Preventing and Reducing Violent Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa

Wars, armed violence and insecurity continue to blight Sub-Saharan Africa. Preventing and reducing such conflict has become a key priority not only for African governments and peoples, but also for Europe and the rest of the world. But successes have been limited, and important lessons have not been properly learned.

This timely and important book examines the continuing sources and dynamics of violent conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, and critically analyses policies and programmes to help to prevent, manage and reduce such conflicts. Commissioned by the Government of Finland, this book has been prepared by internationally recognised experts convened through a joint project by the Finnish Institute for International Affairs (FIIA) and the Centre for International Co-operation and Security (CICS), University of Bradford, UK. It aims to contribute to urgently needed improvements in conflict prevention and reduction measures by the EU and the wider international community.
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Introduction

Owen Greene

Wars, armed violence and insecurity continue to blight Africa, contributing to human suffering and obstructing poverty alleviation across much of the continent. Preventing and reducing violent conflict has become a key priority not only for African governments and peoples, but also for Europe and the rest of the world.

This book examines the sources and dynamics of violent conflict and insecurity in contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa, and critically analyses recent policies and programmes to help to prevent, manage and reduce such conflicts. It aims to contribute to improvements in conflict prevention and reduction policies and programmes by the EU and the wider international community.

Challenges of Conflict Prevention, Management and Reduction (CPMR)

In principle, some key priorities relating to reducing risks of war and conflict are easy to outline. Conflict prevention activities are required to reduce manifest tensions and/or prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict. Once violent conflict has started, conflict management and reduction activities become a priority; to prevent the escalation of violent conflict, reduce its intensity or geographical extent, and bring war to an end. Thereafter, peace-building activities come to the fore: to address underlying causes of violent conflict and/or to enhance resilience against risks of resurgent violence. This includes conflict resolution activities to resolve underlying disputes or divisions.

In practice, enormous international attention and resources have rightly been devoted to efforts to manage, reduce and end wars, and to promote post-conflict stability, reconstruction and peace-building. Experience has shown that such enterprises are complex, frustrating and expensive. Even with the best efforts there are high risks of failure. This is particularly the case for the so-called ‘new wars’, characterised by a combination of civil and transnational conflicts involving state break-down, a range of armed groups and high civilian casualties. Ceasefires are broken, and violent conflicts are most likely to break-out in countries that have recently emerged from such wars. There are limits on what the UN and other international actors can achieve. Nevertheless,
their intervention and engagement has been mostly critically important in limiting the scope and intensity of the violence and accelerating progress towards peace.

It is widely agreed that much the best strategy is to aim to prevent wars and violent conflicts breaking out in the first place. Normally opportunities exist to manage and resolve tensions and conflicts, which reduce or disappear once large-scale violence breaks out. In human terms, everything possible should be done to avoid the death and destruction that are the direct and indirect consequence of wars. But conflict prevention is typically also a challenging task, requiring substantial and sustained political, economic, social or security engagement. Once conflicts become sufficiently serious to attract high level political attention, either nationally or internationally, they have become deeply-rooted and dynamic. There will be important stakeholders and drivers of the conflict. In conflict-prone countries, efforts to prevent conflict can be costly and contentious; involving challenging powerful interests, investment in structural change, and likely accusations of undue interference in internal affairs.

In large parts of the world, most countries are arguably faced with significant risks of conflict, at least in the medium or long term. It can be hard to identify which of these are most likely to escalate to large-scale violence, and how best to respond. It is generally even harder to develop timely international agreement on conflict prevention response strategies. Regrettably, this results in the tendency for governments and international institutions to focus on responding to crises rather than engage in timely conflict prevention before crises emerge. Understandings, policies and institutions for timely conflict prevention activities remain inadequately developed. This is true for the European Union as it is for other key international actors.

Sub-Saharan Africa: a priority

Much of Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced armed conflict in recent decades. In the last ten years, the majority of conflict-related deaths and injuries in the world have occurred in this region, and large numbers of people continue to suffer from insecurity and fear of violence. Moreover, these facts appear to be intimately related to the uniquely poor progress across much of Sub-Saharan Africa towards the Millenium Development Goals. Conflict prevention, management and reduction (CPMR) and peacebuilding are a particular priority for this continent. This primarily depends on African efforts, but international actors have a key role to play. Recently, the European Union, the G8 and their partners have determined to play as constructive a role as possible in Africa, particularly in relation to CPMR and development. Progress in these areas would be strongly in both Africa’s and Europe’s interests.
Although progress has been made, it is clear that effective action by the EU and its partners to support and promote CPMR in Sub-Saharan Africa requires substantial further development and implementation of appropriate policies, instruments and programmes. For example, there can still be a big gap between the EU’s declared policies in this area and the actual practices. Moreover, the issues of policy ‘coherence’ and co-ordination remain critical. Too often, there is low coherence between the EU’s trade, development aid and CPMR policies in Africa; EU member states and their partners have differing and sometimes contradictory approaches; and pursuit of narrow national self-interest continues to be a disruptive factor.

The FIIA/CICS Project

As part of its preparations for its Presidency of the EU in the second half of 2006, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Government of Finland, commissioned a joint project by the Finnish Institute for International Affairs (FIIA) and the Centre for International Co-operation and Security (CICS), University of Bradford (UK), to examine the sources and dynamics of violent conflict in Africa, and issues and priorities for conflict prevention, management and reduction.

The primary aims of the project were to enhance awareness and understanding of the issues and challenges relating to CPMR in Sub-Saharan Africa, and of the ways in which the EU, its member states, and their international partners can contribute to such CPMR objectives. Within this framework, the project aimed specifically to:

- Prepare analyses and assessments to enhance understanding and debates in the relevant decision-making and policy communities and the wider public on the overall challenges of promoting CPMR in Sub-Saharan Africa and in more detail in seven selected key issue areas;
- Assist the Government of Finland to prepare for and conduct Finland’s Presidency of the EU in relation to the above issues and some additional specific CPMR-related issue areas of evolving EU policy making and implementation.

The project was directed by Owen Greene (CICS) and Tapani Vahtoranta (FIIA), with Julia Buxton (CICS) and Charly Salonius-Pasternak (FIIA) joining them to form the project co-ordination and management team. An international group of recognised experts was convened to contribute to a series of published and internal reports and briefings, which were discussed and developed in workshops and public events in the first half of 2006. This book brings together the eight published studies for this project, in order to enable wider availability.
Issues and Themes

To be effective, strategies and activities for conflict prevention, management and reduction (CPMR) need to be based on a detailed and up-to-date understanding of the relevant conflict processes and contexts, as well as of the likely impacts of possible interventions.

Contemporary conflicts in Africa are typically complex, yet there is still a tendency to discuss them in over-simplistic, single-factor, terms: for example in terms of ethnicity, resource conflict, borders, youth alienation or poverty. In fact, the processes of violent conflicts tend to be driven by a complex interplay of a number of factors, including underlying structural features and a multiplicity of different actors with varying motivations. Context matters greatly. Moreover, conflicts are generally very dynamic. Conflict assessments can rapidly become out-dated; particularly for use in judging the likely effects of possible CPMR interventions.

In this context, it can be misleading to think in terms of ‘root’ or secondary causes of violent conflict. Although there are generally some important and enduring underlying or structural factors at work, what matters is the dynamic interplay between these and the evolving power, capacities, interests and motivations of the range of actors involved. The primary drivers for the start of violence are often joined or superseded by other factors as the war proceeds; and arms, armed violence and their impacts can themselves become key drivers as well as symptoms.

Strategies to prevent, manage or reduce violent conflicts and promote peace and security also need to distinguish carefully between the priorities and needs for regime security, state security and human security. These can certainly partially overlap: for example, the security of vulnerable communities is often best achieved in the context of a strong secure state. But there are nevertheless real tensions between these objectives.

These perspectives and understandings inform the whole of this book. The first chapter, by Owen Greene critically examines conflict and development in contemporary Africa and discusses and develops such understandings of the challenges and their interplay. It addresses in some detail the issues and strategies that need to be addressed by those aiming to help to promote and secure peace and security in the continent. The following chapters examine selected particular issues and themes. Thus, in chapter 2, Sarah Bayne, Catriona Gourlay and Hanna Ojanen focus on the development of international and regional capacities to respond to crises and armed conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa. In chapter 3, Jeremy Ginifer examines and draws lessons from experience with specific programmes to promote stability and security, in both post-conflict and conflict-prone countries, particularly programmes for: disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration (DDR) of ex-combatants; controlling and reducing availability and flows of small arms and light weapons (SALW); and security sector reform (SSR).
Chapter 4, by Julia Buxton (with Christiana Solomon and Liisa Laakso), focuses on the inter-relationships between conflict prevention and efforts to promote democratisation, good governance and human rights protection in Sub-Saharan Africa. The following chapter 5, by Cord Jakobeit (with Michaela Maier and Neil Cooper), addresses the complex and much-debated issues of political economies of armed violence in Africa. In chapter 6, Owen Greene (with Tracy Vienings), critically examines the challenges for development and aid in relation to conflict prevention and reduction; focussing particularly on the issues and challenges of promoting and ensuring ‘conflict-sensitive’ development programmes. Chapter 7, by Peter Draper and Cord Jakobeit (with Michaela Maier and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos) examines questions of trade and economic co-operation in relation to CPMR in Africa. The final chapter, by Volker Boege and Mandy Turner, addresses the specific issues of access to freshwater and CPMR in Africa. In combination, these chapters aim to provide both a relatively comprehensive discussion of the challenges and priorities for CPMR in sub-Saharan Africa and a detailed examination of such priorities in relation to selected key thematic issues.

Acknowledgements

Many people have contributed in various ways to this book, and we thank them all. The editors would like particularly to acknowledge the contributions of all chapter authors, who not only contributed their own chapters but also, through workshops and comments on drafts, helped to enhance the quality of the overall project, and particularly this book. At the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, great thanks go to the sectoral advisers at the department for development policy, to Sirpa Mäenpää and Riikka Laatu from the Unit for East and West Africa and, to Kirsi Brolén and Sinikka Antila from the Unit for General Development Policy and Planning at the Department for Development Policy. They not only provided support and guidance throughout the project but also provided detailed comments on drafts. As so often, we have benefited greatly from the contributions and support of colleagues at CICS and the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, and at the Finnish Institute for International Affairs (FIIA). At FIIA, Dr Tapani Vahtoranta, our Co-Director of the overall project, and Pernilla Wasström contributed integrally to the overall design and implementation of the project. Finally, we have been very grateful and happy with the quality of support and partnership offered to FIIA and CICS in this project by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, which not only provided financial support for the project but also engaged very constructively on substantial research and policy matters, within a framework that respected our independent research judgements and findings.
Conflict Prevention, Management and Reduction in Africa

Chapter 1

Conflict Prevention, Management and Reduction in Africa: Issues and Priorities

Owen Greene
Executive Summary

Much of Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced armed conflict in recent decades. In the last decade, the majority of conflict-related deaths and injuries in the world have occurred in this region and large numbers of people continue to suffer from insecurity and fear of violence. The violence and war experienced is intimately related to the well-known challenges of poverty, bad governance and weak states in the region. Conflict, armed violence and insecurity devastate economies, societies and families and they are associated with distorted political economies of violence in which predators enrich themselves to the detriment of the majority. Moreover, conditions of poverty and marginalisation contribute to risks of conflict and violence. Consequently many parts of Africa appear to be trapped in a mutually re-enforcing downward spiral. The EU and the rest of the world have strong humanitarian, security and development interests to help to tackle such problems.

Conflict prevention, management and reduction (CPMR) are a priority for Sub-Saharan Africa. Effective action requires thorough understanding of the sources and dynamics of violent conflict and war in the region, in addition to detailed, well-developed and realistic CPMR strategies that learn from experience and address the range of drivers for peace and conflict. African countries and peoples are making promising efforts in this direction, and the EU and its international partners have developed substantial policies and programmes to help. However, effective CPMR and development in Sub-Saharan Africa will require sustained and comprehensive action as the problems are profound and deeply-rooted. Key issues that need to be addressed include:

- Ensuring effective understandings of conflicts, and well-grounded and sustained CPMR responses;
- Promoting good governance and addressing the problems of weak states and border regions;
- Enhancing democratisation, accountability and respect for human rights;
- Promoting conflict-sensitive development and trade;
- Tackling political economies of violence and war;
- Addressing gender and age related issues;
- Ensuring effective capacities and programmes for crisis response and post-conflict peacebuilding;
- Developing effective programmes for: security sector reform; access to justice, tackling small arms proliferation and misuse; and disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration of ex-combatants;
• Ensuring conflict-sensitive management of scarce water and other environmental resources;
• Addressing transnational and regional problems, and promoting regional co-operation.

Achieving peace and development in Sub-Saharan Africa largely depends on the efforts of the region's governments and peoples. However, co-operation and assistance from the EU and other international actors can make a critical difference. Important policies, programmes and initiatives have been put into place by the EU and international partners to enable and promote co-operation for CPMR and peace-building in Sub-Saharan Africa. But these require further development, and face difficult dilemmas. There are still gaps between declared policies and real practices. CPMR programmes are often inadequately designed, resourced or implemented, and sometimes they are undermined by other types of more selfish engagement with Africa.
1. Introduction

Over recent decades, developing and under-developed regions of the world have experienced economic growth and reductions in poverty. Unfortunately, the story in Sub-Saharan Africa is different. There, economic growth has been limited and the increases in wealth have not kept pace with population growth. As a result high poverty rates have proved enduring. Similarly, much of Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced armed conflict over the last 50 years. Since the 1990s, Africa has suffered many of the so-called ‘new wars’, characterised by a combination of transnational and civil conflicts involving state break-down and a variety armed groups perpetrating terrible violence on civilians. Across most of the continent, human insecurity from risks or impacts of violence and crime is high and this particularly affects the poor and vulnerable.

Efforts to prevent, manage and reduce violent conflict in Africa are therefore a priority – for the EU and the rest of the international community as well as for Africans themselves. The EU Security Strategy identifies five major priorities for European security, of which four are of direct concern in relation to Africa: regional conflicts, state failure, organised crime, and terrorism. Thankfully the fifth (weapons of mass destruction) is not such a high concern in Africa at present.

Preventing and reducing armed conflicts is a priority in its own right. But there are also deep links between violent conflict and poverty. Efforts for development and poverty alleviation in Sub-Saharan Africa are unlikely to be effective without corresponding progress on preventing, managing and reducing violent conflict.

EU countries have a long history of engagement with Africa, much of it to be regretted. The slave trade and colonisation within European empires had a wrenching and profound impact on Africa. Decolonisation was painful and it resulted in independent states with weak institutions and borders that had little legitimacy. Postcolonial and cold war power relationships often subordinated the interests of emergent African states to those of powerful external states. Many of Africa’s problems are also home-grown. Authoritarian, corrupt and incompetent African elites have contributed to the bad government, conflict and poverty that have held Africa back. Now the priorities for security and development in Africa must focus on achieving reform and good government in Africa as well as on transforming international political and economic relationships.

Recently, the EU and its partners have become determined to play a more constructive role, as reflected, for example, in the recent EU Strategy for Africa.1 Both

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the EU and the G8 have emphasised their commitment to supporting development, CPMR and good-governance in Africa. Partnership between the international community and Africa is now top of the agenda, and it is important that this opportunity is grasped.

This chapter reviews contemporary issues and priorities relating to violent conflict and to CPMR in Sub-Saharan Africa, highlighting roles and dilemmas not only for Africa but also for the EU and its partners. It focuses particularly on Sub-Saharan Africa, though linkages with North Africa are important. It aims to provide context and framing analysis for the other chapters of this book, which focus on particular issues.

Section 2 of this chapter reviews key contemporary challenges and opportunities for Sub-Saharan Africa, followed by Section 3 on experiences and trends relating to violent conflict in the region. Section 4 discusses key issues and priorities for efforts to promote CPMR in Africa. Section 5 briefly reviews causes and dynamics of violent conflicts and what is involved in efforts for CPMR and peace-building. Section 6 outlines key CPMR-relevant organisations and institutions that have developed in Africa, Europe and internationally.

Building on these early sections, Section 7 focuses on issues of governance, democratisation and human rights; while Section 8 discusses conflict, development and trade. Section 9 examines issues relating to crisis response and post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building. Section 10 identifies and highlights a number of key thematic issues that need to be taken into account in efforts to prevent and reduce violent conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. Section 11 examines the roles of the EU and other key international actors relating to CPMR in Africa so far while the final section comprises concluding remarks.

2. Challenges for Sub-Saharan Africa

Africa is an enormous continent, encompassing a great variety of natural environments and human societies. The 53 countries on the Continent include many strong traditions, dynamic enterprises, inspiring practices of tolerance, solidarity and peace-building, and talented people. This section provides an overall context of trends and challenges.

The Sahara Desert divides the Continent in important ways; with predominantly Arab-speaking peoples and cultures to the north that generally feel as much affinity to the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions as they do to the rest of Africa. The countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, which are the focus of this chapter, share some distinctive characteristics and concerns. However, it is important from the start to emphasise the differences as much as the similarities, particularly in a relatively short overview such as this.
There are many positive programmes, initiatives and achievements in Sub-Saharan Africa that should be recognised. Perhaps most strikingly, over the last decade there has been important progress towards better governance, democratisation, and respect for human rights. There is now wide support or acceptance of these principles, and in numerous states there have been marked improvements in performance. The transformation in South Africa is particularly significant: it is one of the largest Sub-Saharan states, in terms of population and economy, and in spite of its challenges it is now contributing in many ways to the promotion of good governance, democracy and respect for human rights in the region. More generally, whereas 15 – 20 years ago, most Sub-Saharan African states were governed through authoritarian (often military) dictatorships, now most countries have elected leaders. The main challenges now are to deepen and sustain democratic institutions and accountability, and to manage the peaceful transition of power from long-established powerful leaders.

Institutionally the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) has been transformed into the African Union (AU) with a mandate to contribute more actively to the promotion of good-governance and CPMR. Similarly, sub-regional organisations including ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), SADC (Southern African Development Community), IGAD (Inter-governmental Authority on Development), EAC (East African Community) and COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) have become more active and relevant in promoting co-operation and good governance and in preventing or ending conflict.

Nevertheless, Sub-Saharan Africa is making poor overall progress in promoting human security and development, and the region faces particularly severe problems. In the 1960s, Sub-Saharan Africa was twice as prosperous (per capita) as East Asia, for example. Richly endowed with natural resources, its prospects looked bright. Now, East Asia is twice as prosperous, and the Sub-Saharan region has even been overtaken by South Asia – once much the poorest continent in the world. It has become marginalised in the world economy: its share of global trade and capital has declined from 7% and 6% in the 1950s to 2% and 1% today. This is despite the fact that absolute amounts of development aid transferred to Sub-Saharan Africa have remained relatively high compared to most other developing regions (though much of this aid might have been of low quality).

Currently, 44 out of the world’s 63 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although there has been sustained overall GDP growth since the 1960s, it has barely kept pace with population growth. This implies very slow per capita economic growth, and decline in some countries. Since 1980, only 5 of the 45 Sub-

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Saharan states consistently recorded per capita GDP growth rates of more than 2% a year: Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Seychelles and Swaziland. Moreover, wealth and income inequalities between rich and poor are particularly high in the region.

These factors combine to produce poor overall performance towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In the 2005 UN Review, most regions were judged to be on track towards achieving at least most of the MDGs, but Sub-Saharan Africa had performed particularly badly. Some 320 million African people (some 46% of its total population) exist on less than $1 a day, and on present trends this number will increase rather than decline. The total number of people suffering from hunger has increased by 34% since 1990, and hunger presently affects 33% of the total population (with some 31% of children malnourished).

On gender inequality, modest progress has been made. The share of women in non-agricultural wage employment has increased from 32% to 36% since 1990. The ratio of girls to boys that attend school is about 86%: together with South Asia, the lowest proportion in the world. Risks of death in childbirth remain high (920 per 100,000 live births, compared to 52 in developing East Asian countries). Similarly, under-five child mortality is still an average of 172 per 1000 live births: lower than the rate of 185 in 1990, but still twice as great as other regions. Progress on immunisation is relatively slow, and the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS has led to set-backs on many fronts. Even excluding HIV/AIDS sufferers, tuberculosis is making a comeback in Sub-Saharan Africa, whereas in almost all other regions cases of the disease continue to decline. Access to safe drinking water has improved, but 42% of the population still do not have such access.

It is worth noting that Nigeria, Ethiopia and DRC weigh particularly heavily in such continental averages. Together they account for over a third of the total population of Sub-Saharan Africa. They have also performed particularly badly on poverty alleviation and development.

There is great debate about the reasons for Sub-Saharan Africa’s poor performance. The Millennium Project Report to the UN emphasises five key factors. These include;

- High transport costs and small markets (many Sub-Saharan states are landlocked);
- Low-productivity agriculture (few large alluvial plains, and wide areas of water scarcity);
- A very high disease burden (numerous endemic tropical diseases, and high HIV/AIDS rates);
- A history of adverse geo-politics (such as impacts of slave trade and colonialism) and;
- Very slow diffusion of technology from abroad.

Most would agree that these have been important factors; though there are debates about the extent to which they explain relative decline, or reflect symptoms rather than causes. Other explanatory factors highlighted include: 1) Excessive dependence on exports of minerals and raw commodities, resulting in high vulnerability to price fluctuations; 2) Poor economic and political governance, and the problems of ‘weak’ states; 3) Weak public institutions leading to ‘shadow’ states and patronage networks which play the dominant role in political decisions and distribution of resources; 4) High levels of corruption.

Governing elites have too often been excessively self-interested, neglecting state-building and public services, and particularly prone to manipulating ethnic, religious and other social divisions in order to maintain power. Large parts of many states are not under real government control. Economic governance has often obstructed or distorted wealth creation through poor or predatory management of state-owned resources and excessive obstacles to private companies.

Wars and violent conflicts have undoubtedly had a devastating impact in much of Sub-Saharan Africa. As in other regions, there have been wars in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa in most decades for at least the last century. These conflicts have been particularly devastating in Sub-Saharan Africa since the early 1990s when, for a combination of reasons, a number of states that had previously managed to remain stable (if oppressive) collapsed into conflict. In the decade after 1994, Sub-Saharan Africa probably accounted for more than two-thirds of the conflict-related deaths in the world, and almost half of the total numbers of refugees and displaced peoples. Conflict-related deaths far outweighed deaths from natural disasters in this region during that period.

The direct impacts of war or large-scale armed violence are devastating for the affected countries and communities. In addition to the deaths, injuries and damage directly resulting from armed combat, many more people are killed or injured as a result of associated lawlessness, or through hunger and disease. Armed conflicts devastate economies and societies through the damage to livelihoods, displacement of large populations, destruction of social and economic capital, disruption of health and education programmes, damage to government institutions and governance, deterrence of investment, and many other indirect factors. Similar impacts arise from high-levels of insecurity and societal or criminal violence, even in the absence of war, and repeatedly, surveys of the poor and vulnerable indicate that their greatest priority is to reduce their insecurity from violence and crime.

Estimates of the impacts of wars and insecurity from violence on development and governance are hard to measure. But their impacts in Sub-Saharan Africa in the last

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5 See, for example, Commission for Africa (2005) *Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for Africa*, London. UNDP and World Bank analyses have also tended to emphasise governance issues.
two decades are undoubtedly enormous. Many argue that wars and insecurity from armed violence go a long way towards explaining Africa's poor development progress compared to other regions of the world. They also are intimately related with issues of governance, democratisation processes, and human rights. Weak states tend to be conflict-prone, for example, while armed conflict and insecurity obstructs or undermines efforts to promote accountability and good governance.

In practice, all of the factors discussed above inter-relate. The main conclusion is that violent conflict is a not only a major issue for Sub-Saharan Africa in its own right, but also for all of the other widely recognised challenges facing the continent.

3. Armed conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa

This section briefly reviews recent armed conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa and discusses overall characteristics and trends.

3.1 Sub-regional overview of armed conflicts

**Horn of Africa**: Armed conflict has had a massive impact across much of the Horn of Africa for decades. Sudan has experienced a combination of civil war and centre – periphery conflicts since independence. Somalia descended into complex civil war in the early 1990s from which it has yet to recover. After a long armed struggle, Eritrea won independence from Ethiopia in the 1990s. A major interstate border conflict erupted between Ethiopia and Eritrea from 1998 to 2000, and the ceasefire remains fragile. There are serious risks of national political crises and instability in Uganda as democratisation processes threaten to lead to a transfer of political power. The conflict and insecurity in Northern Uganda has been sustained by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) use of Southern Sudan as a rear base.

In Sudan, the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was a breakthrough but full implementation is a difficult challenge. Serious conflict continues in Darfur, and there is a threat of armed conflict in other marginalised regions. There are also important transnational conflict issues in the sub-region, associated with inter-clan disputes, unstable border regions, pastoralist conflicts, small arms and light weapon (SALW) trafficking, and organised criminal networks.

**Central Africa/Great Lakes sub-region**: This sub-region is in several ways dominated by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, previously Zaire). When the Cold War ended, the aid and support that sustained the Mobuto regime was withdrawn, contributing to the outbreak of long-running civil war that has claimed 1–2 million lives and drawn in most of its neighbours. Rwanda and Burundi suffered from increasing...
divisions between Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups, culminating in the Rwandan genocidal massacre in 1994, and conflict and instability in Burundi. All countries in the sub-region have been prone to violent instability or armed conflict, although Tanzania and Kenya have remained relative centres of stability.

Much progress has been made in addressing the Great Lakes wars since the end of the 1990s. The peace process in Burundi has led to the 2005 election of a government that may enable greater stability and peace-building. Rwanda has made a good recovery since the genocide. The transition is underway in DRC, with an election in July 2006 (but with every prospect of enduring instability). However the sub-region remains one of mostly weak and unrepresentative states that are acutely vulnerable to future conflicts. A key cross cutting issue in this region is the illegal exploitation of economic resources, and the armed militias involved in securing these benefits.

West Africa: The conflict in Darfur is already having a serious spill over affect in Chad where a political crisis is brewing. There has been much progress in post-conflict stabilisation of Sierra Leone and Liberia, but the neighbourhood remains extremely fragile with Ivory Coast still suffering an unresolved crisis and Guinea facing a difficult succession. Nigeria has come some way since the end of military rule in 1998 but still faces serious conflicts, mostly related to distribution of oil wealth among the country’s diverse ethnic and religious communities. Key cross cutting issues in this region include the mobilisation of large numbers of child soldiers. The Sahara-Sahel countries have also experienced widespread armed conflict: for example in Mali, Niger, and Chad. Pastoralists have been important parties in many of these conflicts and as in the Horn of Africa, the escalation of ‘traditional’ raiding practices involving pastoralism has been a factor in much violence.

Southern Africa: Zimbabwe is the main challenge facing this region. In Angola, the government ended the civil war by defeating and co-opting the União Nacional pela Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). Much low level armed violence continues. A key cross cutting issue in the sub-region is HIV, which could exacerbate the problems of governance and state weakness which underlie conflict.

3.2 Trends and Characteristics of Armed Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa

Every sub-region of Africa has experienced several armed conflicts since 1990. These have included inter-state wars of a ‘classical’ nature such as between Ethiopia and Eritrea. However, the great majority of large scale armed conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa have been civil wars, or complex transnational conflicts in which several interlinked conflicts overlap. The characteristics of these civil wars vary greatly, according to specific local contexts and histories, but they share a number of important characteristics. These include:
A multiplicity of armed groups, with irregular militias and guerrilla armies featuring prominently in the conflict, dependent on predatory exploitation of local communities: the state armed forces have tended to be fragmented and undisciplined;

Extensive use of border regions, taking advantage of weak state controls of these areas; with substantial direct or indirect involvement of neighbouring states;

Low respect for rules of international humanitarian law, with wide use of child soldiers and torture: civilians have been a high proportion of the direct as well as indirect casualties of war;

High degree of manipulation and reflection of ethnicity and tribal loyalties by conflict parties, and also of progression of local civilian defence militias into conflict parties;

Armed conflicts that are sustained and partially motivated by trafficking of natural or mineral resources; with a key role for regional and international flows of arms, particularly small arms;

Relatively high UN or other international/regional engagement, including peace support missions: large enough to become a major factor in the conflicts but often too limited or constrained to decisively affect the course of the conflict.

In many cases, neighbouring conflicts have overlapped and inter-acted so substantially that it is better to regard the conflict area as a sub-regional ‘conflict complex’. The recent wars in the Mano River area in West Africa, Sahara-Sahel, and Great Lakes sub-regions are good examples of this.

Such complex conflicts have been characterised by some as ‘the new wars’, or ‘contemporary complex conflicts’. Many of their characteristics can in fact be traced back through the centuries in many parts of the world, particularly in the eras before formation of strong unitary states. However they combine in modern ways and are influenced by contemporary processes of globalisation; transnational organised crime; and growing UN and other international engagement through peace support missions.

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Box 3.1 The ‘resource curse’

Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa has reinforced the view that mineral wealth (oil, metals, diamonds, timber, wild-life, etc) can be a curse rather than a blessing. Violent conflict has been more likely in countries that are rich in natural resources than in those that have resource scarcity. World Bank econometric studies have indicated that developing countries are more than twice as likely to experience armed conflict if more than 25% of their GDP comes from production and trade of mineral resources or timber.7

The availability of rich natural resources create incentives for conflict. The types of factors involved include:8

• Rent-seeking – control of territories rich in resources create opportunity to gain ‘rents’ from their exploitation. These create greed-based incentives for taking such control.
• Grievance –resource wealth can generate grievances that can contribute to the outbreak of armed violence.
• Economic instability – high dependence on the export of natural resources can be associated with complacent neglect to diversify the economy, and makes economies highly vulnerable to external trade shocks.
• Conflict Financing – once violent conflict begins, the availability of rich natural resources can help to finance the continuation of the conflict.
• Encouraging ‘spoilers’ – where the continuation or exacerbation of conflict offers opportunities for continued enrichment, some individuals and groups will act as ‘spoilers’ and try to obstruct or undermine efforts towards peace.

Efforts to identify trends in armed conflict in contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa have not reached a consensus. Over the last fifty years, it is possible to identify a number of phases in the character of armed conflicts in Africa, including the following:

• Liberation struggles and conflicts directly associated with the ending of colonial rule;
• Armed rebellions and military coups against weak or authoritarian regimes;
• Cold war or (especially in Francophone Africa) post-colonial ‘overlay’ on politics and tensions in Africa, combining external suppression of conflicts or destabilisation by armed proxies for reasons of wider international politics;
• Civil wars and complex contemporary conflicts associated with weak or ‘shadow’ states; the ‘resource curse’ (see Box 3.1 above); youth alienation, or impacts of neighbouring conflicts.
• ‘Post-conflict’ armed violence and continued instability.

7 See Paul Collier’s et. al; World Bank studies.
8 See Policy Paper 5 in this series for more detailed discussion.
This list is arranged in rough chronological order, though the phasing has taken place at different times in different sub-regions and the real picture is more confused and complex.

Overall levels of armed conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa were relatively low in the 1970s-1980s; and then increased substantially from the late 1980s, with an upsurge of armed violence and civil wars in the 1990s. Since 2000, many of the wars of the 1990s have come to an often-precarious end. UN and other international peace-support efforts are helping to maintain peace-agreements and support post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building. Although they remain worryingly high, the number and intensity of armed conflicts has been reduced significantly. Some argue that this reduction in large-scale armed conflict is probably a longer term trend as the factors that led to many recent wars are passing, and UN and other international/regional engagement for CPMR reduces the risks that civil wars will re-emerge. However, this assumption depends greatly on the effectiveness of efforts to promote CPMR, which remains uncertain.

4. Priorities and approaches for CPMR

Efforts for CPMR, in Sub-Saharan Africa as elsewhere, are multidimensional and priorities depend on the context and on the characteristics and risks of war and lower-intensity armed violence. This section introduces key concepts, approaches and priorities for CPMR in Africa, to provide a framework for the remainder of the paper.

Key concepts of CPMR are straightforward in principle (see Box 4.1), but often difficult to apply in practice. Once conflicts become sufficiently serious to attract sustained, high level political attention, either nationally or internationally, they have become deeply-rooted and dynamic. There will be important stakeholders and drivers of the conflict. Thus efforts for CPMR are a struggle, in that there will be countervailing pressures and actors that aim to undermine or manipulate CPMR efforts. CPMR is as much about strengthening those working for peaceful resolution of disputes as about engaging with conflict parties.

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Box 4.1 Key CPMR Concepts

For the purposes of this book, the following definitions of key concepts are most useful.

**Conflict Prevention**: activities undertaken to reduce manifest tensions and/or prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict.

**Conflict Management**: activities undertaken to prevent the escalation of violent conflict, in terms of either the intensification of violence or its geographical spread.

**Conflict Reduction**: activities to reduce the intensity or geographical extent of violent conflict, including short-term activities to end wars.

**Peace-building**: activities undertaken over the medium and long term to address underlying causes of violent conflict and/or to enhance resilience against risks that violence will result from tensions, provocations or acts by violent opportunists. This includes conflict resolution activities to resolve underlying disputes or divisions.

The importance of good knowledge and understanding: CPMR strategies and activities need to be developed on the basis of a detailed and up-to-date understanding of the conflict and of the likely impacts of possible interventions (see next section).

The status-quo is not a viable option: Although CPMR objectives focus on prevention or reduction of violence, in Sub-Saharan Africa the objective cannot simply be to maintain stability and the status quo. The risks and outbreak of conflicts on this continent are associated with real problems, grievances and injustices. Effective CPMR efforts need to accommodate or support change, and reinforce efforts to address such problems peacefully.

The importance of sustained engagement: Non-violent struggles are more likely than violent strategies to improve the lives of the vulnerable and marginalised, and to lead ultimately to desirable political or socio-economic reform or transformations. But the prospects for non-violent change can seem bleak amongst marginalised groups in the authoritarian and highly unequal societies that many in Africa still experience. Clear and consistent engagement by the international community, including the EU, to address and resolve problems can in itself give hope for non-violent progress, and thereby reduce risks of armed conflict. Short term efforts to prevent crises escalating into violence, or for post-conflict stabilisation, are important but risk being ineffective unless based on detailed understandings of the conflict and local context, which take time to develop.

Limits on external influence: There are real limits on the extent of influence that can be achieved by the EU and other external actors. Nevertheless, where there is a willing partner government, or a critical local coalition of civil society groups and influential parts of the local elites, international CPMR efforts can have real and enduring effects (such as in Mali, Uganda, Ghana, South Africa, Mozambique and other Sub-Saharan African countries since 1990). Where this is absent, more modest goals of crisis or...
conflict management come to the fore. Witness the limits of international influence over Angola, Sudan, Zimbabwe or Eritrea in recent years.

The importance of co-ordination and coherence: There are normally many international or regional stakeholders interested in influencing conflict dynamics in the countries concerned. Their influence will be enhanced if they work in the same direction, with shared understandings and consultation. In general, co-ordination is hard to achieve, and conflict actors can easily play one external actor off against another. ‘Coherence’ is also important: CPMR efforts have often been undermined by inconsistent activities by the same institutions in another policy sphere. This is particularly a danger for large countries or organisations, such as the EU/EC and its member states, with a multiplicity of political, trade, and security activities.

The Post-Conflict opportunity: International peace-support missions immediately after negotiated peace agreements provide a distinctive ‘moment’ of opportunity for CPMR and peace-building. The country and most armed conflict parties are exhausted by war and open to efforts to establish enduring peace. The international community often has unprecedented influence; with a direct role in the provision of security and relatively large human, financial and other resources. However, often mandates and understandings have been limited or inadequate, and opportunities missed. This has been recognised and at least partly addressed, but CPMR efforts depend on improved international performance (see section 9 below).

State security, regime security or human security?: Many efforts to prevent violent conflict and promote stability in Sub-Saharan Africa have in the past been mainly directed towards regime security. The governing elites in the countries concerned normally focus on this, but the USA, Soviet Union, and EU post-colonial powers have also sometimes propped-up a friendly leader or regime. Such efforts may be selfishly motivated or reflect a genuine belief that the current leadership is the best available option for the people of that country. But it should not be confused with CPMR efforts directed towards state or human security.

Efforts to promote state security are designed to protect and reinforce the security of the state and its institutions, irrespective of the identity of the leader. CPMR efforts in this context focus on preventing or reducing interstate wars or responding to illegitimate external military interventions. They also include activities and norms to deter or reverse military coups against internationally recognised civilian authorities.

CPMR activities directed towards promoting human security focus directly on preventing or reducing violence and insecurity of people and communities. The twin dimensions of human security are often formulated in terms of ‘freedom from

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fear’ and ‘freedom from want’. The EU and most democratic countries have declared commitment to human security goals, and so more recently has the UN. CPMR activities can contribute to both of these human security goals.

In practice, CPMR activities normally aim to combine concerns with state and human security. Communities will generally be more secure within a stable state than an unstable one. However, this is not always the case, for example in an oppressive state. In weak or conflict-prone countries, it is often necessary to achieve difficult balances between human or state security priorities. In post-conflict countries, for example, levels of violence often remain very high: organised armed violence between armies declines, but banditry, score-settling, and social, domestic or criminal violence continues. With scarce resources, international actors face dilemmas on whether to focus most on state-building and DDR, for example, or on civilian insecurity.

5. Understanding conflict conflict-prevention and peace-building

Strategies for CPMR need to be based on detailed and up to date conflict assessments11 if they are to be effective, and to avoid risks of making things worse. This section discusses these, and the different phases of conflict.

5.1 Understanding conflicts
The causes of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa are complex, multiple and often mutually reinforcing. They are intimately related to development issues, understood broadly to include political, economic and social development and issues of governance, human security, and sustainability. It is thus important to avoid over-simplistic analyses of the causes of conflict in Africa. There are almost always many factors contributing to conflict. The key is how they combine and develop. These factors include:

- **underlying or ‘structural’ factors** (such as ‘weak’ states, social/ethnic division or exclusion, bad or authoritarian government, inequality, violent crime, impunity, environmental scarcity);
- **the interests, relations, capacities, and agendas of relevant actors** (such as political parties, military, corrupt elites, warlords, criminal organisations; terrorists, external powers);
- **dynamics** (such as impacts of disasters, elections, reform processes challenging interests, scandals, fiscal reforms, migration, terrorism).

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11 The term ‘conflict assessment’ combines: conflict analysis; analysis of responses, and roles of other stakeholders; and development of CPMR strategies and options.
None of these factors on their own necessarily leads to violent conflict. Most conflict processes are highly dynamic, and are driven by complex and shifting combinations of several factors and actors. Conflict analyses consist of detailed examinations of the structural factors and actors, and how they all combine in relation to conflict dynamics: long term conflict trends; primary drivers of conflict; possible triggers to violent conflict; capacities for managing conflict; and possible conflict scenarios.

5.2 Analysis of responses and roles of other stakeholders
The second phase of a conflict assessment for CPMR purposes is to examine the roles of relevant national and international stakeholders, and their actual or likely responses to the conflict dynamics that the conflict analysis has revealed. There are typically many different actors that are likely to respond in a variety of ways to an emerging conflict. They may take sides; withdraw; lobby their home governments or international institutions to intervene; spot opportunities to enrich themselves; introduce additional security actors to protect their investments; build peace-constituencies; or develop their own CPMR activities. Although it will be uncertain how such stakeholders will actually respond, it is important to start to analyse this, to deepen understandings of conflict scenarios and risks.

5.3 Development of CPMR strategies.
This final phase of the conflict assessment is systematically to consider possible CPMR activities and strategies in relation to the conflict process. An immediate priority is to review current activities in the country or region concerned. Could they do harm, or are their opportunities to adjust them so that they contribute to conflict prevention? A second priority is to develop shared understandings of the conflict processes and risks with partners – international; regional or local – in order where possible to develop joint CPMR strategies. Where there is not strong basis for partnership, it becomes important to develop a strategy to influence others, to reduce the risk that they may do harm. The third priority is to develop appropriate new CPMR strategies and activities. These need to be based on a systematic and realistic assessment of capabilities and opportunities to influence.

There are multiple instruments for CPMR, including: diplomatic and political; security; economic and social. An effective CPMR strategy will normally involve a combination of such activities and instruments. The challenge is to combine and focus them so that they actually address key conflict drivers and influence the prospects for peace and violence on an appropriate time scale. In times of crisis, for example, efforts to address long-term underlying problems will not be effective unless they are directly linked to shorter-term political and security processes.
5.4 Phases of conflict
CPMR strategies obviously must take into account the status or phase that the conflict has reached. These can crudely be divided into the following phases:

Pre-conflict
a) No manifest risks of violent conflict
b) Periods of escalation of tensions or crisis, when risks of outbreak of violence are perceived to be high.

During armed conflict: armed conflict is underway

Post Conflict
a) immediate post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction
b) longer term peace-building

The opportunities and strategies for CPMR differ substantially in different conflict phases. It is important to recognise that most conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa have not mapped easily into the above phases. The above phases are more for conceptual value: reality is messier.

6. Regional and international institutions and CPMR in Africa

This section outlines some key African, EU and international institutions and mechanisms for CPMR in Sub-Saharan Africa.

6.1 African Institutions and CPMR
One of the core missions of the Africa Union (AU) is ‘to play a leadership role for promotion of peace, human security and good governance in the Continent.’ To support this mission, it has a Peace and Security Council (PSC) that serves as the key decision-making body for CPMR and which comprises 15 countries elected from African states. The PSC is supported by the Peace and Security Department of the Commission of the AU, and by a Military Staff that advises of military and security requirements for promoting and maintaining peace and security in Africa. It can also call upon: a ‘Panel of the Wise’ (five eminent Africans) to engage in conflict prevention diplomacy; a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS); and an African Stand-by Force of Peace Keepers – with force goals of a brigade on standby for peace-keeping in each of Africa’s five sub-regions (as defined by the AU).

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The AU was designed to be a more proactive and effective organisation for CPMR in Africa than the OAU. It has substantial political authority and legitimacy. Its activities are based on a Peace and Security Protocol (2002), and a Common African Defence and Security Policy (2004). The PSC can authorise the deployment of Peace Keepers as a regional organisation under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. As chapter 2 demonstrates, it still has limited capabilities in practice. Nevertheless, it organised for example the African Mission in Burundi (2003-4), and since 2004 has been co-ordinating the African Mission in Sudan trying to limit the violence in Darfur.

The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which is discussed in chapter 4, is central to AU efforts to promote development, good governance and security, and to develop supportive international partnerships. Established in 2001, NEPAD is a mechanism for addressing Africa’s key challenges including poverty, conflict and African marginalisation in the global economy, by mobilising and co-ordinating resources to address priority sectors and issues. To promote good governance, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was set up in 2003, to monitor and promote African countries’ performance on good governance, human rights and democracy through a voluntary process of peer review. By early 2006, some 23 of the 53 AU member states had joined, and eight African states had been reviewed by APRM missions. The APRM’s effectiveness remains unclear, but it has started promisingly as a mechanism to promote good performance amongst well-intentioned African governments. Governments with a strategy of oppression or authoritarianism are obviously a greater challenge.

Within the overall African institutional architecture for promoting peace, security and CPMR are five key sub-regional organisations: ECOWAS, IGAD, EAC, SADC, and COMESA. Since the mid-1990s they have all been important foci for African and international efforts to promote co-operation on peace and security as well as development. ECOWAS, IGAD, EAC, and SADC have all established senior committees and mechanisms specifically to promote security. All of these sub-regional organisations have substantial weaknesses, and they vary in the roles in which they have real comparative advantage. But, they have become important to regional and international efforts to promote CPMR.

6.2 The EU and CPMR in Africa
The new EU strategy for Africa brings together a relatively comprehensive set of goals, policies and mechanisms that have developed since the mid-1990s to guide and promote EU engagement with CPMR and/or Africa.13 A recent EC Communication re-enforces this strategy.14 It is based on a framework of partnership with African institutions, and

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establishes a range of policies and programmes to support African efforts to promote: peace and security; human rights and governance; development; sustainable growth, regional integration and trade; and investing in people. Amongst the many important EU policy statements on which EU strategy for promoting CPMR in Africa is based are:

- The EU Council Common Position of 2004 concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa;
- The Action Plan for European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) support for Peace and Security in Africa. Under this plan, the EU provides support for African peace-support mission capabilities, and has so far conducted two military crisis management operations: Operation Artemis in the DRC, and in support of the AU Darfur mission;
- The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, which aims to co-ordinate control of arms exports from EU states to reduce the risks that they undermine regional, national or human security.
- The EU Africa Peace Facility, which provides an earmarked budget for supporting peace and security activities led by the AU and African sub-regional organisations;
- The Cotonou Agreement (2000) between the EU and 77 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, which provides an overarching framework for co-operation on development aid; economic and trade co-operation; and political dialogue. Within the Cotonou Agreement framework, the EU has a European Development Fund (EDF) for development aid; arrangements for economic and trade co-operation within a WTO framework; and mechanisms for regular political dialogue on any issues of mutual concern, including governance, democratisation, human rights and CPMR.

6.3. The UN and other International Institutions and CPMR

CPMR efforts in Africa can draw upon all of the relevant UN and other international institutions (such as the World Bank). As active members and contributors to such international institutions, the EU and its member states aim to co-ordinate closely with them, as well as with external regional organisations particularly NATO. Between 2000 and 2005, the UN had eight peace-support missions in Africa in addition to which UN humanitarian operations were active across much of Sub-Saharan Africa. Africa also benefited from many UN activities to directly and indirectly support CPMR.
7. Governance, democratisation and human rights and CPMR

Good and effective governance, democratic institutions and democratic practices, and a culture of respect for human rights are fundamental for CPMR. Taken together, they reduce the opportunities for the emergence and mobilisation of popular grievances that stem from exclusion, political and economic alienation, oppression and marginalisation (on the basis of ethnicity, gender or age). The absence of democracy, good governance and human rights contributes to risks of violent conflict, and reflect underlying structural conditions that can create conflict prone societies.

Good governance is a relatively new concept and it remains contested. It is commonly understood to mean transparent, accountable and effective governance, based on principles of democracy and meritocracy in the state administration. The institutionalisation of good governance principles is seen as essential to: effective and inclusive public service delivery; the coherent disbursement of donor aid; the creation of a functioning state of law and the reduction of risk associated with private investment. By contrast, bad governance, characterised for example by corruption and practices of patronalism and clientelism, damages state administrative capacity, leads to opaque streams of aid distribution, and deters investment. This in turn limits poverty alleviation, economic growth and development, while also contributing to alienation from the state administration and institutions of government.

Democracy, here defined in terms of regular, free, fair and multiparty elections and the institutionalisation of attendant civil and political freedoms, is an equally important tool for CPMR. This is because democratic systems allow for peaceful articulation, debate and reconciliation of divergent sectoral and group demands. Moreover, it is only through democratic institutions that first generation (civil and political) and second generation (economic, social and cultural) rights can be realised. The importance of creating institutional mechanisms for the upholding and promotion of human rights is underpinned by a growing body of research that demonstrates the implicit linkage between human rights recognition and poverty reduction: countries tend to make progress on both or neither of these.

Sub-Saharan African countries have made substantial progress in developing practices of good governance, democracy and human rights. However, powerful drivers of bad governance and anti-democratic tendencies persist. A substantial gap remains between the outward practice and appearance of democracy, respect for human rights and good governance, and the reality of their practice. Thus there is a continued need for refined and improved strategies of EU intervention in order to support and maintain the recent trend towards democratisation.
Box 7.1 Engaging with Fragile States

Efforts to promote good governance and CPMR in Sub-Saharan Africa need to be aware of the priorities and challenges of engaging with fragile states. ‘Fragile’ states are those where the state power is unable or unwilling, to deliver core functions to the majority of its people: security, protection of property, basic public services and essential infrastructure. Some states could even be said to have failed, in that for a substantial period state structures and institutions have essentially collapsed. The concepts of ‘fragile’, ‘weak’, or ‘failed’ states remain broad and contested, but by any definition there are numerous examples of such states in Sub-Saharan Africa. They include: a) countries recovering from conflict, political crisis or poor governance (probably most Sub-Saharan countries); b) Countries facing declining governance environments (for example Zimbabwe or, less extremely, Kenya and Guinea); c) Countries where the state has partially or wholly collapsed (for example Somalia).

Any substantial international engagement with a fragile state is likely to raise special issues: the state is particularly vulnerable and the risks of doing harm are relatively great; and relations with the government may be particularly complex and difficult. Recognising this, many international institutions have recently developed specific guidelines for engagement. For example, the OECD DAC has issued a set of 12 ‘principles for good international engagement in fragile states’,15 and the European Commission has addressed the challenges in its Communication on Governance and Development.16

8. Conflict-sensitive development and trade

The inter-relationships between development, trade and conflict processes, which are discussed in detail in chapters 6 and 7 of this book, are complex and important. Development-related aid and humanitarian assistance are important resources in Sub-Saharan Africa. Trade is similarly critical for development, and patterns of trade can be expected to affect conflict risks. This section briefly addresses these two inter-related issues.

8.1 Promoting Conflict Sensitive Development17

Development processes can contribute to conflict as well as to peace; for instance by changing balances of wealth, influence and power within societies. This is as true for

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17 For more detailed discussion of this issue, see chapter 6 in this series.
development or humanitarian aid as it is for internally resourced development processes. International aid always has impacts on the politics of the recipient countries, including effects on the prospects for peace or conflict. The key aid principle should be that international development aid should at least do no harm and as far as possible, take opportunities for doing good.

‘Conflict sensitive’ development aid policies and programmes are designed and delivered in a way that systematically addresses risks of contributing to violent conflict and opportunities to promote CPMR and contribute to peace-building. For many years, international, EU and OECD country development aid agencies avoided becoming systematically engaged with conflict or security issues, in case these polluted or diverted their development programmes. These days should now be long passed. Since 1997, the OECD DAC has issued guidelines to promote conflict sensitive development aid, and EU institutions and member states have established policies in line with these. In practice, these policies remain inadequately developed and implemented.

Effective adoption of the ‘do no harm’ principle requires substantial development of institutional capacities and procedures amongst donors and their partners. In the case of efforts to ensure that development aid contributes to CPMR, there are a number of well-established tools for conducting the conflict assessments that are essential for conflict sensitive development aid. Now the key challenges are to ensure that they are effectively used in the design and implementation of aid programmes. Efforts to ‘mainstream’ conflict sensitivity into EU/EC and other development aid programmes have only been partially successful. The same applies to efforts to promote coherence with other aspects of EU engagement with developing countries, for example relating to trade or foreign and security policies.

8.2 Trade, Economic Co-operation and CPMR

Although the specific causal pathways are still much debated, there is a growing consensus that high benefits from trade reduce the incentives for states to engage in costly conflicts with their respective trade partners – although this is more likely to reduce risks of inter-state rather than the civil wars to which Sub-Saharan Africa has proved particularly vulnerable. The primary mission of sub-regional organisations in Africa has long been promoting and facilitating sub-regional and regional trade and economic integration. But limited progress has been made in practice, due to combinations of poor infrastructure, bad economic governance and conflict.

18 For further discussion of this issue see chapter 7 in this series.
Moreover, African trade has been focused more on direct trade in commodities with developed countries, and it is equally important to facilitate fair participation in the global trade. The WTO trade negotiations are therefore important. EU, USA, Japanese and other agricultural subsidies, and protectionist restrictions on agricultural trade have distorted and limited patterns of farming and economic trade from Africa. Although some African governments have used access to inter-state transfers of subsidised food as an instrument for political stability, the net effects on African economies and farmers have almost certainly been negative, with indirect effects on conflict processes. Overall, the EU is particularly well placed not only to contribute to the beneficial growth of African trade, regionally and globally, but also to integrate this aspect into CPMR strategies. So far, however, the EU has not succeeded in doing this: there are major ‘coherence’ issues in its present policies.


9.1 Trends and challenges in UN Peace-Keeping in Africa

With the end of the Cold War the scope for UN and other international peace-keeping and peace support missions increased greatly, leading to the emergence of comprehensive or complex peacekeeping missions. The expansive nature of these missions, combined with the dynamic nature of the conflicts they were meant to tackle, resulted in significant changes to how peacekeeping operations were mandated, staffed and financed. In the period between 1990 and 2005 there were 19 UN peace operations in Sub-Saharan Africa. Most of these missions, some still ongoing, have complex multi-dimensional mandates. In addition to these UN led operations, the past decade has seen several multilateral missions to contain or reduce conflict by African and other regional and sub-regional organisations.

The first post-cold war complex peacekeeping mission, UNTAG in Namibia, saw the beginning of a four year period during which increasingly complex interventions in Africa were mandated through the United Nations. Ultimately, the gap between mandates and capabilities – and the catastrophic results witnessed in Somalia and Rwanda – resulted in developed countries significantly reducing and altering the type of peacekeeping related support they provided in Africa. Currently, while continuing to pay most of the UN peacekeeping budget, developed countries provide relatively

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19 See chapter 2 in this series for detailed discussion of these issues.
few peacekeepers to UN led peacekeeping operations and this affects Africa in particular. Developed countries have focused on supporting development of peace-keeping and crisis response capacities of the AU and other African regional organizations. This has been done either directly (for example through EU Africa Peace Facility) or through the UN: for example by arranging logistics, transport and military advisor support; providing training for African peacekeepers; and financially underwriting operational expenses.

Overall, while the UN remains the key international organization for promoting peace and security in Africa, responsibilities are increasingly shared. Improved operational cooperation between organizations such as the UN, the EU and NATO, and the emergence of the AU and sub-regional organisations with mandates to ensure peace and security on the continent, all testify to the improving prospects for CPMR efforts in Africa.

9.2 African regional and sub-regional organisation

African regional and sub-regional organizations have assumed increased responsibility for peacekeeping type operations since the late-1990s. With financial and training support by numerous international actors, the increasing political will of African leaders to take responsibility for African peace and security is slowly being matched by increasing capabilities. One of the cornerstones of these enhanced capabilities is the African Standby Force (ASF) which is to be operational by 2010. The five regionally deployed ASF brigades, combined with centrally located police and human rights components will begin to address the capacity shortfalls that currently exist. However, even when fully operational, launching and financing anything more than a small observer group will require significant outside assistance, from the UN, NATO and the EU in particular.

9.3 Trends in EU Peace Support in Africa (including support for AU)

The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) form the backbone of an emergent EU capability to provide peace support assistance in Africa. In addition to longer term training efforts, this assistance has taken the shape of direct and indirect support of other actors such as the UN or the AU. The EU has the potential to play a significant positive role in Africa, by coordinating its crisis management efforts, its broad range of financial and trade instruments, and general development programs. But it has yet to properly realise this potential. To date the EU has provided direct support in the form of the first ever EU crisis management operation, Operation Artemis, in eastern DRC. Subsequently the EU has – through cooperation with NATO – provided logistics support to the African Union’s AMIS II operation in Sudan, and has recently responded to AU and UN
requests by agreeing to deploy portions of an EU Battle Group to the Congo. The EU also provides indirect support to African peacekeeping efforts in a number of ways, including the provision of training and advisor personnel, and support through the EU’s African Peace Facility (APF). The APF is designed to enable the AU and other sub-regional organizations to build local crisis management capacity; as well as to directly fund operations (the AU’s operation in Darfur (AMIS I & II) is heavily funded by the APF, for example).

10. Thematic issues and challenges for CPMR in Sub-Saharan Africa

Several thematic issues and challenges are particularly important for present and future conflict processes in the region, and thus for CPMR. Although these and other factors will combine in different ways depending on specific context, they will often be present. We have already highlighted and discussed the issues of: conflict sensitive development and trade; governance, democratisation and human rights; and political economy of peace and conflict. This sub-section identifies and briefly addresses a number of further key thematic issues.20

BOX 10.1: This book and Issues and Priorities for CPMR in Sub-Saharan Africa

This chapter makes clear that risks of violent conflict, and prospects for CPMR, in Sub-Saharan Africa depend upon a complex interplay of different factors, which combine in specific ways according to local context. The other chapters of this book examine several of these factors in more detail. Some of the chapters address broad thematic issues that are central to virtually all CPMR efforts in the region, including: governance, democratisation and human rights (chapter 4); political economies of armed violence (chapter 5); conflict sensitive development (chapter 6); and trade, economic co-operation and conflict (chapter 7). Similarly, chapter 2 focuses on the development of international capacities to respond to crises. Other chapters are designed to examine specific factors, including: support for DDR and SSR after conflicts (chapter 3), and access to freshwater issues (chapter 8). The present overview chapter (chapter 1) clarifies the significance and role of such issues and factors for CPMR in Sub-Saharan Africa, so that readers can better appreciate the interplay between them.

Gender and Age issues
Conflict processes in Sub-Saharan Africa, as elsewhere, are highly gendered and affected by demography. Men and women, young and old, typically contribute in different ways, and are differentially affected by armed conflict and insecurity. One of the most important underlying factors across sub-Saharan Africa is the combination of the youth of the population (the majority of people are less than 20 years old), and the presence of large numbers of under-employed and marginalised young men. Most violent crime is perpetrated by young men, and teenage boys are particularly prone to join gangs or armed militias. Similarly, young men are also the sector of the population most likely to be victims of violence. Policies and programmes to promote CPMR and human security thus need to be strategic in the way they engage with young men.

Girls and women also participate in violence and war, though after the conflict they are generally disowned or forced back to traditional roles. After conflicts, re-integration programmes have tended to focus more on male ex-combatants, with women marginalised as ‘camp followers’, though with similar if not greater social and economic needs. Women are distinctively affected by violent conflict and insecurity. Not only are they at particular risk of rape and sexual violence, but also their lives and livelihoods are particularly affected by insecurity from violence.

Displacement and migration
Migration and displacement are major factors for conflict and CPMR across much of Sub-Saharan Africa. There is massive overall migration from rural to urban areas. Many families depend on remittances from relatives working abroad or across the country. Millions of people have become refugees or internally displaced as a result of a conflict or disaster. In many countries, already impoverished communities are living alongside large numbers of refugees and migrants. Overall the tolerance that has been displayed by hosts toward such displaced people has been remarkable. Nevertheless their presence, and the more general disruption associated with displacement, add substantially to the pressures and tensions in the country. In several sub-regions, such as the Horn of Africa, Great Lakes/DRC, and West Africa, the relationships between chronic and recurring flows of refugees and migrants is a crucial but often under-appreciated factor in conflict processes. Displacement still tends to be regarded as a temporary phenomenon, whereas in large parts of Africa refugee situations have become protracted, and part of an impoverished and insecure ‘normality’.21

Security and development in border-regions

Insecurity and inadequate control of border-regions, which often generally cover large areas of territory perhaps extending to hundreds of kilometres each side of the border, is a major concern across Sub-Saharan Africa. There are, for example, risks posed by alienated or marginalised borderland communities; illicit cross-border trafficking of arms, minerals, timber and other goods; and intervention by armed groups and militias with rear bases in neighbouring countries. This motivates response strategies involving strengthened border controls and deployments of armed forces or paramilitary police to the border-lands.

These responses, though understandable in many ways, often prove counter-productive. They undermine already fragile border-region economies that often depend on cross-border trading. Tighter border controls provide increased opportunities for corruption as well as revenue earning. Legal traders have incentives to become increasingly engaged with illicit trafficking. Deployment of poorly paid and disciplined security forces often damages rather than improves the security of local people. Border region communities become more rather than less alienated. This is a major issue. CPMR strategies in border areas need to be developed in a way that takes account of the concerns of the people who live in them, including measures to promote good governance and security sector reform, as well as to encourage cross-border trade as well as regulate it.

Political Islam

As in other continents, there are many ethnic, tribal, cultural and religious divisions in Sub-Saharan Africa, which can be prone to manipulation and contribute to conflict dynamics. In this context, political Islamism and Islamic-Christian divisions are becoming an increasingly important issue, particularly in the Horn of Africa and West Africa. The imposition of Islamic Law was a key grievance of southern rebels during the civil war in Sudan, and is becoming a sharp focus of division in several west African states including Nigeria. Political Islam is a significant factor amongst rebels in Christian dominated Ethiopia and in Kenya, Eritrea and Uganda. In Somalia, much recent conflict around Mogadishu has been between a coalition of warlords on the one hand and an Islamist ‘Union of Islamic Courts’, with the latter gaining the upper hand in 2006.

The association of Islamism with international terrorism re-enforces international as well as local concern. In addition to possible ideological affinities, it is important to be aware of the material attractions local militias of affiliating with transnational ‘fundamentalist’ political Islamist networks: they are a major source of finance and arms. The issue requires knowledgeable and careful handling, since there is no inevitability that Islamic-Christian divisions will become a focus for conflict. There
has been long peaceful co-existence in many Sub-Saharan African countries; for example throughout the bloody civil war in Sierra Leone, communities successfully resisted violence along religious divides.

Access to freshwater

Freshwater is not only becoming a scarce resource in much of Africa, but access to it is divided unequally within societies and between states, causing water competition, tensions and the risk of violent conflict. 63 rivers in Africa transcend international boundaries and are used by two or more riparian states, including the Nile, Niger and Zambezi Rivers. There are consequently multiple opportunities for inter-state tensions over river water resources. Tensions between Egypt and up-river states including Ethiopia and Sudan have frequently been prominent. In practice, however, it is important not to exaggerate the risks of inter-state ‘water wars’ in Africa. Tensions have not so far become sufficiently serious to become a primary source of violent conflict. Moreover, international river systems offer opportunities for co-operation. The European Water Initiative has, for example, been useful in supporting co-operative sub-regional approaches.

The risks of violence over access to freshwater appear to be greater within states than between them. ‘Water riots’ have been much more frequent than water wars. In arid or semi-arid lands, contested rights to access to water have been a focus of conflict between pastoralist and settled communities. Allocation and enforcement of water rights is a key governance and justice issue, and many states fall far short of good and fair practices. Dams, irrigation and water distribution programmes are sectors where ‘conflict sensitive’ development and aid approaches are particularly critical.

Environment, climate change and security

Access to freshwater is only one of several dimensions of environment, conflict and security issues. Environmental degradation contributes to poverty and scarcities that can contribute to conflict. Illicit trafficking in timber, ivory and rare species is a major concern in Sub-Saharan Africa, and police are often out-gunned by the criminal gangs involved. Land is central to livelihoods and development in the region, and appropriate land-reform is a CPMR as well as development priority in many countries. Competition over scarce land was an important factor underlying the Rwanda genocide. Badly managed land reform in the interests of political patronage in Zimbabwe has been an important factor in the decline of that country. Inadequate systems for land ownership and rights not only hold back development and investment across the continent, but also provide a focus for discontent and tension.

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22 For a more detailed discussion see chapter 8 in this series.
Climate change is adding to the environmental, developmental and conflict pressures across Africa. Even if overall precipitation in the continent is does not greatly change, changes in distribution and frequency are bound to have major repercussions. Extreme weather events, including floods and droughts, are expected to increase. It will create additional pressures for migration and displacement, and add to the already serious tensions in semi-arid areas.

**HIV/AIDS and disease**

Sub-Saharan Africa suffers exceptionally from endemic disease associated with the tropics, poverty and inadequate water, sanitation and health services. The HIV/AIDS epidemic has been a further blow. It particularly effects the young adult populations on which livelihoods and development greatly depend. However, it is not so clear how the HIV/AIDS and other epidemics affect risks of violence and war. The impacts will depend on context, and need to be carefully integrated into conflict assessments.

**Small arms and light weapons (SALW) trafficking and proliferation**

As chapter 3 in this series demonstrates, uncontrolled flows and excessive availability of SALW is a major factor in conflict and armed violence in Sub-Saharan Africa. SALW such as pistols and automatic rifles are the main tools of armed violence and insecurity across Africa. They are cheap, easy to maintain, and highly lethal. They are not only trafficked illegally, but also sourced from large but insecure official stockpiles as well as authorised legal international transfers.

The EU, UN, AU and African sub-regional organisations have developed substantial norms and programmes designed to tackle SALW trafficking, proliferation and misuse. The EU and other donors have initiated programmes to support national and regional efforts, for example through projects to support weapons collection and destruction, legal controls, stockpile security, and enhanced controls of SALW transfers. Recent changes in OECD guidelines mean that much support for SALW control can now be counted as overseas development aid, extending access to mainstream development aid. These developments are encouraging, but are insufficient as actions to address SALW issues need to be better integrated into wider actions to promote CPMR.

**SSR and DDR**

Many of the problems contributing to risks of violence and conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa are associated with inadequate or unaccountable security forces. Security Sector

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23 EU Joint Action and Strategy. See also chapter 3 in this series.

24 For a more detailed examination of SSR and DDR programmes, and linked SALW issues, in the context of CPMR in Africa, see chapter 3 in this series.
Reform (SSR) is therefore a high priority and must be an integral part of CPMR strategies. The objectives need to be to provide effective and just security services to the citizens of the country as well as to serve the legitimate interests of the state. SSR is a politically sensitive process, but in recent years, governments concerned with promoting stability and security for their citizens have welcomed partnerships and assistance in this area. However, these programmes have been relatively stand-alone and short-term when they need to be substantially developed and integrated with promotion of CPMR, good governance and security.

Post-conflict contexts provide specific opportunities. Since 1990, programmes to support Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration (DDR) of ex-combatants have become an integral part of post-conflict peace support missions. It is important not only to control and demobilise armed groups after peace agreements, but also to promote the disarmament and integration of ex-combatants as part of the post-conflict stabilisation and peace-building process. There is sufficient experience with DDR programmes to learn lessons and improve performance. Much remains to be done, including better integration of DDR with post-conflict SSR and SALW; service provision for displaced people and the poor; and wider peace-building strategies.25

**Regional and transnational dimension:**

The regional and transnational dimensions of conflict processes are often critically important in Sub-Saharan Africa. Unfortunately, CPMR strategies and programmes of the UN, EU and its partners are typically focussed on a particular country and do not adequately incorporate regional and cross-border dimensions. There is not enough analysis of, and provision for, the regional dimensions and inter-linkages of conflicts in conflict assessment or in policies and programmes. Typically, they are recognised introductorily and then neglected in the design and implementation of specific programmes. For example, the international peace-support missions in neighbouring Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cote D’Ivoire were developed and implemented in a largely autonomous way, creating inconsistencies that could be exploited by spoilers while missing opportunities for synergy. CPMR-related EU programmes in Uganda, Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia have recently started to become embedded in a well-developed regional framework and strategy.26 Mechanisms for improved sub-regional dimensions of CPMR strategies need substantial development by the EU, UN and partners.

25 A new applied research programme co-ordinated by CICS, Bradford University has recently been established to research these issues; see [www.brad.ac.uk/peace/cics](http://www.brad.ac.uk/peace/cics).

26 See EU (2005) *Action Plan for the EU Regional Political Framework for the Horn of Africa, EU.*
11. The EU, international actors and CPMR in Sub-Saharan Africa

Having examined a range of key issues for conflict processes and CPMR in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the key elements for developing effective CPMR strategies and policies, we critically examine the recent performance of the EU and other international actors in promoting CPMR in sub-Saharan Africa. Such assessments are complex, and they are considered in greater detail in the other chapters in this book.

11.1 The EU as an international actor for CPMR in Africa:

Since the mid-1990s, the EU/EC has developed a relatively comprehensive set of strategies and policies for partnership with Sub-Saharan Africa and particularly for CPMR-related purposes. In many ways, these are now quite well developed and relatively comprehensive in principle. The issue has high political profile, and relatively large budgets have been allocated. In this respect, the EU has made substantial progress recently. It is in a position to play a leading role, together with key partners including the UN, USA and Japan, to contribute to CPMR in Africa. However, there is still a substantial gap between policy declaration and implementation. Amongst the many issues and problems are the following:

- The EU’s instruments for addressing issues of CPMR in Africa are typically inflexible, unwieldy and thus not well-suited to the subtle requirements of CPMR. The procedures for developing assistance and partnership programmes can be cumbersome, and the period between programme design and implementation can be long, limiting the timeliness of the intervention for CPMR (where timing is often critical). The continuing division of EU activities into three separate ‘pillars’ obstructs integrated approaches.

- There are substantial co-ordination problems within the EU, between its various institutions and those of its Member States. The allocation of competencies between the EC and EU is a continual source of rivalry and dispute in key areas relevant to CPMR, distracting from coherent and effective policies. Similarly, EU member states often do not share the same understandings or strategies for CPMR in Sub-Saharan African countries, and there are residual rivalries. Mechanism for managing these and developing shared and co-ordinated EU strategies are inadequately developed.

- The EU/EC has not fully integrated detailed conflict assessments into the development of its policies and programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa. Full conflict assessments of the EU/EC seem to be largely reserved for post-conflict or crisis countries, and even in these cases are often partial or out of date. In this context, conflict sensitivity is still often seriously lacking.
The EU/EC is still some way away from developing a coherent and workable approach towards use of incentives and conditionality to contribute to CPMR goals.

The EU’s capabilities and willingness to support military, policing, or transitional justice in post-conflict or crisis countries remains limited; and there is much to be done to integrate these properly with wider development, trade and security engagements.

There is a continuing tendency to approach implementation of CPMR programmes and policies as if they were mainly technical assistance and capacity-building programmes, rather than complex political exercises.

These are serious weaknesses that need to be addressed. However, it must be recognised that CPMR is hard, particularly where there a deeply-embedded or dynamic conflict processes. Moreover, it is important to highlight the progress made. In spite of the above weaknesses, the EU and its member states are increasingly playing leading roles in promoting CPMR.

11.2 International powers and CPMR in Africa

A number of external powers in addition to the EU are showing renewed and strengthened interest in Sub-Saharan Africa. These include longstanding players such as the USA and Russia, and also new emerging ones including Japan, China, India and Brazil.

After the Cold War, the USA’s geopolitical interest in Africa as a sphere of competitive influence declined. Its interests in promoting development, good governance, democratisation and political stability continued through the 1990s, and in the absence of bipolar competition could now be pursued with more focus on these core objectives. As demands to contribute to UN and other peace-support missions grew, the USA became increasingly focussed on supporting capacity-building for peace-keeping by African regional and sub-regional organisations, and also co-operation to prevent and combat transnational crime and terrorist networks.

The USA has played a major role in promoting and brokering numerous ceasefires and peace processes, often exerting powerful influence behind the scenes (for example Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, and the DRC). In this respect, as in many others, the interests and activities of the USA have broadly been aligned with those of Norway, the EU, and key EU Member States including the UK and France. In many conflict-prone Sub-Saharan African countries and (sub-)regional organisations, the ‘core group’ of international actors seeking to support CPMR-related objectives has generally comprised some changing combination of the USA, UK, France, Norway, Canada, the UN, the EC Delegation, and one or two other EU states (such as Belgium, Germany,
Italy, Netherlands, Sweden). Co-ordination between these has not always been easy, but in practice co-ordination with the USA has often been no harder than between different EU stakeholders. More effective co-operation and co-ordination on CPMR amongst these core players is a high priority.

Japan has long been a major source of development aid for Sub-Saharan Africa. Although substantially motivated by the same concerns for development, good-governance and CPMR as the EU, Japan’s programmes have more often had the character of more traditional technical assistance.

One reason for renewed and intensified EU, US and Japanese interest in Sub-Saharan Africa has been access to oil and mineral resources. In this they are joined by Russia, China, India, Brazil and other emerging players. Particularly since 2001, Russia has developed closer links with several African countries, particularly focussing on the mining or energy sectors. As their economies and interests expand, countries like India and Brazil are becoming increasingly engaged with Sub-Saharan African countries, particularly on trade and peace-support issues.

In this context, the rapidly increasing engagement of China is noteworthy. Sino-African trade increased from $10 billion in 2000 to more than $28 billion in 2004, and it continues to expand rapidly. Since 2000, more than 25% of China’s crude oil has been imported from Africa. China is now a major source of income for several Sub-Saharan African countries, mostly outside the traditional development and governance frameworks. China’s increasing influence is an increasing source of concern for those engaged in promoting CPMR in the region. China’s engagement is economically motivated and the country does not demonstrate concern with, or participate in international coalitions concerned with CPMR. It is prepared to pay substantial amounts to government elites, or to deliver major technical assistance, to secure contracts, with no concerns expressed about transparency, anti-corruption, or good governance.

This reduces the leverage of the EU and its partners. For example, recent efforts to pressure the governments of Angola or the DRC towards commitments relating to good economic and political governance and SSR have been undermined by China’s willingness to undercut bargaining positions. It has proved relatively willing to provide arms as part of inter-governmental contracts. Suspicions are widespread that China’s positions on the UN Security Council relating to Sudan and Darfur have been strongly influenced by its growing interest and investment in oil concessions in that country.

China is hardly alone among international actors in demonstrating such failings and self-interested engagement in Africa. However, as the USA, EU, Japan, UN and

their partners have become increasingly focussed on CPMR in Africa, lack of co-operation with China is causing increasing problems. It is clear that deeper engagement with China on these issues, to encourage greater co-operation in the future, is a priority.

12. Concluding remarks

CPMR is a priority for Sub-Saharan Africa. This requires thorough understanding of the sources and dynamics of violent conflict and war in the region, in addition to detailed, well-developed and realistic CPMR strategies, which learn from experience and address the range of drivers for peace and conflict. African countries and peoples are making promising efforts in this direction, and the EU and its international partners have developed substantial policies and programmes to help. However, effective CPMR and development in the region will require sustained and comprehensive action as the problems are profound and deeply-rooted. There are important opportunities, but frequent set-backs are inevitable.

The challenge of achieving peace and development in Sub-Saharan Africa must largely be tackled by the governments and peoples of the region. However, co-operation and assistance from the EU and other international actors can make a critical difference. Important policies, programmes and initiatives have been put into place by the EU and international partners to enable and promote co-operation for CPMR and peace-building in Sub-Saharan Africa. These require further development, and face difficult dilemmas. There are still gaps between declared policies and real practices. CPMR programmes are often inadequately designed, resourced or implemented, and sometimes they are undermined by other types of more selfish engagement with Africa.

Bibliography and Further Reading


OECD DAC (2005) Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States 9/Rev2m http://www.oecd.org/document/46/0,2340,en_2649_33693550_35233262_1_1_1_1,00.html


Conflict Prevention, Management and Reduction in Africa

Chapter 2

Developing International Capacities for Crisis Management and Crisis Response in Africa

Sarah Bayne, Catriona Gourlay and Hanna Ojanen
Executive Summary

While the overall incidence of conflict has been declining since the 1990s, the basic context for international peace operations is likely to remain civil wars, often long or recurring, and often in the world’s poorest countries where state capacity is weak. Indeed, the past five years has seen a growing demand for crisis management in Africa.

No one organisation alone can cope with the challenges of crisis management in Africa. The UN is viewed as having the primary global responsibility for global peace and security. However, its effectiveness and efficiency are being undermined by organisational overstretch with regard to resources and mandates which stem, in part, from member states with strong military capabilities increasingly choosing to deploy these in other regions and through other organisational frameworks or coalitions of the willing. Moreover, the complexity of peacekeeping has increased with the rise of multidimensional peacekeeping, and has brought with it new challenges in relation to building UN capacity in areas such as police and rule of law and improving co-operation within the UN family and with an increasing number of actors engaged in peacekeeping and peacebuilding beyond it.

The European Union (EU), for its part, has made Africa an important focus of its emerging identity as a key player in military and civilian crisis management. It has proved that it has an important role to play in providing indirect support to other actors, such as the UN and African Regional Organisations (AROs), via financial and technical assistance, as well as by providing military standby capacity. However, ambitions have tended to outstrip actual capabilities and effectiveness, limiting the scope and nature of missions and revealing an ongoing reliance on leadership by a few member states.

AROs, particularly the African Union (AU) are currently promoted as having a leading role in crisis management in Africa. However their capacities and ability to respond make this ideal a distant prospect. Concerted efforts to build capacity in AROs are essential if the potential of these organisations is to be realised and, for some years to come, implementing fragile peace agreements in Africa will require more not less direct support from rich countries and from the UN system.

To optimise the overall effort, organisations are finding it necessary to work in close cooperation with each other. There are examples of collaboration between the UN, EU, AROs and other actors, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), in practical terms in the field, as well as at the level of technical and financial assistance. However, such cooperation is proving challenging. In some cases, such as the EU-NATO relationship, cooperation is hampered by inter-institutional competition. Even where there is a common interest in forging strategic partnerships, as between the UN and EU or UN and AROs, there are no agreements over division of tasks or modalities for interaction. Deeper cooperation is still constrained by questions of mandate and ownership, structural and procedural limitations and practical issues of coordination.
1. Introduction

While the post World War II period saw a dramatic rise in intra-state conflict, the total number of civil wars has been declining steadily since the early 1990s. The overall ‘five year survival rate’ for all peace agreements since 1960 is only about 50%, but the same figure for peace agreements supported by a substantial international peace operation is closer to 80%. This has led some to assert a causal correlation between the level of international engagement in peace operations and the overall decline in the number of wars and their lethality. Where there is a peace to keep, there is good reason to believe that the deployment of peace operations will decrease the chances of a region lapsing back into conflict.

While the overall number of conflicts is decreasing, the basic context for international peace operations in the immediate future is likely to remain civil wars, often long or recurring and often in the world’s poorest countries where state capacity is weak. Indeed, the past 5 years has seen a growing demand for crisis management in Africa. The number of operations is at an all time high with military peacekeepers deployed in nine countries. At the same time, crisis management operations have increased in complexity and missions are now taking on a variety of state-building tasks in addition to traditional security related tasks. These include ceasefire monitoring and protection of civilians, reform of the security sector, support to transitional governments, election monitoring and support to rehabilitation activities. African regional actors are playing a greater role and new actors, such as the European Union (EU), and other major development actors, are emerging as key players in this field.

This chapter looks at how the various international organisations involved in crisis management in Africa, in particular the United Nations (UN), the EU and African regional organisations (AROs), are responding to these challenges, enhancing their capacities and seeking to coordinate their respective efforts. It examines recent trends in the approaches and contributions of each of these organisations, their relationship with each other, and the opportunities and constraints that they currently face. In doing so, it reflects on the extent to which Africa can ultimately assume responsibility for its own crisis management and considers the enduring role of EU member states in shaping crisis responses. The chapter does not engage deeply on issues of long-term

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30 These are Western Sahara, Sierra Leone, DRC, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Burundi and Sudan.
peacebuilding. However, it recognises the importance of a multi-dimensional approach to crisis management which integrates a peacebuilding perspective. Section one focuses on trends in UN peacekeeping, section two on the role of the EU in military and civilian crisis management, and section three on the emerging roles and capabilities of AROs. The paper concludes by providing an overview of emerging issues and priorities. In doing so it provides a number of recommendations as a basis for further discussion on the way ahead.

Although this paper focuses predominantly on the role of international and regional organisations, it is important not to overlook the enduring importance of individual states in shaping crisis management responses in Africa. Organisations, such as the UN and the EU draw on the resources of their member states and it is the political decisions of these individual states with regards to resource allocation that ultimately determines the level and often the nature of responses. In some instances, such as the United Kingdom’s (UK) intervention in Sierra Leone, states have chosen to take the leading role in a response to a crisis, handing over to organisations such as the UN at a later stage. On other occasions, states have found it more expedient to work through the various international organisations. These political choices are clearly consequential and need to be born in mind in any assessment of international capacities for crisis management.

2. Trends in UN peacekeeping in Africa

This section describes the principal trends in UN peacekeeping, and the outstanding challenges to improving the effectiveness and efficiency of UN operations in Africa, notably the level of Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) contributions, overstretch of current resources and the increasing complexity of multi-dimensional peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

2.1 Increasing the level of engagement and the challenge of resources

UN operations and peacekeeping numbers are at an historical high. There are currently 17 UN peace operations deployed, with a total personnel complement of almost 85,000, including 13,000 civilians.\(^{31}\) This represents a five-fold increase in field personnel since 2000. Sustaining these troops over 12 months in 2004-2005 required rotating

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\(^{31}\) While resolution 1325 of 2000 aims for gender balanced representation at all levels and in all processes to build peace and security, women comprise only one percent of all UN military personnel, 4% of civilian police, 30% of international civilian staff and 20% of national civilian staff.
120,000 troops, operating 180 aircraft, 13,500 vehicles, 21 hospitals and 195 clinics. This is the largest military deployment in the world, second only to that of the United States. At a time when the overwhelming bulk of the world’s conflict-related deaths are in Africa, unsurprisingly the majority of troops are deployed in (eight) operations in Africa. Figure 2.1 below documents these ongoing operations. However, the United Nations headquarters is not well prepared to support this surge in activity. The demands on the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) have proven larger than predicted. In 2000, the Brahimi report\(^\text{32}\) envisaged DPKO launching one large mission a year. Practice has consistently exceeded these expectations with, for example, four new missions launched in 2004. Quantitative demands on personnel have increased commensurately. Whereas in the early 1990s DPKO employed 3500 international staff, this figure has now more than doubled. Even so, the ratio between personnel of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to those in the field has declined from 1:48 in 1998 to approximately 1:135 in 2005.

The growth in UN peacekeeping operations means that the annual budget for UN peacekeeping has increased from under $1 billion in the 1990s to over $4 billion in 2005. The EU 25 account for over 45% of the annual budget and together the United States and Japan account for 50% of the annual budget. It is not clear whether this level of engagement is sustainable. Member states have little interest in maintaining these elevated levels of spending and the difficulty of securing sufficient voluntary contributions can lead to delays, under-capacity and inefficiencies.

Maintaining the level of financial support from OECD (and EU) countries is one aspect of the resource problem. The declining level of OECD troop contributions to UN-commanded peace operations is potentially more damaging to the efficiency of UN operations and to UN operations in Africa in particular. OECD troop contributions to ‘blue helmet’ operations have been steadily decreasing from approximately 43% in 1998 to just 7% in 2005, of which the EU 25 contribute less than 2%. During the last decade, OECD (and EU) countries have shifted the deployment of their troops from UN-commanded operations to international coalitions of the willing or to NATO or EU-led operations, often under a UN Security Council mandate but not under UN command. Whereas UN-commanded forces are overwhelmingly deployed in Africa, Western-led multinational forces have been predominantly deployed in Europe and Asia.\(^\text{33}\) The migration of OECD-country troops away from UN-commanded forces has led to what has been characterized as an ‘Africa Gap’ and the concern that UN-led


**Figure 2.1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Troops*</th>
<th><em>Military observers</em>*</th>
<th>Police/ police monitors/ security personnel**</th>
<th>Budget 05/06 $ (gross)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) 91 to present</td>
<td>Implementing ceasefire and organising and conducting referendum. Differences over key elements have delayed plan's full implementation; ceasefire remains in effect.</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>47.95 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) 99 – Dec 05</td>
<td>Helping parties implement peace agreement. Providing security at key locations and assisting Government in carrying out disarmament and demobilization plan. Assisting Government to extend authority, restore law and order and stabilize situation progressively throughout country, including police training; and providing support as requested for elections.</td>
<td>17500 (authorised 1396 (current))</td>
<td>260 (authorised)</td>
<td>170 (authorised) 78 (current)</td>
<td>113.22 million 56 (current)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Organisation Mission in the DRC (MONUC) 99 to present</td>
<td>Monitoring implementation of ceasefire agreement, devising action plan for overall implementation of agreement and verifying disengagement and redeployment of parties’ forces.</td>
<td>15,197</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>403 million (July to Oct 05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) 2000 to present</td>
<td>Monitoring cessation of hostilities, redeployment of troops and temporary security zone; and assisting in ensuring observance of security commitments by parties.</td>
<td>3,080</td>
<td>205</td>
<td></td>
<td>185.99 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) 2003 to present</td>
<td>Supporting implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the peace process; protection of United Nations staff, facilities and civilians; support to humanitarian and human rights activities; as well as assisting in national security reform, including national police training and formation of a new, restructured military.</td>
<td>14,645</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>1,101</td>
<td>760.57 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Operation in Cote D’Ivoire (UNOCI) 2004 to present</td>
<td>Facilitating implementation by the Ivorian parties of the peace agreement signed by them in January 2003.</td>
<td>6,704</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>386.89 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
peace operations in Africa will become ‘second class’ – undertaken without participation of the richer troop contributing countries and the military capabilities that they bring.\textsuperscript{34} These capabilities include both enabling elements, such as strategic lift and advanced communications, as well as force multipliers, such as signal intelligence, superior mobility and air support\textsuperscript{35}.

\textbf{2. 2 Capabilities, mandates and doctrine: the challenge of developing ‘robust’ peacekeeping}

One of the consequences of the UN’s engagement in internal armed conflict is the recognition that for UN forces to be effective, they must be able to create a secure environment in which other UN peacebuilding activities can take place. For this, the mission must present a credible military deterrent to would-be ‘spoilers’. This requires appropriately clear, reliable and achievable mandates.

There is some evidence that the UN is now more comfortable with setting realistic force levels, and using the forces provided, as for example in its robust operations in Haiti, Liberia and Ituri, DRC. Moreover, the UN declined to take on a security role in Afghanistan in 2001 and the Secretariat advised Member States not to take on new operations in 2005, beyond Sudan, because the Organisation’s capabilities were

\textsuperscript{34} This point was made in the presentation by David Harland at the UNITAR/IPS Conference ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Today: Current Challenges and Required Responses’ in March 2005.

\textsuperscript{35} It is interesting to note that EU capability shortfalls largely correspond to these enabling capability areas. This suggests that direct EU member states participation in UN operations would not necessarily resolve capability short-falls in these areas.
stretched. Despite evidence that the UN is becoming more realistic and discerning about when and under what conditions to intervene, peacekeeping force levels still tend to be set by the Security Council on the basis of best-case planning with non-existent or weak provisions for mission reserves. When a security crisis arises, the Secretary General is required to request a new mandate and additional forces. To address this capacity shortfall, the Secretary General has proposed the establishment of a Strategic Reserve, with a pre-approved mandate to deploy at short notice to established missions. However this suggestion has not been endorsed by the member states and alternative suggestions, including a review of the UN Standby Arrangements System, with rapidly deployable elements, is currently being discussed. Achieving a reliable and effective reserve capacity will be key to improving the UN’s military deterrence capability.

In addition to strengthening the mandates and capabilities of UN operations, the UN needs a new doctrinal framework that corresponds to the needs of robust peacekeeping in the wake of civil wars. The current doctrinal basis of UN peacekeeping was laid down by Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld at the time of the Suez crisis, and was characterized by impartiality, non-use of force except in self defence and the consent of the parties. While UN missions such as those in Haiti, Liberia and the eastern DRC have been equipped with mandates, weaponry and rules of engagement that better enable them to respond robustly to the challenges presented by spoilers to the peace processes, each force contingent continues to arrive in theatre without the benefit of shared interpretation of military doctrine or rules of engagement. Indeed, the development of robust peacekeeping is a work in progress. The UN and its member states are still grappling with new doctrinal challenges it has raised. For example, how far should the military engage in policing tasks such as seeking out armed gangs in urban slums (Haiti) and how can civilian casualties best be avoided when operating in urban areas?

Moreover, the absence of a developed architecture of guidance makes it difficult for the UN to define its goals and methods, and to make needed adjustments to planning, budgeting, training and other systems that support deployment. It also makes it difficult for the UN to adequately hold its personnel to account in the absence of clear performance standards. Recent cases of sexual exploitation and abuse and exploitation by UN peacekeepers have highlighted the difficulties that the UN has in setting standards and ensuring that these are maintained across jurisdictional lines. While the UN is making progress in implementing a comprehensive strategy to tackle these issues, building on the Zeid report and focusing on prevention, enforcement and

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36 The weakness of UN doctrine is exacerbated by the fact that some military contingents remain under national jurisdiction.
remediation, it is also recognised that not all staff and troop contingents on the ground support the policy of zero tolerance, particularly as it pertains to prostitution. Working towards full compliance will require, *inter alia*, strengthening peacekeeping operations’ capacity to investigate violations and ensuring that member states incorporate the standards of conduct contained in the Secretary General’s prohibitions, and capacities to enforce them. More generally, as multidimensional peacekeeping has increased the impact of operations on host-country populations, the need and potential for integrating gender perspectives into peace operations has grown. DPKO has responded by increasing the number of gender advisers, developing training tools and resources and developing policies on human trafficking and gender. Yet the implementation of key mainstreaming ambitions remains mixed, particularly with regard to the development of gender-sensitive Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programming and efforts to build commitment to gender mainstreaming among mission staff.

2.3 The increasing scope of UN missions and the challenge of organisational overstretch

Over the past decade the scope of UN peacekeeping has increased with the development of multidimensional peacekeeping, whereby missions take on important peacebuilding tasks. While the tasks of UN peacekeeping are often regarded as limited, security-focused activities, such as monitoring ceasefire agreements and assisting disarmament, the total number of tasks currently mandated to UN peacekeeping operations is around 100 discrete military and civilian tasks. These include traditional security tasks such as ceasefire monitoring and protection of civilians as well as a host of other ‘peacebuilding’ tasks in the broad areas of public order (police and support for the rule of law), support to transitional governments and public administrations, constitutional development, elections, monitoring and support of human rights and humanitarian and development activities. Some of the key developments in the DPKO’s conduct of its security-related tasks are described below.

**Police**

The number and scope of UN police operations has also increased in the past decade. There are currently five on-going police operations conducted by DPKO. Additionally, UNDP is undertaking police reform and training projects in eight African countries. To increase policing capacity, DPKO has elaborated a framework for a Standing Police Capacity comprised of a small group of up to 100 police that would be rapidly deployable, in teams of 10 to 20, and provide start-up and surge capacity for executive policing missions. Draft structures, staffing, job descriptions and command and control arrangements have been developed and implementation is due to begin in 2006. The development of UN policing has also seen an increase in the scope of activities from principally executing ‘substitution missions’ to including police reform and capacity building, whereby the latter increasingly includes the development of extended or community policing.
## Figure 2.2

### UN Police Operations in Africa 2000–2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission/ Project</th>
<th>Objectives/ Mandate</th>
<th>No. of Civpol officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Advising and assisting the Sierra Leone Police. Providing training and mentoring of officers. Coordinating the building of police barracks and training centres.</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(UNAMSIL) 99 – Dec 05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Organisation Mission in the DRC</td>
<td>Supporting the police reform process and providing training to the Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC) Providing security for the Centre Coordination d’Operations Securites. Supporting and guiding security arrangements for the electoral period. Coordinating the activities of the international community in security sector reform.</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MONUC) 99 to present</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission in Liberia</td>
<td>Assisting the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and restructuring the police force, consistent with democratic policing. Developing a civilian police training programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police.</td>
<td>1,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(UNMIL) 2003 to present</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Operation in Côte D’Ivoire</td>
<td>Supporting the restoration of a civilian policing presence throughout Côte d’Ivoire Advising the Government of Nationa Reconciliation on the restructuring of the internal security services. Assisting in re-establishing the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law throughout Côte d’Ivoire.</td>
<td>661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(UNOCI) 2004 to present</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Operation in Burundi</td>
<td>Training and monitoring of police</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(UNOB) 2004 to present</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission in the Sudan</td>
<td>Assisting the development of Sudan’s police service through monitoring and training</td>
<td>168 (up to 715)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(UNMIS) March 2005 to present</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### UNDP Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudan, Rwanda, Mozambique, Liberia, Mozambique, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Sudan</td>
<td>Police reform and capacity building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Police Training and promotion of human rights</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Rule of Law
The Brahimi report argued that international civilian police could not function effectively without support from a criminal justice system and close attention to and training in human rights. It called for a doctrinal shift toward rule of law teams in complex peace operations that combined police, judicial, legal and human rights experts. This has been partially implemented with the drafting of a new rule of law framework for peace operations and some staffing increases. DPKO nevertheless finds it difficult to fill vacancies in these areas and, relative to the development actors, it has played a limited role in developing policy and doctrine in this area. DPKO remains, however, a major operational player in law and order. This is largely because DPKO has more reliable funding for these roles in immediate post-conflict settings under the Assessed Contributions for Peacekeeping, whereas other agencies have a less reliable funding basis for these activities – namely voluntary member state financing. This is likely to change as donors continue to explore new options to finance post-conflict actions.\(^{38}\)

In any case, it is now recognized that in areas such as rule of law, security sector reform and DDR, the range of tasks involved, their specialised aspects and the length of time required to implement them, means that no single organisation can single-handedly address these issues. Rather, a coordinated approach across the wider UN system, to establish principles and strategies that can guide the planning of Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform, is needed. Strengthening the capacity of peacekeeping interventions to support broader post conflict peacebuilding processes is therefore inextricably linked to the challenge of building effective inter-agency partnerships across the UN system and beyond (see below).

2.4 Increasing complexity and the challenge of co-ordination
In several of the large ‘multi-dimensional’ peace operations, most or many of the 100 or so civilian and military tasks will be in play at the same time and, the military (DPKO) will be but one of a host of actors engaged in the overall peacebuilding effort. The major development actors increasingly begin their economic and social interventions earlier in the post-conflict period, to underpin peacebuilding, as well as taking on long-term security related activities such as DDR and SSR. They are also active in failing state scenarios where preventive and responsive efforts are more blurred. UNDP and other UN agencies are seeking to improve their CPMR capacities at both policy and operational levels.

The convergence of institutions and actors in the post conflict space has been accompanied by doctrinal shifts based on the wider policy consensus on the nexus

between development and security. This has resulted in both development and security actors accepting the need for more integrated interventions in the economic, governance and social development sectors immediately following a conflict. Similarly, while post conflict interventions used to be seen as largely sequential (security-relief-reconstruction-development), the concept of full handovers from first phase to second phase actors has largely been rejected as failing to reflect the realities on the ground as conflict phases are rarely linear. Rather a more dynamic process is envisaged that sees the need for simultaneous interventions, be they security, humanitarian, recovery or reconstruction. This places a premium on coordination between different actors and more fluid phasing of interventions by different institutions. It has also generated lessons about the appropriate sequencing of tasks.

The United Nations, for all its strengths, is however a relatively fragmented system. Different agencies, funds and programmes deploy and support operations that are largely autonomous, managed under separate chains of command, and even funded separately. Inter-agency relationships are often competitive and co-ordination is notoriously difficult. In response to the challenge of co-ordination, in 1997 the Secretary General called for the development of an ‘integrated approach’ to peace operations, with all UN field personnel reporting along a single chain of command to a Special Representative of the Secretary General. Institutional resistance has hampered these efforts, as has the failure to harmonise conditions of service for UN personnel from different parts of the UN system. The establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Support Office will require a renewed drive to build a coherent UN-wide system in support of integrated missions. The on-going interagency review of the Integrated Mission Planning Process should, for example, help elaborate how the various UN agencies can best clarify and share their joint labour. Similarly, the Peacebuilding Commission should help co-ordinate strategy in areas such as rule of law, security sector reform and DDR, in which a number of UN agencies are active.

Thus while the capacity of the UN to deploy a wide range of peacekeeping and peacebuilding capabilities is a comparative advantage of the organisation, as the range of activities has increased the organisation has been over-stretched and has struggled to integrate the overall effort optimally. Better management of the span of the UN capabilities is essential and will require deeper integration in the field and more effective decision-making across departments in New York.

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39 For a discussion of UN co-operation with external regional organisations, see section 4.
40 Report of the Secretary-General to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping, A/59/608, 2005.
2.5 Partnerships

In face of the extensive need for peacekeeping interventions in Africa and the UN’s resource and capability limitations, the UN is increasingly interested in regional organizations – particularly the EU and AU – taking on a larger role in peacekeeping in Africa. In the words of the Under Secretary General Guéhenno: ‘It is a very welcome development that AU and EU are developing their capacities, because the UN cannot go everywhere and do everything’. The World Summit in September 2005 affirmed the importance and potential of the UN’s relationships with regional peacekeeping actors. The challenge is now to translate this experience into predictable frameworks for cooperation in peace operations. Efforts in this direction are the most advanced in relation to the EU, where arrangements for cooperation already cover common peacekeeping standards, joint training and exercises, communications and best practices. While the UN and EU already have experience in complementary and coordinated engagements (for instance when the EU rapidly deployed a bridging operation in Bunia, DRC in 2003) in other cases such as Darfur, the EU and UN failed to agree on a unified response. Indeed, the capacity and will of the EU to directly reinforce UN interventions in Africa remains limited (see next section) and concrete and predictable modalities for operational cooperation have yet to be elaborated. However the UN has no interest in building exclusive partnerships and Kofi Annan has recognised that a strengthened UN-NATO partnership might similarly help address UN capability shortfalls regarding rapid and robust deployments in Africa. In 2004 he stated that in future NATO might be employed in a peace enforcement ‘bridging’ role in much the same way that the EU deployed operation Artemis in the DRC. There is, moreover, a lively debate within NATO about its role in Africa, including its potential for becoming both a model and partner for the AU, following the provision of NATO logistical support to the AU’s operation in Darfur.

Deepening the partnership with the African Union is currently a high priority for the UN. Practical co-operation in the field is widespread, ranging from MINURSO in Western Sahara to Burundi and from Cote d’Ivoire to UNMEE in Ethiopia and Eritrea. The UN Secretariat has also actively supported the enhancement of AU

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45 Speaking at the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations in March 2004
46 For example, David Gompert makes the case for a strong AU-NATO partnership in ‘For a Capability to Protect: Mass Killing, the African Union and NATO’. Survival, Vol. 48, No. 1, Spring 2006 pp. 7–18.
peacekeeping through training of African military and police personnel, evaluation of AU needs and support to the development of AU planning and management capacities. This includes the establishment of an AU Situation Centre and the UN Assistance Cell set up in AU Headquarters in October 2004, to give planning support to the AU mission in Darfur. The current ambition is to develop a more strategic approach to building AU capacity for peacekeeping, involving, *inter alia*, staff exchanges and secondments and the build up of a dedicated capacity within DPKO to plan and coordinate support in the areas of logistics, training, doctrine, and planning, and coordinate action with other partners (including the EU and NATO)\(^{47a}\) in relation to building AU capacity.

There is no one-size-fits-all approach to developing UN partnerships with regional organisations. With regard to peacekeeping in Africa, the UN’s strategic ambition is to ensure that EU capacity promotes supportive and complementary action, especially in areas in which the UN lacks capacity i.e. rapid deployment. On the other hand, the drive to build capacity in AROs is essential given the ‘Africa gap’ that UN peacekeeping suffers from and the peacekeeping needs of the continent. An in depth and ongoing evaluation of how inter-institutional coordination and partnerships are working in practice will be important for enhancing future cooperation.

### 3. Trends in EU engagement in Africa\(^ {47b}\)

This section describes the capabilities, commitments and capacity of the EU’s military and civilian response to crises in Africa, as well as its current shortfalls and limitations. It argues that in the face of a number of key constraints, notably a ‘capacities gap’ and ‘strategic deficit’, the EU has some way to go before it is able to reach its potential to directly support peacekeeping and civilian crisis management in Africa in a coherent and comprehensive manner. In this context, drawing on the leadership and resources of member states, EU missions are likely to remain limited in scope and duration and EU efforts will remain focused on cooperating with and supporting other international and regional actors, while pursuing a policy of support to African capacities in crisis management.

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\(^{47a}\) The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (December 2004) mentions explicitly the use of NATO to help train and equip regional organisations, including the AU.

\(^{47b}\) The chapter was finalized prior to the deployment of the EUFOR RD Congo operation. The force is composed of 2100 soldiers from 21 countries, with a mission to support the UN’s MONUC operation.
3.1 EU peacekeeping in Africa – ambitions vs. capacities
The past 5 years have seen the emergence of an EU military crisis management and peacekeeping capability via the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) outlined in box 3.1. The ESDP was, to an extent, born out of the need for an autonomous European capacity to respond to crises and conflict in the Balkans. However, the policy framework and strategic ambitions of both the ESDP and the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) reveal that Africa has also become a key priority area for EU peacekeeping interventions and capacity building.

Box 3.1 ESDP development, structures and headline goals
The central aim of the ESDP is to complete and strengthen the EU's external ability to contribute to crisis management via the development of civilian and military capabilities. It was born out of the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) which enhanced the provisions of the existing Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to contribute to the progressive formation of a common Defence policy. The Treaty incorporated the “Petersberg Tasks” of the Western European Union – humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping missions and crisis management tasks including peace enforcing.

In 1999, following the Kosovo conflict, the “Petersberg Tasks” were placed at the core of the ESDP. The Cologne European Council of June 1999 declared that the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces, in order to respond to crises, without prejudice to actions by NATO, and in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter.

The Helsinki European Council of December 1999 introduced the Helsinki Headline Goal for a European Rapid Reaction Force in which member states agreed that, cooperating voluntarily in EU led operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days, and sustain for at least 1 year, military forces of up to 60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks. It also laid the foundation for the development of a civilian crisis management capacity, and its concepts and procedures.

These commitments have been accompanied by the development of decision making structures in Brussels to enable autonomous decision making in crisis situations and have been backed up by a capabilities process and Capabilities Action Plan (launched in November 2001) in order to facilitate Member State military contributions, address shortfalls and rationalise their respective defence efforts. Inter-institutional cooperation has been developed with NATO and in 2002–2003 “Berlin Plus” arrangements were agreed which provides a framework within which NATO’s planning capacity and some pre-defined assets [military infrastructure] are at the EU’s disposal.

In 2004 a new Headline Goal 2010 was agreed to reflect the new European Security Strategy of 2003. It builds on the Helsinki Headline goal and capabilities process and involves being able to respond, by 2010 rapidly and decisively across the entire spectrum of crisis response operations (Petersberg Tasks). It includes the ability of the EU to deploy force packages at high readiness based on a battle group concept. With the battle groups the EU will be able to undertake autonomous rapid response operations either for stand-alone operations or for the initial phases of larger operations.

An EU civilian and military cell is being developed which will assist in coordinating civilian operations and has the responsibility for generating the capacity to plan and run an autonomous EU military operation.
Commitments towards supporting crisis management in Africa are outlined in a number of important EU policy statements:

- The *Council Common Position of 2004 concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution* in Africa states that the EU will strengthen African peace support capabilities and also continue to consider deploying its own operational means for conflict prevention and crisis management within the scope of capabilities developed under the EU crisis management capabilities.\(^\text{48}\)
- The *Action Plan for ESDP support for Peace and Security in Africa*\(^\text{49}\) produced by the Political and Security Committee of the Council in 2004. The Action Plan focuses mainly on the enhancement of African peace support capabilities. However, it also states that ESDP support to peace and security in Africa could include training, provision of equipment, operation support and even ESDP advisory or executive missions in the framework of African-led operations or UN peacekeeping operations.
- The *EU-Africa Strategy*\(^\text{50}\) agreed by the Council in 2005 in which the EU states commit to provide direct support to African Union (AU), sub-regional or UN efforts to promote peace and stability through, inter-alia, ESDP activities, and military and civilian crisis management missions, including the potential deployment of EU battle groups.
- The EU is committed to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security. The Generic Standards of Behaviour for ESDP operations adopted in May 2005 encourage work towards the implementation of this resolution.

This growing emphasis on Africa can be attributed to the EU’s perspective that peace and stability in Africa are essential for European security. Many of the key security threats outlined in the European Security Strategy (ESS),\(^\text{51}\) such as regional conflicts, state failure, terrorism and organised crime, are present in Africa. Crises and conflict also undermine EU’s objectives towards the continent regarding poverty reduction and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals – in themselves important ingredients for peace and security. Subsequently two of the four EU ESDP military crisis response operations to date have been deployed in Africa – Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo and AMIS II in Darfur, Sudan. These are summarised in figure 3.1.

\(^{48}\) See Council Common Position 2004/85/CFSP.


\(^{50}\) See The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership 15702/1/05 REV 1.

Nonetheless, the EU’s role and capacities for military crisis management operations in Africa and elsewhere tend to be overstated – a reflection of the importance of ESDP for the EU project as a whole. In reality there is a mismatch between the EU’s policy ambitions and its true capabilities and political will – described by many as the ‘capabilities’ or ‘ambitions’ gap. Deploying a rapid reaction force of 60,000 troops (an objective of the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal described in Box 3.1 above) and sustaining them remains a problem for the EU, and the opportunities for slippage with attaining the 2010 Headline Goal are considerable. The EU is particularly weak in the areas of airlift, interoperability and intelligence and will continue to rely on NATO assets for anything but the most limited missions. These capacity constraints are compounded by a lack of political will on the part of EU member states to risk deploying large numbers of military personnel onto African soil. For example, EU member states only provide 2% of the troops for UN operations in Africa.\(^{52}\)

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It is for these reasons that the two ESDP military missions in Africa: Amis and Artemis, have been limited in scope and nature. Operation Artemis was an EU led operation launched in June 2003, in response to a call from the UN Secretary General for an interim emergency multinational force to stabilise the situation in Bunia in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). As the first ‘autonomous’ ESDP military operation, and the first to be deployed outside Europe, it was an important test for the ESDP. It succeeded largely because of its limited mandate as an interim force (pending a reinforced UN presence); its short duration (3 months); its limited geographical coverage (Bunia town); and significantly, the provision of command and control and military personnel by a large EU member state, France, acting as a Framework Nation under the auspices of the EU.

On a positive note, Artemis demonstrated that, if member states are willing, the EU has the capacity to respond quickly to a crisis situation in Africa – troops were deployed on the ground within seven days of a decision by the EU’s Political and Security Council. Yet it also revealed military weaknesses and operational constraints, including inadequate strategic lift capabilities and poor communications between headquarters and staff. Moreover, no strategic reserve was put in place for the extension of the engagement, or to cope with an unforeseen deterioration of the situation - which fortunately did not transpire.

AMIS II is an EU operation in support of the AU’s mission in Darfur. Unlike Artemis it has not required rapid troop deployment. However, like Artemis, the EU’s engagement in Darfur has been inadequate in relation to the task at hand and has revealed the limitations of EU practical support to the AU. Due to capacity constraints and the political difficulties of providing a large scale troop presence, the EU has focused on building the capacity of the AU mission through indirect means (finance and technical assistance) using the EU’s Africa Peace Facility (see below), rather than providing the large-scale military presence desperately needed. Where military capabilities have been provided they have been restricted to strategic support in areas such as equipment, assets and transportation and in coordination with NATO assets, revealing the challenges of such cooperation. Deciding who should do what between the EU and NATO was a complex political process and no agreement on a joint chain of command or common planning centre could be reached. The result was that the NATO and EU efforts have been planned and implemented separately with two separate chains of command, duplicating effort and risking efficiency. The EU Council has

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53 The EU Framework Nation concept was endorsed in 2002.
recently approved the concept of sending troops to support the UN MONUC force during the forthcoming elections in the DRC in response to a request by the UN. Led by Germany, this will involve a limited advance deployment of 400–450 support personnel (logistics and headquarters) and an ‘over the horizon’ battalion sized force (800) of largely French and German troops; it will be available as an on call unit stationed outside the DRC, to be used should the security situation deteriorate. The EU’s commitment is therefore limited but will be important in terms of providing standby capacity.

Given this ‘capability’ gap, the political importance of the ESDP project for EU integration, and the concomitant need to chalk up ‘successes’, future direct EU military crisis management efforts in Africa are likely to continue to be limited in mandate, scope and duration. Large EU member states will remain central to European efforts in peacekeeping in Africa, leading military missions in African countries where they have particular interests, be they strategic or historical (as was the case with the UK’s military involvement in Sierra Leone and the French military involvement in Cote D’Ivoire) and providing financing and equipment to UN and AU led peacekeeping operations. The extent to which member states act within the ESDP framework will to an extent depend on a convergence of interests and the nature of requests for assistance.

3.2 The EU as an effective player in civilian crisis management – its potential and limitations

Alongside its commitments in military crisis management, the EU has both the ambition and the potential to be an active player in civilian crisis management in Africa. The EU-Africa Strategy explicitly commits the EU to providing support to UN and ARO efforts to promote peace and stability through civilian crisis management missions, DDR and Security Sector Reform (SSR) programmes. Through political engagement via the CFSP, ESDP civilian capabilities (see box 3.1), and Community Instruments (see Fig. 3.1), the EU has the potential to contribute in a wide range of areas, including direct support for policing, rule of law, DDR and SSR.
Box 3.1 ESDP Civilian Crisis Management capabilities

Recognising that in practice managing crises requires a combination of civilian and military instruments, the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 laid the foundation for the development of a civilian crisis management capability (concepts and procedures) within the framework of the ESDP. At the Feira European Council in 2000 targets were set for the deployment of civilian personnel in four areas: police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection. These were met by 2003. The Capabilities Commitment Conference in 2004 showed a new commitment to have experts in the field of human rights, political affairs, gender and Security Sector Reform in support of EU Special Representatives.

A Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (CHG 2008) was endorsed at the December 2004 European Council setting out its ambition and tasks and calling for the development of capacities to enable the EU: to deploy integrated civilian crisis management packages in response to needs; to conduct concurrent civilian missions at different levels of engagement; to deploy at short notice (within 30 days of the decision to launch); to work with the military; to promote coherence of EU action and a smooth transition from ESDP operations to follow-on long-term EC programmes; and to respond to requests from other international organisations, notably the UN.

In June 2005, modalities were outlined for setting-up rapidly deployable multifunctional Civilian Response Teams (CRTs) drawn from a pool of experts from Member States and varying according to need. These should be able to be mobilised and deployed within 5 days of a request from the Council.

In 2005 the EU demonstrated this commitment by sending three civilian ESDP missions to Africa comprising a policing mission to the DRC and Sudan and a security sector reform mission to the DRC, described in more detail in figure 3.2 below.
**ESDP CIVIL OPERATIONS IN AFRICA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type and size</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL Kinshasa</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Police 30 personnel</td>
<td>Response to an invitation of the DRC government. First civil mission for crisis management in Africa within the ESDP framework. 30 personnel. The objective of the mission is to provide monitoring, mentoring and advice to the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) under the Congolese line of command and to ensure that the actions of the IPU are in line with international police best practices. The establishment of the IPU was provided for under the Global and All-Inclusive Accord (‘Pretoria Agreement’) of 2002. It operates within the framework of the civilian policing component of UN MONUC–CIVPOL, responsible for coordinating police reform initiatives in DRC undertaken by different countries. As such it also operates within the framework of UN-EU co-operation in crisis management envisaged in the Joint Declaration on UN/EU Co-operation in Crisis Management (24/9/2003). It is one component of an EU inter-pillar operation to establish the IPU. The European Commission is providing support to the IPU in the form of training and provision of equipment and refurbishment of a training centre via the EDF and with in-kind contributions from EU member states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSEC-R.D. Congo</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Security Reform 8 seconded experts</td>
<td>On request of the DRC Government. 8 experts seconded by EU Member States and EU institutions. Provides advice and assistance for security sector reform in the DRC with the aim of contributing to a successful integration of the Congolese army. In the framework of the mission, experts are assigned inter-alia to a number of key posts within the Congolese administration including: the private office of the Minister for Defense, the combined general staff, including the integrated military structure (IMS), the army general staff, the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (CONADER), the Joint Operational Committee. EUSEC-R.D. Congo and EUPOL Kinshasa are part of a broader EU (pillar 1 and 2) response to the crisis in DRC financed through different instruments and include; the appointment of an EU special Representative for the Great Lakes, the military operation Artemis, support to the electoral process, justice sector reform, rehabilitation and DDR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIS II E CIVPOL</td>
<td>Darfur</td>
<td>Police 16 EU police officers</td>
<td>On request of the AU and part of an EU ‘consolidated package’ in support of the CIVPOL (civilian police) component of AMIS II, the AU’s proactive ceasefire monitoring mission in Darfur. Involves: support for the AMIS CIVPOL chain of command through the deployment of 16 EU police officers; support for the training of CIVPOL personnel; EU support to the development of a police unit within the secretariat of the AU in order to develop its longer-term capacity to plan and conduct police operations. The consolidated package is part of a broader EU (pillar 1 and 2) response to the crisis in Darfur financed through different instruments, including the Africa Peace Facility. Actions have included support for humanitarian assistance, support of the political process, diplomatic involvement (appointment of an EU special representative), as well as contributions to AMIS.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: **Bold** indicates elements of cooperation or integration with other activities (European Community, UN or AU)
ESDP capabilities are complemented by the European Community instruments, which allow the EU to link a wide range of both short term and longer-term sustainable civilian crisis management activities in Africa. Described in figure 3.3 below, these range from rapidly deployable interventions to respond to an immediate crisis, including humanitarian assistance, support to political and diplomatic initiatives and DDR; to more sustainable and financially significant interventions designed to foster stability during periods of transition, such as security and justice sector reform. Unlike ESDP, Community interventions are generally implemented through other partner organisations, notably the UN and NGOs, or through the state itself. This brings a number of benefits as indirect assistance is well positioned to foster multilateralism, build the capacity of state and non-state actors and promote civil society support for reform processes. However, these actions are relatively invisible and as such are arguably less effective at generating political pressure for top-down reform.

**Figure 3.3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Possible actions and examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian Aid</strong>&lt;br&gt;Managed by ECHO (European Community Humanitarian Office)</td>
<td>Short-term - emergency relief, humanitarian de-mining, emergency rehabilitation and reconstruction, civil protection.&lt;br&gt;Longer-term - disaster preparedness, services to refugee populations.&lt;br&gt;Used throughout Africa to respond to disasters and crisis related humanitarian emergencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil Protection</strong>&lt;br&gt;Managed by Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit in DG External Relations</td>
<td>Supports and facilitates European civil protection assistance in the event of major disasters.&lt;br&gt;Not widely used in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM)</strong>&lt;br&gt;Managed by Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit in DG External Relations</td>
<td>Short-term – technical assessment and fact finding missions, 6 month projects in field, such as: mediation, arbitration, reconciliation; rule of law and civilian administration; rehabilitation and reconstruction; civil society development; high level policy advice; demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration.&lt;br&gt;Longer-term – can finance the first phase of longer-term relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes.&lt;br&gt;Examples: DRC (2004), support to the establishment of the Integrated Police Unit in Kinshasa; Sudan (2004), support to peace process; Liberia (2003), ECOWAS monitoring.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHIR)</strong>&lt;br&gt;Managed by EuropeAid Cooperation Office</td>
<td>Short-term – Human rights monitoring and observer missions; support for elections; conciliation; support to international criminal tribunals; rehabilitation of victims of torture; promotion of the rule of law; independent media.&lt;br&gt;Longer-term – Promotion of human rights, support for minorities, ethnic groups and indigenous peoples, promotion of international humanitarian law.&lt;br&gt;Examples: Rwanda (2003), EU election observation mission; Sierra Leone (2003), support for Special Court for Sierra Leone – Victims, Justice and Legacy project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rehabilitation and Reconstruction</strong>&lt;br&gt;Managed by EuropeAid</td>
<td>Short-term – Rehabilitation of basic infrastructure: mine clearance; social reintegration of refugees, displaced persons; demobilisation and reintegration.&lt;br&gt;Longer term – Re-launch of production, restoration of institutional capacities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The added value of the EU in civilian crisis management lies in its potential to coordinate and integrate this broad range of instruments, alongside a continuity provided by the EU development programmes and widespread presence in African countries. The EU has, for example, used a combination of different instruments in the DRC to provide short and longer-term assistance to security and justice sector reform. Nonetheless, this is an ideal rather than the norm. Too often Community, ESDP and CFSP civilian instruments are inadequately coordinated, creating inefficiency and incoherence in EU action. A situation not only caused by the division of labour and responsibility in the EU between the Community instruments and ESDP/CFSP, but by a tension between the Council and Commission over the dividing line between their different areas of competence. This tension was highlighted by a recent European Court of Justice action that was taken by the Commission against the Council’s support to ECOWAS’ actions in the area of small arms and light weapons.55

There is also a gap between the civilian ESDP capabilities declared by the member states and the availability and quality of those means, and a limited capacity in the Council to manage civilian missions – a weakness that will hopefully be addressed in the context of the Headline Goal 2008. Furthermore, many Community instruments are proving insufficiently agile or well coordinated to respond to rapidly changing needs in the context of crisis or post-crisis situations. Implementing partners working in African crises are hampered by complex and inflexible administrative procedures and delays in receiving funds. Furthermore the potential to link short-term with

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food aid and Food security</th>
<th><strong>Short-term</strong> – Provision of foodstuffs, supply of seeds, fertiliser, tools etc., drinking water. <strong>Longer term</strong> – creation of food reserves, rural credit, early warning systems etc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mine Action</strong></td>
<td><strong>Short term</strong> – survey and marking of minefields, detection and clearance, destruction of stockpiles, mine awareness. <strong>Longer-term</strong> – training of specialist personnel. Example: Eritrea (2004), support to the UNDP Mine Action Capacity Building Programme in Eritrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>European Development Fund (EDF)</strong></td>
<td>Provides an integrated framework for funding development and security activities including inter alia; support for mediation, negotiation and reconciliation efforts, management of scarce resources, DDR, SSR, actions to control SALW, support to elections, support to justice sector reform. <strong>Support to African Peace Facility</strong> <strong>Example: Northern Uganda, Rehabilitation Programme</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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55 The European Commission is asserting that the European Council’s support for ECOWAS is an infringement of the European Commission’s competencies in the field of development aid.
long-term Community interventions is often undermined by a poor handover between the large number of different instruments, this is exacerbated by institutional and procedural divisions.

The EU’s handling of civilian crisis management operations may be improved by the radical rationalisation of the current Community funding instruments that will take place from 2007 under the new Financial Perspective 2007–2013. The current unwieldy range of geographical and thematic external funding instruments will be replaced with only six, four of them new. The proposed Instrument for Stability, although more limited in relation to crisis management than initially hoped, may provide a more flexible and effective Community instrument for crisis response and provide an improved basis for synergies between community, bi-lateral and ESDP instruments. Unfortunately, it is unlikely to resolve the contest between the Council and the Commission over the division between Community action and CFSP – a dispute that is at odds with the policy trend towards seeing development and security as following a single agenda.

3.3 Challenges to an integrated approach to EU action

By drawing on both its military and civilian crisis management capabilities described above, the EU should be able to provide a coherent and strategically driven response to a crisis situation in Africa. Unfortunately this is seldom the case as the EU suffers from a ‘strategic deficit’ or lack of overall vision in its responses. This is exacerbated by the split between the different Community and CFSP/ESDP frameworks and separation of decision-making structures between the Commission and Council.

The EU does recognise the need to address this shortfall and structural changes proposed in the new EU Constitutional text, including the introduction of a Foreign Minister and External Action Service, provide for more strategic level coherence. Over the shorter term, the ESS calls for greater coherence and points to the need for the EU to “act together” and “bring together the different instruments and capabilities” in response to crises. Subsequently, the military planning structures now include a civil-military planning cell that is intended to ensure that ESDP operations are planned with input from relevant civilian experts, including some from the Commission. Where there is clearly a development and security angle to EU activity, the EU now attempts to develop parallel and complementary strategic policies for the Council under ESDP and the Commission respectively. An example of this approach can be found in the new EU Security Sector Reform Concept and the forthcoming Commission Communication on Security Sector Reform. Nevertheless, EU action whether Council or Commission led remains at best relatively fragmented and ad hoc, and at worst, competitive and contradictory. This is exemplified by recent contradictory attempts by the Commission and Council to support ECOWAS’s conflict prevention capacity.
3.4 EU support to UN and AU peacekeeping activities
   – limitations and approaches
In the context of these challenges, the EU is placing emphasis on cooperation with other international and regional organisations, and support to African capacities in crisis management. This fits well with the EU’s clear commitment to multilateralism, elaborated on in more recent EU policy statements and is demonstrated by its tangible support to the UN and the AU capacities and missions in Africa, via operations Artemis and AMIS. Indeed, a commitment to the primacy of the UN in the field of peace and security is one of the foundation stones of the ESDP. The “Presidency Conclusions” of the Helsinki Summit of 1999 state that, “The Union will contribute to peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter”. Subsequently the EU has been providing a financial contribution to the UN and is taking steps to improve more general cooperation in the hope that mutual knowledge and confidence between the two organisations will improve, notably by promoting better communication between EU and UN staff and by instituting joint planning and training processes (see section 2.5 above).

Direct support to peacekeeping missions
There are structural limitations to the EU directly reinforcing UN or AU peacekeeping missions in Africa. Under the strict requirements of ESDP decision-making autonomy, the EU cannot place military assets under AU or UN command. Nevertheless, recognising the UN and ARO capacity shortfalls and challenges of rapid deployment, the EU considers itself well-positioned to act as a partner for bridging operations (building on the experience of Operation Artemis) whereby it complements, while not being integrated into, UN or AU-run missions. The “bridging model” of support aims to provide the UN or AU with time to mount a new operation or reorganise existing ones. In such scenarios the EU’s modular planning, rapid response capability and the battle group concept bring a particular added value. The EU also considers that it could provide surge or “stand by” capacity within the framework of the UN Stand-by Arrangements System. This system is based on conditional commitments of specified resources (including troops) within the agreed response times for UN peacekeeping operations. However, predictable modalities for operational cooperation have yet to be elaborated.

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Indirect support to the AU – the Africa Peace Facility

Given these constraints, the EU is placing emphasis on building its capacity for indirect support to peacekeeping in Africa – concentrating on the provision of financial and capacity building support to peace support operations capabilities of the Africa Union and other AROs. This approach fits well with the EU’s emphasis on African ownership, and is a cornerstone of the EU-Africa Strategy and the EDSP Action Plan for Africa. Indeed, the EU considers the AU to be the central organisation for peace, security and regional integration on the African continent. The most ambitious support initiative to date is the EU’s African Peace Facility (APF), a commitment in 2004 of 250 million euros from the European Development Fund (EDF) to support African led peace support operations and to enhance the institutional capacities of the African Union and African SROs. Notwithstanding the requirement for a consensus from the member states on each operation funded, the facility demonstrates strong African ownership. It is staffed and implemented by the AU, the initial request for the fund came from the AU Maputo summit of 2003 and any decisions concerning the use of the fund are at the initiative of the AU or regional bodies. By the end of 2005 almost half of the APF has been committed for a total of five operations (see table), with the bulk being used to support the AU’s peacekeeping missions in Darfur (AMIS I and AMIS II).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>African Peace Facility funded operations</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMIS I, Sudan</td>
<td>12 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIS II, Sudan</td>
<td>80 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEMAC (FOMUC I), Central African Republic</td>
<td>3.38 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building for the Africa Union</td>
<td>6 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The APF suits the needs of the AU as it provides coordinated finance to initiate and sustain operations, reducing the need to interact with numerous donors. Nonetheless, it is not without its weaknesses. It cannot directly finance the procurement of military equipment vital for African peacekeeping missions, forcing the AU to rely on other

57 The European Development Fund is a development assistance fund managed within the framework of the EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement – the EU aid and trade agreement with the African, Caribbean and Pacific nations.
donors and increasing its burden of requests and coordination. Moreover, a high degree of EU oversight of expenditures is built in to the facility and disbursement is slow in relation to the needs on the ground. This undermines both flexibility and African ownership. Ultimately, the success of the APF will rest not on its design, but on the ability of the AU and its Peace and Security Council to demonstrate the capacity, political will and unity to use the funds effectively and assume responsibility for crisis management operations – a key issue discussed further in the following section.

With almost half the finance committed and new operations under discussion, the EU is considering options for further “substantial, long-term, flexible, sustainable funding” for the APF – a commitment made in the EU- Africa Strategy. It is as yet unclear what form this funding will take. While an interim agreement allows for continued funding from the EDF, the future source of funding remains subject to review. Ongoing discussions reveal tensions amongst the EU member states over whether the facility should continue to be financed by the EDF and subject to joint EU-AU decision making, or moved to the CFSP budget, revealing different visions of African ownership amongst EU member states. A CFSP option would allow member states to take greater political control of the funds, undermining the principle of African ownership. Despite lengthy debate, efforts to define an efficient but inclusive decision making procedure remain elusive.

While the APF is the most significant EU tool for providing indirect support to African led peace operations, it is not the only one. As stated in its ESDP Action Plan for Africa, the EU has agreed to: provide technical advice to the AROs on concepts under development and on the development of planning and management capabilities; appoint EU military and civilian liaison officers to the AROs; and, to providing training courses.

4. The capacity and roles of African regional organisations

This section explores the emerging role and capacities of Africa regional organisations in crisis management and the role of international organisations and donors in supporting these capacities. It considers the key challenges of coordinating international support as well as ensuring internal cooperation and harmonisation between the different African regional activities and crisis management mechanisms. The conclusion is that AROs are a long way from being able to assume full responsibility for crisis management on the continent. This is due to weaknesses in existing regional capabilities,

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political impediments to effective action, and the challenges of external capacity building support. Consequently while the rhetoric and policies of international actors, including the G8 and EU, uphold AROs as the lead organisations in promoting peace and security on the continent, the role of international actors will remain as important as ever and they will continue to be significantly engaged for the foreseeable future.

4.1 The increasing role of African regional organisations
Over the past five years, regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa, in particular the AU, have increased their role in crisis management on the continent. In 2004 eight African organisations were involved in a total of 24 missions, with the Africa Union (AU) responsible for over half of these. Figure 4.1 outlines the current African led peace support missions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>African organisation</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Union</td>
<td>African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) 2003-2004</td>
<td>To oversee implementation of ceasefire agreement; support to DDR. Composed of civilian and military component. Military strength of up to 3335. Observer element 43. Mission ended when responsibility for peace operations was handed over to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Union</td>
<td>AMIS and AMIS II 2004 - ongoing Darfur, Sudan</td>
<td>In response to the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement – to assist the parties to reach a political settlement. AMIS was an observer mission with up to 80 AU military observers and 300 military observer protectors. AMIS II comprises a strengthened presence including up to 2300 military personnel, 450 observers and 815 civilian police personnel. Mandate extended to contributing to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD Inter Governmental Authority on Development Horn of Africa</td>
<td>Verification Monitoring Team Sudan 2003</td>
<td>Contribution to the Verification Monitoring Team in Sudan, monitoring the ceasefire between the SPLM/A and Government of Sudan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This enhanced engagement has been accompanied by developments in the institutional and decision-making capacity and mandates of African regional and sub-regional organisations outlined in figure 4.2. The most notable is the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU in May 2004, following its creation by a Protocol adopted in 2002 and ratified in December 2003. African foreign affairs ministers elect the 15 countries that serve on the Council. In conjunction with the chairperson of the AU’s Commission, the PSC has a range of powers, including the authorisation, mounting and deployment of peace support missions. The combination of the Peace and Security Protocol, a Common African Defence and Security Policy agreed in 2004 and the various conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanisms of the sub-regional African organisations amount to what can be described as an African peace and security architecture. These decision making capacities are intended to be supported by an African Standby Force, composed of a brigade on standby for peace keeping duties in each of Africa’s five regions (as defined by the AU), as well as a complement of observers, military police and civilian personnel on standby at the continental level. Ideally the force would be deployed under mandate from the UN, but the PSC can authorise the deployment of peacekeepers as a regional organisation in terms of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

Figure 4.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution</th>
<th>Structures and capacities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| AU (African Union)            | Continental peace and security architecture comprising:    | The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU is the key decision making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict.
| The successor to the Organisation of African Unity, was created by Constitutive Act in 2000 | The Peace and Security Protocol (2002) | Other structures of the Council, all at an early stage of development, include a Panel of the Wise (five eminent African personalities) to engage in conflict prevention diplomacy, a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and an African Standby Force of peace keepers. There is a Peace Fund, inherited from the OAU, comprising 6% of the AUs annual budget, a meagre US$2 million |
|                               | Sub-regional organisations’ CPMR mechanisms                  | The PSC is supported by the Commission of the AU - Peace and Security Department. The core function of the department is the maintenance of peace, security and stability through the co-ordination and promotion of African and other initiatives within the context of the UN. The PSC is also supported by a Military Staff Committee which advises and assists in all questions relating to military and security requirements for the promotion and maintenance of Peace and Security in Africa. |
| **ECOWAS**  
| **(Economic Community of West African States)** | **Protocol for the Establishment of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peace and Security (1999)** | **The Authority. The highest decision-making body of the Mechanism which has delegated powers to:**  
| | | **The Mediation and Security Council. Serves as the equivalent to the UN Security Council at the sub-regional level and can authorise all forms of intervention, including the decision to employ political and military missions.**  
| | | **The Executive Secretary. Has the power to initiate fact-finding, mediation, facilitation, negotiations in the effective prevention and management of conflicts.**  
| | | **The Defence and Security Commission. Comprises Chiefs of Defence Staff of ECOWAS. Assists the Mediation and Security Council.**  
| | | **Council of Elders. A group of eminent personalities who engage in preventative diplomacy in the region.**  
| | | **Early Warning Observation and Monitoring System. Conflict early warning system.**  
| | | **ECOMOG. A multilateral armed force established by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). ECOMOG is not a standing army, but a formal arrangement for separate armies to work together, along similar lines to NATO. Its backbone is Nigerian armed forces and financial resources, with sub-battalion strength units contributed by other ECOWAS members.**  
| **IGAD**  
| **(Intergovernmental Authority on Development)** | **Horn of Africa** | **1996 Agreement establishing IGAD includes objective to “promote peace and stability in region”**  
| | | **Programme on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution**  
| | | **Ongoing development of IGAD Strategy on Peace and Security**  
| | | **Peace and Security Division of the IGAD secretariat**  
| | | **Coordination of the East African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG)**  
| | | **CEWARN. Regional Conflict Early Warning Network**  
| **EAC**  
| **(East African Community)** | **East Africa** | **Memorandum of Understanding in Cooperation in Defence 1998, revised 2001.**  
| | | **Sectoral Committee on Cooperation in Defence and inter-state security committee**  
| | | **Defence Expert’s Working Group on Operations and Training**  
| **SADC**  
| **(South African Development Community)** | **Organ on Defence, Politics and Security (2001)** | **Inter-State Defence and Security Committee with three sub-committees on Defence, public security (coordination of public security activities), state security (reviewing security situation, including armed conflict, refugees and consolidating cooperation between member states)**  
| | | **Plans to create a sustainable brigade size peace keeping force are being discussed within the framework of the African Standby Force**  
| **COMESA**  
| **(Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa)** | **The COMESA Programme for Peace and Security (1999). It is established under Article 3(d) of the COMESA Treaty** | **The Authority is the supreme policy making organ of COMESA and makes decisions on the basis of recommendations from the Committee on Peace and Security and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs**  
| | | **Ministers of Foreign Affairs from the region meet at least once every year to consider modalities for promoting peace, security and stability in the region.**
Notwithstanding these developments, the capacity of African organisations remains limited in relation to the task, and it remains to be seen whether the ambitious goals these organisations have set themselves will be attained and whether member states back commitments with action and resources. Currently, financial limitations feature alongside logistical constraints, with organisations only able to launch small observer missions without recourse to external assistance. Very few organisations can deploy or sustain missions using national assets, and staffing, management and mission planning remains a key challenge, undermining the speed and effectiveness of any response. The high rate of HIV infection amongst African troops threatens to erode this capacity further. Moreover, the subsequent reliance of African organisations on external funding and support places an additional burden on already overstretched capacities because requests for funds from donors consumes time and personnel – a problem exacerbated by the often poor coordination of donor support.

However, the success of AROs in crisis management does not only rest on their capacity. It also depends on their credibility and respectability as actors, particularly with regard to their neutrality, and respect for human rights and gender related issues. The AU has certainly proved itself more credible than its predecessor, the OAU. For example making progress on important issues such as governance, through the institution of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)\(^59\) and gender, via commitments to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security.\(^60\) Significantly, it has also shown itself willing to revoke the presidency of one of its larger member states, Sudan, on the grounds of its poor human rights record. However, weaknesses remain. Reports of human rights abuses, including sexual exploitation by South African peacekeeping troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo, have raised concerns regarding African troop standards.\(^61\) Additionally, gender imbalances remain a feature of AU led forces. In AMIS for example, as of April 2005, of a total of 454 Military Observers, only two were women and, as of August 2005, only 126 out of 816 civilian police were women.\(^62\) Furthermore, a tendency to bring stakeholders into African regional operations has undermined their perceived neutrality. The IGAD led mission to Somalia (IGASOM) has received criticism from

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\(^{59}\) The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is a mechanism voluntarily acceded to by AU member states to ensure that the policies and practices of participating states conform to the agreed political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and standards contained in the AU Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance.

\(^{60}\) See Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa, Assembly of the African Union, 6–8 July, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.


Somali factions for its inclusions of troops from neighbouring countries who are not viewed as being neutral. If their credibility is to be upheld, more will need to be done to ensure that regional crisis management mechanisms provide rigorous enough checks and balances on member state actions and uphold the role of women in peacekeeping.

4.2 Inter-institutional cooperation with African regional organisations

Recognising these shortcomings and keen to uphold AROs as the lead organisations in promoting peace and security on the continent, donors are providing external capacity building support to, and building linkages with, AROs in the field of crisis management. The key capacity building activities and inter-institutional cooperation arrangements between the AU and major security and development actors, such as the UN and EU are outlined in figure 4.3 below. Perhaps the most prominent of these are the G8 Africa Action Plan, which aims to enhance capacity for peace support operations, and the EU’s Africa Peace Facility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution/ Donor</th>
<th>Commitments and cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G8 Countries</td>
<td>G8 Africa Action Plan 2002. Commitments to provide technical and financial assistance for conflict prevention, resolution and peace support. Joint Africa/G8 plan to enhance African capabilities to undertake peace support operations (2003). Outlines building blocks, aimed at supporting on the AU’s peace and security protocol, necessary to enhance African capabilities. These include establishment, equipping and training by 2010 of African standby brigades. Includes commitments to improved donor coordination. Ongoing commitments to implement these plans at subsequent summits, including Gleneagles, in 2005. In line with these commitments the US, France, Canada, Germany and the UK have provided bilateral assistance to train and equip African peace support operations units and to develop the capacity of African organisations to establish, manage and sustain peace support operations. Includes the development of regional peace training centres.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>AU has observer status at the UN. Neither AU nor ECOWAS are restricted by UN authorisation, although they tend to seek it. Support to the development and implementation of a 10 year plan with the AU.53 DPKO support program on African capacity building. Includes provision of consultants to AU on African Standby Force. Support to ‘hybrid’ peace support operations where African organisations have played a lead role in advance of and then in concert with UN and individual nations. E.g. the UN has replaced African-led peace operations in three countries: Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Burundi.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Whilst important for supporting African regional capacities, this inter-institutional cooperation is not without its difficulties and there are many impediments to effective cooperation in practice. Competing external efforts to provide capacity building support often lack coordination, are incoherent or overlapping and, as highlighted above, place administrative burdens on the regional organisations. In line with the recommendations of the Joint Africa/G8 plan to enhance African capabilities to undertake peace support operations, in April 2005 a consultation meeting took place between the AU, the G8 members, other partners, and the African peace and security institutions. The purpose of the meeting was to consider the issue of coordination. The possibility of establishing a separate AU Peace Support Operation Fund to compliment the EU’s African Peace Facility was mooted as a step toward reducing the transaction costs of inter-institutional cooperation and support. However, as yet no framework exists that outlines an agreed division of responsibility and means of coordination between bi-lateral, multi-lateral actors and AROs in the area of crisis management. If external actors are to succeed in their efforts to build the capacities of AROs, clearer roles and areas of responsibility need to be defined.

4.3 Cooperation between African regional organisations

Effective harmonisation and close cooperation between the efforts and mechanisms of the AROs (regional mechanisms) is vital to their success in crisis management and to the development of an African peace and security architecture. However, sub-regional organisations face overlapping memberships, mandates and strategies. Mechanisms are being developed to address this issue and Article 16 of the AU’s Peace and Security Protocol has detailed provisions on the way and manner in which the relationship between the regional mechanisms and the PSC of the AU can be structured. It articulates a basic vision in which the regional mechanisms are regarded as part of the “overall security structure” of the AU, and the PSC is given responsibility for harmonisation and coordination of activities and the development of effective partnerships. In order to do this, the AU and regional organisations have committed themselves to ensuring
communications exchange by meeting once a year, involving regional organisations in discussions of the PSC where issues of particular interest are discussed, and by the establishment of liaison offices within the regional organisations and AU. Most significantly, a Memorandum of Understanding between the AU Commission and the regional mechanisms of conflict prevention, management and resolution is being drawn up. This is due to be agreed to in 2006. It remains to be seen how successful these efforts at cooperation will be in practice.

5. Conclusion: Issues, priorities and recommendations

5.1 Recognise the limits of African responses
Even with the emergence of an African peace and security architecture and African led peace operations, AROs are a long way from assuming responsibility for conflict prevention and crisis management on the continent. The policies of international actors seek to uphold AROs as the leaders in responding to crises. However, in reality, the leadership and capacities of the UN, EU and other actors will remain key to peace and security in Africa for some years to come. Indeed many UN and African officials note that in the future, implementing fragile peace agreements in Africa will require more support from rich countries and from the UN system.

5.2 Enhance the capacity of the UN
The UN appears to be accepting its leading role in crisis management as well as the limitations of AROs. During 2003/04 the UN Security Council authorised missions to replace African-led peace operations in three countries: Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, and Burundi. It is currently considering replacing operation AMIS in Sudan. However, the UN and its member states urgently need to consider how they will meet the challenge of this increased level of engagement and the broader scope and complexity of missions. The UN needs to be better resourced, both in terms of finance and troop contributions, and work towards developing more ‘robust’ peacekeeping by addressing issues of capabilities, mandates and doctrine – not least via the development of a reserve capacity and shared doctrinal framework. It needs to reflect on how many peacebuilding tasks it can realistically take on given levels of resources, how it can provide a more reliable basis for peacebuilding funding, and how it can maximise its efforts through an appropriate division of labour and improved coordination between departments. Here the Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding support office may have an important role to play.
5.3 Meet EU policy commitments towards crisis management in Africa

The EU has an important contribution to make in military and civilian responses to crises in Africa. However, as this paper suggests, the realities of its actual capabilities as well as the fragmented nature of its response means that the scope and effectiveness of EU crisis management remains limited. If it is to meet its own policy commitments towards Africa, the EU, under the leadership of its rotating presidencies, will need to address a number of fundamental questions:

- What further steps can be taken to ensure that the various capabilities goals, such as the Headline Goal 2010, are actually met?
- How can political will be garnered for the deployment of larger numbers of EU personnel on African soil?
- How can the EU maximise the potential of its wide-ranging Community instruments to contribute to peace and security and ensure a strategically driven response?
  (Here the EU must address its own internal impediments to coordinated and coherent action, by overcoming internal divisions between Community action and the CFSP/ESDP.)
- How can the EU enhance its cooperation with other actors, in particular the UN and AROs?

5.4 Build the capacity and credibility of African regional organisations

Building the capacity of African regional organisations in crisis management requires actors such as the EU, the UN and individual states to grapple with some key issues. These include how to best coordinate support and define a division of roles and responsibilities in order to reduce the transaction costs on African organisations. How to combine the requirement for internal accountability by organisations such as the EU with promoting African ownership: and, importantly, how to guard against this requirement for accountability becoming a proxy for retaining political control. Lastly, external actors need to support the AU and other organisations to build their credibility as crisis management actors. This could involve technical assistance in promoting gender equality and human rights. It also requires that these issues be routinely raised in political and policy dialogue with African regional organisations.
Bibliography and Further Reading


Chapter 3

Support for DDR and SSR after Conflicts in Africa: Lessons-Learnt and New Agendas in Africa

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Executive Summary

This paper describes and conceptualises the experience in Africa of three key processes that impact upon post-conflict reconstruction: DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration), SALW (small arms and light weapons) and SSR (security sector reform) initiatives. It does this with the objective of distilling lessons-learnt and good practice. It then uses this to put forward key recommendations and findings that may be of significance for the EU Presidency as well as providing information for those with an interest in SSR/SALW and DDR and post-conflict reconstruction in Africa. Key recommendations and prioritisations put forward in the paper are:

*Develop European cross-pillar approaches.* Seek to put forward proposals to develop or take forward what the EU Small Arms Strategy identifies as currently lacking across the EC, a cross pillar approach to the proliferation of SALW and security sector issues.

*Promoting longer-term perspectives.* Consider how Commission policy and frameworks might support longer-term SALW/DDR interventions, as opposed to some short-term interventions currently in place. Prevention might also be accorded more prominence.

*Introducing training/information on DDR and related processes to add to the effectiveness of EU and member state programming.* Research and training on DDR, SSR, and SALW issues and coordination among policymakers and programme officers, in-country and regionally, would be beneficial.

*Improving DDR through engagement in international mechanisms and fora.* Member States and the Commission should seize the opportunity (if not already doing so) to further engage in current international work on improving DDR, such as the recent work done by the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR).

*Pro-poor/human security perspectives.* Drawing upon the recognition that armed violence has strong linkages with poverty/under-development, the Commission and Member States should consider engaging in ensuring that DDR/SALW/SSR programming and policy have a strong pro-poor and human security dimension.

*Addressing root causes of SALW acquisition.* DDR, SALW and SSR initiatives often neglect the motivations for possessing and acquiring weapons. SALW programming undertaken by the Commission and member states might, in particular, be more directly targeted at some of the ‘root causes’ and motivations of armed violence, such as exclusion, poverty and poor governance.

*Strengthen customs and regional SALW non-dissemination.* There is a clear need to assist in strengthening police and customs capabilities in ACP countries to prevent the further proliferation of SALW in areas of tension and vulnerability.

*Support reformed national armies processes.* There is a need to design transitions from DDR to SSR that are connected, seamless, and part of an overall strategy. Too often in Africa, SSR strategies take little account of DDR.
Community-oriented approaches. Community-based, or sensitive, programming is a key area of shortfall in programming, which the Commission and Member States might consider reviewing in terms of improving responses.

Gender orientation. Gender could be an area of focus, particularly in regard to the special difficulties women face in reintegrating into society following their involvement in armed violence as ex-combatants, and in re-establishing their social capital when returning to communities.

Supporting vulnerable groups. Initiatives need to take into account their impact upon the vulnerable, including children in Africa. It is noted that children are a priority group under the Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention.

Linking conflict/security and mainstream development programming. Consider, where appropriate, integrating or linking DDR/SSR into some aspects of mainstream development. Promote a greater dialogue between those with a ‘traditional’ development perspective and those working on conflict and security.

Controlling SALW exports to conflict and post-conflict countries in Africa. If the harmful impacts of SALW on post-conflict reconstruction and development are to be mitigated, EU co-ordinated action might also be further taken forward in terms of brokering, the marking and tracing of SALW, and in transparency in terms of reporting.

Identifying areas of expertise and knowledge pooling. Consider identifying thematic and country-specific areas of intervention in DDR and related processes where Member States can make a difference in Africa, such as in West Africa and the Great Lakes. This could draw, for example, upon the experiences of France, the UK, The Netherlands, and Germany, particularly in DDR and SSR.

Developing linkages across DDR, SSR and SALW initiatives. There are opportunities to take the lead in promoting strategies and approaches that link DDR, SSR and SALW programming more effectively. There is a particular need to create linkages between SSR reform of the police and SALW weapons collection both at the community level and regionally.

Linking DDR/SALW and SSR with SSAJ, peace-building and peace operations. Commission/Member State policy and programming needs to recognise the linkages between these modes of programming. Without access to justice, for example, ex-combatants and civilians are likely to seek to re-engage in grievance-based armed violence. This implies that Commission policy and programmes should seek to link with or include SSAJ and related processes in DDR and SSR.
1. Introduction

DDR and related processes such as SSR and SALW initiatives present a particular challenge in Africa. Over the past few decades Africa has been the most conflict prone continent in the world. It is also the only continent in the world that has grown poorer in the last 25 years.64 It has proved particularly difficult to collect arms, remove former combatants from armed violence, and to bring about a responsible and accountable security sector in this highly insecure environment. By triggering and spreading conflict, SALW are said to have cost the lives of almost 4 million people since 1990 and forced over 18 million people to leave their homes or countries. SALW are thought to be responsible for almost 500,000 deaths a year of which 300,000 occur in armed conflicts.65 Many of these have been in Africa.

Since the ending of the Cold War, the UN and other actors working with African countries have managed to halt a number of civil conflicts in Africa. In Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Eritrea/Ethiopia peace processes have been set in motion and some of these countries have experienced periods of relative stability. However, elsewhere conflicts continue, such as in the DRC, Sudan, and Uganda.

A prime component of many African peace processes has been DDR, SSR and SALW initiatives. These have sought to remove SALW from conflicts, return combatants to civil life (or a reformed military), and to turn the security sector into a responsible and accountable sector that contributes to post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) and development, as well as maintaining security. However, the record of achievement in Africa in these areas has been mixed and sometimes extremely poor. The failed UN and USA DDR and security operations in Somalia in the early-mid 1990s, the protracted Angolan DDR initiatives, and current SALW collection setbacks in the East of the DRC, are indicative of the difficulties involved.

These difficulties across DDR and related initiatives can be attributed to both poor implementation by the international community and local actors, but also to the huge challenge of moving from conflict to peace, and the continuing endemic problems of poverty and poor governance in Africa. In this milieu, armed violence is frequently regarded as having utility in terms of addressing disputes, securing livelihoods, or having a stake in war economies and peace transitions. In particular, DDR and related initiatives have to confront:

64 Despite the wealth of natural resources in many African countries, the continent’s share of world trade fell from 6% in 1980 to less than 2% in 2002.
• The continuing proliferation of SALW across much of Africa, with boundaries providing little barrier to movements and with countries outside Africa maintaining supplies. Many of these arms are used for armed robbery or the re-ignition of armed conflict.
• Large-scale unemployment and poverty for many ex-combatants contributing to armed violence.
• Continuing inter-group, identity, and resource disputes.
• The large numbers of discontented youths in Africa that can be readily recruited for violent ends.
• The lack of effective regional organisations to underpin security, weapons collection, peace processes, and recovery.
• Continued high levels of external interventions in the region, some of which can be regarded as harmful to African recovery.
• Uncoordinated or poorly co-ordinated DDR, SSR and SALW responses.
• Repressive security sectors and armed groups.

However, notwithstanding this, DDR, SALW and SSR interventions have in a number of instances (as in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Mozambique) been very important preventing warring parties returning to conflict and in putting these countries on a path of relative stability during which national recovery and development may take place. There are opportunities for the EC and member states to build upon these positive aspects.

This chapter proceeds by first setting out the conceptual and operational basis of DDR, SSR and SALW processes. It then examines positive and negative experiences in terms of implementation and looks at opportunities to create linkages between these components of programming, drawing upon lessons-learnt and good practice. Finally, it analyses key opportunities relevant to the Finnish EU Presidency.

2. Conceptualising DDR/SALW and DDR Processes

2.1 DDR and SALW
DDR has typically taken place during peacekeeping or peace operations with the purpose of removing arms and combatants from conflict and preparing the ground for peace-building. DDR, as the acronym suggests, consists of three sequential phases – disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration – although, in practice, phasing has not necessarily followed this order.

Disarmament, according to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), involves the collection, control and disposal of small arms,
ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants.\textsuperscript{66} This has been typically undertaken by observers or peacekeepers as part of peace-building interventions. It has involved:

- Weapons disclosures by the parties to the conflict, or less often, weapons surveys;
- Weapons collection;
- Weapons destruction;
- Weapons redistribution to national armies and other security forces.

Demobilisation has been described as the process by which armed forces (government and/or opposition or factional forces) either downsize or completely disband, as part of a broader transformation from war to peace. Demobilisation involves the assembly, quartering, disarmament, administration and discharge of former combatants, who usually receive some form of compensation and other assistance to encourage their transition to civilian life.\textsuperscript{67}

Reintegration is defined as the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain access to civilian forms of work and income. It is essentially a social and economic process with an open timeframe. Reintegration includes cash assistance or compensation in kind, as well as vocational training and income-generating activities.\textsuperscript{68}

SALW programmes have tended to take place separately to DDR processes. They have addressed gaps in DDR and have tended to be sequenced towards the end or after DDR. Weapons for Development programmes (WfD), for example, have sought to persuade arms holders – often civilians or armed groups who were outside the formal DDR process – to give up weapons for specific incentives such as integration into community work schemes. This programming has often tended to be more driven by developmental, community peace-building objectives and individual incentives than DDR which, at least in its initial phases, has been predominantly a military function.

SALW programmes cover a wide range of activities. These have included:

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• Voluntary weapons collection programmes from civilians;
• Weapons collection for small-scale development;
• Weapons amnesties;
• Public arms destruction events;
• Public awareness campaigns to reverse gun cultures through public education;
• The development and implementation of regulations to control SALW possession, trade and use;
• Measures to prevent, combat and reduce illicit trafficking of SALW;
• Sub-regional co-operation – for example, border controls;
• Efforts to improve the management and security of authorised SALW holdings by the police, army and civilians;
• Discouraging crime and promoting arms legislation through public sensitisation;
• National actions plans for arms management and disarmament including permanent national frameworks and arms reduction/management and legislation strategies;
• Weapons collection in exchange for tools and implements (for example for agricultural purposes).

2.2 SSR
SSR involves the transformation of security institutions so that they play an effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal security for their citizens. This can include, for example, down-sizing of the army (to release funds for non-military activities in post-conflict states), professionalisation, and oversight by civilian authorities. The objective is to prevent the security sector being a threat to its citizens as well as giving it the capacity to protect them. The security sector is defined as including all organisations which have the authority to use, or order the use of, force (or the threat of force) to protect the state and its citizens. This embraces: the military, police and other security actors; civilian/security oversight bodies; justice/law enforcement organisations; and informal/non-statutory security actors, such as guerrillas, liberation armies/movements, body guards, private security companies, and militias. In the context of this book, SSR can be said to have special significance in that following DDR processes a number of ex-combatants are normally integrated into new national reformed armies.
3. Constraints and Opportunities

3.1 DDR and SALW Programming

Since the first operation in Namibia in 1989, DDR has been beset by problems. These have ranged from insecurity and the incomplete collection of weapons, to the resumption of fighting in DDR processes in places such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Angola. There have been further poor outcomes in many reintegration and reconciliation initiatives. Many parties to conflicts in Africa, such as guerrilla and government forces, have feared the consequences of giving up arms in DDR processes – will they, for example, be wiped out if their opponents fail to reciprocate? They also face the prospect of losing political, military and economic power once they give up arms and are demobilised, hence the often protracted nature of DDR. In particular, reintegrating ex-combatants into society in a comprehensive way has proved beyond the capacity of almost all DDR programmes that have been implemented in Africa. At the same time, more positively, DDR processes have helped consolidate peace processes, taken relatively large numbers of SALW out of circulation, and fulfilled a confidence-building measure in terms of signalling the cessation of conflict and the return to some form of normalcy. Countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Sierra Leone that have been through DDR processes do not seem likely to revert to civil conflict at present. This section reviews the key problem areas that seem to run generically through DDR programmes with the objective of using this to make suggestions for good practice and future possible programme interventions for the EU and member states.

Disarmament and arms collection programmes, although sometimes successful in collecting significant number of weapons, have frequently failed to amass all the weapons specifically scheduled for collection under DDR agreements. Some weapons have remained hidden in arms caches as insurance against failed DDR programmes or for use in criminal activities. DDR initiatives have sometimes turned a blind eye to the problem of caches, instead prioritising the maintenance of a ceasefire over comprehensive disarmament. Another problem has been the drift of individual ex-combatants back to communities, still retaining weaponry.

In Sierra Leone – viewed as a successful programme – the collection of weapons was spasmodic in many phases. Phase I lasted between September and December 1998. It targeted about 75,000 combatants and the programme was further reviewed in July 1998, and targeted a considerably smaller number of ex-combatants – about 45,000. However, only about 3,200 combatants were disarmed. Similarly, DDR Phase II which was part of the Lomé Peace agreement, signed on 7 July 1999, was incomplete. A total of 18,898 persons were disarmed, but once again DDR was interrupted by the resumption of fighting in May 2000 and the re-arming of many ex-combatants.
One way of taking weapons out of commission in Africa has been to offer incentives. Schemes to collect illicit weapons from ex-combatants by offering cash incentives have sometimes run into difficulties as they have inflated prices and created parallel markets where weapons have proliferated rather than been reduced. They have also created resentment among civilians who have interpreted cash incentives as rewarding combatants who they often regard as responsible for the conflict.

Critically, many DDR programmes in Africa have failed to address armed groups which have been a significant factor in the perpetuation of conflict. This was the case in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and currently in the DRC, where armed groups have proved to be virtually impossible to disarm comprehensively in the East. A parallel problem has been that armed groups have often fallen outside disarmament mandates as they have not tended to be a party to the peace agreements that have articulated DDR initiatives. Further, armed groups have posed considerable problems in post-conflict phases, particularly in terms of banditry and violent criminality. DDR programmes are seldom backed up by interventions to collect and control armed groups and civilian weapons, which have tended to be hidden in homes and communities rather than handed over, although WfD programmes have made a contribution in this area.

In fact, the disarmament of armed groups, including militias and paramilitaries, has tended to be poorly conceived and unsystematic. Sometimes it has been conceived as an *ad hoc* law and order issue – individuals caught using guns in criminal activities have been arrested and their guns seized – or organisations such as the UN have used voluntary weapons collection programmes, as with Hutu and other elements in the east of the DRC. Alternatively, coercive disarmament along with war-fighting tactics have been used against armed groups following attacks on international personnel, in part to deter further attacks and possibly for retributive purposes, as in multinational operations in Somalia between 1992-1995. However, DDR programmes have not historically tended to use properly conceived and designed methods specifically targeted at militias and paramilitaries to collect arms. In Northern Uganda, if peace is achieved, there are likely to be huge problems with the disarmament and disbandment of militias/civil defence forces which have acquired considerable autonomy and power and are not fully under the control of the Ugandan army, which is itself accused of human rights abuse in the north. Although there is on-going work on how to better factor in armed groups into DDR there is scope for further refinement of approaches and thinking in this area.

The experience of voluntary weapons collection seems to be more successful than that of coercive disarmament. While the former has sometimes failed or disarmament has only been partially accomplished, DDR operations in places such as Mozambique, El Salvador, Sierra Leone, and Namibia, have at least collected substantial numbers of weapons. There is very little evidence that coercive disarmament other than at a local
level has achieved its objectives, and even at this level it has frequently failed. Nationwide coercive disarmament has not been imposed upon a country during peace operations in the post-1945 period and rarely at all in historical terms.

**Box 3.1 The Challenge of Rebel Armed Groups and Appropriate Programming Responses**

Armed rebel groups are a source of major concern in post-conflict transitions, particularly when they fall outside of DDR agreements or SALW initiatives. This may happen because they are not part of peace agreements that usually determine DDR arrangements, or because they have been able to resist disarmament, or they do not register as significant. Little policy/programming work has been articulated to grapple with these issues. However, there may be opportunities for Member States and the Commission to move the agenda forward in terms of:

- **Clarifying coercive disarmament responses.** DDR/SALW initiatives do not have a good record of using force to disarm armed groups. Some disarmament has taken place in the East of the DRC, for example, which has involved the use of force, but this has not strictly been a formal DDR disarmament requirement. Clarity is needed regarding appropriate responses.

- **Creating incentives.** Incentives to rebel armed groups, such as offers of employment/training, engagement in reintegration programmes, joint work programmes with the communities they come from, are worth examining, particularly given the poverty of many within rebel armed groups.

- **Include armed groups in DDR mandates or follow-up SALW programming.**

- **Integration opportunities.** Introduce policies/programming that enables armed groups to be easily assimilated into reconstituted national armies and SSR.

Significant numbers of ex-combatants have failed to register in African DDR initiatives. These unregistered ex-combatants pose significant risks for post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) as they are likely to feel resentful and may engage in violence or become socially disruptive. DDR programming has often been powerless to provide adequate incentives to engage them in meaningful disarmament. At the same time, there has been the problem of non-entitled combatants and civilians trying to infiltrate DDR initiatives to claim benefits. Women and child soldiers, particularly in the early days, were inadequately integrated into reintegration initiatives, or as is still sometimes the case, their special needs have been inadequately catered for. Whether combatants’ dependents should receive reintegration support is a continuing unresolved problem in DDR initiatives.

When SALW have been collected during DDR programmes they frequently have not been stored in secure and safe facilities. As a result, collected arms have often been reclaimed, stolen or recycled into criminal networks, militias, and the security sector. Moreover DDR programmes have failed to institutionalise comprehensive measures, such as substantive border checks and customs, to prevent re-arming through regional
arms flows. Nor have they tended to be linked into regional arms control measures and agreements.

Reintegration programmes have often failed to meet the needs of ex-combatants with poor targeting in terms of livelihoods training. Further to this, many ex-combatants have had unrealistic assumptions regarding their future employment prospects and they have been reluctant to consider training that might provide them with a sustainable living. A tendency not to fully engage communities in the reintegration process has also been apparent in some DDR initiatives. However, more recent DDR operations, as in Sudan, have sought to identify strategies and mechanisms to ensure the representation and inclusion of communities, including youths, women, elders and combatants, in DDR implementation and design.

There have been considerable problems in planning and implementing national army reform following DDR processes. In the post-conflict period, re-constituted national armies have usually only absorbed small numbers of ex-combatants while large numbers have been released into society with few prospects of employment. In a few cases in Africa, such as in Zimbabwe, large numbers were given government jobs, but this has not proved economically sustainable. In the DRC, attempts to integrate ex-combatants, including some from armed groups, has not proved successful, with some elements not fully subscribing to the notion of an integrated national army and indeed elements have clashed with other national army units. However, there have been transitions from DDR to integrated national armies. Countries such as Mozambique, Uganda, and Namibia which have been through demobilisation processes can be said, to varying degrees and despite problems, to have re-constituted national armies. However, forming a national army that is regarded as legitimate in civil society, sensitive to human rights and accountable, and that is also inclusive of minorities, remains a challenge that few African militaries have managed to meet. A key lesson in this respect is to plan early and incorporate these factors and sensitivities into SSR, and link DDR and SSR processes.

A further facet of DDR initiatives has been that they have not necessarily enhanced peace-building. In countries such as Angola or Congo-Brazzaville, where disarmament was pursued with a lack of rigor at certain stages, the parties returned to armed conflict. Further, many parties in disarmament initiatives have included ‘spoilers’ with little or no commitment to giving up arms. And the developmental component of DDR (reintegration) has tended to be relatively short-term and under-resourced in Africa. There tends to be a disjunction between the ‘security’ phase of DDR (disarmament/demobilisation) implemented primarily by the military and well-funded, and the reintegration phase funded from voluntary contributions and implemented by international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and development agencies with considerably less resources. Economic reintegration efforts have often yielded
inconclusive outcomes. In Sierra Leone, for example, most ex-combatants remain unemployed since the conflict was formally declared ended in January 2002.

DDR programmes have frequently failed to connect sufficiently with the police and the justice sector to mitigate the problems of increasing crime levels that often follow the demobilisation of ex-combatants. There have also been problems in terms of absorbing ex-combatants into the police as ex-combatants do not necessarily make suitable police officers. Further, the availability of SALW if DDR is incomplete facilitates armed crime, which places a high burden on policing.

The needs of vulnerable ex-combatant groups, such as disabled veterans, and child and women soldiers, have frequently been insufficiently addressed in DDR programmes. As a consequence, in the PCR phase their specific needs and concerns have gone unfulfilled. DDR programmes have also tended to achieve only partial success in assisting in reconciling ex-combatants with communities to which they are returning. Reconciliation remains inherently problematic when ex-combatants have committed atrocities in their own communities and are seen as ‘part of the problem’ by many civilians. ‘Segregated settlement’ of ex-combatants in communities has sometimes hampered reconciliation. However, reconciliation has not necessarily been seen as a DDR programme priority in Africa. In many African countries indigenous traditional community reconciliation approaches offer opportunities for reconciliation, but these have not often been connected with DDR programmes.

As noted above, DDR programmes have been problematic in certain areas. SALW programmes, prior to, during, or following DDR, have made a particular contribution to addressing shortfalls and a lack of coverage in DDR programming in Africa. SALW programmes have sometimes been phased to cover arms collection shortfalls during and after DDR initiatives. In particular, they have been useful in targeting armed groups and individuals that tend to fall outside the DDR process. They have also engaged with ex-combatants who have failed to register in formal DDR processes. In this sense, SALW programmes usefully complement, as well as offer follow up, to DDR.

Weapons for development programmes have tended to prove more successful than DDR in kick-starting development. They have, for example, offered community-based development or community-building programmes (such as building of water wells, schools, health centres or community centres) following the voluntary hand-in of weapons by civilians. Weapons-for-livelihoods programmes have provided further useful entry points in demilitarising communities and creating livelihoods for groups in Africa who have legitimate reasons for weapons possession but have fallen outside DDR. For example, hunters have used their weapons in conflict as well as for livelihood purposes. Following conflict, they may still require their weapons for livelihood purposes but their continued possession of weapons poses a potential threat to communities.
Retraining in, for example, fishing skills and the provision of nets and equipment in exchange for their weapons can provide an incentive for the handing in of weapons. In the immediate post-conflict environment, DDR has not tended to prioritise these activities.

SALW programmes have the capacity to address the insecurity that has often followed incomplete DDR in Africa. SALW programmes have built confidence by creating weapons-free zones in communities and issuing certificates to confirm this. Even if some weapons are secretly retained, they tend to be hidden and become less available. This has created local confidence in a number of post-conflict situations in Africa. The difficult issue of civilian disarmament has also been undertaken in SALW programmes, typically involving the police. This has happened in a number of communities such as in Sierra Leone over the past few years.

SALW programming has addressed regional arms flows that have undermined many DDR initiatives in Africa. This has been achieved, for example, through training and strengthening customs, border police, and cross border commissions. However, regional arms flows remain a massive problem in parts of Africa, particularly West Africa and the Great Lakes region, despite DDR and SALW initiatives. SALW programming has also added to the effectiveness of DDR by addressing attitudes to SALW possession. DDR programmes have tended to target immediate weapons collection priorities rather than attitudes. SALW programmes have undertaken sensitisation and social mobilisation against SALW possession through, for example, educational programmes, the use of theatre, dance, the media, and other mediums. Establishing local dispute mechanisms is a SALW programme technique that has facilitated weapons handovers in areas where arms are for some a means of protecting livelihoods, as in Northern Kenya. In Kenya, peace and development committees have had a role to play in persuading weapons to be handed over.

In Sierra Leone, as in other African countries, vulnerable groups have been victims of armed violence. However, they have not been adequately catered for in DDR programming and many, such as combatants’ dependents, have fallen into poverty. SALW programmes have had an important role in protecting vulnerable groups who have often been given inadequate support during DDR.

3.2 SSR Programming
Reconstituting national armies has a number of potential benefits. It removes soldiers from the temptation of banditry, avoids them going, at least in the short-term, through the potentially problematic process of retraining and finding new employment, and it may also form a bond between combatants that have been formerly fighting and lead to mutual acceptance or reconciliation. However, in Africa this component of SSR has been problematic. Although in a few instances the formation of a new national
army has proved relatively uncontroversial, it has also in many instances proved divisive. In the DRC, for example, recent attempts to form an integrated national army, including armed groups, has made little headway with many groups remaining as independent units and continuing to fight and pillage in the East. In Zimbabwe in the 1980s there was a mutiny shortly before elections in part due to divisions within the Patriotic Front (PF), which had united to fight the Rhodesian government. There were complaints in South Africa over the inequitable division of army posts – for example white officers were seen as favoured within the reconstituted South African National Defence Force (SANDF) – and tensions between the favourable settlements given to demobilising soldiers and the terms offered to non-demobilising soldiers. In the Angolan peace process, only 17.7% of the projected total of 50,000 troops had been integrated into a national army as elections approached in September 1992. After the elections, UNITA withdrew from the peace process and full-scale conflict broke out. In other countries, the take-up on integration has been poor and it has not proved possible to persuade combatants to join and make up projected totals for national armies.

However, SSR is a broader process than absorbing demobilising soldiers into national armies. It is also, for example, concerned with police, army reform and civilian oversight. These elements, once retrained, have the capacity to engage with DDR and SALW processes. Appropriately retrained police, for example, have the capacity to collect civilian and left over SALW from DDR. The army and police can also take part in customs and patrolling duties to intercept arms from neighbouring countries. However, SSR is a complex and difficult process because it:

- Requires taking power from those who have been powerful.
- Needs rapid change in the security sector that is usually conservative and resistant to change.
- Sometimes causes resentment among civilians – why should, for example, the army get resources when it has often failed to protect civilians?
- Is vulnerable to reversal: are re-trained highly professional militaries a threat to civil society/the government?
- It is difficult to provide effective and legitimate oversight in countries that lack a tradition of civilian oversight.
- Involves re-orientation: the prime role of many developing countries’ armed forces has been to preserve the government and ensure the security and continuation of ruling elites.

Box 3.2: Challenges of Small Arms Flows and Landmines

In countries such as South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, Liberia, Somalia, and the DRC, DDR and related processes have not stemmed cross-border arms flows. This has been largely due to the lack of effective border policing capacities and internal demand that has drawn in SALW for crime, livelihood and armed violence rationales. SALW possession in Africa has for many become a livelihood earner through rental to combatants/criminals or rebel activities. In regions such as West Africa, SALW have moved freely across countries according to supply and demand. Regional SALW regimes/agreements, such as the ECOWAS Moratorium, the Nairobi Convention and the SADC Protocol, and controls in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa, have not proved sufficient to halt weapons flows, despite some incremental progress. Fully effective arms transfer controls, including brokering, to curb new supplies moving into the region are not in force internationally.

At the same time, land mines continue to present a considerable challenge in Africa. Despite the Mine Ban Treaty entering into force in 1999, prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of landmines, each year globally up to 20,000 civilians are killed or injured by landmines. About a third of these are children. There are an estimated 70 million mines left in the ground in 90 countries. The numbers left in Africa are uncertain, but are thought to be considerable. Landmines are a developmental, as well as a security issue, which are, among other things, hampering the achievement of the MDGs. Individuals injured or killed by landmines represent a human cost, but their impacts are wider. These include: making agricultural land unusable; creating food shortages and nutritional deficits; restricting access to water; hindering the construction and maintenance of infrastructure and access to social services; and creating insecurity that impacts upon social relations and networks.

4. Good Practice Guidelines and Lessons-Learnt

This section analyses the types of lessons that have emerged from DDR and related processes in Africa and what this suggests in terms of good practice.

4.1 DDR/SALW Programming

DDR shortcomings in Africa suggest the following good practice should be taken account of in terms of ongoing and future programming:

- Provide comprehensive security for the handling/storage/destruction of weapons. Half-hearted or poorly funded disarmament programmes are likely to contribute to the break down of DDR processes, particularly given the security dilemmas that confront many parties. Confidence building is critical.
- DDR operations need to have clear timelines and mandates that are achievable.
• Mandates need to be framed to collect weapons from not just combatants but all sectors of society.
• DDR needs to be linked to long-term SALW strategies.
• DDR initiatives should include elements designed to change attitudes to weapons, not just facilitate their collection.
• More emphasis on the reintegration/developmental end of DDR may improve the long-term chances of avoiding returns of conflict or disorder emanating from disgruntled ex-combatants and other elements within war-torn societies.
• DDR might benefit from linkages with more community orientated approaches (such as weapons for development programmes).
• Regional SALW co-operation is vital to avoid neighboring countries refueling conflict. This should be factored into DDR at an early stage.
• Assistance packages given to ex-combatants need to be carefully balanced against the needs/perceptions of communities they are returning to. Community consultation and engagement, in fact, is critical to successful DDR.
• DDR needs to be linked to SSR (e.g. attitudes within the security forces needs to change) if the state and society is to be fully demilitarised.
• Vulnerable groups need to be prioritized more in African DDR operations (particularly women and children).
• African DDR operations need to focus more on creating weapons-free communities where civilian, as well as combatant, weapons are collected.
• The police have been insufficiently integrated into African DDR and SALW initiatives.
• DDR needs to utilise local conflict prevention/dispute mechanisms to facilitate weapons reduction and reintegration/reconciliation.

The key lessons that emerge from SALW programmes in Africa in terms of good practice particularly relate to the advantages they have in terms of engaging with communities and with filling gaps in other forms of programming. Lessons-learnt include:
• Start sensitisation programmes in communities early, preferably linked to DDR programmes to help prepare and facilitate the effective reintegration of returning ex-combatants from DDR programmes.
• Community arms collection programmes should be specifically designed to link or integrate with DDR programmes or designed to cover shortfalls, such as civilian weapons, that fall outside DDR.
• Use the police more effectively in community arms collection. While the police have been co-opted into or have supported SALW arms collection in some African
countries, there is room for further engagement. Better training of the police is also required in this area.

- Weapons for development programmes have had an impact in mitigating the impact of SALW in communities but they remain vulnerable to corruption in the police who have been known to receive incentives not to collect weapons. Hierarchies in communities have also used development funds for their own interests and personal benefits. Oversight is required and active efforts to ensure that development benefits go to the community as a whole.

4.2 SSR Programming

The following lessons and good practices emerge from an analysis of African experiences of reconstituting national armies and security sector engagement in arms collection and related activities:

- **Promote integration.** Joining a new national army has to be made an attractive proposition for ex-combatants if suitable candidates and numbers are to be enticed in.

- **Equitable distribution of posts.** The distribution of posts, particularly at the higher levels of the army, has to be seen as non-discriminatory and fair. Posts may have to be given on a proportional basis to groups that have been fighting to foster reconciliation and unity.

- **Disorder and breakdowns.** Outbreaks of fighting, desertion and mutinies cannot be ruled out during and following the formation of a national army. This needs to be taken account of in planning reconstituted national armies.

- **Reform of national armies.** The size of a new national army should be fixed at a level that is not economically damaging and which avoids the continuing militarisation of a country following conflict.

- **The police and community security.** Use the police, in particular, to address issues of community and civilian arms collection and to enhance local security.

- **PCR and recovery roles for the military.** Involve national armies to a greater extent in post-conflict reconstruction and development, to prevent the potential outbreak of conflict through engaging civilians and formerly armed groups who might resort to future armed violence.
Box 4.1: Difficulties in ‘Hunting’ Weapons Collection

Hunting weapons collection is a contentious issue in much of Africa. Many hunters are dependent on shotguns for their livelihood through selling ‘bush’ meat and farmers use them for livestock or crop protection. However, hunting weapons have often been used in conflicts or for purposes of criminality. Their continued possession in communities where tensions remain is potentially damaging to post-conflict reconstruction and development. One approach is to allow retention and make distinctions between military weaponry and civil weapons on livelihood grounds. In some contexts this may be sustainable. However, in insecure conditions it may not be.

In Sierra Leone, as part of an Arms for Development (AfD) programme, hunters/farmers were given incentives to hand in hunting weapons. Wires for traps and fishing nets were offered in exchange for these weapons. However, some of these did not materialise as promised and many hunters have become disillusioned with these schemes. Nevertheless, compliance has often been high, and the absence of gunshots has enhanced the sense of security in communities. This was part of a broader approach that offered around US$20,000 to chiefdoms once they were weapons-free to spend on development projects.70 These types of approaches engage in people-centred, locally-owned approaches, seeking to provide freedom from fear, as suggested by OECD DAC’s policy guidelines.71

5. Designing Effective Linkages Between DDR/SALW and SSR Programmes

A major problem in Africa, and elsewhere, is a lack of integration between DDR and related programmes. While the above lessons-learnt and good practice suggests ways that DDR, SSR, and SALW programming can be individually improved, combining approaches can have significant pay-offs in terms of conflict prevention, management and reduction. Ways in which effective linkages can be built are elaborated below.

DDR and SALW programmes have tended to be phased separately. DDR programmes have usually been set up as part of ceasefire arrangements involving the parties to the conflict and are implemented by external bodies, such as the UN, during PCR processes. SALW programmes have tended to be follow-up initiatives that often address areas which DDR has failed to take on or have not fully followed through. Recently, there has been a greater awareness of the need to coordinate and link SALW

and DDR. However, the opportunities have still not been fully realised. This might be achieved through:

• Joint planning and coordination mechanisms between SALW and DDR programming.
• The early integration of SALW programming with DDR initiatives. For example, civilian arms collection programmes could be written into DDR mandates.
• Training for those working on SALW and DDR to improve their understandings of the two types of programming.
• More research into the connections between DDR and SALW and how they can be integrated.
• Factoring SALW/DDR issues into conflict assessments prior to the initiation of programming.
• Engaging a wider audience of donors, INGOs, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and national governments in SALW and DDR issues.
• Co-ordinating DDR and SALW with other components of PCR, and longer-term peace-building and development efforts.

DDR and SSR programmes are to an extent linked, but these links need to be strengthened particularly in the area of reconstituting national armies. There needs to be close co-ordination between DDR and SSR authorities in terms of determining numbers of demobilising combatants and what the security sector can absorb. Further, elements of the security sector can make contributions to DDR through community arms collection and SALW stockpile management or destruction.

In terms of SALW and SSR linkages, the lack of cohesive mechanisms and approaches to link SALW programmes and SSR has been a feature of post-conflict reconstruction in many African countries. Opportunities to better connect SALW and SSR initiatives exist in the following areas:

• Civilian arms: The security sector, such as the police, can usefully engage in SALW programmatic areas such as: control over domestic arms markets; civilian arms registration and licensing; Voluntary Weapons Collection Programmes (VWCPs); and gun amnesties. Conducted with communities, these can assist in reducing arms availability as well as raising community awareness, which can contribute to conflict management and reduction.
• Customs and border controls: Retrained customs and justice officials under SSR can usefully link with SALW programmes in combating arms trafficking through, among other things, customs and border guards.
• Stockpile management and security: Within SSR, the management and security of arms and ammunition stockpiles is often seen as a technical issue or conducted later in SSR programmes, sometimes when the problem is well developed. The
leakage of arms and ammunition from state arsenals is often a major source of arms in illicit circulation. Linkages with SALW programmes that specifically target weapons storage and management can be beneficial to SSR.

Box 5.1: DDR/SALW & SSR Programming: Linkages with Development

The thinking behind these modes of programming is that they reduce insecurity and hence have the capacity to contribute to development. SSR, for example, can reduce the potential of the security sector to act in a predatory manner against civilians. It also can provide security from external threats, and create an environment of security where, for example, livelihoods can be pursued, infrastructure repaired during the PCR phase, and where internal discontent is less likely to spill over into violence. Moreover, the MDGs are unlikely to be met in the absence of, or where there is ineffective SSR. Further, by strengthening justice and providing proper redress to citizens, the possibility of the outbreak of armed violence is further lessened. Moreover the state strengthens its legitimacy with citizens when the security sector is seen to be under democratic control.

Similarly, DDR/SALW programmes remove the incentives to return to violence by providing developmental opportunities. Reintegration processes often offer ex-combatants livelihoods training, employment opportunities, and allowances to tide them over. These are frequently combined with development-oriented SALW approaches such as WdD programmes which also benefit whole communities in developmental terms, not just ex-combatants. In the absence of these types of approaches, armed violence has the capacity to: disrupt economic activities; reduce revenue and savings; diminish access to social services (which are also likely to decline in quality); lead to a rise in armed criminality; and create an environment where external humanitarian and developmental assistance is likely to be impeded.

There are also opportunities to be gained in linking SSR/DDR with SSAJ, good governance, peace-building and peace operations. To avoid unstable post-conflict transitions SSR and DDR programming needs to be further connected to Safety, Security and Access to Justice (SSAJ), good governance, peace operations and related activities following conflict cessations.

SSAJ programming is directed at bringing about an effective and independent penal and judicial system, effective and accountable policing, and an internal security system that respects human rights and the legal system. In the absence of effective DDR (and SALW programming), SSAJ programming is likely to be at risk. Shortfalls in DDR, for example, can lead to outbreaks of armed violence and the undermining or destruction of justice and policing systems. DDR is also unlikely to be achieved without a justice system that addresses grievances that leads to SALW possession.

In terms of SSR, linkages with SSAJ are important because a prime objective is to achieve a democratic, accountable and transparent security sector. This is only achievable
if there is an effective justice system that emphasises and seeks to bring about human rights compliance and that has oversight of the security sector.

DDR and SSR also need to be connected with peace operations/peace-keeping initiatives both during conflict and following it. A classic problem during peace operations and the initiation of DDR and SSR has been a lack of properly constituted programme plans that link these modes of programming with peace operations/peace-building. SSR has only partly been connected to DDR in terms of moving ex-combatants following DDR into a reconstituted army. It has not included planning for security sector transparency and accountability. This has tended to be addressed later and often outside the peace operations framework in separate donor programmes. This has not been an ideal approach.

6. Commission/Member State Frameworks

SALW are recognised within the Commission and Member States as contributing to violence and insecurity, to a lack of development and poverty, and the potential non-achievement of the MDGs – the latter being a major EU priority. The EU has become increasingly active in addressing small arms, and related processes such as DDR and SSR, and recognises that their dissemination and possession cause instability. Through the EC external assistance programmes and the CFSP the Commission is addressing these issues.

6.1 The EU Strategy to Combat Illicit Accumulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and their Ammunition

Action to address SALW has recently been articulated in ‘The EU Strategy’. The aim of the Strategy is to develop an approach specific to SALW that is integrated and constitutes a comprehensive plan of action to combat the illicit trade in SALW and their ammunition. It prescribes:

- Promoting measures addressing the underlying factors of SALW demand.
- Supporting the strengthening of the effective rule of law in unstable countries so as to limit the propensity of local people to provide for their own self-defence and hence SALW possession.

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That the existing EU Joint Action on SALW (see below) needs to be supplemented by a comprehensive and coherent approach that harnesses all forms of leverage at the EU’s disposal.

Developing new elements of EU action: preventive and reactive and setting geographical priorities.

Meeting requests by states seeking to reduce their surplus stocks of SALW and ammunition.74

Further, it makes recommendations regarding co-ordinating international, regional, and EU actions including.

**International action:** supplying small arms to governments in accordance with restrictive and appropriate regional and international criteria on arms exports. Strengthening and supporting sanctions machinery/sanctions and monitoring including the illicit trade in raw materials and the plundering of natural resources (as in West Africa).75 Supporting the strengthening of export controls and participating in strengthening border controls in countries affected by the illicit trade in SALW. Promoting an increased role for peacekeeping missions under SCRs in the area of SALW and ammunition.76

**Regional:** support regional initiatives to combat the illicit trade in SALW and ammunition. Also, support for peacekeeping missions in their monitoring of arms embargoes.77

**Within the EU:** continue the financial assistance provided by the EU since 1993 under DDR operations, while improving effectiveness under the direct participation of European experts in those programmes. Push back the culture of violence through promoting public education and awareness campaigns. Take appropriate measures to deal with the causes and consequences for human development of the illicit spread of SALW. It is also suggested that account should be taken of security issues, such as SSR, in drawing up development and assistance programmes with the ACP countries.78

**Structures within the EU:** It is suggested that strengthening of the capacities of the Council Secretariat should be undertaken to ensure the coherent application of the Strategy, while greater co-ordination/information exchange between geographical and thematic expert groups is also called for.79

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74 See for references to these bullet points, Council of the EU (13 January 2006), pp. 6, 7, and 9.
75 Council of the EU (13 January 2006), p. 10.
76 Council of the EU (13 January 2006), p. 11.
77 Council of the EU (13 January 2006), p. 12.
78 Council of the EU (13 January 2006), p. 15.
79 Council of the EU (13 January 2006), p. 15.
The Strategy also recognises that non-state players have increasing access to SALW, and that Africa remains the Continent most affected by the impact of internal conflicts aggravated by the destabilising influx of SALW.\(^{80}\)

### 6.2 European Security Strategy (ESS)

The ESS, adopted on 13 December 2003, elaborated five key challenges faced by the EU: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, organised crime, and state failure. The spread of SALW can be said to be central to four of these challenges as SALW are used in ‘terrorist’ activities, by those engaging in organised crime, they are invariably used in regional conflicts, and they can contribute to state failure – for example when used by rebel movements.

### 6.3 EU Joint Action

In 2000, the EU adopted the Joint Action. This was used as a basis for specific SALW and SALW-related actions in Africa and elsewhere. The EU within this Action set out three overarching objectives to help:
- End the destabilising accumulation and spread of SALW and reduce them to a level consistent with countries’ legitimate security needs.
- Solve the problems caused by these excessive accumulations.

### 6.4 Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention

The EC’s 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention commits the EC to play an active part in controlling the spread of SALW through support to DDR and SALW. It noted that the Commission would give higher priority to controlling the spread of small arms.\(^{81}\) The Communication also noted that the security sector had not traditionally been a focus of Community co-operation and that it intended to play an increasingly active role in this sector.\(^{82}\) Further, the Commission suggested it had much to contribute in terms of DDR in place such as Cambodia, Burundi and the DRC. Priority areas were child soldiers (for example, the Commission has funded emergency education in the DRC, Sudan, and Sierra Leone) and reconciliation as in the Commission’s support for the TRC in South Africa.\(^{83}\)

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\(^{80}\) Council of the EU (13 January 2006), p. 5.


\(^{83}\) EC (2001), p. 15.
6.5 SALW and the Cotonou Agreement

The Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000, provides a framework for addressing SALW through development co-operation, political dialogue and Article 11, which relates to conflict prevention/resolution and peace-building. It has provided a basis for a dialogue between EU and ACP countries on issues such as the arms trade. Under the agreement a number of projects/programmes have been supported, including:

- Financial support for Small Arms National Action Plans (NAPs).
- SSR, justice and police reform.
- Country/regional DDR initiatives (e.g. through the EDF Great Lakes DDR, via the Multi-Donor Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme, (MDRP).
- Integration of SALW control into development and rehabilitation programmes as in Northern Uganda.

7. Developing and Improving Existing Frameworks and Responses

The EU Small Arms Strategy, in particular, has been viewed as a positive development that demonstrates Member States moving towards ‘collective, innovative and comprehensive solutions to small arms problems’. It signals a stronger emphasis on the linkage between human security and development, the setting of geographical priorities, and the adoption of a more comprehensive approach including preventive and reactive measures. However, it does not signal a strong cross-pillar approach to small arms. While it recognises that Community action has a role to play, this is not well elaborated. There are a number of opportunities to take forward the Strategy in conjunction with other European frameworks, it has been suggested:

- The Commission could consider paying more attention to processes related to SALW such as good governance, development, access to justice, and peace-building.
- Support preventive and reactive approaches to SALW.
- Strengthen linkages between SALW and DDR programming.
- Clarify the institutional legal competence for European action on small arms.

85 Sarah Bayne, p. 3.
86 UNIDIR (December 2005), p. 22.
87 UNIDIR (December 2005), p. 22.
88 These following bullet points draw upon observations made in UNIDIR (December 2005), pp. viii, ix, and x.
• European small arms assistance might be broadened to include: strengthening border management/controls; more support to DDR/child soldiers; and more assistance to NAPs.
• The Commission could focus the Strategy at the community level.
• Greater support for civil society, NGOs, and women’s groups could be given and their concerns addressed in programming.
• Clearer geographic priorities need to be established.
• Develop a broad conceptualisation within the Stability Instrument that enables the EC to fund a wide range of SAL/DDR related activities.\footnote{See UNIDIR (December 2005), p. viii.}
• The Cotonou Agreement could play a stronger role in integrating small arms within EU development co-operation including analysis in appropriate Country and Regional Strategy papers.\footnote{UNIDIR (2005), p. ix.}
• The EU could usefully provide financial, technical and political assistance to partners at all levels to improve their handling of small arms issues.

8. Opportunities for Policy and Programming Development During the Presidency

A number of potential opportunities exist for initiatives by the EU Presidency across SALW/DDR and SSR issue areas, taking into account both the above European framework priorities and earlier areas of shortfall identified in these modes of programming in Africa. Priority areas might include the following:

Identifying areas of expertise and knowledge pooling. The Commission and Member states might consider identifying thematic and country-specific areas of intervention in DDR and related processes where they can make a difference in Africa, such as in West Africa and the Great Lakes. This could draw upon the experiences of countries such as France, the UK, The Netherlands, and Germany, particularly in DDR and SSR. The UK, for example, has provided support to DDR in Sierra Leone; Germany has supported a number of programmes to assist in the reintegration of ex-combatants and their families in the Great Lakes Region; while Belgium has supported community recovery and reintegration through UNDP in the RoC.

Improving DDR through engagement in international mechanisms and fora. Member States and the Commission should seize the opportunity (if not already doing so) to engage in current international work on improving DDR, such as the Stockholm
Initiative on DDR (SIDDR), and with issues being raised within these fora; such as, funding processes, finding ways of making reintegration sustainable, and the increased involvement of civil society in DDR.

Developing linkages across DDR, SSR and SALW initiatives. There are opportunities to take the lead in promoting strategies and approaches that linkDDR, SSR and SALW programming more effectively. There is a particular need to create linkages between SSR reform of the police and SALW weapons collection both at the community level and regionally. Further, DDR programming can benefit from the early integration with SALW programming that addresses sensitisation and reintegration issues, which may help to address customary weaknesses in DDR regarding changing attitudes to weapons and securing long-term and sustainable reintegration.

Linking DDR/SALW and SSR with SSAJ, peace-building and peace operations. Commission and Member State policy and programming needs to be cognisant of the linkages between these modes of programming. For example, without access to justice ex-combatants and civilians are likely to seek to re-engage at some point in grievance-based armed violence. This implies that Commission policy and programmes should seek to link with or include SSAJ and related processes.

Addressing root causes of SALW acquisition. DDR, SALW and SSR initiatives often neglect the motivations for possessing and acquiring weapons. SALW programming undertaken by the Commission and member states might, in particular, be more directly targeted at some of the ‘root causes’ and motivations of armed violence, such as exclusion, poverty and poor governance, linking up with the Strategy’s comment that underlying factors of SALW demand need to be addressed.

Pro-poor/human security perspectives. Drawing upon the recognition that armed violence has strong and pervasive linkages with poverty/under-development, the Commission and Member States may consider engaging in ensuring that DDR/SALW/SSR programming and policy have a strong pro-poor and human security dimension.91

Strengthen customs and regional SALW non-dissemination. There is a clear need to assist in strengthening police and customs capabilities in ACP countries to prevent the further proliferation of SALW in areas of tension and in vulnerable post-conflict transitions.

91 CICS, at the Department of Peace Studies, Bradford University, UK, is being funded over 2006–2008 by DFID to lead an international project to research ‘DDR and human security: post-conflict security building and the interests of the poor’.
Develop cross-pillar approaches. Seek to put forward proposals to develop or take forward what the Strategy identifies as currently lacking across the EC, a cross pillar approach to the proliferation of SALW and security sector issues.

Support reformed national armies processes. There is a clear need to design transitions from DDR to SSR (where ex-combatants join new national armies following DDR), that are connected, seamless, and part of an overall strategy. Too often in Africa, SSR strategies take little account of DDR.

Community-oriented approaches. Community-based, or sensitive, programming is a key area of shortfall in programming, which the Commission and Member States might consider reviewing in terms of improving responses.

Gender orientation. Gender should be an area of focus, particularly in regard to the special difficulties women face in reintegrating into society following their involvement in armed violence as ex-combatants, and in re-establishing their social capital in returning to communities. Women also face special difficulties in engaging with and working in the security sector following conflict.

Box 8.1: Gender programming shortfalls/opportunities in DDR/SALW/SSR

Gender issues loom large in SSR, DDR and related lines of programming. Historically, these lines of programming have sometimes lacked gender awareness or sensitivity, in particular, in terms of the needs of women and girls. In DDR programming, it has been increasingly recognised that female ex-combatants require special treatment in demobilising and in returning to their community both in terms of safety and health. Further, when returning to their communities they may experience problems that are different to male ex-combatants leading to difficulties in reintegration. They are likely to find it difficult to marry or return to husbands due to gender stereotypes of the combatant role being inappropriate to women. They may have been raped, taken as ‘war brides’, or regarded as the property of those who forcibly married them. Further, the experience of conflict may make female ex-combatants reject traditional roles and challenge some of the assumptions of tradition in their communities.

In the security sector there are likely to be few roles for women during peacetime and those who joined up during conflict run the risk of being jettisoned in preference to men. Women are likely to experience inequality including less pay, poor promotion prospects, and negative stereotypes. However, women in Sierra Leone, Uganda, Somalia, and Liberia, have played critical roles in mobilising for peace, and often bringing pressure to bear on rebels and armies to cease fighting, as well taking dialogue and reconciliation roles. They have also played critical combat roles including the defence of communities. This capacity for peace-building in particular opens up opportunities that might be supported by the EU and member states more deeply. OECD DAC notes the potential for:
– Supporting women’s organisations during conflicts to enable them to become involved in mediation and peace roles.
– Developing policies and programmes that focus on conflict situations and that encourage women’s coalitions and alliances for peace-building across regions and sub-regions.
– Encourage capacity-building for women in public life.
– Support representation of women in peace processes.
– Considering designing special programmes to deal with the psychological and emotional trauma of all aspects of violence against women.
– Improving women’s access to resources during reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation. Developing special ways of dealing with women (and men) youth and children who have been victims of gender-based violence and abuse as a consequence of conflict.

Some of these proposals have relevance when applied to DDR/SSR. For example, women groups have a role to play in negotiating disarmament with armed groups or rebels. Women’s groups could help assist in the reintegration of female combatants into traditional society when there are assimilation problems. Similarly, they could help war brides disentangle themselves from forced marriage. More generally, women or women’s groups/coalitions can advocate and press for better conditions and representations in the security sector and make their voices heard in parliament and elsewhere regarding SSR and abuses of power by the security sector.

Supporting vulnerable groups. DDR/SALW and SSR initiatives need to take into account their impact on the vulnerable. This continues to be an area of weakness across many international implementing agencies. It is noted that children are a priority group under frameworks such as the Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention.

Promoting longer-term perspectives. Consider how Commission policy and frameworks might support longer-term SALW/DDR interventions, as opposed to some of the more short-term interventions currently in place. Prevention might also be accorded more prominence across all dimensions of DDR/SALW and SSR.

Introducing training/information on DDR and related processes to add to the effectiveness of EU and member state programming. Research and training on DDR/SSR/SALW issues and coordination among policymakers and programme officers, in-country and regionally, could be beneficial in terms of taking debates forward in these areas in the EU and among member states.

Linking conflict/security and mainstream development programming. Consider, where appropriate, integrating or linking conflict/security thinking (as in DDR/SSR) and programming into some aspects of mainstream development. Promote a greater dialogue between those with what might be termed as having a ‘traditional’ development perspective and those working on conflict and security.

Controlling SALW exports to conflict and post-conflict countries in Africa. If the harmful impacts of SALW on post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) and development are to be mitigated, EU co-ordinated action might also be taken forward in terms of brokering, the marking and tracing of SALW, and in transparency in terms of reporting, so that SALW are not introduced or re-emerge in the post-conflict phase, thereby hampering development.

Box 8.2: The Neglected Issues of Repatriation and Reconciliation in DDR/SSR

When rebel elements in particular are integrated into national armies they often have to leave rural areas and join national armies – sometimes based in capitals with risks of social exclusion. Similarly, repatriation and reintegration into communities by demobilising ex-combatants, given the often high levels of hostility to ex-combatants, have proved problematic. One response to the above problems in terms of integration into national armies has been to allow rebel units to stay in their region and ‘badging’ them as a regional unit within the national army. This approach has been tried in the DRC. However, this has often led to difficulties, with poor co-ordination with national HQs, lack of discipline, human rights abuses, and even mutinies, in the absence of proper oversight.

Reconciliation has been a further problematic area both in terms of security sector reconciliation with civilians (which it has often abused) and between rebel and army elements when they come together in new national armies. Sierra Leone is a good example of a conflict where the security sector committed extensive human rights abuses against civilians, and even joined the rebel RUF in attacking them. Subsequently, there has been considerable pressure from civil society and donors for the security services to engage with civil society. This has happened with a series of joint meetings and work. Nevertheless, there has been limited progress. Truth and reconciliation commissions have been formed in many African countries (including Sierra Leone, South Africa, with Liberia set to follow). However, there is mixed evidence as to whether they have achieved any significant degree of reconciliation. On reconciliation within new national armies, successes have been rare or under threat. SANDF was plagued in its early SSR phases by entrenched racist perceptions of white officers of the black ranks. And in the DRC, attempts at bringing together different armed groups and the Congolese army into an integrated army has made little headway with identity differences and hostilities remaining pronounced. Responses to these above problems might include:

- Mechanisms for the security sector to meet and engage with civil society on reconciliation.
- Reconciliation/forgiveness ceremonies in communities where the security sector might meet with victims of human rights abuses.
- Joint projects – such as peace-building/reconstruction projects – where the security sector, particularly the army, do community work in conjunction with civil society, thus fostering an atmosphere of potential reconciliation.
– Promotion of reconciliation within the security sector as part of their training and education. This should also be linked with national educational programmes. This might included specific education with the military exploring the basis of past conflict, identity differences, and ways of fostering a ‘non-ethnic’ vision within the security sector.
– Ex-combatants entering the security sector will need to be screened for involvement in human rights abuses and, for example, implication in crimes against humanity. This links into reconciliation in that known or suspected war criminals are unlikely to be accepted by many civilians as legitimate members of the security sector.

Bibliography and Further Reading


DFID, ‘Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform’. 


Chapter 4
Promoting Democratisation, Good Governance, Human Rights Protection and Conflict Prevention in Africa.

Julia Buxton (with first draft contributions by Christiana Solomon and Liisa Laakso)
Executive Summary

This paper explores the consensus that has emerged among African regional organisations (AROs) and external partners – including the EU – that democratic, transparent and accountable government is a pre-requisite for peace, stability and economic development. The first section assesses the progress that has been made since the 1990s in promoting democracy and good governance principles in African countries. It is argued that there has been improvement and that this is underscored by the spread of democratic practices, the adoption of institutional reform programmes and the introduction of legislative initiatives that enshrine civil, political and socio-economic rights in the sub-Saharan region.

Section two examines the role that AROs have played in promoting and supporting this trend. After an overview of key treaty initiatives at the regional level, the chapter explores the mechanisms and instruments that have been developed by AROs to support democracy, human rights and the good governance agenda such as the NEPAD, African Peer Review Mechanism and election observation and monitoring programmes.

The third section of the paper offers a more pessimistic account of trends in the region to date. It assesses ongoing limitations to the roll out and consolidation of democracy, human rights and good governance principles through an overview of the drivers of authoritarian political tendencies and ‘bad’ governance.

Section four provides an account of the changes that have occurred in relation to EU strategies and programming initiatives in Africa and the new architecture and policy frameworks that structure EU relations with third parties. It is argued that the promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance principles guides EU relations with African countries and that EU institutions have embraced a series of institutional reforms and policy initiatives that have enhanced the capacity of the EU to partner AROs in the advancement and institutionalisation of these principles.

The final section assesses the challenges and dilemmas that the EU / EC face in confronting the legacy of political ‘underdevelopment’ and bad governance in the sub-Saharan region. It argues that in order to ensure that meaningful democratic systems are created in African countries, the EU / EC needs to address ongoing problems relating to coherence and overlap in programming, policy and institutional responsibility; provide more specific and targeted capacity building support and; address gaps that exist in our understanding of the relationship between participation and poverty and the sequencing of elections and peace building.
1. Human rights, democracy and good governance in Africa: overview

African countries have made some progress in promoting an agenda of respect for human rights, democracy and good governance. Underscoring this, the contemporary political complexion of the Continent is almost unrecognisable from the dictatorial profile of twenty-years ago. However, there is a long way to go before it can be said that a culture of democracy and observance of human rights and good governance principles exists. In the sub-Saharan region, there is a wide variation of performance between countries in terms of respecting these principles and all states have to move from declaratory statements to action if the democracy, human rights and good governance agenda is to build and maintain momentum. This first section outlines the progress that has been made before proceeding to the limitations to meaningful democratisation and good governance and the challenges that this poses for the EU in the remainder of the chapter.

1.1 Democracy

In assessing the advances made in the field of human rights, democracy and good governance observation, a number of positive trends can be identified. Firstly, these principles have become ‘established’ in the majority of sub-Saharan African countries since the 1990s. It is now broadly accepted that regime legitimacy (domestic and international) stems from free and fair elections. It is also worth noting that there is strong popular support for democratic forms of government. For example, the Afrobarometer survey (of fourteen East, West and South African countries) found that 69% of respondents were of the view that democracy was ‘always preferable’ in the first survey round (1999–2001) falling back to 64% in the second survey (2002–03). There was a strong rejection of authoritarian forms of government, as illustrated in the table below.

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<th>Table 1.1 Attitudes toward authoritarianism</th>
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<td>Reject Military Rule</td>
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Multiparty elections at the national, regional and local level have been held in a number of countries and this indicates a relative pluralisation of the political landscape away
from the historical dominance of single-party, autocratic control. This has allowed for new forms of participation and ‘voice’ that in turn enhance long-term democratic prospects, as well as the potential for conflict prevention and reduction by opening up institutional channels for the peaceful articulation and reconciliation of grievances.

The prevalence of the coup d’état has declined and when the military has removed a government by force, it has been quick to acknowledge the need for a transitionary administration and an election process (Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, São Tome and Sierra Leone). There are also positive indications of democratic ‘consolidation’ (characterised by the routinisation of electoral processes and the transfer of power from incumbent to opponent)\(^93\) in countries that include Ghana, Kenya, Senegal and Zambia. Attendant civil and political rights have increased the scope, number,\(^94\) diversity and leverage of civil society organisations, creating the basis for a virtuous circle of democratic growth and participatory opportunities.

Constitutional reforms have been adopted that separate the executive, legislative and judicial branches and these institutional revisions have allowed for more effective checks and balances on executive action. Although there is still a long way to go in creating a functioning, accountable and independent judiciary, the need for judicial autonomy is increasingly recognised and in some countries, it has been enhanced. There has been a trend of decentralising and devolving power and budgetary resources to regional and municipal level administrations. In contrast to the ‘first generation’ of decentralisation / devolution initiatives in the 1980s (that typically de-concentrated central power to unelected regional appointees) these ‘second generation’ reforms are underpinned by constitutional and legal provision and they mandate power and resource transfers to democratically elected local and regional authorities, as in Uganda (1995), Senegal (1996), Benin (2000) and Burkina Faso (1995).

1.2 Human Rights

The spread of democratic practices has run parallel with a reduction of widespread and systematic human rights abuses. However, as recent events in DRC, Sudan, Côte D’Ivoire and Ethiopia demonstrate, setbacks are common, impunity persists and a large gap remains between formal rights and their actual recognition.

‘First’ and ‘second’ generation civil, cultural, social, economic and gender rights have been enshrined in constitutional and legal initiatives of the 1990s and 2000s.

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\(^94\) In Tanzania for example, the number of registered civic organisation increased from 168 in 1990 to 9,000 by 1999.
This has allowed for the creation of new human rights institutions such as human rights defenders and official human rights commissions. While there was just one human rights commission in the region in the late 1980s, there are over 25 today. Although many of them have limited mandates and autonomy, there have been notable successes, such as the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC), which has been praised by international human rights organisations for its reach, effectiveness and capacity to hold state institutions accountable for abuses.

**Box 1.1: The Ugandan Human Rights Commission (UHRC): Institutionalising Reach and Effectiveness**

- The autonomy and authority of the UHRC is enshrined in the 1995 Constitution;
- The UHRC has the authority to subpoena any person or document; compel testimony; order the release of detainees; order financial restitution or other remedies for victims of human rights violations;
- Decisions of the UHRC can only be appealed to the supreme legal authority, the Ugandan High Court;
- National security agencies are accountable to the UHRC;
- The UHRC engages in human rights teaching and advocacy.

There was a significant breakthrough in terms of institutionalising human rights in 2004, when the African Court on Human and People's Rights was established by the African Union. The creation of the court is expected to strengthen the work of the African Commission for Human and People’s Rights and the enforcement of human rights (based on the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights) in national courts.

While there is limited evidence to show that press freedom has increased in Africa, media provision has diversified and inter-regional networks of journalists have expanded. This trend has been underpinned by the introduction of national legislation on press freedom (in line with regional conventions, for example NEPAD’s Declaration on Democracy) and the adoption in 2002 of the Banjul Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa by the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights. This has enabled the media to play an increased role in the dissemination of information, the scrutiny of government and officials and in the development of civil society.

95 The provisions of this declaration are binding on signatories of the African Court of Justice.
Rights of Women

At the formal level, progress has been made in expanding and institutionalising the political, social and economic rights of women. AROs including SADC, ECOWAS and the AU have acted on the Beijing Platform for Action.\textsuperscript{97} National legislation prohibiting violence (sexual, cultural and domestic) against women and girls and promoting female educational and economic opportunities has been introduced in a number of countries in line with regional and international treaty obligations (for example in Rwanda, Guinea, Kenya, Uganda and Burundi). The enhancement of female representation in African political parties, legislatures, executives and institutions (through the use of quota systems) has also catalysed national legislation on female rights. Rwanda, Mozambique and South Africa are now ranked among the world's top fifteen countries for female representation.\textsuperscript{98}

\begin{center}
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\hline
\textbf{Box 1.2 Enhancing Female Representation in African Politics and Government} \\
\hline
\quad - Fifty-one AU member countries have ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). \\
\quad - 21 African countries have quotas for female representation in the national legislature. \\
\quad - Political parties in 13 African countries have voluntarily adopted seat quotas for women. \\
\quad - The AU has legislated for 50 per cent female representation within its own organisational structures \\
\quad - One third of seats in the East African Legislative Assembly are reserved to women. \\
\quad - Gender budgeting has been introduced in Kenya, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda.\textsuperscript{99} \\
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1.3 Good governance

There is a consensus among African countries that democratic processes combined with effective, transparent and accountable government:

\begin{itemize}
\item Enhances political stability and the capacity of countries to prevent and manage conflict, by pacifically channelling grievances;
\item Improves the prospects for reducing poverty and achieving development objectives by encouraging private investment, integration into the global economy and more effective disbursement of aid;
\end{itemize}


• Enables social need to be coherently identified and targeted and;
• Provides an institutional framework for first generation civil and political rights to be respected. This enhances the prospects of governments acting upon second generation social, economic and cultural rights, which have been shown to be unachievable without the institutionalisation of first generation rights.

On the other hand, the lack of democracy and good governance contributes to risks of violent conflict and it reflects underlying conditions that lead to conflict prone societies. ‘Bad’ governance also creates fertile conditions for corruption, which has a regressive impact on the poor and delimits investor and donor confidence in the economic environment. Underscoring the pertinence of the good governance agenda for economic growth in African countries, it is estimated that the continent needs to double per capita income in order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. The challenge inherent in achieving this is represented by the fact that Africa currently accounts for just one per cent of global foreign direct investment, one per cent of the global gross domestic product (GDP) and two per cent of world trade.100

A number of African countries have embraced institutional reforms, legal initiatives and training procedures that enhance transparency and accountability in the public administration and which improve the quality of public service delivery, management and policy formulation (Uganda and Rwanda). Capacity building and legislation in the field of taxation collection and budgetary / accounting procedures has improved central revenue levels, fiscal management and state accountability in some countries. Rigorous anti-corruption campaigns have been undertaken by some administrations and senior figures - state officials and party political – have been prosecuted.101 However, as discussed in Section 3, progress has been uneven, the scale of these ‘good governance’ initiatives has been limited and the meaning of the term ‘good governance’ is contested and confused.

101 Although the EU has a policy of capacity building in this area, there appears to be no comprehensive quantitative assessment of the fiscal benefits of EU programming and the relationship between corruption and economic growth remains contested.
Box 1.3 The Meaning of Good Governance

Good governance is defined here as the tradition and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. It has three dimensions: political, economic and institutional.

The Political Dimension: The process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced;

The Economic Dimension: The government’s capacity to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies;

The Institutional Respect Dimension: The respect of citizens and the state for the country’s institutions.

Source, Kaufman, D. Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption, Ch. 21 World Bank

1.4 Summary

Democracy, human rights and good governance have a higher profile in contemporary African politics and serious efforts have been made by some national governments to act upon commitments and obligations in this area as a means of enhancing development, peace, stability and security. However, major differences exist in the performance of states, progress has not been linear or consolidated and a gap remains between principle and practice. Before turning to address the opportunities open to the EU in terms of strengthening the positive trends identified here, this chapter will assess the role of African Regional Organisations in democracy, human rights and good governance promotion activities.

2. African Conventions and Instruments

African regional organizations have sought to promote the ‘universalisation’ of democratic, human rights and good governance principles in Africa. Through institutional and treaty initiatives, AROs have played an important role in the roll out, promotion, and defence of these principles at the continental, sub-regional and national level. While this is an important development, the AROs are institutionally immature and lack full capacity to enforce commitments and obligations. Consequently a gap between principle and practice exists, paralleling the situation at the national level outlined in the previous section.

2.1 Promoting common standards; treaties and conventions

The responsibility for democracy, human rights and good governance promotion by AROs has been set out in their founding conventions. For example, mission number five of the Africa Union is ‘to play a leadership role for promotion of peace, human
security and good governance in the continent.'102 Article four of the Constitutive Act of the AU emphasises respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance; the promotion of gender equality and social justice and; condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments.103

Parallel objectives are outlined in the founding Treaty of the SADC.104 Under Article 4 of the Treaty, the three key principles guiding member states are ‘human rights, democracy and the rule of law’. Article 5 commits member states collectively, to ‘promote common political values, systems and other shared values which are transmitted through institutions, which are democratic, legitimate and effective’ and to ‘consolidate, defend and maintain democracy, peace, security and stability’ in the region. The 2001 ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance emphasises: the importance of a constitutional separation of powers; freedom of party formation; principles for the monitoring of multi-party elections and; a non-partisan role for the security forces. The Protocol was adopted as a supplementary to the ECOWAS Protocol for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1999) underscoring the link between CPMR and democracy promotion in ARO treaty commitments and initiatives. The 1999 Protocol recognised that to be effective it ‘needs to be complimented though the incorporation of provisions concerning issues such as prevention of internal crisis, democracy and good governance, the rule of law, and human rights’ (ECOWAS 2001, 3). Similarly the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation requires member states to ‘promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within the territories of State Parties and encourage the observance of universal human rights’ as a means of preventing and reducing conflict.

Reflecting a dramatic political change in the conceptualisation of the relations between the government, state and society in Africa, there is a strong emphasis on enhancing the power and influence of civil society on the Continent. This is in line with a vision of participatory development that was originally outlined in the 1990 African Charter for Popular Participation in Development.105 Two of the guiding

102 Strategic Plan of the Commission of the African Union, Volume 1, Vision and Missions of the AU, May 2004. Reiterated in the organisation’s Strategic Objectives of AU Commission for 2004–07, wherein the role of the Commission was to ‘promote the emergence of societies based on the principles of the rule of law, good governance and human security’.
104 Outlined in Article 5 of the Community treaty signed at Windhoek in 1992
105 In the 1990 Charter ‘popular participation is the fundamental right of the people to fully and effectively participate in the determination of the decisions which affect their lives at all levels and at all times’ (Article 10, p.19). See also the Strategic Plan of the Commission of the African Union, Volume 1, Vision and Missions of the AU, May 2004.
principles of NEPAD are to broaden and deepen participation by all sectors of society and to develop partnership between African peoples. The Constitutions of all SADC member states enshrine the right of full participation in the political process. The stress on participatory development and the acknowledgement of the role of civil society in ARO treaties has encouraged civil society participation in policy initiatives and led to the creation of institutional frameworks that allow for civil society dialogue with the state.

2.2 Mechanisms and tools
AROs use ‘traditional’ enforcement tools such as dialogue and sanctions to encourage national governments to uphold their treaty commitments in relation to democracy, human rights and good governance. Article 23 of the AU convention allows the Assembly to impose ‘appropriate’ sanctions on any Member State that ‘fails to comply with the decisions and policies of the Union […] such as the denial of transport and communications links with other Member States, and other measures of a political and economic nature to be determined by the Assembly’. New instruments such as NEPAD, the African Peer Review Mechanisms (discussed below) and election observation support mechanisms have also been introduced to encourage the promotion of, and respect for democracy, human rights and good governance principles and to accelerate the evolution of common standards.

The development and use of these instruments has been informed by an emphasis on collegiality, ‘positive’ engagement, state sovereignty and African ownership. Stress is placed on the importance of dialogue and negotiation with difficult partners; ‘discretion’ when exploring entry points for action and the use of non-adversarial tools, as outlined for example, in the constitutive act of the Peace and Security Council of the AU. Concerns or calls for action against persistent violators of democracy and human rights principles can be directed ‘upwards’ to the UN and other international agencies, an avenue that has more specifically been pursued to avert violent conflict and instability (Sudan).

**NEPAD**
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) was established as the ‘development arm’ of the AU in 2001. It is a mechanism through which key problems, such as poverty, conflict and Africa’s marginalisation in the global economy can be collectively addressed. Through NEPAD, member countries have identified the

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106 Sanctions can also be used against countries that default on their budget contributions to the Union.

107 For a detailed overview of the Peace and Security Council see chapter 2 in this series.
following sectoral priority areas: economic governance; market access and agriculture; human development; infrastructure; science and technology; environment and tourism; and the African Peer Review Mechanism. In each of these thematic areas, specific policy initiatives have been developed and they are supported financially by allocations from member states. By institutionalizing financial commitments on the part of African countries, NEPAD is a mechanism for enhancing African identification and ‘ownership’ of development initiatives.

**Box 2.1 NEPAD Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative**

**Objective**: To promote programmes that enhance the quality of economic and public financial management, and corporate governance.

**Actions**: Creation of a task force from the Ministries of Finance and Central Banks from participating countries that is commissioned to review economic and corporate governance practices across individual countries and regions. The task force recommends appropriate standards and codes of good practice, to be considered by the Heads of State Implementation Committee.

**Intended outcome**: Countries will develop a programme for improving public financial management and targets. This will be supported by the Heads of State Implementation Committee, which will mobilise resources for capacity building to enable countries to comply with mutually agreed minimum standards and codes of conduct.

**NEPAD Human Development Initiative: Education - Reversing the Brain Drain**

**Objective**: To turn the ‘brain drain’ into a ‘brain gain’ for Africa by: a) building and retaining human capacities necessary for the Continent’s development and; b) developing strategies that enable African countries to capitalize on the knowledge of the African Diaspora.

**Actions**: Establish a) incentives within African countries to reverse the ‘brain drain’; b) a database to determine the magnitude of the problem and; c) networks that promote collaboration between Africans abroad and at home.

*The African Peer Review Mechanism*

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) of 2003 is an important instrument for the monitoring and promotion of democracy, human rights and good governance principles. The APRM seeks to build openness, information sharing and accountability through self-assessment and constructive dialogue between African countries. The end goal of the APRM is to promote best practice and universal standards among AU member countries, in turn enhancing the prospects for socio-economic development, peace and democracy. In the view of Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, chair of

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the AU and APRM, ‘The peer review mechanism is not an instrument for punishment or exclusion but rather a mechanism to identify strong points, share experiences and help rectify weak areas.’ Entry into the mechanism is voluntary. To date, 23 of the 53 AU member states have acceded to the APRM. Ghana and Rwanda were the first two countries to prepare for and undergo the five-step review process, which is overseen by a group of experts and based on documentary assessments and interviews with officials and civil society organisations. Countries that have undergone the review process follow up with Plans of Action based on the recommendations of the Peer Review Panel. The review process was launched in 2004 in Ghana, followed by missions to Mauritius, Rwanda, Kenya and Mozambique (2004). Support missions to Nigeria, South Africa and Benin followed in 2005.

**Box 2.2 Findings of the Rwanda APRM 2005**

**Positive findings:** That there had been success in reducing the number of street children from an estimated 400,000 in 2001 to 7,000 by 2005. Major progress had been made in advancing socio-economic rights, specifically through the provision of compulsory, universal and free primary education and improvements in female enrolment. Innovation was noted in delivering justice through community traditions and practices such as Gacaca, which has led to the election of 400,000 traditional judges. Progress in advancing gender empowerment and female political participation was observed. Half of the senators and deputies in the country’s parliament are women and women occupy key posts in the government (including Justice and the Deputy Commissioner of Police). Legislation creating Women’s Councils from the national to the village level have created a forum for female advocacy and participation. That the government had a zero tolerance policy on all forms of corruption. Progress in implementing participatory models of development, though, for example, the HIMO (Haute Intensité en Main d’Oeuvre).

**Areas of concern:** the continued economic inequality of women; limitations on party political activity at the village level; the absence of facilities for secret voting; limited progress on expanding domestic taxation revenue streams.

Source: Oculi, O.112

110 http://www.rwandagateway.org/article.php3?id_article=672
111 Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda.
**Election observation**

The monitoring and observation of election processes is a mechanism for enhancing the credibility, transparency and legitimacy of elections. As discussed in the following section, elections in many African countries have been characterised by violence. In this context, observation and monitoring are recognised as instruments that can reduce conflict before, during and after the election process.

During the 1990s, a substantive critique of election observation and monitoring developed. This pointed to the emergence of an observation ‘industry’ comprised of numerous international and regional observation and monitoring groups of varying expertise and capability. They tended to be short-termist in approach, overly focused on elections as a ‘symbol’ of democratisation and lacking in common standards for evaluating elections. In the 2000s, progress was made by international and regional governmental and non-governmental organisations in refining the role of election monitors and observers and incorporating best practice into missions. It is now recognised that developing domestic observation and monitoring capacities improves the prospects for incorporating lessons learned and sustainability in election programming. It also has a rationale outside of elections as it can feed into wider democracy programming in areas such as civil society strengthening, voter education and the promotion of accountability in election commissions and party political funding procedures.

AROs have assumed increased responsibility for the development of regional and domestic election monitoring and observation standards and capacities in African countries and also for mission deployment. The AU’s *Guidelines for African Union Electoral Observation and Monitoring Missions* (2002) and *Declaration on the Principles Governing Domestic Elections in Africa* (2003) establish a framework for the administration, monitoring, observation and evaluation of elections. In 2006, the AU responded to pressure to enhance and clarify the principles governing elections and in order to enhance the APRM process. *The Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance*, which is currently at draft stage, is intended as a definitive, unifying document that will bring together commitments on democracy, human rights and conflict prevention into a single, legally binding text.

At the sub-regional level, substantive progress has been made by organisations such as SADC and ECOWAS in developing regional observation and monitoring standards and capacities. SADC has established the SADC Electoral Commissions Forum (ECF), SADC Electoral Support Network (ESN), SADC Parliamentary Forum and the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA). These institutions provide election focused technical support and training; have assisted in the practical elaboration of election and democracy related treaty commitments and have developed networks for collaboration between civil society groups, national governments and domestic election agencies.
The framework for collaboration and engagement between institutions such as EISA and the fourteen SADC countries was institutionalised in the 2003 *Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation in the SADC Region (PEMMO)*. The issues addressed in the PEMMO (outlined in Box 2.3 below) and principles set out in the document are recommended as a ‘checklist’ for national governments, national election administrations and domestic election observer and monitoring groups ahead of an election process.

**Box 2.3 Issues address in the PEMMO**

- The need for a comprehensive constitutional and legal framework;
- The importance of transparent and accessible pre-election procedures (candidate nomination, voter registration etc);
- Use of the media, public resources and political party financing;
- The organisation and management of the separate pre-election, election and post-election phases;
- The requirements for unhindered, credible, professional and impartial monitoring and observation of the electoral process.

**Case Studies of PEMMO ‘roll-out’**

- Malawi: EISA provided PEMMO training to sixty members of the Malawi Electoral Support Network (MESN) for the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections;
- Botswana: EISA provided technical and financial support to the Botswana Electoral Support Network (BESNET) in developing a training and deployment strategy for monitoring the Botswana Parliamentary and Local Government Elections held October 2004. BESNET deployed 300 observers during the elections;
- Namibia: EISA worked with the Namibian NGO Forum (NANGOF) to provide technical and financial support for the training and deployment of 200 election observers for the Namibia National Assembly elections;
- Mozambique: ESN members distributed the PEMMO and trained domestic observers.

### 2.3 Summary

AROs have played a substantial role in advancing democracy and good governance principles and respect for human rights in the sub-Saharan region. This has enabled domestic ‘ownership’ of the agenda, while providing an important space for civil society participation. However, more work needs to be done in terms of translating obligations into policies and implementing legislation and constitutional provisions. There are significant institutional limitations in terms of ARO capacity, resourcing and effectiveness. As a result, the ability of regional organisations to achieve further substantive change is questionable. This is problematic given that powerful domestic drivers of bad governance and authoritarianism persist, as is discussed in the following section.
3. Setbacks and Negative Trends

Despite the progress that has been made, major cultural, political and socio-economic obstacles to democracy, human rights observance and good governance persist. While adherence to these principles is growing, this is at a slow pace and these values have yet to be ‘normalised’ within parties, state administrations, civil society and the wider political culture. Indicative of this, in its 2005 survey, Freedom House listed just 11 of the 48 sub-Saharan countries as free, while 21 were partly free and 16 not free. This section provides an overview of the constraints encountered in promoting democracy, human rights and good governance and the roots of ‘Afropessimism,’ before exploring EU / EC approaches and priorities in the final section.

3.1 Negative trends: election processes

In a large number of countries that have held multiparty elections, the campaigns have frequently been characterised by violence.\textsuperscript{113} Election results have also been subject to dispute (Nigeria 2003; Guinea Bissau 2005; Guinea 2004; Togo 2005; Mozambique 2004). The adoption of majoritarian systems has exacerbated this problem by creating a ‘winner takes all’ scenario that reduces the need for coalition building and negotiation.

Despite strong international support for the technical aspects of election processes, the trend has been one of: a) election administrations not functioning effectively; b) voter registration drives encountering problems; c) misuse of public and media resources; and; d) post-election adjudication failing to resolve disputes. The neutrality and capacity of independent election commissions has frequently been challenged and this has led to opposition boycotts of national, regional and local elections.

Multiparty elections have frequently been conducted in less than optimal conditions. Ruling party and state restrictions on opposition party political activity, mobilisation and campaigning, combined with the repression of media freedom has meant that a large number of elections have not qualified as free or fair. The presence of international and domestic election observers has often failed to generate confidence in the election process or the final election result. Despite the creation of standards in election observation and monitoring by the EU, AROs and other actors, there have been recurrent intra-organisational disputes over the transparency and veracity of election processes and results, as represented by the division between EU and SADC countries on the three recent elections in Zimbabwe. This latter case also underscores the limited

ability of AROs to coherently advance domestic monitoring and observation capacities. Despite the extensive attention paid to building capacities in this area, SADC has been ineffective in promoting free and fair elections in Zimbabwe and defending basic democratic principles in that country.

An important factor in accounting for the limited success of post-conflict elections is that they have been held before peace has been established across the national territory. When conflict is ongoing in provinces and outlying areas, a secure and reliable election cannot be conducted owing to impediments to party political mobilisation and participation, voter registration, voting and ballot box transfers. Secondly, if combatants are not disarmed in advance of the election process, this undermines citizen security, the rule of law and the willingness of defeated parties to accept the election outcome (Angola, Sierra Leone, Mozambique and concerns regarding the 2006 election in DRC being cases in point). Thirdly, elections have been conducted when internally displaced people and refugees have not returned to the national territory. Consequently, a sizeable number of voters are excluded from the election process. Finally, infrastructural deficits in African countries (exacerbated in post-conflict contexts) pose serious logistical challenges.

3.2 Representation and rights
Aside from election processes, progress in promoting democracy, human rights and good governance has been undermined by delays to - or government domination of - the drafting and introduction of new laws and constitutions that embody these principles (Congo Kinshasa, Zambia), despite commitments to pluralist negotiations made in peace processes or transition accords. Moreover the process of designing new legislative and constitutional frameworks has usually lacked mechanisms and opportunities for civil society and wider political input and participation. Consequently these new codes tend to lack legitimacy and this has impeded the institutionalisation of human and democratic rights, reducing their utility as a conflict reduction tool and mechanism for promoting democracy and good governance. In a number of countries where new legislative and constitutional frameworks have been introduced, these have been bypassed (Togo) or not been fully effective in institutionalising the ‘rules of the game’. This latter trend is due to a tendency of ruling parties pressing for amendments that expand the power and prerogatives of the president, or for revisions that allow

115 Regarding Angola for example, 305,000 refugees remain in Namibia, DRC and Zambia.
incumbents to re-contest office (Kenya, Nigeria, Chad). Underpinning this is a sustained problem of ‘big man’ politics in many African countries (Uganda, Ethiopia, Nigeria) and the continued mobilisation of ethnic and patronage-based networks of support and, elite institutionalisation of rent-seeking activities. As outlined in chapter 7 of this series, the persistence of patron-client ties and rent-seeking is particularly pronounced in resource rich countries that export primary products such as oil.\textsuperscript{116}

Party systems in Africa range from highly polarised to extremely fragmented. Opposition parties are typically weak, internally divided and lacking in a coherent policy agenda. Being a part of an opposition political party continues to be interpreted in some African languages as being ‘the enemy’ of those in the government party. The ‘new’ political parties that have emerged over the past ten years to challenge dominant party hegemony have not served as a vehicle for popular participation and they often have limited support in rural areas. They are typically personalised, lacking in internal democracy, without a good funding base and they usually present a ‘movement for change’ without a coherent political programme of their own.\textsuperscript{117} This has reduced the opportunities to incorporate alienated and disaffected groups (particularly young males) into the political process.

Because mechanisms for effective civilian control and oversight of the armed forces are not in place, the military remains a central political force while public security and the rule of law remain fragile in many states (Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Uganda). Respect for civilian government remains weak among the armed forces. Indicative of this there were 186 coup d’etats between 1956 and 2001, half of which occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. Overall, civilian control of the security sector is minimal and this has limited progress in institutionalising basic human rights.

Violations of human rights remain routine in some countries (Eritrea, Sudan, and Equatorial Guinea). Progress in institutionalising first generation civil and political rights has been slow and vulnerable to reversal. The media continues to be subject to repression and arbitrary control across Africa (most recently in Ethiopia and Cote’D’Ivoire) and it is in the area of press freedom that Africa has made the least progress according to international measures of democracy and human rights.\textsuperscript{118} Human rights defenders have been subject to intimidation and repression in a number of countries and despite the creation of the African court, limited progress has been

\textsuperscript{116} See for example Omeje, Kenneth (2006) \textit{High Stakes and Stakeholders: Oil Conflict and Security in Nigeria}. Ashgate.


made in creating an autonomous judiciary and institutionalising fundamental rights. Judiciaries in many African countries remain subject to undue political influence and coercion, despite legal and constitutional provisions for autonomy. A lack of oversight and accountability within the judiciary remains an ongoing problem.  

Exclusion, discrimination and non-incorporation as a result of ethnicity, gender, culture and religious belief, remains deeply embedded. This has impeded the institutionalisation of first and second generation rights (economic, social and cultural rights). Cameroon, Zimbabwe and Nigeria have recently moved to adopt discriminatory laws against homosexuals in violation of their responsibilities under regional and international human rights conventions. Progress in expanding female representation and empowerment has been slow and particularly limited in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote D’ Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Sudan and Tunisia. The number of females in parliament in these twelve countries is below the Continental average of 14 per cent. In those countries that have used quotas to bring women into the Parliamentary system, the turnover of females in the legislature has been low and there are concerns that these initiatives have created new lines of patronage. It has also been argued that the emphasis on parliamentary and party political representation of women has detracted governments from the need to address the structural causes of female poverty and marginalisation. Educational and training opportunities for women remain low and profound inequalities between men and women in land holdings, incomes and economic opportunities persist. An estimated 23 million girls in sub-Saharan Africa are not in school and no country has allocated more than 1 per cent of the national budget to gender issues.

Despite the participatory thrust underpinning contemporary development and democracy strategies, there are real problems engaging with civil society in African countries. Overall, civil society in Africa is weak and heterogeneous and mistrust of government persists. Civil society groups lack the skills necessary to take part in technical negotiations, they have inadequate access to information, they tend to be urban focused and are dominated by a narrow elite. They can also incorporate and manifest communal and ethnic tensions. Capacity building within civil society groups has been undermined by funding limitations (which means people move in and out

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121 ECDPM InBrief 3E, ‘Non-state actors in Benin: Dialgoue on cooperation is getting organised’, http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Content.nsf
123 ECDPM InBrief 3C, ‘Non-state actors in Senegal, Towards a strategy for political action’.
of posts and therefore do not build up their skills base) and also the ‘pull’ of working with donor countries and organizations. The legal and institutional frameworks that have been set up for participation and dialogue lack funding and they have failed to effectively incorporate those directly affected by poverty, people from rural areas or representatives of religious and traditional authorities.124

3.3 Institutions and government
Decentralisation and devolution initiatives have faced setbacks amid conflict between central and regional authorities over responsibilities and financing (Nigeria, Congo Kinshasa), a lack of political will from the national government and efforts by local elites to manipulate decentralisation for their own political ends. Elected and unelected local government officials lack the technical skills and financial resources to implement participatory budgeting and development and planning strategies. Transparency and accountability within central–regional budget lines remain opaque and this has justified centralist efforts to rein back decentralisation initiatives. Frameworks for city level democracy are fragile and of poor quality.125 Furthermore, voter apathy has been a sustained problem in local elections, reducing the democratising intentions of the process. Central governments have proved particularly reluctant to relinquish control over local and regional government when these have been won by opposition groups (Ethiopia).126

Progress on reducing corruption and promoting effective and accountable governance has been limited. Despite the introduction of national action plans, anti-corruption initiatives are rarely taken forward and when they are: a) they do not amount to an integrated anti-corruption programme and; b) they have tended to focus on individual (and politically motivated) ‘exemplary’ cases. Governments have been reluctant to prosecute members of the outgoing administration owing to concerns over political instability that a highly charged case could bring. Frustration with the lack of progress has led to the resignation of anti-corruption commissioners (Kenya).

Privatisation, procurement, opaque tendering practices and subcontracting have expanded the opportunities for corrupt practices, while the mono-export dependent profile of a number of countries has perpetuated rent-seeking behaviour. Two key criticisms of the ‘good governance’ oriented institutional reforms undertaken by African

125 IDEA Democracy at the Local level in East and Southern Africa, Profiles in Governance.
countries (in co-operation with international actors such as the EU) are: 1) that they focus too heavily on legalistic aspects and civil service capacity building, to the detriment of projects that build transparency and accountability and; 2) the responsibility of private sector actors (domestic and international) for encouraging unethical and illegal behaviour in the public sector has been neglected.

Box 3.1 Case Study: Combating corruption in Sierra Leone

The government has introduced initiatives to combat corruption including performance appraisal systems, a code of ethics for the private sector and the construction of a decentralised framework of government. However corruption remains pervasive. Underscoring this, the Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) has exposed overall discrepancies between money allocated to line ministries and money received at grass roots level. The judiciary, the public accounts and public expenditure committees, and other integrity pillars have all received training, rehabilitation or resources from donor agencies but they still lack the required impetus to make any real impact. The above initiatives have been donor-driven and focus on restricting monopolistic power through administrative and market-orientated reform. These projects are in their early stages and are yet to have an impact. Resistance has been encountered within the relevant ministries, departments and institutions from vested interests, who perceive the introduction of greater transparency as an erosion of their power.

As part of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy an Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) was established with funding from the UK Department for International Development (DfID) to investigate and discourage administrative abuses. The ACC can arrest suspects but lacks the mandate to prosecute. Suspects are handed over to the Attorney General, who is also the Minister of Justice. This infrastructural flaw has meant that cases put forward by the ACC against individuals with political connections have been undermined. Action has yet to be taken against senior former ministers alleged to have committed acts of corruption. At least 35 cases brought before the Attorney General by the ACC have essentially been ignored and critics have labelled the ACC as a tool to deter and punish political opponents, “a key instrument of Presidential authority rather than an impartial body.”

Quantitative measures of governance based on a statistical time series (Table 3.1 below) demonstrate that limited progress has been made in developing good governance models, practices and procedures in Africa. The longitudinal approach also shows that advancing the good governance agenda is not a smooth, linear process and that setbacks and reversals are a common problem. There are also significant variations in governance performance across the Continent and also variations in performance on different governance measures on a per country basis.
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\(^{127}\) Note: The governance indicators are a statistical compilation of responses on the quality of governance given by enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries, as reported by a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations.
As a result of the ongoing problems and political weaknesses described in this section, in a large number of countries that have held multiparty elections, a hybrid regime type has emerged that has variously been described as electoral-, authoritarian-, semi- or quasi-democracy. This model is characterised by the 'outward' acceptance of the democratic rules of the game and international and regional treaty obligations. However these obligations are not respected, upheld or promoted in practice. These semi-democracies are failing to function as a mechanism for interest reconciliation between contesting groups. In a number of countries, this situation has the potential to re-ignite previous ethnic, political and religious conflicts. The existence of semi-democratic forms of government also reduces the prospects for economic growth along the lines of the participatory-based development model, as well as prospects for good governance. As a result of problems of legitimacy, resourcing and capacity, the ability of the state to govern in a credible, effective and transparent manner remains weak in many African states.

3.4 Summary
African countries are far from developing a culture of democracy, tolerance and pluralism. Institutions remain fragile, mechanisms for representation, feedback and accountability are weak and the gap between state and society is large. Fundamental and pre-existing problems, most specifically the limited reach, capacity and coverage of the state continue to be a severe impediment to meaningful democracy and the advance of good governance principles. Although the AU and sub-regional organisations have played an instrumental role in developing democracy, human rights and good governance agendas, they are institutionally immature, under-resourced and under-staffed. Moreover, they lack the technical capacity to effectively support these principles in a manner consistent with treaties and regional agreements. There is an ongoing lack of professionalism and financial resourcing, specifically for APRM, while the ARO stress on dialogue and state sovereignty has limited the opportunities for effective early and intervention by regional groups when member states fail to abide by their democracy, human rights and good governance obligations. There is also an ongoing debate over the extent to which development aid itself is the central obstacle to the achievement of democracy, human rights and good governance. In this respect donor aid is seen to: a) increase the financial benefits of being in office – and consequently intensifies the political struggle for control of the state;\textsuperscript{128} b) erode the willingness and need for central and local government authorities to raise local taxes (perpetuating aid

dependency); c) render government accountable to donors and not civil society and it d) sucks capable African nationals out of employment in the state bureaucracy as they seek employment in the aid ‘industry’. Further to this, there is criticism by groups like Action Aid that very little of the financial support provided actually reaches those most in need, with the majority of revenues directed into consultancy fees and technical support.

4. The EU: Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance in Africa

This section provides an overview of EU policy and instruments in relation to democracy, human rights and good governance promotion in the sub-Saharan region. Despite the pessimistic overview provided in the previous section, it is possible to discern entry points for EU / EC activities that can be effective in supporting the hesitant progress made to date by African countries and AROs, as explored in the final section.

4.1 The evolution of EU policy positions and statements

In the 1990s, the EU emerged as an important partner in the development, promotion and implementation of ARO democracy, human rights and good governance programmes. Following from the introduction of new treaty agreements and institutional initiatives in the 1990s and 2000s, these principles now form the cornerstone of contemporary EU political relations with African countries and the basis for development co-operation. A number of inter-related factors account for the shift in EU policy, away from unilaterally structured member state engagement and toward a multilateral policy approach based on the promotion of democracy, human rights and good governance. These include:


131 For example, the creation of the Human Rights and Democracy Committee in 1999, the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights and the launch in 2000 of the EU-Africa Partnership.

• The end of the Cold War and related Cold War security concerns. During the Cold War, EU member states perceived Africa as a zone of strategic confrontation, resulting in stress on unilateral engagement and stability over democracy and human rights. In the post-Cold War period, the adoption of a common EU foreign and security policy has led to the collective promotion of democracy, human rights and good governance as a mechanism for the reduction and management of conflict, the promotion of economic development and the prevention of terrorism.  

• The economic globalisation process, changing patterns of EU trade and concerns Africa was being marginalized from the global integration processes. There has been a paradigm shift in development policy in line with the economic globalisation process that followed the end of the Cold War. This is reflected in EU thinking and strategic approaches. From the 1990s, the EU emphasised the instrumental value of human rights, democracy and functioning, accountable and transparent government for economic development and poverty reduction in Africa. ‘Good governance’ (initially loosely defined) was viewed as essential for African countries to capitalise on foreign direct investment and opportunities for global integration. Specific stress has been placed by the EU/EC on the importance of participation by state and non-state actors in political and economic initiatives and on the centrality of institutionalising first generation civil and political rights as a means of achieving second generation economic, social and cultural rights and sustainable reductions in poverty.

• The perception that established frameworks for EU-African political and economic relations (the Lome conventions) had failed to fundamentally improve the economic position of African countries and that earlier trade agreements went against the principles of the WTO. This served to reinforce the emphasis on good governance as a means of enhancing African development goals and opportunities in the global economy.

133 The Commission Communications on relief and rehabilitation and conflict prevention (2001) emphasised the need for EU member states to support ‘structural stability’, defined as sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, democracy and healthy environmental and social conditions, as these allow for peaceful change and the resolution of conflict.


• Reductions in the level of EU aid to African countries (from 52 per cent of total EU external aid in 1990 to 25 per cent by 2000\(^{137}\)) and recognition that the quality and effectiveness of the aid that continued to be provided had to be improved. These changes accentuated the importance of transparent, accountable and effective government. By contrast, corruption, understood as the abuse of public office for private gain, is a pertinent manifestation of bad government. It has a highly regressive impact on the poor; it accentuates inequality; it increases the costs associated with private sector investment and it reduces the effectiveness of aid by limiting the impact of (and fiscal resources available for) poverty reduction and social development initiatives.

4.2 EU / EC Instruments

EU institutions have developed a range of tools and instruments to promote human rights, democracy and good governance in Africa and to encourage the mainstreaming of these principles into EU / EC programme initiatives and agreements. The development of these tools has run parallel with efforts to enhance co-ordination and co-operation among member states; improve the ‘sensitivity’ and coherence of policy; streamline and improve institutional responses and tackle obstacles to effective policy implementation.\(^{138}\) These instruments include;

• Sanctions;
• Demarches – usually confidentially and undertaken by the Presidency of the EU
• Diplomatic representations;
• Dialogue within regional, multilateral and international arenas, with the EU position informed by the six EU Guidelines on Human Rights;\(^{139}\)
• The development of uniform strategies and positions among member states, in turn allowing for coordinated joint actions. In 2001, EU member states also introduced annual progress reports on Country and Regional Strategy Papers (CSPs and RSPs) that include a political analysis section that assesses the human rights and democracy situation in each country.


\(^{138}\) For example, the 2001 Communication from the EU Commission, which restated the centrality and importance of human rights and democracy promotion in EU relations with third countries, emphasised the need for greater coherence in EU human rights and democracy promoting activities and enhanced application of the EIDHR in EU projects.

\(^{139}\) These cover the death penalty (1998), torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (2001), children and armed conflict (2003), human rights defenders (2004) and promotion of International Humanitarian Law (2005). These can be read at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/intro/
• Financial and technical support for capacity building programmes in the ARO institutions, the judiciary; national, regional and election administrations, parliamentary bodies, civil society and constitutional drafting processes.
• Human rights, democracy and good governance clauses in trade and aid agreements and in cooperation and assistance programmes, in line with the EC’s 2001 Communication on the EU’s Role in Promoting Democracy and Human Rights in Third Countries.
• International election observation and monitoring missions; technical support for election commissions, voter registration schemes and election processes. Assistance to support domestic election observation and monitoring capacities.
• Devolution of decision-making from Brussels to the Commission’s delegations overseas.\(^\text{140}\)

The most recent European Commission initiative, the *EU Development Policy* of December 2005 explicitly links the promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance with poverty reduction, international security and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals by 2015;\(^\text{141}\) it establishes a set of common principles under which the EU and member countries will implement development policy and it restates the importance of civil society and non-state actor participation in the development process in order to ‘ensure the viability, effectiveness and impact of development strategies and programmes’. This underscores the integration of participatory-based development concepts into EU thinking and it marks an important shift away from the traditional emphasis on government-to-government relations that underpinned the Lome Conventions.

**The Cotonou Partnership Agreement**

In 2000, relations between the EU and ACP countries were restructured in line with new AU and EU thinking on peace, democracy and development through the twenty-five year Cotonou Partnership Agreement. This marked a break with the framework of the Lome Conventions in terms of the emphasis placed on African integration into

\(^{140}\) ECDPM Institutional Framework of EC External Assistance http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Content.nsf

the global economy and the importance of participatory-based development. Article 1 of Cotonou set out the broad objective of the partnership agreement as being: ‘To promote and expedite the economic, cultural and social development of the ACP states, with a view to contributing to peace and security and to promoting a stable and democratic political environment […] centred on the objective of reducing and eventually eradicating poverty consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy’.

The promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance are reflected in: a) Article 2, in which two of the four pillars of the agreement are participation of ‘all sectors of society’ and ‘dialogue and fulfilment of mutual obligations’; b) recognition of human rights, democratic principles and rule of law as ‘essential elements’ of the agreement; c) Article 9, in which human rights are ‘universal, indivisible and interrelated’ and d) the incorporation of good governance as a ‘fundamental’ element. The emphasis placed on the participation of civil society and non-state actors in the development process, and the elevation of participatory development to the status of defining principle in EU-ACP relations is unprecedented. Cotonou effectively mandates the EU and ACP countries to resource and develop the capacity of civil society groups and to actively engage civil society in the initiation, development and implementation of policy and programmes. As surmised by the secretary general of the ACP, Jean-Robert Goulongana: ‘This principle involves associating all the active forces of society with the development efforts, under the responsibility of the government, which acts as foreman’.

In terms of enforcing and upholding the principles of Cotonou, strong emphasis is placed on (continuous) dialogue, negotiation and engagement, over and above the use of sanctions and ‘punishment’ of non-compliant governments. If violations of human rights and democratic principles persist, or if corruption is not tackled effectively and deepens, Articles 96 and 97 allow for a consultation procedure between the EU and the relevant ACP country, aimed at finding a commonly agreed solution. In the event that no solution can be reached, or agreements to resolve the problem are violated, sanctions can be imposed such as the suspension of co-operation and development assistance and targeted travel sanctions against members of the offending government. This only pertains to violations of human rights and democracy (Article 96) and not to breaches of governance standards. ACP member states that have been called to dialogue under Article 96 (principally in relation to unconstitutional changes of government and human rights violations) include Guinea-Bissau (2004), Cote D’Ivoire

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The emphasis on negotiating solutions in Cotonou is in line with ARO and EU policy of ‘remaining engaged’ with difficult third parties.\textsuperscript{144} This is underpinned by the view that a more adversarial, sanction-oriented approach would:

- Lead to a further deterioration of the situation in a given country;
- Unless competently targeted, negatively impact on the general population, further worsening their situation;
- Negatively impact on neighbours of the country in question, spiralling into a regional problem;
- Isolate the country in question, rendering it vulnerable to infiltration by terrorist and criminal organisations (an increasingly important consideration for the EU in the current security environment);
- Require the EU to ’start all over again’ and lose investments made in existing programming.

In accord with Article 95, the Cotonou Agreement is revised every five years. At the first revision session in 2005, provisions were made for a more systematic and formal political dialogue process (strengthening Article 8 of the agreement relating to dialogue) ahead of the use of Article 96, which was viewed as a punitive measure by ACP states. The timeframe for Article 96 negotiations were extended and changes introduced that allow representatives of the ACP group and the Joint Parliamentary Assembly to participate in the dialogue process. The revised agreement also incorporated a new annex of detailed modalities for dialogue.

5 Challenges, Dilemmas and Priorities for the EU

Although the EU / EC has made substantive process in terms of evolving its institutional structures and programming priorities in line with contemporary security, development assistance, poverty reduction and CPMR objectives in Africa, significant obstacles to the effective roll-out and promotion of the guiding principles of democracy, human rights and good governance persist. This final section outlines the current challenges faced by the EU / EC in this area and highlights priority areas for action.

\textsuperscript{144} See for example 2005 EU consensus document.
5.1 Intra-EU dilemmas

EU institutions have a number of weaknesses that need to be addressed if foreign and security policy initiatives are to be more effective in promoting conflict reduction, socio-economic development and democratic outcomes in Africa. The EU has reformed and streamlined its institutional structures and organisational modalities in relation to external relations, however;

• Cumbersome bureaucratic procedures persist;
• There remains a gap between policymaking in Brussels and implementation by the EC’s overseas delegations. Progress devolving power to EU / EC in-country delegations has been limited. Problems of communication and tension between Capitals and Country / Regional missions persist within the EC as well as EU member states.
• The management of external assistance is fragmented across different EU services that are under different commissioners, with overlapping mandates and their own financial instruments;
• New procedures have yet to be fully embedded and institutionalised;
• Unilateralist predispositions and the perceived national interest of individual EU member states continue to prevail over the development of a common EU position; More progress needs to be made in developing common understandings and political approaches;
• There is an on going lack of coherence between political, development and trade aspects of EU and member state policies;
• The EC has a weak capacity in terms of developing and implementing politically refined strategies and programmes;
• There has been a lack of direction from the Commission and political support from EU member states, a majority of which have yet to meet their commitment to dedicate 0.7% of the gross national income to development assistance.

Consequently a principle priority for the EU / EC is enhancing institutional coherence, response and performance across its external affairs institutions. A paradigmatic example of the heavy bureaucratic constraints and inflexibilities of development and implementation of EC programming relates to the procedures under which (European) non-governmental organisations apply for funding for projects related to human rights, good governance and democracy promotion in African countries. Deadlines for funding calls are vague, subject to change and not responsive to ‘immediate’ problems

145 ECDPM Institutional Framework of EC External Assistance.
and demands for funding as they arise and political circumstances evolve (for overseas projects, the EU requires the view of the EU delegation in that country). Award procedures are complex and can tie NGO staff up for weeks, while the acceptance rate for submissions is low at around 22 per cent in 2003. Significant improvements can be made in this – and other areas of programming - through the rationalisation of application processes, speedier evaluation of proposals and reform of procedural obstacles to allow for flexible review and adjustment of programmes, specifically during implementation.

5.2 Elections
Following from the assessment of problems related to contemporary African elections in section 3, it is evident that the EU / EC can do a number of things in order to play a more effective, stabilising, sustainable and cost effective role in election processes.

First, the EU / EC should continue to work with international partners in promoting universal standards in election monitoring and observation. Secondly, and inter-related with the previous point, financial support for ARO and domestic election observer organisations in Africa should be enhanced and prioritised over the funding of large (and typically short-term focused) EU election observer delegations. Supporting local capacity in this area has a number of benefits; it helps to generate retainable capacity; it provides resourcing to civil society groups that are usually engaged in other democracy promotion related activities and; it builds African ownership and (in the SADC experience) co-operation. Through the promotion of domestic election observation capacities, the EU / EC can work more effectively to incorporate ‘best practice’ and ‘lessons learned’ from ARO member states such as Ghana, which is viewed as a model for best practice in developing national election administrations.

Thirdly, the EU can devote more attention to wider sequencing and programming issues. There has been a move away from short-term observation to more long-term, technically oriented mission deployment. The promotion of longer timeframes for elections (particularly in post-conflict scenarios) will ensure that election processes become ‘understandable’ to citizens by providing time for voter education and training. Although there is now greater awareness that elections are not an immediate guarantee of peace and democracy, and that they can in fact re-ignite political violence,\(^{147}\) they still tend to be prioritised in EU programmes and evaluations of the progress made by African countries. However, a bias toward short-termist approaches persists. By adopting

a more flexible approach to election timetables and ensuring that elections are more coherently sequenced with Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) initiatives and peace negotiations, the EU / EC can play an important role in enhancing the utility of elections as a conflict reduction and democracy building mechanism. In this respect, election support needs to be placed in a wider political / CPMR strategy for improving governance and long-term stability and more coherently integrated with DDR and SSR (security sector reform) programmes. More significantly, democracy and good governance programming needs to be more effectively informed by, responsive to, and understanding of, the limitations and challenges faced by civilian government in ‘weak’, ‘fragile’ and ‘failing’ states.

5.3 Rights and representation

A third major challenge for the EU / EC is ensuring that the progress made in developing democratic institutional and constitutional frameworks is sustained. It is important that African leaders are encouraged to respect their own legal and constitutional initiatives. ‘Big man’ politics continues to prevail in many African countries and this poses obstacles to the development of a coherent, democratically-based working relationship between the EU and AROs. While it is recognised that ‘semi-democracies’ can be politically stable and effective in the delivery of security objectives and pro-poor outcomes (and consequently that pragmatism is required when engaging with regimes with authoritarian characteristics), it has been repeatedly shown that ‘neighbourhoods matter’. In this respect undemocratic states set a bad example for neighbouring countries, they become entrenched over time and ultimately they can generate systemic and political crises that exacerbate grievance and which can culminate in conflict. Engagement with difficult parties must therefore be principled if EU-African relations are not to perpetuate practices of pragmatic support for overtly authoritarian executives.

As has been outlined in Section 3, violations of human rights remain routine in some countries. This requires EU / EC institutions to pro-actively support human rights institutions and defenders in African countries; maintain a principled stand on issues such as freedom of expression and to work collaboratively with AROs in order to ensure that these values are institutionalised and upheld. An increase in financial disbursements to support capacity building and technical training would be effective in enhancing the influence and autonomy of human rights commissions and defenders. Through continued collaboration with international partners engaged in the promotion of human rights, the EU / EC will be positioned to maintain a central role in the institutionalisation of first and second generation rights.
The persistence of exclusion is a dilemma for the EU. Aside from underscoring the need for EU organisations to identify and promote the interests of excluded groups, this situation also points to the importance of active engagement with political parties, with the aim of expanding their capacity to represent and incorporate the needs and interests politically marginalised sectors. To date, the EU / EC has been reluctant to engage with party political organisations, despite the benefits that can accrue from encouraging pluralistic and representative party political organisations. Despite the participatory thrust underpinning contemporary development and democracy strategies, there are real problems engaging with civil society in African countries, as outlined in section 3. The weakness of civil society in Africa is a challenge for EU / EC programming and this is reflected in the tendency for ‘conventional’ projects. As a way of addressing this problem, the EU / EC can focus on the continuing and serious information gap that exists in relation to the support that is available to civil society and, by expanding engagement in non-urban settings. This requires enhanced decentralisation from Brussels to country-based offices. In supporting civil society, there needs to be better identification of ‘core’ groups and needs. The primary challenge for the EU here lies in identifying organisations that; a) allow for female and youth participation; b) work at the local rather than the national level; c) cover rural as well as urban areas and; d) already have – or could have transparent and accountable internal structures.

5.4 Good governance and institutions
It is increasingly recognised that ‘good governance’ is complex and country-context specific. This has operational implications that need to be more fully incorporated into EU / EC programming and projects. Identifying the opportunities and constraints for institutional reform on a per country basis is necessary if the ‘good governance’ agenda is to be effective in generating legitimate, competent government and public sector institutions. A more nuanced identification of need, project feasibility, potential entry points and local context is therefore required for good governance programming to be sustainable and credible. This in turn points to the importance of enhancing local capacity to devise and implement good governance focused initiatives, through, for example, targeted and fully monitored support to specific elements of the APRM. Moreover, good governance programming needs to address the drivers of bad governance – specifically the complex political dynamics that generate and exacerbate problems of corruption, unethical conduct, rent-seeking and patronage politics.

Progress to support good governance programming can be further enhanced through the more effective integration and use of existing instruments such as drivers for change, CPMR analyses and strategies and broader development of Country and Regional Strategy Papers to incorporate challenges and operational constraints. It is essential that there is more effective engagement and analysis of the dynamics and drivers of bad government and that a broader view of the wider political environment is used to inform selected and targeted programming strategies.

The progress that has been made in crafting transparent and accountable institutions and reducing violence is threatened by the rise of organised crime and the expansion of the international trade in narcotic drugs into African ‘transit’ countries (as seen in Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya). As a matter of urgency, the EU / EC needs to address the threats posed to African countries by the arms trade, money-laundering and narcotic-drug trafficking and prioritise support to African countries in dealing with these issues in partnership with other international actors, such as the United Nations. UN drugs control agencies have significantly failed to address the impact on Africa of counter-narcotics enforcement efforts in other areas of the globe (specifically in relation to trafficking) and the EU needs to press for coherent international action on this issue, in addition to supporting and framing bilateral and EU-African counter-narcotics programmes. As discussed in Chapter 7 of this series, more needs to be understood about the dynamics of cross border activities and the impact of informal economies if a more coherent legal and institutional response to criminal challenges is to be framed. Drawing the issues of criminality and good governance together, the EU / EC is positioned to actively promote exchanges and experience sharing between African countries and sub-regional organisations.

5.5 AROs and intra-regional agreements

Owing to the institutional fragility and weakness of AROs, there has been a tendency for external actors to channel financial assistance and technical support – through a somewhat blanket approach – to intra-regional institutions. This approach needs to be refined if the support that is provided is to generate sustainable and positive outcomes. More specifically, the EU / EC should accelerate the steps that are being taken in the direction of: a) identifying specific end policy objectives (with the participation of stakeholders) and goals ; b) identifying those elements / institutions within the ARO structure that are capable of delivering these end goals and; c) targeting technical and / or financial assistance to support these specific programmes and those institutions responsible for delivery and implementation.

In terms of intra-organisational instruments, there are limitations to ‘preventative’
approaches and strategies such as the use of Article 96 in the Cotonou Agreement.
Experience with the mechanism to date has shown that it has not served as an effective
tool for reducing human rights and democracy violations; that engagement with
‘difficult partners’ and dialogue is entered into only when a crisis situation has already
developed (such as a coup d’état); that in the absence of a significant trigger (such as a
coup) it is problematic to identify points for intervention and; that the follow up
phase has been under-resourced, under-emphasised and inadequate.150

A significant challenge for the EU / EC lies in enhancing the body’s capacity to
monitor and identify triggers and developing multilateral interventions that are
responsive to the unique historical and political situation of each country. This can be
achieved through greater cohesion between those institutions within the EU that have
responsibility for external affairs, between Brussels and overseas EU delegations and
between EU member states. A recent research paper identified the responses, actions
and attitudes of neighbouring governments to democratic / human rights violations
in ACP member countries to be a key determinant of the success of political dialogue
(under Article 8 and article 96) of the Cotonou Agreement. This reinforces the view
that EU / EC democracy and human rights focused activities must address the dilemma
of ‘big man’ politics and the legacy of semi-democracies in the region.

A final but none the less crucial challenge for the EU / EC lies in enhancing European
understanding of processes and sequences relating to human rights, democracy and
good governance and the impact (at the grassroots) of current policies in this area.
Very little is known about, for example, the impact of decentralisation initiatives.
There is a lack of research on participation and development in the African context
(specifically at the local level) and if / how decentralisation and participation reduce
poverty.151 It is estimated that the urban population of Africa will reach 500 million
by 2025 of which 350 million will live in slums.152 Support for and understanding of
the challenges around local government development, capacity and responsiveness is
essential if serious problems relating to violence, insecurity and deprivation in urban
areas are to be controlled over the next decade. As Devas has argued, it is only if fiscal
transfers are transparent, equitable and predictable that substantial progress can be
made. The key to success is not what is budgeted but what is delivered.

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Chapter 5

Addressing the Political Economies of Armed Conflict in Africa

Cord Jakobeit with Michaela Maier and Neil Cooper
Executive Summary

Conventional policy approaches to conflict prevention and management have too often disregarded the centrality of economic motivations, opportunities and agendas in civil wars. The chapter takes this omission as a starting point and puts special emphasis on the political economy of civil wars in Sub-Saharan Africa. We ask what progress has been made in our understanding of and responding to the challenge of today’s civil conflicts in Africa.

Many intrastate conflicts are self-financing via trade in natural resources, global financial flows, the misappropriation of aid and remittances of diaspora communities. Consequently, disrupting and managing these resource flows is a central policy approach to conflict resolution.

Special emphasis is put in this chapter on the role natural resources play in influencing the likelihood of civil conflict, its duration and intensity. We show that different resources have different characteristics and thus different effects on conflict probability, either through abundance or through paucity.

We conclude with a set of recommendations for the European Union, thereby highlighting the importance of borderlands, a plea for bottom-up strategies and a suggestion to upgrade the various schemes promoting transparency and open accountancy in the trade of resources beyond the current voluntary compliance. But it should be equally clear that there are no uniform success-promising approaches to the transformation of war into peace economies. What is needed is the building of awareness, context-sensitivity and recognition of the specific characteristics of the target states, resources, and conflicts to be addressed.
1. Introduction

The prevalence of violent, mainly internal conflict in almost all regions of sub-Saharan Africa constitutes an issue of intense political and public concern, interest and debate. From time immemorial, economic factors have played a central role in warfare. Economic agendas are all the more a reality, since the end of the Cold War led to a rapid decline of superpower financial support of the various warring parties in the developing world. As a result, the protagonists of intrastate wars were forced to open up new resources to finance their campaigns. This led to the development of increasingly sophisticated and diversified political economies of civil war in addition to more traditional fundraising channels via pillage and predation. To name but a few of the now available options:

- Trade in lucrative natural resources via licit world market channels or more illicit shadow economic networks (constituting the phenomenon of so called ‘war economies’);
- Diaspora remittances;
- Anonymous financial transactions round the globe;
- Capture of foreign aid.

Assisted by insufficiently regulated globalisation, modern information technologies and weak states in the developing world, civil war actors have become able to benefit from business transactions with criminal networks, arms dealers and even legal corporations. Thus, their economic activities transcend the immediate war zones and penetrate the world’s commodity and financial centres and markets.

Against this background, it is all the more astonishing that the complex intermingling of political, economic and social aspects in today’s civil wars began to attract heightened interest within the international community, research circles and the wider public only at the end of the 1990s. A sound understanding of the nature of the economic dynamics behind violent conflict and its interplay with political aspects is the necessary precondition for all efforts and policies to transform war-torn societies into peaceful zones, regions and states.

This chapter addresses the nature of war economies and their implications for CPMR in Africa. Section 2 introduces the topic by establishing the key elements and dynamics of the political economy of intrastate war and by discussing the question of the causal factors instigating civil wars. Special emphasis will be put on the role natural resources play in influencing the likelihood of civil conflict, its duration and intensity. It will be shown that it is not only the ‘paradox of plenty’ (abundant resources and the incentives to get control over them) which can enhance a country’s risk of war, but also the scarcity of resources that can trigger violent struggles over access. In sum, different
resources have different characteristics and thus different effects on conflict probability, either through abundance or through paucity. On this basis, section 3 elaborates issues related to the transformation of war-triggering and conflict-prolonging economic behaviour into development-enhancing, inclusive peace economies.

Finally, section 4 addresses the urgent need for good resource governance to change the incentives of potential conflict actors and alter their opportunity structures in such ways that peace becomes more profitable than engaging in conflict predation and shadowy economic networks. It will be demonstrated that the first initiatives are already under way to come to grips with the phenomenon of resource conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Overall, the paper indicates that a political economy perspective can add valuable insights into the logic of many African civil wars. The first steps of the international community to prevent further violent breakdowns and bring ‘hot spots’ to a peaceful settlement and post-conflict reconstruction have profited from this body of knowledge and have, by transforming theory into practice, further contributed to our understanding of the logic and dynamics behind intra-state wars. Nevertheless, much more has to be done to enhance our knowledge of these pertinent issues.

2. Economic dimensions of civil wars: beyond greed and grievance

Not least thanks to the work of World Bank economist Paul Collier and collaborators, followed up by various other studies, the whole field related to the political economies of internal armed conflict in the developing world in general and in sub-Saharan Africa in particular has a permanent place on the conflict prevention and management


agenda. Economic activity behind civil conflicts is now acknowledged as no secondary epiphenomenon (ending automatically with the termination of violence), but as a potential trigger of violent conflict and as a chief factor sustaining and nourishing civil wars. Dependent – inter alia – on the opportunity costs of insurgency, rebel greed and inequality between (ethnic) groups or between regions both matter in relation to economies of (civil) war. Within this context, the existence and accessibility of natural resources is a further factor of great importance.

2.1. Civil wars, economic activity and resources – fighting for profit or for justice?

The actual mainstream knowledge transcends the previous, simplistic dichotomy of explaining, understanding and tackling the economic forces behind initiation, duration and termination of civil conflict only on the basis of the ‘rebel greed’- versus ‘grievances of marginalized groups’-theses (see Box 2.1 on the following page). At the beginning of the 1990s, international policymakers and researchers began to realise that after the end of superpower conflict the vast majority of wars occurred within and not between states. The main characteristics of these conflicts are:

- They are concentrated in specific regions of the developing world, with Sub-Saharan Africa being mostly affected.
- In all these conflicts economics, economic aspects and agendas play a prominent role for actors (insurgents and governments). Onset and course of many civil wars are, inter alia, influenced by economic factors.
- In most African civil wars, natural resources play an important role – be it because of their paucity or abundance.

The central point of contention in the early debates about how to respond to the ‘new wars’ was whether the main cause of rebellion is rebel greed or widespread objective grievances among the marginalized sub-groups of the population. Although figuring prominently on the agenda of conflict researchers, the debate was even in its early dichotomous stages never just an artificial scholarly dispute. The conclusions drawn from the debate had immediate and profound influence on the design of international policies in response to civil wars (especially in the sub-Saharan region), not least because the main protagonists were World Bank economists. Therefore, the conflict management concept of the Bank and other international actors rested and still rests to a certain degree on the initially favoured pure ‘rebel greed’-explanation of civil wars.
The box shows that our early coming to grips with the civil war phenomenon was rather simplistic. In its pure ‘either-or’-version, neither did it give an adequate picture of reality nor was it very useful as a basis to formulate policy approaches. Nevertheless, the stage was set for more nuanced ways to understand and address post-cold war civil wars. First, we began to move away from the interpretation of economic activity in conflict as a pure epiphenomenon of political motives and agendas ending automatically with termination of hostilities. Second, a host of conferences on the topic and diplomatic initiatives were initiated bringing together experts from such diverse fields as economics, development studies, political science, geography and area studies with government and international organisation officials. Policy lessons drawn from these activities are
reflected in a number of policy instruments put into force within the last decade. The participation of the above-mentioned numerous disciplines did not lead to complete harmonisation between the greed- and grievance-advocates. Rather, and perhaps even more promising with regard to the design of policy measures, it forced the international community to open up the erstwhile blind economic eye and acknowledge both sides of the coin: political and economic causes of and agendas in intrastate warfare. Third, we began to appreciate that there exists some kind of inter-linkages between natural resource endowments and internal conflict. Indeed, one can even speak of a resource-conflict-nexus which implicates the centrality of various puzzling questions for effective conflict prevention and management approaches (see Box 2.2).

Box 2.2 What Influence Do Natural Resources Have on Civil Wars? The Main Questions

- In what way do natural resources influence the onset of conflict?
- How do natural resources influence duration and intensity of conflict?
- Do natural resources influence all types (separatist, ethnic etc) of intrastate war?
- Do different resources have different effects on and linkages to civil conflict?
- What causal mechanisms constitute the link between resources and conflict?
- Do both scarcity and abundance of primary resources, influence the probability and duration of civil wars?

With regard to the above questions, our knowledge about the resource component in civil war economies is – at least in some respects – alarmingly underdeveloped. To be sure, great progress has been made since the inception of our examination of the political economy of internal warfare. Qualitative and quantitative studies as well as the lessons learned from international efforts to prevent, manage and settle civil conflict since 1990 have all generated valuable insights. But despite these positive advances, much has to be done before one can speak of a coherent body of structured understanding of all facets of the resource-conflict interface.

That said, there are some aspects already understood quite well. To start with, natural resources are not all alike. They have different characteristics and this might entail different effects for the question as to whether, and how, scarcity or oversupply of the respective commodities affects the political and economic fate of countries. The current experience – especially regarding Sub-Saharan Africa – points to a staggering paradox: both primary commodity abundance (oil, non-fuel minerals etc) and paucity (e.g. land scarcity) can render countries more prone to intrastate conflict and warfare. In both cases, quite different mechanisms are at work linking different types of primary commodities to conflict. The next two sections address the political economic dimension of (violent) competition over scarce resources (2.2.) and the resource ‘curse’, i.e. resource abundance leading to domestic violence (2.3.).
2.2. Resource scarcity and domestic conflict

The statement that a lack of natural resources leads to a host of social and economic problems that might translate into violence is somewhat trivial. However, the interconnection between scarce resources and internal conflict is more often than not overlooked when policymakers, the media and researchers talk about resource conflict in Africa south of the Sahara. In this region, many countries do not have enough (qualified) human, social and physical capital. Consequently, natural resources such as water, land and fertile soils make up the main or the only source of socio-economic development.

Land scarcity has until recently not been a major characteristic of most sub-Saharan economies. However, land surpluses in fact were reduced even in the past in that export agriculture was intensified and land was denied to large parts of the indigenous population by colonial and white-minority regimes which fenced off land for European settlers. But land scarcity as a widespread and growing problem and source of conflict is relatively new as a phenomenon and aspect of many local disputes.

The heightened pressure on land is accompanied by an evolving tendency toward social inequality and exclusion in access to land and landed resources across sub-Saharan Africa. These outcomes have no single cause. They are a product of complex processes, combining the negative effects of:

- Increasing population (through high birth rates and the movement of people seeking better/more land or fleeing civil strife);
- Fencing off of large areas for plantations, tourism or conservation;
- Increased focus on cultivation and extension of cultivated land (intensified commercialisation of land);
- Peasants trying to intensify agricultural outputs because of shrinking world market prices and land degradation;

156 Human capital encompasses a trained, skilled and healthy workforce. Social capital points to a society without deep rifts, (inherited) cleavages, inequalities or ethnic hatred between groups. Physical capital is constituted by infrastructure (streets, airports, harbours, schools, hospitals etc) and production factors such as industrial sites.


• Insecure land tenure (often conflictual co-existence of traditional, communal systems with individual property and land titles) and;
• Badly conceptualised and implemented land reform programs (see Box 2.4 for an overview of the conflict-producing fast-track land policy in Zimbabwe).

All this increases pressure on arable land, a trend that is further aggravated through the appropriation of land by political elites in often dubious or illegal ways. In a continuation of colonial practices, African governments often enable (colluding) national and local political elites to obtain private control over formerly communal land. As a result, poverty rises among peasants whose land was confiscated by the state. To make matters worse, most intense competition and conflict over land occurs in the most densely populated areas (Rwanda, Burundi, Kenyan Highlands, Hausa region in Northern Nigeria, semi-arid dry-lands in the Sahel zone). Even where land per se is not scarce (see Box 2.3), competition can arise over other valuable resources, such as flood plains, wetlands or water points in semi-arid dry-lands or areas with only a single rain per annum. This lies at the heart of many of the farmer-herder conflicts, taking place first and foremost in the Sahel zone where key resources (riverbeds, floodplains) come under intensified use and, as a result, generate various forms of competition and conflict. One of the most recent and intensively media-covered conflicts with a farmer-pastoralist-component takes place in Darfur/Sudan.\(^{160}\) There is a long history of clashes over land between the Masalit, Fur and other ethnic African sedentary farmers on the one side and the Arab camel- and cattle-herding Beni Hussein from North Darfur and the Beni Halba of South Darfur. Traditionally, these conflicts were managed through negotiations between community leaders. But in the recent past, a combination of extended drought periods, competition over dwindling resources, the lack of good governance, easily available small arms and Arab pastoralist moving south with their flocks earlier than in former years made hostilities increasingly bloody and violent.

Moreover, in 1994, an administrative reorganisation of the Karthoum government gave Arab ethnic groups a new position of power, thereby disturbing the fragile balance between farming and herding groups in their respective areas and politicising farmer-pastoralist conflicts. The Sudanese example shows again that resource scarcity does not per se lead to violence but can exacerbate pre-existing political tensions or add further complexity to ongoing conflicts over other issues.

Box 2.3 Land as Subsidiary Trigger of Intrastate Conflict (Ivory Coast and DRC)

Land use and access is a significant aspect in some high intensity conflicts in the Sub-Saharan region, even when land has not been the original root cause. Ivory Coast is a good example in this respect. Land disputes are linked to a wider conflict that since 2002 has centred around tensions between Northern Muslim rebels and Southern majority-Christian loyalists. In the secondary land conflict, indigenous groups and newer settlers originally from neighbouring countries to the North clash over access and title to cocoa farms (Ivory Coast is the world’s largest cocoa exporter with roughly a 40% share of the world’s total supply). The situation is exacerbated by an insecure land tenure system characterised by conflicting and incompletely implemented laws. The DRC is another example for land disputes adding further conflict-sustaining elements to various political and economic issues that caused war in the first place. First, in the Ituri province contested distribution of agricultural concessions constituted an important proximate (i.e. triggering) cause of violence. Second, the ongoing civil war dramatically changed land access patterns through forced displacements and alterations of power of different traditional and administrative leaders. Thus, the pre-existing conflict has produced new competition for land and contributed to the re-erection of ethnic, class and other barriers.

Both cases show that land and agricultural commodities are perhaps not as important causes of conflict as are diamonds, oil or minerals. Nevertheless, on lower levels than the typical conflict resources, they can increase war duration and serve as a basis for conflict financing.

Source: Huggins et al. (2005), Balint Kurti (2005).

Of course, land scarcity as such does not automatically lead to competitive use or conflict. The land use and management policy of the state is crucial in this realm. Colonial and postcolonial regimes changed ‘customary’ traditional land tenure systems in often inadequate ways. This led to redistribution and allocation of land titles without involving the users and communities affected by such land reform in the first place. Unsurprisingly, government titling and registration often tends to have a negative effect. Even worse than ill-conditioned and badly implemented governmental land reform programmes is another often observable pattern of action: be they national (government officials) or local elites (regional strongmen, clan and family chiefs), both of them (mis)use their decision power to either benefit members of their patronage networks through expropriation of land from peasant and smallholder communities or to engage in self-enrichment via laying claim on and selling huge tracts of confiscated or public land to (often urban-based) commercial mass-producers of farm products. Moreover, the problem is often exacerbated by endemic and growing corruption. Small groups of clients with privileged access to decision-makers and the necessary financial means for paying bribes often benefit disproportionately from the redistribution of land. Zimbabwe is a sad case in point.
Box 2.4 Zimbabwe – Conflict over Politically Constructed Scarcity of Land Resources

Zimbabwe suffers from a long history of racially determined patterns of land use and access. At the beginning of black-majority rule in 1980, about 6,000 white farmers owned 40% of the most fertile soils, while some seven million blacks were crowded in dry and infertile communal areas. In the first years after independence, white farmers were encouraged to remain an important part of the Zimbabwean economy and efforts at land reallocation were undertaken half-heartedly. Up to the mid-1980s a class of wealthy black commercial farmers emerged, many with intimate ties to the ruling party ZANU-PF. The government scaled back its previous commitments to land redistribution leaving the black majority landless. Instead, access to land was tilted to favour the new black elite. This class was able to take advantage from the lack of clear guidelines of how to implement the land reform programme and from its backing by the government. Furthermore, commercial farmers contributed the lion’s share to the country’s good economic performance in the 1980s.

The situation deteriorated in the 1990s, not least because of the beginning of an economic downturn and two constitutional amendments (1990 and 1993) making compulsory land acquisition by the ruling ZANU-PF possible. In effect, land reform became an issue of growing conflict, since its prime beneficiaries were senior government officials (ZANU-PF leaders, ministers, military officers) and not the landless poor lacking access to agricultural resources for subsistence or cash cropping. In the late 1990s large-scale occupations of commercial farms began. Most occupations were committed by lightly-armed militias and government, parastatal or military personnel encouraged and physically facilitated by ZANU-PF party officials. Such government assistance intended to alleviate the growing anger of the black majority and liberation war veterans, about the government’s oscillation between disregarding the land issue and abusing it for its own enrichment or for ensuring electoral support of the rural people. After a harsh defeat of the ZANU-PF in the 2000 parliamentary elections (because of increasing public outrage about endemic corruption and elite enrichment via land titling), the government sought to regain rural support by putting land redistributing on fast-track (compulsory expropriation of white farmers without any compensation) and by massively encouraging farm invasions. These land seizures of former profitable commercial farms resulted in widespread violence, human rights abuses, an unprecedented inflation (up to 623% in January 2004), unemployment of hundreds of thousands of black farm workers, often becoming homeless, and the Zimbabwean economy in free fall. Perhaps most sadly, the vast majority of the seized farms were destroyed or simply left unused and so aggravated by failing rains, Zimbabwe, the erstwhile granary of sub-Saharan Africa, slipped into a situation with up to five million people needing food aid in 2004. Zimbabwe’s rulers have used the very real issue of land-hunger to further their own ends, resulting in the deaths of white farmers and black farm workers during the illegal occupations of white-owned commercial farms. These farms had long been the engine of Zimbabwe’s growth.

The case of Zimbabwe is indicative of the fact that many conflicts growing out of resource scarcity are not a law of nature but rather man-made, politically constructed and a result of the incentive structure of political elites doing well out of a situation of violent conflict.

The case study of the ‘resource conflict’ in Zimbabwe is indicative in that it backs the underlying consensus of many international instruments aimed at managing and preventing resource conflicts and of specialists of the political economy of intrastate conflict in Africa as well: neither resource abundance nor scarcity per se fuel violent conflict but rather bad and (private) economic gain-seeking resource governance, at the local, national and global levels.

2.3. Abundance of natural resources and intrastate conflict – the resource curse

2.3.1. Mechanisms linking resource wealth and intrastate conflict

It is plausible that scarcity of natural resources can instigate violent conflict over their allocation. But the fact that many of the most longstanding civil wars in Sub-Saharan Africa occur in countries with rich resource endowments might come as a surprise at first sight. Nevertheless, growing consensus exists among researchers and the international community alike over the conflict-triggering effects of too many (not too little) primary commodities, the heightened commercialisation of civil war, conflict parties pursuing economic and financial instead of pure political agendas and the development of illicit networks linking warring parties to organised crime – the so-called ‘resource curse’.161

Unfortunately, our understanding of the mechanisms that link resource abundance to the onset, duration and intensity of intrastate warfare is quite immature. Several paths of causation or modalities are conceivable:

– Rent-seeking
– Grievances
– Economic instability
– Conflict financing
– Peace spoiling

First, resource abundance may induce rent-seeking, i.e. the negative political impact of the availability of large natural resource rents to the ruling elite that in turn is not dependent on taxation for generating revenues. Resulting from a lack of transparency of the allocation and amount of resource rents, the ruling class may be able to monopolise the assets and/or to uphold corrupt and neo-patrimonial support networks. Taken as a whole, in a situation with widespread corruption, large and unevenly distributed resource rents can increase the conflict risks by raising the ‘prize’ value of capturing the state. Arguably, the existence of large resource rent incomes from diamonds and oil increased incentives to violently gain control over the states in the DRC, Sierra Leone and Angola. The conflict

161 Indeed, the evidence of many recent econometric studies seems to suggest that states with rich resource endowments which rely heavily on the export of these primary commodities face a higher risk of civil wars than resource-poor countries.
risk was even aggravated, at least in the DRC and Sierra Leone, by the tendency of these states to have weak institutions and incapable state bureaucracies unwilling and unable to rely on broader taxation for generating revenues.

Second, there are many ways in which resource wealth can lead to political grievances that ultimately end in violent upsurge. The distribution of resource wealth is often perceived to be uneven and unjust, thereby constituting incentives to struggle for reallocation of the benefits. In some cases, such as the Casamance province in Senegal, the south of the Sudan or the Niger delta, such (perceived) grievances may have contributed to secessionist or ethno-political motivated violence. Furthermore, the extraction of natural resources (especially oil, gas and non-fuel minerals) can spark grievances due to perceived discrimination of local communities in the distribution of extraction- and transport-related jobs. Another causal chain may run via forced migration of local residents to enable resource extraction or via the environmental degradation associated most notably with oil production, both of these paths creating incentives to engage in violent conflict to address the mal-distribution of revenues. Again, the Niger delta and the fate of the Ogoni people provide a striking example for the latter causal chain.

Third, if a country’s economy is heavily dependent on the export of natural resources, it will be more sensitive to external trade shocks or shrinking world market prices than countries whose economies rest on diversification and manufactured commodities. Moreover, a substitution of primary commodity exports through other goods is often not possible because the resource wealth discouraged the development of other economic sectors in the first place (the so-called ‘Dutch disease’). The negative effects of such shocks on affected groups may lead to growing dissatisfaction and, ultimately, political instability, opposition against government, social unrest and increased conflict risk.

Fourth, even in cases of conflicts that developed out of causes other than natural resources and their distribution (resources not responsible for conflict onset), the access to primary commodities may sustain and prolong civil wars by providing finances to purchase weapons on part of the weaker party that would have suffered early defeat without these opportunities. In Angola, for example, both parties (government and UNITA) had access to resource pools to support, equip and pay their combatants. In addition, agendas may change during ongoing intrastate warfare when formerly political motives are supplemented by the newly emerging opportunities to raise profits out of upholding violence (the phenomenon of war economies and the exploitation of illicit trading networks made possible through a situation of collapse of public order like in Somalia, with its warlords engaging as conflict entrepreneurs).

Fifth, peace spoilers are at work whenever the involved parties have an incentive to prefer ongoing conflict over the reaching of a peace settlement. This is clearly the case when belligerents gain more out of conflict trade and war economies than out of
peace, either because these businesses are illegal (and hence not transferable in post-conflict environments) or because the involvement of conflict parties in resource extraction depends on their ability to make use of violent means (e.g. warlords engaged as security forces to protect the oil fields in Nigeria).

As has been shown, evidence can be found for all the potential causal modalities in Africa south of the Sahara. But clearly, we need to develop a more sound understanding of the transmission belt between resource wealth and conflict proneness, since in each conflict a correct identification of mechanisms at work is a necessary precondition for the design of adequate policy responses: For example, mining might cause conflict because it might trigger further grievances over environmental damages or access to jobs. In this case, a greater involvement of, and participation by the local community might be helpful. But if conflict is a result of the extortion opportunities that mining opens up for warlords and rebels, then the solution would be less community participation and stricter mine site policing.

2.3.2. Resource type matters
Different resources have different effects on a country’s conflict probability. In other words, the physical quality and geographic location of resources are important with regard to the likelihood with which they produce violent conflict. First, when resources are found near the national capital they are easier to capture for the central government, while distant resources are easier for rebels to hold and defend. Second, ‘point source’ resources are concentrated and thus more easily controlled by a single small group. In contrast, diffuse resources are spread over a large area and for this reason harder for any single group to capture. A third key factor is whether primary resources are lootable – easily captured by rebel groups – or non-lootable – favouring central governments or instigating secession respectively. Lootable resources (alluvial diamonds, timber, drugs etc) can easily be appropriated by small groups of unskilled workers. They tend to benefit the local economy and so pose little risk of instigating separatist conflicts unless captured by rebels or warlords. Unlootable resources (oil, natural gas and deep-shaft minerals) often lead to separatist conflicts, since they require sophisticated and cost-intensive technologies to exploit them and tend not to benefit local communities but rather the state in control of them.162

162 Even in these cases, there are always exceptions. Mali is a case in point: The Tuareg rebellion in the Northeast of the country can be attributed to drought, farmer-herder conflicts, failing governance and economic tensions between the nomadic Tuareg groups and the sedentary population in the desert provinces of Timbuktu and Kidal. There is little evidence that would suggest a causal connection between the discovery of rich gold deposits in the Southwest of Mali. For an illuminating general overview see Cooper, Neil (2005) ‘Picking out the Pieces of the Liberal Peace: Representation of Conflict Economies and the Implications for Policy’. Security Dialogue 36 (4) pp. 463–478.
In effect, the different qualities of primary commodities produce two regularities observable in most of the (African) civil wars. On the one hand, oil as the prime example of unlootable concentrated resources (often situated off-shore or in remote areas) is the main suspect in producing the onset of (separatist) civil wars. On the other hand, lootable resources have little effect on the likelihood of war outbreak, but can have significant effects on the duration of civil conflict in that they improve the financial resources of weaker combatants who would otherwise have to surrender (see Box 2.5 for a listing of conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa by resource type and country, which clearly underlines the abovementioned interrelationship between resource type and conflict). Although our knowledge base could be better, one can argue that only oil wealth can clearly be said to increase the danger of civil wars breaking out whereas other resource types can ‘only’ fuel or prolong ongoing conflicts. Thus, conflict prevention programs and initiatives should and must turn their special attention to oil-rich regions and oil governance regimes, if not management of conflicts but their avoidance is the ultimate objective.

| Box 2.5 Resources and Conflict – by Type and Country |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| **Lootable Resources** | **Separatist Conflicts** | **Non-Separatist Conflicts** |
| Country | Resources | Country | Resources |
These important distinctions notwithstanding, natural resources constitute a central element of civil war economies in Africa – whether it be diamonds in Sierra Leone, oil and diamonds in Angola, timber and diamonds in Liberia, oil in Nigeria and Sudan, or a diversified shadow economy in the DRC incorporating diamonds, timber etc. With rare exceptions, such as the diamond industry in Botswana, the abundance of natural and mineral resources in sub-Saharan Africa has not led to and is not utilized for a sustained improvement of living conditions or for significantly better poverty reduction and development policies and programmes. On the contrary, the existence of resources in a context of underdevelopment, the erosion of state capacity and poor (global) trading conditions trigger, sustain and prolong conflicts related to their control and exploitation in which a multiplicity of actors with different agendas (governments, rebel groups, warlords, transnational mafia networks, multinational corporations etc.) are engaged. As a consequence, some of the most complex and complicated issues to be handled in civil war economies are constituted by the problems of:

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The self-financing nature of crises because of the resource trading via black markets and trans-border shadow economy-networks;

• The accessibility of official global market structures to these illicit networks;

• The ambivalent role of western private sector actors in the ‘resource curse’;

• The different effects of different types of primary commodities that affect conflict dynamics in no consistent manner;\textsuperscript{164}

• The legacy of previous interventions that advocated deregulation, privatisation, limits on welfare and the role of the state in employment creation;

• The limits of and adaptive responses to good governance initiatives and the ethical regulation of markets;

• The importance of conceptually distinguishing between different kinds of actors and different kinds of war economies in the same conflict – e.g. the combat economy (where profits pay for the tools of war or for military operations or where economic strategies are aimed at the disempowerment of specific groups), the shadow economy (where the motivation for participation in shadow trade is primarily economic rather that to fund war, although this may not preclude cooperation and trade with combatants) and the coping economy (economic activity undertaken by population groups that are using their asset-base to more or less maintain minimum or below minimum living standards).

Last but not least, further complexity to the economic dynamics behind (internal) conflict is added by the reinforcing effects of so called ‘weak states’, often governed by repressive regimes. Whenever the coercive power of the state is subverted by corrupt, authoritarian or weak elites, the cost-benefit-calculations of resource-plundering and resulting conflict economies change in favour of illicit actors. Therefore, prospects for establishing sustainable peace might diminish.\textsuperscript{165}

3. Transforming ‘war economies’ into ‘peace economies’

The various factors of the economic dynamic underlying civil conflict should also be the focus of all strategies aimed at transforming war economies into peace-securing economies.


It is true that contemporary peace operations include measures to establish good governance and the rule of law in the affected states. But more often than not they fail to adequately address the specific challenges for war economies in peace-building processes/operations.\textsuperscript{166} As a consequence, intervening international and external actors often struggle with the effective and successful translation of concepts and identified key issues into operational strategies during post-conflict peace-building and peacekeeping processes.\textsuperscript{167} In recent years, some of the most longstanding civil wars in Africa that gained sad prominence in the international media because of the prevalence of economic criminality and resource predation were brought to an end (Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, DRC). Unfortunately, conflict actors have been able to prolong the economic networks and activities that have been at the centre of the former war economies into the post-conflict period. The conclusion for peace-builders and mediators to be drawn is that different actors have different cost-benefit ratios in and after the end of war.\textsuperscript{168}

\textit{First} and unsurprisingly, what needs to be taken into account and attended to is the fact that only the establishment of opportunity structures that make peaceful economic transactions more profitable for conflict parties will be conducive to sustainable economies of peace.

\textit{Second}, predatory groups have a tendency to use the financial assets and political power accumulated in conflicts in order to consolidate their networks even in post-conflict phases. Consequently, the establishment of new governance structures after conflict termination can be undermined by entrenched informal economies. Without a detailed understanding of war traders’ motivations the danger of a breakdown of local capacity building will increase.

Most recent experiences in the DRC and Liberia point to problems that the legacies of war economies pose to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) strategies (as an integral part of most current peace operations). Whenever former fighters are in the position to continue their pillaging of resources, availability of arms


\textsuperscript{168} Not especially related to the transformation of civil war economies, but nevertheless important to bear in mind is the lesson learned from experience with conflict settlements in interstate wars: Countries in the immediate post-conflict phase do need an atypical high amount of financial resources, foreign aid and policy advice because of the then extremely fragile societies. The problems of adequate phasing and coordination add to this challenge. See Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke (2002b) \textit{Aid, Policy, and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies}. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2902. Washington, DC: World Bank.
is a key economic asset. Only when peace settlements provide better economic opportunities for the conflict actors than the conflict economies did can they be persuaded to reintegrate and return to civilian (economic) life. Again, Sierra Leone is an illuminating example: besides other problems, the UN reintegration program experienced a substantial shortfall in funding from donors after the transition from high visibility activities (public burning of weapons etc) passed into more trivial measures such as providing training and housing. Consequently, many ex-combatants were not reached by the UN’s reintegration program and thus had incentives and opportunities to move to diamond mining areas, engage in further exploitation and work as mercenaries for the Liberian civil war, where conflict trade in primary commodities was still an option because of the ongoing war. In sum, special attention has to be directed to offer fine-grained incentives to conflict actors to voluntarily reintegrate, while keeping the regional context of the conflict(s) in mind.

Third, most civil war economies are characterised by their shadowy nature. Economic criminality is often endemic and systemically connected to global markets (licit) and international criminal networks (illicit). Once entrenched, criminality can seriously undermine post-conflict reconstruction. The perpetuation of shadow economies reduces the revenues of governments from taxes and, as a consequence, their ability to invest in social services, security, governance and reconstruction projects. Criminal and/or terrorist networks often do engage in the provision of such social networks, thereby cutting off incentives for reintegration in licit economic systems.

Fourth, there are a number of actors often excluded in processes of transformation of war economies (trade unions, public sector employees, women etc). Given that peace economies are characterised by having their roots in dynamics of local social change, whereby claims to ownership, welfare distribution etc can be mediated without recourse to violence, just and inclusive economies cannot be established parallel to the existence of large marginalized constituencies (breeding ground for renewed tensions undermining the establishment of social cohesion).

Lastly, the social functions of conflict trade for civilians simply trying to cope with the hardship caused by war, and to survive in conflict zones, should be acknowledged in order not to create new grievances through peace-making measures that transform war economies in an indiscriminate manner. (Re)construction of the manufacturing

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169 In this context it should be taken into account that not in all cases are sophisticated connections to global markets necessary from the perspective of conflict entrepreneurs. Large proportions of conflict trade are processed by accessories who transfer small amounts of commodities across borders. For example, small arms were trafficked into the North Eastern DRC from Uganda by car, bike and even on foot. The often porous interstate borders, especially in remote areas of states with weak central government (e.g. between the Anglophone Cameroon and Nigeria) further facilitate such activities.
sector, training and education, diversification of local economies, providing local communities with the means to engage in cash or subsistence farming\textsuperscript{170} and using trans-border trading systems as assets – i.e. ‘developmental peacekeeping’\textsuperscript{171} – might be useful approaches.

4. Addressing the resource-conflict-nexus

Despite many remaining debates, the political economy perspective has produced agreement on one central aspect: Nearly all intrastate conflicts are self-financing via trade in natural resources, global financial flows, the misappropriation of aid and remittances of diaspora communities. Consequently, disrupting and managing these resource flows is the central policy approach to conflict resolution of most governments, the EU and the UN. Curtailing the resource and financial flows of the warring factions might be effective to redirect the incentives of combatants from war to peace. This section starts with a brief presentation and review of current policies aimed at curtailing conflict trade. It proceeds with central challenges that have to be taken into account by international actors designing policy instruments to transform war economies. From this, some policy recommendations for the Africa policy of the EU can be derived.

4.1. Policies enhancing good resource governance

The contemporary state of globalisation and the related programmes of deregulation and privatisation, as applied to the underdeveloped African economies, have contributed to the context in which local conflict entrepreneurs are put in a position to use and abuse flexible and fluid global trading networks and shadow or black markets, that are perfectly suited to generate profit out of exploited, plundered and looted primary resources. More often than not, multinational corporations and governments collaborate in the trading of conflict diamonds, timber, drugs, oil, gold, cobalt etc. These shadow globalisation processes result in conflict-sustaining vicious circles.\textsuperscript{172} The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the often observable collaboration of warlords or rebel groups with the traders of (lootable) resources, such as diamonds and timber, leads to

\textsuperscript{170} Dependence on the export of primary agrarian commodities other than coca, opium paste or marijuana is – to our current knowledge – not linked to conflict onset. Cf. Ross, Michael L. (2004a) ‘What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?’ Journal of Peace Research 41 (3) pp. 337-356.


a situation of relatively secure transactions and trade with conflict goods. This limits the accessibility of (external) peace-builders to these regional trading platforms.\footnote{Dietrich, Christian (2004) ‘The Use of Regional Diamond Trading Platforms to Access Conflict Zones’. \textit{African Security Review} 13 (1) 51-57.} Policies enhancing good resource governance include the following:


- Industry codes of conduct and corporate social responsibility initiatives to prevent complicity with warlords, corruption and exploitation of local communities. Examples include the UN’s global compact; the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance; the Business Principles for Countering Bribery in the Engineering and Constructing Industry; the ILO tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy; the EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Voluntary Partnership scheme; the G8 Declaration on Fighting Corruption and Improving Transparency; the Transparency Directive adopted by the EU in 2004; the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI),

- Campaigns to pressure multinational corporations and governments to disclose the financial scope of resource exploitation (Publish-What-You-Pay);

- Measures targeted at the (weak) African governments themselves, e.g. embargoes, economic sanctions, establishment of new governance structures.

With respect to curtailing conflict trade, it is not academia providing proposals for policy instruments and pushing forward the international community, but rather the policy-makers themselves – often in cooperation with NGOs and the private sector – who set the pace and develop and evaluate instruments by trial and error.

Whereas the present focus of governments and NGOs alike is on the monitoring of (illicit) trade in raw materials, external actors should not dismiss but intensify efforts to enhance the resource management capacity of African governments and, first and foremost, state bureaucracies. Often, technical expertise is lacking. This problem becomes even more pressing when one considers that raw material related conflicts occur precisely because of weak management of resource exploitation and of resource revenues.
Box 4.1 The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme

The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is an international and voluntary system for certification of trade in rough diamonds. It was put into effect on January 1, 2003. The initiative leading to this novel form of international control regime was launched by the government of South Africa in May 2000. The Kimberley Process is aimed at denying ‘blood diamonds’ access to international markets. The scheme is a joint venture of governments, the private sector, NGOs and civil society and shall establish a global ‘chain of warranty’ to track the supply chain of rough diamonds from their mine to the point of sale. Therefore, the Certification Scheme consist of four main elements:

- **Requirement for standardized control in producer countries**, from mine to the point of export;
- **Certification process** (rough diamonds put into sealed packages and equipped with a Kimberley Certificate listing data on country of origin, carat weight/mass, exporter and importer and being received and documented by customs officials in the importing country);
- **Voluntary system of industry warranties** (to start with first diamond import into a processing county and to continue tracking as long as diamonds remain in their rough state);
- **Commitment to regular publication of standardized statistics** on production, export, and import (progress on this issue could be increased).

For the first time, the international community put into place a regime with teeth, i.e. Kimberley is underpinned by the threat of exclusion from the world markets for diamonds for those states convicted of breaching their commitments not to engage in conflict trade. Participants are only allowed to trade with other participants meeting the minimum requirements of the certification scheme. The DRC, for example, was removed from the Kimberley Process in July 2004 after having been convicted of non-compliance. To date, 67 countries, including all the major diamond producers and traders, are participating and have passed national laws to establish export/import control regimes.


The KPCS can in large part be seen as a response to the role of the diamond trade in financing, intensifying and prolonging the civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola and in the DRC. The experience with this kind of regime indicates that it could potentially be used as a blueprint to expand the logic of commodity certification to other industry sectors. Clearly, the regime has its flaws. Despite certification, diamonds continue to fuel sustained conflict because they are vulnerable to being used as a tool for money laundering. The Liberian case is typical in this respect. The UN Security Council maintains its sanctions on diamonds originating from Liberia since the central government does not have control over diamond production areas in remote border regions. A major challenge for the regime is thus to secure effective implementation
and enforcement of its requirements. Moreover, the Scheme defines only diamonds that are traded by rebel organisations as conflict diamonds and does not cover sales by governments involved in wars or states that act as transit zones for other states’ deliveries. This helped the Angolan government to dramatically increase its military budget in the war against UNITA and so led to the long duration of the conflict in Angola. Nevertheless, effectiveness is still rather unclear: To date it is uncertain if the Scheme will eliminate the total amount of shadow trade in diamonds, although it surely has contributed to an increase of official diamond exports. Moreover, the evidence seems to suggest that the KPCS has not led to a significant change in the terms of trade for either small exporting countries (costs of certification and licensing sometimes exceed revenues from official trade) or artisanal diamond diggers (working conditions and payment remain on a poor level). This context has led to a recognition that there is a need to transform Kimberley into a regime that is not simply concerned with the phenomenon of conflict diamonds but one which also promotes what have become known as ‘development diamonds’. In other words, modes of production and trade which promote good labour conditions and provide means of development both for local communities and governments. As a promising sign in this direction, first steps have recently been taken with the Kono Peace Diamonds Alliance in Sierra Leone (see Box 4.2).

Box 4.2 The Kono Peace Diamonds Alliance in Sierra Leone

Launched in December 2002, it brings together multiple stakeholders (NGOs, the government of Sierra Leone, diamonds purchasers, mining corporations) on a local level. The objective is:
- To expand licensed diamond mining;
- To establish transparent and just diamond mining through ensuring regular incomes to artisanal miners and their communities;
- To ensure transparent marketing systems;
- And to create a ‘systematic diamond management’, including the development of mining cooperatives; the support of artisanal diggers with training and provision of micro-credits and the securing of fair prices being paid to them.


175 For example, some of the African participants do not meet the reporting requirements. Tanzania has not even provided any statistical record on its production and export in 2005. The Central African Republic, Guinea, Ghana and Lesotho also provided only limited and incomplete data and would, in effect, have to be excluded from trade for non-compliance with the minimum standards of the KPCS. Global Witness (2005a) Implementing the Kimberley Process: 5 Years on – How Effective is the Kimberley Process and What More Needs to be Done?, London: Global Witness.
Bearing in mind the insufficiencies of existing control regimes for the trade in conflict diamonds, available data and figures seem to suggest that their potentially positive impact has already begun to materialize. Statistics on the official trade record of Sierra Leone tend to back this assumption (see Box 4.3).

**Box 4.3 Official Diamond Exports from Sierra Leone**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Carats</th>
<th>Price per Carat</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>351,859</td>
<td></td>
<td>US$ 41,732,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>506,723</td>
<td>149.62</td>
<td>US$ 75,969,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>691,757</td>
<td>183.09</td>
<td>US$ 126,652,634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>668,655</td>
<td>212.27</td>
<td>US$ 141,940,244</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above figures clearly indicate a significant rise in official trade in diamonds and resulting revenue for the state in Sierra Leone since the launch of the Kono Peace Diamond Initiative in 2002 and of the KPCS in 2003. The obvious conclusion to be drawn from this is that the various control regimes to reduce illicit trade in conflict diamonds do have positive effects and, thus, can be seen as important first step of an encompassing approach to establish conflict avoiding natural resource governance regimes.

*Source: PAC (2005: 4, 6) and PAC (2006: 9).*

Today, transparency in the extractive industry is widely deemed to be the central policy issue for conflict prevention, peace-building and development. The Publish What You Pay (PWYP) Campaign and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) are the two central initiatives in this realm that have gained global recognition over the last few years (see Box 4.4).
Box 4.4 Revenue Transparency in the Extractive Sector

The Publish What You Pay (PWYP) Campaign was officially launched in London in 2002 by an international association of NGOs. The movement was established amid growing consensus that an absence of transparency in the extractive industry sector was the chief harmful governance issue in the field of resource management and that voluntary approaches on the part of the mining companies to the problem had all but failed. The core message of the campaign is the necessity of ‘mandatory disclosure of taxes, fees, royalties and other payments by oil, mining and gas companies to governments and other public agencies’. The underlying logic is twofold: On the government side, mandatory disclosure should enable citizens of resource-rich countries to hold their governments accountable for the way resource revenues are spent. The mining sector, as the second part of the extractive equation, would also be more easily scrutinized by the public. Corrupt behaviour and the payment of bribes would become more difficult, easily revealed and, at best, penalised (not least via consumer reaction in the mainly Western home countries). Such a mandatory approach would consist of various components and control mechanisms, including:

- stock exchange listing rules;
- public accounting standard in a standardised form; and
- public export credit and insurance agencies’ conditionality and contractual agreements.

The compulsory approach is aimed at helping companies overcome the free rider problem with which companies that unilaterally publish their payments are confronted. Without mandatory requirements, such willing companies are vulnerable to host country reprisals and face competitive disadvantages vis-à-vis less progressive corporations. The case of British Petroleum (BP) in Angola is instructive of these collective action problems: In 2001, BP publicly announced its intention to lay open its total oil production and the related payments to Sonangol, the Angolan state-owned oil company. As a consequence, Sonangol circulated a letter to all other multinational oil companies operating in Angola in which the state enterprise threatened to terminate the contract with BP in case of published payments. In a mandatory regulation framework such threats would not enable competitors to benefit from responsible behaviour of a company.

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was launched as the most noteworthy response so far to the claims of the PWYP Campaign. The EITI was launched by British prime minister Tony Blair at the World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, in September 2002. The British government took the lead in establishing the initiative as a reaction to growing demands for resource transparency. EITI brings together donors (G8, UK, Norway, France), governments implementing EITI principles (in Africa: Congo-Brazzaville, Ghana, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe) or endorsing EITI guidelines (in Africa: Angola, Cameroon, Chad, DRC, Gabon, Guinea, Niger, Sierra Leone), companies (inter alia BP, ChevronTexaco, ExxonMobile, Shell, Total), industry associations (International Organisation of Oil and Gas Producers, OGP, etc), international organisations (IMF, World Bank etc), NGOs (Global Witness, Transparency International, PWYP Coalition etc) and civil society. EITI follows the same logic as the PWYP Campaign. However, there is a central difference between the two. Contrary to PWYP, EITI thus far is based on a voluntary approach to double, parallel disclosure (host governments and extracting companies) of revenue streams to reconcile company figures with government accounts. The framework works via country level agreements setting out provisions for the annual revealing of resource revenue streams by all parties, to a trusted third party using special standard accounting templates.

As is shown in Box 4.4, both frameworks seek to introduce transparency in the extractive sector. But whereas the PWYP Campaign presses for the establishment of a reporting commitment via international agreement, the approach of the UK-sponsored EITI rests on voluntarism of industry and state actors.

The main achievement of the NGO-led campaign PWYP Campaign and the EITI framework for intergovernmental discussion is that, publishing and transparency of resource-related payments and, holding actors engaged in oil production accountable for their behaviour is now permanently on the international agenda. Although this has furthered public, state and corporate awareness of the conflict-related ‘side effects’ of oil extraction, the commitment of many relevant actors still does not extend beyond voluntary compliance. But it is the lack of compulsory regulation that lies at the centre of the unbroken interrelation between oil richness and conflict proneness in much of the African oil exporting countries. Examples of this appraisal abound. The case of Chinese corporations operating in Africa is especially illustrative in that it points to the flaws of voluntarism, especially of companies whose countries of origin do not have a developed civil society to press for socially responsible conduct. Moreover, awareness of Western publics for the now global operation of Chinese oil companies is still in its infancy (see Box 4.5).

**Box 4.5 Chinese Petro-Diplomacy in Africa and its Effects on Resource Management**

As the world’s second-largest oil consumer and (since 1993) net importer of crude oil and refined products, China and its state-owned oil companies (China National Petroleum Corporation CNPC, Petrochina, SINOPEC etc.) increasingly rely on overseas imports. China’s drive for resource security makes the under-exploited African oil reserves interesting for the People’s Republic. Beijing’s state oil company CNPC has invested heavily in production-sharing agreements (PSAs) with national petroleum companies in Sudan, Angola and, most recently, Gabon. China is engaged in area-wide oil investments in Africa. Beijing imports oil from eleven African countries (approximately 25% of all oil imports) and is mainly engaged in niche-markets (upcoming markets in the Gulf of Guinea or markets to which Western governments have no entry because of sanctions regimes, e.g. Sudan).

Increasing Chinese oil exploitation in sub-Saharan Africa is embedded in a policy approach of ‘You scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours’. Host governments are rewarded through symbolic diplomacy (China investing in huge prestige projects, e.g. the Gabon house of parliament) or increasing amounts of development assistance (e.g. direct funding of the civil service in Liberia). Especially relevant with respect to resource exploitation in sub-Saharan conflict zones is that China tends to reward oil or mineral concessions through arms supplies to governments who are the target of sanctions or arms embargos of the Western world (e.g. fighter jets for Zimbabwe, light arms for Sierra Leone). Currently, China is the largest arms supplier for the Sudanese government in Khartoum. To make things worse, none of the Chinese state-owned oil enterprises is supporting, endorsing or participating in the voluntary EITI framework.
This undermines international measures to establish transparency and accountability in the realm of resource management and, ultimately, to break the resource-conflict-nexus fuelling and prolonging many African intra-state conflicts. Unsurprisingly, some African leaders (e.g. Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe and Sudan’s Omer el Bashir) involved in resource wars and internationally accused of bad governance and systematic human rights abuses seek to stabilise their repressive regimes and bypass Western sanctions regimes and aid conditionality by forging strategic alliances with China.

Beijing’s policy towards Angola is another striking example of Chinese ‘petro-diplomacy’. In 2004, the state-owned Chinese Eximbank awarded a $2 billion loan to Angolan president José Eduardo Dos Santos. To reciprocate, Angola gave the concession for a huge oil field to the Chinese SINOPEC instead of, as was widely expected, the Indian Videsh corporation. The deal was widely criticized, e.g. by the NGO Global Witness, for a lack of transparency relating to how much money was provided, under what conditions and how the money would be spent by the Angolan government (known for endemic and notorious corruption, resource rent-seeking and abuse of resource revenues for patronage, arms purchases or elite self-enrichment). It was also criticised for undermining the IMF-Angolan negotiations regarding the implementation of the IMF-staff-monitored programme to secure revenue transparency in the oil sector.

Many African governments would prefer the ‘Beijing consensus’ (no hard strings attached) over the much criticized and Western led ‘post-Washington consensus’ which still comes with a host of financial, economic and political conditions.

Source: Alden (2005).

Although the example of Chinese oil diplomacy in Africa points to potential flaws in the current voluntary international framework of establishing resource revenue transparency in the extractive sector, Beijing’s activities in Africa are increasingly scrutinized by Western governments and especially the U.S. as the West is now paying more attention to the relationship between Africa and China (at least since the Darfur crisis). As a result, China’s discretionary freedom of action in the realm of oil production will be challenged by the West. Moreover, Chinese oil interests may be vulnerable to international pressure. CNPC currently aims at to be listed on Western stock exchanges. The precondition for foreign companies listing on Wall Street is submission to U.S. listing requirements, most notably the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act. Chinese oil companies whose shares are to be traded on Wall Street will be liable for their conduct in Africa under American corporate law. A second possible channel of influence on Chinese engagement in oil extraction in Africa could be opened up by the premier club of industrialized nations, the Group of Eight (G8). Western leaders recently invited Beijing to participate in the G8. This gradual incorporation can and should have positive repercussions on China’s economic and political choices.

Thus, it can be stated that China and India pose a significant challenge to the voluntary resource revenue management agenda of the international community. But
there are also indications that even without compulsory transparency in the extractive industries significant progress has been and can be made with respect to curtailing conflict trade and establishing transparency and accountability. The aforementioned developments, with respect to China’s external energy policy and its gradual integration in the G8 framework, all point to potentially effective channels and measures to positively influence and, in the long run, alter Beijing’s incentive structure towards increasing openness for transparency of resource-related contracts and payments.

4.2. Challenges

The complexity and context specificity of the interrelationship between resources, their abundance or scarcity, and conflict constitute great challenges for the EU and for the international community as a whole. It would go well beyond the scope of this chapter to address and discuss all possible challenges. But two points stand out, both of which are essential for managing the political economy aspects of domestic conflict in Africa. Even given that each civil war has its own logic and idiosyncratic characteristics, the following two aspects should be taken into consideration in all conflict-preventive policies:

First, in order to prevent, manage and end civil wars in Africa it is essential to break the crime-conflict nexus by establishing or rehabilitating legal institutions and administrative capacity to handle, allocate and distribute revenues from the exploitation of resources. Second, while the state must be recognised as an important actor in this, it is equally important to keep in mind that individual livelihoods are secured in violent economic contexts. Unless local participation, local and regional livelihoods, existing social and economic networks are reckoned with, the transformation of war into peace economies will remain a fundamental challenge.

4.3. Policy recommendations for the European Union

The EU should reinvigorate its partnership for peace and security with Africa through innovative approaches to come to grips with the problem of conflict-triggering and prolonging economies of war. In expanding existing forms of consultation, the EU could attempt to establish trilateral cooperation between the UN, Europe and the AU in order to combine the specific strengths of the three organizations in a coherent and consistent manner. Congruent with the EU’s internal functioning, the promotion of constructive political dialogue is a must. This political dialogue must aim to integrate all relevant groups in governance models for African societies.

Another aspect too often overlooked relates to the critical role of borderlands in post-conflict peace-building processes. While current efforts focus mainly on the (re)establishment of central government facilities, there are often too few efforts to
vitalise the potential of borderlands, so that they can become centres of the free circulation of goods, and catalysts for the development of resilient official economic ties and political relations to neighbouring states. With persisting predatory cross-border networks in most current conflicts in Africa, these asymmetries of regulation with regard to borderlands need to be addressed. Closely related to this aspect, the current and mainly state centric top-down approach to post-conflict peace-building should be coupled with a focus on bottom-up strategies including capacity-building of civil actors and use of the peace-enhancing potential of included and acknowledged local civil communities. The importance of consulting civil society actors in the evaluation of projects – as opposed to consulting them on the parameters of proposed projects – must be reckoned with.

Related to this is the need to provide financial support and a favourable regulatory environment for less exploitative methods of production, such as the workers co-operatives that already employ about 100 million people around the world. Some funding for co-operative mining activities has been provided in Sierra Leone and these kinds of initiatives might be expanded in post-conflict societies, particularly in those resource sectors that have played a key role in the original conflict.

With respect to the more narrow economic issues, the EU might rethink the current control regime on conflict and shadow trade, which confronts the developing world with harsher disciplinary measures than the developed world. Northern countries and companies tend to be in a better position to escape formal regulation and monitoring. While useful in a first phase to gather widespread support and acceptance, the various schemes promoting transparency and open accountancy in the trade of resources should be upgraded beyond the current voluntary compliance. Parallel efforts should be aimed at increasing the revenue margins of African governments from official trade with primary commodities. Returns from exports tend to often remain below the level that would support development. Therefore, incentives for illicit exploitation and trade remain high. Such policy measures could be most successful if complemented by EU efforts to influence the political agenda of other international fora and organisations such as the United Nations. Future European proposals could include the initiation of the following policy approaches:

- Creation of a UN early warning system to identify emerging cases of conflict trade (possibly supplemented by a convention that produces a settled definition of conflict trade and sets clear restrictions on the practice);\textsuperscript{177}

\textsuperscript{177} For a similar demand see Le Billon, Philippe (2005) \textit{Fuelling War: Natural Resources and Amend Conflict}. Adelphi Paper 373, London et al.: Routledge.
• Introduction of mainstreamed requirements to monitor the trade in natural resources in the mandates of peacekeeping forces (e.g. MONUC in the DRC has a mandate to monitor arms flows but not the trade in natural resources that finances these arms flows);\textsuperscript{178}

• Explicit inclusion of trade in ‘conflict goods’ within the remit of all experts panels established to monitor UN sanctions or – more far-reaching – creation of such panels for all conflicts irrespective of whether they are the subject of sanctions or not;

• Creation of better instruments to permit the prosecution of companies that have participated in, facilitated or contributed to breaches of international law (e.g. commission of serious human rights violations, war crimes or crimes against humanity).\textsuperscript{179}

Finally, it should be recognised by EU actors that there are no uniform success-promising approaches to the transformation of war into peace economies. What is needed is the building of awareness, context-sensitivity and recognition of the specific characteristics of the target states, resources, and conflicts to be addressed. Related to this, attention should be redirected: not only to regions relevant to European security, but also to those regions of Africa where conflict economies have no direct security implications for the EU.

\textsuperscript{178} The NGO Global Witness has also called for the inclusion of natural resource governance in the mandate of the new UN Peacebuilding Commission proposed by the Secretary-General. Global Witness (2005b) Under-Mining Peace: The Explosive Trade in Cassiterite in Eastern DRC. London: Global Witness.

\textsuperscript{179} To date, the prosecution of companies having allegedly been involved in such crimes is possible only via the establishment of the jurisdiction of national courts (the US Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) being the most prominent example) – an approach that only works in countries whose governments do not hesitate to make companies’ misconduct a political priority.
Bibliography and Further Reading


Conflict Prevention, Management and Reduction in Africa

Chapter 6

Promoting Conflict Sensitive Development Aid in Africa: Issues and Challenges

Owen Greene with Tracy Vienings
Executive Summary

The relationship between development and conflict is complex and much debated. Non-violent tensions and conflicts are intrinsic to any dynamic society or development process. But violent conflicts, and their associated insecurities, obstruct, undermine or distort economic, social or political development; as has been the case in Sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, development processes affect the patterns and risks of violent conflict. Progress towards poverty reduction and development can reduce the risks of violence, for example by addressing ‘root causes’ of conflict or by empowering peacemakers. But development processes also contribute to conflict in Africa; for instance by changing balances of wealth, influence and power within societies.

This is as true for development or humanitarian aid as it is for internally resourced development processes. International aid always has impacts on the politics of the recipient countries, including on prospects for peace or conflict.

The key aid principle is that international development aid should at least do no harm, and also take opportunities for doing good. ‘Conflict sensitive’ development aid policies and programmes are designed and delivered in a way that systematically addresses risks of contributing to violent conflict and opportunities to promote conflict prevention, management and reduction and contribute to peace-building.

For many years, international, EU and OECD country development aid agencies avoided systematic engagement with conflict or security issues, in case such concerns polluted or diverted their development programmes. These days should now be long passed. Since 1997, the OECD DAC has issued guidelines to promote conflict sensitive development aid, which EU institutions and member states have adopted in policies. In practice, these policies remain inadequately developed and implemented. Effective adoption of the ‘do no harm’ and ‘take opportunities to support CPMR’ principles requires substantial development of institutional capacities and procedures amongst the EU, bilateral donors and their partners.

There are several well-established tools for conducting the conflict assessments that are essential for conflict sensitive development aid. These have strengths and weaknesses, but now the key challenges are to ensure that they are effectively used in the design and implementation of aid programmes. Efforts to ‘mainstream’ conflict sensitivity into EU/EC and other development aid programmes have only been partially successful. The same applies to efforts to promote coherence with other aspects of EU engagement with developing countries, for example relating to trade or foreign and security policies.
1. Introduction

Sub-Saharan Africa suffers both from widespread poverty and from wars and violent conflict. Poverty and distorted patterns of development undoubtedly contribute to the risks of wars and to the vulnerability of the poor to violence and insecurity. Those who aim to help to prevent, manage or reduce violent conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa thus need also to actively promote effective development aid to the continent. Similarly, violence and insecurity obstructs and undermines development programmes. Thus conflict prevention, management and reduction (CPMR) are important issues for the development aid community.

This chapter examines the issues and challenges for promoting ‘conflict sensitive’ development aid in Sub-Saharan Africa, and examines issues and challenges for the EU and its partners. It is primarily concerned with violent conflict. Non-violent tensions and conflicts are intrinsic to any dynamic society or development process. They are not in themselves a problem. It is risks and realities of violent conflict that are particularly undesirable.

The term ‘conflict sensitive’ development aid refers to development aid policies and programmes that are designed and delivered in a way that systematically addresses risks that development aid might unwittingly contribute to violent conflict, and takes opportunities to promote CPMR and contribute to peace-building. International aid always has impacts on the politics of the recipient countries, including on the prospects for peace or conflict. The key aid principle should be that international development aid should at least do no harm in this respect, and should as far as possible take opportunities for doing good.

Section 2 of this chapter outlines the emergence of international concerns and debates about conflict-sensitive development aid. Section 3 examines and illustrates the risks of ‘conflict insensitive’ aid in Sub-Saharan Africa. Section 4 then examines the concept of ‘conflict-sensitive’ development policies and programmes, and clarifies what they involve. The following sections focus on key operational aspects of a conflict sensitive approach to development aid. Section 5 discusses analytical tools and procedures for conflict assessment. Section 6 explores the requirements for implementing conflict sensitive development programmes. Section 7 identifies some key issues and challenges for the EU and its partners. The chapter ends with some brief conclusions and suggestions for further reading.
2. Emergence of international agendas for conflict-sensitive development

In 1997, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) agreed on a set of Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation. In 2001, these were supplemented by OECD DAC Guidelines on Helping to Prevent Violent Conflict. In combination, these are now a key reference point for the international development community. They are based on the principle that international development cooperation should aim to do no harm and guard against unwittingly aggravating existing or potential conflicts, as well as to take opportunities to prevent conflict and address underlying causes of poverty and conflict.

These OECD DAC guidelines were hard to negotiate within the development aid community. Although they are now adopted policy for almost all bilateral and multilateral development agencies, they are still inadequately implemented and indeed widely ignored in practice.

This may seem to be strange. In view of the almost obvious importance of conflict and security issues for poor people and for development, one might have thought that such guidelines would have been established many decades ago, and would have become mainstream practice. The reason why this is not the case is not only because these are complex and difficult issues, but also because for many years most development aid agencies and professionals tried hard to avoid systematic engagement with conflict and security issues. Indeed, resistance is still widespread. It is useful briefly to review its sources and history, to clarify what is needed to overcome such resistance.

In past decades, many in the development aid community judged that the risks of becoming engaged with conflict and security matters outweighed the potential benefits. The risks included becoming excessively entangled in the self-interested foreign and security policies of the main donor states; politicising and ‘polluting’ development aid programmes; increasing risks to development and humanitarian aid workers in the field; and rendering development aid budgets vulnerable to exploitation by powerful government security agencies.

These risks were real. During the Cold War period, for example, development aid policies and programmes of NATO and Soviet Bloc countries were frequently distorted in the service of bilateral cold war competition. Large aid budgets were allocated to sympathetic governments in Africa, as elsewhere, in order to consolidate alliances.

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with little regard to the development aid merits or to the risks of corrupt diversion of resources. How else can we explain the squandering of vast development aid during the Cold War provided by the ‘west’ to President Mobutu of Zaire (now DRC), or by the Soviet Union to Angola or Ethiopia? Ex-colonial powers such as Belgium, France and the UK similarly often used development aid programmes more to promote political influence than to alleviate poverty.

In this context, it is not surprising that many development agencies and professionals tried to avoid engagement with conflict and security issues, which were inevitably relatively politicised. For similar reasons, Parliaments and other oversight bodies tried to isolate development aid from security or military assistance programmes. The OECD deemed that virtually all types of security assistance did not quality as ODA (overseas development aid), and the mandates of most development agencies and international financial institutions (such as the World Bank) banned or heavily restricted involvement in such aid.

In rhetorical support of this approach, naïve understandings of the relationships between development aid and violent conflict developed amongst development professionals. These included over-simplified understandings about poverty as a ‘root cause’ of conflict, and assumptions that well-motivated development aid and poverty alleviation programmes almost automatically contribute to CPMR. These were almost statements of faith, and bore little relationship with the results of research on the risks of violent conflict.

In fact, all evidence shows that the inter-relationship between development and violent conflict is more complex. For example, there is little correlation between absolute levels of poverty and risks of war or violent conflict. Instead, it is changes in relative poverty levels within and between societies (or expectations of such changes) that have more effect on the risks of violent conflict, and their impact depends greatly on the context. In practice, the risks of large-scale violence do not appear to be governed mainly by underlying ‘structural’ root causes, but rather through the complex and dynamic interaction between such structural factors and a multiplicity of national and international actors and processes (as discussed further in section 4). This means that even well-motivated development aid can either contribute to or reduce risks of violent conflict, according to the context and characteristics of the aid programme.

The end of the Cold War stimulated changes in policy debates relating to conflict, security and development. It reduced pressures on development aid programmes to serve selfish national security interests. For example, western aid budgets to the corrupt government of Zaire could be allowed to fall without strategic concerns about possible Russian influence. During the 1990s awareness of the risks of civil war and complex humanitarian emergencies also developed rapidly. At a time when development aid agencies had more scope to focus on poverty alleviation, the impacts of violence and insecurity on the poor and vulnerable attracted increasing attention.
The inadequacies of many development and humanitarian aid agencies’ approaches towards conflict and insecurity were increasingly cruelly exposed. Humanitarian aid programmes in conflict areas were manipulated or exploited by conflict parties or militias, and may even have served to prolong the conflict (see for example Box 1 on Rwanda). Development aid programmes in weak or conflict-prone countries not only missed important opportunities for CPMR, but also may actually have done harm. For example, some irrigation projects in the Horn of Africa to help agricultural communities also heightened grievances amongst pastoralists or power imbalances with other rival communities.

The failure of the international community to prevent the genocide in Rwanda in the mid 1990s provided further impetus to review the relationship between development assistance and conflict. Studies have made a strong argument of how foreign aid in Rwanda actually contributed to structural violence – both directly and indirectly, through action and inaction, through its mode of functioning and its ideology – and this realisation resulted in more attention being given to the design and implementation of conflict sensitive aid and trade.

Box 1: Aid and the Rwandan genocide

An example of the risks that development and humanitarian aid can contribute to violence is the case of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda in 1996 stated that "By and large, relief agencies had only a very limited understanding of the structures of Rwandese society and very little account had been taken of the views of the beneficiaries in the design and implementation of the programmes... [During] the first weeks of the refugee crisis... traditional structures of authority had been used to organise food distribution and very high levels of diversion had occurred and vulnerable groups often received very little... attempts to rectify these failings were met with violent resistance." Even if food distribution had been more effective, the high levels of insecurity and violence within the refugee camps and the negative impact the camps had on the surrounding populations precludes this intervention from being considered a success. In subsequent years, the pernicious exploitation and (mis-)use of refugee camps by Rwandan militias became another salutary lesson for humanitarian relief agencies.

The resulting debates led to important reviews of conflict, security and development issues amongst development aid agencies and practitioners. For example, the EU adopted policies to promote conflict prevention and reduction, with explicit implications for EU/EC develop aid policies. Several bilateral donors (including Canada and the UK) emphasised the particular importance of security from violence for poor and vulnerable people. Practitioners working in war-torn or conflict prone countries became more critical of the conflict-insensitive programmes they experienced. It was
in this context that the OECD DAC Guidelines on Helping Prevent Violent Conflict were developed and widely adopted by donors as policy.

Meanwhile, priorities and discourses amongst security practitioners and agencies also changed profoundly. There was increasing concern about civil wars and complex transnational violent conflicts. Conflict prevention and post-conflict peace building were priorities for the UN, EU and the rest of the international community. The security agenda was broadened from state and international security to include the concept of ‘human security’.

Human security embraces the twin objectives of ‘freedom for fear’ (the threat of violence, crime and war) and ‘freedom from want’ (economic, health, environmental and other threats to people’s well-being). A human security approach takes a holistic view of poor people’s needs, increasing the efficacy of development initiatives. Conflict puts both the twin objectives in jeopardy. By definition the human security approach demands conflict sensitivity.

Human rights, justice, reconciliation, humanitarian protection, good governance and the rule of law were increasingly accepted as important dimensions of both development cooperation and CPMR. The EU as well as many governments and donor agencies established crisis response, conflict prevention and peacebuilding units. New departments and coordination mechanisms were created at the United Nations (recently including the UN Peacebuilding Commission). Several multilateral and non-governmental peacebuilding networks were created. Regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa were restructured or their mandates broadened to address violent conflicts and insecurity as well as development. The international responses to the terrorist attacks such as those of 9/11, including the so-called ‘war on terror’, added further dimensions to the review of traditional security and development policies: highlighting the importance of renewed engagement with governance issues, alienated communities, and fragile, failed or conflict-prone states.

Belatedly, therefore, promoting conflict-sensitive development is now high on the EU and international policy agenda. The relevant broad policy goals are now established. The challenge now is to implement and develop them effectively.

3. The risks of ‘conflict-insensitive’ aid in Africa

3.1 Identifying risks
This section aims to clarify the ways in which aid can unwittingly contribute to violent conflict, building on the illustrations of conflict insensitive programmes outlined above. The risks posed by conflict insensitive development aid are even greater for Sub-Saharan Africa than they are for other regions of the world. Since the early 1990s, the region has been particularly afflicted with violent conflict; from inter-state or civil wars ad widespread communal, criminal or societal violence. Many Sub-Saharan states are conflict-prone, and face risks of large-scale violence even where they are presently relatively peaceful.

Moreover, Africa is relatively heavily dependent on external development aid. Some 5% of its total income comes through aid; a much higher proportion than for other developing regions. In numerous Sub-Saharan countries, external donors provide over 25% of government spending. Thus aid has relatively high impact on recipient countries, and conflict insensitive approaches can do relatively great harm.

Aid resources represent opportunities to enhance economic wealth, political power, and social prestige. Therefore, people preparing for, or engaged in, conflict try to secure or control such resources for themselves or their allies, and also to deny them to their perceived adversaries. If they succeed in controlling aid resources, they will at worst try to use the aid directly to support their conflict aims, and at best distort its distribution in divisive ways. If they fail in their attempts to control, they will fear that adversaries are benefitting, and may try to undermine or discredit the aid programmes.

Thus, in conflict prone or war-affected contexts, aid agencies have to deal with deliberate efforts by local conflict actors to manipulate their programmes as well as with the risks of entirely unintentional harm. Often, the recipient government and its policies contribute to conflict, and government elites also aim to manipulate aid in their domestic political interests.

Violent conflicts in Africa tend to be complex; often consisting of several overlapping conflicts or conflict processes. As discussed in chapter 1 of this book, conflicts are typically caused and driven by the complex interplay between:

• underlying/structural factors, relating to security, political, economic or social issues (such as high insecurity or impunity; bad governance; socio/economic, ethnic or ideological/religious divisions; political/economic systems);
• influence and roles of a range of local and international actors and organisations, each with their own interests, capacities, agendas, and inter-relationships;
• dynamics of the situation, including conflict or political dynamics, ‘external shocks’, and changing opportunities and constraints.
Aid policies and programmes can affect each of these factors in many ways, such as:

- Affect distribution of resources in the recipient country and affect inter-group relationships; reducing or contributing to tensions; empowering some actors over others; or changing the societies’ capacities to prevent, manage or resolve conflicts;
- Substitute for local resources required to meet civilian needs, freeing them to support conflict or peace-building;
- Affect markets, and possibly re-inforcing war, peace or criminalised economies;
- Lend legitimacy or authority to some structures, actors or agendas, contributing either to peace or conflict.
- Be commandeered or stolen, and used to support one or more conflict parties.\(^{183}\)

Aid policies and programmes can also send implicit messages, through the way they are perceived by local people. The priorities, accountability structures, styles of consultation and engagement, employment practices, and behaviour of aid agencies and programmes sends normative messages as well as has material impacts. For example, if aid workers appear to act with impunity, they are not likely to be seen as potential allies to help tackle injustice. Similarly, jobs with aid programmes are very highly valued in most Sub-Saharan African countries. But many aid programmes have recruited local staff or drivers through informal contacts rather than transparent, open and balanced appointment processes; re-inforcing bad practice, and leading to perceptions that they have taken sides in ethnic or social rivalries.

The risks posed by conflict insensitive aid depend greatly on context. One of the main contextual issues is the status or ‘phase’ of conflict in the country or region concerned. These can be broadly divided into the following:

- Before large-scale violent conflict (either in the context of crisis or not);
- during large-scale violent conflict or war;
- ‘post-conflict (either immediate post-conflict period or longer term post-conflict re-construction and peace-building).

These different phases often overlap, and it is not always apparent at the time which phase of conflict the country is in. However, they provide a convenient way of highlighting particular risks for conflict-insensitive aid.

\(^{183}\) See, for example, M. Anderson, *Do No Harm: how aid can support peace – or war*, Lynne Reinner, London, 1999, chapter 4.
3.2 Phases of Conflict

Before large-scale conflict

Many states in Sub-Saharan Africa have not recently experienced war or large-scale violence, and yet are seriously vulnerable to violent conflict: for example because of underlying structural conditions (including fragile or oppressive state); existence of incentives for (or propensity to) violence; or risks of outside destabilisation.

In such contexts, the main problem is that external development aid agencies tend to act as if conflict-sensitivity is either irrelevant or a low priority. Thus, little effort is made to ensure up-to-date understandings of peace and conflict processes. Development aid programmes are rolled-out without much thought or consultation with stakeholders about possible conflict implications, or for opportunities to contribute to conflict prevention. Possible harmful impacts or missed opportunities for CPMR often go unnoticed, because no mechanisms are in place to monitor or review them and such risks are not high on the political agenda.

In this context, key risks from conflict insensitive aid relate to the distributional impacts of aid; empowering some groups relative to others; missing opportunities to help overcome old grievances or problems of marginalisation or relative deprivation. Another major risk relates to unintentional impacts or missed opportunities relating to governance programmes, where the conflict and peace aspects of human rights, good governance, and democratisation programmes are often more complex than aid agencies assume. Humanitarian aid is also relevant in many such contexts in Sub-Saharan Africa: responding to drought or starvation, or meeting the needs of displaced people or refugees from neighbouring conflicts.

Examples of conflict insensitivity in such ‘pre-conflict’ settings are easy to find. Agricultural programmes directed at increasing overall output and foreign-exchange earning capacity were supported across much of sub-Saharan Africa, with little systematic attention to distributional impacts, between different agricultural communities or between agriculturalists and pastoralists. Good governance programmes to promote decentralisation have neglected opportunities for engagement with marginalised or disaffected communities, or the risks of manipulation by conflict parties. Food aid or refugee camps have been managed in ways that have enabled their misuse by armed militias (for example in Tanzania in relation to refugees from Rwanda and Burundi).

Similarly, the IMF-sponsored structural adjustment programmes in numerous African countries during the 1980s and early 1990s were designed and implemented with little attention to the enormous implications of cut-backs in government spending or employment for regime stability or resilience against conflict. Often in the name of ‘sovereignty’, international financial institutions and bilateral donors did little to prevent such programmes being implemented by the recipient government in a divisive or
conflict insensitive way. In practice, marginalised political and social groups suffered much more from job cuts than those in the patronage networks of the ruling elites. Government systems of particular importance for conflict prevention (such as police and justice systems, and programmes promote inclusion amongst alienated groups) were often disproportionately weakened.

Thankfully, there is now wide awareness of the particular needs and requirements for effective aid co-operation with fragile states. However, the category of ‘fragile states’, or ‘Low-Income Countries Under Stress’, is a wide one, including countries with very different conflict dynamics, structures, and risks. The risks of a conflict insensitive approach here include assuming that conflict risks are sufficiently addressed by following the OECD DAC guidelines on development co-operation with weak and fragile states.\(^{184}\)

If political tensions or instabilities rise, aid programmes often find themselves working in the context of crisis. In this context, there are risks that aid agencies and donors either try to ‘work around’ the escalating conflict in inappropriate or damaging ways, or belatedly try to ‘work on’ the conflict with clumsy attempts to help manage or reduce the crisis. In either case, lack of real understanding of the conflict dynamics and risks, and inadequate track-record and networking in relation to conflict-sensitive activities, means that such attempts are likely to be ineffective, and perhaps unhelpful. As discussed, in contexts of crisis or violence, conflict parties seek to manipulate external actors and aid resources, and naïve aid agencies are particularly vulnerable. In contrast, aid programmes which have adopted a conflict sensitive approach will not only be less vulnerable to such risks but may also positively be able to help manage or resolve the crisis (as well as prevent it in the first place).

Box 2: Assistance to Somalia and clan based violence

The War Torn Societies Project, its partners in Somalia and the World Bank published a report on conflict-sensitive assistance in Somalia. The following points were made to donors providing international assistance:

- Avoid fuelling clan-group competition through aid delivery; the clan system has been used as the basis for the control of resources, which has led to division and conflict between lineage groups at different levels. The civil war after the state collapse in 1990-1991 was fuelled by the plunder of material resources, and relief aid was an important part of the loot. Currently, any infusion of resources into the economy, however small (e.g. salaried employment with an aid agency) represents a potential for competition and division between lineage-based groups.

- Small is better; large-scale projects and high value investments are likely to attract lineage-based competition and division. As a rule, small-scale projects with well-defined goals, developed across clan groups, would be more likely to have a positive impact rather than a negative impact on the conflict environment.

- The real or perceived exclusion by clans, sub-clans or other distinct groups are likely to fuel resentment and may become a rallying point for political mobilisation and potential violence. This requires an excellent understanding of how clans operate in Somalia.

During large-scale violent conflict

In contexts of war and large-scale violence, there is limited scope for development co-operation: humanitarian aid tends to come to the fore. There is extensive recent experience of providing aid in such contexts (for example in Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, Cote D’ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Mali). In these contexts, almost all of the risks of conflict insensitivity come into play, including risks that aid resources are commandeered by conflict parties, or indirectly misused to reinforce war economies, maintain militias, or to release other resources for conflict purposes.

Humanitarian aid agencies and NGOs have experienced virtually all of these problems over the last 15 years, across Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere. Even the most conflict-aware humanitarian aid organisations have not been able to avoid them. A key reason is that armed militias and other conflict actors have strong bargaining power in such contexts. They are often able to block delivery of aid to vulnerable people, or commandeer it after delivery, and are in a good position to demand compromises from aid organisations. Understandings have been made, such as payment for protection or diversion of some of the aid.

In these extreme circumstances, conflict sensitive aid agencies have developed many tactics as well as strategic guidance to reduce risks of making inappropriate compromises or contributing to or prolonging conflict. Good practice guidelines on working in
Conflict prevention, management and reduction in Africa

Conflict prevention, management and reduction in Africa have been developed for the sector, requiring substantial investment in relevant research, training, capacity-building, management, oversight and consultation by each organisation. Most major humanitarian agencies have now made such investments, implying high ‘start-up’ costs for any responsible new humanitarian actor entering the sector. However, difficult dilemmas remain, such as whether and how to retain a reputation of ‘neutrality’ in the conflict area while also contributing to conflict reduction and peace-building.

Although humanitarian aid is most prominent in contexts of large scale violence, in practice there are also some opportunities for longer-term development aid. Many of the wars in Africa and elsewhere are ‘patchy’, in that there are often pockets of relatively low violence and order. These are sometimes transient, but they are also often the result of concerted action by local communities, striving to reduce the impact of war in their area. They deserve support, and may benefit from some types of development aid programmes. Such programmes have to be exquisitely conflict sensitive. Greater investment by donors in capacity to deliver conflict-sensitive aid will create more opportunities to provide useful aid in such circumstances.

After wars end

After either military victory or a negotiated peace agreement, the conflict context passes officially to a ‘post-conflict’ phase, at which point the UN and other international and regional bodies may establish post-conflict peace support missions to support stabilisation, re-construction and peace-building. Recent examples in Sub-Saharan Africa include Angola, Cote D’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mali, Rwanda, Sudan (north-south), and DRC. Immediately after the end of the war, the priority is humanitarian aid, peace-building, and establishment of a functioning, legitimate government and basic public services. As time goes on, the focus shifts towards longer term development aid.

Almost by definition, post-conflict aid is to some extent conflict sensitive. However, experience demonstrates serious inadequacies. Many of these stem from the fact that the ending of large-scale violent conflict is a process, not an event. The structural factors underlying the conflict change only over many years, and conflict parties continue to pursue their interests in the new context – often still with some violence. Conflict dynamics continue to evolve. Meanwhile the mandate for the peace-support mission may be constrained by the particular military and political conditions existing when the peace agreement was signed.

Aid agencies have often made the mistake of operating with out-of-date assumptions about the conflict risks and peace-building priorities. In the name of ‘stabilisation’, there is a risk of contributing to the reconstruction of the very systems that contributed to the conflict in the first place. Focussing simply on ‘implementing the peace
agreement’ may lead to programmes that unduly privilege ex-warlords present at the negotiating table, and neglect opportunities to empower the communities that need to be at the heart of future peace-building. Post-conflict countries are at greatest risk of renewed conflict, and the forward looking task of conflict prevention remains at the heart of a conflict-sensitive approach to aid.

**Box 3: The Paramount Chiefs Project in Sierra Leone**

In Sierra Leone the focus of the National Recovery Strategy after 2000 was to put the state back in the position it was before the war. The emphasis of restoring government authority in its original form meant that institutions and structures were recreated in their original status. In reality, it was the misrule, bad governance, corruption and mismanagement of state resources associated with these structures that had helped to cause the war. The election of 60% of the vacancies for Paramount Chiefs became a priority for the DFID support to National Recovery - even though in many districts the Paramount Chiefs were distrusted and had been conflict parties. The project had to be fundamentally revised mid-stream.

There is often a serious transition problem between assistance in the immediate post-conflict reconstruction period and longer term development aid. With the withdrawal of the post-conflict peace support mission, the scale of available international aid both declines substantially and is profoundly re-structured. Patterns of co-operation change, disorienting the local development partners and imposing major demands on development aid programmes starting that this stage. It is better for development aid programmes to begin earlier, to reduce problems of transition and to gain knowledge of the context, which remains conflict prone.

Some years after large-scale conflict ends, development agencies have a tendency to work as if conflict sensitivity is no longer a priority, or is simply an issue of residue of past war issues. Thus, many recent aid programmes in countries like Uganda and Ghana, which have widely been seen to have made relatively successful progress after their past violent conflicts (in the 1980s and early 1990s respectively) have been designed as if conflict sensitivity is no longer an issue.

### 4. Approaches to Conflict-Sensitive Aid

#### 4.1 Principles and priority issues

At this point, it is useful to elaborate key concepts and principles. Conflict sensitive development aid is assistance that is carefully designed and implemented to:
avoid or reduce the possibility of unintentionally exacerbating or contributing to processes or risks of violent conflict; and

take opportunities to help to prevent or reduce violent conflict and to promote peace.

In order to adopt this approach, development aid partners need to:

• Understand the context in which they are operating, particularly conflict dynamics;
• Understand the likely interactions between the proposed aid programme and the country or regional context, particularly in relation to peace and conflict issues;
• Act upon these understandings to design and implement the relevant development programmes so that they do no harm (in relation to violent conflict) and where possible positively contribute to CPMR and peace-building.

All this is easier said than done. The country contexts and their associated conflict risks are typically complex. So too are their possible interactions with development co-operation activities. Developing necessary understanding can demand considerable time and resources. Acting on this to design and implement appropriate aid programmes that achieve both development and CPMR goals may require institutional capacities and skill-sets that some development agencies do not at present adequately possess.

In this context, it has been tempting for many development practitioners to appeal to the ‘do no harm’ principle, declare inadequate knowledge, and refocus their attention towards either less conflict-prone countries or to supposedly less challenging development sectors. This is definitely not consistent with a conflict-sensitive aid policy or practice. While limits need to be recognised, a decision not to engage with a conflict-prone area may certainly do harm.

In practice it is not necessary for a development aid organisation to have comprehensive reliable understanding or fully developed institutional capacities before embarking on a conflict-sensitive intervention. Provided that it adopts an approach of active learning and appropriate consultation and responsiveness, these can develop over time as the development partnerships mature. Moreover, there are now many specialist resources available to help. However, the conflict-sensitive approach towards development co-operation inevitably implies engaging directly with a number of challenges, which we now briefly highlight.
Challenges of developing conflict-sensitive partnerships with recipient governments and elites

Good development co-operation practice emphasises the importance of ‘local ownership’ and partnership. In principle, development aid agencies seek to respond to development priorities set by the recipient country. In this context, national development frameworks (NDF) or national ‘poverty reduction strategy papers’ (PRSPs) adopted by the recipient government are strategically important for external development aid agencies. This can raise challenges for a conflict-sensitive approach, because such NDFs and PRSPs may not take appropriate account of conflict processes or conflict prevention opportunities.

In practice, it may become necessary for donor agencies to engage in sustained dialogue on peace and conflict issues with the government and other local stakeholders, as well as on ‘mainstream’ development issues, in order to encourage appropriate development of NDFs and PRSPs. This is obviously desirable in principle. But normally the governing elites in the recipient country have strong interests in local conflict dynamics. Government policies and practices may be contributing to risks of conflict. This is particularly true in conflict-prone, post-conflict, or weak and fragile states. As discussed in section 3, the recipient government will often want to use development aid to help to sustain governing coalitions or local patronage networks, and maintain current power relationships.

In this context, shared understandings of a conflict-sensitive approach towards development may be slow to develop between donors and recipients. Continued discussion and engagement with the government on such issues is in itself a contribution to conflict prevention. But in the meantime, a conflict-sensitive approach may imply additional friction points with the government and other powerful local interest groups, which have to be managed. However, this should not raise intrinsically new challenges for any development aid agency that is already seriously concerned with promoting good governance, anti-corruption and human rights.

The importance of ‘joined-up’ donor government approaches

Development aid agencies have traditionally tried to steer clear of directly engaging recipient country governments on politically-sensitive issues relating to peace and conflict. This has been more the domain of foreign affairs and other ministries. An effective conflict-sensitive approach to development aid implies close co-operation at least between development agencies and foreign ministries, and perhaps also with defence, interior and justice ministries where, for example, they provide assistance to armed forces, police or judiciary. Such co-operation can often prove difficult. Different departments in the same donor country have different priorities, and will have different understandings of peace and conflict issues in the recipient country in the absence of positive efforts to promote shared analyses.
Several donor countries have recently developed new mechanisms to promote ‘joined-up’ engagement with developing countries on peace and conflict issues. For example, the UK ‘Conflict Prevention Pools’ mechanism is designed to pool resources and promote joint approaches by the development, foreign affairs and defence ministries. Similarly, the Netherlands has established a ‘Stability Fund’ designed to enable it to provide flexible assistance from development aid and other political/security assistance budgets according to the identified needs of fragile, conflict-prone or war-torn recipient countries.

The examples from the UK Conflict Prevention Pools and Netherlands Stability Fund should be seriously considered by all donor countries and also by the EU. It is important to develop mechanisms that not only enable more joined-up and coherent approaches to CPMR but also help to overcome rigid divisions between aid budgets that are eligible for ‘overseas development aid’ status and those that are not. In most donor countries, such divisions remain a major obstacle to providing appropriately comprehensive and integrated conflict-sensitive aid programmes.

The UK and Netherlands experience has not been problem free. In practice, developing joint approaches and co-ordination between Ministries has sometimes been hard, and capacities to actively manage joint programmes are not yet always in place. Planning for military missions to help to manage conflict or provide post-conflict stability remains relatively detached from other aid programming. Further, joint aid programming for CPMR in conflict-prone and war-torn countries tends to focus on programme or project oriented aid, and thus needs to be associated with clear policy strategies if it is also to influence wider policy-level co-operation with recipient countries. Nevertheless the UK and Netherlands’ mechanisms have helped them to promote more coherent national approaches towards conflict prevention and reduction in Africa and elsewhere, and need to be built upon.

The importance of co-operation amongst external stakeholders
There are normally many development aid agencies and other external actors engaged in providing assistance in any country. Each individual aid agency has only limited influence. They can individually ensure that their own development aid programmes are conflict sensitive. But the overall contribution of development aid to CPMR can obviously be greatly enhanced if they all adopt consistent approaches. Experience shows that full ‘donor co-ordination’ is a worthy but generally unattainable aspiration: each donor wants to retain some autonomy and individual profile. Often, they do not even share their own studies and assessments. However it is possible, with effort, to develop some shared understandings, consultation mechanisms, and common approaches. The conflict-sensitive approach places a premium on such co-operation.
The importance of flexibility, local consultation and responsiveness

The local context is typically dynamic. The risks and opportunities of contributing to peace and conflict change over time. Timeliness is very important in conflict prevention and reduction activities. Conflict-sensitive aid programmes need to be continually reviewed and adjusted if they are to be effective; involving regular updates analysing the causes and risk factors for conflict, which inform programming priorities and sequences.

Unfortunately, some development aid institutions are notoriously inflexible. They may devote considerable time and resources to develop an appropriate programme, but then lack the capacity flexibly to revise and develop it once it has been established. Even if those responsible for the design of the aid programme are ‘conflict-sensitive’, the programme managers appointed to implement it often lack the skills, experience or authority to dynamically adjust and develop the programme to avoid emerging risks or take conflict prevention opportunities. Whereas most aid professionals are aware of the importance of regular consultation with direct local partners or beneficiaries, they often neglect wider engagement with possible stakeholders, including for example groups that may feel disadvantaged or disempowered by the programme.

Measures to improve responsiveness and adaptability in the implementation of aid programmes are important for the effectiveness of aid institutions in fulfilling their core development goals in Africa. Thus there is little tension here with priorities implied by conflict sensitivity.

4.2 Opportunities for conflict-sensitive aid

It is important to emphasise that there are normally many rewarding opportunities for designing and implementing development aid programmes in ways that not only contribute to conflict prevention and peace but also greatly enhance their effectiveness in achieving their direct development goals. This is particularly the case in conflict-prone or fragile regions which have not yet experienced large scale violence, or in post-conflict settings after peace agreements. Much of sub-Saharan Africa falls into this broad category.

Once there is a commitment to avoid harm, and to design and implement the aid programme responsively, with effective consultation and participation of a range of local stakeholders, creative ways of promoting CPMR have often emerged quite easily, and can be implemented without great friction or political dispute.
Box 4: Conflict-sensitive water project in Ethiopia

Oxfam Great Britain (GB) was planning to construct a new water scheme in Shebelle, a village in eastern Ethiopia. The two main clan groups inhabiting the area were both speculating to benefit from the project – through water supplies, and, perhaps more importantly, the water fees that can be collected at water points on one’s territory. After consultations with the elders and other community stakeholders, it was decided to build water distribution points on the territory of both clans. This design helped to avoid everyday quarrels among the people queuing for water. However, there still was the greater task of jointly maintaining the borehole on which all distribution points depended.

In order to set up a water management committee comprising members of all clans of the area, Oxfam called about 80 people from all branches of the community to a more than week-long training workshop in the major town of Dire Dawa. The group had to develop a community action plan on how it intended to collect and administer water fees (needed for the maintenance) and on how to manage the technicians, the operators and hygiene of the scheme. The plan was to progressively sensitise the whole population concerned. The mixed nature of the sensitisation team would in turn lead to a series of community exchange visits. It is quite rare for community representatives to converge in a place distant from their homes (and thereby to some extent detached from their usual environments and pressures). Oxfam tries to use such opportunities to make competing or even opposing elements of a community focus on a common issue, thus enhancing community cohesion and peaceful resolution of conflict. In the case of the Shebelle project, this agenda was pursued using the positive slogan ‘water is life’.

Instead of dividing the community, water as a shared resource became a connector - a point of co-operation, where the different groups maintain their bonds and in this case even address questions linked to their general relationship. Activities such as these primarily aim to prevent a project from aggravating tensions and to use the opportunities for violence prevention in the immediate context of the development project.

5. Conflict Assessments: tools and practices

Conflict sensitive approaches to development aid require effective analysis and understanding of the context and of the likely interactions with possible aid programmes, particularly in relation to peace and conflict issues. Developing capacity to conduct and use peace and conflict assessment methods and tools is thus a priority for aid institutions. A conflict assessment has several characteristic phases:

- Analysis of the context, particularly conflict analysis;
- Analysis of possible interventions and aid programmes, and their likely impacts on conflict and peace;
- Identification and design of appropriately conflict sensitive aid programmes and activities, taking into account other relevant programmes and interventions.
Although logically distinguishable, these phases interact. The process of developing a good overall conflict assessment is generally iterative. Analyses of the likely impacts of possible programmes will generate new or refined questions and insights relating to the conflict dynamics, which in turn deepens understanding of likely impacts of aid programmes.

There are now a wide range of established methods and tools for conducting peace and conflict assessments. Several bilateral and multilateral aid institutions have developed their own tools, including DFID (UK); USAID (USA); GTZ (Germany); CIDA (Canada); the EU and the World Bank. Others have been developed by NGOs and civil society experts, such as: CARE; FEWER; Responding to Conflict; World Vision; Local Capacities for Peace Project; Clingendael Institute; and the Swiss Peace Foundation.

These conflict assessment tools have been developed for a number of different specific purposes and priorities, but they are similar in many ways. Most have the following key elements; a conflict profile which briefly characterises the context; an analysis of structural or proximate factors contributing to conflict and peace; an analysis of the internal and external actors and their interests and relationships; and a dynamic analysis which explores the interactions of the different causes with the actors. To illustrate, we briefly outline key tools of three development aid agencies: DFID; EC and the World Bank.

**DFID Strategic Conflict Assessment tool**

The guidance notes for DFID’s ‘Strategic Conflict Assessment’ (SCA) methodology were published in 2002, and have been used for several major conflict assessments for DFID, the UK government, and for some multi-donor joint approaches; for example for Sri Lanka, Uganda, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, the Caucasus, and Moldova. The conceptual basis for the SCA is the combined use of the following analytical ‘lenses’:

- The ‘political economy’ approach focusing on political and social interests of those engaged in conflict, highlighting those who may benefit from continuing conflict;
- Analysis of the causes of conflict in terms of ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’;

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186 Available at: CARE, 2001, pohrian@care.org; www.respond.org; www.wvi.org; Local Capacities for Peace project, lcp@cdainc.com; www.clingendael.nl; www.swisspeace.org/fast/.
– Combined analysis of structures and actors and how they interact with one another;
– Analysis of all of the different layers/dimensions of the conflict (international, regional, national and local)
– Recognition of the dynamic character of conflicts, which may mean that underlying causes of violent conflict change and are reshaped in protracted conflicts.

**Box 5: DFID’s Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) framework**

DFID uses a Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) framework, which is intended as a conflict analysis and planning tool that would supplement other assessments to inform country and regional strategies. Although developed by DFID, the SCA is increasingly being used as the basis for multi-donor conflict assessments. The main objectives of the SCA are to assess:

- The risks of the negative effects of conflict on programmes
- The risks of programmes or policies exacerbating conflict
- Opportunities to improve the effectiveness of development interventions in contributing to conflict prevention and reduction.

The methodology is based on three analytical steps, with specific areas under each:

**Conflict analysis:** the interaction of structures, actors and dynamics

**Analysis of international responses:** International actors, development actors and interactions between development interventions and conflict

**Developing strategies and options:** developing common donor approaches to better respond to conflict, developing conflict-sensitive individual donor approaches, adjusting current activities – working ‘in’ or ‘on’ conflict, developing new initiatives.

DFID’s guidance notes for the SCA provide lists of possible factors to be taken into account relating to each of the above steps.

The SCA has proved useful in developing several country strategy papers, and for informing efforts towards multi-donor common approaches. In practice, however, it has only been applied in detail by DFID to a relatively few countries: there are still mainstreaming challenges.

**Drivers for Change analysis:** in addition to the SCA, DFID has also developed methodologies for analysing drivers for change within a society. This is not focussed specifically on conflict issues, but rather aims to inform development aid strategies by identifying the key actors and processes that drive change within a society or country and generate the underlying causes of poor governance and lack of ‘political will’ for sustained change from specific stakeholders and actors. Using a political economy approach that recognises the importance of power and interest, it introduces an explicit...
The political dimension to analysis that in the past has often been missing. Drivers of change analyses recognise that the policy environment is shaped by political, economic, social, cultural and institutional factors. Reportedly, those who have used this analysis emphasised that although the analysis had not told then anything new, it had served to make implicit knowledge explicit, to provide a basis for structured discussion of the political and institutional context and its impact on development; and to legitimise this discourse. It also helped to identify where and who could be potential spoilers of peace or drivers of constructive change.

*The EC Checklist for Root Causes of Conflict*

The EC has aimed to promote a conflict-sensitive approach with the help of a Checklist for Root Causes of Conflict, developed for desk officers and staff by the Conflict Prevention Unit in DG Relex in 2001. This identifies eight political, economic and social indicators used in the drafting of Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) and Regional Strategy Papers (RSPs) (see Box 6).

The aim is to provide a simple framework for EC desk officers and delegation staff to apply. Whilst it does not provide a detailed conflict analysis, it does help to ensure that a range of key factors are considered in the development of an assessment and agenda for conflict-sensitive programming. It has reportedly proved useful to desk officers, though there are problems of inconsistent use and uneven quality. The tool is meant to be supplementary to other EC mechanisms for monitoring and early warning. However, it appears that more needs to be done to achieve systematic conflict sensitivity for EC CSP and RSPs.

**BOX 6: EU Checklist for Root Causes**

The EC Checklist for Root Causes focuses on the following issues and indictors:

- **Legitimacy of the State** (inclusiveness, accountability systems, levels of corruption);
- **Rule of Law** (access to justice, criminal justice system, degree of criminalisation, etc);
- **Respect for fundamental rights** (respect for political, civil, religious, human rights);
- **Civil society and media** (openness to civil society; media pluralism/professionalism);
- **Inter-community relations and dispute resolution systems** (their character, etc);
- **Sound economic management** (economic robustness, macro-economic stability, etc);
- **Social and regional inequalities** (are regional and social inequalities addressed?);
- **Geo-political situation** (regional stability, external threats, government policies in region).

Each indicator is rated between 0 – 4, on an overall qualitative assessment, with higher ratings indicating greater degrees of concern; and then added to provide an overall indication of risk of violent conflict. Countries with high overall ratings are placed on a watch list.
The World Bank’s Conflict Analysis Framework
In 2002 the World Bank issued its Conflict Analysis Framework to help desk officers and donor aid planners to conduct conflict analyses at the country level (although it can be adapted for sub-regional use). The methodology has two stages: a screening process; and a full conflict analysis where the screening indicates that this is justified (see Box 7). The full conflict analysis in the CAF framework is highly detailed and involves extensive consultations with experts and stakeholders, though there is flexibility for more modest exercises. It has been used for several countries, including Burundi, Rwanda and Somalia. Thus its use has focused largely on countries that have experienced large scale conflict.

Box 7: World Bank Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF)

A CAF-based conflict analysis involves several steps:

• a desk study re-examining existing relevant information using CAF frameworks;
• workshops with country specialists on key variables, and assess overall conflict risks;
• follow-up studies, as required;
• stakeholder analysis to identify and examine groups capable of affecting political and social change (including through violence) and the main affected groups;
• country consultations with stakeholder groups;
• concluding workshops and analysis to integrate findings in country strategy, PRSP.

There is now substantial experience with using a number of conflict assessment tools, including those of DFID, the EC and World Bank outlined above. Numerous lessons have been learned about how best to use these methods for effective conflict assessments to develop good proposals for appropriate conflict sensitive country strategies. Similarly, there is wide experience with conducting Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments (PCIA) to analyse or evaluate the inter-relationships between specific aid programmes and the dynamics of peace and conflict in the area or country concerned. At an intermediate level, similar tools can be used to clarify the CPMR risks and opportunities for sector-wide development co-operation programmes; for example aid to support sectoral programmes in PRSPs or NDFs on health, education, communications or power supply. These seek to identify key issues and priorities for conflict and peace for particular sectors.
6. Implementing conflict-sensitive aid approaches

Unfortunately, the existence of well-tested methods and tools for conflict assessment has not so far led to consistent development and implementation of conflict sensitive aid strategies or programmes. Development aid institutions are not systematically using such tools to ensure effective peace and conflict analyses and assessments. Typically, they only conduct detailed conflict assessments for a limited number of countries; mostly for countries that are already affected by large scale violence or war or are emerging from it.

Thus, it is very likely (comprehensive information is not publicly available) that the great majority of country strategy papers and development aid programmes relating to sub-Saharan Africa are not based on a detailed, up-to-date, conflict assessment, or indeed any systematic assessment of their interrelationships with peace and conflict dynamics. Even where relevant conflict assessments are carried out, they are not necessarily acted upon by aid agencies. This may reflect inadequate procedures, capacity or commitment to ensure that:

- Conflict assessments are properly integrated into aid agencies’ overall needs assessment and planning processes,
- Aid strategy or programme implementation and review is conflict-sensitive.

This section briefly outlines and illustrates what needs to be done in order to use conflict assessments and implement conflict sensitive approaches.187

6.1 ‘Mainstreaming’ conflict assessments

Conflict assessments will not reliably be acted upon by aid agencies unless they have put into place procedures and capabilities to integrate them into their overall assessment and planning processes.

One of the problems experienced to date, even in aid institutions with strong overall policy commitments on conflict sensitivity, is that any conflict assessment is treated as an occasional ‘add-on’ to the mainstream and established institutional processes for assessing needs and designing country strategies and aid programmes. The conflict assessment may come late in the planning cycle, after the overall country strategy and aid programme objectives and priorities have been set. Due to lack of properly trained and experienced core staff, it will often have been developed through an outside

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consultants team which is not represented at later stages of the planning process, or when the country strategy is reviewed and revised. Additionally, the conflict assessment may become caught up in the tensions that often exist in aid agencies between staff at headquarters and in-country.

Staff with overall responsibility for the country strategy or programme often lack experience and know-how in using the results of the conflict assessment to revise and shape programming choices, and thus take a very conservative approach. Similarly, such staff may neglect to establish conflict sensitive indicators for the aid programme itself and the also for its interaction with wider conflict and peace dynamics.

Such problems are in principle easily overcome, through strengthened procedures and capacity-building. But doing so requires sustained senior-level commitment; attention to procedures; institutional capacity-building to ensure adequate in-house awareness and expertise; and measures to ensure that conflict assessments are taken properly into account as opportunities in the institutional planning cycle allow.

A major strategic decision for an aid agency is whether to aim to ensure that conflict assessments are thoroughly integrated into all country strategies or aid programmes, or only in cases where peace and conflict issues are manifestly a priority (for example, because the country is already deeply affected by large scale violent conflict). In practice, most aid agencies have adopted the latter approach. Although this is understandable in some ways, it means that in-house capacity to conduct and use conflict assessments is not regarded as a core capacity for desk and field officers, but rather as an exceptional need for certain situations. At least in relation to Sub-Saharan Africa, with many weak or conflict prone states, and where peace and conflict are major issues for each sub-region, it appears justified for all development aid agencies to aim to ensure appropriate capacity and procedures for conflict sensitivity aid for all partner countries.

6.2 Promoting conflict sensitive implementation and review
Conflict sensitive implementation of aid policies and programmes involves active management to ensure that the aid programme is:

- Implemented in a conflict sensitive way, avoiding risks of contributing to conflict and taking opportunities as they arise to implement the programme in a way that contributes to conflict prevention and peace processes;
- Monitored and reviewed to in relation to indicators relating to the conflict context, programme implementation, and the interaction between the two;
- Adjusted and developed in response to changes of context or of the inter-relationship between the aid programme and the dynamics of peace and conflict;
- Evaluated in relations to peace and conflict impacts, and learning lessons for conflict sensitive programming in that country or sector.
Many aid institutions already have an approach towards delivery of aid programmes which entails commitment to ensuring the capacity and procedures for such sensitive, flexible and responsive implementation. For example, similar capacities would be required for programmes that are sensitive to issues of gender, good governance, democratisation, or human rights. Where this is the case, ensuring capacity for conflict sensitive implementation is a relatively modest institutional challenge.

On the other hand, some aid institutions are relatively inflexible and insensitive to changing contexts or stakeholder responses once implementation of the programme has started. These face severe challenges in developing capacities and procedures for conflict sensitivity, because it implies a wider reform of institutional practices.

This has the important implication that aid agencies with the capacity for conflict-sensitive implementation and review of aid programmes may not depend so greatly on conducting and using detailed conflict assessments in the planning stage. Although these remain very important, in this context it is also practicable for desk officers and field staff to rely on more schematic conflict assessments at the early planning stage, and then to learn and adjust to peace and conflict risks and opportunities as they develop their aid programmes over time. More detailed conflict assessments and updates would then be conducted and responded to as required once programmes are underway.

7. Issues and Challenges for the EU/EC

The EU/EC has a broad range of policy instruments that can positively affect the peace, security and development of conflict-prone and conflict-affected states. These include human rights and democracy initiatives and major aid and trade co-operation led by the European Commission. In the Council, EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) initiatives include Track I diplomacy as well as peacekeeping, rule of law and policing missions. In addition many EU Member States are important bilateral donors.

The agreement of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts at the Gothenburg Summit in June 2001 and the publication of the European Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention in April 2001 consolidated the EU’s firm policy commitment to conflict prevention, management and reduction.\textsuperscript{188} These provide a framework for future action, and include proposals for; a) improving early warning; b) setting priorities for preventative action; c) enhancing the EU’s

\textsuperscript{188} See EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts at the Gothenburg Summit, June 2001; and the EC Communication on Conflict Prevention, April 2001.
instruments for long and short-term prevention and; d) building effective partnerships for prevention and a commitment for all relevant EU institutions to mainstream conflict prevention. Within this broad framework, the EU and its member states are committed to the 2001 OECD DAC Guidelines ‘Helping Prevent Violent Conflict’ in relation to development and humanitarian aid. At a high policy level, the EU/EC is firmly committed to providing conflict sensitive aid. In practice however, performance has been at best patchy in this respect. The following sections highlight some important issues and challenges for the EU/EC.

**Enhancing EU/EC co-ordination and leadership on CPMR**

Key commitments of the 2001 Gothenburg conflict prevention programme have hardly been implemented. Member States have committed themselves to work on joint preventive strategies in the Council; and the EC has similar commitments. But despite guidelines for co-ordination between the Commission and Member States, which were quoted in the new draft EU Stability Instrument, struggles for legal competences over security activities continue between the EU Council (and Member States) and the European Commission.

There is CPMR capacity within some of the EU institutions. The institutional structure of the EU makes it difficult to co-ordinate instruments from different pillars. CPMR leadership has been given an institutional ‘home’ under Pillar One (i.e. in DG Relex in the Commission). But even here, the capacities are limited and appear to have diminished recently. In the EU Council, CIVCOM and the Civ-Mil Cell’s capacity and remit are very limited on the civilian side, and their connectivity with the Commission can be weak. Currently there is only one staff member in the Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention Unit in the Commission whose mandate includes mainstreaming conflict prevention. Member states were also encouraged to develop national action plans to increase their capabilities for conflict prevention. As noted above, some countries have started to create cross-institutional structures with specific budget lines to address conflict prevention but these remain isolated cases.

The Gothenburg programme emphasised the need to use crisis management tools for CPMR. Progress has been made, but because crisis management operations are meant to remain short in time, the key challenge is to link them with longer-term peace-building community actions in development, reconstruction or reintegration, and trade. The role of non-state actors (NSAs) in partner countries, highlighted in the Gothenburg programme, is still marginal and deserves particular attention. The creation of a new thematic instrument on NSAs for 2007–2013 offers new opportunities for the EU institutions to co-operate more closely with relevant NGOs.

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement, signed in June 2000, provides the basis for co-operation between the European Union (EU) and the African Caribbean and Pacific
(ACP) countries in three main areas: aid, trade and political dialogue. It contains explicit commitments to promote CPMR, and the political dialogues between the EU/EC and partner countries have been institutionalised and useful. But there are continuing coherence challenges for the EU/EC, in that aid programmes, trade and political dialogues are sometimes in tension, and often do not take proper account of CPMR issues.

The EU/EC has a programme to strengthen capacity and co-ordination of EU Member States and EC Delegations at country level. There are now good examples, of core groups of a few EU member states and the EC Delegation developing co-ordinated CPMR strategies, in co-operation with close partners such as the USA or Norway, and thus providing leadership for the whole of the EU and international community. This is still ad-hoc, and needs to be systematically encouraged.

Mainstreaming conflict prevention and conflict-sensitivity

Conflict prevention mainstreaming is at an initial stage within the EU and more is needed to ensure that CPMR concerns are rooted in the day-to-day work of the Commission, Council and Member States services, and that effective capacities for CPMR and conflict sensitivity are in place. EU member states vary greatly in their commitment and capacity to provide conflict sensitive development or humanitarian aid. Even those recognized to be amongst the leaders of this approach (including Netherlands, UK, Germany and Sweden, for example), recognize that much remains to be done to ensure that conflict sensitivity is mainstreamed across their aid institutions.

In the EC, DG Dev has lead responsibility for development aid in Sub-Saharan Africa, while ECHO is responsible for delivering humanitarian assistance. In common with many strongly institutionalised development aid organisations, established development professionals in DG Dev have tended to resist conflict sensitive approaches as a diversion from and possible politicisation of core development priorities. With the reforms associated with the new EC Commission in 2005, DG Dev integrated responsibilities relating to co-operation with Sub-Saharan Africa that should strengthen its capacity to implement conflict sensitive aid: it now has responsibility for most areas of EC-Sub-Saharan Africa co-operation. However, the expectation is that this will be subject to further re-organisation in future Commissions, reducing incentives for fully developing relevant institutional capacity. ECHO has ongoing concerns that involvement in wider EU/EC efforts to promote CPMR could endanger its reputation for conflict neutrality; posing risks for staff and aid operations.

Systematic review and development of existing EC and EU procedures, capacities and systems (in line with requirements already discussed) is needed to overcome existing weaknesses and rigidities so as to promote conflict sensitive co-operation with Sub-Saharan Africa. This includes specific analysis of the training needs of EU staff (in
Brussels, Member States and in-field delegations), as well as an assessment of structures, tools and processes required to effectively implement commitments already in place in EU policy.

**Conflict-Sensitivity and Country Strategy Papers**

The European Commission has identified the Country or Regional Strategy Papers (CSP or RSP) as key tools in integrating conflict prevention in the programming of development co-operation. Since mid 2001, the Commission has been reviewing its CSP and RSP for most of its partners, including for Africa, Caribbean & Pacific (so-called ACP partners). Developing a conflict sensitive country strategy, based on proper conflict assessments is an essential step for ensuring conflict-sensitive aid.

In practice, use of the EC Checklist for Root Causes of Conflict appears to have contributed to improved reference to conflict issues in CSPs and RSPs. But the quality of conflict assessment appears to be very uneven, and often appears to have had a marginal effect on the overall development aid programme. Procedures to enable or ensure that political and conflict analysis takes place in the context of annual and mid-term reviews need to be established. More training and senior leadership are needed to ensure that staff in the Delegations are able to conduct conflict assessments, and ensure that they are influential at all stages of the programming cycle.

**Box 8: Country strategy papers in the Horn of Africa**

In early 2000, for the first time, the EC drafted a Country Strategy Paper for all of the countries in the Horn of Africa, regardless of the status of EU-ACP co-operation in the country. The CSPs for Eritrea and Somalia coordinated the appropriate conflict analysis with the adapted use of instruments. However, in some other cases, like Kenya, Sudan and Uganda, the analysis of conflict risks seems to be more ‘detached’ from the choice of instruments. For example, although corruption in Kenya and high military expenses in Uganda and Sudan may have been correctly identified as conflict risks, the choice of macro-economic (i.e. budgetary) support does not seem to seriously address these problems.

**Direct Budget Support and Conflict-Sensitive Aid**

Direct budget support (DBS) to “good performers” has established itself as preferred aid distribution mechanism by some key donors including the EU and the UK. In some countries, such as Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, the EC is moving towards wide macro-economic support and sector wide approaches (SWAPs), instead of programmatic aid. Eligibility for DBS has largely been based on development / poverty reduction criteria – such as the recipient country’s performance against health or education indicators. The quality of governance is supposed to be a key criterion,
but decisions to date indicate that this tends to be understood in financial management rather than in political governance terms, and that human security issues and the conflict dynamics within a country have been given lesser priority or not been assessed. Moves towards budget support require new approaches to political conditionality and to conflict impact assessments. It is easier to ‘suspend’ development co-operation projects than ‘freeze’ budgetary or sectoral support in key areas, such as health and education.

**Conflict-sensitive development aid in fragile states**

The EU has great potential to address the issue of fragile states because of the wide range of policy instruments it has at its disposal. As discussed in chapter 1, the EU has adopted OECD DAC guidelines for engaging with fragile states, but it is not clear that it has followed through to clarify and put systems in place to implement these. There is important overlap between the categories of fragile and conflict-prone states. The EU/EC needs to consider ways to ensure that conflict assessments and conflict sensitive programmes are prioritised in all fragile states.

**Ensuring a regional conflict-sensitive approach**

Many conflict processes in sub-Saharan Africa have important regional and transnational dimensions. Yet EU/EC development aid programmes tend to be planned and implemented on a country level. The EU/EC does increasingly conduct at least schematic regional conflict assessments, but these need to be developed further, and integrated better with the country strategies. There are institutional obstacles to cross-border aid programmes, yet these may be particularly important in a conflict sensitive approach, for example to address border region issues as highlighted in chapter 1.

**Moving from conflict prevention to crisis response**

EU/EC and other aid programmes tend to be customised for a particular phase of armed conflict. Conflict sensitive approaches developed before tensions became manifest need to be revised and supplemented to contribute to crisis response. The transitions from development aid to support for crisis management, humanitarian aid and post-conflict recovery tend to be difficult and take inadequate advantage of the capacities and knowledge developed in the previous phase. The EU/EC should review its present procedures to ensure improved central planning. However, a key focus should be to invest heavily in in-country co-ordination mechanisms between EU embassies, EC delegations and partners, and the links between these and planning units in Capitals, to strengthen their capacity to define and call upon additional resources (diplomatic; aid conditionality, military support, etc).
8. Conclusions

It is a priority to ensure that development and humanitarian aid to Sub-Saharan Africa is conflict sensitive. Important progress has been made in recent years, particularly at the policy level. There is now wide and high-level policy commitment in the EU/EC and its bilateral and multilateral partners to adopting such an approach.

However, much remains to be done to implement it. There are now a wide range of tested methods and tools for conducting the conflict assessments required to understand the context and its likely inter-relationship with aid programmes in relation to peace and conflict issues. However, these are not yet actually used widely or effectively by aid agencies. Country and regional aid strategies and the design of aid programmes are often inadequately conflict sensitive. This can be explained by a combination of inadequate commitment, procedures and capabilities. It is straightforward in principle to address these, but it will require sustained senior commitment and attention.

Implementation of conflict sensitive aid also requires appropriate institutional capacities, for flexible, adaptive and responsive implementation and adaptation in relation to emerging peace and conflict risks and opportunities. Some aid agencies have already focused on developing relevant institutional capacities, and these are in a position rapidly to implement aid programmes in a conflict-sensitive way. Other aid institutions, including the EC, face greater challenges, because they continue to suffer from relatively inflexible and unresponsive procedures.

There are important challenges, even if institutional capacity to provide conflict sensitive aid is achieved. Conflict sensitivity inevitably raises important political sensitivities with partners and in recipient countries, which need sustained commitment and attention.
Further Reading


EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts at the Gothenburg Summit, June 2001; and the EC Communication on Conflict Prevention, April 2001.

**Conflict Assessment Tools and Practices**


Local Capacities for Peace project, lcp@cdainc.com; www.clingendael.nl; www.swisspeace.org/fast/.
Executive Summary

The chapter begins with a brief review and assessment of current knowledge in the field of trade, increased interdependence and conflict. Although the specific causal pathways are still much debated, we observe a growing consensus that high benefits from trade reduce the incentives for states to engage in costly conflicts with their respective trade partners. This is subject to the caveat that most conflicts in Africa are intra-state or civil, rather than between states. However that is addressed in chapter 5 hence we concentrate on inter-state dynamics.

If Africa were to increase regional trade and integration into the world economy, contrary to much of the experience of the last few decades, and other than with illicit trade activities, the net effect on the peaceful settlement of conflicts would seem to be obvious. Although this insight has gained ground in recent years, as witnessed by the new push for regional and continent-wide integration, the obstacles on the continent are still tremendous.

In the subsequent section on good economic governance, we stress that viable, reliable, credible and effective institutions have to be put in place in order to enable economic actors to engage in commercial transactions in the first place. Much rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding, many African states could do much better in this respect. However, promising examples from West and Southern Africa help to illustrate that the trade-related regional integration agenda is increasingly coupled with security enhancing institutions on the regional level.

We continue with a look at the Cotonou Agreement, which has set the stage for a reform of EU policies towards Africa that include the trade, aid and security agendas. The EU seems particularly well placed in this respect and we recommend that the EU should seek a leading role in harmonizing and coordinating the various efforts of external actors in matters of trade and security.
1. Trade, Interdependence and Conflict

The view that trade integration diminishes the potential for violent conflict is deeply rooted in the European intellectual tradition, as it was in this centre of the world that the rise of commerce and the formation of nation-states were mutually reinforcing. Ironically, this was also the region that gave rise to the most destructive (global) conflicts in recent history. Indeed, the late nineteenth century was a time of great optimism for liberal theorists but, this gave way to the carnage of the First and subsequent Second World Wars. Arguably a major factor underlying this history was the lack of formal institutional mechanisms for regulating resource competition amongst industrializing nation states – states built on mercantilist notions of state-craft. It was not until after the Second World War that such mechanisms were put in place (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; the European Union) and with great success. This recent historical experience lends substantial weight to the liberal proposition, at least from the standpoint of Western history. It also supports the notion that strong states (France and Germany in the EU context; the US in the GATT context) are required to underpin and underwrite the costs of maintaining these institutions.

Thus, most observers agree that trade and its volume and density have significant influence on the likelihood of violent conflict (between and within states). Open bilateral, regional and international markets and heightened economic transactions seem to inhibit (international) violent conflict.189 Unfortunately, the causal relationships and the direction of causation among business, trade, regional economic integration and integration in the world trading system on the one hand and intra- as well as inter-state conflict are only insufficiently known and understood today.190

Country case studies and the experiences of development and diplomatic practitioners provide us with a mixed – and sometimes even contradictory – picture. Most cases are marked through close interconnectedness, reciprocal causation and a negative relationship between levels of economic interdependence and the incidence of (violent) conflict.191 Others, although the clear minority, seem to indicate that the

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implications of intense trade for the initiation and duration of crises are at best indeterminate, if not positively related to one another.\textsuperscript{192}

Despite this incomplete comprehension of the interdependence-conflict nexus, the majority of empirical indications points to the contemporary mainstream perception that high benefits from trade reduce the incentives for states to engage in costly conflicts with their respective trade partners. Positive economic interdependence tends to lead to preferences (at least among citizens and economic actors of two or more states) against war.\textsuperscript{193} Recent research and political practice show that economic and political regionalisation often produces similar peace-enhancing effects as those conventionally attributed to the democratic nature of western nation-states. Put differently, institution-building and increased interdependence in regions without deeply rooted liberal and democratic traditions have been found to result in comparable peaceful inter-state relations as the European ‘liberal democratic peace’.\textsuperscript{194} Of special interest is the importance of the institutional environment which surrounds foreign commerce since not all forms of cross-border trade are conducted in the same context and thus do not have the same effects on the nature of the wider political relations.\textsuperscript{195}

In the recent past, African governments have increasingly sought to capture the potential ‘peace gains’ from intensifying regional trade relations and to put into place institutionalised forms of commercial and political ties (ECOWAS, NEPAD, SADC, etc.).\textsuperscript{196} A conflict-increasing effect of increased dense economic interdependence and exchange can indeed lead to more conflict. States that trade heavily with one another will almost inevitable experience an increasing variety of trade-related disputes. Without containment mechanisms, these disagreements may spill over into the diplomatic realm and ultimately promote heightening political tensions. This is the reason why many institutionalised forms of intense trade relations (WTO, European Community etc.) have established dispute settlement bodies and appropriate legal mechanisms (cf. Mansfield, Edward (2003) ‘Preferential Peace: Why Preferential Trading Arrangements Inhibit Interstate Conflict’, in Mansfield, Edward and Pollins, Brian 2003a).

\textsuperscript{192} Morrow, James (1999) ‘How Could Trade Affect Conflict?’. \textit{Journal of Peace Research}, 36 (4) pp. 481–489. A conflict-increasing effect of increased dense economic interdependence and exchange can indeed lead to more conflict. States that trade heavily with one another will almost inevitable experience an increasing variety of trade-related disputes. Without containment mechanisms, these disagreements may spill over into the diplomatic realm and ultimately promote heightening political tensions. This is the reason why many institutionalised forms of intense trade relations (WTO, European Community etc.) have established dispute settlement bodies and appropriate legal mechanisms (cf. Mansfield, Edward (2003) ‘Preferential Peace: Why Preferential Trading Arrangements Inhibit Interstate Conflict’, in Mansfield, Edward and Pollins, Brian 2003a).


\textsuperscript{195} A case in point here is the fact that civil wars are often not limited to one country. Frequently foreign states have a stake in the (shadow) trade (e.g. in natural resources) emanating from countries undergoing intra-state warfare. In such situations, trade (of conflict and other goods) can contribute to deteriorating inter-state relations because foreign states engage in the civil wars of other countries or take part in the related trade networks. Uganda and Rwanda, for example, provoke political conflict by being part of the commercial networks of the rebels in the DRC (see chapter 5 for more information on the political economy of intra-state war). This illustration underlines that not all forms of trade and surrounding institutional context are alike in their implications for the probability of conflict.
EPAs with the EU and other REPAs between African states being just the most prominent examples). The trade integration record of many of these often overlapping regional integration schemes is less convincing and it remains an open question whether rhetoric is always matched by action. A particular problem is the weakness of the states constituting these integration arrangements. In many cases they do not have the minimal infrastructural capacity at governmental or at societal level to implement requisite policies. Nor are there sufficient pre-existing physical links among these states that would provide the basic underpinnings of facilitating intra-regional trade. Limited state capacity to control borders and projection of power over the whole territory is also inimical to meaningful trade integration. This is compounded by the fact that sovereignty is newly acquired whereas closer integration requires pooling sovereignty. Furthermore, regional leading-states are themselves generally chronically weak (in an institutional sense) and unable to either provide the necessary leadership or to underwrite the costs of maintaining regional institutions. In these circumstances, regional integration in Africa – or at least its supporting institutional architectures - often seems donor-driven, rather than member-state driven. Conversely, this has contributed to substantial donor-fatigue and disillusionment with integration processes in Africa.

However, the trend in Africa (and elsewhere) to establish and promote preferential trade arrangements (PTAs)\(^\text{196}\) and sometimes to combine these PTAs with security cooperation is indicative of the high relevance of the institutional surrounding in which trade relations are embedded. Therefore, the new African regionalism is especially well suited to exemplify the possibility of improving political relations via intensification of the institutions covering trade.

One interpretation of recent experience with various regional PTAs (EU, ASEAN, NAFTA etc) seems to suggest that parties to the same PTA are less prone to inter-state conflict than other states not engaged in such frameworks.\(^\text{197}\) The mechanism responsible for this tendency is fairly simple: Conflict would decrease the benefits for which the PTA had been established in the first place. The reduced trade barriers among all the participating parties have a double effect: First, trade-creating effects will increase and trade will become more valuable and important for the participating states. Second, the arrangement secures that no party can erect protective walls against the others, thereby reducing the danger of conflict because of discrimination against

\(^{196}\) PTAs include free trade zones, customs unions, common markets and other economic groupings such as the ACP-EU framework of cooperation.

foreign traders and firms. Even more important, PTAs open the markets of all involved states to firms of third countries who invest in one of the PTA countries. As a result, all states taking part have the chance to increase foreign direct investments (FDI) in their respective economies.

Yet, there is need for caution here. First, the notion that regional integration will promote economies of scale amongst tiny markets could be considered an extension of the infant industry argument, with all the dangers associated with that path. Second, African countries produce a small range of export commodities which are almost entirely traded with developed countries. Thus the basis for meaningful exchange so crucial to constructing regional integration arrangements (RIAs) is lacking and, consequently, pro-poor growth and improvement of human security are hampered.

More fundamentally, proponents of the ‘New Economic Geography’ advance strong arguments against promoting south-south economic integration schemes amongst poor developing countries. The theory predicts that whilst all countries in such schemes have a comparative disadvantage in manufacturing relative to the global economy, there will be one with less of a disadvantage than the others. Hence industrial activity will tend to relocate to the relatively advantaged country at the expense of the others. This effect will be aggravated by agglomeration economies, which promote industrial concentration in the relatively advantaged country. Furthermore, as tariff levels decline overall within the RIA so those countries suffering from industrial relocation will also experience trade diversion effects – importing relatively expensive goods from the growing industrial centre rather than more efficient global producers, thereby lowering their overall welfare. Meanwhile, the favoured country will gain as regional industry relocates to its soil and real wages rise as a result. Clearly these effects could generate substantial political tensions over time which in turn would undermine integration processes.

Considerable benefits may however be derived from economic integration in as far as it promotes the building or upgrading of trade-supporting infrastructure across the region (see Box 1.1). As already mentioned above, this is an area where Africa lags behind and it is heartening to note that both SADC and NEPAD have put the development of infrastructure high on the agenda (this has also been echoed in the EU’s Africa Strategy paper adopted by the Council of Ministers in December 2005.) Thus, on the trade facilitation front, deepened regional integration is critical for a

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199 This process was a major factor behind the unravelling of the original East African Community, as Kenya attracted manufacturing investment and relocation at the expense of Uganda and Tanzania.
highly fragmented continent like Africa that has more landlocked countries than any other continent. External actors have a critical role to play here in assisting the development of supporting institutions such as customs authorities, and infrastructure systems. These initiatives may have the added benefit of promoting regional value-chains and integrated production, thereby developing economies of scale to compete globally. The downside, however, will be the agglomeration forces noted above.

Box 1.1 Structures of Official and Unofficial Trade in Border Regions

To date, we have only a limited knowledge base and available qualitative information on who is trading, in what commodities and services, and under what conditions and constraints cross-border trade and economic migration are taking place. Nonetheless, present evidence seems to suggest a link between intra-African trade, economic migration, poverty reduction, and pro-poor growth. Recent initiatives to develop (better) methodologies for border assessment underline and show the positive impact of cross-border trade on national food security and strengthening local agricultural markets. For example, the vivid cross-border interactions between Malawi and Mozambique create many benefits for both sides. Hence, state bureaucracies should obstruct less, and facilitate more. The last point holds true even if one considers the (estimated) large amount of unofficial cross-border trade interactions. Looking at the Southern border between the DRC and Rwanda proves that Rwanda is exporting goods and services ranging from cassava to banking, worth an estimated US$10 million p.a. in just one area, 90% of which was unrecorded. However, while border communities may sometimes be quite economically ‘integrated’, continuing to replicate historical trading exchanges, this seems, up to now, not to have contributed to the deepening of state-level institutional integration.


The logic of north-south economic integration is much more compelling: it reinforces comparative advantages, promotes income convergence, and over time should also promote knowledge transfers from developed to developing countries. This is a strong theoretical argument behind the EU’s Economic Partnership Agreements and potential FTAs between Sub-Saharan African countries and the US. Yet it is questionable whether vulnerable economies could cope with the competition from efficient northern producers if the agreements are not sensitive to development needs. Furthermore, if they do not have appropriate institutions in place to manage ensuing liberalization the

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200 The accession of relatively poor countries into the European Union in various waves provides strong evidence of such convergence effects.
ultimate effect could be further dislocation.\footnote{For a very perceptive analysis outlining the opportunities and dangers for Africa posed by EPAs see Szepesi, Stefan (2004) Coercion or Engagement? Economics and Institutions in ACP-EU Trade Negotiations. ECDPM Discussion Paper, No. 56, June 2004.} And if liberalization is only partial, as seems probable, then it is unlikely that production shifts will actually occur. Therefore the end result may be to increase profit margins for the more powerful actors in supply-chains – most likely EU companies – without the efficiency enhancing effects associated with meaningful liberalization. So ACP states must carefully consider their room for manoeuvre in such negotiations and their state of preparedness in light of the economic impact negotiated outcomes may have.

In our view, to the extent that RIAs are actually likely to work in sub-Saharan Africa,\footnote{All the available empirical evidence points in the opposite direction: levels of intra-regional trade remain very low in all major regional integration arrangements (RIAs) in Africa, not exceeding 10 percent in any case. Furthermore, political commitment to deep regional economic integration is not much in evidence. In light of the relative ‘youth’ of states in the region it is perhaps not surprising that this should be the case. After all, regional integration involves pooling sovereignty – in Africa’s case it is newly acquired. For an exposition of this argument see Mbeki, Moeletsi (2004) ‘Regionalisation and the Africa’s Search for Economic Renewal’. eAfrica, Vol. 2, October 2004, 4–6. Available from South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) Homepage: <http://saiia.org.za/images/upload/eAfrica_Oct1_2004.pdf>.} it is likely that over a period of time a small set of regional leaders will emerge around which regional economies will increasingly concentrate. The key question then is how those regional leaders can be supported and boosted, with a long-term view to pulling their regions up with them.\footnote{Here, the UN’s recently released Millennium Development Report proffers some interesting, if controversial, proposals, notably doubling official development assistance and targeting it on a core group of states most likely to use the funds effectively and by extension most likely to succeed. See Sachs, Jeffrey D. (2005) Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals. New York: Millennium Project.} Undoubtedly major northern trading partners such as the EU and US, but also Japan and China have a key role to play in this. On the positive front, and of special relevance for sub-Saharan Africa which has witnessed some of the most harmful domestic and international violent conflicts of the last decades, is the fact that the prior establishment of PTAs generates incentives to back commercial integration by developing security cooperation mechanisms and thus, ultimately, by acknowledging the necessary extension of existing security notions to incorporate the concept of ‘human security’ (see Box 1.2).

PTAs help to dampen conflict eruption through mechanisms other than trade intensification. Such arrangements often work as bargaining, negotiation and discussion forums and can so be utilized as tools to mitigate conflict risks of all forms, not only in the narrower trade-related aspects. Finally, PTAs also reduce phenomena often seen in
non-institutionalised environments of dense trade, namely conflict about the distribution of gains from trade. In establishing reciprocity, PTAs have the potential to counterbalance such disputes about relative gains.

**Box 1.2 Economic Development/Integration and Human Security**

Trade policy and its potential for development are intricately linked to an increasingly comprehensive notion of security, i.e. the concept of human security. State security remains an important element, as secure states are necessary for people to realise their human security. But as the Commission for Human Security states, ‘without human security, state security cannot be attained and vice versa’. Africa has adopted this broad definition of security in many of its continental or regional agreements, although there is a wide gap between the rhetoric and the reality of implementation and adherence.

Economic security is a major component of the concept of human security. Trade, trade integration and investment (both through domestic and international private sector growth) are vehicles for such security as they create opportunities for income generation and diversification. Security-sensitive trade policy can also be used to build up economies emerging from conflict through the reduction of tariffs to such countries’ exports. A more flexible trade policy thus helps to cushion such states and their people from the inevitable shocks of economies in transition, and the concomitant loss of livelihoods, the perpetuation of so-called war economies (see chapter 5 of this series) or worse still, the inability to create jobs. Post-conflict states’ institutions are weak and cannot cope with the need to effectively aggregate, articulate, channel and, in the long run, mitigate grievances.

In more effective states, trade and negotiations on new agreements with the potential for new opportunities may create positive incentives in the fields of institution-building, regulatory systems and thus more predictable commercial environments and better overall governance. These, in turn, have the potential to feed into the strengthening of economic security.

Ultimately, human security is improved if the poor can benefit from a greater share of the wealth generated by economic growth, rather than only a small elite, as has happened up to now in a country like Angola. Given the huge challenges that African states face in attaining the MDGs, it is imperative that trade agreements and relations are structured with the above points in mind – the development and poverty eradication objective.

*Source: Commission on Human Security (2003).*

Against this background, establishing and fostering intense commercial ties between states and societies seems to have the potential of reducing the incidence of violent and armed conflicts in the sub-Saharan African region. However useful the furthering of intra-African trade and, ultimately, more development of the whole continent may be, attention has to be directed to the fact that in spite of a clear and meaningful
connection between poverty and conflict (poor countries engage in armed conflicts more often than wealthier countries), the probability of violent crises increases with the onset of development (compared to the least developed states) and only starts to decrease again when a certain threshold of economic well-being is passed. In other words, the first steps towards open and free policies carry the risk of various ethnic, political or other groups engaging in harsh competition for the benefits of political power or control over natural resources. This holds true first and foremost in resource-rich countries with high levels of inequality, but also in those where control over the state brings major patrimonial benefits. Bearing in mind that more often than not there exists no single cause of violent conflicts, but that multiple causes reinforce one another, donors and trading partners like the EU or single European governments have to calculate the possible (negative and positive) effects of their engagement. But there is no automatism that leaves all (rapidly) developing countries more prone to domestic and international wars. As shown, institutions matter. In other words, the establishment of governance institutions aimed at balancing different and conflicting interests can reduce the conflict risk in the early stages of development. Yet, even the development of such institutions is not always the panacea, but requires a certain level of capacity and understanding of how checks and balances work for them to be more than just token oversight institutions.

Trade issues do also come into play when intrastate wars are still ongoing. Trade sanctions, mandatory (Kimberley Process Certification Scheme) and voluntary agreements (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative) are possible avenues to interrupt the financial and economic bases of those actors who fail to agree to peaceful settlement initiatives. However, so far the record of these attempts is mixed at best.

In some instances trade regimes and agreements provide incentives for the continuation of rebel activity, illicit trade and by extension the proliferation of organised crime networks. This may include price controls on commodities, rationing, non-import parity pricing and higher taxes on key commodities.

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206 Cf. Policy Paper 5 in this series.

2. Good Economic Governance

The previous section has described and explained why increased intra-regional trade in Africa can potentially contribute to limiting conflict risks for the whole continent. In this context, it should be noted that an improvement of economic performance, growth and governance in sub-Saharan countries to provide the necessary incentives for private actors and (foreign) investors to engage in economic exchange is a necessary precondition for increased intra-African trade relations and, ultimately, a better integration in the world economy. Unfortunately, recent African trade performance seems to indicate that only very little sustainable development or economic progress has been made in most African states over the last few decades. Many of the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) are to be found in the sub-Saharan region. Thus, the obvious first step to increase intra-African positive interdependence and, at the same time, decrease conflict risks is to establish high-quality governance for trade. This must be supported by a range of other domestic reforms (including regulatory regimes, investment in social capital, education and health care, development of human resources, poverty-reducing and growth-enhancing public expenditure allocation etc.).

In the African context much of this revolves around enhancing supply-side capacities, in other words production supporting infrastructure.

On the other hand, developed countries, especially but not exclusively the European Union, have an important role to play too. Much of this revolves around the systems of agricultural protection and subsidisation that lie at the heart of the Doha Round of negotiations in the WTO. These systems lock poor countries into commodity-dependent export paths whilst depressing global prices for agricultural goods thereby distorting domestic price signals. This inhibits development of agriculture - a critical sector in the African context. Further to this, as noted above, successful agricultural development also requires the necessary domestic infrastructure to be in place for African states to take advantage of the opportunities. Yet in some instances keeping food prices low in urban centres has been an important political tool of African leaders.

Of course, there is no silver bullet leading to rapid development via public expenditure policy. We still lack a nuanced understanding of the most effective trade-off between social expenditure (health care and education) and infrastructure expenditure (agricultural and industrial development). To make things worse, development assistance based on conditionality has to take into account that the effects of public expenditure of the various kinds are interdependent and extremely difficult to measure. As a result, the donor community as a whole and the EU in particular can rely on little guidance when designing country-specific governance reform packages (cf. Paternostro, Stefano; Rajaram Anand and Tioukon, Erwin (2005) How Does the Composition of Public Spending Matter? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3555. Available from World Bank Homepage: <http://www.worldbank.org>).
limiting the potential for mobilisation against the state. And some states (so-called net food-importing developing countries) depend on subsidised food imports to maintain food supplies. Consequently some African countries are schizophrenic about dismantling (particularly) European systems of subsidisation and protection.

Growing evidence from developmental practice and research seems to suggest that flaws in the state apparatus (e.g. public administration) lie at the heart of (economic) governance failures. Countries that pursue rigorous competitive commercial, governance and trade policies are more likely to achieve substantially higher levels of growth (in exports, imports and gross domestic product) and they tend to be more successful in integrating in regional and global economies. National trade policies and economic institutions loom large as factors impacting upon economic performance. As a consequence, inappropriate economic institutional contexts and policies seem to be the main causes of the dismal economic performance in much of Africa. To date, most African countries have passed largely restrictive fiscal, monetary, wage and trade laws and policies, and have, intra-regionally erected trade barriers (tariffs, customs procedures and other non-tariff barriers). This situation is contrasted by a completely different picture when considering the fact that the majority of African exports to the OECD world are subject to no or very low tariffs and to only a relatively small number of non-tariff trade barriers. It would seem then that the key to capturing the conflict-preventive gains from trade lies in efforts of African governments to reduce intra-regional tensions and to craft and implement urgently needed governance/institutional reforms furthering the densification of Sub-Saharan economic interdependence. However, much depends on whether such efforts are properly designed to avoid the problems of agglomeration associated with economic integration amongst poor countries.

In sum, because of the growth-enhancing and conflict-reducing potential of regional and international trade, reforms must pursue a twofold objective: First, African countries have to intensify their integration in trading blocs and networks. Second, as a precondition of the aforementioned aim, viable, reliable, credible and effective institutions have to be put into place in order to enable economic actors to engage in commercial transactions in the first place (on the intra-state, regional and global levels). Yet this is a tall order in a continent littered with failed or near-failed states that are often heavily

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209 To make things even worse, these negative effects are exacerbated by deeply embedded social and political dynamics of a country.

dependent on single-commodity exports and, thus, require a more sensitive handling in relation to trade agreements.\footnote{Countries that are exporters of primary commodities and have weak institutions are particularly vulnerable. A World Bank study found that if 25\% of a country's GDP are derived from primary commodity exports, the risk of civil war jumps to over 30\% \cite{Collier2003-NaturalResourcesAndViolentConflict} (Collier, Paul and Bannon, Ian (2003) \textit{Natural Resources and Violent Conflict – Options and Actions}. Washington, DC: World Bank).}


- Credible protection of property rights;
- Enforcement of voluntarily concluded contracts; and
- Provision of public infrastructure and services that support private economic activity.

Many of today's Least Developed Countries\footnote{Today, 44 out of 63 Least Developed Countries are in Sub-Sahara Africa.} (LDCs) in Africa have failed to implement the most promising policies that could contribute to fostering conflict-reducing interdependence via increasing economic performance and trade. To the contrary, policies have often created perverse incentives so that measures to increase saving, investment, foreign aid, education and public health, to modernize technology and to reduce population growth and debt burdens too often failed. Various factors underlying this sad record must be addressed:

- Corruption and transparency (e.g. via reform of governmental financial management, procurement and audit systems, as well as laws relating to conflict of interest for government officials, and disclosure of income by senior government officials and civil servants);
- Voice and accountability (e.g. by obliging bureaucracies to open up the regulatory process to more public participation, and also enacting freedom of information laws to enable citizens and the media to gain access to all tendering documentation in a timely manner) and;
- The improvement of administrative quality (e.g. by performance-related payment and opening up of recruitment procedures).
At the same time, all policy measures have to be designed with a great deal of context-sensitivity. If underlying national political and social characteristics negatively influencing economic governance are not reckoned with and altered, potential development spoilers will be allowed to persist and survive reform. This indicates that we cannot rely on a ‘one size fits all’ approach to establish good quality economic institutions in African developing countries.214

3. The Cotonou Agreement as the Key EU Instrument for Conflict Prevention in Africa

The central framework outlining the European approach towards cooperation between the EU and Sub-Saharan African states in the fields of trade, enhancing African integration (within the region and into the world economy) and increasing sensibility for conflict prevention and management in Africa is the Cotonou Partnership Agreement215 between the European Union and the ACP states. The Agreement was signed in 2000 as a follow-up of the Lomé Convention and it is the latest in a long history of co-operation agreements between the ACP countries216 and Europe.217 As outlined in chapter 2 Cotonou is based on an encompassing approach, tying together political, economic and developmental aspects of Euro-African cooperation. It rests on five interdependent pillars (see Box 3.1). The agreement includes a specific provision

215 The official name of the agreement is ‘Partnership Agreement between Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the One Part and the European Community and Its Member States, of the Other Part.’ In the following, the terms ‘Cotonou Partnership Agreement’ and ‘Cotonou’ will be used as synonyms. The document is available from the European Commission’s Homepage: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/cotonou/agreement_en.htm>.
216 The ACP countries are the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries almost all of them former colonies of European States.
217 Negotiations for the Cotonou Agreement started in September 1998 and were concluded in February 2000. The Agreement entered into force on April 1, 2003, having attained the required number of ratifications (52 on the ACP side and 15 on the EU side). The objectives of the agreement are the reduction and eventual eradication of poverty, consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy. The agreement seeks to establish a reform of the former partnership framework, while building on the existing acquis. The agreement has been concluded for twenty years, with a clause allowing for revision every five years and a financial protocol for each five-year period. A specific timetable was also agreed for trade arrangements.
on ‘peace-building policies, conflict prevention and resolution’,\(^{218}\) which reflects the growing interest of the EU in conflict prevention in Africa and a newly emergent political will of European leaders to integrate conflict prevention into trade policies.\(^{219}\) However, the commitment to conflict sensitivity appears to be rather unconnected to the main trade-related content of the document. What is needed, therefore, is a systematic and coherent incorporation of conflict prevention as part and parcel of all other areas of engagement, i.e. the mainstreaming of conflict-preventive strategies.\(^{220}\)

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**Box 3.1 The Five Pillar-Structure of the Cotonou Agreement**

- **I: Comprehensive political dimension including:**
  * a flexible framework for political dialogue on all issues of mutual concern (Art. 8);
  * an ownership-guided cooperation strategy to address peace-building and conflict prevention with a special emphasis on regional initiatives and the strengthening of local capacities (Art. 11);
  * a focus on essential and fundamental elements of the partnership: commitment to human rights protection, democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance all of which constitute a field of active EU engagement (Art. 9).

- **II: Participatory approach containing**
  * innovative provisions to foster participatory cooperation between EU and Africa and the inclusion of civil society, social and economic actors by
    - informing these actors about Cotonou and consulting them on economic, social and institutional reforms to be supported by EU;
    - facilitating private engagement in implementation of projects;
    - supporting capacity-building of non-state actors; and
    - fostering EU-ACP networking.

- **III: Focus on poverty reduction as a goal of Cotonou through**
  * endorsement of the OECD development strategy (OECD DAC guidelines);
  * commitment of the parties to jointly establish a strategic framework and to permanently measure progress of achievements;
  * individual development strategies for each ACP country incorporating local stakeholders;
  * integration of the various dimensions of development policy (economic, social, cultural, institutional, environmental, conflict-preventive and gender aspects) in a mutual complementary framework.

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\(^{218}\) Part I: General Provisions, Title II: The political dimension, Article 11.


IV: Reformed financial cooperation including
* regrouping of the European Development Fund (EDF) to channel resources via two instruments (non-repayable aid and venture capital and loans for private sector development);
* transferral of main responsibility for the resource allocation to the ACP countries;
* provision of investment guarantees (from the Investment Facility of the European Investment Bank) to support and hedge private local and foreign investment;
* strengthening of local financial institutions and capital markets.

V: New framework for economic and trade cooperation including
* establishment of new trading arrangements (economic partnership agreements intra-regional among ACP countries and inter-regional between ACP groupings and EU);
* WTO-compatibility of the preferential trade relations between EU and its former colonies;
* commitment of African EPA-participants to reciprocally open their market to all other EPA-states (reciprocity, cost of trade liberalisation and economic adjustment to be counterbalanced through financial aid), to extend and expand inner-African regional groupings (regionalisation) and to liberate the 39 least developed countries from the obligation to sign EPAs.


Because of the open and process-focused character of the Cotonou Agreement there seem to exist sufficient possible channels to take steps to mainstream conflict prevention strategies, especially when one looks at the focus of the agreement on encouraging and fostering African ‘ownership’ of developmental strategies and conflict-mitigating paths. Furthermore, the EU external assistance (trade, developmental and foreign policies) is increasingly geared towards supporting and improving regional economic and political integration in the ACP countries.

These considerations have direct policy implications. Special attention is and should be directed to intra-ACP cooperation structures and procedures as well as to African regionalisation processes and evolving integrative approaches. The Cotonou Agreement focuses on such aspects. However, it is this central element of the EU-African relationship which attracted heavy criticism from political practitioners, NGOs and the academic community. One of the main criticisms is that the Cotonou approach to

221 Article 11/1.
222 See Article 30 of the Cotonou Agreement which defines areas of regional security cooperation and Lehtinen, Terhi (2002) p. 47.
African regionalism remains insensitive to indigenous regionalisation strategies and objectives because of the supposed central aim of the agreement to make EU-ACP relations WTO-compatible. In Africa, this has had the effect of fragmenting some existing regional integration arrangements in the context of the negotiations on the Economic Partnership Agreements (see Box 3.2).

The EU has also been criticised for a supposedly state-centric approach and for paying too little attention to civil societies and other actors. Lastly, in the current stage of establishment and negotiation of EPAs, and review of the whole Cotonou Agreement, it is open whether the EU will ultimately succeed in enhancing the conflict-sensitivity of its developmental framework.

**Box 3.2 EPAs and Pre-Existing Intra-African Trade Arrangements**

The potential of regional economic cooperation to promote competitive regional industries and markets has to date not been effectively exploited within Sub-Saharan home-grown regional groupings and integration schemes. Nevertheless, cooperation does exist in various forms and constellations.

For example, Southern African countries belong to a number of overlapping regional economic communities (SADC, COMESA, and the East African Community). As overlapping membership is not possible in the negotiation of EU-African trade arrangements, these states have been compelled to choose between the Southern African EPA and the East African EPA. Consequently, a number of SADC countries, who are also members of COMESA, are negotiating as part of the East and Southern African EPA, while the rump of SADC is negotiating as what has colloquially become known as ‘SADC-minus’ (Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia, Angola and Tanzania). Four of those countries are also members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). South Africa is also a member of SACU, but has a different instrument governing its relationship with the EU, viz. the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA). Tanzania, which has decided to negotiate as part of SADC, is also a member of the East African Community (EAC) that includes Kenya and Uganda, who are negotiating as Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA). South Africa is officially an observer to the SADC-minus negotiations, but the EU, through its Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson, has expressed a desire for South Africa to become a more active participant in the negotiations. A possible scenario is that the final SADC EPA may be some form of amended TDCA.

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The EPA negotiations are forcing realignments among the regional economic communities, but these are externally imposed. Moreover, because of the relatively strict and short timetable for negotiating EPAs with the EU, African governments have to make fast-track decisions about the question to which EPA grouping they will adhere. Such decisions have major impacts on a country’s development chances. Even the World Bank has cautioned developing countries to carefully consider their economic regionalisation and cooperation strategies, especially when such policies include the opening of markets to developed countries.

To complicate matters even further, in most regional integration schemes in Africa no internally agreed-upon visions of a properly functioning integration process or geography exist. But, such a common understanding will be necessary if African states are to play an active role in determining the make-up of the regional integration schemes on their continent. Bearing in mind the above mentioned flaws of the Cotonou process, the negotiation of EPAs between the EU and Africa may indeed be an externally imposed integration concept but this may, on the other hand, be one way of compelling a form of streamlining of the ‘spaghetti bowl’ of Africa’s integration schemes.


Although many of the aforementioned gaps do exist, considerable progress has been made. The EU has injected a heavy dose of conflict-sensitivity into its Africa policies.\textsuperscript{226} Since the inception of the African Union in 2002, the EU has worked very closely with the AU Commission on specific aspects of peace and security, not necessarily through the conduit of Cotonou, as the AU is a continental rather than only a sub-Saharan institution. For this purpose, a bundle of instruments are at the EU’s disposal (within and alongside Cotonou, see Box 3.3), the still open test of their ultimate effectiveness notwithstanding.

The 9th European Development Fund (EDF) as the chief EU-ACP funding mechanism to support regional conflict prevention is one of these instruments. Its 2002 regional programming identified conflict prevention as one of the core areas of cooperation and assistance. In the regional programming documents, conflict prevention is systematically integrated as ‘non-focal’ area of cooperation. As such an area, conflict prevention receives less funding than policies defined as ‘focal’ cooperation areas (e.g. large-scale infrastructure projects or support to regional frameworks of economic cooperation and regional EPAs). However, as the EU Strategy for Africa (see Box 3.3) states, peace and security are defined as key prerequisites for sustainable

development and for attaining the Millennium Development Goals. This implies that non-focal areas must not be seen as areas with less political priority for the EU.

Based on the Cotonou Agreement and the related 9th EDF, the EU has decided to negotiate regional cooperation frameworks with five mandated African regional organisations (as set out by the AU). Using EDF resources, these five organisations (with assistance of the European Commission) are now in the process of developing conflict prevention and management strategies tailor-made for their respective regional needs and problems.

The EU institutional commitments and mechanisms for the implementation of regional frameworks of conflict prevention in Africa are in place since 2004. This can be considered as a major step forward towards an integrated EU approach to conflict prevention in Africa.  

Furthermore, the European Security Strategy of December 2003, as well as the EU’s Africa Strategy, emphasise the interconnectedness between development, trade, good governance and conflict avoidance. Trade and development policies could be powerful tools for promoting necessary reform in fragile African States. The EU has identified the creation of a positive economic environment as an important prerequisite to this.  

There are a number of significant areas for ensuring that trade policy does not exacerbate underlying conflicts and tensions in a country. Of particular relevance to trade is the recognition of the need to build trade capacities. Assisting in improving Africa’s negotiating capacity could be helpful for the conclusion of trade agreements which are conflict sensitive and adjusted to African needs. Related to this is the issue of trade facilitation, which is a major cause of the inability of African states to become more competitive, and which is provided for both in the Strategy as well as in the discussions on the EPAs. If one accepts that one of the causes of conflict in Africa is the unequal access to resources and income, i.e. relative deprivation (sometimes manifested in ethnic, religious or regional discrimination), then it is critical to ensure that one of the objectives of the Strategy to ‘enable African governments to effectively use trade as a policy tool to reduce poverty’ forms part of the framework of any trade negotiations.

The development of local capacity in trade facilitation and negotiation is expected to contribute to the creation or strengthening of institutions and structures that form the bedrock of capable states (e.g. customs, taxation) by reducing the potential for corruption and creating more transparent systems of accountability.

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Box 3.3 Instruments of the EU Africa Policy

- **9th (2002-2007) and 10th (2008-2013) European Development Fund (EDF):** The EDF is the main financing instrument of development cooperation with the ACP countries. Its goal is the promotion and advancement of economic, social, political and cultural development with a view to contributing to peace and security and to establishing political stability. The EDF is not part of the EU budget, but is funded by the member states and managed by a specific committee. The EDF consists of several instruments (grants, risk capital, loans to the private sector). The EDF is expected to be integrated into the overall EU budget, which has caused some consternation among African states.

- **Political instruments:** The instruments of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) cover political dialogue, joint actions, common positions and strategies, demarches, special envoys, police and military missions. The Cotonou Agreement’s articles 8-9 also provide such instruments.

- **Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM):** The mechanism was designed to increase the capacity of the EU to intervene timely and effectively in civilian crisis management and covers areas such as police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection.

- **Trade cooperation:** The EPAs and the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement with South Africa are the main vehicles for this.

- **Initiatives in the Justice and Home Affairs pillar:** Examples are contribution to the fight against terrorism, and asylum and immigration policy.

- **Development-oriented budget lines:** These lines complement formal EU-ACP cooperation. Their aim is to provide the possibility for targeted support to peace and development. Examples are the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), securing food security and co-funding NGO engagement.

- **EU Strategy for Africa:** This was published in October 2005 and sought to draw together the various instruments of EU policy towards Africa (both North and Sub-Saharan). The Strategy sets out quite clearly that peace is a pre-condition for development. It commits the EU to enhance cooperation with the African Union (AU) and regional organisations (ECOWAS, SADC etc) to predict, prevent and mediate conflict as well as to address the root causes of conflict. Therefore, the EU’s increased funding of the African Peace Facility, assists Africa to develop its own capabilities (through training, technical, logistic and planning support), envisages deployment of EU battlegroups (if needed), seeks to encourage others to adopt the EU Code of Conduct on arms export (to reduce illicit trafficking of small arms) and to assist the AU in its policy against terrorism (to support the implementation of international agreements and technical assistance for and information sharing with the AU Anti-Terrorism-Centre).

Source: Commission of the European Communities (2005), Alexander et al. (2003).

Because of the EU’s recent attempts and steps towards the establishment of a holistic Africa policy through cooperation with continent-wide bodies (AU), regional organisations (ECOWAS, SADC etc.), parliamentarians, local authorities and civil society, it is essential for the EU not to view these various levels of engagement as
independent of one another. Many of the most pressing African security problems can only be addressed, and their solutions discovered, by taking a close look at the intersections and interconnections of the different actors and arenas. That said, it seems fruitful to examine recent attempts of the sub-Saharan states to increase economic, political and security-related cooperation as well as support of the EU for such regionalism and the question of complementarity between regional and continental processes. To do so, the next chapter looks at ECOWAS and SADC as two regional cooperation frameworks supported by the EU.


Sub-Saharan African states have recently developed a regional security agenda and related dynamics of their own to strengthen security aspects and prevent and manage conflicts among and within them. The creation of the continental African Union (AU) in 2002 and some positive developments at the regional level (SADC and ECOWAS increasingly concentrating on security aspects and their interconnectedness with the trade and political dimensions of their relations) all point to a growing awareness among African governments of the relevance of peace and security for development and vice versa.

Moreover, these innovations have been accompanied by an altered perception among external actors such as the EU and its member states of the significance of African security for international politics and their own relation to ACP states. As a consequence, the EU is pursuing more and more cross-cutting strategies that integrate and combine elements from various fields of foreign and security, economic and development policy.229

The AU has established a number of initiatives aimed at avoiding the failure of its predecessor, the OAU, to address conflicts effectively. The Peace and Security Council of the AU was launched in May 2004 as the ‘standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.’ An African stand-by force was also envisaged to be ‘composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice.’ The standby force will consist of brigades in each of the five regions. A Panel of the Wise has also been established and a Continental Early Warning System.

Article 16 of the Peace and Security Protocol emphasises that the regional economic communities form the building blocks of the AU’s peace and security architecture – as indeed with the rest of the AU’s activities. What is a little unclear is the division of responsibilities between continental and regional structures on matters of peace and security, and the extent to which one can talk about a subsidiarity principle. Indeed, one can argue that the RECs don’t necessarily regard themselves as ‘subsidiaries’ of the AU. As regional building blocks, these RECs are also poorly equipped for the task. There is a vast gap in capabilities among the various RECs, which both the AU and EU see as key actors in implementation. Some are more capable or active than others. The Secretariats are often under-resourced and lacking the requisite mandate from member states to act. This has created problems for both trade and political integration.

4.1 West Africa (ECOWAS)
Endeavours of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to supplement its economic agenda, and thus to initiate a new security architecture for West Africa, constitute but one of the examples of the growing awareness of African governments themselves – and the EU – that regional African organisations could be well-suited to develop region-specific conflict prevention approaches.230

On 10 December 1999, the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, as the highest decision-making authority of the Community, adopted the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.231 The Protocol spells out the criteria and objectives of ECOWAS engagement in conflict management in West Africa including:

– The promotion of free movement of persons;
– The linking of development to security;
– The necessity of democratic forms of governance and the protection of human rights;
– The emphasis on the necessity to strengthen the cooperation between the Member States in the fields of preventive diplomacy, early warning, prevention of cross-border crimes, peacekeeping and equitable management of natural resources.


The Authority has delegated substantive powers to the Mediation and Security Council, an innovative and unprecedented approach in Africa. Thus, the Executive Secretary has been provided with the power to initiate fact-finding, mediation, negotiation and reconciliation missions and actions aimed at the prevention and management of conflict in the region. They are also responsible for training and preparation of composite standby units through regional peacekeeping training centres.

Within the ECOWAS Secretariat, the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defence and Security is the primary implementing body of the Conflict Prevention Mechanism. The Office is sub-divided into four departments: the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, the Department of Defence and Security and the Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC). The OMC receives reports from four zones within the West African region that serve to gather information from their focal areas on a day-to-day basis through contact with government authorities, civil society and the public media. The OMC is responsible for data collection and analysis and the drafting of up-to-date reports to the Executive Secretariat that (shall) enable ECOWAS to identify emerging crisis, monitor on-going conflicts and post-conflict transition phases.

Currently, the ECOWAS system for conflict prevention and management is at an early stage of construction. However, it can be seen as the most comprehensive and sophisticated conflict prevention structure within the African continent, although the low ratification rate of ECOWAS Member States must be a cause of concern pointing to an obvious gap between rhetorical commitment and actual practice. Moreover, ECOWAS early warning has to deal with the problem of the lack of adequate technical equipment to conduct timely data collection, processing and dissemination. There is still no consensus among West African governments about how to differentiate between political and pure humanitarian crises or conflicts.

To summarize, the development of a security dimension within the erstwhile pure economic grouping of ECOWAS can be seen as the reaction of West African states to

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232 The Council was officially launched in Monrovia in May 2000. For West Africa, the body serves the same functions as the UN Security Council on the global level. The Council meets at ambassadorial, ministerial and head of state levels and can authorise all forms of interventions (e.g. the deployment of political and military missions), inform the UN Security Council and AU of its decisions, provide mandates and appoint force commanders.


the intricate interdependence between security and development and to the complex and violent political environment of the region. Current experience with West African security cooperation is mixed. Despite the above mentioned problems, ECOWAS has managed to rapidly adjust its institutions and objectives to deal with the multiplicity of violent conflict in West Africa. One of the lessons learned during the ECOMOG interventions (1990s) into crises in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau is the necessity to establish institutions for conflict management before the outbreak of violent conflict. In the case of the Liberian crisis, no permanent institutional infrastructure had been put into place before the onset of war, which confronted ECOWAS with the need to invent some kind of mechanism ad hoc while the conflict had already begun. However, recognizing the persistence of high tension in the region, the EC/EU has already acknowledged the potential of the ECOWAS framework to embrace conflict prevention and begun to support this dynamic process through various instruments (see Box 4.1).

**Box 4.1 EU Support for Enhancing ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Capacity**

- **Institutional support** to the secretariat of ECOWAS;
- **Political dialogue**: regional political dialogue with ECOWAS, inter-regional consultations on the regional programming of EC cooperation and aid;
- **Analysis and Monitoring**: support for the regional early warning structures;
- **Support for regional dialogue** of West African governments, parliamentarians, civil society etc;
- **Mediation and regional diplomacy** through appointment of EU special envoys, financial support for regional peace processes, mediation and regional confidence building;
- **Support for cross-border cooperation** through the encouragement of ECOWAS to form an African regional Economic Partnership Agreement grouping, the channelling of Cotonou-related development aid to such regional frameworks and through support related to regional infrastructure.

*Source: Lehtinen (2002)*

**4.2 Southern Africa (SADC)**

The Southern African Development Community adopted the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation on 14 August 2001. The SADC heads of state had agreed to create an Organ on Politics, Defence and Security in 1996, which would ‘allow more flexibility and timely response, at the highest level, to sensitive and

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potentially explosive situations.’ However, its status was unclear, with some members such as Zimbabwe maintaining that the wording in the documentation establishing it, made it autonomous of the SADC Heads of State summit. This matter was finally resolved with the adoption of the Protocol in 2001.

The SADC Organ falls under the overall control of an annually rotating troika of SADC heads of state. A new Ministerial Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Public and Security from the troika countries was established. Three committees fall under this: the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) and the projected Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff. The Protocol also instructs the Organ to conclude a Mutual Defence Pact to respond to external military threats. This was signed in 2003.

It is clear both from the Protocol as well as the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) adopted in August 2003, that the definition of security is now much broader than its classical narrow interpretation. The Organ’s security agenda includes both political-military (inter-state war, internal war, large-scale human rights abuses, coups, poor governance and abuse of power, attacks on democratic institutions) and non-military security threats (food security, mass movements of refugees, illegal migrants, poverty and underdevelopment). The SIPO divides security priorities into four areas or sectors: political; defence; state security; and public security. The political sector includes economic underdevelopment and poverty as a key challenge facing SADC. The state security sector identifies dealing with the negative effects of globalisation, such as the growing vulnerability of national borders, the increase in transnational crime, money laundering etc as key challenges.

Furthermore, at least on paper, there is a sense of the interplay between development issues and peace and security. SADC’s Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), its development roadmap, should be seen in conjunction with the SIPO, which focuses on security in its broader definition. ‘Success is seen in the aligned SIPO and RISDP ‘because the function of defence and security in the development process is to guarantee that the development plans are realised in a climate of peace and security’.”

The SADC security provisions are very comprehensive, albeit ambitious. In practice therefore, SADC continues to focus far more on the traditional definition of security — a reflection of the perspective of many of its member states. Consensus is far easier in this field than it is in the area of interventions in the face of domestic instability. In

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those areas there is a notable absence of political will to ensure members comply with protocols and related agreements. Notwithstanding the policy design and protocols, SADC is still far from being regarded as a security community. Its members hold divergent views on the broad principles and values, such as good governance, democracy and accountability. This is compounded by the very different levels of political and economic development of SADC members. In addition, there continues to be substantial internal instability and uncertainty in a number of the member states – particularly Zimbabwe, DRC and Angola. Furthermore, as with all regional organisations on the continent, both the Organ and SADC itself suffer from serious capacity constraints to manage their affairs and to implement policy.

Another difficulty relates to the role that South Africa has played in helping to construct a regional community. Although it is very much the dominant political and economic power in the region, it has been very hesitant (especially politically) to flex its muscles – unlike Nigeria in ECOWAS. It is highly unlikely that South Africa will adopt such a stance in the short term, primarily because of its sensitivities of being branded a ‘big brother’ by its neighbours, and the concomitant resistance from other members of SADC of it assuming a ‘hegemonic’ role (it must be noted that on trade-related issues, South Africa has not been averse to driving a hard bargain with its neighbours).238

On trade-related issues regarding the SADC, one can argue that much more progress has been made outside of it, within the Southern African Customs Union (which comprises South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland). However, political issues are taken up at the SADC level. With regard to the EU, there is the Berlin process which facilitates political engagement and dialogue. Nevertheless, the EPA negotiations, which also have a clear political element to them, raise questions about how the existing political, security and trade arrangements of SADC will co-exist with the new EPA alignments, in the face of fragmentation. This is particularly evident on the trade front, where the EU’s insistence on negotiating EPAs with regional groupings is forcing countries to make hard choices about the region grouping with which they will align themselves.239

Looking beyond the special problems and challenges faced by ECOWAS and SADC, there are additional issues to be handled because of the parallel development of regional and continent-wide approaches to African security problems. The chief continental

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organization, the African Union (AU), is itself establishing structures and mechanisms for conflict prevention while at the same time promoting and encouraging further regionalisation of security questions. The AU acknowledges five regional building blocks of African integration: the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), ECOWAS, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Nevertheless, the AU has also deplored a ‘cacophony’ of overlapping regional competences and approaches. To make things worse, not all these organisations have a separate security and conflict prevention agenda. The COMESA, as the largest regional economic grouping, has stressed its economic and trade related importance, while largely avoiding conflict prevention, management and mitigation.


In view of the ongoing debates on the new African peace and security architecture and its interconnectedness with international politics, regional and global trade issues and the respective role of various external actors such as the EU, a number of challenges and open questions remain. However, some recommendations for the EU can also be listed.

First, there is the problem of timing. Given the long-term and ambitious agenda of the AU, external donors will have to agree on how to fill in the gap until the AU and/or African regional organizations are able to successfully on their own cope with the major security challenges in Africa. The EU should play a leading role in harmonizing and coordinating the various efforts of external actors such as the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions, and other bilateral donors. Given the rapid improvements in the EU’s own CFSP, and contrary to some other actors, the EU is well placed to have an impact on the linkage between the security and trade agendas in Africa. A common approach to Africa will also provide an opportunity for the EU to show that there is progress on the CFSP, as in many ways, EU members can forge consensus on Africa more easily than on other matters closer to home. A second aspect of the problem of timing is related to the above-mentioned too short time horizon of the EPA negotiations, which forces African governments to make fast-track decisions about the question of which EPA grouping they will join. The EU should reconsider the negotiation timetable and, possibly, provide its African counterparts with more time to make careful and considered decisions about their respective regionalisation strategies. Moreover, institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF could be invited to play an active role in this process, and provide support for African states making such far reaching decisions.
Second, the EU will have to shoulder a significant responsibility to bring the Doha round of current WTO negotiations to a convincing conclusion, while also negotiating acceptable and meaningful EPAs with African regions by 2008. In doing so, the EU’s own trade and regional integration agenda in Africa must keep WTO-compatibility in mind. The EU should also undertake analyses of the potential impact of EPAs on national and regional stability. Furthermore, the EU should be careful not to too actively promote its own institutional experiences and norms in a continent not entirely suited to adopting those norms. In this regard the EU, as the major donor active on the continent, needs to be sensitive to how such developed country norms and institutions should be adapted to African conditions.

Third, a consensus among donors has emerged to put conflict prevention needs on high priority and to integrate those needs into all other policies (trade, aid etc.). The negative consequences of erupting and/or ongoing violent conflicts and wars are such that the merits of successful preventive action are very obvious. Along with other donors (World Bank, IMF, UNDP and other bilateral donors), the EU should establish and attempt to agree on benchmarks for assessing the relationship between root-causes of conflict, development levels of African states, poverty and trade. Such benchmarks will lead to revised aid conditionality and should help to mitigate the enduring problem of more effective donor coordination and to provide incentives for African governments to speed up their regional integration and governance agendas. In terms of financing and the ability of states to absorb funds and also regarding proper monitoring of these funds, it is important to adopt the Action Plan on Aid Effectiveness. There is a real danger of getting caught up in the ‘fever’ of more aid as a panacea to security and developmental challenges, instead of providing better and more effective aid.

Fourth, some form of compensation or stabilisation fund or commodity agreement, beyond the EU’s FLEX Facility, should be promoted to provide safeguards against price volatility especially during the transition phase for economies that rely on primary commodities.

Fifth, coordination among the various international actors is vital and actors need to try to identify a niche which they focus on in terms of the list of priorities identified. Equally important is the need to coordinate and cohere with the identified priorities of the African states and institutions. Therefore, the EU should play an active role in promoting mutual complementary aid and development policies of the various actors within the donor community.

Sixth, the EU should engage not only with the AU’s Peace and Security Council and the Political Affairs Department, but should focus on some of the other institutions.

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240 Many countries fear that with the reciprocity element of the EPAs, they will be unable to compete in EU markets, and that government revenues from import taxes will be slashed.
aimed at reducing violent conflict and the related violations of human rights. For example, more funding support should be given to the Human Rights Commission in the Gambia and the African Court of Justice. In a related point, it may be helpful to consider special guidelines and flexible trade arrangements for fragile states just emerging from conflict or for ones that are teetering on the brink.

Seventh, the EU’s proposal in its Strategy paper to create an Infrastructure Forum is a recommendation that if implemented with the participation not only of governments, but also of the private sector, should help to address some of the key supply side problems that were highlighted earlier in this paper. In other words, the EU would be well advised to abandon its state-centric African regionalisation approach in favour of mainstreaming stakeholder needs in its trade, aid, development and conflict prevention policies.

Bibliography and Further Reading


Chapter 8

Access to freshwater and Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa

Volker Boege and Mandy Turner
Executive Summary

Water-related conflicts are caused by the way in which water and its uses are governed, which inevitably involves conflicting interests. Water is not only becoming a scarce resource but is also one that is divided unevenly between regions and states, and within societies. Unevenly divided scarce resources are – as history shows – contentious subjects which can lead to conflict. Conflicts may easily arise if water is, or is perceived as being, (over)used and/or degraded by other actors at a cost to oneself. The possibility of conflicts over access to and use of freshwater poses a serious threat to both human security and the security of states, especially in regions of the world seriously affected by water scarcity. There is no doubt that the challenges facing extending access to freshwater and harnessing water resources for modernization/development programmes in sub-Saharan Africa are huge. These efforts have had, and will continue to have, the potential, if not managed properly, to provoke unrest and violence. There are a number of factors which will impact on water resources – climate change, increasing population and urbanization – and thus increase the potential for conflict creation.

More than 260 rivers in the world transcend international boundaries and are used by more than two or more riparian states – 63 are on the African continent. It is hence easy to imagine the number of potential international conflicts as any unilateral action by one riparian that affects the quantity or quality of water flowing down a shared river system can seriously impact on other riparians. Therefore any endeavours to develop the river economically and make use of its resources, e.g. the production of hydroenergy, can become contentious. However recent important empirical work has concluded that the risk of “water wars” between states has been exaggerated and that fully-fledged inter-state wars over water are less likely than localised violent conflict over: actions that degrade water quality, reduce access or heighten competition over access; the impact of dams and diversions, and the privatization of water services. In addition, major advances made in transboundary water governance – such as Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) and the creation of regional, pan-African and river basin institutions, has reduced the potential for water-related conflict between states. The European Water Initiative has given valuable support to building capacity in this regard.

While transboundary water governance has made great advances, there exists a huge lacuna at the local level. The main future priorities therefore, should be to support the continuation and extension of IWRM, particularly down to the local level. Stakeholder participation, while not a panacea, is a necessary aspect of pro-poor water governance and conflict prevention, particularly given that in the future intra-state conflicts over water – so called “water riots” – are likely to be more common occurrences than inter-state conflicts.
Map 1: African River Basins

Map courtesy of United Nations Environment Programme
Introduction

Water-related conflicts are caused by the way in which water and its uses are governed, which inevitably involves conflicting interests (rather than merely the issue of scarcity). Water is not only becoming a scarce resource but is also one that is divided extremely unevenly between regions and states as well as within societies. Unevenly divided scarce resources are — as history shows — contentious subjects which can lead to conflict. Conflicts may easily arise if water is, or is perceived as being, (over-)used and/or degraded by other actors at a cost to oneself. The possibility of conflicts over access to and use of freshwater therefore poses a serious threat to both human security and the security of states, especially in those regions of the world already severely affected by water scarcity. However, while there is always likely to be competition for water resources — at inter-state, regional and local level — it is how competing interests are addressed which is important for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict. The structures that manage and govern water resources therefore need to recognise the conflicting interests at different levels and mediate between them.

This paper assesses some of the key issues relating to access to freshwater and CPMR in Africa. Section 1 outlines some of the key issues facing Africa in terms of freshwater provision, including impacts on resources. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the existing literature relating to conflict and water, which are divided here into the (albeit interconnected) problems of inter-state and intra-state conflict. Section 3 explores the catalysts of international water-related conflicts and identifies future hotspots. Section 4 assesses the potential for intra-state, local conflicts over water. It identifies five key issues around which (different) communities mobilise: the degradation of water quality; pastoral grazing rights; irrigation schemes; large dams; and water privatisation. Section 5 moves on to an assessment of existing mechanisms for CPMR, focusing on water governance and River Basin Organisations. The paper also provides an assessment of the European Water Initiative (EUWI) as it pertains to Africa. This section finishes with an overview of the shortcomings of current water governance strategies, particularly relating to the local level. Section 7 identifies the development of meaningful stakeholder participation as a key priority for national governments and international actors, particularly if the poor are to have equitable access to freshwater. The concluding section 8 argues that the ultimate aim of all these endeavours to address water-related CPMR directly or indirectly should be the development of new ways of conflict-sensitive thinking about water governance based on community participation and equality of access to fresh water.

242 See Paper 5 in this series for a detailed theoretical elaboration of these issues.
1. Dimensions and scale of problem

There is no doubt that the challenges facing extending access to freshwater and harnessing water resources for modernisation/development programmes in sub-Saharan Africa are huge. These efforts have had, and will continue to have, the potential, if not managed properly, to provoke unrest and violence. There are a number of factors which will impact on water resources – climate change, increasing population and urbanisation, and industrialisation – and thus increase the potential for conflict creation. These are outlined below. The section concludes with some thoughts on the potential to meet the MDG relating to water provision and sanitation.

1.1 Climate change

According to the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the African continent is the most vulnerable to climate change. Runoff and water availability are expected to decline in the northern and southern regions of the continent; and the frequency of floods and droughts will increase. As a result, 25 African countries are expected to experience water scarcity or water stress over the next 20–30 years.²⁴³ Some of these changes are happening already. The flow of Africa’s rivers has been declining over the past 10 years.²⁴⁴ Large donors such as USAID and DFID are funding projects on managing the impact of climate change in the developing world. However, these are unlikely to have any major impact while political will to reduce CO2 emissions in the North is weak.²⁴⁵ However, while it is clear that climate change is going to have an impact on water resources worldwide and thus considerable conflict-creating potential, there seems to be some consensus among researchers that “poverty and the lack of institutions to manage conflicts are more important reasons for conflict than actual scarcity”.²⁴⁶

1.2 Increasing population and urbanisation

The annual per capita requirement for water for habitation and subsistence crop production is 1250 cubic metres. A large number of countries are already suffering from severe water scarcity and the situation is likely to worsen since per capita availability

²⁴⁴ Pearce, 2004. **
²⁴⁵ The Kyoto Protocol, for instance, is non-binding and has not even been ratified by the US.
declines with increasing population levels. The demand for water use is also being ratcheted up by the global trend towards urbanisation. Population numbers in most urban areas, particularly in developing countries, increase faster than general population growth. This will create problems for water resource planning as cities cannot be easily relocated to areas where there is a better water source nearby. Increasing population also means a need for more food, and hence more water required for irrigation. In Africa, 60 per cent of food production is from non-irrigated agriculture. A sizeable part of irrigation potential is already used in North Africa, but a large part remains unused in sub-Saharan Africa. In 1999 UNESCO reported that irrigated land as a percentage of potential was only 13 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa, whereas in South Asia it was 85 per cent. Water for irrigation is a high priority for economic development and stability. This has fuelled the construction of dams across Africa. The region hosts more than 1,200 dams, more than 60 per cent of which are located in South Africa (539) and Zimbabwe (213). More than 50 per cent of these were constructed to facilitate irrigation, only 6 per cent for electricity generation.

1.3 Industrialisation
As industrialisation and urbanisation increases apace across Africa (and indeed the rest of the developing world), problems of pollution will emerge unless industries have strict control frameworks to ensure that water sources such as rivers, lakes etc do not become polluted. National level development priorities may conflict with the day-to-day priorities of the poor at local levels. Hydropower projects, for instance, require flooding large areas, the clearing of forests and the relocation of the local population. This is a source of tension and conflicts, as witnessed for instance in India, China, the Philippines and Africa. It is generally accepted that access to energy services is a prerequisite to the achievement of all the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The International Energy Agency estimates that four out of five people without energy live in rural areas predominantly in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Outside of West Africa, only the richest 20 per cent of households have electricity. Electricity supply, of course, is not the only energy source. However, despite potential conflictual issues arising from their location, the construction of hydroelectric dams is likely to continue as sub-Saharan African countries try to raise energy standards.

248 http://www.unesco.org/water/facts_figures/food_supply.shtml
249 In sub-Saharan Africa, the proportion of renewable water resources allocated to irrigation is likely to remain below the critical threshold.
1.4 Meeting the MDG on water and sanitation
Unfortunately, water and sanitation has a low priority within many national government
development plans due to lack of sufficient information on the plight of the urban
and rural poor (or indifference to it) and a failure to understand the severe health,
social and economic impacts of inadequate access. In Sierra Leone, for instance, the
road fund receives twice as much as water services despite the fact that in a 2004
Participatory Poverty Assessment, sickness and ill health were named as the number
one cause of poverty, a large proportion of which is due to unsafe water and inadequate
hygiene. All of these issues are likely to aggravate an already desperate situation.
Africa's share of global freshwater resources is about 9 per cent. These resources are
distributed unevenly across the continent – western Africa and central Africa have
greater precipitation than northern Africa, the Horn of Africa and southern Africa.
Africa has the lowest proportional coverage of any region of the world – only 64 per
cent of the population has access to improved water supply. The situation is worse in
rural areas, where coverage is only 50 per cent compared with 86 per cent in urban
areas (this drops to 50 per cent in urban areas if the definition of supply is a house
connection or yard tap). Meeting the MDGs and the targets set during the World
Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 (reduce by half the proportion of people
without sustainable access to safe drinking water and the proportion of people who do
not have access to basic sanitation by 2015) will require tripling the rate at which
additional people gained access to water between 1990 and 2000 and quadrupling the
rate at which sanitation was improved. It is very unlikely that this will be achieved
in sub-Saharan Africa given the current levels of investment and funding.

2. Recent research into water and conflict
Until very recently, research relating to water and conflict focused on the idea of “water
wars”. This relates predominantly to conflict at the inter-state level, particularly around
cross-border river systems. However, recent important empirical work (reviewed
below) concludes that the risk of water wars between states has been exaggerated and
largely overtaken by the problem of localised intra-state conflict, dubbed “water riots”.

Leone. Tearfund.
253 UN (2003).
254 UN (2003).
255 The cost of providing safe drinking water and proper sanitation to everyone in the world by 2025 will
be US$180 billion a year, two to three times greater than present investments. UNEP (2003).
2.1 The ‘water wars’ discourse

There have been serious tensions between upstream and downstream or bordering riparians of the Nile River, the Euphrates and Tigris, the Jordan River, the Amu-Darja and Syr-Darja. The “water wars” discourse repeatedly refers to these cases. However, in doing so, a highly distorted picture has been presented. Despite the vast number of transboundary river systems (260 worldwide, 63 on the African continent) there have been no serious conflicts to date, and even in the most conflict-prone cases violence has been avoided. The “Basins at Risk” (BAR) project at Oregon State University conducted comprehensive empirical work on the issue of international water courses and conflict. The findings of this project, presented in the “Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database” (TFDD), have put the “water wars” thesis into perspective. The project assessed all reported events of conflict and cooperation over water resources between two or more states from 1948 to 2000. It found that of the 1,831 interactions between riparians, the vast majority (1,228) were of a cooperative nature. Indeed, over the past 50 years approximately 200 treaties on the common use of shared water courses have been put into effect. Of the 507 conflictive events registered, only in 37 cases was violence used and only 21 of these included military action. Of these 21 cases (out of 1,831) 18 involved Israel and its neighbours, hence a very specific conflict constellation. In the database not one single “water war” can be found.

The danger of “water wars” may be exaggerated but there is no doubt that water scarcity deriving from environmental degradation can and does lead to conflicts between (and within) states. At present the situation with regard to international river courses is characterised by a spectrum ranging between the extremes of: a) (rare) best practice examples of coordinated and integrated management of international water courses; and b) (also rare, albeit dangerous) cases in which a violent escalation of water-related disputes could happen. For instance, in 1999 Egypt’s President, Hosni Mubarak, threatened to bomb Ethiopia if it carried out plans for building dams on the Nile to the detriment of Egypt. These kinds of tensions have hampered development, not only in the case of the Nile, but also with regard to other international river courses.

\[256\] See Wolf, Aaron; Yoffe, Shira and Giordano, Mark (2003) ‘International Waters: Identifying basins at risk’. Water Policy 5 (1) pp. 29–60 and Wolf, Aaron; Yoffe, Shira and Giordano, Mark (no date) International Waters: Indicators for identifying basins at risk. Paris: UNESCO (PCCP Series, No. 20) and Yoffe, Shira et al (2004) ‘Geography of international water conflict and cooperation: Data sets and applications’. Water Resources Research Vol. 40, W05s04 pp. 1–12. However, two caveats have to be kept in mind here. First, Wolf and his colleagues confined themselves to research on state-to-state relations with regard to international water courses, they omitted the sub-national and regional level. Secondly, future developments that are likely to contribute to an escalation of the water crisis – e.g. climate change and its impacts on precipitation patterns – cannot be appreciated adequately if one only looks back into history.
2.2 New research on ‘water riots’

As reviewed above, recent research has shown that large-scale inter-state wars over water are less likely than localised violent conflict. However, due to the overwhelming academic and policy focus on “water wars” little attention has been given to local water conflicts until recently. As discussed in greater detail in section 4 below, water conflicts have emerged at the local level in Africa over: the degradation of water quality; reduced access or heightened competition over access; the impact of dams and diversions; and, the privatisation of water services. However, as concluded by researchers at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS); “Our current knowledge of local water-related conflicts is sporadic, making it difficult to assess their character, number and intensity.”

Intra-state violence between different groups, and between different groups and a state or business over access to freshwater is a growing concern. With respect to dams, the World Commission on Dams, whose final report was launched in 2000, reviewed the impact of dams and offered recommendations which are discussed in section 4.1 below. The issue has also been highlighted by journalists and campaigners such as Arundhati Roy. And, over the past two years, there has been an emergence of research on the issue of water privatization and its potential for creating conflict at the local level. Nevertheless, local-level conflict remains a relatively under-examined and under-theorised issue in academic and policy circles.

However, there is extremely rich (both empirical and theoretical) research being conducted on water governance that focuses on local level involvement. Although

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257 “If there is to be water related violence in the future, it is much more liable to be like the ‘water riots’ against a Bechtel development in Bolivia in 1999 than ‘water wars’ across national boundaries” (Wolf, Yoffe and Giordano (2003) p. 50).
262 See for instance the papers given as part of the ESRC-sponsored seminar series run by Bradford Centre for International Development, ODI and WWF, “The Water Consensus: Identifying the Gaps”. Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/bcid/seminar/water/
most of it does not deal directly with conflict, it is grappling with the problems of power relations and how to ensure local participation in decision-making. For this reason, we posit in section 5.4 that it offers a fruitful avenue for exploring pro-poor CPMR.

3. International water-related conflicts in Africa

States sharing a river basin constitute a highly complex, interdependent hydropolitical system, the dynamics of which are intimately interwoven in terms of the environment, the economy, politics and security. Therefore hydropolitics have become an important area of international policy. More than 260 rivers in the world transcend international boundaries and are used by two or more riparian states – 63 are on the African continent. It is hence easy to imagine the number of potential international conflicts. Any unilateral activity by one riparian that affects the quantity or quality of water flowing down a shared river system can seriously impact on other riparians. Many states are dependent on water resources generated outside of their territories. Therefore, any endeavours to develop the river economically and make use of its resources, e.g. the production of hydroenergy, can become issues of contention. This section assesses the transboundary rivers in Africa most at risk of conflict escalation, with attention paid to the experience of the Nile and the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Box 3.1 below summarises what we believe to be the main causes of water-related conflict.

3.1 African transboundary rivers at risk of conflict escalation

The prominent case of the Nile River basin, which provides an example of a “water war” danger, is shared by 10 countries in Northern and Eastern Africa. It is often regarded to be a special case as the entire economic development of the downstream riparian, Egypt, depends on the waters of the Nile. Egypt, which is the most powerful riparian state in economic and military terms, has declared the secure inflow of Nile water from beyond its boundaries a national security issue. In the past, there have been serious disagreements between Egypt and upstream riparians (Ethiopia in particular) about the division of Nile water, which in situations of serious stress (drought), has led to threats of military action. However, the danger of war has diminished due to cooperation efforts in the basin (see 5.2 below).263

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263 This is despite the fact that Egypt is planning further projects that are likely to create tensions with upstream riparians, notably two huge irrigation projects (the New Valley Development Projects).
Box 3.1 Potential hydropolitical hotspots in southern Africa

- Additional project phases of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project.
- Completion of the Eastern National Water Career in Namibia by the proposed Rundu-Grootfontein pipeline component, starting on the Okavango River.
- Construction of Batoka Gorge hydropower scheme between Zambia and Zimbabwe on the Zambezi River.
- Development of the “Congo River Project”, where a pipeline will cross Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo on its way to the water-deficient South.
- Proposed Epupa hydropower scheme between Angola and Namibia on the Kunene River.
- Proposed Divundu hydropower scheme on the Okavango.
- Sugar-cane irrigation project on the Zambezi in Namibia.
- The Zambezi-Bulawayo water-transfer scheme in Zimbabwe.
- The Mpande Uncua hydropower scheme in Mozambique.
- The supply of water to Botswana and South Africa from the Zambezi.
- Save River between upstream riparian Zimbabwe and downstream riparian Mozambique.
- The Limpopo between upstream riparians (Botswana, South Africa, Zimbabwe) and downstream Mozambique.

Source: Heyns, 2003, 34

The only case of violence on a large scale in southern Africa was related to the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), the biggest hydropower project in southern Africa, and one of the world’s largest infrastructure projects under construction today (see box 3.2 below for a description of the project and the conflicts surrounding it). In addition to the Nile and the LHWP, there are other potential hotspots of tension and thus possible conflict escalation. The basins at risk identified in Africa are: Lake Chad, Incomati, Kunene, Limpopo, Nile, Okavango, Orange, Senegal, and Zambezi. However, identifying potential hotspots does not imply an automatic, inevitable violent escalation. On the contrary, in many cases the dangers have been identified and work is under way to tackle the conflict potential to avoid violent escalation (see section 5.2 below).

265 Transboundary groundwater aquifers, of which there are 38 in Africa, are becoming ever more important for agriculture and domestic water supply, and have the potential to become subjects of international conflicts. However, only very limited research has been conducted on this.
**Box 3.2 The Lesotho Highlands Water Project**

The LHWP is a bilateral endeavour of the Kingdom of Lesotho and South Africa. It aims to harness the water resources of the headwaters of the Orange River in the highlands of Lesotho to the benefit of the water-scarce Gauteng region, the urban-industrial heartland of South Africa, for the mining and industrial sectors. A series of large dams and tunnels are being constructed. The first dam (the Katse dam) was completed in 1995, and the second dam (the Mohale/Muela) was completed in 2004. The LHWP has had and is likely to continue to have considerable negative environmental and social effects in the Lesotho highlands and downstream regions. Most severely affected are tens of thousands of Basotho people dwelling in rural mountain communities in the Lesotho highlands. Resettlements on a large scale have already been undertaken, with more displacements to follow. Some 27,000 people have lost their farms or access to grazing land.

The World Bank, which is involved in the project and considers it a model for future large projects in Africa, has admitted that “it cannot guarantee that people were not made poorer as a result of the project – although this minimal requirement was an explicit commitment made by the parties to the project contract.” (Trojan Horse, 2005:8) Conflict over resettlement, compensation issues, environmental protection and construction management between local communities and NGOs opposed to the project on the one hand, and government authorities on the other have accompanied the project from the beginning (not least because of corruption scandals). So far these conflicts have been non-violent (apart from a few incidents of police violence at demonstrations). However, in September 1998, South Africa and Botswana intervened militarily in Lesotho (on behalf of SADC), ostensibly to restore order in the face of internal power struggles, and to protect the LHWP, particularly the Katse dam, and thus the water supply to South Africa. Many died in the course of fighting in the capital, Maseru, which was left in ruins. Some observers have called this military intervention southern Africa’s first “water war”. Indeed, some attribute the military coup of January 1986 in Lesotho to the LHWP. Shortly after the coup, the treaty on the LHWP was signed thus giving some credence to the claim that the apartheid regime in South Africa was behind the coup in order to get the LHWP off the ground. Even if this appears an exaggeration, (there were other more important causes to the intervention), the LHWP holds potential for further conflict. The additional planned project phases, to be implemented in the years to come until 2020, will massively impact on the whole region. The history of the LHWP makes it clear how important conflict impact assessments are for projects of such enormous dimensions.

4. Local-based water conflicts

At the local level, the situation becomes more complicated, largely because there is a multiplicity of actors involved and there are massive differentials of power which will affect how contentious issues are resolved. Actors at the local level who are competing with each other for water resources include: small-scale, locally-orientated farmers and larger-scale commercial farms producing for export; industrial sectors, urban and rural users; and social groups (often ethnically defined). However, these different
communities are not homogenous; they have their own internal relationships of power and inequality. Balancing the needs of these competing communities is a necessary part of water governance. Some of these competing needs are likely to be more contentious and difficult to resolve than others, all the more so as water-related issues frequently intertwine with other contentious subjects (e.g. access to land and other resources). Clearly then, the political dynamics of conflict escalation do not only depend on the ‘water dimension’ but on a combination of factors in a given socio-political context. Mono-causal conflict analysis therefore will not be helpful for CPMR. Rather, a holistic and contextualised approach needs to be pursued, which identifies and gives prominence to water-related conflictive issues (Box 5.1 below summarises the main causes of water-related conflict).

4.1 Conflict over degradation of water quality

In the extraction of non-renewable resources, the degradation of water quality can be a cause of – or at least contribute to – violent conflict at the local level. In the process of oil production and mining, water (as well as land, forests, wildlife and air) is environmentally degraded. Water resources are often over-used for mining purposes, and polluted by oil spills or by the dumping of mine tailings and waste into nearby rivers. Large-scale environmental degradation caused by the extraction of natural resources such as oil, copper or timber can lead to violent resistance as the affected local communities lose the basis of their (often largely subsistence) economy and see no other alternative than to engage in protest. This often provokes a violent response from the government, triggering a spiral of conflict. A typical case is the oil-producing areas of the Niger delta in Nigeria. The violent conflicts that erupted in the 1990s were not so much conflicts about the exploitation of oil but about the environmental degradation of renewable resources (water, land and forests) in the course of oil extraction. The beginning of 2006 witnessed an escalation of violence in the region, with rebels attacking oil installations and taking hostages. Indeed, in February 2006, Royal Dutch Shell was ordered to pay $1.5bn in damages for polluting the Niger delta, a major victory for the Ijaw community which has campaigned relentlessly on the issue.266 Today’s violent conflicts in the Niger delta of Nigeria provide a staggering

example of how water-related issues (the degradation of water) can considerably contribute to conflict escalation. This shows that the “water dimension” must be included in any conflict analysis and conflict impact assessment. Given the current trends of resource exploitation and industrialisation in Africa, it is highly likely that this type of water-related conflict will become more frequent if no preventive measures are taken.

4.2 Pastoral conflicts
Conflicts between nomadic pastoralists and sedentary farmers and irrigators are common in many places on the African continent. In some regions, there are long-standing and on-going conflicts between different groups of pastoralists over access to water and pasture. The most recent examples of sub-national localised water-related violence are the clashes, raids and massacres in the Marsabit district of Northern Kenya (close to the Ethiopian border) between May and August of 2005. Competition over water in this semi-arid region between pastoralist communities from the ethnic groups of the Borana and the Gabra turned violent. Hundreds of people were killed and thousands displaced.267 While these conflicts are long-standing, by the 1990s, their frequency and magnitude had increased, resulting in the death of hundreds of people.268 The fact that the Borana and Gabra reside on both sides of the Kenyan-Ethiopian border complicates the matter further, making it both a local and a transnational conflict. Similar conflicts occur in other regions of East Africa and the Horn of Africa, as well as in the Senegal River basin. These conflicts have become increasingly violent due to the easy availability of small arms and light weapons and the commercialisation of cattle raiding, as discussed in chapters 5 and 3 of this book.269 Migration induced by lack of, or competition over water may also lead to conflict between local communities and the newcomers, particularly when in-migration increases pressure on already scarce

267 In similar incidents, dozens of people were killed and up to 23,000 displaced between January and March 2005 in clashes between two Somali clans, the Murule and the Garre, in the Kenya-Somalia border region. Access to water and grazing land were the causes of the conflict.
The effects of climate change and the decline of the pastoralist economy means that this type of conflict in drought-prone/stricken regions of Africa will likely increase in the future.

4.3 Conflict over irrigation and hydro-electric schemes
Conflict may arise between central governments and/or modern water sectors, and local communities, over large-scale irrigation schemes for agricultural (cash crop) production, and hydroelectricity for mining and industrial purposes. These schemes often negatively impact on local communities who are often highly dependent on subsistence economies and the respective local water resources. The (forced) resettlement of people affected by water-related infrastructure construction may also contribute to conflict, as was the case in the Awash Valley in Ethiopia. Here the central government pushed through large-scale irrigation schemes against the interests of the local Afar pastoral communities. These schemes negatively affected the communities’ access to pasture along the Awash River (now irrigated for cotton production). Violent conflicts between the government, cultivators and neighbouring pastoralist clans ensued. The proposed Jonglei canal project in Sudan provides another case of violent conflict between a central government and local communities. This project, jointly planned by Egypt and Sudan to improve water supply for the Aswan dam, provoked violent opposition by the local population as it would have dried up the Sudd swamps in Southern Sudan. This was a contributing factor to the internal war in Sudan (the project’s giant earth excavating machines were one of the SPLA’s earliest targets271); the project had to be abandoned in 1983.

4.4 Conflict related to large dams
Large dams can become a source of both international and internal conflict. Because of their well-documented negative impacts, the number of large dams built annually has fallen dramatically – from a high of 848 in 1978 to 48 in 2005.272 Only too often they have had negative social and environmental impacts, including the displacement of people, increasing erosion and flooding, loss of land, loss of income from downstream

fisheries, an increase in water-borne diseases and loss of species and ecosystems. These negative impacts have been comprehensively documented by the World Commission on Dams, particularly in its final report of 2000. The positive economic impacts of dams have been systematically overestimated, especially due to cost overruns and sedimentation which causes considerable loss of storage capacity and shortens the functional lifetime of many dams. Without a doubt it is poor, rural communities, who are generally politically marginalised, that suffer the most from large dam projects. Either they become victims of (forced) resettlement or the development itself gives them little direct benefit causing widespread resentment. Resettlement and compensation plans are in most cases inadequate, leaving displaced people worse off than before. This in turn leads to conflict and, on occasions, to violent conflict escalation. Torture, beatings, arbitrary arrests, and widespread repression have been, and continue to be, carried out by governments in order to push through unpopular development projects, such as large dams.

Africa has a history of conflict-prone large dam projects. Problems surrounding the LHWP have already been charted. A further example is provided by the Manantali dam at the Senegal River (completed in 1988). It led to the collapse of traditional flood-recession agriculture, siltation of soils, loss of fisheries, inundation of fertile land and forests, increase in malaria and other water-borne diseases and the displacement of thousands of people. Severe conflicts over land rights ensued, largely along ethnic divisions. The governments of Mauritania and Senegal became entangled in the conflict – anti-Senegalese riots in Mauritania and anti-Mauritanian riots in Senegal forced tens of thousands of people to flee and hundreds of people were killed, while skirmishes between the militaries of both states brought them to the brink of war. Finally, it is large dams that have been the main source of conflict in the Nile River basin, with 10 major ones so far constructed. The most important of these, the Aswan High Dam with Lake Nasser, has been heavily criticized because of the displacement of tens of thousands of people both in Egypt and Sudan, severe salinisation and extremely high levels of evaporation in Lake Nasser. All of these criticisms make the dam a highly questionable project in economic, environmental and human rights terms.

Although today it is widely accepted that Social and Environmental Impact Assessments (SEIA) are required for large development projects, research shows that these are either limited, have a flawed engagement with stakeholders, have a pro-project bias, or tend not to consider the indirect impacts. Even today, conflict-prone large dam projects are carried out or planned, often with the assistance of export

273 WCD (2000).
credit agencies of the states of the North. Examples are provided by the Ewaso Ngiro Hydropower Scheme in Kenya, which — if pursued as planned — would have a negative impact on the local Maasai population (loss of land, resettlement, inadequate compensation), or the planned Epupa dam at the Kunene River in Namibia, which could lead to the destruction of the resource base and traditional lifestyle of the local Himba people. While IFIs and export credit agencies of OECD states have integrated requirements for SEIAs into conditions for access to some forms of project finance, this clearly does not have an impact on projects funded by other sources. For instance, the Merowe/Hamadab Dam Project in Sudan, funded by the China Export Import Bank and various Arab financial institutions, is the largest hydropower project presently being developed in Africa. It will displace around 50,000 people whose peaceful protests have been met with violence and repression from the authorities. Despite attempts by the NGOs Corner House and the International Rivers Network to raise the issue, the companies and the Sudanese government refuse to address the lack of stakeholder analysis or participation by the affected communities.

4.5 Conflicts over water privatisation

The privatisation of public water utilities to multinational enterprises from the North is, we believe, likely to become a serious source of future localised water-related violence. The implementation of water concessions in many developing countries is sparking a “new” type of conflict around water — namely “water riots” rather than “water wars”. While the most serious example to date has been the riots in Cochabamba, Bolivia, in 2000, there has been serious unrest across Africa (particularly South Africa and

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275 For instance, the UK’s Export Credits Guarantee Department has been involved in the Muela Hydropower Project, part of the LHWPT, and the Turkwell Gorge project (Kenya) (Hildyard (2005) pp 1–2). Other African large dam projects that are assisted by export credit agencies are Ewaso Ngiro (Kenya), LHWPT, Kainji (Nigeria), Bujagali (Uganda) (ibidem: 18).

276 See http://www.irn.org/programs/merowe/


278 After the riots in Cochabamba, the concession was handed back to the original water company but restructured to include local authorities and end-users. Despite good progress and huge public support, the political and business elite of the city boycotted the organisation and are refusing to pay water tariffs. In addition Bechtel has petitioned the World Bank-affiliated International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes for $25m compensation from the Bolivian government. There were also strikes and clashes between protestors and riot police in El Alto earlier this year because of demands to reverse water privatisation.
Ghana).\textsuperscript{279} In South Africa, grassroots organisations, made up of the urban poor and workers, have protested price increases and the cutting off of services and evictions for debt recovery.\textsuperscript{280} The slums and squatter settlements of the big cities in the South cannot afford the rising water prices imposed upon them.\textsuperscript{281}

There is little doubt that many African countries do not have the economic resources with which to invest in their (usually poor) existing water (and sanitation) services. This, plus the leverage of debt recovery conditions, is being used to force developing countries to privatise provision of services. For instance, Sierra Leone is in line to get multilateral and bilateral debt relief in mid-2006 as long as it continues to implement IMF and World Bank conditions, including basic services privatisation. This, plus the international consensus amongst international financial institutions (IFIs) and development agencies regarding the privatisation of services (GATS), has meant that water supplies are being contracted out to multinational water companies. The potential for inequality in service provision is high unless price regulation and other rules are put in place and enforced. Unfortunately, recent history has proven this not to be the case. The potential this has for creating conflict, particularly in urban areas, is high.

This issue is unlikely to be resolved in the short term for a number of reasons. First, major donors and IFIs are unlikely to fund the level of investment needed to expand freshwater access in the developing world, thus requiring it to come from another source. Second, major donors and IFIs insist on regarding water as an economic good (as codified in the Dublin Principles) and are ideologically committed to the privatisation of public services. While few would disagree with the need to recover the costs of water services, the degree to which water provision should be subject purely to the rules of the market is a contentious issue, particularly given the increasing numbers of well-publicised failures. This is likely to spark increasing conflicts in Africa (and across the developing world) due to concerns over: the economic implications of privatising water resources, including concerns over rising water prices; the risk (perceived or real) to ecosystems; foreign control over a natural resource; inequalities over access to water; and, the exclusion of communities from decisions about their

\textsuperscript{279} See Hall, David \textit{et al} (2002) \textit{Water Privatization in Africa}. Public Services International Research Unit.

\textsuperscript{280} In Kwa-Zulu Natal, the country’s biggest cholera outbreak occurred in 2000 as a result of changing the free communal tap system to a privatised pre-paid metering system. Transnational Institute, 2005: 184.

\textsuperscript{281} Only recently, the privatisation of Dar es Salaam’s water in Tanzania proved to have considerable negative effects for the citizens of the city: substantial increase of tariffs, and at the same time deterioration of services. Therefore the Tanzanian Water Ministry terminated the contract with the private firm in May 2005 because of “poor performance” and “incompetence of the firm”. See Trojan Horse (2005). \textit{A Trojan Horse for Large Dams}. A report prepared for ECA Watch by the Corner House, Paris pp. 22–23.
own resources.282 Suggestions for achieving a balance between managing water as an economic and a social good are made in section 5.4 below.

5. Existing mechanisms for water CPMR

It is our contention that the present water crisis is not “naturally given” but is man-made – the result of inadequate, unsustainable modes of water usage and unequal access to and control over water resources. These problems need to be addressed, not least in the interests of conflict prevention.

Box 5.1 Water-related conflicts and potential for conflict escalation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Potential for conflict</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Reducing conflict potential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International: Transboundary rivers</td>
<td>Shared river system. Attempts by one riparian to use resources with potential detrimental impacts on other riparians, e.g. dams, diversions</td>
<td>Nile River (Egypt, Ethiopia), Orange River (Lesotho, South Africa, Botswana)</td>
<td>Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM); transboundary water management systems such as RBOs and pan-African institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local/international: irrigation and hydroelectric schemes</td>
<td>Negative impact on subsistence livelihoods; forced resettlement</td>
<td>Awash Valley, Ethiopia; Jonglei Canal in Sudan</td>
<td>IWRM, RBOs and pan-African institutions. Impact assessments. Stakeholder participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local/international: large dams</td>
<td>Displacement, loss of land, loss of livelihoods</td>
<td>Manantali Dam (Senegal River); Merowe/Hamadab Dam (Sudan)</td>
<td>IWRM, RBOs and pan-African institutions. Impact assessments. Stakeholder participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local/cross-border: Pastoral</td>
<td>On-going conflict between different groups of nomadic pastoralists over access to water and pasture</td>
<td>Kenyan/Ethiopian border; Horn of Africa.</td>
<td>Promote alternative livelihoods. Reduce trade of SALW in region; address cross-border, commercial cattle-raiding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local: extraction of natural resources</td>
<td>Pollution. Degradation of water quality. Loss of livelihood</td>
<td>Niger Delta</td>
<td>Promote corporate social responsibility for extractive industries, particularly monitoring and fines. Stakeholder participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local: privatisation of public water utilities</td>
<td>Inequality of access, price increases, service withdrawal, evictions for debt recovery</td>
<td>South Africa; Ghana</td>
<td>Strict guidelines for water MNCs over price regulation and stakeholder participation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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We would argue that the lack of adequate institutions for water and conflict management is a more important cause of conflict than actual water scarcity. Following the World Water Development Report, we locate the main problem in “a crisis of governance.” This section therefore assesses existing mechanisms of water governance in Africa and their potential for CPMR, as well as the European Water Initiative (EUWI). It is our contention that, while excellent institutions and good practice exists in transboundary water governance, such cooperative arrangements have not been implemented at the local intra-state level due to a lack of community consultation and involvement.

5.1 Water governance
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), defined by UNDP as a “cross-sectoral policy approach to responding to the growing demands for water in the context of finite supplies”, was designed to replace the traditional, fragmented sectoral approach that has led to poor services and unsustainable resource use. Practicing IWRM means “seeing watersheds, rivers, lakes, wetlands, coastal zones and oceans as part of an interdependent system; recognizing the ways in which the hydrological cycle affects and is affected by land use; and aiming to create governance systems, policies, institutions and instruments that take these physical processes into account in planning, decision-making and implementation.” This concept is of particular relevance for cooperation on international rivers as it deems that states can no longer confine their management strategies to their respective stretches of a given river but have to collaborate with (all) other states in the catchment area. Hence, in all international river basins, IWRM is or has to be transboundary. IWRM consequently not only has economic and social dimensions but also security implications – even if this is not made explicit. IWRM is not merely a technical or economic endeavour, it is a holistic view of water that posits that ecological, cultural and social dimensions should also be taken into account, which of course is a highly political issue and must therefore be seen in the wider context of water governance.

According to the UNDP: “The term water governance encompasses the political, economic and social processes and institutions by which governments, civil society, and the private sector make decisions about how best to use, develop and manage

283 A major finding of the BAR project is that institutions matter. “In fact, our study suggests that institutional capacity within a basin, whether defined as water management bodies or treaties, and generally positive international relations are as important as, if not more important than, the physical aspects of a system“ (Wolf, Yoffe and Giordano (no date) p. 16.
water resources.” Hence “water governance is more than national-level water legislation, regulations and institutions, though these are important components. It also refers to the processes that exist to promote popular participation in designing water and sanitation systems, and where decisions about those systems are made (in the capital city or the community itself) as well as how and by whom.” Water governance, therefore, should not be confined to governments and state bureaucracies. The UNDP has emphasised the importance of popular participation in decision-making on and implementation of water use and management. This makes water governance a complex and complicated undertaking as there are a multitude of actors on several levels – from the local to the international – who have a stake in the issue. They all have distinct interests in (the use of) water, hold specific views on (the value or meaning of) water and pursue particular goals with regard to the resource. These interests, perceptions and aims need to be dealt with as part of a political process which is itself a process of conflict and cooperation.

5.2 Transboundary water governance

Major achievements have been made in transboundary water governance. Hundreds of bilateral and multilateral agreements are already in place all over the world dealing with international freshwater resources. Moreover, the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigable Uses of International Watercourses (May 1997) provides a general framework for the use of international rivers by riparians. Three core principles of international water law are enshrined in the Convention: the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization, the obligation not to cause significant harm, and the duty to cooperate with co-riparian states. From this flow two other important principles, namely the principle of prior notification (co-riparians have to be notified of any planned water-related projects by neighbours) and the rule of no objection (if co-riparians do not object, the project may be implemented). In Africa, these guiding principles form the basis of a host of bilateral and multilateral agreements on shared water courses and of several international and regional organisations which deal with good water governance in a broader framework. Those institutions substantially contribute to the prevention, management and resolution of water-related conflicts. Cooperation rather than conflict is thus the main feature of international hydropolitics in Africa.

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288 The UN Watercourse Convention was adopted with 103 states voting in favour, 27 abstentions and three against, namely Turkey, Burundi and the People’s Republic of China (which all are upstream riparians).
At present, there is a three-level structure of international institutions dealing with transboundary water issues developing in Africa: the AMCOW/NEPAD on the continental level; organisations such as SADC, EAC, IGAD or ECOWAS on the regional level; and multilateral river basin organisations (RBOs).

Over the past few years, a number of all-African institutions have been established with the task of coordinating water policies and water management. In 2002, as part of the African Union (AU) framework, the African Ministerial Council on Water (AMCOW) was founded. As an organ of all African water ministers, AMCOW is the most senior political institution dealing with water issues on the continent. The Council is assisted by an Executive Committee (comprising ministers of water from 10 countries), a Secretariat (situated in Abuja, Nigeria) and a Technical Advisory Committee (AMCOW-TAC). AMCOW-TAC is the linkage partner of the Africa component of the European Union’s Water Initiative (EUWI) (see 5.3 below). Prospects are good that AMCOW will develop into an efficient and effective institution for the coordination of politics with regard to transboundary water resources. In addition to AMCOW, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) also has a water programme. As part of its “Short Term Action Plan for Infrastructure” NEPAD runs a “Transboundary Water Resources Strategic Framework and Action Plan”, closely cooperating with the African Development Bank (AfDB). Furthermore, the AfDB and AMCOW have recently launched the African Water Facility (AWF) in order to mobilise resources from donors for a whole range of water-related investments on the continent.

While these relatively new pan-African institutions are still in the process of defining their roles, and remain rather distant from the real problems on the ground, SADC is a relatively well-established regional organisation with a high interest in transboundary water issues and a strong water sector. The 14 SADC member countries have undertaken several important initiatives intended to make shared river courses a source of cooperation rather than of conflict. They have agreed, in principle, on integrated and cooperative management of transboundary river basins. The SADC Water Sector Coordinating Unit (WSCU) developed a Regional Strategic Action Plan for Integrated
Water Resources Development and Management (RSAP-IWRM) that was adopted by all SADC member states in 1998. The plan is a component of the overall Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), which is SADC’s long-term strategy in the field of economy and development. It aims at fostering conditions conducive for a common management of regional water resources. RSAP shall provide for the prerequisites and institutions necessary for the implementation of water-related infrastructure and development. RSAP-IWRM has been praised by experts in the field as “a unique experiment in international cooperation directed at achieving an integrated approach to water-use development and management, crossing national borders and river basin boundaries. It is the most advanced and comprehensive multi-country freshwater programme in the world and it has no parallel on this scale anywhere else in the world.” However, because RSAP-IWRM projects are mainly funded by donors, its success largely depends on donor commitment and the changing agenda and priorities set by the international donor community. “This fact, more than any other, has impeded the ability of SADC to implement a well coordinated and integrated programme towards achieving the original goals of RSAP-IWRM.”

In contrast to the UN Convention of 1997, which lays down elaborate dispute settlement mechanisms, the (Revised) SADC Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems (adopted in August 2000) addresses the issue of conflict resolution only very briefly and incidentally (in Article 7). It stipulates that disputes between states not settled amicably should be referred to the SADC tribunal, established under the SADC Treaty, whose decisions are final and binding. These provisions have not been applied in practice so far.

In addition to the Revised SADC Water Protocol and the WSCU, several other bilateral and multilateral institutions regarding shared water courses have been established in the SADC region. At present, almost 20 agreements related to transboundary water courses are in place. They are of three different types:

- Agreements establishing general water course commissions (e.g. the Permanent Water Commission of Namibia and South Africa);
- Agreements concerning single water courses (e.g. the Permanent Okavango River Basin Water Commission OKACOM of Angola, Botswana and Namibia, which is also the oldest having been set up in 1994) and;

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• Agreements dealing with specific water course projects such as dams (e.g. the Lesotho Highlands Water Commission of South Africa and Lesotho for the management of the LHWP). 295

Most important are the so-called river basin organisations (RBOs) which (in the best case) comprise all riparians of a river basin and are responsible for the integrated transboundary management of the basin’s water resources. In addition to OKACOM, there are the Orange-Senqu River Commission (ORASECOM), the Limpopo River Commission (LIMCOM), and the Zambezi Watercourse Commission (ZAMCOM). 296 Furthermore, there are more RBOs under development such as the Incomati Maputo River Commission (participants: South Africa, Mozambique, and Swaziland). Similar institutions can be found in other parts of Africa, e.g. the Niger Basin Authority (NBA) for the Niger River and the Organisation pour la mise en valeur du fleuve Senegal (OMVS) for the Senegal River. There are also institutions covering the big international African lakes, such as the Lake Victoria Basin Commission (LVBC) and the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC). Even in the case of the highly volatile Nile River basin, prospects for cooperation supersede dangers of war, particularly since the establishment of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in 1999, which provides a forum for cooperation of all riparians. These achievements were assisted by various donors (Finland, among others) who in 2001 formed the International Consortium for Cooperation on the Nile (ICCON, chaired by the World Bank). In the framework of the NBI even traditional water foes, Egypt and Ethiopia have commenced cooperation (on dam projects on the Blue Nile, in particular).

Out of 63 international river basins on the African continent, 20 are covered by international agreements, and in 16 basins there exists RBOs. 297 Although this appears to be an impressive record, the majority of international rivers in Africa are still not covered by functional agreements (neither are transboundary groundwater aquifers), and many of the institutions discussed above are new and weak. In addition, most of these agreements and institutions do not provide for dispute settlement mechanisms explicitly. Nevertheless, their existence is an indication of political will to joint problem-solving.

296 ORASECOM was established in November 2000, members are the riparian states South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho and Botswana: LIMCOM was founded in November 2003 (members: South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique); ZAMCOM is the most recent southern African RBO, established in July 2004 (members: Angola, Botswana, Congo, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe).
297 Out of a total of 263 international river basins less than half, namely 117, have international treaties. Wolf, Yoffe and Giordano (2003) p. 45.
5.3 EUWI – European Union assistance to transboundary water governance

The European Union and several of its member states have considerably assisted water-related institution-building in Africa, thus having an (indirect) conflict preventive effect. At present the African component of the European Water Initiative (EUWI) is of particular importance in this regard. It builds on a declaration of “Africa-EU strategic partnership on water affairs and sanitation” signed at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002 by the Presidents of South Africa, Nigeria, the European Council, and the European Commission. It aims to establish a joint Africa-EU contribution to the achievement of the water-related MDGs. Two EUWI working groups were established that specifically address African issues. One focuses on water supply and sanitation, the other on IWRM. They closely cooperate with AMCOW-TAC (see 5.2 above). The IWRM working group (led by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs) aims at supporting transboundary water resources management, strengthening underlying institutions and building respective capacity. Hence, assistance in the establishment and strengthening of RBOs is one of the main tasks of EUWI’s African component. In cooperation with the African partners, five pilot basins have been identified for priority action. These include: Lake Chad, Lake Victoria/Kagera, the Orange/Senqu, the Niger and the Volta River. Some ten million Euros have been earmarked to finance transboundary basin action programmes. ORASECOM for instance has asked for EUWI assistance with regard to capacity building, stakeholder participation, information systems, transboundary irrigation and harmonisation of water legislation in riparian countries. In the Lake Victoria basin the focus will be on the Kagera River. The EUWI Kagera Programme (EUWIKP) builds on a respective SIDA-NORAD Programme. Furthermore, the European Commission is currently financing a Lake Victoria Fisheries Management Project (2003–2008; 35.3 million Euro). In the Lake Chad basin, EUWI is assisting the LCBC

298 EUWI was launched in 2002 at the WSSD. Its aim is to contribute to the achievement of the water-related MDGs. One of its main objectives in this context is the improvement of regional coordination and cooperation on water management issues, using an IWRM approach, especially in transboundary river basins. Its organisational framework is made up of four main bodies: the multi-stakeholder forum (with an advisory function, including private operators, NGOs and other civil society representatives), the Steering Group (co-ordination function), the Commission/Secretariat and the Working Groups. The latter are in charge of implementation at the regional level. Working Groups are covering Latin America, the Mediterranean, Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia and Africa.

299 This was endorsed in December 2003 by a joint AMCOW-EU declaration on the implementation of the Strategic Partnership.

particularly in the field of collection, evaluation and dissemination of data. The EU is also assisting the Lake Chad Inland Fisheries Project.

The EUWI’s African component is an important step forward in assistance to transboundary water management on the African continent. Although the “conflict” dimension is not directly addressed, the institution-building and capacity-building effects will contribute to conflict prevention and the improvement of conflict management capacities.301 However, the EUWI has been heavily criticised by Water Aid and Tearfund for: a) a lack of commitment; b) an absence of accountability; c) the omission of key players; d) an unfocused approach; and e) an ideological bias towards private finance. They call on the European Council to reform it to include targets and programme reports, and a formal funding system.302

5.4 Shortcomings of current water governance – the local dimension

Formal institution building has come a long way in Africa.303 Hence there are good reasons for optimism. The “basins at risk” identified earlier may be critical cases, but they are on the path to resolution rather than to escalation, as far as the inter-state dimension is concerned. This is good news. However, potential conflicts at the sub-national and local level need more attention. The formal hydropolitical institutions and strategies which have been established so far will not suffice in this regard, particularly given that the most probable future type of violent water-related conflicts, in our view, will be local.

Despite the considerable advances made, there continues to be a “disjuncture between policy and practice”304, i.e. a considerable gap between declared policies, legislation, and organisations on the one hand, and the implementation and practices on the other. Moreover, cooperation is still very much an inter-governmental undertaking

303 However, one must not gloss over the fact that much of the institution building is driven by external actors and agendas. An international community increasingly concerned with the potential for conflict over scarce water resources and with the environment substantially influences transboundary IWRM in Africa. Lautze, Jonathan; Giordano Mark and Borghese, Maelis (2005) Driving forces behind African transboundary water law: internal, external, and implications. Paper presented International Workshop on ‘African Water Laws: Plural Legislative Frameworks for Rural Water Management in Africa’, 26–28 January 2005, Johannesburg. Institutions such as the NBI are to a large extent dependent on donors – both with regard to their establishment and their actual projects and operations.
involving various agencies and institutions of the riparian states and often confined to technical questions. Critics have pointed out that they are “elitist, high-political projects that exclude and/or ignore the needs of indigenous people – usually rural, small, subsistence farming communities – and the impacts on the natural environment.”

In addition, they “are dominated by engineers whose main concern is to move water from point A to point B”. The dominance of this technical and managerial approach tends to conceal the highly political nature of the whole endeavour, which is presented as a neutral, technical, “expert” issue. Non-state actors at the local and regional level are largely left out of the processes of policy formulation, decision-making and implementation. A recent overview of efforts aiming at the improvement of water resource governance in southern Africa concludes that: “One noticeable omission by all the countries was the lack of participation by local level communities at the national and inter-state levels. This needs to be corrected.”

The issue of stakeholder participation, therefore, remains a huge problem (see 6.1 below).

In addition, the role of informal customary water management at the grassroots level should not be ignored, although it is generally poorly understood. In most sub-Saharan African states, modern statutory (water) law coexists (although it does not acknowledge) traditional customary law (and, in many areas, Islamic law) that regulates access to and distribution of water resources. Traditional actors and institutions have received little attention by state agencies and international organisations occupied with IWRM. However, in order to build trust and understanding (and project sustainability) it is necessary in the interests of conflict prevention, to recognise and include them. In Botswana, for instance, the custom of “Kgotla” (consultation) is an intrinsic part of community life – decisions are reached through consensus with a high level of stakeholder consultation. Failure to recognise customary practices could be “a recipe for social tension.”

This can be seen in the case of water privatisation where water has been defined as a commodity rather than as a social good, see Gleick, P. and Wolff, G. et al (2002).
relatively weak statehood, or in the extreme case of ‘failing’ states, these informal traditional institutions become even more important.

Water governance in southern Africa’s Okavango River Basin has been a success story – despite a high potential for both international and sub-national conflict – largely due to the involvement and collaboration of state institutions: OKACOM as the RBO in charge, and a host of traditional actors in the community as well as civil society organisations, all of which are assisted by external international NGOs and donors. With custom-based grassroots involvement, the engagement of international civil society and the scrutiny of international public opinion, governmental actors would find it difficult to resort to conflictual behaviour, either in their international relations or when dealing with local communities. The Okavango experience may provide valuable lessons to other transboundary river basins in Africa (and elsewhere); for example, one major shortcoming of the NBI so far has been the limited involvement of civil society. However, having said all this, it is necessary to introduce a word of caution as the involvement of traditional or local institutions does “not automatically result in social distribution or environmentally benign development”. These should be integrated within a national strategy and institutions of poverty reduction.

6. Key issues and priorities

Although institution-building and (transboundary) water management have come a long way in Africa and therefore there is reason for optimism with regard to water-related CPMR, there are some major shortcomings which could well spark conflict, and will have to be addressed more vigorously in the future. The key to addressing some of these shortcomings, we believe, lies in developing meaningful structures for stakeholder participation at the local level. Below we assess what this means and how international actors can support such processes.

6.1 Stakeholder participation

African experiences demonstrate that only too often public participation and transparency are lacking and methods of settling disputes are underdeveloped. Not least with regard

311 Although the so called Nile Basin Discourse (NBD) initiative provides for a formal framework for public and NGO participation; however, this seems to be very much a top-down approach, dominated by so called GONGOs.
to intra-national (local) conflicts regarding the use and protection of water sources, as well as the repercussions on local communities of decisions on water use patterns made by state authorities and private corporations without due participation of the people affected. If the latter are excluded, deliberately or not, from policy processes they may easily turn to strategies of confrontation in order to pursue their interests and defend what they perceive as their traditional rights. This could easily lead to intra-national conflicts that could also have an impact on inter-state relations. The reverse also holds true. Inter-governmental agreements on transboundary water courses can impact at the local level, which in turn could lead to intra-national conflicts (e.g. the example of the Jonglei canal cited above). All international agreements when implemented domestically benefit some places and people more than others, and their costs are unequally distributed in geographical and social terms. For example, revenues from large infrastructure water projects often only benefit a small elite, while local communities have to bear the negative social and environmental effects. Large dams are the most pressing issue in this regard. While harnessing natural resources for industrialisation, electrification and agricultural irrigation is a good thing, it should be done equitably. Due compensation and conflict sensitive resettlement packages, which are adequate, well-financed, phased in properly, and done in consultation with the communities concerned, are a necessary aspect of CPMR. OECD states should only allow financial incentives and special export credit terms under the strict recommendations made by the World Commission on Dams.313

This means that the problems inherent in the linkages between the closely interwoven different levels (from the local to the global) of water use, water management and hydropolitics must be taken into account. What is good on the inter-governmental level might be counter-productive on the domestic level – and vice versa. The potential linkages and relationships between cooperation and conflict at the international level, and conflict and cooperation at the sub-national level need to be fully explored. In addition and perhaps more importantly, processes which provide for the inclusion of all stakeholders at all levels in the hydropolitical processes should be developed.

Participation can be token or substantial. Development agencies strongly advocate participation, and states in developing countries promise to provide for participation of stakeholders. However, only too often it is perceived as a burden by experts and state authorities, and is often reduced to hollow tokenism, with no decision-making power in the hands of the affected people. Affected communities obliged to “participate” in such a meaningless way often realize they are being manipulated and abstain from respective endeavours, all the more so as transaction costs of participation for them are

313 Trojan Horse (2005) p. 5.
usually high. Participation in a village meeting on the allocation of water resources may be possible for every village member (although it may pose problems for women with small children), participation in more formal institutions such as Water User Associations (WUAs) poses a problem for many (because of time, distances, alien proceeding etc), and all the more so in far-removed state bodies and negotiations. Recent research on multi-stakeholder platforms in South Africa show that bottom-up initiatives, such as the Landcare programme, formed a stronger and more accepted new institution to discuss land and water management. However, community management is not automatically inclusive and requires gender sensitivity, particularly if you want to reach poor women who are generally at the bottom of the scale when it comes to rights and access to water.

It is also important to remember that the participation discourse often obscures the fact that water management is a politically contested issue and that there are massive social and economic differences between stakeholders, who have very different power resources at their disposal. Only meaningful participation that goes beyond mere top-down information sharing and non-binding consultation to allow for active involvement in decision-making can muster public support, a sense of ownership and hence minimise the risk of protest. Such protests can only too easily turn violent and become very costly. Consequently there needs to be “devolution of power” in contrast to the mere “decentralisation of tasks”.

How to achieve this “devolution of power” – particularly to involve the poor – in the process of water management remains an under-researched question. While the importance of the issue is widely acknowledged, practical solutions are difficult to find. Forging basin-wide networks of governance that meaningfully include water users on the ground is difficult to achieve. What works in the local context – customary mechanisms of water management and respective conflict resolution – cannot simply be transferred to the basin level. This has been observed with regard to the Usangu basin in Tanzania where “the physical scale and size of the basin means that local-level


institutions dealing with local issues find it difficult to engage with the issues facing others in the basin who are perhaps 100 km away, and for whom indeed the key issues may be very different.”318 “This is even more the case for very large basins, e.g. the Zambezi. The difficulties and options of ‘upscale’ local governance mechanisms need further research.

It is obvious that as the scale of basins prevents the direct participation of all stakeholders, some kind of representation is inevitable. However, representation can be organised in different ways. The traditional answer is to delegate representation to the respective state authorities. Diplomats and bureaucrats from the responsible ministries and boards represent the citizens of their state in international negotiations and organisations that deal with the given transboundary basin. This is both inevitable and appropriate, but arguably it is not enough. Given the distance between the politicians and bureaucrats in the ministries and the local communities on the ground, and given the plural character of water management (formal as well as customary), additional avenues for representation should be explored. Exchange programs, transnational fora and workshops, electronic communication and participation in official delegations are potential solutions. External actors such as INGOs and development agencies could act as facilitators.

With regard to water privatisation, provisions for public participation and contract monitoring in privatisation agreements are of utmost importance in preventing conflict. Recent experience shows that privatisation agreements often fail to include public participation and contract monitoring, and they often lack dispute-resolution mechanisms. Multilateral organisations such as the World Bank and IMF, and bilateral financial organisations, such as USAID, DFID and GTZ, should push for greater transparency and accountability by multinational water corporations and should not grant concessions to companies that cannot or will not work with stakeholders. There should be a strong aspect of public participation and contract monitoring in all privatisation agreements. Furthermore, national governments should be encouraged to retain or establish strong regulation and oversight, thus ensuring appropriate subsidies, allocations, protection of quality, and efforts at water-use efficiency (which are typically ignored or cancelled).319

6.2 International actors

For external actors who want to assist in the formation of good water governance and water-related CPMR, there are two basic prerequisites. First, taking heed of the local cultural-societal context of water and access to it may help to explain why turning it into a commodity through privatisation has been met with widespread local opposition.320 Second, there is no apolitical neutral water management, as water governance is always subject to political contestation. “Thus, donor organisations who wish to support conflict prevention and mitigation in relation to water governance at the local, national and international levels are recommended to encourage the political aspects of water governance being explicitly addressed.”321

External actors should be aware of, understand and be prepared to learn about, the pluralistic character of institutions and actors that are involved in water management issues in weak states. In particular, they need to understand that local governance matters, and that this local governance often does not function along the same lines as developed western state environments, which usually focuses on structures of the state, the formal economy and civil society. It is necessary to learn about local community-based water arrangements and engage with informal institutions, traditional authorities and customary ways.

If a central aspect of donor involvement, particularly development agencies, is to optimise the role of and service delivery to the poor, then a number of key questions need to be asked: what are the relative costs and benefits to the poor of different institutional arrangements; what extra resources are needed to enable participation by the poor; what does pro-poor capacity building mean for local water governance institutions; how can community-led processes be integrated within state-wide approaches; and how can conflict and dispute resolution mechanisms be integrated into the processes of local level governance?322 Many of the answers to these questions will depend on local context. Developing knowledge and building capacity amongst the most disadvantaged stakeholders (rural poor, urban poor, women and tribal groups) should be the main goal of external contributors. The protection of water uses that are most beneficial for the poor has to mean reining in more powerful users, which is

320 However, this is not to suggest, as many governments do, that it is a PR issue. Many local communities in the developing world know what the process entails, largely due to the well-publicised failures, and actively oppose water privatisation. While they are made to accept the dogmatic adherence to this on the part of donors and IFIs, perhaps the donors and IFIs should accept that communities want to, and should, have a voice in who owns and controls water resources in their country. There are alternatives emerging to both privatised water delivery and state-owned utilities, see TI, 2005.


likely to prove difficult. However, even with stakeholder analyses and participation, there may still be conflicting interests. Alternative Dispute Resolution, undertaken in combination with any already-existing local conflict resolution mechanisms, can be of use in this regard. Furthermore, the establishment of an ombudsman-like institution at the various levels of water use could provide third-party arbitration.  

7. Conclusion

While transboundary water governance has advanced, a huge lacuna at the local level persists. The main priorities should be to support the continuation and extension of IWRM, particularly down to the local level. Stakeholder participation, while not a panacea, is a necessary aspect of conflict prevention in this regard. The ultimate aim of all these endeavours to address water-related CPMR directly or indirectly should be the development of new ways of conflict-sensitive thinking about water governance based on community participation and equality of access to fresh water, particularly given that those who are marginalised in society are generally marginalised in water governance. However, ensuring the participation of the marginalised and poor and taking into account their needs is going to be problematic when powerful interests are at stake. But this, we would argue, is essential to ensure that the weak do not have to resort to violence to be heard.

Future conflicts over water are less likely to happen at the inter-state level and more likely to be at the local level, driven by local pressures and linked to lack of access or unequal access, and poverty. Finally, it is our belief that while there are dangers from water-related violence, we must put these into perspective. Given that 6,000 people, mostly children, are dying from water-related diseases every day and that waterborne diseases kill 5 million to 10 million people each year, the problem of violent conflict over water resources pales in significance. The structural violence that expresses itself in these figures is a much more pressing problem. For many Africans, water is a matter of life and death every day, even in the absence of violent conflict.

Bibliography and Further Reading


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Preventing and Reducing Violent Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa

Wars, armed violence and insecurity continue to blight Sub-Saharan Africa. Preventing and reducing such conflict has become a key priority not only for African governments and peoples, but also for Europe and the rest of the world. But successes have been limited, and important lessons have not been properly learned.

This timely and important book examines the continuing sources and dynamics of violent conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, and critically analyses policies and programmes to help to prevent, manage and reduce such conflicts. Commissioned by the Government of Finland, this book has been prepared by internationally recognised experts convened through a joint project by the Finnish Institute for International Affairs (FIIA) and the Centre for International Co-operation and Security (CICS), University of Bradford, UK. It aims to contribute to urgently needed improvements in conflict prevention and reduction measures by the EU and the wider international community.