wealth rather than poverty. If operating within the extended EU+US+UN lists, the casualty-based correlation is non-significantly negative (-0.117) while again the correlation with number of groups is positive but non-significant, 0.020. The number of nations examined in all these calculations is 174. The UN list is available at www.un.org/docs/sc/committees/1267/tablelist.htm; The US list is published at US State Department Fact Sheet, Office of Counter Terrorism: *Foreign Terrorist Organizations.* Washington, DC, October 23, 2002; and the EU list can be found in Council Decision 2002/848/EC, on 12.12. 2002, implementing Art. S(3) Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001.

[40] On the basis of calculations made using the EU list of terrorist groups, the correlations for the number of groups and the number of casualties were 0.059 and 0.027, respectively (Pearson, N=174). When calculated on the basis of the combined EU+UN+US list, the correlations were 0.074 and -0.005 (the only negative correlation). Positive correlations are of course weak, but the fact that they are positive rules out the common claim that terrorism grows out of the lack of education. Even the political list of terrorist sponsors and havens, as defined by the United States State Department, consists of countries with a higher average level of education compared to the rest of countries in the world (0.77 as compared to 0.76).

[41] All correlations were closer to zero than -.01, while casualty correlations tended to be positive (non-significant correlations).

[42] The health data is from UNDP 2002. *World Development Report.* UNDP: New York. The data for some of the terrorism problem countries and areas (Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia) were roughly estimated with 0.5 percentage point accuracy on the basis of their available HDI data (Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia scored 0.5%, and Palestine 2%). The Pearson correlation between the percentage of public spending on health and the number of casualties caused internationally by groups hosted is positive (0.018, N=150), while the correlation between the percentage of public spending on health and the number of terrorist groups hosted by a country is slightly negative (-0.075, N=150). Both correlations are clearly quite insignificant.

When investigating international and transnational grievances, we are faced with the same dilemma as in our examination of individual motivations. We can see that the rhetoric of terrorist organizations explicitly refers to the grievances of Muslims, and we can see that these grievances are real. But since we do not have several human worlds, some with Islamic grievances, and some without, we cannot prove quantitatively whether or not these objective grievances are indeed statistically associated with the rise of terrorism.

When studying global terrorist organizations, we can, however see that their concerns and activities are indeed often based on objective, international grievances. The problems of commodity producers in the international economy and in international politics are well documented in the development studies literature, and terrorist organizations seems to arise most often in countries producing two of the main commodities in world trade: oil and coffee. Just as in the case of the transnational community of Muslims, the coffee farmers and peasants of the globalizing periphery are also objectively deprived. However, we cannot prove whether this objective deprivation is the cause of terrorist organization or whether it is perhaps the other way round. It may be that the emergence of terrorist organizations is caused by something else, while the rhetoric of these terrorist groups and the justification of their terrorist activities simply exploits the grievances of Muslims and the economic losers in globalisation.

On the level of the organization, justification and finding a legitimate basis for terrorist activities is a necessary component in the success of the group. A brief analysis of the components of legitimacy in the rhetoric of a few, violent, Islamic organizations reveals how important the element of the transnational grievances of the Islamic communities is for the legitimacy of the existence of the organization. As an example of "legitimizing" economic grievances, Osama bin Laden refers to '*the death of more than six hundred thousand (600,000) Iraqi children because of the shortage of food and medicine which resulted from the boycotts and sanctions against Muslim Iraqis*'.[43]

Rejection of Western capitalism was also clear among many of the violent Indonesian Islamic radicals who were interviewed. Economic marginalization of the Muslims was also mentioned as one of the reasons why violent means of protest against capitalism and its centres in the USA were seen acceptable. The relationship between poverty and support for terrorism is also understood in the same way in the other camp: President Bush has called the war on terrorism a *'struggle against hateful groups that exploit poverty and despair.'* [44]

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[43] Osama bin Laden 1996. "The New Powder Keg in The Middle East". This article was published in the 15th issue of Nida'ul Islam magazine (http://www.islam.org.au), October – November 1996.

[44] U.S. President Bush's speech to the United Nations, November 10, 2001. The speech can be found for example at http://www.milparts.net/bushun.html

Economic grievances are, however, not as prominent in the Islamic terrorist rhetoric as are the grievances related to the violent, undemocratic system of international governance in which national military power rules over international law and norms. The inability of Muslim majorities to make the state reflect their culture and values was already among the main justifications for violence stated in the texts of early modern Islamic radicalism. According to Muhammad al-Farag, member of the Islamic Jihad, the neglect of the violent aspect of Jihad has resulted in the subordination of Muslims by the West. *'This state is ruled by heathen laws despite the fact that the majority of its people are Muslims. These laws were formulated by infidels who compelled Muslims to abide by them. And because they deserted jihad, Muslims today live in subjugation, humiliation, division and fragmentation… The aim of our group is to rise up to establish an Islamic state and restore Islam to this nation. . . The means to this end is to fight against heretical rulers and to eradicate the despots who are no more than human beings who have not yet found those who are able to suppress them with the order of God Almighty.'*[45]

The violent aspect of political grievances has become most important in the "legitimation" of violence: terrorist violence is portrayed as similar to the violence it reacts to, and the targets of terrorism are often accused of "real terrorism" by the terrorists.[46] According to Osama bin Laden's message to Europe in April 2004, *'attacks on European and American targets … were merely retaliation for aggression on Muslims in Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq.'*[47]

While legitimacy of terrorism requires objective grievances held by the transnational and international terrorist constituencies, it seems that terrorist organizations also require legitimacy. If this assumption can be established, we can then establish the link between objective international grievances and the emergence of terrorist organizations.

If terrorism was completely rejected by the people, it would not be kept secret from the security apparatus of the state. However, if it is widely accepted by the people, it is often also accepted by the security apparatus and thus groups can organize without the fear of retribution. Such a climate is well exemplified by the fact that the *Jemaah Islamiyah* operational manual was sold openly in bookshops in Jakarta. Sometimes police and military officials explicitly reject counter-terrorism as anti-Islamic and demonstrate their support for people and ideologies that the West often associates with terrorism. The present author has witnessed an officer of the Kopassus (special

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[45] Muhammad al-Farug's book *The Neglected Duty*, as quoted on page 64, in John L. Esposito 2002. *Unholy War: terror in the name of Islam*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

[46] In the radical Islamic discourse this feature is related to the Quranic principles (2:294) of proportionality of warfare.

[47] Osama bin Laden citation from Magdi Abdelhadi, 2004. *Tape plays to European audience*, BBC, Thursday, 15 April, 2004, 11:47 GMT.

forces unit responsible for much of the Indonesian army efforts to counter terrorism) changing from his military uniform to his gym clothes, which included an Osama bin Laden T-shirt! In the case of Egypt, 4% of the convicted terrorists were actually people from the security establishment.

The majority of people in Muslim countries and areas do not see terrorism as a very big problem. In fact, only a minority in Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Mali, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan and Palestine feel that terrorism – suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets – is never justified.[48] Furthermore, when asked about people's trust in world leaders, trust in Osama bin Laden ranked very high among Muslims.[49]

Table 3.4. Confidence on world figures to do the right thing

	Confidence in World Figures to Do the Right Thing		
	First	Second	Third
Indonesia	Arafat (68%)	Abdallah (66%)	bin Laden (58%)
Jordan	Chirac (61%)	bin Laden (55%)	Abdallah (42%)
Kuwait	Abdallah (84%)	Bush (62%)	Blair (58%)
Lebanon	Chirac (81%)	Annan (38%)	Abdallah (35%)
Morocco	Chirac (65%)	bin Laden (49%)	Arafat (43%)
Nigeria	Annan (52%)	Blair (50%)	Bush (50%)
Pakistan	Abdallah (60%)	bin Laden (45%)	Arafat (42%)
Palest. Auth.	bin Laden (71%)	Arafat (69%)	Chirac (32%)
Turkey	Arafat (32%)	Abdallah (21%)	Annan (18%)

Percent saying they have "a lot" or "some" confidence in each leader's ability to do the right thing regarding world affairs. Three highest rated (of 8 world leaders) shown here.

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[48] Pew Research Centre for People and the Press 2003. *2002 Global Attitudes Survey.* Online at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=165. Only six countries in the survey showed a majority opinion that terrorism is always unacceptable. The conclusion on Palestine is from Alan B. Krueger & Jitka Maleckova, National Bureau of Economic Research, (US) 2002.

[49] PEW study in September 2003. This does not mean that Islamic people would support civilian targeting and terrorism. Osama bin Laden is not the same person for Southeast Asian Muslims as he is for the Western people. He is seen first and foremost as a symbol of anti-Americanism, not as representing violence and terrorism. Still, in March 2003, Indonesia's former chief of intelligence, for example, claimed that *al-Qaida* does not target civilians and that it was the United States who was behind the Bali attack. Z.A. Maulani, former Indonesian intelligence chief. Interview based on a questionnaire drawn up by the author, interviewer Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, in March 2003. However, support for individuals that in the Western discourse are defined as terrorists is needed for organizing these individuals, as can be seen below.

In some cases even public statements by politicians illustrate the differences in moral judgements related to terrorism. The first comment of Indonesia's vice-president Hamzah Haz in relation to the September 11 attack was a wish that the '*attack would hopefully cleanse the USA of its sins*.' [50]

On the basis of all the existing data, a relation can be derived between the ideological climate and the numbers and number of casualties caused by organizations based in different countries. For this purpose we have classified nations into three groups:

1. Nations where Osama bin Laden is not among the three most trusted world figures (among Muslims),
2. Countries where he is among the three but not trusted by the majority, and
3. Countries where he is trusted by the majority.

In Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show that greater support for Osama bin Laden implies greater opportunities for terrorist organization and mobilization, regardless of which list of terrorist groups is used.

Figure 3.1. Number of terrorist groups in countries categorized by their support to Osama bin Laden



[50] *Pikiran Rakyat*, 17.9. 2001. Translation by the author.

Figure 3.2. Casualties by groups in nations categorized by their suppo to Osama bin Laden



In sum, we can now conclude that the international economic grievances of Muslims are needed for the legitimation of terrorist organizations, and the legitimacy of agents that are defined by the West as terrorist is required for members of the organization. Thus there is a link between the objective economic grievances of Muslims and terrorist organizations.

Democracy and Terrorism

All in all it seems that, while the development of individual terrorist motivations requires the perceived unavailability of democratic channels for protest, organization of terrorist groups often takes place where a week state or the presence of a certain amount of democratic freedom allows such mobilization. This is probably why the contribution of the lack of democracy to terrorism cannot be detected through an analysis of terrorist organizations and not terrorist individuals. A statistical analysis does not reveal that the lack of democracy can be strongly associated with the number of casualties caused by, or total number of, terrorist groups hosted by countries.[51] In fact, terrorist

[51] Dramatic negative correlations could not be established even though the original data were supplemented by labelling all polities of failed states (Afghanistan, Somalia) and a non-existing state (Palestine), which tended to lack information, as 'least democratic nations'. Even then correlations between polity data and casualties, and polity data and the number of listed groups, were both weaker than -0.12, regardless of the list of terrorist organization used. The polity data scale was treated as ordinal, and correlations presented as nonparametric (Spearman).

organizations often originate in countries that are slightly more democratic than the global average.

Indonesia, one of the new centres of emphasis for the growth of terrorist activities (one-third of all terrorist activity in 2002 was in Indonesia), is a good example of the effect of more democracy on the emergence of terrorist organisations. Previously Indonesia offered an abundance of individual motivations for terrorism: due to a certain amount of Muslim opposition to the authoritarian rule of President Suharto, devoted Muslims were not seen as reliable partners; and thus crony capitalism developed around the presidential family, using non-Muslim Chinese to run the businesses. According to General Benny Murdani, a well-known military figure of the 1970s and 1980s, devoted Muslims were not regarded as being reliable enough for appointment to the highest military posts either, because the main security challenges to the authoritarian order had come from Muslim circles.

However, it was not until after the democratic reforms of the 1990s that violent Indonesian Islamic organizations started to emerge (Laskar Jihad in 1999, Islamic Defenders Front in 2000, Jemaah Islamiyya in 2001). In short, it seems that terrorist organizations require an environment with some democratic freedoms, or at least weak government control in fragile states. Alternatively, what is needed is a state policy favourable to terrorists. How national, transnational and international support to terrorism develops will be dealt with in the next stage of the analysis.

Poverty, Democracy, and National, Transnational, and International Support for Terrorism

The rise of support for terrorism within a nation and in transnational populations does not seem to be associated with the relative poverty of a nation, or with problems in the educational system. According to a study in Palestinian areas, rich, well-educated people tend to support terrorism more than poor people do.[52] Regarding the support of Osama bin Laden, one can also see that the countries where support for him is high are not less advanced in terms of human development than countries where it is low. Peculiarly enough, our limited data did not seem to show any correlation between terrorist support and lack of democracy. Further, Osama bin Laden had roughly equal

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[52] Alan B. Krueger & Litka Maleckova 2002. *Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?* Working Paper 9074, National Bureau of Economic Research. Internet: www.nber.org/papers/w9074

support among Muslims in countries with predominantly Muslim populations as in countries where the share of the Muslim population was smaller.

The relationship between transnational economic and political grievances, on the one hand, and national and international support for terrorism on the other, can be inferred on the basis of interviews and historical evidence of the processes that took place in the development of terrorism. Two types of support will be discussed below: the support of terrorist strategies of civilian targeting, and the support provided to people and organizations that the West often considers as icons of terrorism.

The interview data seems to suggest that support to terrorist strategies is limited. Even when, in the recent study[53] referred to above, a majority of Indonesians say civilian targeting is justified in some circumstances, these circumstances need to be very extreme. This limited support of terrorist strategies becomes clear if the existing opinion polls are carefully studied. For example, in Palestine, 41%–50% of people felt that 'terrorism was not acceptable under any circumstances'. This despite the data that, 66.7%–69.4% (variation caused by people who did not reveal their opinions) felt that armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel were a good thing for Palestinians.[54]

The experience of the arrogant use of national power against Islamic populations in international relations seems to be linked with the increase of the acceptance of terrorist means of retaliation. Terrorist violence is seen as a reaction to international violence against Muslims: "*When you punish, punish them in the way they have punished you. (Qur'an 16:126)"* was the quotation that the terrorists responsible for the Madrid bombing in March 11, 2004 gave as an explanation for their action.[55]

The perpetrators tend to view the front line as being between Israel and the United States, on the one hand, and the Islamic world on the other. This 'front line' includes the dispute over the US occupation of Muslim holy places, either by the US itself or through US 'proxies' such as the authoritarian regimes of Saudi Arabia and Persia, or Israel. According to the EU report *Extreme Fundamentalism and Terrorism Group*,[56] the settlement of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict would have a very important positive impact on the struggle against extreme fundamentalism and terrorism. In its

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[53] PEW study in September 2003. Pew Research Centre for People and the Press 2003. Online at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=165.

[54] Alan B. Krueger & Litka Maleckova 2002, op. cit.

[55] On March 12, 2004, the pro-Saddam pro-bin Laden London daily al-Quds al-Arabi published the alleged statement by the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades of al-Qaida, in which the brigades claimed to be responsible for the March 11, 2004 bombings in Madrid.

[56] EFTG was a group established by the EU Council, The group consists of representatives of EU Foreign Ministers, under Danish Chairmanship.

declarations, *al-Qaida* claims to represent the global community of (religious) Muslims against the (secular) Americans who use the tactics of indirect rule within Muslim territories: *'Our main problem is the US government while the Saudi regime is but a branch or an agent of the US. By being loyal to the US regime, the Saudi regime has committed an act against Islam.*[57]

According to the data collected by the present author from interviews with Indonesian counter-terrorist authorities, a feeling of humiliation translates into pro-terrorist motivations in a special way: *'When they humiliate us and take away our dignity as human beings, they are in fact, inviting reactions that are not humane.*[58] According to an Israeli expert, *'Terrorism is a war waged by the weakest, those who are not pressed for time.*[59] The support for the channelling of violent political frustration into terrorism tends to increase whenever there are sufficient opportunities for terrorism, but no opportunities for targeting the real enemy. Thus, support for terrorism tends to increase whenever the strong powers demonstrate their arrogance in world affairs. The American military operation in Iraq in 2003 was a prime example. The commander of the West Kalimantan police force (KAPOLDA), Brig. General Iwan Pandjiwinata, complained about this in a discussion with the author: '*We naturally do our best, but what can you do when the political climate is like this … (i.e. anti-American)… when people see how Americans kill fellow Muslims.*'[60]

In many Third World countries, the acceptance of anti-American symbols and the support of icons of international terrorism merely signifies resistance to the United States. More specifically, it signifies resistance against the use of superior force in violation of international law, UN authority and international democracy. In an emerging hegemonic setting in which Islamic terrorism is seen as the force opposing the United States, it is only natural that anti-Americanism expresses itself as apparent support for terrorism. In Indonesia, Saddam Hussein, who had been labelled as an ally of the terrorists, received tremendous sympathy in Indonesia during the US military operation in his country. In fact, Saddam Hussein became the most popular name given to

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[57] Osama bin Laden, cited in his biography. Online at http://www.amerika.org/Osama_bin_laden/index.html

[58] This citation is from a civil servant: he referred to 'us' as the Muslim population. This statement was related to the war in Iraq and its effects on terrorism. It is interesting to note how the perception of the sides (Islam against the US) in many interviews in Indonesia (conducted by the present author in April 2003) was the same both among radicals and among people who were supposed to feel ownership for the common effort to crack down on terrorism.

[59] Uzi Eilam, Former Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Defence Mission to Europe, interviewer Sonja Lende, March 2003.

[60] Iwan Pandjiwinata, Brig. Gen Police, Kapolda, discussions – conducted partly in Indonesian partly in English – with Timo Kivimäki in Pontianak of March 2003, interpreter: Iwan Supardi.

babies born in Indonesia during the Second Gulf War![61] However, support for groups and personalities understood by the American government as icons of terrorism does not reveal real support of terrorism in Southeast Asia. It only reflects political and economic grievances vis-à-vis what is perceived as Western imperialism and casino capitalism. Thus, the perception of economic exploitation and military suppression of Muslims in Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Chechnya, Algeria, Lebanon and Kashmir is reflected in growing support for persons and organisations that explicitly declare themselves to be fighting against the forces that cause these grievances, even if they are using illegitimate means.

Although the international support, shared by many Muslims, for forces that in the USA symbolize terrorism does not necessarily indicate acceptance of civilian targeting, this support still is a problem. For the narcissistic terrorist this support is often interpreted as support for terrorist means, leading to a misconception: if people support Osama bin Laden, then violence against Western civilians must make a young radical a hero in the eyes of Muslims. This expression of disgust at global political and economic unfairness also encourages the organization and mobilization of terrorist groups. Finally, this support makes working cooperatively to prevent violence against innocent civilians very difficult.

Conclusions: Grievances and Terrorism

The main association between terrorism and political and economic grievances involves transnational Islamic grievances that make it easier for radical groups to justify their violence to their constituencies. This legitimacy breeds tolerance and acceptance of symbols of terrorism, which then creates the illusion among a handful of Islamic individuals that they could be heroes to Muslims if they used violence to address these transnational grievances. Tolerance towards radical organizations also makes it easier for these organizations to organise, recruit members, and plan operations. Furthermore, tolerance towards terrorist organizations, ideologies and icons makes any Western cooperation for containing terrorism very difficult, and even illegitimate in the eyes of those who tolerate and support terrorism. This logic can be summarized in the following figure:

[61] *Media Indonesia*, 22.4. 2003.

Figure 3.3: Main causal linkages between grievances and terrorism



In addition to the main links from grievances to terrorism, one can also identify other important links. These secondary linkages are:

1. National political grievances give rise to individual terrorist motivations
2. National economic fluctuations, especially relative economic deprivation, gives rise to conflicts. Most terrorist organizations originally mobilize for specific local conflicts.
3. National economic problems increase the risk of the weakening and possible collapse of the state, which again is a main source for terrorism, especially as a weak state offers opportunities for terrorist organization. State collapse and weakness can, however, be the result of other conditions than economic problems, which is why the role of economic grievances in this dynamic is only of secondary importance. The complex structures and dynamics of state weakness as such, however, make a crucial contribution to Islamic radicalization. This contribution will be analyzed in the following chapter.

Chapter 4

Weak States and Terrorism in the Arab World

Heidi Huuhtanen

This chapter investigates the weakness of a state as a source of or catalyst for Islamist terrorism. The hypothesis is that incomplete state-building in the Arab world has created weak states in which the use of force is seen as legitimate, and the legitimacy of the political system, the available means of political participation, and the ability of the state to provide services are all inadequate. In the Muslim world, this weakness and inadequacy of a state can be seen as a primary source for the rise of Islamist protest.

The radicalisation of small factions of a political protest movement to the extent that they begin the use of terrorism develops step-by step from the use of extra-parliamentary means of political disengagement, to challenging the legitimacy of the entire political system and the creation of strategies for a new order. This radicalisation process is influenced by a lack of parliamentary or non-violent extra-parliamentary means of protest, and state repression. Typically, de-legitimation of the respective state appears; but in the case of *al-Qaida* related groups, the radicalisation process also appears, directed towards the international order and main actors on the international political stage.

Policy tools for influencing the radicalisation/de-radicalisation process include:

1) Ensuring political inclusion: allowing parliamentary means and extra-parliamentary means of protest and demonstration

2) Diminishing violent state responses and reducing the legitimisation of counter-terrorism operations

3) Enhancing political legitimacy: broadening participation and accountability, guaranteeing human rights, and providing good governance, public services (employment, education, health, social security) and more equal economic distribution

4) Re-evaluating Western policies related to the regions/conflicts/states in question (regional security arrangements/ conflicts, especially Western questions and policies towards current Israeli/Palestinian regimes.

Introduction

Most third world states suffer from incomplete state-building and nation building. processes. Inadequate state-building has created weak states which have failed to satisfy the needs of the populations with regard to public services and the political system. The weak states are able to retain a monopoly over resources and violence, but they have not been able to ensure the provision of health, welfare and education services, or modes of political participation, nor can they guarantee the legitimacy of decision-making processes, the stability of political institutions, the rule of law, or the existence of effective and accountable governance. Typical of weak states is that they have lost legitimacy in large segments of their society. Almost all Middle Eastern Arab states, such as Saudi-Arabia, Egypt and Syria, belong to this category: they are "weak", even though the regimes are seemingly "strong" when measured by their power and resources.

State weakness, that is, inadequate statehood, is seen by some as the greatest source of insecurity in the third world.[1] As one scholar specialized in Third world security argued: "It is the internal fragilities and vulnerabilities of these states, rather than any regional and global dimension, that essentially explain the high level of violence and suffering in many parts of the third world…There is no substitute for the time and resources to build greater societal cohesion and state legitimacy."[2] Domestic instability appears in many cases in form of ethnic conflicts, but Islamist radicalism has became a new channel for resentment.

The argument presented here is that the organisation and popularity of Islamist movements is very much linked to the weakness of a state. Islamist movements in the Muslim world respond to these deficits in a state by presenting a revolutionary ideology for a population that they see has suffered from political repression, corruption, and a decline in services. The movements mobilize civil society against the authoritarian state and provide a channel for political expression; they work in the area of social services and fulfil the vacuum in health care, education and social security. In addition, Islamist political activity works as a vehicle to address several types of conflicts that a weak state is not able to respond to. These are, for example, conflicts between central authority and local government, conflicts between different social classes and ethnic groups, and conflicts caused by sectarian governance.

It is also argued here that the development of terrorist activity is a product of the radicalisation process. A review is presented of how small segments of social and political

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[1] Notions of weak statehood and inadequate state-building and nation-building came under increased debate in security studies after Barry Buzan, 1981.

[2] Thomas G. Weiss in Mohammed Ayoob: Third World Security Predicament. State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Press 1995, xi.

protest movements in the Muslim world turn to the use of terrorism as a systematic strategy or tactic, and how the radicalisation process develops step by step from extra-parliamentary means of protest to riots, and thence to terrorism and civilian targeting. Many factors contribute to this radicalisation process. Here state weakness is investigated as a factor underlying and contributing to Islamist terrorism, viewing state weakness as a structural condition that creates circumstances in which it is very likely that political groups will undergo a process of radicalisation. The influence of state weakness can be most clearly analyzed in the cases of local Islamist radical groups that have been the traditional source of terrorism since the 1960s, and up to the middle of the1990s, in the Arab world. The local regimes were the primary targets of terrorism until the middle of the 1990s, when many local groups were defeated by the regimes and became more moderate. The new source of Muslim terrorism came from the internationalised Islamist radicalism of *al-Qaida*, which consists of a network of radical groups whose organisation is local but whose targets and operations are international. Therefore, a distinction must be made between the older groups fighting solely against their respective local state regimes, and the new, *al-Qaida* related, transnational terrorist groups targeting international actors.

In analyzing the reasons for radicalisation, it should be pointed out that the "new" *al-Qaida* related groups are very much influenced by local conditions at the state level. At first, the radicalisation of these groups was linked to domestic conditions, most of the group and individual affiliates of *al-Qaida* being members or second-generation splinter groups of "old" radical Islamist groups. Subsequently, especially after the demolishment of "the base" in Afghanistan, many members of *al-Qaida* related groups returned to their home countries and their operations became largely localised. All the *al-Qaida* affiliated attacks after 9/11, such as the bombings in Tunisia, Morocco, Saudi-Arabia, Turkey and Spain (by a Moroccan group) seem to follow this pattern. So, local conditions, including state weakness, continue to have an influence on the level of moderation or radicalisation of the groups, as well as on their support base and recruitment.

The connection between state weakness and terrorism has this far been studied in relation to the possibilities of already existing terrorist networks (such as *al-Qaida*) to operate in failed states, where the state's control and monopoly on the use of violence has been severely weakened or is completely lacking, such as in Somalia, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan.

It will be demonstrated here that, in the long term, studies of terrorism as well as efforts of the international community toward solving the problems of terrorism should be focused on the weak states and their potential to create radicalisation, and on preventing the weak states from becoming even weaker.

Further, it will be shown that, in the Middle East, the weakness of a state is related to Islamist organisations and their popularity in that state. The ways in which state

weakness can cause radicalisation of social and political groups to terrorism will also be analysed, and an investigation will be made of ways and means for influencing the radicalisation process by affecting the conditions leading to violence.

State Weakness in the Arab World

The indicators for state weakness can be categorised into three groups linked to the three basic functions of a state, which are: 1) the ability to monopolize the use of legitimate violence (security and law and order apparatus), 2) the ability to guarantee political organisation, and 3) the ability to provide public services.[3] As mentioned in the Introduction to this chapter, unlike failing and failed states, weak states still retain their monopoly on the use of violence, but in contrast to strong states, most of the population regards this monopoly as not being legitimate. All regimes of weak states use significant amount of coercion in order to strengthen their statehood, that is "to persuade and coerce the disparate populations under their nominal rule to accept the legitimacy of state boundaries and institutions, and the right of the state to extract resources from them, as well as the right of the state to regulate important aspects of their lives."[4] In addition to a discussion of problems arising from state's use of force, problems in political and socio-economic development will also be investigated more broadly in relation to the radicalisation process and the question of terrorism..

Because many Arab states are still in the process of state building, the last stage, building of political institutions and broadening of political participation, is incomplete in these states. After their independence, the Arab states confronted the typical problems of post-colonial state building as they suffered through the difficulties of national integration, political institutionalisation, and power struggles between different elites. These problems lead to a series of revolutions in the 1950s and 1960s in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, North Yemen, South Yemen, Sudan, Algeria and Lebanon, and to the establishment of radical republics in several of these countries.

Especially the new nationalist regimes used repression to gain stability and control. Building a power base for regimes and creating a stable political system was much easier in the oil-rich Gulf monarchies, where the 'purchasing' of the different groups in society was possible with the help of petrodollars. Other external income (worker

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[3] Ulrich Schneckener: Staatszerfall als globale Bedrohung. Fragile Staaten und Transnationaler Terrorismus. Internationale Politik 11/2003, 12–13. This definition has also been influenced by Timo Kivimäki's recent research findings..

[4] Ayoob, 29.

remittances, foreign aid etc.) also helped Arab regimes to establish a "rule bargain"[5] with their societies: services were exchanged for political loyalty. But even though political stability increased, increased stability never led to a significant increase in political legitimacy.[6]

In these newly independent, authoritarian, single-party ruled states, political demands were mediated through patrimonial structures and client networks in which allocation of the resources of the state, such as jobs and education, was done on a basis of political loyalty, through personal and unofficial patron-client relationships. These structures continued to be the basis of political organisation even after independence. Single party rule was supported by corporatist structures, meaning that the political demands from different sectors of society became channelled through the vertical organisation of interest groups, not through the horizontal, class-based organisation.

This system of corporate relations and political representation faced problems in the 1970s and 1980s. Firstly, the regime's capabilities to deliver goods and services diminished due to failed development policies, a decline in oil-related income, and massive population growth. The regimes were unable to deliver their share of the "rule bargain", which created increasing social and economic problems such as mass unemployment and a rise in food prices that culminated in "bread riots" in different countries. The political legitimacy of the regimes was further weakened by the failure of the state to provide public services.

As the regimes changed the direction of their development policies and began to introduce liberal economic reforms in the beginning of the 1970s, the political consequence was the diminished ability of the state-client structures to mediate political demands. There was less mediation and demands were expressed more directly. As a result, resentment grew.

The state needed to broaden its political base, and economic liberalisation was accompanied by some opening up of the political system. Electoral politics was introduced in Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen, Turkey and Islamic Iran in the 1980s and 1990s. However the increase of institutional political participation in technical terms did not lead to increased participation of the people or to liberalisation in the long term. Many Middle East countries witnessed a rise in authoritarianism.[7] This is apparent for example in Egypt and Tunisia in the end of the 1990s.

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[5] The term is used by Daniel Brunberg, for example, in his article: "Democratization in the Arab World? The Trap of Liberal Autocracy". Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 4, Oct 2002.

[6] Noble, Brynen, Qurany: *The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World*. Macmillan, London, 1993, 283.

[7] Anoush Ehteshami & Emma Murphy: "Transformation of the Corporatist State in the Middle East" Third World Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1996, 753–772.

The re-imposition of authoritarianism by the state after economic and political liberalisation has been explained as being due to the state's desire for regime security and stability. The new reforms proved insufficient to increase the state's capabilities to deliver economic growth, employment, and basic services, or to increase political legitimacy in all sectors of society: this created protest to which the state responded with repressive measures. Similarly, the failure of political mediation structures, and the emergence of directly expressed criticism and demands resulted in the state's authoritarian response. Rather than indicating setbacks along a path of democratisation, it has been suggested that this type of behaviour of the Arab states may indicate that the semi-authoritarian political system is there to stay, and these states are not on a path to becoming modern democratic states.[8]

In addition to problems in the state-building process, such as failures in political participation and provision of services, Arab states have suffered from an as yet incomplete nation-building process, which seriously adds to the problem of political legitimacy. Due to the lack of a sufficient power-base, regimes have had only narrow support within particular ethnic, religious or tribal minority groups. As a result, sectarian rule has been common, as in the case of *Alawites*' rule over the Sunnis in Syria, or Sunni rule over Shiites in *Ba'athist* Iraq, or particular tribal preferences in the Gulf. Often, religious, ethnic or tribal minorities are often excluded from the political process, such as the Copts in Egypt, or the Kurds in Syria, Iran and Turkey. It is also typical of a weak state that at the local level the central authority lacks political legitimacy in the minds of the people. Traditional monarchies, such as Morocco, Jordan and the small Gulf principalities, have on the whole been more successful in nation-building and the creation of political legitimacy than have radical republics.

Weak States and Islamism

Islamist groups first emerged as opposition movements to the weak states in the Muslim world. These Islamist groups capitalised on the lack of legitimacy of the weak state and its failure to integrate the entire population and increase political participation. . The timing and scope of the resentment is linked to the Arab regimes inability to keep its side of the rule bargain. The political legitimacy that was bought by distribution of benefits and services was no longer there when regimes failed to deliver jobs, education,

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[8] Eberhard Kienle: "A Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt" IB Tauris, 2000. Address by Volker Perthes in EuroMESCo Annual Meeting "The Mediterranean and the New International Order" in Barcelona, 29–30 March 2004.

housing, health care and social security, as a result of the pressures of population growth and rapid urbanisation.

This meant that the economic and social role of the state diminished in the 70s and 80s, and the states had to cut back some of their activities. More importantly, the international donors also pressured the states to leave the provision of services to private and grass-root bodies. Privately-funded Islamic charitable organisations largely filled in the gaps in state-run services. In the early 1970s there were 600 Muslim NGOs in Egypt, increasing to 2000 in the mid-1980s. At the same time, the number of private mosques grew from 14 000 to 40 000 from the early 1960s to the early 1980s. As an Hezbollah activist explained it, their aim was to: "We provide services for people who are not able to afford it (or) where there are no government services at all." [9] This further constrained the state's ability to play an active role in the society, and hindered state building. Typically, a privately-funded Islamic charitable organisation provides a cluster of services that are organised around a private mosque, offering e.g. a clinic for health care, a kindergarten and a primary school. The organisation also provides social services and welfare donations for the poorest people through the alms (*zakat*) that it collects. The charitable organisations have also founded religious schools, orphanages and homes for the elderly. These activities exist within many levels of society, from rural peasants and poor urban dwellers to the urban middle-class. A significant sector of Islamic sub-economics, these charitable organisations emerged simultaneously with private, Islamic companies and banks.[10] Most significantly, in many countries Islamist movements also took over a large share of the education sector. Some of the often foreign-funded Muslim religious schools preached radical ideology. Recent reports of radical schools in Indonesia conclude that religious schools are likely to produce up to 5000 recruits for radical Islamist groups and sometimes even offer concrete terrorist training.[11] On the whole, these networks created a strong mechanism for distributing the Islamist message and mobilising the masses.

In addition to filling the gap left by the retreat of the state from the distribution of services, Islamist movements capitalised on political resentment by providing an ideology and political movement of reform. Structures for political organisation grew widely along with the grass-root social work, making the Islamist groups the most organized political groups in most of the Arab states. However, these Islamist groups

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[9] Ibrahim Karawan: *The Islamist Impasse*. IISS Adelphi Paper 314, 1997, 21.

[10] Nazih Ayubi: *Political Islam. Religion and Politics in the Arab World*. Routledge, London and New York 1991, 195–198.

[11] Tom Allard: "Terror army on the rise, says Downer" Sydney Morning Herald. 18.3.2004. http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/03/17/1079199293103.html

have not been able to win true political power or change regimes except in Iran, Sudan and Taliban Afghanistan. If allowed at all, the political participation of the Islamist groups in elections has been controlled: the election results have ensured that pro-government forces have retained the majority. Where Islamist groups have been allowed to share power, as in Jordan and Turkey, the policies of the government have still remained mostly unchanged. [12]

The mainstream, non-militant, Islamist groups have generally failed in bringing about an Islamic revolution. In the 1990s. most groups allied with the secular opposition and were committed to pluralism and parliamentary means of reform.[13] Even if the ideologies of secular and religious opposition forces differ, their political aims are similar, which further strengthens the argument that Islamist groups are a reformist reaction to state weakness. Opposition to bad governance, lack of political participation and lack of welfare services has been widely shared by other political forces. Interviews of members of different political groups in Egypt revealed that all political forces were demanding the same first steps from the state: free elections, removal of restrictions on political participation, freedom of the press, and socio-economic equality. These demands from civil society exist in all Arab states. One should, however, not come to the conclusion that despite shared aims the pursuit of change in government policies would not be hindered by the significant contradictions between the ideologies of these civil society actors.[14] In fact, an analysis of the political aims of Islamist political parties nowadays illustrates their opposition character, and the lesser significance of the revolutionary aim of building an Islamic state as a short or even long-term political goal. For example, in Egypt the Islamist parties emphasise the civilian instead of the religious idea of the state, and see people instead of God as the source of authority.[15] The following quote from a Sudanese man talking about the state of affairs in his country could also serve as a good illustration of 'Islamist aims':

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[12] Karawan, 23.

[13] Oliver Roy: *The Failure of Political Islam*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1994.

[14] Interview in Egypt with Supreme Guide of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Mamoun Al Houdeibi and leader of Al-Wasat, Abu El Iila Madi, Abdel Halim Kandeel, Editor-in-Chief of Al Arabi weekly (Arab Socialist Nasserite Party), leader of Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Said Eddin Ibrahim and philosopher Said Al Ashmawy, in Cairo 6 November 2003.

[15] Interview in Egypt with Supreme Guide of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Mamoun Al Houdeibi, the leader of young Islamist splinter group of Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Wasat 6.7.2003. For views on the multi-party system, see also Muhammad M. Al-Hudabi: *The Principles of Politics in Islam*. Islamic Inc. Publishing and Distribution, 2003, 23–25 (A previous version of the article has also appeared in Harvard International Review, Spring 1997).

"They say they form an Islamic government but they are not. We need a truly Islamic state…You know, there is not a single Islamic state in the world?…Or perhaps, you know the only countries that come close to Islamic government are in Europe. They are really Islamic because they have governments that are there because of the people, they care for the people, and if they don't, they go away. That is what is an Islamic state."[16]

Weak States and the Process of Radicalisation

The process of radicalisation of a political movement tends to proceed in the stages described below[17]:

Stages of radicalisation ending in terrorism

- Stage 1. Crisis of Confidence: Political protest movements use extra-parliamentary politics and direct actions such as demonstrations and protests. Groups do not challenge the legitimacy of the system.
- Stage 2. Conflict of Legitimacy: Political disengagement. Some groups challenge the legitimacy of the system and create strategies for creating an alternative system. Intense dehumanisation.
- Stage 3. Crisis of Legitimacy: Some groups function underground, use revolutionary strategies for creating a new order. Terrorism likely.

State weakness provides the particular context to the radicalisation process because of the factors typically inherent in a weak state: i) lack of legitimacy, ii) lack of parliamentary means of protest and iii) capability of the states for coercion. The lack of legitimacy is primarily due to the state's inabilities to satisfy the needs of the population, as explained

[16] Robbert A F L Woltering: "The Roots of Islamist Popularity" Third World Quarterly, Vol. 23, No 6, 2002.

[17] Researchers in terrorism analyse the process of radicalisation is by screening the development of various types of terrorist movements. The arguments of the dynamics of radicalisation are presented in Ehud Sprinzak: Process of De-Legitimation: "Towards a Linkage Theory of Political Terrorism" Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 3, Spring 1991, No.1, 50–68. They were also presented in seminars given by Ehud Sprinzak on the subject of political terrorism and held at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel in 1999–2000.

above. The low level of political participation leads to a situation in which extra-parliamentary means are often used for political influence. However, the most common extra-parliamentary 'voice of protest', demonstrations, used by many social and political groups in any democratic system, is usually lacking in a weak state because the room for such extra-parliamentary participation is non-existent. Radicalisation to the use of extra-parliamentary means or complete political disengagement is therefore relatively more likely to occur in weak states than in strong, representative, states. Similarly, because the political system has never been completely legitimate in the Arab states, Islamist – and other – groups do not remain in the first stage of demonstrations and protests, but are readily radicalised to Stage 2: Conflict of Legitimacy. When the aim of political groups is to change the entire system, which in the case of certain Islamist political groups is to change the secular to a religious system of government, the road to the goal can no longer run through the existing channels of political participation or protests.

The use of coercion and repressive measures by the state finalizes the impact of state weakness on radicalisation: the first measure taken is usually halting extra-parliamentary political protest by force. The effect on the radicalisation process of the state's use of force is often exacerbated because of the unnecessary use of repressive means (including violence) by the security apparatus when dealing with individual activists or even non-activists, particularly when taking prisoners and in prisons. The fact that the state's use of force is seen as illegitimate complicates taking the necessary counter-terrorism measures, and may even create sympathy for the groups targeted. [18]

[18] These tables appear in Mohammed M. Hafez: *Why Muslims Rebel. Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, 2003, pages 32 and 87.

Table 4.1. Islamic militant activism in Algeria and Egypt (number of violent incidents)



Source: The data were collected from the *MEJ* quarterly chronologies, *MEI, ACR, and MECS* and episodes reported by Roberts (1988), Al-Ahnaf et al. (1991), Lamchichi (1992), Ayyashi (1993), Willis (1996), and Burgat and Dowell (1997).

Table 4.2. Muslims killed and injured by terrorist acts in Egypt 1992–1997.



Source: Abulala (1998); *al-Hala al-Diniya fi Misr* (1998); *Taqrir Misr al-Mahrousa wal-Aalam, 1997* (1998).

It is typical of the process of radicalisation that the political movement goes through many stages of internal division. The further radicalisation progresses, the smaller the number of radicalised people is. Therefore most Islamist groups are either moderate, and function within the political system and social sphere when possible, or they remain on either the first or second level of radicalisation. The number of members radicalised so far as to use terrorism and civilian targeting is relatively small. Instead of the state, radicalisation can also target certain elements of the society, for example: foreigners seen as "inferiors", such as workers in Western companies, members of foreign military forces, and foreign tourists. Another instance of this type of "split delegitimation", that appears towards some particular groups in society, is violence aimed at domestic religious or ethnic minorities, such as the Copts in Egypt.[19] As conflicts between different societal groups are typical of weak states, Islamist radicalisation is often channelled and integrated into the dynamics of these conflicts. It has been posited that this form of Islamist radicalisation will become more common in the future. [20]

In the case of *al-Qaida* related militant Islamist groups, all of them have their roots in the radicalisation process that started in most Middle East countries in the 1970s. In most cases, these groups are the new generation of the same groups or splinter groups that radicalised in their respective countries as explained above.[21] The target of their radicalised protest before the advent of *al-Qaida* ideology in the mid-1990s was their respective state, but in most cases delegitimation and dehumanisation was also directed towards other minorities and westerners, who were also the targets of terrorist attacks.

What is different in *al-Qaida* related militant Islamist groups is that, in addition to radicalised protest against their respective governments, they have also targeted the international established order, which becomes delegitimised and its relevant actors dehumanised in *al-Qaida* groups.[22] The aim of *al-Qaida* groups is not just to establish an Islamic state, but an Islamic world order. In more practical terms, the groups' radicalisation to the point of targeting the international system seems to derive from an ideology that links the international system to the regional and local systems.[23] There seems to be a more direct link between delegitimation of their respective states

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[19] Sprinzak, lectures given in the seminars mentioned in Endnote 17, above. 1999–2000.

[20] Interview with Abdel Atti Mohamed, Al Ahram Center for Strategic Studies, 6 July 2003 Cairo.

[21] Gilles Kepel: *Jihad. The Trail of Political Islam*. I.B. Tauris Publishers, London, New York, 2002.

[22] This is evident in various speeches of Osama bin Laden.

[23] In addition to abolishment of the current international order altogether, and the building of a new Islamic order, the specific political aims presented by the *al-Qaida* network with regard to the international order are: abolition of the US military presence in Saudi-Arabia, and the creation of a Palestinian state.

and delegitimation of the international order: delegitimation appears directed towards the international system that supports the local states, which are seen illegitimate. [24]

Both a radicalisation process directed against the state, and a radicalisation directed against the international order or its actors, can exist at the same time. Empirical examples of the recent use of terrorism by *al-Qaida* affiliates in Saudi-Arabia, Turkey, Tunisia, Morocco and Spain (by a Moroccan group) are proof of this double process. In some attacks, the international order was the target (Spain), in some the foreign elements in the state was targeted (Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, Saudi-Arabia) and in some only the state was targeted (Saudi-Arabia). In all cases, however, the rhetorical legitimation of the attacks indicated some level of radicalisation targeting the international order or its actors.

Influencing De-Radicalisation and the Radicalisation Processes

The academic definitions of terrorism assume that terrorist groups have political aims and that terrorism is used as a tactic or strategy to achieve them.[25] This in turn implies that there is a possibility of the cessation of terrorist activities. This type of behaviour change in groups can occur due to tactical or strategic considerations, and it can remain short-term. It can also be a starting point for the de-radicalisation process. Pragmatic change in tactics/strategy and even full de-radicalisation has been confirmed in many

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[24] However, no theories exist on the process of radicalisation of protest against the international order, as there are no previous examples of such a process.

[25] Because of the religious ideology employed in the rhetoric of religious terrorists such as *al-Qaida*, it is often considered by the media and by officials that they do not have concrete political aims. The arguments against these groups having pragmatic political aims are: 1) The nature of their proposed aims: the aims are such that they can be seen as unrealistic and not legitimate; and such aims as the end of the world (delete this: there is no world after its destruction according to them as we know it), an end to the existence of the US and Israel, and an end to a secular state and world-order, cannot be seen as being able to be reached through the political process or negotiation; and 2) The nature of their use of terrorism: the use of terrorism is such that it does not appear to be strategic or tactical. For example, an overly destructive attack such as 9/11 is not necessarily beneficial to the aims of the groups. In addition, particularly *al-Qaida* is not seen as having coherent political goals; rather than being seen as a coherent group, *al-Qaida* is considered more of an ideology binding a loose network of various, separate, radical Islamist groups. The aims of these local groups can be completely different from the aims of the *al-Qaida* ideology. However, all political terrorists, with or without a religious ideology, do have political aims, which they see as legitimising their use of terrorism. Recently *al-Qaida* related groups have also used terrorism very strategically as a clearly tactical move, for example the attacks in Iraq and in Madrid before the elections. Even if the political aims of the terrorist groups cannot be negotiated, the context of radicalisation can be influenced.

cases of nationalist and/or ethnic terrorism, but also Islamist groups such as *Hamas* and *Gama'a al-Islamiyya* in Egypt have shown signs of pragmatism.[26] The political logic of *Hamas* can be understood in the context of involvement in a nationalistic ethnic struggle; but the de-radicalisation process of *Gama'a* is a clear example of the moderation of an Islamist terrorist group in a weak state, providing evidence that the context of radicalisation and possible de-radicalisation can be influenced.

Studying the de-radicalisation process, the first conclusion is that moderation has primarily been due to the complete i) inability of taking action because of state responses, such as imprisonment of most of the leadership and members of the group, and ii) cessation of public support. Inability to take action in some cases leads to the transportation of activities outside the reach of regime (i.e. Afghanistan or other safe heavens). Although the inability to take action concretely affects a group's ability to use terrorism, the de-radicalisation process and moderation has begun only after a substantial decrease in both public support, and the perceived legitimacy of the terrorist attacks, occurs. For example, in the case of *Gama'a al-Islamiyya,* the attack in Luxor in 1997 was a landmark for change in the support of the group and a turning point in strategies. After a long conflict between the Islamist militants and the state which took place in many countries during the 1990s, the activities of several radical Islamist groups ceased, and the Islamist challenge found moderate forms for protest in the political arena.[27]

A second conclusion that a study of the de-radicalisation process leads to is that counter-terrorist strategies are necessary in regard to already radicalised groups, in order to limit their space for action. In terms of group support, it is important for the success of these counter-terrorist strategies that the state's repressive acts and use of force are seen by the population as being legitimate. The state responses should be limited to targeting already radicalised individuals. If the measures are used too broadly within the society, the counter-reaction may well be more widespread radicalisation. Particular emphasis should be put on respect for the rule of law and human rights in arrests, judicial procedures and imprisonment. There should also be reforms made in the security apparatus and in the legal framework for defining the role and the use of security services and the army.

The amount of room the groups are given after they have made the decision to moderate is crucial to maintaining the de-radicalisation process. There are examples of

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[26] *Hamas* considered taking part in the Palestinian elections in 1994. Gama'a al-Islamiyya announced a cease-fire at the end of the 1990s, and after 9/11 their written statements show a change in ideology towards a more moderate position.

[27] This argument has been adopted by most scholars of political Islam after the work of Oliver Roy 1994.

groups in the process of de-radicalising which attempt to create dialogue with society: for example, *Gama'a* leadership published several letters and papers written while they were in prison that aimed to assure people in their society that *Gama'a* had opposed the 9/11 attacks and continued in the path of moderation[28] It is also important that religious and political activities are allowed, and that the existence of moderate Islamist groups is permitted, in order to ensure that there is a moderate option to act as a channel for protest and to compete with the radicalised groups for public support. The moderate groups can also serve as important mediators with the radicalised militant groups and support their non-violent activities.[29]

Political inclusion is even more necessary for influencing the ongoing radicalisation of political protest groups and those individuals that have not yet reached the level of complete political disengagement from the society. Expanded participation of moderate Islamist groups had an effect on the number of radical groups and terrorist acts in the 1990s, in Morocco and Jordan for example. Expanded participation has also had some effect on the de-radicalisation process in Lebanon, where Hezbollah now participates in parliament.[30] (For the importance of democratisation as a long-term anti-terrorism tool, see Chapter 3 of this book.)

An improvement in the provision of services by the state is also crucial for diminishing the support base of radical groups, as well as diminishing the need for protest. The case of radicalisation in the southern district of Ma'an in Jordan is an example of the direct impact of neglect in providing state services. As a consequence of failed government policies and poor regional planning, conflict has increased between the local population and the central government. Local warlords and criminal elements have violently conflicted with the central government, they have taken roles in local leadership and adopted Islamist rhetoric. They are reported to have weak links to other Islamist groups. Locals see these "Islamists" as "composed of pious individuals, who work to help the needy, reflect local community concerns, and uphold local rights and dignity."[31]

State spending on employment, education, health and social security is therefore crucial. For example, reconstruction projects in public transportation, education, agriculture and state hospitals, as well as the provision of housing loans, have helped

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[28] Interview with Said Eddin Ibrahim 9 July 2003, Cairo.

[29] Interview with Abdelkader Amara, member of the Moroccan Islamist Party for Justice and Development (PJD), Helsinki 14. March and 17 March 2003.

[30] A. Nizar Hamzeh: "Lebanon's Hezbollah: From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation" Third World Quarterly, Spring 1993.

[31] Red Alert in Jordan: Recurrent unrest in Maan. ICG Middle East Briefing, Amman/Brussels 19.2.2003. Jillian Schwedler: Occupied Maan. Jordan's Closed Military Zone. MERIP, 3.12.2002.

to undercut Hezbollah's support in Lebanon[32] . The strengthening of a state's abilities in providing services should not, however, undermine the activities of moderate Islamist groups (See Chapter 5).

From the point of view of the importance of services, it is noteworthy that those traditional Arab monarchies that have been able to keep their part of the "rule bargain" and provide services have remained relatively calm, even in those countries where the level of political participation has been lower. In these countries the traditional forms of mediation between different societal groups have functioned well alongside the emerging, new, political institutions, often working to the same end in introducing political changes that are becoming more urgent as the regimes begin to lose their capability to provide services under the pressure of population growth.[33]

General state-building efforts, such as increasing political legitimacy, diminishing violent state responses, broadening and deepening political participation, and improving the state's capability to provide services, are all necessary, long-term actions to be undertaken for the reduction and prevention of the radicalisation process occurring in certain sectors of society in a weak state.

Conclusion: Weak States and Terrorism

Radicalisation of the Islamist movements can be seen as a logical consequence of

- Lack of political legitimacy of the weak state in political processes, failure to provide services, and the lack of legitimacy of the use of force by the state
- Political exclusion: Inability to channel political demands by parliamentary means
- Repressive state responses: Inability to channel political demands by extra-parliamentary (riots and demonstrations) means
- International grievances, particularly regional security arrangements (military alliances, for example Saudi-US), regional security issues (Iraq), and conflicts (Israel-Palestinian question) can add to the radicalisation process, but the primary context of radicalisation is the state level.

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[32] Nizar Hamzeh: "Islamism in Lebanon: A Guide" MERIA, September 1997. http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324.2/islamism/shia-islam-leb.html, 25March 2003, page 8.

[33] Anoush Ehteshami: "The Delicate State of Muslim Democracy" Global Agenda, World Economic Forum 2/2004. http://www.globalagendamagazine.com/2004/anoushehteshami.asp

Tools that can reduce radicalisation are

- Enhanced political legitimacy: broadening political participation, increasing accountability, good governance, ensuring human rights, provision of public services (employment, education, health, social security), and redistribution of income
- Political inclusion: allowing both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary means of protest and demonstration,
- Diminishing violent state responses to political protest, and legitimating counter-terrorism operations
- Re-evaluation of policies of international actors as they relate to the regions, conflicts, and states in question, particularly in regard to regional security arrangements, conflicts (especially Israel-Palestine), and regimes.

Chapter 5

Taking a Local Struggle to the International Stage: The Palestinian Conflict

Minna Saarnivaara

Introduction

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, although local, has international and regional dimensions and ramifications, involving i.a. the United States, the EU, and the Arab and Muslim countries. Moreover, there are several different actors within Israel and in the Palestinian areas. This chapter concentrates on the Palestinian Islamists, who play a major role in taking the local struggle to the international stage. The major Islamist groups involved are *Harakat al-muqawama al-islamiyya*, an Islamic resistance movement whose acronym, *Hamas*, means 'enthusiasm' or 'zeal'in Arabic, and *al-Jihad al-islami*, the Islamic Jihad. Both groups are involved in armed struggle and in terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians.[1] However, the Islamic Jihad will not be discussed here in any great detail, due to its minimal political and social influence within Palestinian society compared to *Hamas*.[2] Instead, the power struggle between *Hamas* and the Palestinian Authority (PA) will form the main part of this chapter.

Supporters or members of the Palestinian Islamist groups are generally found within the Islamic current or accept the resistance programs of *Hamas* and the Islamic Jihad.[3] According to the results of interviews of members of the military wings of Palestinian Islamist and secular groups, carried out before the second uprising, or *intifada*, in

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[1] Palestinian Islamist groups do not make a distinction between military or civilian targets, as they see all Israelis as occupiers of Palestinian land. Post, J. M., E. Sprinzak and L. M. Denny: The Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists. Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 15, No.1, Spring 2003, p. 181.

[2] See more about the Islamic Jihad in Hatina, Meir: *Islam and Salvation in Palestine. The Islamic Jihad Movement.* Dayan Center Papers 127, Tel Aviv University, 2001.

[3] Robinson, Glenn E.: *Building a Palestinian State. The Incomplete Revolution*. Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1997, pp. 159–160; Hossein, Razi G.: "Legitimacy, Religion and Nationalism in the Middle East." *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 84, Issue 1 (Mar., 1990), pp. 69–91.

2000, Islamist and secular fighters have different perspectives on the justification for terrorist attacks. Secularists justified their action by declaring they were at war, while the justification of Islamists was the defense of their faith and that they were following a religious command, which gave them religious absolution.[4] According to *Hamas*, the Western countries should differentiate between terrorist actions taken to promote self-interest (e.g. Israel's military operations which lead to civilian casualties), and those actions which are a legitimate means of self-defense (e.g. the armed action of *Hamas*).[5]

During the second intifada, Palestinian political culture radicalised. Many secularists, who had already given up violent action, turned again to violence at this time, and Islamist groups gained new supporters in people who did not necessarily support all the political goals or religious perspectives of these groups. These new supporters were disappointed at what they saw as the inability of the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organisation) and the PA to resist the Israeli occupation[6]. Islamist groups, such as *Hamas* and the Islamic Jihad, are seen by many Palestinians as the only, or the strongest, alternative for ending this occupation.

The question of radicalisation and the taking of a local struggle to the international level is viewed here from the perspective of the Palestinian areas' interim situation and the power struggle between the PA and *Hamas*. The internationalisation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as the possibility that the local Palestinian Islamists' struggle will be taken to the international level, are discussed primarily in terms of Palestinian interim politics. This leads to an analysis of the rhetoric of Palestinian Islamists.

There are different opinions in Israel as well as in Palestine as to whether the solution to the conflict should be a single, shared state, or two separate states. Many Israeli find the idea of a shared state problematic due to the demographical fact that Palestinians would be the majority group in such a state within ten years.

The PA and *Hamas* have different opinions about the territory of the Palestinian state. *Hamas* divides the future into short-term and long-term solutions. The ideological long-term solution of *Hamas* is to win back 'all of Palestine', in other words, the area within its 'historic borders from the Mediterranean Sea to the River Jordan'. The more pragmatic, short-term solution of *Hamas* accepts Palestinian, Arab, or Islamic

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[4] Post, J. M., E. Sprinzak and L. M. Denny, 2003, p. 175.

[5] al-Hamad, Jawad & Iyad al-Barghouthi (eds.): Dirasa fi al-Fikr al-Siyasi li-Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (*Hamas*), 1987–1996 [A Study of the Political Ideology of The Islamic Resistance Movement (*Hamas*), 1987–1996]. Markaz Dirasat al-Sharq al-Awsat, Amman, 1997, p. 27.

[6] The term occupation is understood and used here as in the UN documents, that is the areas in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip occupied by Israel from Egypt and Jordan in the 1967 war. According to *Hamas*, the whole "historic Palestine from the Mediterranean Sea to the River Jordan" is occupied. The official stand of Israel is that its presence in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is legitimate.

sovereignty over only a part of the historical territory of Palestine, alongside a sovereign State of Israel. According to official publications of *Hamas*, the short-term solution would be only a 'temporary fix' before their long-term solution would be implemented. However, it could be argued that, as a pragmatic and populist organisation, *Hamas* would settle for a State of Palestine comprising the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, if the majority of Palestinians would accept that solution.

In 1988, in the meeting in Algiers, the PLO decided to accept the 1947 UN General Assembly Resolution 181 dividing Palestine into Jewish and Arab states.[7] The Algiers meeting also recognised Israel within her 1967 boundaries, through PLO acceptance of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 of 1967 and 338 of 1973,[8] and opened the way to a diplomatic dialogue with the United States. In other words, the Algiers meeting declared that the two-state solution meant that the State of Palestine would include the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Nowadays this is the stand taken by the PA.

There are different opinions within Israel and Palestine regarding the extent of the division between religion and state. In general, the discussion in Israel is about the Jewishness of the state; e.g. is Israel a Jewish state or a state for Jews. The goal of Palestinian Islamists is to establish Palestine as an Islamic state, while the secular Palestinian nationalist groups stress a more democratic parliamentary system in which religion would not have such an active role.

In May 1996, Benjamin Netanyahu, the head of the Israeli right-wing coalition at the time, and who opposed the 1993 Oslo Accords, became Prime Minister of Israel. The Palestinian regime then became less inclined to support democratisation, and more concerned to ensure its stability, because of the problems with Israel's new government and with Palestinian Islamists, as well as Palestinian economic problems.[9] Palestinians' high expectations regarding a just settlement of their grievances, and peace through negotiations, seemed to vanish with the electoral victory of the Israeli right-wing, even though the PA had made some achievements. The lack of peace, and democratic and personal rights for Palestinians had a strong impact on them, and their disappointment slowly deepened. Because Palestinian expectations did not match

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[7] UN General Assembly Resolution 181 of 1947: http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/a06f2943c226015c85256c40005d359c/7f0af2bd897689b785256c330061d253!OpenDocument

[8] UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967: http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/45996cc3259e1c9c052567270057ac6f/59210ce6d04aef61852560c3005da209?OpenDocument
UN Security Council Resolution 338 of 1973: http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/be25c7c81949e71a052567270057c82b/7fb7c26fcbe80a31852560c50065f878?OpenDocument

[9] Brynen, Rex: "From Occupation to Uncertainty: Palestine." In Korany, Bahgat & R. Brynen, P. Noble (eds.): *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World. Volume 2, Comparative Experiences.* Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, London, 1998, p. 194.

the reality, people became frustrated.[10] This led to a resurgence in the Islamists' popularity, following its decline during the PA's elections in 1996.[11] It could be argued that this frustration, and the Palestinians' relative deprivation, were the reasons for the beginning of the second intifada in September 2000.

Evidently, for the negotiators of the peace process, the PA was meant to be only a temporary framework for government until a full state structure could be created. From the beginning, Arafat was criticised by Palestinians for appointing his close allies from Tunis to key posts and ignoring local leaders familiar with local conditions.[12] Even though the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) was elected in 1996 through free elections, it did not have "the power that parliaments normally have in democratic countries".[13] After the elections, Arafat still implemented most policy measures autocratically, without consulting the PLC or sometimes even the Cabinet. The PA has been criticised by *Hamas* for governing chaotically and not being able to improve the provision of everyday services for people. For example, the PLC approved the Basic Law in October 1997, which was meant to be an interim 'Constitution' and to provide procedures for government during the peace process, but Arafat was unwilling to ratify it for five years, until May 2002. This created a situation in which the powers, limits, and procedures of the PA were unclear. Before the ratification of the Basic Law, the PA's procedures were based on the Oslo and Cairo agreements and PA Executive Orders, as well as on a complex local legal system comprised of old Ottoman and British mandatory laws, the pre-1967 legal codes of Jordan and Egypt, Israeli military orders, and the PLO's own legal code.[14]

Surveys have shown that most Palestinians thought that the PLC was ineffective, unresponsive and subordinate to Arafat and the executive branch.[15] Many Palestinians

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[10] See the Relative Deprivation Theory, in Gurr, Ted: *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton University Press. Princeton, New Jersey, 1970.

[11] This growing support can be seen through the victories *Hamas* had in the student and professional association elections during 1996–1998. For example, in 1996–1997 in student council elections in Hebron University *Hamas* got 53 percent (40.7 percent for *Fatah*), at Birzeit University 44.7 percent (33.6 percent for *Fatah*) and in Gaza at Islamic University 75.5 percent (17.3 for *Fatah*) of the vote. Hroub, 2000, pp. 218–219.

[12] Smith, Charles D.: *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. A History with Documents.* Bedford/St. Martin's, Boston, New York, 2001 (1st ed. 1989), p. 466.

[13] Sirriyeh, Hussein: *Democratization and the Palestinian National Authority: From State-in-the-Making to Statehood*. Israel Affairs, Vo. 7, No. 1, Autumn 2000, p. 50.

[14] Brynen 1998, pp. 192–193.

[15] Jerusalem Media & Communication Center, Poll no. 49, October 2003; An-Najah National University, Poll no. 2, September 2003; Daneels, Isabelle: *Popular evaluation of the Legislative Council.* Palestine Report, 19 September, 1997, Vol. 3, No.15. http://www.jmcc.org/media/report/97/Sep/3.htm.

also criticised the PA for patronage and corruption. The territorial proximity of Israel, and the day to day contacts Palestinian people have with Israel, have made them familiar with Israelis' political rights as well as the absence of patron-client relations in Israeli politics: the comparison with their own system has had a profound effect on Palestinians. One important characteristic of Palestinian self-government that still remains is the widespread use of political patronage. According to Rex Brynen, this kind of "political system undercuts the very logic of democratic participation, suggesting to citizens that connections – rather than the electoral process and constitutional order – hold the keys to effective political power".[16] The perceived political rights of Israeli citizens, together with the geographically and politically fragmented Palestine, have had the effect of the creation of different languages of power: Palestinians still have the rhetoric of patronage, but now they also have the rhetoric of 'rights'. In such a system, the problem is how to obtain power or services without becoming corrupt. Corruption is also *Hamas*' one topic of criticism toward the PA. In recent years, polls have shown that over 70 per cent of Palestinians clearly believe that corruption exists in the PA.[17] In addition, in a survey conducted in May 2002, 95 per cent of Palestinians supported the dismissal of ministers accused of corruption.[18] While a system of patronage and a 'chaotic' legal framework continue functioning within the administrative apparatus, it can be assumed that corruption will continue to arise as a result.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as corruption and the lack of effective social structures governed by the PA, have created the possibility for Islamists, and especially for *Hamas*, to obtain and use political power within the society, as well as to engage in the conflict. Furthermore, *Hamas* has come to represent an incorrupt organisation to the Palestinian people. The Palestinian interim economic and political situation, and the ways in which this situation creates possibilities for radicalisation, will be discussed in the sections that follow below.

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[16] Brynen 1998, p. 198.

[17] According to Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research polls, 81 per cent of Palestinians believed corruption existed in the PA in April 2003 (Poll No. 7, 2003), 84 per cent in November 2002 (Poll No. 6, 2002), 74 per cent in December 2001 (Poll No. 3, 2001) and 76 per cent in July 2000 (Poll No. 1, 2000). http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/index.html.

[18] Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 15–19 May 2002. http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2002/p4a.html.

Moving the Palestine-Israel Conflict to the International Level

The view that the "West" has "double standards", and supports the status quo in the Arab countries, contributes to the opposition within these countries to the West and Western culture. To many Muslims, the continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict symbolizes the "Western" attitude towards the problems in the Arab world. According to Judy Barsalou, the change in US support for the President of the PA, Yasser Arafat, represents these perceived double standards: until recently, the United States "strongly supported Arafat's one-man rule...Like Israel, it was anxious to maintain a Palestinian government that would take seriously Israel's security and other needs."[19] The situation changed in May 2002, when the Prime Minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon, demanded wide-ranging reform as a precondition for a return to the peace negotiations, and in June 2002, the President of the U.S., George W. Bush, made a similar statement.[20] It would be interesting to know what kind of discussion international community would have if the Palestinian elections could have been held so that Arafat would have been returned to power through the ballot box. In October 2003, 59.8 per cent of Palestinians believed that if free democratic elections were held under the then current situation, Palestinians would have re-elected Arafat as President.[21]

In the Muslim world, religious rhetoric has been used by many political leaders as a tool for legitimacy. Currently, international terrorist groups such as *al-Qaida* make use of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in their rhetoric. Further, the emphasis in Muslim religious rhetoric on Jerusalem's role as a Holy City for all Muslims introduces the Israeli-Paslestinian conflict into a broader Islamic context.[22] International terrorists are using the conflict as a tool for legitimating their actions. Actually, the reasons for the terror actions of *al-Qaida* evidently have very little to do with the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. However, international terrorists have gained the sympathy and support of many Palestinians, as was shown in Chapter 3. It is likely that this sympathy arises from the feelings of frustration and hopelessness of these Palestinians. Both Yasser Arafat and the spiritual leader of *Hamas*, Sheikh Yasin (who was killed by Israel on March 22, 2004), have condemned Osama bin Laden's "Palestine-rhetoric" and have stressed that bin-Laden should not use the Palestinian situation for his own ends.

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[19] Barsalou, Judy: The Long Road to Palestinian Reform, Middle East Policy, Vol. X, No. 1, Spring 2003.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Jerusalem Media & Communication Center, Poll no. 49, October 2003, http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/2003/no49.pdf

[22] See Elad-Bouskila, Ami: Modern Palestinian Literature and Culture. Frank Cass, London, 1999, pp. 127–138.

As long as the Palestinian conflict remains unresolved, values and pressures from the international community will have an effect on Palestinian political culture, and thus on the political process of the formation of a Palestinian state. Normally in a conflict situation, people stress the 'otherness' of the opposition and underline their own identity. Such an emphasis, as well as name-calling and dramatising the opposition as the 'enemy', are features of the rhetoric of fundamentalist and Islamist groups.[23] However, *Hamas* leaders have said lately that the struggle is not about religion, as some "voices in America" say, but a fight "on Palestinian land against [an] Israeli enemy who took [our Palestinian] home".[24] Nonetheless, the conflict creates an opportunity for some people to contrast Muslim religious aspects to the Jewishness of the State of Israel. In contrast, it seems to be very important within Palestinian society to create an identity as a 'citizen of Palestine', a concept which would promote national unity. In actual fact, the conflict has already made Palestinians, whether Muslims or Christians, strongly feel that Palestine is a nation and they are its citizens.[25]

If *Hamas* leaders could set up the State of Palestine, it would be an Islamic state. One of the goals of *Hamas* is to create a completely Islamic society, and through that, to create an Islamic state. It could be argued that *Hamas* Islamic ideology has had an effect on Palestinian political culture, an effect which can be seen in the ideas of citizenship expressed in the drafts for the PA Constitution.

Hamas' view of Jews and Christians

In classical Islamic thinking, those who adhere to the Islamic state's doctrinal principles are to be counted as full citizens of a state. There are two categories of citizens in an Islamic state: the Muslims and the non-Muslims, or *dhimmis* Traditionally in Islamic law, one who has made a covenant of protection with the Muslim power under which they live is considered *dhimmi*. Jews and Christians, 'People of the Book', can have *dhimmi*-status. In *dhimmi*-theory, the Muslim regime offers *dhimmis* security of life and property, defense against enemies, communal self-government, and freedom of religious practice in return for paying the poll tax, *jizya*. At the same time, this poll tax represents political loyalty and a financial compensation for exemption from military service. *Dhimmis* do not have equal status as citizens, but they do not have the same duties either. The *dhimmi*-status of the religious minorities is not explicitly articulated in the present-day Muslim countries. However, traces of the *dhimmi*-status can be found in different societies, for example in Iran.

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[23] Marty, M. E. & R. S. Appleby (eds.): Fundamentalisms Observed. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991.

[24] Plett, Barbara: *Hamas* leader talks strategies. BBC News, 29.10.2003.

[25] Amayreh, Khalid: Sharing a vision: Palestinian Christians. Al-Jazeera, 30.11.2003.

A comparison of *Hamas* ideology with its actual practice reveals that *Hamas* is ambivalent toward minorities. *Hamas* does not mention the term *dhimmi* in its Charter. However, it can be argued that its minority-oriented ideology is based on the traditional *dhimmi*-status thinking common to Muslims. In the Islamists' opinion, Muslims should control a state in which the majority of the population is Muslim.[26] Islamists evidently think that, according to the rules of 'democracy', the minority should accept the majority's point of view.

The *Hamas* Charter uses very anti-Semitic terminology. However, such language vanished from the movement's literature and political discourse in the early 1990s, and later *Hamas* differentiated between Judaism (the religion) and Zionism (Jewish nationalist movement). Yet, *Hamas* does not clearly define the difference between a Zionist person and a Jew. Furthermore, during the second intifada, anti-Semitic terminology re-emerged. According to *Hamas*, Jews can live in the Palestinian Islamic state as citizens, but they cannot establish a sovereign Jewish entity.[27] For Christians, the other large minority group in the territory of the future Palestine, *Hamas* promises equal status. The equal status of a minority group is very problematic: this contradicts the ideologically unequal *dhimmi*-status, because *dhimmis* are not legally competent citizens. The modern nation-state idea of the equality of all citizens does not belong to *dhimmi*-theory, in which democratic pluralism does not exist. Even though Islamists call for the freedom of opinion, the Islamic state still holds that everyone should accept Islam's superiority over other ideologies. The attitude of *Hamas* toward the Christian population seems to be a pragmatic and tactical choice made in order to maintain unity within Palestinian society. The pragmatism of the *Hamas* movement can also be seen in the recent comments of Sheikh Yasin in regard to the Palestinian state. According to Sheikh Yasin, everyone, that is, Christians, Jews and Muslims, should have equal rights in the future Palestine and should also have the possibility to decide what kind of a state they want, to decide whether the state is an Islamic state or something else.[28]

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[26] For some Islamist groups, it is not necessary for a state to have a majority of Muslims in the population in order for the state to be ruled by Islamic principles. However, *Hamas* has stressed the majority approach.

[27] Compare with the attitude of the fundamentalist Zionist group, Gush Emunim, toward Arabs in Israel. See in Sprinzak, Ehud: "The Politics, Institutions, and Culture of Gush Emunim", in Silberstein, Lawrence J. (ed.): *Jewish Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective*. New York & London, New York University Press, 1993, pp. 117–147.

[28] Interviews from Gaza. Middle East Policy, Vol. IX, No. 4, December 2002. Sheikh Ahmad Yasin interviewed by Minna Saarnivaara in Gaza City, 2000.

Citizenship in a Palestinian state

Over the last few years, the PA has greatly changed its thinking about what constitutes 'a good citizen'. The latest draft Constitution of March 2003[29] shows that a 'good citizen' will be a 'democratic' citizen: a full and equal member of society. However, it seemed earlier, in the draft Constitution of February 2001[30] that the 'good' citizen would be an 'Islamic' citizen, that is, Muslims would be full members of society while people from other religions would be "respected". For example, the 2001 draft states: "Palestinians shall be equal before the law. They shall enjoy rights and incur duties equally without discrimination for any cause except those constitutionally legitimated." The published draft Constitution of March 2003 states more clearly: "The Constitution guarantees equality in rights and duties to all citizens irrespective of their religious belief."

When minorities are discussed in connection with citizenship in an Islamic state, one important fact is that the non-Muslim status in an Islamic state is of necessity linked to the world community. The question is not an easy one, because it involves the nature of the modern nation-state and the place of a nation in the world. Every state needs economic and political co-operation with influential members or organisations of the world community. The position and treatment of non-Muslims in an Islamic state would affect that state's relations with the international community. This would probably lead to pragmatic choices that might contradict the ideology of Islamists. It can be seen that a system has been created in which populations are governed both by their own modern states and by the overarching system of states into which their own states have been incorporated.[31] The international state system has always had an effect on individual states; but in the current situation in Palestine, the local conflict increases international tension and the international tension has an effect on the local conflict. This makes the local process of the formation of a Palestinian state partly an international process as well.

Several conflicting pressure groups exist within Palestinian society. This situation raises several questions, such as who actually has authority, or what is the limit for "concessions" to be made to pressure from the international community in the process of state formation. It could be argued that this international pressure, and the internal

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[29] http://www.mofa.gov.ps/constitution/index.asp

[30] http://www.mofa.gov.ps/constitution/constitution.asp

[31] Seth, S: "A 'postcolonial world'?" in Fry, G. & J. O'Hagan (eds.): *Contending Images of World Politics,* Macmillan, London, 2000. See also Barry Hindess: *Neo-liberal Citizenship*. Citizenship Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2002, and Charles Tripp: "Islam and the Secular Logic of the State in the Middle East", in Sidahmed A. S. & A. Ehteshami (eds.): *Islamic Fundamentalism.* Westview Press, Colorado, Oxford, 1996, pp. 51–70.

struggle between different groups, can be seen in different drafts of the Palestinian constitution.

When looking at the draft Constitution of 2001, it appears that:

- the political culture of the society is so influenced by the Islamists' view of Islam that it is that view which is reflected in the legislation, and/or
- the PA finds *Hamas* such a great political threat that it tries to diminish the influence of *Hamas* through use of similar rhetoric.

The PA may also be calculating that, if the essence of the constitution is Islamic, this will assuage some Palestinian grievances and have a certain appeal. The PA does not necessarily have to care about the language or the content of the constitution later, but if it uses religious rhetoric now, it might keep *Hamas* quiet for a while. Thus, it can be argued that Islamists have had an effect on the draft constitution. However, the extent of any direct effect *Hamas* has had is difficult to estimate. The drastic change in the rhetoric of the later draft Constitution of 2003 seems to be more the result of immense external, international pressure, as well as internal pressure from e.g. the Christian Palestinians, than the result of any understanding that *Hamas* does not represent a political threat to the current Palestinian political regime, or that the political culture would have become secularised during the second intifada.

Carrying the Local Palestinian Radicalism to the International Level?

Both *Hamas* and Islamic Jihad have been distinctively local, nationalistic groups, even though most Islamic thinkers consider nationalism to be contrary to classical Islamic thinking.[32] According to Islam, all Muslims are part of a common community, the Islamic *umma*. *Hamas* ideology is somewhat unclear when it comes to the idea of *umma*. Article 7 of the *Hamas* Charter states: "... [*Hamas*] is a universal movement, and it is prepared for this because of the clarity of its thought, noble goal, and the loftiness of its objectives."[33] Article 15 says: "It is necessary to spread the spirit of

[32] The issue of nationalism versus Islamic universalism is not a simple one. Many thinkers have tried, especially in 1920s and 1930s, to show that the two do not necessarily have to contradict each other. One of these thinkers is al-Bazzaz.

[33] Mithaq Harakat al-muqawama al-islamiyya – Filastin. [The *Hamas* Charter] In Leqrain, Jean-François: *Les voix du soulèvement palestinien 1987–1988.* Cedej, 1991, pp. 211–231. Translations are by Minna Saarnivaara.

jihad[34] among the *umma*, fight with the enemies, and join the ranks of the Jihad fighters." However, *Hamas*' goals are clearly nationalistic as Article 6 shows: "The Islamic Resistance Movement is a distinct Palestinian movement." The tension between the ideas of nationalism and *umma* is demonstrated in *Hamas*' rhetoric. Nevertheless, this rhetoric has managed to connect the ideas of traditional Islam to nationalism by using religious terms.

There have been several speculations as to whether *al-Qaida* has a foothold in the Palestinian territories or not. Both *Hamas* and the Islamic Jihad have clearly stated that they do not allow international terrorist networks to operate in the area. The reason for this prohibition may be that there might be civil war if *al-Qaida* became active within the area. Both of the Palestinian Islamist groups oppose civil war and stress national unity. Nonetheless, it was asserted in Spring 2002 that Abu Musa'ab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian born terrorist who has claimed to have connections to *al-Qaida* and *Ansar al-Islam*, has begun setting up possible connections in Palestinian areas.[35] This is still unclear.

Both the US and the EU have listed *Hamas* and the Islamic Jihad as terrorist organisations and have tried to freeze the funds of these groups.[36] This listing of *Hamas* seemed to be problematic for the EU, not least because of the problematic nature of the connections between the military and political branches of *Hamas*. The EU faced strong pressure from the US and Israel in the matter of adding the political branch of *Hamas* to the terrorist list. Currently the ongoing discussion about the structural nature of *Hamas* is divided between two opinions: the first is that *Hamas* is still divided into separate political and military branches;[37] and the second is that these two branches are nowadays working together.[38]

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[34] The term "jihad" has two meanings. The spiritual struggle inside oneself, that is termed "the greater jihad" (*al-jihad al-akbar*), and the defensive war, or holy war, which is "the lesser jihad" (*al-jihad al-asghar*). However, the definition of 'holy war' is problematic. Bernard Lewis pointed out in his book *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1988, p. 71) that there is no word corresponding to 'holy war' in classical Arabic usage. It is unclear, because of the divergent verses of Qur'an, whether jihad is justified only in defense against aggression (for example see verses 2:190 and 9:12) or under all circumstances (for example verses 9:5 and 9:29). (Peters 1996, pp. 2–3).

[35] The United States Department of the Treasury, Press Release 24.9.2003, http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/js757.htm

[36] The United States listed both groups on October 2001. The EU listed Islamic Jihad and *Hamas* military wing 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades on March 2001. The whole of *Hamas* was listed by the EU on September 2003.

[37] This view is supported by for example Anders Strindberg. Panel discussion in Helsinki on October 9, 2003, arranged by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

[38] This view is supported by e.g. Matthew A. Levitt: *Hamas from Cradle to Grave.* Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2004, http://www.meforum.org/article/582.

The functional units of *Hamas* have been divided into two groups: one in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and one operating outside these areas. This divisiveness leads to problems of control. Since the leaders of the different unit have had divergent visions of the organisation's plan of action, it is justified to question whether *Hamas* is centrally controlled or not. In fact, from the beginning *Hamas* has adopted the principle of decentralisation, and a policy of functional independence.[39] Its strategy has been to keep, or at least present its political and military branches as independent and separate units. It could be argued that many times this has been the case. Those who hold the opinion that the political and military branches of *Hamas* are still divided, often reach the conclusion that the total unification of the movement in the future would be very dangerous politically, and such unification would not make sense in terms of the overall strategy of *Hamas*. Furthermore, this unification would mean that *Hamas* would have changed its strategy and could also isolate itself politically later on.

The other opinion, taken e.g. by the US government, emphasises that the political and military branches of *Hamas* are united. It can then be argued that Sheikh Yasin must have been personally aware of the planned terror attacks or at least had approved the intention to carry them out.[40] Furthermore, the following statement made by Salah Shehadeh, the former commander of the military branch of *Hamas*, who was killed by the Israeli air force on July 23, 2002, has been used as an evidence by people who hold the 'unified' view: "The political apparatus is sovereign over the military apparatus, and a decision of the political [echelon] takes precedence over the decision of the military [echelon], without intervening in military operations."[41]

Indeed, according to *Hamas*, the orders and overall policy for the movement come from the political leadership, but the actual operations are carried out by the military branch without the interference of the political branch. As 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Rantisi, the former *Hamas* leader in Gaza, who was killed by Israeli security forces on April 17, 2004, has stated: "The military wing plans operations, while the political wing sets a framework for policy and nothing else. So, for example, if we [the political wing] agreed in negotiations to halt operations, we would see that immediately because we

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[39] al-Hamad & al-Barghouthi 1997, p. 11

[40] See also Karmon, Ely: "*Hamas*' Terrorism Strategy: Operational Limitations and Political Constraints." *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 4, No. 1, March 2000, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2000/issue1/jv4n1a7.html and Khalil Shikaki's opinions in this article.

[41] "A May 2002 Interview with the *Hamas* Commander of the al-Qassam Brigades", The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), July 24, 2002, http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP40302. See also Human Rights Watch Report: *Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks against Israeli Civilians*, October 2002, p. 63, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/isrl-pa/.

have indirect connections with the military wing, and all the time they respect our declarations."[42] Despite this assertion, however, for private or religious reasons individuals sometimes carry out terrorist attacks, which seem to come as a surprise to the leadership of *Hamas*.

Historically, Middle Eastern opposition groups have been partly funded from outside the state in which groups have acted, for example from expatriates and various countries supporting the opposition groups. It has also been argued that terrorists or their supporters are using the traditional Muslim method of money exchange, the informal financial mechanism *hawala*, as a platform for money transfers. *Hawala* has been used for its speed, low cost and reliability compared to the use of established financial institutions. It functions as a financial transfer or remittance from one agent to another without the use of formal financial institutions. These "informal" transactions are not formally documented and, in fact, are based on trust and communication between intermediaries. Even though small transactions would be safer to make without raising suspicion, large amounts of money are still relatively easy to transfer.[43]

The second subject of debate is whether or not *Hamas* has become an international player. This debate is linked with the problem of agency (see Chapter 1): whose actions represent the actions of *Hamas*? The tendency to see *Hamas* as being an international player is clear in the statements of US foreign policy advisors.[44] This discussion is related to the financial, logistical, and sometimes even the training operations of *Hamas*. The rationale of this approach appears to be that *Hamas* has in fact internationalised, if one looks at its financial and logistical operations, and if certain charities or people outside the area can be seen as representing the will of *Hamas*. This approach stresses, for example, people with connections to both *Hamas* and *al-Qaida*, such as Ali Hasan al-Muayyad from al-Aqsa International Foundation in Jemen, Muhammad Zuaydi from the Islamic Association of Spain, and Suleiman Biheiri from BMI Inc. in New Jersey.[45] However, the argument against the internationalisation of *Hamas* argues that these people with connections to both *Hamas* and *al-Qaida* could be acting as individuals and not as representatives of a certain group, and therefore their connections to *Hamas* do not prove that the organisation would have become international.

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[42] Interviews from Gaza. Middle East Policy, Vol. IX, No. 4, December 2002.

[43] See more in Looney, Robert: "Hawala: The Terrorist's Informal Financial Mechanism", *Middle East Policy*, Vol. X, No. 1, Spring 2003.

[44] One of the clearest examples is Matthew A. Levitt: "Untangling the Terror Web: The Need for a Strategic Understanding of the Crossover Between International Terrorist Groups to Successfully Prosecute the War on Terror." Testimony of Levitt, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, October 22, 2003.

[45] Testimony of Levitt, 2003; Levitt, M. A.: "Turning a Blind Eye to *Hamas* in London", the Wall Street Journal Europe, 20.10.2003.

If *Hamas* became a group which used armed force on the international stage, this would mean a total turnaround in its strategy, which has forcefully stressed its local nature. In fact, *Hamas* has restricted its struggle only to the area of 'historical Palestine'. According to *Hamas*, it sees itself as a 'freedom fighting organisation' and not a terrorist organisation, a category into which it thinks the PLO fell because the PLO's armed operations became international.[46] Thus far, *Hamas* has not used armed force on an international level. In this sense *Hamas* has not internationalised.

An example of the problematic nature of actors and the internationalisation of an organisation can be revealed through a comparison of the several assessments made by Israeli and American security sources stating that *Hamas* and the Islamic Jihad are working with Hizbullah in the geographical area along the borders of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, the so-called 'tri-border' area. According to the Israeli-American sources, this area is a centre for drug trafficking, the weapons trade, money laundering, forgery, and activity that supports Islamic terror in Latin America.[47] Despite these reports, the organisational roles of *Hamas* and the Islamic Jihad within the area are still very vague, and the agency of these activities is unclear. Due to the number and variety of different Muslim groups which call themselves 'Islamic Jihad' also makes it unclear which country's Jihad group these reports refer to. This ambiguity appears in, for example, Jane's Terrorism & Security Monitor Report for October 2003, which states that the 'Islamic Jihad' carried out and claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks against Jewish interests in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994.[48] However, the Islamic Jihad's role in those attacks is questioned by Dr. Boaz Ganor, Director of the International Policy Institute on Counter-Terrorism: "In practice, the operational command of Hizbullah has undertaken numerous attacks under the name of Islamic Jihad. The attack on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in March 1992 was apparently done by Hizbullah activists in Argentina in revenge for the killing of one of the organisation's top leaders, Abas Massawi, by the IDF [Israel Defence Forces] in Lebanon. Yet responsibility for the attack was claimed by a body calling itself the Islamic Jihad."[49]

Lack of funds, due to the freezing policies of the international community and the continuing intifada, has created a space for the Lebanese Hizbullah to move into

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[46] Hroub, Khaled: *Hamas. Political Thought and Practice.* Institute for Palestine Studies, Washington DC, 2000, p. 245.

[47] US Department of State, 2003. Patterns of Global Terrorism – 2002, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/; Amir Oren, Haaretz 10.2.2004. "Islamist terrorism in Latin America", *Jane's Terrorism & Security Monitor*, October 2003.

[48] "Islamist terrorism in Latin America", *Jane's Terrorism & Security Monitor*, October 2003.

[49] Ganor, Boaz: "The Islamic Jihad: The Imperative Of Holy War." *Survey of Arab Affairs*, 31, 15 February 1993, http://www.jcpa.org/jl/saa31.htm.

Palestinian areas and operate as a political and military agent. There are speculations that Hizbullah has begun to financially support Palestinian military groups, especially the Islamic Jihad and groups belonging to PLO's largest group, *Fatah*, such as the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. Hizbullah is also thought to recruit supporters among Israel's Arab minority.[50] Hizbullah is able to stabilise its position within the Palestinian areas because of its monetary funding. It is possible that Hizbullah may even expand its current activities within the area, joining in attacks with *Hamas* and the Islamic Jihad, which are already cooperating and coordinating their attacks.[51]

Palestinian welfare

Currently, the economic and humanitarian situation in the Palestinian territories is catastrophic, due to the continuing intifada, Israel's repressive policies in the area, the armed action of different groups, the PA's legitimation crisis, and the lack of a functioning socio-economic network. As long as these factors continue to weaken the Palestinian economy, foreign aid can primarily address only short-term humanitarian needs, and such recurrent expenditures as civil servants' salaries and job creation programmes. The longer-term development of infrastructure, and projects designed to fuel medium and long term economic, social and political development, all of which according to Judy Barsalou remain the top priority of the Palestinians and the international donor community, will have to wait until the political situation changes.[52]

Even though the PA has been generally regarded as being corrupt, it seems that current donors believe that the PA's reforms in 2002, for example to improve accounting procedures, have been somewhat effective, and now support for recurrent expenditures is effective enough to put essential resources into the hands of ordinary Palestinians. Even though donors are now giving aid directly to the PA, the PA's previous financial mismanagement has created tension in the donor community, which arises from the donor's desire to control how aid is spent and on what. In 2002, the Israeli closure policy during the second intifada led to a situation in which the PA was paying "40 per cent of all domestic wages".[53] Furthermore, despite the great amount of foreign

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[50] The Associated Press: Hezbollah Influence Grows in Mideast, 8.2.2004.

[51] "Shin Bet uncovers Gaza terror cell tied to Hezbollah", Haaretz 11.3.2004. Oren, Amir: "Muslim terrorists step up activities in Latin America", Haaretz 10.2.2004, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/392425.html.. Plushnick-Masti, Ramit: "*Hamas* joins forces with Islamic Jihad". *The Washington Times*, 30.10.2003; Guerilla tactics boost Gaza Resistance Fighters. *Hamas*online, 14.5.2004, www.*Hamas*online.com.

[52] Barsalou, Judy: "Missing the Mark: Foreign Aid to the Palestinians", *Middle East Policy*, Vol. X, No. 4, Winter 2003.

[53] Ibid.

aid given to the Palestinians, these economic measures have been substantially less than what Palestinians actually need. In March 2003, the World Bank released a report stating that: "60 per cent of the population of the West Bank and Gaza live under a poverty line of US $2 per day. The numbers of the poor have tripled from 637,000 in September 2000 to nearly 2 million today."[54]

So, despite massive foreign aid, most Palestinians are suffering from poverty. Even though there has been improved planning and coordination among the PA ministries, and structural reorganisation within the PA and in Palestinian civil-society organisations, in regard to delivery of services to the grassroots level the PA's situation is currently chaotic. Because the PA lacks a functioning socio-economic network, another actor has strengthened its position as a provider of welfare services: Islamic social organisations. Even though there are several different Islamic and non-religious organisations providing welfare in Palestinian areas, the main strength of *Hamas* is that it is providing a network of those services.

Freezing the funds of *Hamas* does make a difference as to the number of armed attacks, but this measure cannot end the attacks totally. Freezing funds not only decreases funds for armed attacks, but also decreases funds for the welfare services *Hamas* is providing to Palestinians, and thus the measure also has a direct effect on Palestinian lives. Providing social welfare services cannot be seen as a purely altruistic action on the part of *Hamas*. When Palestinians get basic services from *Hamas*, *Hamas* gains popular support and can spread its political agenda, Islamise the society, and recruit new members. Currently, the PA is undergoing a legitimation crisis while *Hamas* is enjoying legitimate power in regard to resistance to Israel and the provision of health care for the poor. *Hamas* is working within an alternative social system, the 'Islamic welfare system', and has authority in many social matters.

It is difficult to estimate the number of Islamic institutions. However, according to Sara Roy, these "comprise anywhere from 10-40 per cent of all social institutions in the Gaza Strip and West Bank."[55] Furthermore, according to the PA Ministry of Education, 65 per cent of all educational institutions below secondary level in the Gaza Strip are run by Islamic organisations. Both the management and the workers in these organisations are perceived as being well educated, highly trained and professional; and moreover, Palestinians perceive the services they provide as being generally of high quality.[56] In addition, the former director of an EU humanitarian agency speaks

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[54] The population of the occupied Palestinian territories is approximately three million. The World Bank Report: *Two Years of Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis*. 5 March 2003.

[55] Roy, Sara: *The Transformation of Islamic NGOs in Palestine*. Middle East Report 214, Spring 2000.

[56] Ibid.

highly of the professionalism of Islamic social welfare organisations, stressing that these organisations' lists of beneficiaries are impressive and that some international organisations have even checked their lists with the lists of the Islamic welfare organisations.[57]

These Islamic social welfare organisations provide services to low-income households, but they also accord special status to orphans and the physically or mentally disabled. It seems that the beneficiaries are not selected because of their kinship, religion, piety or political ties but on the basis of their socio-economic need instead. For example, the Ramallah Zakat Committee counts ten Christian families among its beneficiaries.[58] Islamic organisations emphasise the equality of people in their action, compared to the patronage system used commonly by the PA.

In some localities, Islamic social welfare organisations reach people who cannot be helped by any other actor. This factor, and the quality of the services provided, have not gone unnoticed in the PA: a high ranking official from the Ministry of the Interior has acknowledged that they have "look[ed] the other way with many Islamic institutions because they provide excellent services and this helps" the PA.[59]

The social welfare services *Hamas* provides can be divided into two categories: The first is charitable acts, such as provision of financial subsidies and food support for Palestinians affected by bad economic conditions. *Hamas* also supports families whose members have died as "martyrs" during the struggle against Israel, and families whose members are imprisoned in Israel. The second category is provision of services, such as education and medical aid. The social service organisations affiliated to *Hamas* can provide several services at the same time. For example, *al-Salah* Society provides emergency relief, and runs orphanages, kindergartens, and medical centres. It also dispenses cash and food aid to people in need. Taken all together, *al-Salah* serves nearly 20,000 Palestinians and sustains tens of thousands more.[60]

The political ties of Islamic social welfare organisations are not clear: some organisations are independent, some are sympathetic to *Hamas*, *Fatah*, or other actors, through the political leanings of their founders, governing bodies, funding or workers. As witnessed during fieldwork conducted by the author in 2000 in the West Bank and Gaza City, the local people 'just know' which institutions, mosques or committees belong to *Hamas*. This is confirmed by the ICG Reports' interviewees, who stress the common knowledge of political ties. According to the same report: "It is generally

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[57] ICG Report No. 13, 2003, p. 9
[58] Ibid., p. 8
[59] Roy, S. 2000.
[60] Usher, Graham: "Building from the ruins". *Al-Ahram Weekly*, November 2003.

held that *Hamas* is far more influential within the social welfare sector than any other Palestinian political organisation, including the PA."[61]

Hamas' attacks against Israeli civilians have created considerable pressure from outside the Palestinian territories on the PA to freeze all funds of the institutions affiliated with *Hamas*. Islamic charitable institutions have been accused of transferring charity money to fund military activities, to recruit members for Islamist groups and to promote violence and intolerance in their educational programmes. For example, the funds of *al-Salah* Society were frozen in August 2003 by the PA, because of the Society's alleged links with *Hamas*. However, there has also been enormous pressure from inside the Palestinian society on the PA to provide basic services which it cannot provide. In May 2004, this internal pressure caused the PA to release some previously frozen funds of charities linked to *Hamas*.

The Power of Hamas

In the current situation, *Hamas* has both physical and ideological power. Because of that power, *Hamas* can be said to have an effect on the Palestinian state formation process. It seems that *Hamas* also has religious and political power, even though it has lost a great deal of its economic power due to the fund freezing. It could be argued that in the current situation economic power is not a condition for the use of physical and ideological power.

Hamas' physical power resources are clear if one looks at its use of violence and armed struggle to achieve its goals. *Hamas* uses violence not only against the Israelis but also against fellow Palestinians who are considered to be henchmen of or collaborators with Israel.

Economic power can be used for material rewarding, as well as for blackmailing or threatening to remove the benefits gained earlier. Economic power makes the control of material wealth possible. The corruption and incapacity of the PA has led to a situation in which economic power, through for example welfare services, has slowly transferred to *Hamas* after the failure of the PA; the situation might also be that *Hamas* has always had economic power in some areas due to its nature as a strong social organisation at a time when life is difficult for Palestinians and none of the official 'institutions of power' have the ability or the possibility to produce material wealth to improve their lives.

The latter possibility, that *Hamas* has always had economic power, seems more likely than the former. Even before the establishment of *Hamas* in 1987, the Muslim Brotherhood organisation had economic power and it provided welfare services to all

[61] ICG Report No. 13, 2003, p. 11.

Palestinians who needed their help. Later, *Hamas* was founded as a "wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine"[62] and continued the Brotherhood's social work. *Hamas* has used rewarding economic power to all Palestinians through its provision of welfare services, as said earlier, as well as through money it has given to the families of 'martyrs' and those who have family member imprisoned in Israel.

Ideological power can be divided into cognitive and affectional power. Erkki Berndtson has stressed that knowledge or information becomes an important power resource in a society when the attempt is made to affect the opinions and attitudes of people through this knowledge. In such a situation "cognitive knowledge becomes a part of the ideology of the society."[63] Information is power, and *Hamas* stresses that it has the information about how the society should be ruled in the right, Islamic way. *Hamas* delivers this information to people through its efforts toward the Islamisation of the society, and by providing a network of schools, adult education centres, libraries, youth and sports clubs, hospitals and charity organisations. Even more effective than cognitive power is affectional power, which is linked to the idea of legitimate power. *Hamas* does indeed have legitimate power in the eyes of many Palestinians.

With these three resources of power, physical, economic and ideological, *Hamas* can affect the process of state formation at least on the level of values. Using the latest support rates of *Hamas*,[64] it can be argued that *Hamas*' ideological power is strong enough for it to wield both physical and ideological power. It could also be argued that in the current political situation, in which the centre of political authority is vague, the changes in the political situation have more effect on the support of *Hamas* than does its use of economic power. *Hamas* leadership has made public statements which reflect the possibility of the internationalisation of *Hamas* activities. In February 2003, on the eve of the US war with Iraq, Sheikh Yasin made a statement, in which he

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[62] Mithaq Harakat al-muqawama al-islamiyya – Filastin.

[63] Berndtson, Erkki: Politiikka tieteenä. (Political Science as a Field of Research) Valtionhallinnon Kehittämiskeskus, Painatuskeskus, Helsinki, 1994, p. 32.

[64] Public Opinion Polls: an-Najah National University, Poll No. 6, May 13–15, 2004, http://www.najah.edu/: popularity of *Hamas*: 26.5%, popularity of *Fatah*: 22.3%, popularity of Islamists (together): 40.4 %. Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research, Poll No. 11, March 14–17, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2004/p11epdf.pdf: popularity of *Hamas*: 20.3 %, popularity of *Fatah*: 26.6%, popularity of Islamists (together): 29.4 %. Jerusalem Media & Communication Center, Poll No. 49, October 2003, http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/2003/no49.pdf: popularity of *Hamas*: 22.6 %, popularity of *Fatah*: 29.3%, popularity of Islamists (together): 28.9 %. An-Najah National University, Poll No. 2, September 2003, http://www.najah.edu/: popularity of *Hamas*: 26.4%, popularity of *Fatah*: 27.7%, popularity of Islamists (together): 36.1 %. Jerusalem Media & Communication Center, Poll No. 48, April 2003, http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/2003/no48.htm: popularity of *Hamas*: 22.0 %, popularity of *Fatah*: 22.6%, popularity of Islamists (together): 29.5 %.

stressed that if the US goes to war with Iraq, "Muslims should threaten Western interests and strike them everywhere."[65] The former *Hamas* political leader in Gaza, al-Rantisi, commented on the Iraqi war in March of 2003 with similar remarks.[66]

These comments differ totally from the strategy *Hamas* has previously applied: the armed struggle against the Israelis has always taken place within Israeli borders. After the huge amount of publicity which the above statements received, the pronouncements were softened and connected to the economic jihad. In September 2003, al-Rantisi stated that Muslims all over the world should wage an 'economic jihad' against the US, and that products made in the US should be boycotted.[67]

There are several different possibilities for the shifting of in the stance taken by *Hamas*:

- *Hamas* could have wanted to play a sympathy card, with an eye towards the Arab countries on the eve of the war when the opposition to the U.S. was strong in the Middle East.
- The reasons behind these statements could have been economic. *Hamas* has received a great amount of funding from Iraq, and from other countries in the Gulf area, where feelings of antipathy towards the US were rising at the time, due to the possibility of war. This economic connection could have made *Hamas* leaders want to adapt their statements to make use of the feelings of people from the Gulf area.
- It is possible that the leadership of *Hamas* wanted to draw the attention of the international community back to the Palestinian territories at a time when Iraq was holding centre stage. The situation within the Palestinian territories and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was continuing without major changes.
- There might also have been some pressure within *Hamas* to internationalise its armed action.

After the killing of Sheikh Yasin in March 2004, the statements from *Hamas*' members and its leadership were angry and they were interpreted by the US as threatening US

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[65] Bennet, James: "*Hamas* Leader Urges Muslims to Retaliate", *The New York Times* 8.2.2003.

[66] Paz, Reuven: "Rantisi vs. the United States: New policy of a new leader of *Hamas*?" *PRISM*, Occasional Papers, Vol. 1, No. 5, April 2003, http://www.e-prism.org/images/PRISM%20no%205.doc.

[67] Ibid.; Fighel, Yoni: "*Hamas* calls for "economic Jihad" against the US", *ICT*, 2.10.2003, http://www.ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=932.

interests. However, the leadership of *Hamas* quickly stressed that *Hamas* has no intention of changing its policy and starting armed action against the US and its interests.[68]

There is the possibility that the pressure for *Hamas* to widen the struggle outside the Israeli borders will increase. If the Israeli-Palestinian conflict situation is not moving in any direction, and the conflict continues as it has been since the beginning of the second intifada, it is possible *Hamas* may come to believe that their tactics must change to take a more radical direction. In this situation, internationalisation can be seen by *Hamas* as a possibility. The other possibility for internationalisation exists if the Palestinian internal situation changes so that *Hamas* no longer has any space to act. If *Hamas* still has strong support and ideological power in the Palestinian territories, but no space for political action. This could lead to a civil war or the internationalisation of *Hamas*' armed action. This scenario could be played out if *Hamas* is marginalised politically within the Palestinian society by, for example, the PA, Israel or the international community.

Conclusions

The continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict represents to many Muslims the perceived double standards of Western countries and their support to the status quo in the Arab world. While international terrorists are using the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a tool for the legitimation of their actions, Arab regimes are also using the conflict as an excuse not to make changes in their governing principles.

Since the beginning of the second intifada, the PA has been in a legitimation crisis. It also lacks a functioning socio-economic network. This has created an opportunity for *Hamas* to operate as a political player, mainly through the popularity of its socio-economic network and its resistance against Israeli policies.

Hamas cannot be seen as a political party, it is more like a movement representing certain political and moral views. The reasons for its support vary. Over the past few years *Hamas* obtained new supporters from among people who were disappointed at what they saw as the inability of the PLO and the PA to resist the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories. The actions of Islamist groups, such as *Hamas* and the Islamic Jihad are seen by many Palestinians as the only, or the strongest, alternative for ending the occupation. *Hamas* has also worked hard to win the support of the Palestinian

[68] New *Hamas* chief vows all-out revenge, *Hamas*online, 25.3.2004, http://www.*Hamas*online.com/index.php?itemid=464; "*Hamas* Says U.S. Not in Its Sights for Now", *Hamas*online, 26.3.2004, http://www.*Hamas*online.com/index.php?itemid=467

people by satisfying their social needs in terms of the provision of social welfare services and economic support. In the eyes of many Palestinians, what the organisation has done on the ground has become important: that is, *Hamas* has provided social welfare services and resisted Israeli occupation.

In this chapter, the internationalisation of the local struggle has been discussed primarily in terms of the internationalisation of *Hamas*, and the effect of the power and worldview of *Hamas* on both Palestinian society and the international community. The discussion of the internationalisation of *Hamas* is further linked to the unclarity of the agency of this internationalisation. It can be argued that *Hamas* has internationalised if one looks at its financial and logistical operations and if the certain charities or people outside the area are seen as representing *Hamas* in the actions they take. However, at the same time it can be argued that these people are acting as individuals and not as representatives of a certain group. *Hamas*' military action is still aimed at Israel and the Palestinian territories. Nevertheless, *Hamas* has always had political bureaus in Israel's neighboring countries. Taking the view that *Hamas*' political and military branches are working together and that the movement has internationalised, it follows from the Israeli viewpoint that it would be understandable to try to destroy the movement totally using all possible means. However, those who take this view and come to this conclusion rarely ask what consequences such an action might possibly have. It is possible that Palestinians would suffer more because they would lack the social services now provided by *Hamas*. Further, Israel would probably still face attacks by Palestinians. As long as the PA cannot provide basic services for people, and *Hamas* or armed resistance in general has popular Palestinian support, it can be argued that destroying *Hamas* will not solve the problem of Israel security. If *Hamas* is beaten, and if some Palestinians still suffer under Israeli repression, then support for armed resistance might increase. It is likely that other military groups would develop to replace *Hamas*, or some individuals would continue attacks, which would be seen as a legitimate form of revenge. There is also a possibility that these new groups or individuals could affiliate and combine their lists of grievances against Israel and the US, seen as a biased supporter of Israel. Since terrorism should be dealt with using all possible means available, it is important to secure the basic social needs of Palestinians, thus addressing their core grievances and reducing their support for the use of violence.

Some possible scenarios can be drawn of ways in which to deal with the *Hamas* attacks. The two first scenarios assume a situation in which *Hamas* has no space to act within Palestine. The last scenario looks at a situation in which *Hamas* has political power and is a part of the political sphere in Palestine.

Scenario 1: Internationalisation

If the conflict situation is not moving in any direction and continues unchanged, remaining what it has been since the beginning of the second intifada, *Hamas* may need to change its tactics and take a more radical direction. If this happens, the internationalisation of the armed attacks by *Hamas* could become a real possibility.

There is also another possibility for internationalisation if *Hamas* enjoys popular support and weilds ideological power in the Palestinian territories. Should *Hamas* be marginalised within Palestinian society by the PA, Israel or the international community, so that *Hamas* has no space for political action, there could be a great pressure for *Hamas* to begin taking military action outside the Israeli borders.

In the case of the internationalisation of armed action, *Hamas* would possibly lose lots of its support from Palestinians, for two reasons: Firstly, it is possible that Palestinians would not support the internationalisation of the conflict or the violent acts of *Hamas*. Secondly, in a situation in which *Hamas* violence has internationalised, the reaction of Israel and the international community against Palestinians would probably be very strong. This would not help the situation of Palestinians and would likely reduce popular support for *Hamas*.

Scenario 2: Violence within the society

If all *Hamas* funds were frozen, and the PA could repress *Hamas*, the PA might eventually get a hold on power and the importance of *Hamas* would be reduced. As the power of the PA increased, *Hamas* would shrink and finally would not exist anymore.

This scenario, however, requires extensive international support for the PA in order to strengthen it structurally as well as economically, while currently the PA is weak. Additionally, this scenario is likely to involve at least some aggression and violence within the Palestinian society, if not an actual civil war.

The risk of internal violence of Palestinians against Palestinians increases in this scenario if the PA does not enjoy popular support and *Hamas* is still favoured by the Palestinians. Particularly if an individual's self-image is intertwined with the success of *Hamas* – in other words, if success within the Palestinian community is defined as fighting for 'the cause'[69] – then repressing *Hamas* would simultaneously affect to its supporters' self-image. This can lead to increasing violence.

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[69] Post, J. M., E. Sprinzak and L. M. Denny, 2003, pp. 175–176. The poll carried out by Palestinian an-Najah National University's Center for Opinion Polls and Survey Studies on September 2003 (Poll No. 2) indicates this. The question of "what qualities does the respondent seek in the person that the respondent intends to vote for in the coming legislative elections" ranked answers between zero and ten. The quality of 'record of resistance' (7.9286) came in second just after 'educational qualifications' (8.4803). The resistance record clearly won over the next most important qualifications, such as political affiliation, gender, economic situation, family relations, place of habitation, etc.

Furthermore, it is not impossible that *Hamas* would change its target from Israel to the PA. According to Ehud Sprinzak: "Compared to opening a terror campaign against a foreign ruler, it is far easier to extend a campaign of intercommunal terrorism into a struggle against the ruler. Rebels who are accustomed to terrorism do easily switch targets."[70] It is possible that nationalist terrorism can turn to anti-authoritarian terrorism. In order to avoid that, the PA will be able to utilise internal pressure to reform itself.

Scenario 3: Moderation

If the PA brings *Hamas* into the political process, *Hamas* might moderate and give up its armed resistance. In order to become a moderate political player, at first *Hamas* should agree on a truce, *hudna*. Also, *Hamas* has the power to pressure other Palestinian resistance groups for armistice.

Since *Hamas* is basically a pragmatic movement, it could agree to a truce. Before the killings of Sheikh Yasin and al-Rantisi, opinion polls showed that Palestinians wanted peace and the armistice.[71] Because of that, there was pressure to implement the ceasefire. The picture here is contradictory: while Palestinians want a truce, at the same time it seems that as long as Israel's actions are seen as being repressive, the armed resistance of Palestinian groups is seen as legitimate by many Palestinians. This also has a link to the sense of 'success' through armed resistance against Israel that seems to permeate at least part of the Palestinian society.

In 2003, Palestinian resistance groups were aware of the immense pressure for a truce, and ceasefire negotiations were held with the help of Egypt.[72] In the near future, when the first shock of the killings of the leaders of *Hamas* is over, it is likely that pressure for a truce will arise again. Because *Hamas* is a practical and populist socio-political movement, its moderation is a real alternative. However, in order to transform itself into a political party, *Hamas* probably needs some proof that Israel sincerely intends to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

The change in the attitude of *Hamas* toward the peace process from its original ideological views to the point where an armistice with Israel is possible distinctly shows the pragmatism of *Hamas*. This change in attitude has gone through four stages:

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[70] Sprinzak, Ehud: "The Process of Delegitimation: Towards a Linkage Theory of Political Terrorism". *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 3, Spring 1991, p. 61.

[71] ICG Survey, 24.11.2003; http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=2384&I=1. Jerusalem Media & Communication Center, Public Opinion Poll No. 49, October 2003.

[72] "*Hamas* sends out political feelers." *Jane's Intelligence Digest*, September 2003; "Palestinians seek unity in Cairo", *al-Ahram Weekly Online*, 23–29.1.2003, Issue No. 622: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/622/re1.htm.

At first, *Hamas* emphasised its rejection of political solutions, a rejection based on its religious principles.[73] This stage lasted until the eve of the Madrid Conference in 1991, when *Hamas* went to the second stage and declared its rejection of any political agreement which would threaten any Palestinian rights. At this point, *Hamas* also took on board strategic and political reasons for its rejection. Its official statement declares that this time (1991) is the worst time to join the peace negotiations because "America has gained ascendancy over the world, ... the former Soviet Union is no longer a superpower, ... the Arab political and military positions have been debilitated by war in the Gulf, and ... Israel has proven itself to be the chief beneficiary of that war."[74] Once political agreements began to be implemented, *Hamas* announced that it would accept the principle of a transitory solution only if it did not involve giving up the rest of Palestinian rights (as defined by *Hamas*). Finally as a result of the Oslo Agreement, in 1994 the movement's Political Bureau issued a statement about the short-term solution, an armistice, and the creation of a Palestinian community on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. *Hamas* emphasised that it did not object to the principle of peace if certain conditions, which were related to "Zionist occupiers, settlements and free elections", were carried out. Even though *Hamas* expressed its willingness to accept an armistice with Israel, it did not recognize Israel as a "legitimate state" on "Palestinian land".[75]

The armistice had already been introduced in November 1993 by Sheikh Yasin. He wrote an open letter from prison, in which he pointed out the possibility of armistice if Israel would withdraw from the occupied territories.[76] The armistice was not a part of the ideology of *Hamas* in the beginning, but it came to be later on as a result of the Oslo Agreement. It can be argued that this was a completely pragmatic decision, made so that the organisation could increase its public support. This also shows the potential flexibility of *Hamas*.

This third scenario is supported by several people who have closely observed the situation. According to two members of the Palestinian Legislative Council, Ziad Abu-Amr, an academic and the chairman of the PLC's political committee, and Haider Abdel Shafi, a former chief Palestinian negotiator in peace talks with Israel, *Hamas* should be included in the decision-making process and in the Palestinian national

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[73] Mithaq Harakat al-muqawama al-islamiyya – Filastin.

[74] *Hamas* Official Statement, dated 20.10.1991, cited from Jarbawi, Ali: "The Position of Palestinian Islamists on the Palestine-Israel Accord". *The Muslim World*, Vol. LXXXIV, No. 1–2, January–April 1994, p. 138.

[75] al-Hamad & al-Barghouthi 1997, p. 40.

[76] Kristianasen, Wendy: "Challenge and Counterchallenge: *Hamas*'s Response to Oslo". *Journal of Palestine Studies* XXVIII, no. 3 (Spring 1999), p. 23.

unity-leadership. Abu-Amr reported that, in the conference for all Palestinian factions held in Gaza in May 2002, "leaders of *Hamas* said that, if they were part of ... collective decision-making, they would comply - - if it were decided that we will go to negotiations [with Israel], they would support negotiations. If the leadership called for a halt to suicidal attacks, *Hamas* would stop suicidal attacks."[77] Furthermore, Alastair Crooke, the former security adviser to EU High Representative Javier Solana, stressed that an armistice would enable *Hamas* to be a part of a diplomatic process: "This is not an issue of preference: whether it is easier or more fruitful to engage with Fateh [stet] rather than the Islamics. This is reality. Without their engagement, either quietly or explicitly, they will oppose a process that excludes them and the substantial segment of Palestinians whom they represent."[78]

Nonetheless the dilemma in this scenario remains: if *Hamas* is brought into the Palestinian political process, many people would see that as a victory for terrorists. Even though bringing *Hamas* into the political process could have a positive effect on the structures of this specific conflict, there is a risk that this could motivate other groups to use terrorist strategies so that they would gain political power, too.

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[77] Gaess, Roger: "Interviews from Gaza: Palestinian Options Under Siege". *Middle East Policy,* Vol. IX, No. 4, December 2002.

[78] Crooke, Alastair & Beverley, Milton-Edwards: "Costly Choice". *World Today*, December 2003, Vol. 59, Issue 12.

Chapter 6

Relations between Islam and the West as a Context and Catalyst of Terrorism

Gubara Said Hassan & Timo Kivimäki[1]

Introduction

This chapter looks into the roots of distrust and antagonism, which here are the perceived context of a conflict that uses terrorism as a tactic. Before investigating the problems of Islam's relations to the West, it will map the structure of the agencies of the conflict between the two worlds, and attempt to sort out what is the "Western world", and what is the "Islamic world", in reality. From there it will dive into the constructed world of Islam-West antagonism. We will first look into the difficulties inherent in trying to find common social and cultural norms for Islam interaction with the West, by tracing the historical roots of the most debated differences between the Western and Islamic conceptions of the rules of interaction between different social structures and cultures. In particular, the focus will be on differences related to the role of religion as a source of norms in political and international relations, which is a central issue in the explanation of Islam-West differences in understanding fairness in inter-civilisational relations.

Differences as such do not, however, create antagonism. Instead, an additional ingredient of the antagonism between the two worlds is related to the asymmetries of relations between the West and Islam. The question of power asymmetries is clearly a central theme in the analysis of these conflict-provoking asymmetries.

Following the analysis of the origins of Islam-West antagonism, the discussion moves on to look into the ways in which the internal logic of a conflict holds sway and continually reproduces the conflict (even without any reference to the original grievances). The process of escalation in the negative perceptions of "the other" involves monolithic, demonised views which emphasise the representation of the extreme

[1] Timo Kivimäki is responsible for the structure of the chapter, the Introduction, the section on the Development of Sides, and the Conclusions. The author of the remainder of the chapter is Hassan Gubara.

position: In the "Islamic camp" the entire West is increasingly seen as being represented in the violent actions in Iraq (actions whose violent nature is then associated with the nature of the West), while the rhetoric of Osama bin Laden, or the brutality of the Taliban regime, sometimes tarnishes the Western image of the entire Islamic world.

Finally, one of the sources of the escalation of antagonism is the mobilisation of the long history and tradition of conflict between the Islamic and Christian worlds, as proof of the normality and inevitability of conflict between these two "camps".

International conflict as a context of terrorism can be visualised in the following diagram:

Figure 6.1. International Conflict



As a consequence of these conflict-provoking elements, theories have arisen suggesting the unavoidability of inter-civilisational clashes in Islam-West relations.

Development of Sides in the Islam-West Dispute

Despite differences in inter-civilisational norms, and despite the asymmetry of the Islam-West relationship, the West has not united against Islam, nor the other way round. It would be unfair to justify the perceptions of the radicals on both sides of the clash between these two civilisations.

Even though Muslims are marginalised in the current world system, as has been mentioned in Chapter 3, this marginalisation does not reflect anti-Muslim sentiment in the powerful West. On the contrary, according to a recent poll by the Pew Research Center, in none of the Western countries studied (the US, UK, France, Germany and Russia) was the attitude of the majority of those questioned unfavourable to Muslims.[2] Even if Western military operations are studied, it appears that the Western powers are not systematically targeting Muslims in the defence of non-Muslims. For example, Western support of activities in the former Yugoslavia, and the support of Islamic forces against communists, exemplify cases in which the West defended Muslims against Christians. A list of US military interventions since 1990 illustrates this lack of anti-Muslim bias:

Table 6.1. US Interventions

Place of intervention	Against whom	In defence of whom
Liberia 1990	Non-Muslim (parties to the Liberian civil war)	Non-Muslims (foreigners that needed to be evacuated)
Iraq 1991	Muslim (Saddam Hussein)	Muslim (Kuwait)
Somalia 1992–4	Muslim (Aideed and some other warlords)	Muslim (people of Somalia, opponents of Aideed)
Yugoslavia 1992–4	Non-Muslim, (Serbia, Montenegro)	Muslims/Non-Muslims
Bosnia 1993–5	Non-Muslim (Serbs)	Muslims (Bosnians)
Haiti 1994–6	Non-Muslim (military government)	Non-Muslims (Aristide)
Zaire (Congo) 1996–7	Non-Muslim	Non-Muslim
Liberia 1997	Non-Muslim (parties to the Liberian civil war)	Non-Muslims (foreigners that needed to be evacuated)
Sudan 1998	Muslim (alleged terrorists)	Non-Muslim (US)
Afghanistan 1998	Muslim (alleged terrorists)	Non-Muslim (US)
Afghanistan 2001	Muslim (Taliban)	Non-Muslim (US)
Iraq, 2003	Muslim (Saddam Hussein)	Non-Muslim (US) & Muslim (People of Iraq).

[2] Question 2g, in The Pew Research Center 2004. Their study, *A Year After the Iraq War,* is available with all the statistics at http://people-press.org/reports/. In Germany, more people expressed an unfavourable than a favourable attitude, but due to the number of people who did not know or refused to answer, even in Germany the percentage of the unfavourable remained at 46%.

Due to the asymmetry of Islam-West relations, Muslims tend to associate their everyday suffering with the intercivilisational, Islam-West, conflict, and thus blame the West for their problems, while people in the West do not make this association. The Islamic world is much more dependent on the West than the other way round. This is one reason why Muslims assume Western hatred of their civilisation, more than Westerners assume Islamic hatred of Western culture. As a result, according to the recent PEW opinion poll of March 2004, the majority of Muslims in the Middle East and North Africa tend to direct their negative feelings toward Jews, while the majority of all Muslims studied direct their negative feelings toward Christians.[3]

While comparable data is not available for earlier years, data on the support of the United States in Islamic countries suggests that recent operations in the war on terror have contributed to these anti-Western sentiments. Especially since the onset of the US coalition's operations in Iraq, Muslim majorities around the world have turned against the United States.[4] The growth of anti-Christian sentiment probably dates to the same period. The unfortunate thing for inter-civilisational relations is that that anti-Christian and Anti-Western sentiments which have prevailed during the post-9/11 period, have also tarnished the image of the United Nations in the eyes of Middle Eastern Muslims.[5] The UN role in the sponsorship of the war in Afghanistan, and the post-war allied policies in Iraq have crippled this important instrument of inter-civilisational dialogue, since only a minority of the Muslims studied in the PEW opinion poll see a UN role as a positive contribution to the lives of the Iraqi people.[6]

The growth of the popularity of Osama bin Laden also followed after the actions taken by the United States in its war on terror. Harsh American measures that cause civilian casualties tend to increase the support of Osama bin Laden.[7] Support for the justification of suicide bombing against civilians has also grown in Muslim countries during the war in Iraq.[8] Clearly, the logic of asymmetric escalation is at work here. Operations on both sides create anger on both sides, while on the side of the weaker

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[3] Ibid, Question 2e & 2f.

[4] A comparison of PEW studies in 2002 with more recent studies reveals,for example, that in Indonesia, the country with world's largest Muslim population, the share of people with positive feelings towards the USA declined from 60% (June 2002) to 17% (Oct 2003).

[5] PEW, March 2004, Question 2d.

[6] Ibid, question 22. The UN role in Afghanistan and Iraq might still have had a positive outcome in terms of preventing terrorism, and helping people,. but the image of the UN in the Muslim world at that time was that it was a tool of the West.

[7] Ibid. According to this study, in the Middle East and in Pakistan, more people saw Osama Ben Ladin in a favourable than an unfavourable light. . Another PEW survey from 2003 revealed the same sentiments in Indonesia. Despite its anti-Americanism, Turkish opinion was, however, also anti-Osama.

[8] Ibid, Question 13.

also providing perceived legitimacy for desperate violence, especially when the West emphasizes this asymmetry. Expressions of this asymmetry and the power advantage of the West continue to radicalise the Islamic world.

While opposition to the United States tends to unify the Islamic world, a perception of a unified, monolithic Islamic bloc would still be quite misleading. The distinction between the Westernised Muslims and the reformist Muslims still divides the Muslim camp into two fundamentally different groups. Furthermore, within the reformist groups, there is tremendous variation in opinions related to some of the main differences in Islam-West relations, such as the role of women, the possibility of Islamic democracy, and the nature and rules of Jihad.

Paradoxically, while the war on terror seems to unify the Islamic world, it also makes the notion of a unified West more misleading. Although the entire West disapproves of terrorist operations against civilians and condemns the activities of Osama bin Laden, it is utterly divided on almost all other questions related to the war on terror. According to a recent Eurobarometer opinion poll, the majority of people polled in all EU countries, except Denmark, disapproved of the war in Iraq (Question 1). With the exception of the UK, the majorities polled in the European countries for the PEW March 2004 study, together with global Muslim majorities, believed that the US-led war on terror is not a sincere effort. In all European countries polled, as well as in the Muslim world, more people supported than opposed the positions that the US motive for the war on terror is to dominate the world, control the Middle Eastern oil supply, and target Muslim governments and groups it sees unfriendly.[9] In terms of threat perceptions, European people also seem to belong to the same camp as Muslim countries, instead of simply belonging to a Christian/Western civilisation. According to a recent Eurobarometer poll, a 52.7% majority of Europeans (the majority of all but Italians and Germans) saw the United States as a threat to peace in the world; and a majority of 58.5% of all Europeans would like Europe to distant its foreign policy efforts from those of the United States.[10] Furthermore, on the question of the conflict in Palestine, unlike Americans, Europeans, again together with the Muslim world, felt more sympathy towards Palestinians than towards Israel. In fact, Israel was seen by a 58.6% majority (the majority of all but Italians) as a threat to peace in the world.[11] The complexity of the West is also emphasised in relation to the difference in opinions about the United States overall, and its current government in particular. A previous PEW poll (March 18, 2003) revealed that a majority in all EU countries studied felt that Bush was the problem, not America in general.[12]

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[9] PEW March 2004, Questions 12 a,b & d.
[10] Eurobarometer EB 151, October 2003, Questions 10k &11.
[11] Eurobarometer EB 151, October 2003, Question 10o.
[12] The results of the PEW March 2004 study were similar for all countries except the US and the UK.

Thus a realistic approach to agency in the Islam-West relationship should carefully consider the divisions of the West between the US (or the Anglo-American West) and Europe, and between countries/peoples and their governments At the same time, one should consider the divisions of the Muslim world between the mainstream and the marginal terrorists, between the Westernised and the reformist Muslims, and between the liberal and the dogmatic Muslims. Therefore, the dividing lines in different inter-civilisational issues should not be seen in simplistic terms, but instead as subject to the dividing issues. The agency structure and the dividing lines in Islam-West relations could be summarised in the following manner:

Figure 6.2. Divisions in Islam-West Relations





Despite the real picture of the division of current opinions and political sides in disputes involving the West and the Islamic world, the general perception of this dispute is more monolithic. People in the West are not very aware of the differences in the opinions of Muslims with regard to i.a. democracy and international politics;. while people in the Muslim world are not sufficiently aware of the European sentiments in favour of Palestinians and against the militaristic approaches of the US-led war on terror. As a result, the perception of all the above issues is often that the opposing side is united. This is why, in addition to the need to reveal both the disunity and the inter-civilisational alliances on important questions, there is also a need to take a serious look at the percieved, as well as the real, division between the West and the Islamic world, and to study the background of the escalation of this process of division.

Rules of Islam-West Interaction

Any study of the sources of Islamic and Western understanding of what constitutes fair and just inter-civilisational rules of interaction needs to go to the roots of Western and Islamic ideas of what constitutes fair political processes in general. In tracing these, seeking the origins of the Islamic political principles leads to fundamentally different processes than those at the core of the Western political principles. According to a convincing argument presented by one of the most cited radical Islamic thinkers, the Islamic political thinking was born in a context of tribal Bedouin society with no laws or rules of the sort that existed in the Roman Empire which was the context of the birth of Christianity.[13] Consequently the analysis of the genesis of Western political processes has to focus on the development of the secular ideas that existed previous to the advent of Christianity. The fact that in the West these political principles exist separately from religious principles does not create contradictions between politics and Christianity (as would be the case in Islam), since the holy book (The Bible) of this religion, that was born in the context of existing (Roman) principles of state, law and social order, explicitly rules out the religious domination of politics: "render unto God that which is God's and unto Caesar that which is Caesar's."(Matthew 22:21)

One could argue that, although no unanimity or consensus exists as to a precise definition of the 'West', scholars[14] of the subject typically acknowledge its derivation from three basic and distinctive sources: the classical legacy of Greece and Rome; the Christian religion, particularly Western Christianity; and the eighteenth century Enlightenment of the modern age. Some Western historians tend to favour one source over the rest, others have seen the West as the amalgam or synthesis of all three, and still others understand the West in terms of the historical conflicts among them and the sources of other civilisations e.g., Islam.

For the British historian, Paul Johnson, the first source of the ideas and principles of the modern West was the inherited classical Greco-Roman culture.[15] In the sphere of politics, the Greeks contributed the concept of a republic. The Greeks borrowed legal ideas from many ancient civilisations, notably the Persians, but they brought to

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[13] Sayyid Qutb 1996. *Social Justice in Islam.* In: William E. Shepard, ed. & translator. *Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism, A Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justice in Islam.* Brill: Leiden, p.7 & 2–3.

[14] See, e.g. Kurth, James, "Global Triumph or Western Twilight*", Orbis*, Vol. 45, No.3, Summer, 2001; Hay, William Anthony, "America, the West and the World*", Orbis*, Vol. 45, No. 3, Summer, 2001; Gress, David 1998. *From Plato to NATO: The Idea of the West and its Opponents*. New York: Free Press, and Daniel, Norman 2000. *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image.* Oxford: Oneworld Publications.

[15] Johnson, Paul "Why West is Best? Secret or Rather, Obvious Ingredients of the Good Society ", *National Review*, December 3, 2001, p. 18.

the science of law the spirit of philosophic investigation. Their probing of the nature of 'social justice', and the validity of morality, meant the infusion of law-making with the dynamic elements of mutual tolerance and co-existence. The Romans, in turn, built on their Greek predecessors' methods to evolve into one of the world's largest and longest-lasting empires. Similarly, Greece contributed the notion of liberality and Rome that of law. When amalgamated, these ideas gave birth to the significant concept of 'liberty under the rule of law'. However, the rule of law was not established in the West without bloody conflicts and acrimonious rivalries. The constitutional struggle that in 1215 produced the Magna Carta, the first English Statute of the Realm (still in force), the English Civil War of 1640–60, and the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the American Revolution of the 1770s and 1780, producing the first modern constitution, and the French Revolution of 1789, are all episodes in the continuing process of Western efforts to subject monarchies, kings, princes and subsequent governments to the rule of law, the people's right to liberal democratic participation and representation, and the separation of spiritual and temporal authority. Unlike Islamic culture, in Western culture the separation of God and Caesar, Church and State, spiritual and temporal authority, had been a prevailing tendency. This division of authority contributed immensely to the development of freedom, social pluralism, civil society, representative bodies, and individualism in the West. I Taken separately, almost none of these features is unique to the West. But their combination or mixture is a peculiarly Western reality and has given the West its distinctive quality. These concepts, practices, and institutions have been far more prevalent in the West than in other civilisations, including the Islamic civilisation. They form the essence or core of Western civilisational and cultural entity and distinguish it from other world civilisations and cultures. The West, as Arthur M. Schlesinger has stated, is "the unique source of the ideas of political democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and cultural freedom. These are Western ideas not Asian, nor African, nor Middle Eastern ideas, except by adoption."[16] These concepts and characteristics are also, to a great extent, the that which has enabled the West to achieve global economic, political and cultural hegemony while deliberately excluding other civilisations and cultures, including those of Islam. In addition, this hegemony has been achieved through geographical discoveries, industrialisation, capitalism, imperial expansion and colonial administrative and exploitative systems overseas where imbalanced trade and exchange, not the civilising mission of the White Man's Burden , followed the flag.

Christianity, as the second source of the ideas of the West, shaped the Western world in several significant ways. Christian theology established and reinforced the

[16] Schlesinger, Arthur M 1992. *The Disunity of America.* New York: W.W. Norton, p. 127.

sanctity of the individual believer and called for obedience to an authority (God the Father and God the Son, Jesus Christ) higher than any secular ruler (Caesar, monarch, or prince): these are two ideas that further refined and solidified the concept of individual liberty under law. Christian institutions, particularly the Papacy of the Roman Catholic Church and its ongoing territorial and political struggles with the Holy Roman Emperor and local monarchs, bequeathed to the West the idea of a separation, and therefore a limitation, of powers.[17]

The third source of the ideas and principles of the Western world was the philosophy of the eighteenth century European Enlightenment, which provided the ideas of liberal democracy, the belief in reason and rational judgement, and science as the means for making sense of the universe, along with the emergence of the 'free market' or 'capitalist' system. As stated above, these are the three main sources which have given the West its particular quality and distinguished it from other cultures and civilisations, including those of Islam.

Unlike the case of Western civilisation, Islamic principles do not allow the separation of religion and politics. As Ali-Shariati stated: "The Prophet of Islam was the only one who simultaneously carried the sword of Caesar in his hand and the heart of Jesus in his chest. This is the religion whose history began amidst politics and struggle (jihad); the religion whose taxation is on a par with praying, the religion which has built societies, political and economic systems."[18] Accordingly the point of departure for all Islamic political principles, despite their socio-economic, political and cultural diversity, is the attempt to understand the world, politics, and inter-civilisational interaction through faith or religion (Din): Islam. For many centuries, all Muslims belonged culturally to a larger Islamic community (*Ummah*) whose chief characteristic was a religious attitude to life. Such an attitude has been described as, again, the belief that there is an invisible order (Lahoot?), and that man's supreme good (Khayr) lies in harmoniously adjusting himself and his community to that order. Applied to Islam, this general description must be accompanied by the qualifications that Allah (the God of the Muslims), and only Allah, is responsible for this unseen order, and that His Scripture or Revelation (*Qur'an*) to the Prophet is man's divine guidance (Huda) in the historical endeavour of adjusting himself and his community to that order. With such provisions, this definition would represent the minimum upon which all Muslim

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[17] See the account of the struggle between the Church and State, or Papacy and Monarch, given by Al-Turabi, Hassan 1984. Al-Iman: Atharahu Fi hayat Al-Insan (Faith: Its Impact on Human Life). Beirut: Al-Asr Al-Hadith Publications and Qutb, Sayyid 1990. *Islam: the Religion of the Future*. Kuwait: International Islamic Federation of Students' Organizations.

[18] Shariati, Ali 1986. *What is to be Done: The Enlightened Thinkers and an Islamic Renaissance.* Houston: IRIS, pp. 23, 43 and 79.

sects (Furuq) agree, although the radical Sunnite Islamic view, which prevails in some parts of the Muslim world, would insist on adding that Revelation (Wahy) or *Qur'an* is the only guide.

It should be pointed out that in the Islamic religious attitude to life, values, norms, ideas, and ideals are viewed as founded on this given order, which is both objective and transcendental or metaphysical. Sunni Islam stipulates further that, in the radical view, not only the formative principles but even the specific formulations of values, norms, ideals and ideas relating to all aspects of man's life have objectively been given by divine revelation. In this sense, Islam is a system for human life in all its aspects. This is a system that entails what Sayyid Qutb called the "ideological ideal"[19] – a concept which expounds the nature of the universe and determines the position of man in this universe as well as his ultimate objectives therein. It includes the doctrines and practical organisations which emanate from and depend on this ideological ideal, and make of it a reality reflected in the everyday life of human beings. For instance, these doctrines and organisations take this ideological ideal as their ethical foundation and sustaining power. In Islam, this ideological ideal underlies and imbues the political system together with its forms and characteristics, the social order and its bases and values, the economic and business sphere with its philosophy and institutions, and the international Muslim bodies with their interrelations. Inasmuch as history is concerned, Muslims believe that Islam will be the religion for both present and future redemption and salvation. For them and in their reality, this Islamic system is so comprehensive (*Shamil*), interdependent, and interwoven that it covers all aspects of human life and the various genuine needs of man in his life as well as in all his different activities.

In addition, the Islamic divine law (*Sharia*) is a vast system of norms and regulations encompassing all areas of a Muslim's life – his religious duties, directives concerning ritual cleanliness, food, and dress; laws of family, inheritance and endowment, contracts and obligations; criminal, fiscal, constitutional and international law. Theoretically, the *Sharia* derives entirely from the *Qur'an* and the traditions of the Prophet's deed and sayings (*Sunnah*). Its purpose is not only to determine relationships between human beings, but also to define the standard of right and wrong in all matters considered by God (Allah) as ethically relevant. Differently expressed, the *Qur'an*, as a divine discourse, is considered to be the final arbiter of human affairs and of truth (*Haq*) and falsehood (*Batil*). Muslims believe that the Quranic text is the only reference to what is absolutely true and eternal, so that the Qura'n, along with the Prophetic traditions, is the

[19] Qutb, Sayyid 1985. Al-Mustaqbal Li Hadha Al-Din *The Future Belongs to This Religion (Islam).* Kuwait: International Islamic Federation of Students' Organizations, pp. 5–6. Translations are by Hassan Gubara Said.

permanent and fundamental authority. Through the medium of the Quranic discourse, Islam is revealed and reinterpreted for all ages as a comprehensive mundane and heavenly system (*Nizam Shamil*). As Hassan Al-Banna states, "Islam is a comprehensive system which deals with all spheres of life. It is a country and a home or a country and a nation. It is conduct and power and mercy and justice. It is a culture and a law or knowledge and jurisprudence. It is material and wealth or gain and prosperity. It is Jihad [Holy/Sacred War] and a call or an army and a cause. And finally, it is true belief and correct worship."[20]

Furthermore, the Islamic system derived from the Quranic discourse is not a system of a specific historical epoch or a local system for a particular generation or location. For Muslims, it is a universal reality co-existing with the unfolding generations of mankind as the permanent law of the Universe. More importantly, the Islamic religion offers humanity a comprehensive interpretation of the place and objective of human existence and of man's relation with his Almighty Creator (Allah). Man does not realise the goal of his existence by worship alone, but also by achieving unity in all spheres of life. Muslims, in general, and radical Islamists, in particular, reject the Western divorce between politics and religion as well as the division of religion from any aspect of life, whether economic, social or political. This rejection results from their belief in the existence of a strong relationship between the social order and the metaphysical or doctrinal concepts of Islam. Accordingly, Islam means "the comprehensive revolution in the government of man in all its forms, shapes, systems, and institutions, and complete rebellion against every situation that is contrary to the principles of Islam on the whole earth."[21]

For Muslims, compartmentalisation of life into private and public spheres is a risky endeavour at best, and, at worst, an abandonment of the categorical imperatives of the faith (*Imam*). In their view, the materialisation of God's commands in their daily lives cannot be accomplished unless they construct the requisite social, economic and political institutions. For them, again, Islam is both religion and politics. Islam has a highly legalistic and communitarian system of ordinances. Muslims do not accept Western Christian tenets that emphasise that faith is a private matter. The mainstream, or Sunni, interpretation of Islam attaches overwhelming significance to the Islamic charismatic community (*Ummah*) as a basis for redemption worldwide. As Professor William M. Watt states, "its charisma is that it is capable of bestowing salvation on

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[20] Al-Banna, Hassan (trans.) 1996. *The Message of the Teachings.* London: International Islamic Forum, pp. 7–8.

[21] Moussali, Ahmed S. 1992. *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism.* Beirut: American University of Beirut, p. 204.

those who become members of it. It possesses this charisma because it has been divinely founded (through the Revelation given by God to Muhammad) and because it is based on and follows the divinely given rule of life, *Sharia* (Islamic law), which has been developed from the *Qur'an* and the example of Muhammad."[22]

When looking at the foundations of Islamic and Western political thinking, the difference in viewing the role of religion as the source of political norms is crucial for understanding the disagreements about the norms of inter-civilisational interaction. Partly this is because of the fact that this aspect of civilisational differences covers inter-civilisational rules of conduct. Differences regarding prayers or domestic national institutions are not crucial, since they are intra-civilisational and apply only to people within the civilization; but issues about the role of religion in politics have implications in regard to inter-civilisational politics. The dispute about whether or not the normative foundation of politics should be religious, is necessarily part of inter-civilisational dispute, since it offers two foundations for the normative basis of Islam-West relations. The problem has two levels. On the one hand it is about whether to apply specific Western norms, or Islamic norms, in the regulation of inter-civilisational political issues such as the international oil-trade, the US military presence in Saudi Arabia, international humanitarian interventions in Muslim countries, or the transitional governance of Iraq. However, it is the meta-level of the dispute – whether particular religious ideas should be utilised to solve political disputes – that often makes it difficult to solve the questions on the first level. Both civilisations tend to see their own inter-civilisational norms as neutral and just, regardless of which civilisational approach we take in judging them, while at the same time seeing each others' approaches as civilisationally-biased impositions of one civilisation's norms into the inter-civilisational sphere. The Western perception of the separation of religion from political life is seen as neutral in the sense that, with this separation, supporters of any religion would have equal individual freedom to practice their religion and follow their religious norms. Seen from this point of view, the organisation of society and polities on the basis of religion would appear to be denying the people their individual rights to express their religious beliefs. No religion should impose its theocracy upon the believers of other religions, and thus inter-civilisational relations should be religion-free.[23] However, this thinking is not civilisation-neutral, since it takes a Western, (Greco-Roman) individualistic starting point in the definition of rights. Taken that the separation of

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[22] Watt, William M. 1973. *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, p. 36.

[23] This logic is followed in most of the explanations of religious freedoms in Western constitutional debates, as well as in the UN debate on religious freedom.

religious and political authority is also prescribed by the Christian religious texts, it is would seem that non-religious politics is paradoxically religious; it is now a Christian notion, tied to the historical context of the birth of Christianity. At the same time, from an holistic and all-encompassing perspective, a society whose order is not explicitly based on religious norms looks secular or godless, and this 'godless' social order denies the expression of religious ideals in the public sphere. Imposition of Western secularism on Muslim politics would then seem to be limiting the collective religious rights of Muslim in a way which unfairly imposes one civilisations norms upon the other.[24] However, the accusation by some radical Muslims of the godlessness of Western politics is also a product of a civilisational misunderstanding: Western international relations in regard to development cooperation, humanitarian assistance, defence of human rights, and democracy, rely heavily on religious norms, despite the fact that religion is not usually allowed to be used by anyone as a transcendental justification for policies, and power is not explicitly used to promote any religion.

Without the realisation of the fact that both the liberal idea of religious freedom of individuals, and the radical Islamic idea of the rejection of godlessness in politics, are civilisation-biased, there can be no understanding as to why these ideas cannot as such be used as "neutral" or undisputable foundations of inter-civilisational interaction. Neutral rules can only be achieved by dialogue and mutual compromise. This process will need to focus on the concrete cases of interaction, and look at them from a principled point of view. However, before any dialogue can develop, both sides will have to rid themselves of the burden caused by the demonisation of extreme positions and the time and energy spent on attacking them. To understand the development of these antagonistic perspectives, it must be seen within the context of asymmetry in Islam-West relations.

Relative Deprivation and the Asymmetric Islam-West Relationship

Islamic radicalism seeks its identity through contradiction of the perceived powerful oppressors. This is typical for any type of radicalism which seeks legitimacy for desperate, violent actions taken to save themselves from or to draw attention to the perceived wrongdoings of a "powerful enemy". Legitimacy for desperate violence – involving strategies that are insensitive to sacrifices on one's own side, and to innocent casualties

[24] This logic is followed, for example in Sayyid Qutb's rejection of Western norms in the Islamic world. See Sayyid Qutb 1996. *Social Justice in Islam.* In William E. Shepard, ed. & translator. *Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism, A Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justice in Islam.* Brill: Leiden, p.7.

on the other side – can only be found where just and reasonable opposition is no longer feasible due to the asymmetry of the relationship with the powerful "enemy". There seems to be a clear association between the asymmetry of a relationship and the degree of desperation in the strategies used in a conflict.[25] Suicide strategies (strategies insensitive to the loss of life on "our" side) and terrorist strategies (strategies insensitive to the loss of innocent life on the "other" side) are typical of asymmetrical conflicts. It then follows that the asymmetry of the Islam-West relations is an important factor in contributing to the type of frustration-releasing, grievance-related violence we have seen in Islam-West relations. The association between the power asymmetry and the rise and rational of radical Islam can easily be show in an analysis of the development of the radical Islamic identity.

The search for a 'lost' identity, and the offering of an earthly Islamic alternative to current governance, both of which address the current needs of Muslims, are of great significance to the Islamic community. This alternative identity is primarily meant to function as a criticism of the present with its violence-and-terrorism-generating crisis environment of 'relative economic deprivation'[26], political despotism, cultural dislocation, identity crisis, and Western economic, political and military hegemony. Secondly, it works toward the adoption of a dualistic cognitive map which is itself composed of a dualistic outlook on the world and mankind'[27] with a division into the abode of Islam and peace and the abode of unbelief (*Kufr*) and war (Harb); or into Islam and Jahiliyyah (pre-Islamic ignorance). Thirdly, this alternative identity relies on the ideological demarcation of the universe, and on presenting a violent challenge to modern civilisation and the Western positivist philosophies and models. A final aspect of this alternative identity is that those that adopt it see themselves as members of an Islamic charismatic community which has a comprehensive understanding of Jihad (holy/sacred war) and the way in which Jihad applies to nearly every aspect of human life. To achieve this, it becomes necessary for Islam to claim a political and a theocentric function, to assume a political role, so that Islam's social message and the change needed to implement this message become integral elements of its religious vision. Political activism, in all its non-violent, peaceful, or violent, terrorist

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[25] For an analysis of the process of choosing terrorism as a stategy of struggle see: Timo Kivimäki & Liisa Laakso. 2003. "Causes of Terrorism", in Timo Kivimäki, ed., *Development Cooperation as an Instrument in the Prevention of Terrorism*. Danida: Copenhagen, p. 90–91.

[26] Gurr, Ted Robert 1970 *Why Men Rebel.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[27] For the Islamic division of the world, see: Rudolph Peters 1979. *Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad.* The Hague: Mouton Publishers; John Kelsey (ed.), 1991. *Just War and Jihad.* New York: Greenwood Press; and Sayyid Qutb, (trans.) *Ma'alim Fi Al- Tariq (Milestones).* 1990. Indianapolis: American Trust Publications.

manifestations, continues as a sacred responsibility for Muslims and is overruled and qualified by a metaphysical order.

The force of Islamic ideology, especially concerning holy war (Jihad), serves to create in radical Islamists a sense of Islamic universalism or 'globalism'[28] in opposition to its Western-centred counterpart, globalisation based on Western civilisational and cultural hegemony. That is to say, Islamic radicals have a 'utopian' vision of unitary, worldwide Islam in which the running of the government and the morality and social behaviour of all people are regulated according to Islamic laws (*Sharia*). These radicals are determined that they will tolerate nothing less than this, at least in their countries of origin, e.g., Egypt, Iran, Palestine, Afghanistan, and Indonesia. The globalisation of holy war (Jihad) and the exportation of Islam are the practical expression of this determination where 'martyrdom (*Istishhad*)'[29] is conceived as a divine duty in the fight against those believed to be corrupt and infidel (*Kafir*). The radical Islamists, backed up a by a sense of ultra-nationalism and religious radicalism, wish to change the present state of affairs by any means available, including popular Islamic revolution (e.g., Iran), military coup (e.g., Sudan), political assassinations (e.g., Egypt) or other forms of violence and terrorism (e.g., 'Osama Bin Laden'[30] and his International Islamic Association). They rely on deliberate intervention in the socio-economic, political and cultural arenas to bring about a 'revolutionary change' in the societies, states and governments they perceive to be infidel (*Kafir*). In the eyes of radical Islamists, this revolutionary change has to be drawn from traditional classical Islam, which still survives and grows despite the attractions of globalised Western modernity and post-modernism.

For radical Islamists, true Islam is a faith based on constant Jihad and justice (*Adala*). Moreover, Islam, in general, and resurgent radical Islamic fundamentalism, in particular, sees itself as living today in that crucial, creative moment in which the sacred heritage or legacy of the past is being radically and violently transformed into the herald of their future. For both Westerners and Muslims, the most important and interesting chapter in Islamic history, culture and civilisation so far is the one that is today in the

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[28] For the sense of unity among Muslims as belonging to a global nation (*ummah*) see: Tahir Jabir Al-Alwani 1995. *The Qur'an and the Sunnah: The Time-Space-Factor.* Virginia: International Institute of Islamic Thought.

[29] For martyrdom (*istishahd*) see: Kohlberg, E. 1997. *Medieval Muslim Views on Martyrdom.* Amsterdam: The Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, pp. 281–307.

[30] For Osama Bin Ladin, his international network, and terrorism see: e.g. Juergnesmeyer, Mark 2001. *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence.* Berkeley: University of California Press; and Bodanesky, Yosseff 2001. *Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America*. New York, Toronto and London: Random House.

process of being written, as Islam is re-discovered, re-interpreted and re-imposed on domestic, regional and global levels.

The process of re-discovery, re-interpretation and re-imposition of Islam, particularly through its radical offshoot, is a product of, again, a violence-and-terrorism-generating crisis environment with several domestic, regional and international components (see the diagrams at the beginning of the chapter). One of these components is a feeling of humiliation among Muslims: this is sensed in the 'charismatic community' of believers, the faithful, who were accustomed to regard themselves as the sole guardians or custodians of God's eternal Truth and straight Way, commanded by Him to bring the Truth and the Way and show them to the infidels, the unbelievers (*Kuffar*) and the polytheists (*Mushrikuun*); and who suddenly find themselves vanquished, dominated and exploited by those same infidels or unbelievers. Furthermore, even when Muslims are no longer directly dominated by the 'infidels', they are still profoundly affected by them in ways that change their worldview and practical socio-economic, political and cultural lives, moving them from the pure Islamic fundamentals onto other un-Islamic paths. To this humiliation, partly also a result of repeated 'military defeats'[31] at the hand of the state of Israel, has been added anomie and frustration or despair, as the various secular ideologies, philosophies and remedies, most of them imported from the West and transplanted into the Muslim world, were tried and resulted in abysmal failures.

In addition, the onslaught of Western imperialism, colonialist administrations, and the gradual dissemination of Westernisation throughout the traditional milieu of Muslims, produced tremendous psychological shocks. It shattered the Muslims' confidence in the strength and validity of their culture and value system, as well as in the social and political structures that these values had produced. Furthermore, the economic dependence, social disruption and alienation, political disintegration, cultural dualism, and so on that arrived concomitant with Western penetration and hegemony, gave birth to much soul-searching among Muslims about the causes of their decline

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[31] The economic, political and moral crises consequent upon the defeat by the State of Israel of the Arab-Muslim armies in the June 1967 War culminated in a period of anguished self-criticism, and a searching reappraisal of post-War Arab and Muslim culture and political practices. The principal victim of this process has been secular ideology, e.g., Nasserism, Ba'athism and Pan-Arabism, etc. For more on how the June 1967 War seriously altered the ideological landscape of the Middle East see i.a.: Laroui, Abdalla, 1976. *The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual: Traditionalism or Historicism?* Berkeley: University of California Press; Al-Azam, Sadeq, 1968. *Al-Naqd Al-Dhati Ba'ad Al-Hazimah (Self-criticism After the Defeat).* Beirut: Al-Risala Establishment for Publications and Distribution; and Haddad, Yvonne, "Islamists and the Problem of Israel: The 1967 Awakening", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring 1992.

and predicament. The result of this soul-searching has been the development of two schools of thought about the causes and cures of this decline. One school, secular, offered Westernisation or secularisation as a prescription for Muslims' ills. The other school, Islamic and mainly 'reformist'[32], defended the return to Islam as a solution and an alternative to the unsuccessful, imported, Western secular ideologies and philosophies.

Thus it should not be surprising to observe people, Middle Eastern people in particular, turning to Islam as: first, a refuge providing emotional comfort, peace and certainty of the absolute; and, second, as a spearhead of socio-political resistance. Internally, within the Middle East, this resistance may be launched against what was discussed above as the 'crisis environment' of political suppression, economic deprivation, socio-economic disparity, frustration and alienation. Externally, it may be directed against foreign economic, political and cultural domination, and against the 'military aggressiveness and hegemony of the United States of America'[33] and Europe. If this internal and external resistance is now taking more radical, violent and terrorist forms in some Middle Eastern, predominantly Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Chechnya, it is partly because Islam represents one of the most deep-rooted and therefore least alien cultural strands in such countries. More particularly and pragmatically, however, resistance takes a terrorist form because quite often there are no other outlets left for channelling political demands, economic complaints, and social resentment and dejection. Islam, including its radical branch, often represents the only outlet for social protest, both rural and urban, and for mobilisation of protest.

In a time of intensifying stress and strain in the socio-economic, political, and cultural spheres;, a time of faltering secular ideologies and ill-preserved national loyalties; a time when the prevailing environment is that of American military aggressiveness and an international politics based on double standards and Western hegemony; in such a time, an ideology which is sometimes expressed in radical and violent Islamic terms and forms, offers several advantages. It provides an emotionally familiar foundation for group identity and solidarity. It presents an immediately intelligible formulation of fundamentals for both a harsh criticism of the appalling present status quo, and an alternative, though unarticulated and utopian, programme for the future.

Islam is able to provide very effective symbols and slogans for popular mobilisation, whether for or against a cause or a regime. In this respect, Islamists in general and

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[32] Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Rida and Hassan Al-Banna are some of the pioneers of this Islamic reformist school.

[33] See Bennis, Phyllis 2003. *Before and After: US Foreign Policy and the September 11th Crisis.* New York: Olive Branch Press.

radical Islamists in particular, criticise 'Muslim rulers as apostates'[34] who have abrogated God's laws (*Sharia*) and adopted foreign and infidel institutions and cultures. For these critics, the only solution is a return to the original and authentic Islamic referential framework:, the *Qur'an* and prophetic traditions (*Sunnah*). In order for this to take place, the violent removal or overthrow of the present apostate rulers and governments is an essential first step to establishing an Islamic State and restoring the 'Islamic caliphate'[35] . These radical Islamists are also vehemently anti-Western, in the sense that they consider the West as the "antithesis to their own culture"[36] and the source of the evils that are devastating Muslim societies and corroding their authentic Islamic identity and cultural patterns. Since Western culture (not its technological aspects) is seen to be damaging to what is called Islamic authenticity (*Al-Asala Al-Islamiyyah*), Islamists have declared a Holy War (Jihad) against it, a war which is spiritual, physical and intellectual, as well as both defensive and offensive. This Jihad is seen as first, a mechanism for propagating an Islamic message worldwide and establishing a new Islamic global order; and second, as a means of self-defence against an historical neighbour and rival, an aggressive and hegemonic Christian West.

In other words, the current criticism of the West in the 'Muslim world'[37] , which is frequently accompanied by a violent rejection of Western secular culture, and by terrorist activities against Western targets and interests, seems to be positively correlated with the Muslims' sense of weakness and vulnerability in the face of the power and economic domination of Western states. This suggests that if the relationship between the Muslim and the Western worlds is to become more equal in future, then first there must be a transformation of radical Muslims' rejection, violence, and terrorism into more tolerant perceptions, attitudes, and behaviour. The bitterness towards the West associated since the 1970s with the most radical, extremist Islamic movements, groups and organizations should be seen in the light of the historical context and relationships between Islam and the West or, more precisely, between Islam and Christendom, two rival faiths competing for the salvation of souls and the mastery of the world.

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[34] See Farj, Muhammad Abd Al-Salam, "The Absent Duty (Al-Fraida Al-Gha'ibah)" in: *Ganeena, Ni'mat Allah, Tanzim Al-Jihad (The Jihad Organization)* 1988. Cairo: Dar Al-Huriyyah Li Al-Tiba'a Wa Al-Nashr (Al-Hurriya House for Press and Publication.

[35] See Mustapha, Shukri Ahmed "Wathigat Al-Khilapha (The Caliphate Document)" in: Rif'at Sid Ahmed 1991. Al-Nabi Al-Musallah- 2: Al-Tha'iruun (The Militant Prophet- 2: The Revolutionaries). London: Riyad El-Rayyes Books.

[36] Jochen Hippler and Andrea Lueg (ed.) 1995. *The Next Threat: Western Perceptions of Islam.* Boulder: Pluto Press, p. 15.

[37] The 'Muslim World' is used here in a broad sense to include the extensive geographical areas and diverse socio-economic, political and cultural settings for Muslims from Morocco to Indonesia.

Escalation of Negative Perceptions

Demonised perceptions deriving from a monolithic image, based on extreme expressions that are interpreted as representative of the "other", can be found both in the West (Europe and North America) and in the Muslim world. When Sayyid Qutb, one of the most well-known radical Islamic thinkers, argues for the moral supremacy of the Islamic world, he emphasises the violent history of The Spanish Inquisition and Protestant-Catholic religious wars, and the lack of such intra-faith violence in the Islamic world. "Islamic history has not known those terrible organized persecutions of thinkers and scientists such as the courts of the Inquisition carried out."[38] Osama bin Laden, in his *fatwa* against Americans, sees Americans through the filter of their occupation of Islamic holy sites, and the million of victims of the first Gulf War, and the subsequent economic sanctions. However, the Inquisition is probably not the best comparison for the current activities of Western civilisation in the Muslim world, as it is not possible to see the victims of war as representing only one of the sides in a war. Rather, the Inquisition represents a demonised image of the West. Similarly, "the organized persecutions of thinkers and scientists" under Taliban regime in Afghanistan or during the first years of the revolutionary Iran, hardly represents Islam. Neither do Osama bin Laden's actions represent all of Islam, despite his support among Arabs and Muslims. Nonetheless, the media-shared images of the events of September 11, 2001, continue to be used as arguments (propaganda) against Muslims.

The Western image of Islam is affected by the ideas of Muslim aggression and brutality, fanaticism, irrationality and medieval backwardness, and antipathy towards women, as opposed to Western enlightenment and modernity. The seventh-century Islamic expansion into and conquest of Persia and the Eastern Roman Empire, as well as the Muslim Turkish siege of Vienna in August 1529 and again in 1683, are rediscovered and made to appear to be once again imminent.. With the Iranian Khomeini, Saudi Arabian Osama Bin Laden, Egyptian Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Afghani Mullah Omar, Indonesian Sheikh Ba'ashir, and Sudanese Hassan Al-Turabi, to name only the most prominent, the anti-Western wave rolls on and on. The threat of Islam and the Muslims might only be a spiritual one, an oriental counter-model to Western civilisation, but it might result in stopping the flow of oil, the disrupting of international trade routes and markets, or in a cultural invasion of the West through immigrants from the Muslim world. The Islamic threat might lie in the 'Islamic' nuclear bombs of Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Simple-minded Western statesmen might

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[38] Sayyid Qutb 1996. *Social Justice in Islam.* In: William E. Shepard, ed. & translator. *Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism, A Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justice in Islam.* Brill: Leiden, 13.

even perceive it as a battle between a reactionary and inferior Islam on the one side, and an advanced, superior and civilized West on the other. As the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi stated in the aftermath of the events of September 11th, 2001:, "We should be confident of the superiority of our civilization, which consists of a value system that has given people widespread prosperity in those countries that embrace it, and guarantees respect for human rights and religion. This respect certainly does not exist in Islamic countries. [Therefore], the West is bound to Occidentalize [the rest of the world] and [conquer] new people. It has already done it with the [communist world] and part of the Islamic world, but unfortunately part of the Islamic world is still 1,400 years behind. From that point of view, we must be conscious of the strength and force of our civilization."[39] Berlusconi then suggested that "Europe must reconstitute itself on the basis of her Christian roots."[40]

On the other hand, Muslims, in particular radical Muslims, justify their anti-Western stand by reciting a litany of deeply felt grievances against the West. Painful historical memories of the Crusades and European imperialism, the creation of and the existence of "literary and material support for the State of Israel"[41] , the Cold War and American neo-colonialism – all the aggressive actions of a 'Militant Christian' West – become superimposed upon current events. The past is used to colour i.a. the continuing Arab-Israel conflict, the presence of American troops in the Gulf, the devastating impacts of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Jihad resistance and liberation movements in Kashmir[42] and Chechnya. These memories of the past feed popular frustration and resentment, ignite new anger, and deepen anti-Western, particularly anti-American, attitudes and actions, not just among radical Islamists and terrorists, but also in the broader Muslim world. A gloomy climate of scepticism and animosity is reflected in the common usage of terms such as: 'the Christian crusaders', neocolonialism, Zionist expansion, and the 'Judaic-Christian alliance'[43] against Islam and Muslims. In other words, and as Professor Ted Robert Gurr argues: "The greater the frustration, the

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[39] Hiro, Dilip 2002. *War Without End: The Rise of Islamist Terrorism and Global Response.* London and New York: Routledge, p. 415.

[40] Ibid.

[41] For the US-Israel alliance see: Bennis, Phyllis, Op.cit., pp. 40–61.

[42] For example, Yoginder Sikand argues that "from the 1990s onward, there has been a remarkable transformation in the terms of discourse in which the Kashmiri liberation struggle against Indian rule has sought to express itself." See Yoginder Sikand, "The Changing Course of the Kashmiri Struggle: From National Liberation to Islamist Jihad?" *The Muslim World*, Vol. 91, No. 1and 2, Spring 2001, pp. 229–256.

[43] See Osama Bin Laden's Declaration of Jihad in Bernard Lewis, "Licence to Kill: Osama Bin Ladin's Declaration of Jihad*", Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 6, November/December 1998.

greater the quantity of aggression against the sources of frustration"[44] be they despotic political regimes, or Europe and America along with their allies and hegemonic ambitions.

Furthermore, President George W. Bush's use of the word 'crusade' in a speech given on the 16th of September, 2001, in reference to the ongoing war against international terrorism, highlighted the distance between the Muslim and Western worlds, and brought up painful memories of historical encounters. President Bush's choice of the word 'crusade' was harshly criticised and protests were made by many Muslims who accused him of conjuring up images of the worst historical conflict between Muslims and Christians: the medieval Crusades waged by European Christians to recapture Palestine, the home of Jesus Christ. However, Bush was not alone in his faux pas. Having named their ensuing military operation 'Infinite Justice', after 'Infinite Reach' mounted by President Bill Clinton in August 1998, the Pentagon altered the name to 'Enduring Freedom' within hours when Muslims pointed out that only God can dispense 'Infinite Justice'. It also took President Bush only a short time to revive President Ronald Regan's old-fashioned Biblical language of good and evil. Like Regan, who termed the former Soviet Union an 'evil empire'[45], Bush felt he was entirely justified when he described the states or regimes of North Korea, Iran and Iraq, and their terrorist allies as "constituting an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world."[46] This equates the ongoing war on international terrorism to the war of the liberal and capitalist West with the communism of the former Soviet Union, a cold war in which the rhetoric was that of good and evil, of civilised, freedom-loving nations against barbaric and tyrannical ones.

This brings us back to the earlier-cited remarks of the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi about the superiority of Western democratic civilization. One of Berlusconi's fatal mistakes, in the view of some critics[47], is to have lumped all Islamic countries into a single civilisation and culture that shows no respect for human rights or religious freedom and which has lagged '1,400 years behind the West' Another is to have chauvinistically glossed over the West's record of illegal and aggressive acts. A third mistake is to have asserted that the West is bound to ' Occidentalize and conquer new people', which suggests fresh Western aggression is in store. Berlusconi's use of words like 'conquer' resembles that of Osama Bin Laden and his radical counterparts, who believe that it is a divine obligation and mission to preach and carry out both a defensive

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[44] Gurr, Ted Robert 1970. *Why Men Rebel.* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p. 9.
[45] Bennet, William J. 2002. *Why We Fight? Moral Clarity and the War on Terrorism.* New York: Doubleday/ Random House, pp. 44–45.
[46] Hiro, Dilip, op. cit., p. 388.
[47] Hiro, Dilip, op. cit., p. 415.

and an offensive *jihad* to spread the Word of God (Allah) worldwide and to defend international Muslim communities against the Crusaders from the West.

In Bin Laden's view, charges of terrorism are not plausible or defensible, but are deliberately deceptive in a world of Western hegemony and oppression by domestic political regimes within which acts of violence and terrorism are religiously justified and obligatory. As a radical Islamist and a warrior (*mujahid* or *jihadist*), he paints the modern world in binary dichotomies or polarities, a world of belief/faith (*Imam*) and unbelief (*Kufr*), within which the forces of evil (*Shar*), injustice (Dhulm) and repression assault the forces of belief and good (*Khayr*). This prominent and manifestly radical Islamic rhetoric of assault and struggle and battlefield warfare stresses that the battle is spiritual and intellectual, as well as physical. Accordingly, the concept of *jihad* in the spheres of personal spiritual development, ideas, worldviews, ideologies and real physical combat, has been manipulated by radical Islamists to mobilise their followers into political activism and into a state of continuous organisation, training and alertness or vigilance. It has also been reinterpreted to legitimise violent struggle, and terrorism against those considered to be the 'enemies of God', and in certain contexts where the ends are considered to justify the means.

For radical Islamists, Islam and the Muslim world are under siege from the West: "they rob us of our wealth and our resources and of our oil. Our religion is under attack. They kill and murder our brothers. They compromise our honour and our dignity and dare we utter a single word of protest against the injustice, we are called terrorists."[48] By stressing the divine obligation and reward for *jihad* and martyrdom in the path of God, Bin Laden and his partisans appeal to Islam as a transnational, global, revolutionary ideology which seeks not only to alter the social order of the entire world, that is, to rebuild it in conformity with Islam's tenets and civilisational and cultural ideals, but also to create a global community (*ummah*) of believers. In this sense, Bin Laden and others like him are seeking the worldwide establishment and proliferation of Islamic organisations, groups and networks, including radical ones, all working to change the circumstances of injustice in which they perceive themselves as living. Their further intention is to fan the flames of the determination and enthusiasm required in their "commendable terrorism",[49] while they struggle to implement

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[48] Interview with Osama Bin Laden (May 1998), Hunting the Enemy", Frontline: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/bin laden/who/family.html.

[49] Ibid. Herein Osama Bin Laden makes a legalistic distinction between "commendable" and "reprehensible" terrorism. To terrify the innocent is unjust; however, terrorising oppressors is necessary. In Bin Laden's words: "there is no doubt that every state and every civilisation and culture has to resort to terrorism under certain circumstances for the purpose of abolishing tyranny and corruption…The terrorism we practise is of the commendable kind for it is directed at the tyrants, the traitors who commit

domestic socio-economic, political and cultural reforms and challenge Western civilisational and cultural hegemony, and counter Western (military) aggression which now seem to be the rule, not the exception, in international politics.

Reinforcing this radical Islamist challenge, their anti-Western attitudes and actions, is their increasingly vocal expression of grievances, and their critical stance against what Professor Bassam Tibi has termed the "New World Disorder".[50] In other words, the rise of radical Islam and its domestic, regional and international terrorist manifestations have a positive correlation with the political events and transformations taking place worldwide. This correlation is inevitable at a time described by Cyrus Bina as the "decline of Pax-Britannica and the corresponding rise of Pax-Americana, following the Second World War."[51] The current international political transformation, the 'new world order', seems to have as its mission achieving hegemony over the economy, polity and socio-ideological fabric of the world community, including Muslims. s attempts to establish this hegemony have sometimes met with violent resistance, the West, particularly the United States, has had to resort to the adoption of foreign policies formulated along confrontational lines in order to counter the challenge coming from the Islamic world, in particular from its radical extremists and terrorist groups.

A Tradition of Conflict

According to Ted Robert Gurr,[52] a tradition of conflict is an important factor contributing to antagonism in relations among collective actors. The mobilisation of violence against another party is always easier if this mobilisation can utilise the experiences of past hostility as images to represent the current relationship. The history of the Islam-West conflict offers many incidents that can be utilised by Islam in the mobilisation of anti-Western, or by the West of Anti-Muslim, prejudice and hatred. The genesis, evolution and ideological outlook of radical Islam have been shaped by a reverence for history, a sacred past, and the Islamic-Western historical encounters, as

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acts of treason against their own countries and their own faith and their own prophet and their own nation. Terrorising those and punishing them are necessary measures to straighten things and make them right."

[50] Tibi, Bassam 2002. *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California.

[51] Bina, Cyrus, "Towards a New World Order: U.S Hegemony, Client-States and Islamic Alternative" in Hussin Mutalib (ed.), 1999. *Islam, Muslims and the Modern States.* London: St. Martin's Press, p. 3.

[52] Gurr, Ted Robert 1993. *Minorities at risk.* Washinton DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

well as by geographical neighbourhood, and by cooperation among Muslims as they have faced mutual challenges and a mutual enemy. . It was during the lengthy historical encounters with their Western neighbours and rivals that Muslims, radicals in particular, began to perceive their religion and societies as being in a state of inferiority and decay in comparison with Western nations. For radical Islamists, then, history holds the key to comprehending not only the past, but the present and future as well. Throughout most of their shared history, Muslim-Christian encounters or relations have been coloured by geographical rivalry, confrontation, and conflicts over power, and over the hearts, minds, and souls of people worldwide. Muslim-Christian confrontation has involved such historical events as the defeat of the Christian Byzantine Empire by Islam in the seventh century; the brutal combats of the Crusades during the eleventh and twelfth centuries; the expulsion of Muslims from Spain in 1492 and the subsequent persecutions of Jews and Muslims by the Courts of the Inquisition; the Ottoman Empire's threat to Europe; European (Christian) imperialist expansion and colonial domination in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; the political and cultural challenge of the superpowers (the former Soviet Union and the U.S) following the Second World War; the creation of the State of Israel in 1948; and the current global resurgence and reassertion of Islam, including its radical offshoots.

At the same time, violent Islamic political activism, has historically often been regarded by the West as a major threat to regional stability in the Middle East, and to Western strategic interests in the broader Muslim world. The Iranian Islamic Revolution, the fanatic activities of the Taliban movement, attacks on different Western embassies and tourists, hijackings, hostage-taking, and global violent activities (e.g. the events of September 11) by radical Islamic groups and organisations have signalled a militant Islam on a collision course with the (Christian) West. In this respect, the terrorist assaults of September 11, 2001 against the U.S have reinforced images of an expansive and potentially explosive Islam as a power in global politics. To Westerners, these attacks are no less than a globalisation of holy war (*jihad*), with its concommitant, tragic, violent, and terrorist trajectories, and its 'utopian' aspirations for creating a global community of Muslim believers and holy warriors (jihadists/mujahideen) prepared for self-sacrifice and 'martyrdom'[53]. The September 11 terrorist incidents add another dimension to this global jihadist movement, the tremendously enhanced power that 'globalisation'[54] affords to terrorist groups. Globalisation and its structural dimensions of a nation-state system, a global economy, global systems of communication

[53] For martyrdom see: Kohlberg, E, op.cit., pp. 281–307.

[54] For reactions to and criticism of 'Globalization' see David Held and Anthony McGrew 2000. *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

and transportation, and global military- industrialism, all enable terrorist organisations, groups and networks to harness religion, finance, information, and weapons to inflict fatal blows anytime, anywhere and against anyone. This dark side of globalisation reinforces the threat of Islamic radicalismto global stability and security. It has forced the world community to recognise that the growing threat of violence and terrorism in the name of Islam is part and parcel of historically accumulated, mutually negative perceptions, or, to be more precise, images, stereotypes and clichés, strengthened by the repetition of historical processes of attacks, counterattacks, conquests and counter-conquests on military, political, economic, cultural and civilisational levels.

The Risks That Lie Ahead: A Clash of Civilisations

The emerging perception of the Islamic world and the West as antagonistic actors on the world political stage, the difficulties of finding common inter-civilisational rules for these two actors, as well as the problems of asymmetry between them, and the demonising logic of continuing antagonism, clearly involves threats to world peace. The presentation in this Chapter will concentrate on the risks, and for that we need to present the two most influential doomsday scenarios, those of Bernard Lewis, and Samuel P. Huntington. However, these scenarios will not be presented as deterministic, inevitable threats. Instead, in Part III we will present ways in which the clash of civilisations can be avoided.

To Bernard Lewis, "for more than 1,400 years, since the advent of Islam in Arabia and the incorporation into the Islamic empire and civilisation of the formerly Christian eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean, Islam and Christendom have lived side by side – [always as neighbours, often as rivals, sometimes as enemies]. In a sense each is defined and delimited by the other. Each recognised the other as its principal, indeed, its only rival. The result was a long series of conflicts beginning with the early holy wars – jihad, Crusade, conquest, re-conquest – and continuing with the ebb and flow of the Muslim empire in Europe and of European empires in the lands of Islam."[55] The vision of an impending imminent conflict between Islam and the West as but yet another stage in a historic pattern of confrontation is reinforced by Bernard Lewis: "The struggle between Islam and the West has now lasted for some fourteen centuries. It has consisted of a long series of attacks and counter-attacks, jihad, crusades, conquest and re-conquest. Today much of the Muslim world is again seized by an intense – and violent – resentment of the West. Suddenly America has become the archenemy, the

[55] Lewis, Bernard 1993. *Islam and the West.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. viii.

incarnation of evil, the diabolic opponent of all that is good, and specifically, for Muslims, of Islam."[56] This Muslim resentment and intensive violence against the West is due in part to the contrast between Western secularism, i.e., the historical separation of church and state, and Islamic theocratism, i.e. the amalgamation of religion and politics which results in an anti-democratic attitude.

While opinions have differed as to the real meaning of the phrase 'render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's', there is a generally agreed-upon interpretation. The phrase is seen as "legitimising a situation in which two institutions exist side by side, each with its own laws and chains of authority – one concerned with religion, called the church, the other concerned with politics, called the state. And since they are two, they may be joined or separated, subordinate or independent, and conflict may rise between them over questions of demarcation and jurisdiction."[57] Since this separate formulation does not exist in Islam, the Muslim world is inherently and intrinsically, anti-democratic, deeply anti-Western and invariably targets the West. Islam's attitude to the electoral process is "one man, one vote, once. Islam and democracy are antithetical."[58] Gilles Kepel, like Lewis, and like Pipes and Miller, contends further that liberal democracy is compatible with neither Islamic fundamentalism nor with Islam itself. For him, "the rejection of even a chimerical notion of democracy is actually inherent in Islamic religious doctrine."[59]

In the same vein, Professor Samuel P. Huntington contends that the struggle between Islam and the West is not just about material and political interests, it is a clash of cultures and civilisations. In a widely noted article, Huntington affirms the primacy of culture in international relations or politics. For him, "the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind, and the dominating source of conflict, will be cultural. The clash of civilisations will dominate world politics."[60] The most important conflicts, believes Huntington, will occur along the cultural lines separating the West from non-Western civilization: "On both sides, the interaction between Islam and the West is seen as a clash of civilisation. With the end of the Cold War, international

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[56] Lewis, op. cit., p. 2.
[57] Lewis, op. cit., p. 1.
[58] Lewis, Bernard, "Islam and Liberal Democracy", *Atlantic Monthly*, February 1993, p. 91. See also Daniel Pipes, "Same Difference: The Islamic Threat- Part One", *National Review*, 7th September 1994, p. 63; and Judith Miller, "The Challenge of Radical Islam", *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1993, pp. 45–51.
[59] Braley, Alan (trans.,) 1994, Gilles Kepel *The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World.* Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, p. 194.
[60] Huntington, op. cit., p. 22.

politics moves out of its Western phase and its centrepiece becomes the interaction between the West and non-Western civilisations and among non-Western civilisations."[61]

To support his argument, Huntington cites the engagement of American forces in various military encounters with Iranian, Arabic, and Islamic terrorists, supported by at least three Middle Eastern governments, "Iran, Lebanon and Libya."[62] According to Huntington, this warfare between Arabs and/or Muslims and the West culminated in the 1991 Gulf crisis and subsequent war, during which Islamic fundamentalists universally supported Iraq rather than the West and its Arab allies. In the war's aftermath, Huntington asserts, NATO planners increasingly targeted potential threats and instability in the Muslim world. As Huntingdon puts it, "this centuries-old military interaction between the West and Islam is unlikely to decline. It could become more virulent."[63]

In this context the vision of a cataclysmic clash in international politics draws a parallel between the communist threat and Islam. As Western leaders attempt to forge the 'New World Order', transnational Islam has increasingly come to be regarded as the new, global, monolithic enemy of the West. Westerners searching since the collapse of the former Soviet Union for a new enemy against whom to test their power prefer Islam as the antagonist. Fear of the 'Green Menace' (Green being the colour of Islam) has replaced that of the 'Red Menace' of world communism as the principal strategic threat of the post-Cold War era. In Daniel Pipes's words, "like communism during the Cold War, Islam is a threat to the West."[64]

Conclusion

The risk of the Muslim world and the West drifting into a collision course can be seen as a consequence of the following:

1. The inclination, by both Muslims and Westerners, with some exceptions, towards alarmism and gross simplification. Alarmism has concerned the 'threat' which, from one side, 'Islam and Muslims' pose to non-Muslim and Christian worlds, and on the other, which the 'West' poses to Muslims, in particular Arabs and Middle Easterners. Non-Muslim and Christian Western simplification involves

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[61] Huntington, op. cit., p. 23.
[62] Huntington, op. cit., p. 31.
[63] Huntington, op. cit., pp. 31–32.
[64] Pipes, Daniel 1995, "Political Islam Is a Threat to the West*", in Islam: Opposing Viewpoints* .U.S.A: Greenhaven Press, p. 192.

many controversial issues: a) violence and terrorism – as if most Muslims, despite diversity, are, by definition, terrorist or most terrorist are, by origin, Muslims; b) the degree of crises, and the resulting atmosphere of rebellion and aggression experienced in the Muslim world and the degree of Muslim responsibility for these crises; and c) Muslim intolerance towards pluralism, diversity, dialogue and respect of human rights. To use Fred Halliday's phrase, it is not only the 'sensationalist media', but also writers with an eye to the current anxieties of the reading public who reinforce such misrepresentations or negative images. Muslim oversimplification is itself two-sided: on the one hand, a stereotyping of the 'West' on West-centric and hegemonic basis; and on the other hand, the assertion among Muslims themselves of a monolithic identity for more than a billion diverse Muslims, and of a unitary interpretation of Quranic and prophetic texts and Islamic culture. Neither the Western world and Christianity, nor the Muslim world and Islam and Muslims, are a valid amalgam in the modern world, and the terms lend themselves far too easily to monist presentations of socio-economic, political and cultural interactions. To completely eradicate such 'alarmism and simplification' is, however, impossible, since both Westerners and Muslims adhere to these and similar labels, stereotypes and prejudices.

2. Difficulties in finding common inter-civilisational rules of interaction despite the historically mutual cultural influences, and economic exchanges. Furthermore, these influences and exchanges are concrete evidence that the relationship between Muslims 'Easterners' and Christian Westerners was not simply one of holy conquest, Crusades, colonialism, and *jihad*. There was trade across the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, its balance and volume of it changing over the course of time. There was also an exchange of knowledge in all scholarly and scientific fields.
3. Asymmetry in the Islam-West relationship.
4. The logic of escalation, including consolidation of negative presentations of the other. Muslim and Western image-makers, including religious authorities, political establishments, and corporate mass media (e.g. TV, radio, internet, the press), conceptualise images for their consumers to serve their benign and not so benign purposes, sometimes with tragic consequences. A recurring theme in this corporate mass media is the idea of packaging the complexities of Islamic/Muslim and Western/Christian civilisations and cultures into easily comprehensible categories or binary dichotomies: good and evil, peaceful and violent, beautiful and ugly.
5. The re-discovery or re-invention and utilisation of conflict history, not only to assert Islam-West negative perceptions but also to escalate current conflict and to justify violence and terrorism. In this sense, negative images of the 'other' are

prevalent in both Islamic/Muslim and Western/Christian civilisations and cultures, and have become firmly ensconced in the discourse of Islamic conquest, and the Christian Crusades. These images have been carried through the age of Western imperial territorial expansion and colonialism, developed by the Orientalists in the 19th and 29th centuries, and continue on into the age of global communication, economy and military industrialism. But images do not exist in a vacuum. They have their uses, and have been and are used; they could even be and have been and continue to be manipulated to serve a maleficent objectives in specific socio-economic, political and cultural contexts and historical epochs.

While the above factors highlight the risks involved in the relationship between the West and the Islamic world, they also confirm the global necessity, and the urgency, for inter-faith and inter-civilisational dialogue, and for tolerance and respect as essential ingredients for mutual, peaceful co-existence and co-operation. This need, and a strategy for this dialogue will be the focus of Chapter 10 (Part III).

Part III:
How Islam-West Cooperation Can Ameliorate and Decrease the Sources and Catalysts of Terrorism

Chapter 7

Development Cooperation and Support of Democratisation as Ways to Tackle the Terrorist Threat

Timo Kivimäki

Some of the root causes of terrorism are indeed related to poverty and the lack of democracy. While it is clear that terrorist strategies which address these grievances by targeting innocent civilians are unacceptable, grievances related to poverty and the lack of democracy are perfectly legitimate. It would thus seem that democratisation of political systems would do some good toward inhibiting the motivation of individual terrorists. Moreover, to reduce individual and national support of terrorism and terrorists, as well as terrorist organisation, the inequalities of regional economies should also be addressed. Addressing relative economic grievances, especially in communities whose income levels drop drastically, also seems useful for the prevention of terrorist motivations, as well as terrorist organisation.

However, the economic and political grievances that are mainly associated with the growth of terrorism are experienced by transnational communities. Islamic people all over the world are currently deprived of opportunities for human development, education, access to health services, and decent income. Furthermore, they do not have sufficient non-violent channels for the expression of their grievances, as Muslim populations are also often deprived of democracy. Due to the huge Western interest in the natural resources of many Muslim countries, especially oil, Western treatment of Islamic populations has for the past few decades been problematic. The rule of international law and the supremacy of international institutions of democracy, such as the United Nations, have had less relevance than economic interests have had in Western relations with Islamic populations and Western relations with other countries and populations outside the West. Even in the area of development cooperation, it turns out that the West is involuntarily discriminating against Muslims.[1] Denmark,

[1] According to the UNDP statistics on aid (World Development Report 2003), and CIA statistics on Islamic populations (Factbook 2003), the percentage of Muslims in the total population is not positively associated with the amount of aid a country received. Nonetheless, taken that poverty and the proportion

for example, has recently declared (in November of 2004) that it will upgrade the priority of its aid relationship with Indonesia, referring to its policy statement paper on the principles of counter terrorism (available in Danish at http://www.um.dk/upload/Principplanfordanskudviklingsbistand.pdf).

While developing countries should continue to use whatever powers they have to contain the illegitimate and unacceptable strategy of civilian targeting, they should also continue to work for the alleviation of the legitimate grievances that are at the roots of the illegitimate strategies of terrorism. Terrorism has some of its root causes in poverty and a lack of democracy; and therefore continuing to address these issues is important also from the point of view of the prevention of terrorism. The international community could be of great help in this effort to reduce poverty and increase democracy.

The causal links from various levels of poverty to terrorism are of a nature that can be approached by paying attention to the counter-terrorism aspect in many types of poverty reduction measures. ***Rather than just designing interventions specifically designed to address the problem of terrorism, the aim of preventing violence, conflict and terrorism should be integrated into normal development cooperation programming and diplomatic dialogue with the developing world.*** The ways in which all poverty reduction could better serve the purpose of prevention of terrorism, while still primarily focusing on basic development aims, are the following:

Start with the creation of a common platform: Cooperation in the prevention of the root causes of terrorism has no common perceptional and conceptual platform. If a majority of Muslims trust a man such as Osama bin Ladin, who in the West is seen as the icon of global terrorism, it can easily be concluded that this cooperation requires a great deal of preliminary work to ensure that an effective agenda and strategies are adopted. Cooperation to uproot and eliminate terrorism should try to avoid the problems of international systems that give rise to terrorist support.. Anti-terrorist cooperation cannot mean 'buying' or 'bribing' countries to comply, and it especially should not involve coercion by the powerful states. The platform for addressing the root causes of anti-terrorism cooperation should be created in perfect adherence with international law, and should recognise the supremacy of legitimate international organisations such as the United Nations. There may be reason for an UNGA special

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of Muslims in the population do correlate very strongly, and taken that there is a natural association between poverty (need) and aid, we can conclude that Muslims are discriminated against in the allocation of Western aid. This, however, is probably related to the history of aid: aid often followed missionaries, who again often managed to convert people to Christianity. This is why Western aid usually goes to Christian countries.

session or conference to create that platform. Principled discussion and dialogue is needed much more than hasty decisions and quick action. As the topicality of terrorism is partly caused by West-centric global agenda setting, and since this very problem of West-centric agendas is one of the main sources of international terrorism, it is clear that in counter-terrorism the risk of counterproductive strategies is much more pronounced than in most types of cooperation.

Focus on relative poverty: Poverty reduction should also put emphasis on relative poverty – the decline of the economic position of groups, as well as the decline in the position of a group relative to that of some other groups. According to the analyses done in this book, it is relative poverty that is the main economic condition responsible for the successful expansion of terrorism.

Focus on transnational poverty alleviation and the promotion of international/transnational democracy: Instead of just operating on the basis of national programs, development cooperation should also address the problems of transnational peoples and the problems of international inequalities. The transnational community of Islamic people should be a high priority. The ideas of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and the European Extreme Fundamentalism and Terrorism Group (EEFTG) on 'inclusive globalisation' should be brought into the UN debate and concretised there. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) could be given a central role in the concretisation of the ideas of 'inclusive globalisation' involving the political empowerment of refugee populations. The expertise of refugee and other immigrant communities of the donor nations could be mobilised for the brainstorming of ideas on how to empower transnational communities, and communities outside democratic rights, in development cooperation.

Focus on Muslim poverty: The issues of economic grievances of the Islamic community, particularly those grievances related to relative poverty in both international and local comparisons, should be addressed not only in direct terrorism prevention interventions, but also in any development cooperation aimed at reducing poverty. For historical reasons, Western aid does not currently target Muslims as much as it does people of other religious communities with similar grievances. Countries such as Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, and areas such as Central Asia, should be given a higher priority. Furthermore, Muslim communities in non-Muslim countries (such as the Philippines and Kenya, for example) should be given at least the same amount of attention as other religious communities.

The reorientation of Western aid towards the deprived Islamic populations would help do away with the widespread distrust of the West among Muslims. Western tsunami

aid in Aceh, for example, has been a visible and powerful demonstration against the terrorist construction of a world deeply divided among antagonistic religious civilisations. In this kind of aid, development cooperation can demonstrate solidarity among religious communities, and offer tremendously powerful political tools for working to break the vicious circle escalating tensions between Muslims and the West.

Promote dialogue: Addressing the international economic grievances of Muslims would create opportunities for a constructive cultural, political and diplomatic dialogue, which would make it difficult for terrorists to appeal to their "constituencies" by dehumanising their civilian targets. Dialogue would also help destroy the culture of tolerance towards terrorism, common in the Muslim world.

Destroy the link between grievances and terror: Dialogue could also reduce the popular appeal for support for terrorism made by linking the international Islamic grievances with desperate acts of civilian targeting. Diplomatic means could be used to encourage Islamic leaders to explicitly tackle the misperceptions of the Muslims in many areas: terrorism has so far only weakened the position of the poor Muslims and should therefore not be seen as a legitimisation of terrorism. While Europe should certainly address the economic grievances of Muslims, through i.a. development cooperation, Muslim leaders could at the same time be expected to campaign against the rhetorical link between these grievances and the legitimacy of terrorism.

Poverty alleviation has to reach difficult areas: Working with difficult partners might be necessary to prevent weak states from collapsing and forming areas where the organisation of terrorism would be very easy. Most importantly, Western development cooperation should focus on the objective grievances of those Muslim areas with weak governance.

Equal Partnership: The fact that terrorist propaganda successfully utilises the feelings of humiliation and grievance, felt by many individual Muslims, sets special requirements for choosing the ways in which development cooperation and development partnership operate (not only in specific projects, but in any type of development cooperation). Development cooperation should try to avoid exemplifying the problems that Muslims perceive in the international system and which give rise to terrorist support: Anti-terrorist development cooperation should not involve powerful economic persuasion to comply with Western aims, and it especially should not involve coercion by the powerful states. Development cooperation should come with no political strings attached. The platform for addressing the root causes of anti-terrorism cooperation should be created in complete adherence with international law and the supremacy of

legitimate international organisations such as the United Nations. A policy to fight terrorism by using aid as an instrument should be based on principles originating from the UN system (such as the commonly accepted UNSC resolution 1373). Support for UN coordination in counter-terrorism would emphasise the principle of equal partnership, and would improve the efficiency of counter-terrorism. The aim of the prevention of terrorism further places a special emphasis on the principles of equal partnership between donors and recipients to avoid building up the too common impression of aid as an instrument of power politics.

Monitoring /Surveillance/ of International Aid: In order to help prevent aid and charity work from benefiting terrorist charities, international aid should take certain precautionary measures. By working together with Arab donor organisations, and using both political and diplomatic means, Western development cooperation can coordinate efforts to prevent aid and charity contributions from being diverted to terrorist actions. Donors should work together to discern which charities are acting as fronts for terrorist organisations. To ensure the legitimacy of counter-terrorist measures, donors should also be very careful to avoid the labelling of legitimate Muslim charities as terrorist. In channelling aid, donors should also always try to reach the constituencies of illegitimate charities, so that the controlling of terrorist charities would not end up reducing the levels of basic, needs-related services for terrorist constituencies: when a terrorist charity has been closed down, an alternative needs to be found as soon as possible for the continuation of the legitimate functions of this charity.

Ideological Battle against Informal Terrorist Organisation: The prevention of terrorism should focus on the violent ideology of civilian targeting, rather than on organisations with formal organisational structures. The greatest potential for terrorist threat lies in fragmented terrorism with an undisciplined cell structure, glued together by global grievances and ideologies.[2] Utilising the three-pronged approach of the alleviation of

[2] This seems clear from the studies of conflict violence, which seem to point to the fact that (old type) conflicts with disciplined political action tend to produce far fewer casualties than conflicts with spontaneous, splintered, group actions. The danger of the tendency of terrorism moving in an undisciplined, unorganised, direction was exemplified in the Madrid strikes of 2004: the people of Spain, the majority of whom were against Spain's participation in the military operation in Iraq, were not a globally legitimate target, even within the terrorist mindset. However, the cell that implemented the action was there in Spain, so they could not prioritise between the globally most legitimate targets and the theatres of action open to them. Spain was their theatre of action and Spaniards were their available targets, so the action was taken in Spain, against Spaniards. With a cell structure, terrorism has to act everywhere, in individual cells, instead of having terrorists around the world acting as global partners in more carefully selected operations.

core grievances (international and local relative poverty), dialogue (re-humanisation of potential terrorist targets), and challenging the ideology of violence, in order to tackle the question of acceptance and tolerance of , civilian targeting, will be much more effective than any measures taken to fight the existing, formal, international terrorist organisations and individuals.

Put counter-terrorism into perspective: However, international cooperation with developing countries always needs to be both sensitive and sensible. The prevention of terrorism has become a dominant issue on the international agenda partly because of the threat it poses to Western people. Calculated from the US Department of Defense annual reports on global terrorism, terrorism causes about 700 casualties among Western people annually. Hunger kills over eight million people annually (not Westerners, though) and the issue of the global, international income gap is not prioritised in the international diplomatic agenda. The very emphasis on the prevention of terrorism thus exemplifies the West-centric agenda setting of the international powers, and the real lack of global democracy that is one of the root causes of terrorism. In order to have any real effect on eliminating the problem of terrorism, any cooperation should try to avoid exaggerating the gravity of the problem, despite the fact that terrorism has the potential for even greater destruction and violence than any we have seen so far. Since terrorism is a problem for the developing world as well as the West, there could and should be cooperation in solving the problem. Furthermore, despite the fact that the casualties of terrorism are not so numerous, terrorism is a hindrance to investment, development, and poverty alleviation and as such relevant to setting priorities in development cooperation.

In short, development cooperation should continue to be focused on poverty and the suffering of people in the developing world. It should especially focus more on Muslims, who have so far received too little attention. Since it is not obsessed by the need to counter terrorism, this work could serve as an important tool in reducing tensions between the Muslim world and the West. Indirectly, it could thus also prove to be an important tool in the prevention of terrorism.

Chapter 8

Support for State-Building as a Means of Preventing Radicalisation

Heidi Huuhtanen

Weak statehood is at the heart of the "root-causes" of terrorism. It creates structural, political, and socio-economic problems that add to the set of conditions that promote the process of radicalisation to the point of the use of terrorism. Weak statehood as a cause or catalyst of terrorism is not just a phenomena of the Arab world; Islamist radicalisation seems to appear wherever weak statehood and a significant Islamic population co-exist. In geographical areas with other religious populations, the problems of weak statehood are channelled into other fundamentalist ideologies (for example Hindu fundamentalist or Serbian nationalist). Weak statehood combined with these other ideologies may also lead to the use of terrorism, or to clashes between different sectors of society, or to guerrilla war or civil war, or even a full-blown, traditional war.

Therefore support for state-building should not be seen as a limited means for fighting in the "war against terrorism", but as a necessary strategy for long-term domestic, regional and international security. State-building efforts should also not be contingent on ideological questions regarding the form of governance. The debate about the Islamic and/or liberal-democratic nature of the state should not hinder state-building efforts, nor efforts to increase political participation, accountability, good governance, the rule of law, and the upholding of human rights. Linking state-building efforts to ideological debates should also be avoided even on the rhetorical level..

Western actors have introduced reform policies aimed at political and economic change in the Arab world as a response to the threat of terrorism. At the heart of these policies are basic state-building efforts, in particular the promotion of political participation in order to build an active 'democracy', and the upholding of human rights. The timing and content of the reform initiatives are politically coloured, as is the response from the Arab regimes. This should not, however, be allowed to undermine the efforts for state-building and reform.

Policy conclusions for external actors

Support for state-building should be seen as a long-term tool for domestic security and stability in the Arab world. Policies of external actors should be aimed at supporting the states and civil societies to act against state weakness, particularly by increasing political participation and strengthening public services (e.g. employment, education, health, social security, income distribution).

General state-building measures include assisting with the process of democratisation, taking anti-corruption measures, ensuring and monitoring elections, reforming the legal and court systems, fostering human rights, fostering freedom of press, instituting constitutional reforms, reforming states bureaucracy, providing financial and economic aid (e.g. by lowering trade barriers), carrying out economic and agricultural reforms, prioritising public investment for education and the health sector, and supporting the effective use of natural and cultural resources (capacity-building).

The Western actors should be vocal on the need for reforms; and consistent and coherent long-term policies should be formulated. These policies should not be used solely as short-term, anti-terrorism policies. They should also not be subjected to short term security interests; balancing long-term security interests and short term stability is (may even) be necessary. Commitment to long-term reforms needs to be in line with policies being implemented, and the policies need to be consistent.

Support for domestic reform must be accompanied by a re-evaluation of policies on regional security issues (for example in Iraq Iran, and the Persian Gulf), and a re-evaluation of the policies on regimes in the region as well as policies on conflicts (especially the Israel-Palestinian question). Rooting out the sources of grievances in the Middle East is of the utmost importance for reducing popular support for and the perceived legitimacy of terrorist actions. International efforts should be intensified to achieve stability in Iraqi and to find a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian question. Regional security arrangements should be such that they reduce the external security dilemma of the Arab states, and decrease legitimation of the militarization of governance.

Conditionality should be introduced in policies towards regimes. Regimes should not be excused from violating mutually shared principles on the grounds of security considerations, be it for reasons of international, regional or domestic security. The EU should act on violations of the human rights clause in the association agreements, and should not hesitate to impose economic conditions if necessary.

A platform for dialogue should be created for institutionalising cooperation in reforms aimed at state building, in order to commit the different actors and to have a genuine dialogue. This platform should be the basis for dialogue among the main international actors as well as the Arab states. The EU should broaden its cooperation to include the Gulf countries. Western actors should increase concrete dialogue with

regimes and provide technical assistance in preparing and revising the legal and institutional framework of political participation, rule of law, good governance, and the institutionalisation and upholding of human rights. Technical assistance and education could also be provided for reforms of legal systems and the security sector.

There should be an increase in the promotion of political participation. The EU should increase its direct "democracy support" substantially. For example, in the year 2002, only 7% of EU aid on democracy and human rights was allocated to Arab Mediterranean, more specifically to Tunisia, Morocco and the West Bank.[1]

Western diplomacy should increase dialogue with civil society actors and opposition parties in weak states. This would serve to empower civil society and create a partnership and a feeling of ownership of reforms, which would enhance peaceful internal debate among different actors. The EU could provide frameworks and facilitate contacts between different civil society actors from Islamists to liberals.

The abilities of states to provide services in education, health, social security and employment should be supported through assistance in reforming these sectors. Technical assistance could also be provided for building the basic infrastructure for a modern information society. External actors can also engage in supporting independent media, educating journalists, building opinion poll agencies, and promoting access to Internet. It should be remembered that the ownership of reforms should lie with the states themselves. Previous historical analogies provide many examples showing that external influence can only support, not initiate, the domestic process of reforms. On the domestic level, these reforms must be owned by both the state and the civil society and its different actors. External actors should support the dialogue of the reforms between these actors.

The following table summarises the main policy tools to be used by the external actors for strengthening weak, failing and failed states:[2]

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[1] Richard Youngs 2002. The European Union and Democracy in the Arab-Muslim World. *Center for European Policy Studies, Working Paper*, No. 2, November 2002.
http://www.esdpdemocracy.net/word/Publications/CEPS_MEEM.pdf

[2] Ulrich Schneckener: 2003. *Linking State Failure and Transnational Terrorism.* Unpublished policy paper, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik: Berlin.

Table 8.1. Policy tools

	Monopoly of violence and resources	Public services and utilities	Political system
Weak States	• security sector reform, • combat "crime and conflict" networks	• financial and economic aid (e.g. lowering trade barriers), • economic and agricultural reforms, • prioritising public investment for the education and health sectors, • effective use of resources (capacity-building) • Programmes for small-medium size businesses (SMBs)	• assistance to democratisation • anti-corruption measures, • election observance, • reform of the legal code and the court system, • fostering human rights, • fostering freedom of the press and other media, • constitutional reforms, • reform of state bureaucracy
Failing States	• programmes for demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants, • support of local peace processes, • support for enforcing the monopoly of violence, • security sector reform, • combat "crime and conflict" networks	• financial and economic aid (e.g. lowering trade barriers), • substantial economic and agricultural reforms, • increasing public investment for the education and health sectors, • effective use of resources (capacity-building)	• assistance to democratisation, • anti-corruption measures, • election observance, • reform of the legal code and the court system, • fostering human rights, • fostering freedom of the media, • constitutional reforms, • reform of state bureaucracy
Failed states	• international peace-keeping and peace-enforcement • international policing, • establishment of local police and a national army, • programs for demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants, • control of external borders, • support of national peace processes, • combat of "crime and conflict networks"	• rehabilitation and reconstruction of infrastructure, • providing basis needs for the population, • humanitarian aid, • return of refugees, • long-term financial aid, • substantial economic and agricultural reforms, • increasing public investment for the education and health sectors	• international administration, • institution building, • establishment of the rule of law, • new constitution, • organisation and monitoring of elections, • anti-corruption programmes • fostering human rights standards and freedom of the media

Chapter 9

Prevention of the Internationalisation of the Palestinian Radicalism

Minna Saarnivaara

The discussion here focuses on the different factors in the Palestinian conflict and how these factors may affect the internationalisation of the Palestinian struggle. The use of the Palestinian conflict as a tool by different states has been discussed in Chapter 3.

To prevent the possibility of the Palestinian group *Hamas*, and similar violent groups, from internationalising their actions, several simultaneous actions should be taken, including:

1. Concrete improvements should be made in the lives of Palestinians so that the Palestinian people would have hope for the future.

Improvements in the standard of life and personal security of the Palestinian people, and giving them hope for the future, could diminish frustration and reduce Palestinians' support for the groups that are using terror as a weapon in the conflict. A lessening of popular support might result in a reduction of terrorist attacks.

Since at present the Palestinian Authority (PA) lacks a functioning socio-economic network, the Palestinian group *Hamas* has strengthened its position as a provider of an alternative social system, the 'Islamic welfare system', and has taken authority for itself in many social matters. While freezing the funds of *Hamas* does make a difference on the number of armed attacks the group carries out, it cannot totally end them. The actual effect is not only on the armed struggle, but also on the daily lives of the Palestinian people, because *Hamas* is providing welfare services to Palestinians, and when its funds are cut, these services are cut, too. Currently, the PA is undergoing a legitimation crisis while *Hamas* is enjoying legitimate power in regard to their resistance to Israeli policies, and in the provision of social services such as health care for the poor.

The aims of *Hamas* in providing social welfare cannot be seen simply as altruistic. While Palestinians get basic services from *Hamas*, *Hamas* gains popular support and can spread its political agenda, Islamise the society, and recruit new members.

International aid should be allocated so that it would prevent groups such as *Hamas*, which use terror as a weapon in the Palestinian conflict, from having a monopoly over the provision of social welfare and charity to the Palestinian people.[1] However, Islamic charities which have good networks should not automatically be excluded as distributors of aid.

In the past, charities and social welfare institutions have been shut down, or their funds have been cut, when they have been seen to be diverting money for illicit purposes, or providing a platform for recruitment into the military branch of *Hamas*, or inciting violence. Both international and Palestinian regulatory agencies should intervene and block the use of charities and NGOs for financing terrorism. Furthermore, monitoring and investigating charities should be made more effective in order to minimise the risk of closing legitimate charities. In those cases when the funding of a charity or a social welfare institution is frozen, it should be ensured that those who need the aid that had been provided through the frozen agency will get this aid through other relief channels.

The personal security of the Palestinian people should be guaranteed by a legitimate authority. This is not the case now in the Palestinian territories. In the current situation, many Palestinians have the feeling that *Hamas* and the Islamic Jihad are at least doing something to take revenge on Israel because of Israel's repressive policies in the area, while the Palestinian Security Services cannot protect Palestinians lives.

A prerequisite of the view that the reform process can begin only after the basic security is first in place, is that the security is monopolised for the legitimate Palestinian administrative authority. Security is also necessary in order to promote development; however, it should not be prioritised over development, nor over removal of the root-causes of frustration. The UNDP has developed an integrated and proportional approach to security and development, the 'Security First' approach.[2] Micro-disarmament and the 'Security First' assistance approach in international development cooperation were first pioneered in Mali.[3] This approach might also be successfully applied in the Palestinian situation, with development aid being used in its support.

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[1] Kivimäki, Timo (ed.): Development Cooperation as an Instrument in the Prevention of Terrorism. Danida, Copenhagen, 2003, p. 112.

[2] http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-92-9045-000-1-en.pdf

[3] Kivimäki, Timo: Integrated Approach to Security in Northern Mali. Conflict Transformation Service, Helsinki & Copenhagen, 1998. www.conflicttrasform.org/ctg.htm.

In the current situation of the Palestinian conflict, the EU should:

- Consider using development aid in support of the integrated 'Security First' approach.
- Support the PA in its efforts to create a functioning security structure so that security can be the monopoly of the legitimate administrative authority.
- Give technical and material support to the PA for creating a well-functioning general welfare system.
- Support the PA in making reforms to its legislation on charitable societies and civic associations.
- Block the use of charities and NGO's as a channel for financing terrorism.
- Make the monitoring and investigation of charities more effective in such a manner that the risk of closing legitimate charities would be as small as possible.
- Discuss the Palestinian humanitarian situation with Israel and emphasise its obligations as an occupying power.

2. There should be active negotiations with Islamist groups in order to reach an armistice.

Currently *Hamas* enjoys popular support and ideological power. It has also symbolic power as a resistance group. If Islamists had no support from the people, they would have no political power. Even if *Hamas* would lose its economic and physical power, in all probability it would still have some ideological power which would give it popular support. If *Hamas* is excluded from the political process while it still enjoys popular support, there is a risk of escalation of violence within the Palestinian society.

One view on the question of the future of *Hamas* is that if the PA would bring *Hamas* into the political process, *Hamas* could moderate and give up its armed action. In order to become a moderate political player, *Hamas* should agree on a truce.

Because it has shown itself to be a practical movement, *Hamas* might well agree to a truce. Before the killings of Sheikh Yasin and al-Rantisi, opinion polls showed that Palestinians wanted peace and an armistice. This force of popular will for peace put pressure on militant groups for a ceasefire. The picture is contradictory: while Palestinians want a truce, at the same time it seems that as long as Israel's actions are seen as repressive, the resistance by the armed Palestinian groups will be seen as legitimate by many Palestinians.

In 2003, Palestinian resistance groups felt the pressure for a truce and the ceasefire negotiations were held with the help of Egypt. The first shock of the killings of the leaders of *Hamas* stopped the process, but when this shock is gone, it is likely that

pressure for the truce will arise again. As a practical and populist socio-political movement, the moderation of *Hamas* is a real alternative. Nonetheless, in order to transform itself into a political party, *Hamas* would probably require some guarantees that Israel intends to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

The moderation of *Hamas* and allowing it to participate in the political process, is supported by several people who have looked at the situation closely. According to two members of the Palestinian Legislative Council, Ziad Abu-Amr, an academic and the chairman of the PLC's political committee, and Haider Abdel Shafi, a former chief Palestinian negotiator in peace talks with Israel, *Hamas* should be included in the decision-making process and in the Palestinian national leadership. According to Abu-Amr "[The] leaders of *Hamas* said [in a conference for all Palestinian factions held in Gaza in May 2002] that, if they were part of ... collective decision-making, they would comply...if it were decided that we will go to negotiations [with Israel], they would support negotiations. If the leadership called for a halt to suicidal attacks, *Hamas* would stop suicidal attacks."[4] In addition, the former security adviser to the EU High Representative, Alastair Crooke, stresses that an armistice enables *Hamas* to be a part of a diplomatic process: "This is not an issue of preference: whether it is easier or more fruitful to engage with Fateh rather than the Islamics. This is reality. Without their engagement, either quietly or explicitly, they will oppose a process that excludes them and the substantial segment of Palestinians whom they represent."[5]

The dilemma of this approach is that if *Hamas* is brought into the Palestinian political process, many people would see that as a victory for terrorists. Even though bringing *Hamas* into the political process could have a positive effect on the structures of this specific conflict, there is a risk that this could motivate other groups to use terrorist strategies.

Then again, if *Hamas* were to be excluded from the political process but still enjoyed popular support and ideological power, the internationalisation of its armed attacks might be a distinct possibility. If *Hamas* would become marginalised within Palestinian society through the actions of the PA, Israel or the international community, so that *Hamas* had no space for political action, the group might face some pressure from within the group itself either to start a struggle against the PA or to act militarily outside the Israeli borders. The likelihood of either of these happening would decrease if there were a real peace process supported by Palestinians.

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[4] Gaess, Roger: "Interviews from Gaza: Palestinian Options Under Siege." *Middle East Policy*, Vol. IX, No. 4, December 2002.

[5] Crooke, Alastair & Beverley, Milton-Edwards: "Costly Choice." *World Today*, December 2003, Vol. 59, Issue 12.

Because of this problematic and very difficult situation, the EU should:

- support active negotiations with the Islamist groups in order to reach an armistice.
- discuss what the stand of the EU is on the question of the participation of *Hamas* in the political process if the group dissociates itself from terrorism.

3. The conflict should be solved.

The continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict represents to many Muslims the perceived double standards of Western countries and their support of the status quo in the Arab countries. While international terrorists are using the conflict as a tool for legitimating their actions, Arab regimes are also using it as an excuse not to make changes in their governing principles.

A just solution should be found as soon as possible. Settlements, refugees and Jerusalem are just a few of the things which are important for every Palestinian, not only for Islamists. Therefore it is necessary to show willingness to resolve these issues.

As long as Palestinians do not see a real political alternative to the violent resistance groups for getting the Israelis to withdraw from Gaza and the West Bank, then these groups will have support among Palestinians. Islamist militant groups are calculating on the support of Palestinians. If Palestinians withdraw their support from *Hamas* and other groups that use terrorist strategies, then these groups are in trouble. Should this happen, in order to be politically influential, in the long run they would have to give up their armed action.

It is possible and even likely that there will be some individuals or groups, more or less connected to each other, which will continue armed attacks even after a peace agreement is finally reached. However, if there is a strong political authority with a clear mandate to provide security, the delegitimation of terrorism would be easier than in the current situation in which the PA is undergoing a legitimation crisis.

A just solution to the Palestinian conflict is also needed in order to apply the norms of foreign aid for post-conflict societies. Finding a solution would create a situation in which development-oriented projects could be facilitated, and the Palestinians' dependency on financial aid for recurrent expenditures would be reduced.

As things stand at present in the Autumn of 2004, the EU should:

- strongly support the peace process and help in finding a just solution to the conflict, in order to cut the mobilization force of terrorists. This issue should be taken up in every possible diplomatic situation.
- engage the United States in the cooperative process for peace also in a context of reforms within the Middle East and North Africa, and especially within the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative.
- pressure the PA to condemn terrorist attacks
- support the PA if it starts to resolve its administrative problems, such as corruption. A strong PA can successfully work to eliminate terrorism.

Chapter 10

Dialogue and Tensions between Islam and the West

Gubara Said Hassan& Timo Kivimäki[1]

The perceived conflict between the Muslim world and the West is the international context of international Islamic terrorism, within which the weaker party uses terrorism as a tactic in the struggle. Chapter 6 discussed the causes of this conflict and portrayed the dangers of a clash between the two civilisations, a clash in which terrorism is just one of the problems. Removing the risk of this clash between the Muslim civilisation and Western civilisation thus requires more than just winning the 'war on terrorism', which further means that more than one motivation should be found than simply a response by the West to the 'ultimatum' set by the provocateurs of the 'war' on 9/11, 2001.

The literature on the Islam-West civilisational clash has so far suggested two approaches to tackling the problem, one confrontational and the other based on dialogue. The confrontational approach will be presented first in order to show its weaknesses, and then as a contrast the dialogue-based strategy, which is recommended here.

Confrontation & Containment

According to the theorists of the clash of civilisations, the West should resort in its defence against Islam, as it did with communism, to containment and confrontation. These theorists call on Western governments to take active steps, similar to those taken against the former Soviet Union, to contain the real and potential threat of the violence and terrorism of Islam along with its Islamic messianic creed. Samuel Huntington, for example, advocates not just containment of Islam but also calls upon the West to "promote greater co-operation and unity within its own civilisation,

[1] The section on containment and confrontation was written by Gubara Said Hassan, and the remainder of the chapter by Timo Kivimäki.

particularly between its European and North American components, to incorporate into the West societies in Eastern Europe and Latin America whose cultures are close to those of the West."[2] To these Western policy implications Huntington adds the necessity "to limit the expansion of the military strength of the Confucian and Islamic states, to exploit differences and conflicts among Confucian and Islamic states, and to strengthen international institutions that reflect and legitimate Western interests and values and to promote the involvement of non-Western states in those institutions."[3]

Because of their belief that the West must realise that Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism has replaced other secular, radical ideologies as the principal threat to the West, and that liberal democracy is incompatible with Islam, advocates of the clash vision call on the West not to press its Middle Eastern allies to make concessions on democratic reforms and to institute and uphold human rights. According to these theorists, pressure for democratisation and respect for human rights will weaken pro-Western political regimes in the Muslim Middle East, and lead to their replacement by theocratic Islamic dictatorships. Judith Miller states that: "America's mindless, relentless promotion of democracy in the Middle East immediately is likely for now to bring to power through the ballot box those who would extinguish democracy in the name of Allah."[4] In addition, she sees that: " Free elections seem more likely than any other route to produce militant Islamic regimes that are, in fact, inherently anti-democratic and incompatible with Western values."[5] Far from bringing about a peaceful world, the collapse of the Soviet Union has inaugurated a new, deadlier, cultural conflict: that between Islam and the West.

This so-called "realist" approach of containment and confrontation can, on the basis of the findings presented here in this book, be shown to be actually unrealistic, as this confrontational approach ignores the influence of normative considerations and legitimacy in world politics. As was shown in the figures in Chapter 6, on the emergence of sides in Islam-West antagonism, Western confrontational and containment policies were exactly the ones that divided the West and united its opponents. So the strategy of confrontation and containment proposed by e.g. Huntington seems problematic. Furthermore, the idea of disregarding matters of international and national democracy, and the strategy of indirect rule through authoritarian governments, was shown above in Chapters 2 and 3 to have proven to be counterproductive: this is the strategy that has in fact contributed to terrorism in Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Indonesia and

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2 Huntington, P. Samuel, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1993, pp. 48-49.
3 Op Cit., p. 49.
4 Miller, Judith, "The Challenge of Radical Islam", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 2, Spring 1993, p. 53.
5 Op. cit., pp. 52-54.

many other places, rather than alleviating it. Elections might bring anti-Western political Islamic parties to power, but the suppression of democratic elections brings (a fraction of) them to the streets and secret meetings with Al Qaeda.

Taken that terrorism kills only 700 people annually, while state repression killed 1.7 million people in an average year of the late 20th century, attempting to prevent terrorism by supporting authoritarian governments would also be throwing the baby out with the bath water. The number of 171 million victims of genocide and other types of killings of citizens by their own governments during the 20th century is an average of estimates given in several sources. Of these various sources, Rudolph Rummel's *Death by Government*[6] is probably the most authoritative. Of these victims, Stalin's violence against the gulags, Pol Pot's genocide, Chinese repression, and the German holocaust are the most notorious.

On the basis of the findings presented in this book, the international community should try to avoid confronting and containing both terrorists and Muslims alike, as if all Muslims were terrorists or potential terrorists, as this is likely to actually push them into the same camp. While specifically targeted measures against *al-Qaida* infrastructure, training camps and individuals are not ruled out, such measures need to be contrasted with conciliatory policies of dialogue towards the Islamic world. This is needed primarily because of the legitimate frustration of Muslims at being disadvantaged in the current world system. At the same time, the appeal that anti-Western terrorist rhetoric holds for Muslims needs to be diminished or done away with.

Dialogue

A different view adopted by Western opinion-makers and academicians towards Islam and international politics in the post-Cold War era consists of a vision of an inter-civilisational dialogue which rejects and criticises the "clash of civilisations"[7] notions that depict Islam and the West as being on an historical collision course. Partisans of dialogue as opposed to confrontation argue that Islam is neither unified nor a threat to the West. The detailed arguments of Graham E. Fuller, John L. Esposito and Leon T. Hadar, three leading proponents of the dialogue view, on whether or not Islam is a threat to the West, will not be gone into here. Instead, reference will be made to the

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6 Rummel, Rudolph 1994. *Death by Government.* New Brunswick: Transaction Press.

7 For more criticism of this vision of the clash of civilisations, see Edward W. Said, "*The Clash of Ignorance", The Nation*, October 22, 2001, and Edward W. Said 1997. *Covering Islam.* London: Vintage, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

reasons just presented for not challenging all Muslims, but only Islamic terrorists. Ways of using dialogue to reduce tension will be discussed in what follows.

The steps in the escalation of Islam-West tension to the present situation, and the problems that led to these steps being taken, were presented in Chapter 6. Based on these sources and catalysts, four ways for reducing tension by using dialogue to remove these sources and alleviate the accompanying problems are:

1. **FIRSTLY**, the Islam-West tension is due to difficulties in finding a common normative platform for interaction.

   Thus ***dialogue should focus on finding culturally accommodating rules of cooperation in areas and on issues where the West collaborates with the Muslim world.*** This search for mutually acceptable rules of interaction should start with the realisation that these rules need to be based on acceptance of the existence of two meta-norms: the Western norm that religion should be separated from political and economic cooperation; and the Islamic meta-norm of the supremacy in all things of Islamic political and economic principles. In other words, neither Western ideas of "culturally neutral secular rules" nor Islamic ideas of norms between believers and non-believers should be imposed as the common starting point for dialogue. . Instead of seeking agreement on the foundations of inter-cultural norms, the dialogue could utilise Western and Muslim experts in trade and military relations, and focus narrowly on the pragmatic normative issues related to the main bones of contention, which evidently are:

   A. International commodity ***(oil) trade***[8] ,
   B. ***Western investment*** (its economic, environmental and legal rules) in the Muslim world,
   C. ***Rights of Muslim immigrants/visitors*** in the West[9] and vice versa,
   D. ***Western military presence***[10] in the Muslim world and
   E. ***Joint humanitarian crisis preventive operations*** in the Muslim world[11] .
   F. ***Humanitarian issues***, including collective and individual human rights, women's empowerment, etc.

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[8] To find a formula that would be accepted by Muslims so that the cooperation with regards to oil exploration, production and trade would not be seen as *eating Muslim resources* as Osama bin Laden put it in his Fatwa of 1998 on war on the USA.

[9] To seriously address the issue that has motivated many immigrant terrorists to engage in violence.

[10] To find a solution to the question of "Western occupation of sacred lands", as Osama bin Laden has called it (Osama bin Laden's Fatwa of 1998-02-22).

[11] Which, without dialogue and normative consideration, is sometimes seen as based on religious and economic objectives (Osama bin Laden's Fatwa, 1998-02-22).

Focusing on normative issues in the Islam-West relationship does not constitute an endless debate on values, but is something that is needed for solving the practical problems related to the prevention of terrorism and improving of Islam-West relations. ***Ignoring the normative dialogue would be too costly for the economic relations and too dangerous for the security relationship.*** In the beginning, this dialogue could be based on expert, semi-official (officials in their personal capacity) participation as is done, for example, in EU-Asia relations in the Asia-Europe Roundtable. In the Asia-Europe Roundtable, experts often draft an agenda, which is then discussed by diplomats and officials. Sometimes decisions are reached which aim at joint implementation. In other cases, recommendations are drafted and are then forwarded to the regular Asia-Europe Meeting, through ASEM contact persons. Taking the ***Asia-Europe Roundtable*** as a model, a similar Islam-West (Europe) Roundtable could be initiated, involving scholars, officials and representatives of business communities[12], with a system of reporting to the relevant Ministries of the sponsoring states.

2. **SECONDLY**, the Islam-West tension is due to power asymmetries in international affairs.

   As mentioned in Chapter 7, the problem-causing elements of these asymmetries can be addressed by means of ***poverty alleviation and support for both national and international democracy.*** While the relative economic deprivation of Muslims should be addressed by development cooperation, international interaction should, more generally, cherish 'inclusive globalisation', and empower Muslims in the international system. Addressing the issues of the ongoing terrorism fuelling conflicts in Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq, and Kashmir would also help in reducing this tension. It might even be that an institutionalised dialogue along the lines of the roundtable talks suggested above, with a separate roundtable for each of the conflicts, could prove useful, taken together with serious political and diplomatic efforts to solve the conflicts themselves.

3. **THIRDLY**: West-Islam tension escalates in accordance with conflict logic. Because of the broad basis of the escalating negative images, any dialogue intended to ameliorate and eventually remove the negative images should also be broadly based. Dialogue should be used to tackle the main elements of this logic. Thus it should:

[12] Companies with fixed assets in conflict-prone countries tend to be very interested in conflict resolution and dialogue in their host communities. Thus, their enthusiastic participation would be a realistic probability.

A. ***Reveal the diversity*** of Islam to the West and reveal the diversity of the West to the Muslim World.
B. It should ***"rehumanise" "the other"***.
C. It should show how ***marginal the violent extreme*** groups opposing the West or Islam are.

Indiscriminate targeting can be seen as useful only if one assumes that the collective enemy is monolithic. This is why cultural dialogue should give ***visibility to different civilisational expressions***, such as Islamic critics of violent Islam, Western critics of oil-imperialism, Christian Palestinians, Muslim Westerners, Indonesian cuisine, Western football, prominent Islamic women, appreciated Western elders, Arab belly dancing, Western health-asceticism, and so on.

Politically correct cultural events do not always attract the attention of mass-audiences, yet if they cover a wide range of interests, such as tourism, music, food, academic and educational exchange, they can sometimes attract the curiosity of wider audiences. For example, recently a successful and popular *Arab Heritage Week* was organised in Singapore on 5-12 June 2004 by a combined public and private sector organisation committee. ***Arab cultural diversity*** was presented in an interesting combination of food, shopping, tourism, textiles and performances, which cherished the diversity of one of the world's many Muslim cultures, and framed Arab culture in Singapore as a tourism asset (***positive framing***, instead of presenting Islamic culture as a problem). The role of ***local*** Arab ***communities*** in Singapore was used in a constructive manner, ***as a bridge*** between the mainstream and the Arab cultures in Singapore. ***Instead of even articulating an idea of a monolithic 'Islamic culture'***, the events of the Arab Heritage Week focused on just ***one of the Islamic cultures in the world.***

This formula should be explored for wider application. Different ***cultural, political, academic, commercial, religious, environmental, and tourism events should prove useful in building a network of diversified contacts between the Western and Islamic worlds***. Intellectual forums focusing on Islamic and Arab issues, jointly organised by different ministries, NGOs and universities, could also be useful. Student exchange programs in social sciences and the humanities should also be explored for building cultural bridges, instead of simply focusing on the exchange of students in natural sciences. Cultural exhibitions like the ones already being implemented by the parliaments, the foreign ministries and NGOs should also be further encouraged.

As suggested by the pluralistic theory of peace, different groups (professional, interest groups, ethnic groups, religious groups, etc.) that cut across the frontlines

of tension, can act as bridges between the Western and Muslim civilisations.[13] ***Using Muslim immigrants in the West as bridges between their old and their new cultures would probably be very efficient in the context of popular events of various kinds.*** In the case of presentation of the Western diversity, the concept for Finland could be just to present one of the Western cultures, i.e. the Finnish culture, to challenge the more monolithic perception of a "Western culture, Western actor, in world politics".

Academic dialogue between the Islamic and the Western worlds could be facilitated by an academic, interdisciplinary journal, partly funded by Finland, and focusing on the global relationship and the pragmatic normative issues relating to these two civilisations and cultures. Arguments in favour of launching this journal could be taken from two vantage points: On the one hand, Finland does not have a single international journal focusing on world politics, and on the other, no visible international journals exist which focus on the Islam-West relationship on a more global level.[14] This journal could be jointly edited by a Finnish university and a university from the Muslim world (University of Cairo, The Islamic University of Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur, The Islamic University in Medina, Saudi Arabia, for example).

Dialogue that brings human beings back into the picture, when thinking of the "civilisational other", would also be important. The Danish Foreign Ministry's International Development Agency, DANIDA, has sponsored interesting ***TV programmes*** that focus on the everyday life and problems of people in countries where Danida is carrying out development programmes. These TV programmes seem to attract the interest of viewers, and they are used in geography teaching at schools. From the point of view of inter-civilisational dialogue, their function is to highlight the individual above the abstractions of politics. The Finnish Foreign Ministry could sponsor documentaries focusing on individuals, mothers, and families affected by and involved in both sides of conflicts, including conflicts central to West-Islam relations. These TV documentaries could involve the assistance of conflict scholars, or scholars specialising in the culture of an area where individuals are trying to cope with a conflict situation.

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[13] Lijphart, Arend 1968. *The Politics of Accommodation.* Berkeley: California University Press; Kivimäki, Timo 2003. "Finland's Membership Negotiations with the EU", in Gunnar Sjöstedt, ed., *Professional Cultures in International Negotiation*. Lexington: Lanham.

[14] There is an American journal called *Journal of Islam and Muslim-Christian Relations,* which focuses on Muslim-Christian relations from the point of view of Islamic studies, but the focus of this journal is local, not global l. In addition, this journal has little visibility among scholars of world politics.

Visits by state leaders among "ordinary people" also tend to put ordinary, individual human beings in the spotlight, as these visits are often followed by the mass media, even in the case of otherwise repressive media regimes. Thus, bringing Muslim leaders to schools or homes not only educates the leaders, but their followers, too.

Finally, regarding the media, Western governments should – instead of fighting the Arabic media with sanctions and expulsions (as in the case of the Aljazeera TV network in the US-dominated interim Iraq) – ***cherish transparency of the media as an example to be followed, and as a move to be reciprocated by governments in Muslim countries***. If Aljazeera or another (satellite) Arab TV channel had publicly funded Finnish (or at least English) subtitles, the everyday life of the Arabic world would be much better known in Finland (the world at large), and the dehumanisation of Muslims would be more difficult.[15] All these moves to rehumanise Western perceptions of Muslims should be negotiated in the spirit of some kind of reciprocity which would also see the beginnings of efforts toward the re-humanisation of Western images in the Muslim world.

Transparency, instead of control of information in the name of confrontation and containment, would show the lack of representativeness in aggressive statements. Even if this transparency and relaxing of control means the publication of occasional aggressive messages, the importance of these verbal provocations would be smaller if the flow of information across the civilisational boundaries was greater. Furthermore, ***if the West showed that it listens to words, there would be less perceived need for violent actions as symbolic messages.***

4. **FOURTHLY**, a long tradition of conflict fuels tension in Islam-West relations. Dialogue cannot change the conflict history between the West and Muslims. However, ***dialogue, if paired with concrete actions*** to help Muslims with their economic and political grievances, their state-building, and in solving the concrete examples of current Islam-West conflicts in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, can ***change the perception of the civilisational adversaries in regard to the relevance in current conflicts of past conflicts and hostilities.***

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[15] The example of the Central Chinese TV, CCTV, (in particular its English broadcasts) is encouraging. It gives ordinary people (in both the international community and in China) access to human perspectives, as well as balancing Chinese views and propaganda on world events and developments in China. The CCTV example should be emulated by the Islamic world in order to enhance interest in rehumanising the West-Islam relations.

Conclusion

Briefly stated, the conclusion of this chapter, and indeed the entire book, is that Islam-West dialogue should primarily be strengthened in order to reduce the existing tensions between these two great civilisations and cultures, not simply as a response to terrorism. Therefore, this dialogue should strive to:

1. Create a normative platform for cooperation and mutual exchange by means of dialogue, not by dictation. In this sense, the acceptance of the necessity and significance of dialogue would essentially mean the absolute rejection of the logic of using violence or force, and would equally mean the promotion of cultural understanding and enhancing of cultural, economic, political and scientific exchange of knowledge.. Strengthening of the foundations of liberty, justice, human rights and the dynamic institutions of civil society are contingent upon dialogue among Islamic/Muslim and Western/Christian societies, civilisations and cultures. Institutionalisation of dialogue is urgent in order to replace Islam-phobic and West-phobic perceptions, and attitudes of enmity and confrontation, with languages and actions of mutual recognition, understanding, tolerance and respect.
2. Ameliorate and eventually remove the negative influences of perceived suppressive asymmetry by means of coupling dialogue with straightforward actions to address the marginalised position of Muslims as well as their sense of exclusion and insecurity in relation to the functioning of the post-Cold War international system.
3. Counter the logic of escalation by
   a. Cherishing the diversity of the two civilisations and cultures. Accordingly, each civilisation should accept, for itself, the basic fact of the existence of other civilisations and cultures, simultaneously with all other different value systems, beliefs, social habits, etc. This fact of cultural diversity, or multiculturalism, should be interiorised by each civilisation and should not be seen as a 'threat' but as a chance for further developing and enriching the identity and awareness of one's own civilisational and cultural particularity or specificity.
   b. Reinforcing the positive images of other civilisations and cultures as additional contributions to and enrichment of human history.
   c. Showing the variety of intra and inter-civilisational and cultural opinions on issues of common interest such as human rights and the empowerment of women; the battle against violence, terrorism, and organised crime (e.g., trade in narcotics, white slavery, child labour, sex industry); peaceful and

equitable settlement of domestic, regional and international conflicts; economic partnership; international development; environmental pollution; and stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

4. Downplay the conflict history by filling the individualistic and collective memory of civilisational and cultural adversaries with fruitful experiences of economic, political and cultural cooperation. Reflection on the undeniable dogmatic and metaphysical similarities between Islam and Christianity could also be a step further in the long march towards an enlightened dialogue between these two great civilisations and cultures, in all fields of life.

Finally, it should be remembered that dialogue should not be just lip service, but should be part of a strategy which combines action with dialogue, to the end that inter-civilisational cooperation works to eliminate problems involving violence. Dialogue should, therefore, be part of a strategy that addresses the political and economic grievances of Muslims, supports their state-building and build-up of law and order, and helps in solving the concrete conflicts that provide anti-Western actors with ample evidence and justification for anger, hatred, and terrorist acts of revenge.