

This appendix is not a legally binding document. The only legally binding documents are the regulations published in the Official Journal of the European Union. This appendix is a non-exhaustive compilation of new statutory amendments.

Sanctions against Russia:

Individual sanctions (Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014)

The first part of the latest package concerns individual sanctions imposed for actions that undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

The 21st sanctions package contains **218 new listings** (48 natural persons and 170 entities) involved in actions undermining or threatening Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence.

Sectoral sanctions (Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014)

Secondly, the EU is expanding the sectoral (or economic) sanctions adopted in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine. The key changes to the sectoral sanctions are described below.

Export and import bans

New items, such as **nickel powders, nickel metal and alloys of nickel, beryllium powders and self-adhesive films, tapes and strips used in the aerospace and defence sectors**, are being added to the export ban list of goods and technologies that might contribute to Russia's military and technological enhancement or the development of its defence and security sector. The ban is also expanded **to goods and technologies related to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as ground support equipment, jamming / interception systems, launch systems and servomotors as well as well as flight termination systems for UAVs or missiles.**

The EU is further adding **51 new listings of sanctioned persons, entities and bodies that are military end-users**, part of Russia's military and industrial complex or have commercial or other links with Russia's defence and security sector or otherwise support it. This export ban list also includes operators in third countries that enable the circumvention of export restrictions, including those on computer-controlled machine tools, microelectronics and semiconductor processing equipment.

In addition, the EU is expanding the list of products that generate significant revenues for Russia. Import bans are being expanded to cover **certain copper ores, nickel ores, lead ores, precious metal ores, unwrought zinc, alkaline earth metals, certain inorganic chemicals (zinc oxides and chrome oxides), tall oil, glassware, imitation pearls and car parts**.

[Suspending amendments to the oil price cap \(OPC\)](#)

The EU decided to suspend the automatic amendment of the oil price cap mechanism for twelve (12) months. The dynamic price cap mechanism is currently tied to the market price of Russian crude oil, and the cap is automatically adjusted every six months. The decision also included the option of readjusting the price cap in early 2027. Subsequently, the price cap for Russian crude oil will remain at the current level (USD 44.10 per barrel) until 14 July 2027.

[Sanctions against Russia's shadow fleet](#)

The EU is listing new **40** shadow fleet vessels. In the context of sectoral sanctions, the term shadow fleet is used for vessels that transport goods for use by the Russian arms industry or carry Russian crude oil, petroleum products or mineral products and fail to comply with shipping standards adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). With the latest additions, the total number of sanctioned shadow fleet **vessels is 672**.

Moreover, the criteria for listing shadow fleet vessels are broadened, which will making it possible to list vessels that offer services to listed vessels, such as bunkering, tug services and ship-to-ship transfers.

The EU has already approved measures to restrict Russian income from exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Such exports depend on the availability of LNG carriers. It is important to limit Russia's ability to gain access to and use LNG carriers. To this end, the EU is introducing a pre-notification procedure for the sale of LNG vessels.

Furthermore, the EU has adopted a temporary exemption regarding the transfer or purchase related to that transfer of LNG originating in or exported from Russia where such transfer or purchase related to that transfer is destined for third countries and when both transfer and purchase is executed under contracts concluded before 24 February 2022. The provision implementing that temporary exemption explicitly lays down a rule that the overall capacity of Russian LNG transferred by Union operators to third countries under the temporary exemption does not exceed the 2025 volumes, thereby avoiding any increase in the export revenues Russia derives from such transfers. The Commission shall regularly assess the implementation of the exemption and submit its assessment to the Council. On the basis of that assessment, the Council shall review the functioning of the temporary exemption and, where appropriate, adopt a decision to shorten, extend or terminate its duration.

Sanctions against the financial sector

The EU is adding **over 20** entities to the scope of the transaction ban targeting financial and crypto operators. The EU is also expanding the ban to crypto platforms and crypto-asset service providers in certain third countries. The EU also adds **33** credit and financial institutions to the list of legal persons, entities or bodies subject to transaction bans. EU operators are prohibited to directly or indirectly engage in any transaction with an entity on the list.

The EU is introducing the option to completely prohibit transactions with legal persons, entities or bodies that are entities providing crypto-asset services or assets or are platforms enabling the exchange or transfer of crypto-assets that are established in third countries defined in the relevant annexes. The purpose of this ban is to address the increased circumvention of the EU ban on contacts with Russian crypto-asset service providers and crypto-asset platforms through third countries.

The EU will also introduce a derogation based on which the each member state's competent authorities could allow citizens of Member States or the European Economic Area and Switzerland to withdraw funds that they may have in certain credit and financial institutions and entities providing crypto-asset or payment services that are subject to the transaction ban so that these citizens can terminate their operations, contracts or other agreements with the relevant institution or entity.

Other changes to Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014

The EU decided to implement a binding ban on granting visas to applicants who serve or served in the armed forces of the Russian Federation or in armed groups linked to or controlled or led by the Russian government **since 24 February 2022**. However, a Member State could exceptionally grant a regionally restricted visa under the Visa Code when necessary for humanitarian reasons, national interests or international obligations or when the visa applicant is a dissident or defector from the Russian armed forces or the aforementioned armed groups.

The EU has previously restricted the movement of Russian diplomats and their family members across the EU. Third countries have adopted similar restrictions on the transit through the EU of Russian diplomats and consular officials as well as on the administrative, technical or service staff of Russian diplomatic or consular posts and their families. As a result, the EU is expanding the exchange of information with these third countries.

The EU is expanding its ban on Russian citizens or natural persons resident in Russia owning, controlling or holding any posts in the governing bodies of certain legal persons, entities or bodies that are incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State. The ban now applies to all entities offering crypto-asset services as defined in Regulation (EU) 2023/1114.

The EU previously introduced a prohibition of the satisfaction of claims presented by persons established in third countries if these persons sell goods or technologies subject to export bans. However, these persons may still present claims in the jurisdiction of third countries concerning contracts or transactions within the scope of these prohibitions. Such claims cause damage to citizens of a Member State or legal persons established in accordance with the legislation of a Member State. For this reason, the EU is extending the possibility to claim compensation for such damage in the courts of Member States.

The EU is also expanding the competence of the Court of Justice of the European Union to issue orders to not seek the enforcement or recognition of or invoke in any jurisdiction an injunction, order, relief, judgment or other court decision that have been or may be obtained in such judicial procedures. In addition, the EU is obligating Member States to not recognise or enforce any injunction, order, relief, judgment or other court decision issued by a Russian court in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, by the measures imposed under Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 and Regulation (EU) No 269/2014.

Sanctions against Belarus

The EU is adding **2** new listings to the list of sanctions against Belarusian individuals.

The EU is also adding **4 new listings** of sanctioned persons, entities and bodies that are military end-users, part of Belarus' or Russia's military and industrial complex or have commercial or other links with the countries' defence and security sector or otherwise support it.

The list of sectoral sanctions against Belarus is being extended significantly, and is further harmonised with the sanctions against Russia. The export ban list against Belarus is also expanded, i.e. harmonised, with the corresponding list against Russia by adding goods and technologies which might contribute to Belarus's military and technological enhancement or to the development of its defence and security sector.